Freedom of navigation

Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Freedom of navigation is a principle of international law that guarantees all states the right to conduct navigation and overflight on the high seas, in exclusive economic zones, and through straits used for international navigation, subject to reasonable regulations by coastal states but free from interference that hampers these freedoms.^[1] This right, essential for global trade—which relies on maritime shipping for over 90% of its volume—and security, derives from longstanding customary international law predating modern treaties. The principle is reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which codifies freedoms of navigation in territorial seas via innocent passage, transit passage in international straits, and unimpeded navigation in economic zones and high seas, though the United States, while adhering to these norms as customary law, has not ratified the treaty.^[2]^[1]^[3] To enforce these rights against excessive coastal state claims—such as those imposing prior approval for passage or restricting military activities—the U.S. Department of Defense conducts annual Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs), challenging over 15 such claims globally each year through operational assertions rather than diplomatic protest alone.^[4] A primary contemporary controversy surrounds the South China Sea, where China's assertion of sovereignty over features and expansive maritime zones via its "nine-dash line" has prompted repeated U.S. FONOPs to affirm rights under international law, including transits near the Paracel and Spratly Islands, amid Beijing's rejection of these operations as provocative and lacking legal basis.^[4]^[5]^[6] These operations underscore tensions between open-access advocacy and coastal states' security concerns, with empirical data showing no alteration in challenged claims' persistence despite U.S. efforts, highlighting the limits of operational assertions in altering state behavior without broader enforcement mechanisms.^[7]^[8]

Conceptual and Legal Foundations

Core Principles and Definitions

Freedom of navigation encompasses the rights of all states to exercise navigational freedoms on the high seas and in certain other maritime zones without interference, subject to specified limitations. These rights include freedom of navigation for ships, freedom of overflight for aircraft, and freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, as established under customary international law and reflected in Article 87 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).^[9] The high seas, defined as all maritime areas beyond the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), territorial sea, internal waters, or archipelagic waters of any state, remain open to all states regardless of coastal or land-locked status, with no sovereignty exercisable over them by any nation.^[1] This principle dates to early customary practices but has been affirmed as a cornerstone of ocean governance, ensuring global trade and security by prohibiting excessive claims that restrict passage.^[10]^[11] In the territorial sea, extending up to 12 nautical miles from a state's baseline, the right of innocent passage applies to foreign-flagged ships, permitting continuous and expeditious transit provided it remains non-prejudicial to the coastal state's peace, good order, or security.^[12] Innocent passage excludes activities such as threatening use of force, weapons exercises, spying, or propaganda aimed at the coastal state, and coastal states may temporarily suspend it in specified sea lanes for security reasons.^[9] Submarines and other underwater vehicles must navigate on the surface and display their flag during such passage, distinguishing it from full high seas freedoms.^[13] Aircraft lack a right of innocent passage over the territorial sea, underscoring the regime's focus on surface navigation.^[14] For straits used for international navigation and archipelagic sea lanes, UNCLOS provides regimes of transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage, respectively, allowing continuous and expeditious unimpeded transit for ships and aircraft that cannot be suspended or regulated beyond basic safety and environmental measures.^[2] In the EEZ, up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline, high seas navigational freedoms persist alongside coastal state resource rights, prohibiting interference with passage except for resource conservation or pollution prevention. These provisions largely codify customary international law, binding even non-UNCLOS parties like the United States, which asserts them through operational practice to counter excessive maritime claims.^[15]^[16]

International Law Framework

The international legal framework for freedom of navigation derives from longstanding customary international law, codified and expanded in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which entered into force on November 16, 1994, and has 169 parties as of 2023.^[9] UNCLOS delineates maritime zones and corresponding navigational rights, balancing coastal state sovereignty with global interests in open seas access.^[1] Customary elements, predating UNCLOS, include the principle of free navigation on the high seas, affirmed in earlier treaties like the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas.^[10] On the high seas—waters beyond national jurisdiction—Article 87 of UNCLOS enumerates freedoms including navigation, overflight, and laying submarine cables, exercisable by all states under the convention's conditions, such as due regard for other states' interests and compliance with international rules on pollution and fisheries.^[1] Article 90 specifically grants every state the right to sail ships flying its flag on the high seas, reinforcing non-exclusive access essential for global trade, which accounts for over 90% of merchandise transport by volume.^[1] These provisions reflect causal realities of maritime interdependence, where restrictions could disrupt supply chains and escalate conflicts, as evidenced by historical blockades like those during World War I.^[15] In territorial seas, extending up to 12 nautical miles from baselines, UNCLOS Articles 17–19 establish the right of innocent passage for foreign vessels, defined as continuous and expeditious transit not prejudicial to the coastal state's peace, good order, or security.^[12] Passage is innocent unless involving threats like weapons use, intelligence gathering, or propaganda; submarines must navigate on the surface and show their flag.^[12] Coastal states may regulate but not hamper innocent passage, prohibiting requirements for prior notification or authorization except in straits under Part III.^[13] This regime evolved from customary law to prevent de facto enclosures of coastal waters, which could hinder naval mobility and commerce. Exclusive economic zones (EEZs), spanning up to 200 nautical miles, grant other states under Article 58 freedoms of navigation and overflight akin to high seas, subject to coastal states' resource and environmental rights but without authority to impede transit absent specific threats. For international straits, Part III introduces transit passage—a broader right than innocent passage—allowing continuous passage for warships and submarines submerged, with coastal states limited to safety and pollution regulations.^[2] Archipelagic states under Part IV permit sea lanes passage, simulating transit rights through designated routes. The United States, while not a UNCLOS party, treats its navigation provisions as reflective of customary international law binding on all states, a position articulated in U.S. policy since the Reagan administration's 1983 ocean policy statement.^[17] This adherence underpins U.S. assertions against excessive maritime claims, prioritizing empirical enforcement over treaty ratification to avoid potential institutional biases in UNCLOS bodies like the International Seabed Authority.^[18] Disputes arise when states interpret zones expansively, such as asserting security perimeters in EEZs, contravening UNCLOS Article 58(3)'s due regard obligation, as noted in International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea advisory opinions.^[10] Overall, the framework promotes stability through reciprocal rights, though enforcement relies on state practice rather than centralized adjudication.

Relation to Territorial Claims and Innocent Passage

Freedom of navigation intersects with territorial claims primarily through the regime of innocent passage, which governs foreign vessels' transit through a coastal state's territorial sea, defined under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as extending up to 12 nautical miles from baselines.^[9] Article 17 of UNCLOS establishes the right of all ships, including warships, to innocent passage through the territorial sea, provided it remains continuous, expeditious, and non-prejudicial to the coastal state's peace, good order, or security.^[19] Article 19 specifies that passage loses its innocent character through activities such as threats of force, intelligence gathering, or weapons exercises, allowing coastal states to regulate or temporarily suspend such passage under Article 25, but not to impose prior authorization for innocent passage except in limited straits cases.^[19] Territorial claims delineate the application of innocent passage versus broader high seas freedoms; excessive claims, such as straight baselines enclosing large bays improperly or assertions of sovereignty beyond 12 nautical miles, restrict navigation rights inconsistently with international law. The U.S. Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program operationally challenges such claims, including those requiring prior notification or permission for warship innocent passage, by conducting transits that assert the absence of such requirements under customary international law.^[20] In fiscal year 2023, U.S. forces challenged 29 excessive maritime claims globally, many involving territorial sea restrictions that undermine innocent passage rights.^[21] In disputed regions like the South China Sea, overlapping territorial claims exacerbate tensions, as China's assertions based on the nine-dash line extend historic rights into areas claimed as exclusive economic zones (EEZs) by neighbors, where full navigation freedoms apply rather than restricted innocent passage.^[22] The 2016 Arbitral Tribunal award in Philippines v. China invalidated these excessive claims, affirming that features like Mischief Reef generate no territorial sea entitlements when submerged and that innocent passage does not apply in EEZs. U.S. FON operations in the region, such as the May 2024 transit by USS Halsey near the Paracel Islands, demonstrate non-acquiescence to China's territorial sea claims around occupied features, conducting innocent passage without prior notice to preserve navigational order.^[4] Distinctions arise in international straits, where UNCLOS Part III provides for transit passage—a continuous and expeditious regime applicable to straits used for international navigation, permitting submerged submarine transit and overflight without the coastal state's ability to suspend it, unlike innocent passage.^[2] This regime upholds freedom of navigation against territorial claims that might otherwise fragment straits into multiple territorial seas, as seen in potential applications to straits like the Malacca or contested passages in the South China Sea.^[14] Challenges to claims persist where states like China demand adherence to innocent passage protocols in straits or EEZs, prompting operational assertions to clarify legal baselines and prevent erosion of customary rights.

Historical Development

Early Maritime Customs and Treaties

In ancient Roman law, the high seas were regarded as res communis, a common property accessible to all peoples without exclusive sovereignty by any state, permitting unrestricted navigation for trade and fishing. This principle, articulated by the jurist Marcianus in the 3rd century AD and preserved in Justinian's Digest (compiled AD 533), explicitly stated that the sea could not be appropriated as private property, akin to air and sunlight, thereby establishing an early customary norm against maritime enclosure.^[23] Roman practice reinforced this through naval dominance in the Mediterranean, where control extended to coastal waters for security but left open seas free, reflecting pragmatic recognition that exclusive claims hindered commerce essential to empire.^[24] This custom influenced subsequent European maritime thought, though medieval papal bulls like those of Alexander VI in 1493 briefly asserted Iberian dominion over Atlantic routes, challenging open access until contested by northern powers.^[25] The doctrine gained doctrinal rigor in the early modern era through Hugo Grotius's Mare Liberum (1609), a treatise defending Dutch access to Asian trade against Portuguese monopolistic claims rooted in 15th-century papal grants and the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494). Grotius argued from natural law and historical precedent that the seas were inherently free for navigation and commerce, incapable of ownership due to their vastness and utility to humanity, directly countering mare clausum assertions that would stifle global exchange.^[26] Written amid the Dutch-Portuguese commercial rivalry and published during negotiations for the Twelve Years' Truce (1609), the work prioritized empirical trade needs over territorial pretensions, influencing Protestant maritime states' rejection of enclosure.^[27] While not a treaty, Mare Liberum codified emerging customs into legal theory, paving the way for reciprocal practices among European powers. Early treaties began embedding these customs, with the Dutch Republic securing bilateral agreements in the 17th century granting their vessels navigation freedoms through European waters, effectively extending mare liberum via diplomacy amid Anglo-Dutch rivalries. By the late 1600s, alliances like that between Britain and the Netherlands diminished disputes over sea sovereignty, tacitly affirming open navigation as customary law essential for mutual trade interests.^[28] These pacts, though bilateral, contributed to a broader normative framework by the century's end, where freedom of navigation prevailed not through universal codification but through state practice prioritizing economic interdependence over exclusionary claims.^[11]

Evolution into Customary International Law

The principle of mare liberum, or freedom of the seas, transitioned from early maritime customs into customary international law through consistent state practice and the emergence of opinio juris, whereby states treated unrestricted navigation on the high seas as a legal obligation rather than mere convenience or policy. This process began gaining doctrinal clarity in the early 17th century with Hugo Grotius's Mare Liberum (1609), which argued that the oceans were res communis—common to all humanity—drawing on Roman law precedents and challenging Iberian claims to exclusive dominion over vast maritime areas, such as the Portuguese assertions in the Indian Ocean. Grotius's work reflected prevailing Dutch and broader European practices of open navigation for trade, which states increasingly viewed as binding custom amid disputes over colonial routes.^[29]^[26] By the 18th and 19th centuries, state practice solidified this custom as naval powers, particularly Britain, enforced open access against episodic mare clausum (closed sea) pretensions, such as Scandinavian claims to tolls in the Baltic or Russian assertions in the Black Sea, through diplomatic protests and naval demonstrations that elicited acquiescence from claimants. Legal scholars like Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui and Emer de Vattel further articulated the principle as inherent to natural law and international comity, emphasizing that high seas enclosure violated the universal interest in commerce and fisheries; these views aligned with observable practices where warships and merchant vessels traversed oceans without prior consent, fostering opinio juris as states protested interferences as unlawful. For instance, Britain's 1854 opposition to Greek and Danish territorial sea expansions beyond narrow limits underscored the growing consensus that high seas freedoms were non-derogable.^[30]^[10] This customary status was affirmed in multilateral instruments reflecting state consensus, such as the 1923 Geneva Draft Convention on the Regime of Territorial Waters, which preserved high seas freedoms beyond a limited territorial belt, and the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, where 86 states agreed to codify navigation rights as "free for all States," evidencing both enduring practice and legal conviction. The International Court of Justice later recognized freedom of navigation as a "cardinal principle" rooted in custom, independent of treaty codification, as states continued to assert and respect these rights even amid territorial disputes. By the mid-20th century, deviations were rare and met with collective opposition, confirming the norm's generality and binding force under Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute.^[15]^[31]

UNCLOS and Modern Codification

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was opened for signature on 10 December 1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica, following nine years of negotiations involving over 150 states, and it entered into force on 16 November 1994 after the deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification.^[9]^[32] This treaty, often described as a "constitution for the oceans," systematically codified longstanding customary principles of freedom of navigation into binding international law, while introducing new balances between coastal state resource rights and navigational freedoms in response to post-World War II expansions of maritime jurisdiction claims.^[33] UNCLOS's Part II establishes the territorial sea extending up to 12 nautical miles from baselines, where all states enjoy the right of innocent passage—defined as continuous and expeditious navigation that does not prejudice the coastal state's peace, good order, or security (Articles 17–19).^[34]^[12] For straits used for international navigation, UNCLOS's Part III introduces the regime of transit passage (Articles 37–44), granting ships and aircraft the right of unimpeded transit without the restrictions applicable to innocent passage, provided it remains continuous and expeditious; this provision addressed gaps in prior customary law by ensuring vital chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz or Malacca Strait remained open to commerce and military mobility.^[2] On the high seas beyond national jurisdiction, Article 87 explicitly affirms freedoms of navigation and overflight for all states, alongside laying of submarine cables, construction of artificial islands, fishing, and scientific research, subject only to the duty to respect other states' freedoms and obligations like collision avoidance under international regulations.^[34] Within exclusive economic zones (EEZs) extending up to 200 nautical miles, Article 58 extends these high seas freedoms to other states, subordinating them to coastal state resource management but prohibiting interference with navigation except in cases of resource-related conservation measures.^[35] UNCLOS modernized navigation codification by standardizing measurement baselines (Article 5 for normal baselines, with archipelagic and straight baselines under Articles 7 and 47), limiting coastal state overreach, and establishing compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms under Part XV, including the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, to resolve ambiguities in passage rights.^[9] This framework drew from the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and High Seas, which had partially codified freedoms but lacked comprehensive EEZ provisions or detailed strait regimes, thereby transforming ad hoc customary practices into a unified treaty structure ratified by 169 parties and covering 98% of global maritime space.^[32] Despite its successes in clarifying regimes, implementation challenges persist where states assert excessive claims, such as straight baselines enclosing high seas pockets or security-based suspensions of innocent passage, testing the treaty's navigational guarantees against evolving geopolitical pressures.^[36]

United States Historical Adherence

The United States' commitment to freedom of navigation originated with the nation's founding, as unrestricted access to the seas was critical for emerging commercial interests and naval mobility amid European maritime rivalries. Early American leaders, including Thomas Jefferson, emphasized principles of open seas in diplomatic correspondence, rejecting expansive territorial claims that could hinder trade routes. This stance aligned with the mare liberum doctrine articulated by Hugo Grotius in 1609, which influenced U.S. policy against closed-sea assertions by powers like Britain and Spain. By the 19th century, the U.S. Navy actively patrolled international waters to protect merchant shipping, as evidenced by operations during the Quasi-War with France (1798–1800) and the Barbary Wars (1801–1805), where freedom of passage was asserted against tribute demands.^[37] In the 20th century, this adherence intensified amid global conflicts. During World War I, President Woodrow Wilson in his Fourteen Points (1918) declared "absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas" as a core principle for postwar order, underscoring U.S. opposition to wartime blockades and territorial enclosures. Post-World War II, the United States championed narrow territorial sea limits—initially three nautical miles—in international forums like the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, rejecting broader claims by Latin American states that extended jurisdiction up to 200 nautical miles and restricted navigation. The 1949 U.S. policy statement on the regime of the high seas further affirmed freedoms of navigation, overflight, and resource use beyond national jurisdiction, influencing customary international law despite evolving coastal state assertions.^[38] The formalization of U.S. adherence came with the establishment of the Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program in 1979 under President Jimmy Carter, directed at countering a surge in unilateral maritime claims following the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, including excessive straight baselines, historic bay designations, and restrictions on innocent passage. This program integrated diplomatic protests with operational assertions by U.S. military assets to challenge inconsistencies with customary law, preserving rights in exclusive economic zones and archipelagic waters. President Ronald Reagan reaffirmed and expanded it via National Security Decision Directive 265 (1982), emphasizing protection of navigation, overflight, and related interests globally. The 1983 U.S. Oceans Policy explicitly committed to exercising and asserting these freedoms worldwide, consistent with treaty law and custom, even as the Senate declined to ratify UNCLOS in 1983 and 1996 due to concerns over deep seabed mining provisions—while treating navigation articles as binding customary norms. Successive administrations, from George H.W. Bush to Joe Biden, have sustained the program, conducting over 700 operational assertions by 2021 against claims by more than 30 nations.^[39]^[40]

Operational Mechanisms

Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) represent the military component of the United States' Freedom of Navigation Program, consisting of deliberate operational assertions by U.S. armed forces to contest excessive maritime claims imposed by coastal nations that exceed the limits set by international law.^[41] These operations include surface ship transits through disputed territorial seas, aircraft overflights of claimed airspace, and maneuvers in exclusive economic zones or contiguous zones where foreign states unlawfully restrict high seas freedoms.^[4] The primary objective is to affirm the rights and freedoms of navigation and overflight enshrined in customary international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ensuring unimpeded global mobility for military forces and commerce without prior coastal state approval or adherence to contested regulations. FONOPs are planned, legally vetted, and executed professionally across all U.S. military services, including the Coast Guard when appropriate, as complementary to diplomatic protests led by the Department of State.^[41] In execution, FONOPs differ from routine military transits by their explicit intent to challenge specific invalid assertions, such as straight baselines enclosing open seas, territorial sea claims around low-tide elevations or artificial islands, security zones restricting overflight, or requirements for prior notification in territorial seas.^[42] For instance, a U.S. Navy destroyer might sail within 12 nautical miles of a disputed offshore feature to reject a coastal state's territorial sea claim over international waters, conducting the transit as on the high seas rather than invoking innocent passage rights.^[43] Overflights by fixed-wing aircraft or unmanned systems similarly assert non-recognition of restricted airspace. These actions are non-provocative in nature, avoiding confrontation while signaling U.S. commitment to the rules-based maritime order, though critics, including claimant states like China, characterize them as escalatory power projections inconsistent with peaceful dispute resolution. ^[44] The FON Program, formalized by presidential directive in 1979, has involved operational challenges against maritime claims by more than 30 nations worldwide, with U.S. forces conducting assertions annually to deter creeping encroachments on sea lanes vital for 90% of global trade. ^[45] In fiscal year 2023, U.S. forces operationally challenged 29 excessive claims from 17 coastal states, spanning regions from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea and Asia-Pacific.^[46] Similarly, in FY2022, 22 claims were contested, underscoring consistent application regardless of alliance status.^[42] Annual DoD reports detail these activities without specifying exact operation counts, as multiple assertions may address one claim type, but the pace has intensified in contested areas like the South China Sea since 2015, with at least six FONOPs there in 2020 alone.^[47] Empirical assessments vary on efficacy; while U.S. officials maintain FONOPs reinforce legal norms and deter unilateralism, some analyses argue they have not reversed entrenched claims, such as China's in the South China Sea, potentially entrenching rival interpretations of maritime rights.^[42] ^[7]

United States FON Program Details

The United States Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program, formally established in 1979 by the Department of Defense, challenges excessive maritime claims by foreign states that are inconsistent with the international law of the sea, thereby preserving navigation and overflight rights essential for U.S. forces' global mobility and lawful commerce.^[48] The program's objectives align with customary international law, including key navigation provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which the United States adheres to as reflective of customary rules despite not being a party to the treaty.^[48] It operates worldwide, targeting claims by any nation, including allies and partners, rather than focusing on specific adversaries.^[48] The program integrates complementary diplomatic and operational components coordinated between the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of State (DOS).^[48] Diplomatic efforts involve formal protests or representations to claimant states, advocating adherence to international law without physical presence, such as objections to requirements for prior permission for warships entering territorial seas or undue restrictions on activities in exclusive economic zones (EEZs).^[48] Operational assertions, often termed FON operations (FONOPs), entail deliberate transits or activities by U.S. military assets—typically naval or air forces—through areas where excessive claims are asserted, conducted in a manner that exercises high-seas freedoms or innocent passage without prior notification to avoid implying recognition of the claim.^[48] These operations undergo rigorous legal review by DoD judge advocates to ensure compliance with international law and are planned to avoid provocation while demonstrating U.S. resolve.^[48] Excessive claims challenged include improper straight baselines enclosing internal waters, assertions of historic title beyond permitted limits, sovereignty over airspace above international waters, security zones extending beyond territorial seas, and prohibitions on military activities in EEZs that exceed UNCLOS allowances.^[48] Examples from fiscal year 2021 encompass China's straight baselines along its mainland coast, Russia's around the Kuril Islands, India's requirement for prior consent for foreign naval vessels in its territorial sea, and Iran's restrictions on foreign military operations in its EEZ.^[48] In that period, U.S. forces challenged 37 such claims by 26 claimant states through a combination of operational and diplomatic measures.^[48] Similar efforts in fiscal year 2022 addressed 22 claims by 15 claimants, while fiscal year 2023 reports continued this pattern, with DoD emphasizing routine execution to deter erosion of maritime rights.^[49]^[21] DoD submits an annual unclassified report to Congress detailing the program's activities, including general locations of challenges (to preserve operational security) and types of claims contested, without disclosing specific operational details or claimant responses.^[48] The fiscal year 2023 report, released on May 8, 2024, underscored the program's role in countering global trends toward restrictive claims amid rising coastal state assertions.^[21] This reporting reinforces transparency and congressional oversight, while the program's non-confrontational approach—distinguishing it from shows of force—prioritizes legal assertion over military posturing.^[48]

Military Assets and Execution

U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) primarily employ naval surface combatants from the U.S. Navy, with Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers (DDGs) serving as the most common assets due to their versatility, defensive capabilities, and presence in forward-deployed fleets.^[50] For instance, on May 10, 2024, the destroyer USS Halsey (DDG-97) conducted a FONOP near the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, transiting to assert navigational freedoms without prior notification.^[4] Similarly, USS Dewey (DDG-105) executed a transit on November 3, 2023, near the Spratly Islands, challenging restrictions on high-seas passage.^[16] Littoral combat ships (LCS) have also been utilized for lower-profile assertions, relieving strain on destroyer schedules while maintaining operational flexibility.^[51] Air assets, including surveillance aircraft and long-range bombers, support FONOPs by conducting overflights to challenge excessive airspace claims, reinforcing freedoms of overflight alongside maritime transits.^[52] Submarine operations involve submerged transits through claimed internal waters or territorial seas, deliberately forgoing surface navigation and flag display required for innocent passage, thereby protesting the validity of such enclosures.^[53] U.S. Coast Guard cutters participate in select FON-related activities, particularly in gray-zone enforcement scenarios, as part of a whole-of-government approach involving all military services.^[41] Execution of FONOPs follows deliberate planning protocols, with operations directed via U.S. military operation orders that outline specific procedures, legal justifications, and approval chains, typically coordinated through combatant commands like U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.^[54] These assertions are legally reviewed to ensure compliance with international law, focusing on non-provocative maneuvers that avoid engagement while prepared for potential interference, such as shadowing by foreign vessels.^[41] Surface ship transits, for example, proceed at high-seas speeds through zones of excessive claims—like within 12 nautical miles of disputed features—rejecting requirements for prior permission or innocent passage protocols.^[50] The Department of Defense conducts these globally and even-handedly, with annual unclassified reports summarizing challenges to claims from over 20 nations, emphasizing professional execution to deter acquiescence to restrictions without escalating tensions.^[42]^[45]

Legal Distinctions from Routine Transits

The United States Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program conducts operational assertions, commonly known as FONOPs, specifically to challenge excessive maritime claims that deviate from customary international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). These operations differ from routine transits, which involve standard passages through international waters or applicable legal regimes without targeted protest against disputed claims. Routine transits, such as commercial shipping or unscheduled military movements, adhere to established rights like innocent passage in territorial seas or transit passage in international straits, without maneuvers designed to refute specific coastal state assertions.^[12] In contrast, FONOPs entail deliberate exercises of navigational freedoms—such as submerged submarine transits, low-altitude overflights, or weapons system employment in exclusive economic zones (EEZs)—that coastal states like China deem impermissible under their expansive interpretations of sovereignty. Under UNCLOS Article 17, foreign vessels enjoy the right of innocent passage through territorial seas, defined as continuous and expeditious navigation not prejudicial to the coastal state's peace, good order, or security.^[12] This regime permits submarines to traverse submerged only if they comply, and prohibits activities like weapons use or intelligence collection.^[12] Routine transits in territorial seas typically follow this framework, avoiding actions that could render passage non-innocent per Article 19.^[12] FONOPs, however, target excessive claims such as requirements for prior notification or approval for innocent passage—practices not endorsed by UNCLOS Article 18, which mandates no such preconditions. For instance, a FONOP might involve a surface warship conducting a transit without seeking permission, directly contesting the claim while still navigating expeditiously to align with baseline legal rights. In EEZs and high seas, UNCLOS Articles 56 and 87 affirm freedoms of navigation, overflight, and military activities for all states, subject only to coastal resource rights and due regard.^[9] Routine transits here exercise these freedoms incidentally during deployments, without emphasis on refuting restrictions like China's assertion of "security" limits on foreign military operations within its nine-dash line claims. FONOPs explicitly incorporate challenge elements, such as flight operations from ships or extended maneuvers, to demonstrate that such activities are lawful absent threats to coastal interests, thereby preserving the non-sovereign character of EEZs beyond 12 nautical miles. This distinction ensures FONOPs serve a diplomatic protest function under international law, where mere presence might not suffice to interrupt acquiescence to invalid claims. For straits used for international navigation, UNCLOS Part III establishes transit passage as a broader right than innocent passage, allowing continuous movement with minimal coastal interference, including for warships and aircraft without surface navigation requirements.^[2] Routine transits through straits like the Taiwan Strait invoke this regime routinely, focusing on safe passage rather than confrontation. FONOPs in such areas, however, may combine transit with assertions against adjacent territorial sea claims, such as rejecting median-line restrictions not recognized under UNCLOS. Legally, both routine transits and FONOPs uphold the same core rights, but the latter's structured intent—to catalog and publicize challenges via DoD reports—differentiates them by actively shaping state practice against eroding norms. This approach has been routine since the program's formalization in 1979, with annual reports documenting over 20 assertions in fiscal year 2022 alone.

Strategic and Economic Significance

Dependence of Global Trade on Open Seas

Maritime transport accounts for approximately 80% of the volume of global trade in goods, a figure that rises to over 90% for many developing countries reliant on exports of bulk commodities.^[55] In 2023, seaborne trade reached 12.3 billion tons, reflecting a 2.4% increase from the prior year despite geopolitical disruptions and supply chain pressures.^[56] This dominance stems from the cost-efficiency of shipping large volumes over long distances, enabling the integration of global value chains for manufacturing, energy, and agriculture.^[57] By value, maritime shipping handles over 50% of international trade, with containerized goods alone supporting trillions in annual economic activity through just-in-time logistics.^[58] Disruptions, such as the 2021 Suez Canal blockage, demonstrated this vulnerability, delaying an estimated $9.6 billion in daily trade and underscoring the causal link between unimpeded sea routes and economic stability.^[59] Key sectors like energy (e.g., 20% of global oil trade through the Strait of Hormuz) and food (e.g., wheat shipments via the Black Sea) depend on these routes, where even temporary closures can trigger inflation and shortages.^[60]^[61] Critical chokepoints amplify this dependence, with over half of global shipping passing through passages like the Strait of Malacca (handling 80 million barrels of oil daily), the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Panama Canal.^[62] These narrow corridors lack viable alternatives, making freedom of navigation essential to prevent cascading effects on supply chains; for instance, Houthi attacks in the Red Sea since 2023 have forced rerouting, adding 10-15 days to voyages and increasing costs by up to 30%.^[63] Without assured access, trade volumes could contract, as evidenced by historical precedents like the 1973 oil embargo, which highlighted how sea lane restrictions exacerbate energy price volatility and GDP losses.^[64] Empirical models indicate that sustained interference with these routes could reduce global GDP by 1-3% annually, with disproportionate impacts on import-dependent economies.^[65] Thus, open seas function as a foundational enabler of trade liberalization, where legal guarantees of passage directly correlate with lower transport costs and higher trade flows, as per gravity models of international commerce.^[66]

Geopolitical Implications for Security

Freedom of navigation principles underpin geopolitical security by safeguarding access to international waters, thereby deterring unilateral dominance over vital sea lanes that could enable economic strangulation or military isolation of adversaries. In contested areas, challenges to these freedoms, such as China's "nine-dash line" claims in the South China Sea, risk escalating tensions into broader conflicts by militarizing artificial islands and deploying anti-access/area-denial capabilities, which threaten regional powers like Vietnam, the Philippines, and Taiwan.^[67]^[52] These actions, if unchallenged, could consolidate control over routes carrying $5.3 trillion in annual global trade, amplifying leverage for coercion during crises.^[68] United States Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) counter such encroachments by operationalizing international law, demonstrating resolve to allies and imposing costs on revisionist actors through persistent presence that temporarily disrupts gray-zone harassment by maritime militias.^[69]^[70] This signaling reinforces deterrence against further territorial expansion, as evidenced by coordinated multinational transits that bolster collective security frameworks like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, preserving a balance of power essential for preventing hegemonic control.^[67] However, FONOPs have limited success in reversing militarized reclamations, highlighting the need for integrated strategies combining naval assertion with diplomatic and economic pressures to mitigate escalation risks while upholding navigational rights.^[7]^[44] Beyond the Indo-Pacific, analogous implications arise in theaters like the Black Sea, where Russian interference with shipping post-2022 invasion underscores how violations of navigational freedoms erode deterrence and invite opportunistic aggression, potentially destabilizing NATO's eastern flank.^[71] In the Arctic, emerging claims amid melting ice challenge FON, risking militarized competition that could fracture cooperative norms and heighten great-power rivalries over resource-rich routes.^[72] Overall, robust enforcement of FON contributes to global stability by embedding causal constraints on aggressive maritime revisionism, ensuring that no state can weaponize geography to undermine collective security without facing calibrated opposition.^[50]^[72]

Contributions to International Stability

Freedom of navigation principles and operations contribute to international stability by systematically challenging excessive maritime claims that could otherwise fragment the global commons into contested zones prone to militarization and conflict. The United States Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program, initiated in 1979, has conducted over 300 operational assertions and lodged more than 100 diplomatic protests to contest such claims, often persuading coastal states to revise their practices in alignment with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).^[48] This conformity reduces ambiguities in sea lane usage, minimizing miscalculations that historically precipitated naval standoffs, as evidenced by the decline in U.S.-initiated FON disputes following broader adherence to UNCLOS norms.^[73] By demonstrating resolve to operate in accordance with international law, FON efforts signal a commitment to the rules-based maritime order, deterring revisionist actions that might otherwise escalate into blockades or seizures of commercial vessels.^[74] The economic interdependence enabled by open navigation further bolsters stability, as disruptions to sea routes carry cascading effects on global supply chains and prosperity. Maritime transport accounts for over 80% of international goods trade by volume, underscoring the seas' role as arteries of commerce that link disparate economies and incentivize cooperative behavior to avoid mutual harm from interruptions.^[56] FON operations safeguard these routes against unilateral closures, as seen in challenges to expansive claims in areas like the South China Sea, where unchecked assertions could reroute or halt trade flows valued at trillions annually, potentially triggering resource scarcities and geopolitical tensions.^[4] Consistent enforcement correlates with reduced confrontational incidents, such as those involving maritime militias, thereby preserving the predictability essential for sustained economic growth and peaceful interstate relations.^[69] In strategic terms, FON enhances deterrence by normalizing presence in international waters, which constrains aggressive posturing without direct confrontation and fosters multilateral norms among allies. U.S. Navy operations, for instance, uphold high seas freedoms in critical chokepoints like the Taiwan Strait, countering attempts to treat them as territorial extensions and thereby averting escalatory spirals that could draw in regional powers.^[75] This approach has contributed to the absence of major maritime conflicts since World War II, as the mutual interest in accessible commons discourages zero-sum territorial grabs in favor of diplomatic resolutions.^[76] While claimant states may decry FON as provocative, the empirical record shows that routine, law-compliant transits have prompted adjustments in excessive claims rather than provoking sustained hostilities, reinforcing a stable equilibrium grounded in legal reciprocity.^[77]

Key Regional Challenges

South China Sea Disputes

The South China Sea disputes center on overlapping territorial and maritime claims by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan, with China's "nine-dash line" encompassing approximately 90% of the sea, far exceeding entitlements under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).^[22] China's claims assert historic rights that prioritize sovereignty over modern international law, conflicting with UNCLOS provisions allowing freedom of navigation and overflight in exclusive economic zones (EEZs).^[78] Under UNCLOS Article 58, foreign vessels retain high seas freedoms beyond territorial seas, yet China has imposed restrictions, such as requiring prior approval for military transits in its claimed EEZ.^[79] In July 2016, a Permanent Court of Arbitration tribunal, constituted under UNCLOS Annex VII at the Philippines' request, ruled that China's nine-dash line had no legal basis and invalidated assertions of historic rights beyond UNCLOS limits.^[80] The tribunal determined that certain features, like Scarborough Shoal and many Spratly Islands, generate no EEZ or continental shelf, only 12-nautical-mile territorial seas if above water at high tide, and rejected China's use of low-tide elevations for baseline claims.^[81] China dismissed the ruling as non-binding, continuing activities inconsistent with it, which underscores challenges in enforcing international adjudication without coercive mechanisms.^[82] China's response included extensive land reclamation, creating over 3,200 acres of artificial islands in the Spratly Islands since 2013, transforming reefs into bases with airstrips, ports, and radar systems.^[83] By 2022, at least three such features—Subi Reef, Mischief Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef—were fully militarized, equipped with anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles, fighter jets, and laser/jamming capabilities, enhancing power projection and surveillance over vital sea lanes.^[84] These developments have restricted navigation by asserting 12-nautical-mile territorial seas around artificial islands, contrary to UNCLOS Article 60, which denies such status to man-made structures, and have led to harassment of foreign vessels, including fishing boats and survey ships.^[22] To counter these excessive claims, the United States has conducted Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) since 2015, sailing within 12 nautical miles of claimed features to challenge invalid baselines and restrictions on innocent passage.^[85] Notable operations include USS Lassen's transit near Subi Reef on October 26, 2015; USS Dewey near Mischief Reef on November 3, 2023; and USS Halsey near the Paracel Islands on May 10, 2024, asserting rights consistent with international law without prior notification.^[4] ^[43] These operations, joined by allies like Australia and Japan, aim to preserve access to routes carrying one-third of global trade, amid reports of Chinese vessels shadowing or maneuvering aggressively during transits.^[22] Persistent tensions highlight the disputes' role in broader strategic competition, with China's actions empirically altering the maritime domain while international law provides a framework often undermined by non-compliance.^[86]

Taiwan Strait and East China Sea

The Taiwan Strait, approximately 180 kilometers wide at its narrowest point, separates mainland China from Taiwan and constitutes a critical maritime corridor for global trade, with over half of the world's largest container ships transiting annually.^[87] Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the strait qualifies for transit passage regime, permitting continuous and expeditious passage of foreign vessels and aircraft without prior notification or approval, as it connects the East and South China Seas and exceeds the territorial sea limits of the adjacent states.^[87] China, however, has asserted sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction over the entire strait, rejecting its international waters status and employing domestic laws such as the Maritime Traffic Safety Law to impose restrictions, including requirements for foreign vessels to report passages.^[88] This stance, articulated in official statements since at least June 2022, contradicts prior Chinese positions acknowledging innocent passage and contravenes UNCLOS by attempting to treat the strait as internal or archipelagic waters through straight baselines.^[89] To challenge these excessive claims, the United States conducts regular transits with naval vessels, framing them as routine presence operations rather than operational assertions under its Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program, though they align with FON objectives by demonstrating rights to innocent or transit passage.^[90] For instance, on February 10-11, 2025, the guided-missile destroyers USS Benfold and USS Marion transited the strait, shadowed by People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships including the destroyer CNS Nanning, marking the first such U.S. passage under the Trump administration.^[90] Similarly, in September 2025, the U.S. destroyer USS Higgins and British frigate HMS Spey conducted a joint transit, prompting Beijing to condemn it as provocative and dispatch PLAN and China Coast Guard vessels for surveillance.^[91] China has criticized these operations as lacking legal basis and employing "double standards," while escalating military activities, such as deploying 27 warplanes and eight ships near Taiwan on October 20, 2025, to assert dominance.^[92]^[93] Allies including the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada have joined transits, reinforcing the strait's international character against unilateral restrictions that could disrupt $5 trillion in annual trade flows.^[94] In the East China Sea, freedom of navigation tensions stem primarily from overlapping territorial and maritime jurisdiction claims, particularly China's "nine-dash line" extension and disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, administered by Japan but claimed by China and Taiwan.^[95] These uninhabited islets, located 170 kilometers northeast of Taiwan, lie within Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) under the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and UNCLOS median line principles, granting Japan continental shelf rights; China's assertions rely on historical claims predating modern international law, leading to frequent incursions by Chinese fishing militias and coast guard vessels, with over 300 such entries recorded in Japanese waters near the islands in 2024 alone.^[96] Such activities risk escalating into interference with commercial shipping lanes, as the East China Sea handles 30% of global liquefied natural gas trade, though direct blockades remain absent.^[97] The United States has not conducted explicit FON operations challenging East China Sea baselines to the same extent as in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea, prioritizing alliance commitments under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which covers the Senkakus as Japanese territory.^[96] Incidents include close encounters, such as PLAN shadowing of U.S. aircraft near the islands, but U.S. naval transits emphasize routine operations to uphold overflight and navigation rights without formal protests against China's EEZ claims, which Beijing interprets as permitting resource exclusion zones.^[98] Japan counters with enhanced patrols, including coast guard deployments, while bilateral U.S.-Japan exercises simulate responses to contingencies, underscoring the disputes' potential to constrain navigation if unresolved through arbitration, as urged by UNCLOS mechanisms.^[99] China's rejection of a 2016 South China Sea arbitral ruling extends to analogous East China Sea claims, heightening risks of miscalculation amid resource competition for seabed hydrocarbons estimated at 200 billion cubic meters of natural gas.^[97]

Black Sea and Russian Actions

Following Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014, which international law deems illegal, Moscow asserted de facto control over the Kerch Strait connecting the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov, enabling restrictions on navigation that previously enjoyed freedom under the 2003 Russia-Ukraine agreement recognizing the strait as internal waters shared for non-commercial passage.^[100]^[101] This control facilitated Russian enforcement actions, including the November 25, 2018, Kerch Strait incident, where Russian border guards fired on and seized three Ukrainian naval vessels—the small armored boats Berdiansk and Nikopol, and the tugboat Yani Kapu—as they attempted transit from Odessa to Mariupol, resulting in the capture of 24 Ukrainian sailors and vessels held until a 2019 prisoner exchange.^[100]^[102] Russia justified the seizures as a response to alleged Ukrainian provocation and territorial waters incursion, but the actions violated Ukraine's navigational rights under UNCLOS Article 19, which permits innocent passage for warships absent threats to peace, and contravened the 2003 treaty's provisions for free non-commercial navigation.^[100]^[103] In April 2021, Russia notified the International Maritime Organization of temporary closures of specified Black Sea zones off Crimea and near the Kerch Strait to foreign warships and state vessels for six months, citing military exercises, a move condemned by the U.S. State Department as an unlawful attempt to assert excessive maritime claims and restrict international navigation in areas beyond Russia's territorial sea.^[104]^[105] NATO allies similarly criticized the restrictions as unjustified and escalatory, urging de-escalation to preserve freedom of navigation.^[106] These closures echoed broader post-2014 patterns, where Russian forces harassed commercial and military transits, including shadowing NATO vessels, to enforce a security perimeter around occupied territories.^[107] Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, intensified navigation challenges, with the Black Sea Fleet imposing a de facto blockade of Ukrainian ports like Odessa, preventing grain exports and commercial shipping through missile strikes, sea mines, and patrols that denied access without adhering to blockade notification requirements under international humanitarian law.^[108] Although Russia later participated in the July 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative brokered by the UN and Turkey—facilitating over 30 million metric tons of Ukrainian grain exports until its unilateral withdrawal on July 17, 2023—the blockade and subsequent attacks on shipping underscored Moscow's prioritization of military dominance over navigational freedoms.^[109] Under the 1936 Montreux Convention, Turkey closed the Bosporus and Dardanelles to non-littoral warships on February 28, 2022, limiting Russian reinforcements while exempting Black Sea states, though Russia circumvented restrictions by militarizing civilian vessels for logistics, violating the convention's intent to demilitarize straits passage during conflict.^[110]^[111] In response, the United States has conducted freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the Black Sea, such as the April 2021 transit of the destroyer USS Donald Cook and guided-missile cruisers through the straits under Montreux limits, challenging Russian excessive claims and affirming high seas freedoms beyond 12 nautical miles from baselines.^[112]^[113] Analysts from institutions like the Hudson Institute recommend expanded U.S. reporting on Russian FON violations in annual summaries to Congress, emphasizing that sustained allied naval presence deters disruptions to commercial routes vital for 3-5% of global trade passing the straits.^[114] Russia's actions, including Sea of Azov restrictions and piracy-like seizures of neutral vessels, have prompted calls for NATO to bolster regional allies' capabilities, as Moscow's control erodes Ukraine's maritime sovereignty and invites escalation risks absent countervailing enforcement of UNCLOS principles.^[115]^[116]

Arctic Waters and Emerging Claims

The Arctic Ocean's receding ice cover, driven by climate change, has intensified navigation through routes such as Canada's Northwest Passage (NWP) and Russia's Northern Sea Route (NSR), prompting disputes over the applicability of freedom of navigation principles under international law. Arctic littoral states, including Canada and Russia, assert sovereignty over these archipelagic waterways, classifying them as internal waters requiring prior permission for transit, while the United States maintains they qualify as international straits entitled to transit passage rights without interference.^[117]^[118] These conflicting interpretations stem from Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which the U.S. adheres to as customary international law despite non-ratification, versus domestic claims prioritizing security and resource control.^[119] Canada regards the NWP, comprising multiple channels through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, as historic internal waters under full sovereignty, necessitating authorization for foreign vessels, a position reinforced by legislation like the 2009 Northern Strategy but challenged by the U.S. since a 1985 transit by the USS Polar Sea without permission.^[120]^[121] The U.S. counters that the NWP functions as a strait used for international navigation, invoking transit passage to ensure unimpeded access, as articulated in diplomatic protests and operational assertions, including U.S. Coast Guard transits in 2017 and 2020 that Canada tolerated without formal objection but did not concede legally.^[122] A 1988 U.S.-Canada agreement to "disagree" has held, but recent U.S. strategies, such as the 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, signal intent to prioritize operational presence amid escalating great-power competition.^[120] Russia exercises de facto control over the NSR, a series of straits along its northern coast from the Barents Sea to the Bering Strait, imposing permit requirements, icebreaker escorts, and fees on foreign shipping under Federal Law No. 132-FZ, updated in 2023 to mandate advance notification and potential denial for warships, which the U.S. deems excessive and inconsistent with UNCLOS straits provisions.^[123]^[124] Russian assertions extend to claiming certain straits like Vilkitsky as internal, prompting U.S. diplomatic challenges and considerations for freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs), though none have been publicly executed there as of 2025 due to logistical challenges and escalation risks.^[125] Russia's militarization, including reopened bases and hypersonic missile deployments, underscores enforcement intent, with over 100% increase in NSR cargo transit from 2016 to 2022.^[126] Emerging extended continental shelf (ECS) claims further complicate surface navigation by potentially justifying resource exclusion zones that overlap high seas corridors. Russia submitted revised ECS boundaries in 2021, seeking 1.2 million square kilometers including the Lomonosov Ridge, approved in part by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in 2023, while Canada expanded its 2019 claim in December 2022 to cover the Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge, overlapping Russian and Danish assertions by Denmark-Greenland, which filed in 2014 for similar ridges extending to the North Pole vicinity.^[127]^[128]^[129] These seabed delineations, processed under UNCLOS Article 76, do not inherently restrict navigation on overlying waters but enable regulatory measures for marine scientific research and installations that could indirectly challenge FON, as evidenced by Russia's 2021 claim encompassing 70% of the central Arctic Ocean beyond exclusive economic zones (EEZs).^[127] The U.S., having delineated its own ECS in 2023 covering 1 million square kilometers without CLCS submission, advocates high-seas status for unshelved areas to preserve navigational freedoms.^[130] Ongoing bilateral delimitations, such as Russia-Norway's 2010 Barents Sea agreement, contrast with unresolved overlaps, heightening risks of inadvertent incidents amid rising commercial transits—117 complete NWP passages from 2020-2024, predominantly non-state vessels.^[131]^[132]

Controversies and Diverse Perspectives

Arguments in Favor of Assertive FON Enforcement

Assertive enforcement of freedom of navigation through operations like U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) challenges excessive maritime claims that deviate from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), thereby upholding navigational rights and overflight freedoms recognized under international law.^[133]^[134] The U.S. Department of Defense conducts these operations to contest unilateral acts by states that restrict access to high seas and exclusive economic zones, preventing tacit acquiescence that could legitimize such claims over time.^[85]^[135] For instance, in fiscal year 2022, the U.S. challenged 20 instances of excessive claims worldwide, including in the South China Sea, to affirm that nations may operate consistent with international law without prior consent.^[42] Proponents argue that assertive FON enforcement safeguards critical sea lanes vital for global commerce and security, as routes like the South China Sea facilitate over $3 trillion in annual trade, equivalent to roughly one-third of global maritime commerce.^[136] Without such challenges, unchecked claims could impose tolls, inspections, or blockades, disrupting supply chains and escalating economic costs; historical precedents, such as the U.S. program's initiation in 1979 to counter similar restrictions, demonstrate its role in maintaining open access.^[85]^[45] These operations also enhance strategic deterrence by signaling resolve against militarization of disputed waters, as evidenced by transits near the Paracel Islands, such as the USS Halsey's operation on May 10, 2024, which asserted rights without interference.^[4] From a geopolitical standpoint, FONOPs bolster alliances and regional stability by countering attempts to establish de facto control, preserving the balance of power and reducing the risk of coerced concessions from smaller states.^[79] The U.S. maintains that consistent enforcement reinforces the rules-based international order, essential for collective security, as unrestricted navigation enables rapid military response and humanitarian aid delivery in crises.^[133]^[45] Critics of restraint, including U.S. defense analysts, contend that passivity would embolden revisionist actors, potentially leading to broader territorial encroachments beyond maritime domains.^[137]

Criticisms from Claimant States

Claimant states, particularly China in the South China Sea, have criticized freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) conducted by the United States and allies as lacking legal basis under international law and constituting provocations that heighten tensions. In a report released on August 25, 2025, by China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the U.S. FONOPs were described as employing "double standards," instrumentalizing international law, and excessively expanding navigation interests beyond established norms, thereby causing unnecessary friction and risking maritime and aerial incidents.^[92]^[138] Chinese officials maintain that while commercial freedom of navigation remains unimpeded—evidenced by over 100,000 annual merchant vessel transits through the region without interference—military operations near disputed features infringe on sovereignty and security interests.^[44] Following specific U.S. Navy transits, such as the March 23, 2023, operation by the destroyer Milius within 12 nautical miles of Mischief Reef, China's Foreign Ministry protested that the action "seriously violated China's sovereignty and security, severely breached international laws," and represented an "ironclad proof" of U.S. disruption to regional peace.^[139] Beijing argues that these operations undermine the principle of sovereign equality in international law and damage multilateral frameworks by prioritizing hegemonic interests over cooperative maritime order.^[140] Critics within claimant perspectives, including Chinese state commentary, contend that U.S. FONOPs selectively challenge China's "nine-dash line" claims while ignoring similar assertions by other littoral states, thus applying inconsistent standards.^[78] In the Black Sea, Russia has similarly decried foreign naval presence as escalatory, announcing closures to non-littoral state warships in April 2021 off Crimea and the Kerch Strait, framing such restrictions as necessary countermeasures to perceived NATO provocations that threaten regional stability.^[104] Russian officials have criticized Western exercises and transits as violations of bilateral agreements and unilateral assertions of dominance, echoing broader claimant concerns that FONOPs prioritize geopolitical rivalry over genuine navigational freedoms.^[115] These positions from claimant states highlight a recurring theme: FON enforcement, when directed against territorial assertions, is viewed not as neutral upholding of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea but as biased interventions that exacerbate disputes rather than resolve them.

Debates on FONOP Effectiveness and Risks

Debates on the effectiveness of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) center on whether they successfully deter excessive maritime claims and uphold international norms under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Proponents argue that FONOPs demonstrate U.S. resolve and signal to claimants like China that unilateral assertions will face operational challenges, potentially discouraging further encroachments.^[141] For instance, a 2018 analysis from the Center for Strategic and International Studies suggested that repeated FONOPs in contested areas could impose costs on China through consistent signaling, thereby reinforcing deterrence without immediate confrontation.^[141] However, empirical evidence indicates limited long-term impact, as China has persisted in militarizing artificial islands and asserting control over disputed features since the program's intensification in 2015, including the deployment of advanced anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems that complicate future operations.^[8] ^[142] Critics contend that FONOPs have failed to alter Chinese behavior, with a 2025 study assessing U.S. operations in the South China Sea as falling short of expectations in countering Beijing's claims and gray-zone tactics.^[143] Quantitative analysis of Chinese maritime militia activities shows a short-term deterrence effect immediately following FONOPs, where incidents of harassment decrease temporarily, but this influence diminishes over time, allowing Beijing to resume coercive actions.^[69] Regional perspectives vary; while some Southeast Asian states view FONOPs as essential for preserving a rules-based order, others perceive them as escalatory due to China's framing of the operations as provocative intrusions lacking legal basis under its domestic interpretations of international law.^[144] ^[92] This lack of transparency in U.S. reporting on FONOP details further undermines their political and legal efficacy in building allied support or isolating China's positions.^[52] Risks associated with FONOPs include heightened chances of inadvertent escalation through close-quarters encounters, as evidenced by the October 2018 near-collision between the USS Decatur and Chinese destroyer CNS Lanzhou, where the latter maneuvered aggressively within 45 yards of the U.S. vessel, prompting evasive action to avoid impact.^[44] Such incidents echo historical precedents like the 2001 Hainan Island mid-air collision, illustrating persistent miscommunication hazards in high-stakes maritime environments.^[8] Operations inherently involve dangerous proximity between warships and aircraft, amplifying miscalculation risks amid China's improving A2/AD capabilities, which reduce U.S. operational freedom and divert naval assets from training and maintenance priorities.^[145] ^[44] Chinese state media and officials have portrayed FONOPs as threats to regional stability, potentially justifying reciprocal militarization or militia deployments that blur lines between peacetime and conflict, thereby increasing overall tension without resolving underlying disputes.^[146] ^[92] Despite these dangers, advocates maintain that forgoing FONOPs would signal weakness, emboldening further assertions, though causal assessments reveal no clear reversal in China's assertive trajectory post-operations.^[147]

References

[1]
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea - Part VII
The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention.
[2]
part iii. straits used for international navigation
Transit passage means the exercise in accordance with this Part of the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and ...
[3]
All important provisions of UNCLOS for freedom of navigation rights ...
Even as a non-party to UNCLOS, US navigational rights have been protected for decades through customary international law · Ratification of UNCLOS would trade ...
[4]
U.S. Navy Destroyer Conducts Freedom of Navigation Operation in ...
May 10, 2024 · The United States upholds freedom of navigation for all nations as a principle. As long as some countries continue to claim and assert limits ...
[5]
7th Fleet Conducts Freedom of Navigation Operation
Dec 6, 2024 · Unlawful and sweeping maritime claims in the South China Sea pose a serious threat to the freedoms of the seas, including the freedoms of ...
[6]
The “Freedom of Navigation” Claimed by the United States is Not ...
Jun 3, 2023 · “Freedom of navigation” is a core claim of the U.S. maritime order and has been used to accuse and suppress China's maritime activities.
[7]
US freedom of navigation operations 'unsuccessful,' study says
Jan 22, 2025 · New research found US operations to challenge China's claims in the South China Sea fell short of expectations.
[8]
A Reassessment of U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations in the ...
Jun 25, 2025 · Although there had been FONOPs in this region before, the South China Sea became a focus of the U.S. FON program from 2016 to 2023. As instances ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[9]
[PDF] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
United Nations. Page 134. 140. Article 308. Entry into force. 1. This Convention shall enter into force 12 months after the date of deposit of the sixtieth ...
[10]
[PDF] Freedom of Navigation - International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
According to article 25 of the Convention, coastal. States may take action only against passage which is not innocent. The provisions of the Convention ...
[11]
Navigation, Freedom of - Oxford Public International Law
22 Freedom of navigation provides ships of any States with the right to traverse the high seas with no or minimal interference from any other State. A key ...Missing: core | Show results with:core
[12]
Part II Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone - UN.org.
... innocent passage through the territorial sea. Article18. Meaning of passage. 1. Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of: (a) ...
[13]
[PDF] UNCLOS and Freedom of Navigation - Asean Regional Forum
Submerged submarines have no right of innocent passage. Customary international law. Territorial Sea Convention article 14. LOS Convention articles 17-19.
[14]
Chapter 3: Freedom of Navigation – Law of the Sea - Tufts University
This chapter focuses on the application of the broad principles of freedom of the high seas and navigation rights, as outlined in the LOSC, within specific ...Missing: core | Show results with:core
[15]
[PDF] The Legal Efficacy of Freedom of Navigation Assertions
Navigation Program encourages nations to modify their domestic laws ... freedoms and obligations existing under the 1982. LOS Convention and at customary law.
[16]
U.S. Navy Destroyer Conducts Freedom of Navigation Operation in ...
Nov 3, 2023 · Under customary international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention, the ships of all States - including their warships - enjoy the ...
[17]
[PDF] Reflecting on UNCLOS Forty Years Later: What Worked, What Failed
Nov 20, 2022 · • UNCLOS enables freedom of navigation by its compromises on the status of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and by the regimes of innocent.
[18]
On the United States, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and ...
Aug 5, 2022 · The US Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program was instituted in 1979 by the Carter administration to highlight the navigation provisions in the ...
[19]
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
Article 19. Meaning of innocent passage. 1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.
[20]
Maritime Claims Reference Manual — - jag.navy.mil
It provides a general reference concerning the maritime claims of all coastal nations. Its principal purpose is to facilitate the DoD Freedom of Navigation ...
[21]
DOD Releases Fiscal Year 2023 Freedom of Navigation Report
May 8, 2024 · Today, the Department of Defense (DoD) released its annual Freedom of Navigation (FON) Report for Fiscal Year 2023.
[22]
Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea | Global Conflict Tracker
Sep 17, 2024 · According to the United States, claimant countries, under the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), should have freedom of navigation ...
[23]
Justinian and the Freedom of the Sea - jstor
The text of the jurist Marcianus, preserved in the Digest of Justinian,' is the first formal pronouncement in recorded legal theory on the legal status.
[24]
https://scholarship.law.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1711&context=scholar
[25]
https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1187
[26]
[PDF] the free sea - Scholars at Harvard
Few works of such brevity can have caused arguments of such global extent and striking longevity as Hugo Grotius's Mare Liberum (The Free Sea). The book ...
[27]
https://www.brill.com/downloadpdf/book/9789047430452/Bej.9789004177017.i-178_002.pdf
[28]
[PDF] Freedom of Navigation - Its Legal History and Its Normative Basis
At the end of the 17th century the British and the Dutch became allies, and consequently their controversy over maritime sovereignty subsided. The disputes with ...
[29]
1 The Political Setting and Origins of Mare liberum - Brill
Mare liberum, written by Hugo Grotius, argues for Dutch freedom of navigation and trade in the East Indies, challenging Portuguese exclusive rights.
[30]
[PDF] The High Seas, The Continental Shelf, and Free Navigation
Few principles of International Law have been more fully recognized and accepted than free navigation on the high seas ! Professor Colombos of the Hague Academy ...
[31]
[PDF] 1 FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION - AN OUTDATED CONCEPT? We all ...
We all know that there is no freedom above the law and that, consequently, freedom means only choices individuals are able to make within the context of an ...
[32]
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea - UNTC
In the EEZ all states enjoy the freedoms of navigation and overflight, subject to the relevant provisions ofthe Convention. 3. Installations in the ...
[33]
Overview - Convention & Related Agreements - UN.org.
Feb 26, 2025 · * All States enjoy the traditional freedoms of navigation, overflight, scientific research and fishing on the high seas; they are obliged to ...<|separator|>
[34]
UNCLOS - Table of Contents - UN.org.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 · Article 17. Right of innocent passage · Article 18. Meaning of passage · Article 19. Meaning ...Part iii. straits used for... · PART VII. HIGH SEAS · Part II Territorial Sea and...
[35]
https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closcont.htm
[36]
[PDF] United States (US) Responses to Excessive National Maritime ...
Article 21 of the LOS Convention empowers a coastal state to adopt, with due publicity, laws and regulations relating to innocent passage through the ...
[37]
[PDF] Department of Defense Report to Congress Annual Freedom of ...
Jul 14, 2020 · For a complete list of all coastal states making excessive maritime claims, as well as the years those claims were last operationally challenged ...
[38]
[PDF] Department of Defense Report to Congress Annual Freedom of ...
Dec 31, 2018 · In. 1918, President Woodrow Wilson named “absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas” as one of the universal principles for which the United ...
[39]
200. National Security Decision Directive 265 - Office of the Historian
The United States has successfully conducted a Freedom of Navigation (FON) program to protect US navigation, overflight, and related interests on and over the ...
[40]
[PDF] U.S. Department of Defense Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program
Feb 28, 2017 · As stated in the U.S. Oceans Policy (1983), the United States “will exercise and assert its rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea on a worldwide.
[41]
None
### Summary of DoD Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program
[42]
DoD Releases Fiscal Year 2022 Freedom of Navigation Report
Apr 21, 2023 · They include a variety of restrictions on the exercise of navigation and overflight rights and other freedoms. Unlawful maritime claims – or ...
[43]
U.S. Navy Destroyer Conducts Freedom of Navigation Operation in ...
Nov 3, 2023 · This freedom of navigation operation ("FONOP") upheld the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea recognized in international law by ...
[44]
[PDF] A Reassessment of U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations in the ...
There was a time when U.S. freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) were relatively low-key and routine operations signaling U.S. commitment to ...
[45]
[PDF] U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program
The FON Program preserves U.S. national interests and global mobility by challenging excessive maritime claims and demonstrating U.S. non-acquiescence in ...
[46]
[PDF] Annual Freedom of Navigation Report - Fiscal Year 2023
The report identifies excessive maritime claims challenged by US forces, with 29 claims from 17 claimants in FY2023, to preserve freedom of the seas.
[47]
SECDEF Esper: U.S. Will 'Keep Up the Pace' of South China Sea ...
Jul 21, 2020 · Six FONOps have been conducted in the South China Sea this year, starting with the Littoral Combat Ship USS Montgomery (LCS-8) in January, ...Missing: 2015-2025<|separator|>
[48]
None
### Summary of the FON Program from FY2021 Report
[49]
Pentagon 2022 Freedom of Navigation Report - USNI News
Apr 21, 2023 · The following is the Fiscal Year 2022 summary of the Department of Defense's freedom of navigation operations.
[50]
Freedom-of-navigation operations as signals in the South China Sea
Jun 18, 2024 · The South China Sea is an important conduit to mobilise military assets today, and FONOPs can signal that the United States attaches great ...<|separator|>
[51]
“Use the Coast Guard for Freedom of Navigation Operations” –USNI
Jan 3, 2022 · The Navy has rightfully used littoral combat ships (LCSs) to conduct limited FONOPs in the South China Sea, somewhat relieving overworked destroyers.Missing: types procedures<|separator|>
[52]
South China Sea "Lawfare": Fighting over the Freedom of Navigation
In addition, surveillance aircraft and long-range bombers have been asserting the freedom of overflight. Officially, FONOPs serve a legal purpose. However ...
[53]
Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea - Lawfare
Oct 23, 2015 · For a submarine transit to qualify as innocent passage, the submarine must navigate on the surface and show its flag. The Chinese, on the other ...
[54]
[PDF] The U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program, Procedure, and Future
Nov 15, 1997 · Freedom of Navigation Operations in Practice. FON assertions are directed in operation orders that specify procedures and approval authority ...
[55]
Review of Maritime Transport 2024 | UN Trade and Development ...
Oct 22, 2024 · Global maritime trade grew by 2.4% in 2023, recovering from a 2022 contraction, but the recovery remains fragile.
[56]
Shipping data: UNCTAD releases new seaborne trade statistics
Apr 23, 2025 · Maritime transport is the backbone of global trade, moving over 80% of goods traded worldwide by volume. It connects global value chains ...
[57]
Review of Maritime Transport | UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
Around 80% of the volume of international trade in goods is carried by sea, and the percentage is even higher for most developing countries. Every issue ...
[58]
The impact of rising maritime transport costs on international trade
Over 50 % of the value and 80 % of the volume of international trade is carried by sea (UNCTAD, 2021).<|separator|>
[59]
Maritime Chokepoints Wreck Havoc On Global Supply Chains - Forbes
Jan 23, 2025 · The Suez Canal and the Panama Canal are critical, narrow maritime passages that provide shortcuts on lengthy intercontinental maritime journeys.
[60]
Chokepoints and Vulnerabilities in Global Food Trade
Jun 27, 2017 · Key points Global dependence on maritime chokepoints has increased since 2000, particularly in respect of internationally traded wheat and ...
[61]
These Four Chokepoints Are Threatening Global Trade | BCG
Feb 12, 2024 · 1. The Suez Canal and Bab El-Mandeb Strait. · 2. The Strait of Hormuz. · 3. The Straits of Malaca and Taiwan. · 4. The Panama Canal.
[62]
The Vulnerabilities of Our Maritime Trade Routes - The AGS Globe
Aug 19, 2025 · More than half of global shipping passes through five key chokepoints: The Panama Canal. The Suez Canal. The Strait of Hormuz. The Strait of ...
[63]
Vulnerability of supply chains exposed as global maritime ...
Oct 22, 2024 · The global economy, food security, and energy supplies are at increasing risk due to vulnerabilities at key maritime routes.
[64]
The Changing Character Of Maritime Choke Points: Who Throttles ...
Jun 12, 2025 · Despite the resilience of maritime trade, the dependence on a limited number of critical chokepoints introduces significant strategic vulnerabilities.
[65]
Disruption of maritime trade chokepoints and the global LNG trade
Maritime chokepoints are key corridors in the global supply chain because they connect waterbodies, countries, and regions worldwide with few alternative routes ...
[66]
Maritime dependency and economic prosperity: Why access to ...
Maritime trade and access to deep-water territory are important when determining a country's economic success. Today, as much as 75% of international trade ...
[67]
UNCLOS: China, India, and the United States Navigate an Unsettled ...
Apr 30, 2021 · Disputes over freedom of navigation represent a volatile fault line in U.S.–China relations, and a point of growing strategic convergence ...Missing: implications | Show results with:implications
[68]
How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea? | ChinaPower Project
Writings on the South China Sea frequently claim that $5.3 trillion worth of goods transits through the South China Sea annually, with $1.2 trillion of that ...
[69]
[PDF] U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations and China's Maritime Militias
This creates an unofficial side effect of U.S. FONOPs in the form of temporary deterrence and shows how adversaries and regional actors' factor in the presence ...
[70]
FONOPS and Deterrence: There's No “FDO” in “FONOPS” - USNI Blog
Feb 29, 2016 · This effect highlights the strategic importance of FONOPS in the South China Sea. FONOPS cannot deter China from reclaiming islands and ...
[71]
G7 Foreign Ministers Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity
Mar 14, 2025 · We express deep concern over the growing risks to maritime security, including strategic contestation, threats to freedom of navigation and ...Missing: implications | Show results with:implications
[72]
[PDF] Chapter 1 The Security of the Sea Significance of the Freedom of ...
In recent years, the issue of maintaining the stability of a rules-based maritime order has drawn attention as fundamental to the security of the sea.<|control11|><|separator|>
[73]
U.S. freedom of navigation disputes have decreased due in part to ...
U.S. freedom of navigation disputes have decreased due in part to the influence of UNCLOS · Quicktabs: Evidence · Arguments · About this page · Recent Quotes · Open ...
[74]
[PDF] Advantage at Sea - DoD
Dec 16, 2020 · Navy and Coast Guard ships conduct freedom of navigation operations globally, challenging excessive and illegal maritime claims. Coast Guard ...
[75]
U.S. Strengthening Deterrence in Taiwan Strait - Department of War
Sep 19, 2023 · "The strait itself is an international waterway, where high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight are guaranteed under international law ...
[76]
Freedom of navigation is critical to U.S. leadership and economy
"' Access to the global commons enables these flows, in turn promoting both international stability and prosperity. Indeed, global commerce, travel, and ...
[77]
[PDF] Reassessing the US Freedom of Navigation Program - DTIC
Multilateralizing freedom of navigation issues helps reduce some of the nationalism and domestic politics that challenge the resolution of border disputes and ...<|separator|>
[78]
US-China International Law Disputes in the South China Sea
Jul 9, 2021 · China's incremental expansion and bold territorial claims in the South China Sea (SCS) over the past 20 years have raised global concerns.
[79]
Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea: A Practical Guide
All ships of all states, including both civilian and military vessels, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea of other states.Missing: core | Show results with:core
[80]
South China Sea Arbitration - Cases | PCA-CPA
The arbitration concerned the role of historic rights and the source of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea.
[81]
Eighth Anniversary of the Philippines-PRC South China Sea Arbitral ...
Jul 11, 2024 · The Tribunal firmly rejected any PRC territorial or maritime claim to areas determined by the Tribunal to be part of the Philippines' exclusive economic zone.
[82]
Law of the sea: A contested watershed ruling - Lowy Institute
Apr 13, 2022 · The 2016 arbitral award on the South China Sea has changed the dynamics of maritime disputes.
[83]
China Island Tracker - Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative - CSIS
Since 2013, China has engaged in unprecedented dredging and artificial island-building in the Spratlys, creating 3,200 acres of new land, along with a ...Fiery Cross Reef · Cuarteron Reef · Mischief Reef · Subi ReefMissing: facts | Show results with:facts
[84]
China has fully militarized three islands in South China Sea, US ...
Mar 21, 2022 · China has fully militarized at least three of several islands it built in the disputed South China Sea, arming them with anti-ship and anti- ...Missing: facts | Show results with:facts
[85]
US Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea
The US government initiated a Freedom of Navigation Program to contest “unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedom of the ...
[86]
Chinese Power Projection Capabilities in the South China Sea
China has substantially expanded its ability to monitor and project power throughout the South China Sea via the construction of dual civilian-military bases.Missing: facts | Show results with:facts
[87]
China Claims To Own The Taiwan Strait. That's Illegal. - Forbes
Jun 28, 2022 · The Taiwan Strait, indeed, contains international waters. China's claim to the contrary can harm world trade, freedom of navigation, and the rule of law.
[88]
China Maritime Report #48: Great Inspectations
Jul 16, 2025 · China is using its Maritime Traffic Safety Law and Coast Guard Law to illegally enforce expansive maritime jurisdictional claims in the Taiwan ...
[89]
The Principle of “Estoppel” and Beijing's Sovereignty Claims over ...
Jul 13, 2022 · In June 2022, Beijing claimed that the Taiwan Strait is not international waters. These two Chinese statements run counter to China's position of many decades.
[90]
Chinese Navy Tracks First U.S. Taiwan Strait Transit under Trump ...
Feb 12, 2025 · Two US Navy ships sailed through the Taiwan Strait this week as China's People Liberation Army shadowed the first warship passage in the waters under the new ...
[91]
U.S., U.K. Warships Transit Taiwan Strait, Pentagon Confirms
Sep 16, 2025 · A U.S. and U.K. warship transited the Taiwan Strait last week drawing protests from Beijing, USNI News has learned.
[92]
China challenges US freedom of navigation operations as having ...
Aug 25, 2025 · Beijing accuses Washington of 'double standards' in first report of its kind criticising its activities in South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.
[93]
https://www.aeronewsjournal.com/2025/10/taiwan-detects-27-chinese-warplanes-8.html
[94]
Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP)
Reuters Two German Navy ships are set to transit the international waters of the Taiwan Strait in September 2024, becoming the first German military vessels to ...
[95]
Timeline: China's Maritime Disputes - Council on Foreign Relations
Whether the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were considered part of Okinawa or ceded to Taiwan after the treaty remains a contentious issue in the present-day debate ...
[96]
The Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations
Japan and China are involved in another East China Sea disagreement over their maritime boundary (as opposed to the competing claims over the territorial ...
[97]
Maritime and Sovereignty Disputes in the East China Sea
Feb 9, 2021 · This essay focuses on the complex maritime and sovereignty claims of Northeast Asian states in the East China Sea and unpacks the differing legal principles ...
[98]
Promoting crisis management in the East China Sea - SIPRI
The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have become the focal point of larger disagreements between China ... freedom of navigation and overflight rules and political ...
[99]
[PDF] The East China Sea: The Role of International Law in the Settlement ...
The conflicts surrounding sovereign control over the mineral resources beneath the East China. Sea and title to the Senkaku Islands provide excellent case- ...
[100]
The Kerch Strait Incident: Law of the Sea or Law of Naval Warfare?
Dec 3, 2018 · In either event, Russia's interference with Ukrainian warships violates freedom of navigation under the peacetime regime of UNCLOS as well as ...
[101]
[PDF] case concerning the detention of three ukrainian naval vessels ...
May 7, 2019 · Federation and Ukraine used for non-commercial purposes shall enjoy freedom of navigation in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch. Strait.” Page 6. 5.
[102]
Top Political Official Urges Restraint from Ukraine, Russian ...
Nov 26, 2018 · Emphasising that Ukrainian ships set sail on 25 November from one Ukrainian port to another via the Kerch Strait, she said the Russian ...
[103]
The Passage Regimes of the Kerch Strait—To Each Their Own?
Nonetheless, Ukraine could invoke the Kerch Strait incident of 25 November 2018 as a material breach of the freedom of navigation within the terms of Article 2 ...
[104]
Russia's Illegal Restriction of Navigation in the Black Sea | Lawfare
Apr 27, 2021 · Russia recently announced that it was closing off portions of the Black Sea off the Crimean Peninsula and near the Kerch Strait to foreign warships and other ...
[105]
Russia's Intention To Restrict Navigation in Parts of the Black Sea
Apr 19, 2021 · The United States expresses its deep concern over Russia's plans to block foreign naval ships and state vessels in parts of the Black Sea, ...
[106]
NATO, EU Condemn Russia's Plans To Close Parts Of Black Sea ...
Apr 16, 2021 · Russia's reported plans to restrict maritime traffic in parts of the Black Sea for six months as it holds military maneuvers would be ...Missing: post- | Show results with:post-
[107]
To fend off Russia in the Black Sea, the US and NATO need to help ...
Jan 10, 2024 · The absence of a credible and sustained allied naval presence across the Black Sea opens the door for Russia to disrupt commercial shipping.
[108]
[PDF] The Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Blocking Access to the Black Sea
Feb 6, 2023 · 20. Fatima Bahtić, “Russian Navy's Operations. Restrict Shipping in Sea of Azov amid Con- flict with Ukraine,” Naval Today, 24 February.
[109]
Black Sea mine sweeping aids a subtle convergence of Turkish-US ...
Jun 18, 2024 · This operation is critical for securing Ukraine's ability to continue exporting its grain and aims to protect freedom of navigation and trade in ...
[110]
Russia Is Violating the Montreux Convention with Civilian Ships
Russia is using a “civilian” cargo ship to transport war materials through the Bosporus Strait, violating the spirit of the Montreux Convention.
[111]
Russia is violating the spirit of Montreux by using civilian ships for war
May 18, 2022 · On Feb. 28, Turkey triggered the Montreux Convention, not used since World War II, and closed the Turkish Straits to military ships.<|separator|>
[112]
U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations in the Black Sea - jstor
Mar 13, 2025 · The Soviet Union considered U.S. operations in the Black Sea unacceptable. Thus, the Soviets routinely dispatched their naval vessels and ...
[113]
Has the U.S. Ceded the Black Sea to Russia?
Mar 6, 2024 · Navies should be conducting freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) in the Black Sea. Neutral nation warships, and especially NATO Nation ...
[114]
The Future of United States Black Sea Strategy | Hudson Institute
The Department of War's annual report to Congress on Freedom of Navigation (FON) should also include language on Russia restricting FON in the Black Sea. The ...
[115]
Russia's aggressive behavior in the Black Sea can be challenged
Sep 8, 2023 · Russia's malign behavior in the Black Sea includes piracy, plunder, petroleum price cap violations, and actions to prevent the free transit ...
[116]
Full article: Interpreting Russian aims to control the Black Sea region ...
Oct 9, 2023 · According to both Ukrainian and U.S. sources, Russian actions were restricting 'Ukraine's maritime sovereignty, limits freedom of navigation in ...
[117]
Options and challenges for a potential US FONOP in the Northern ...
This paper focuses on the Russian claims with regard to the NSR that could be deemed valid targets for a FONOP.
[118]
Navigational Rights for Warships in the Northwest and Northeast ...
Mar 9, 2022 · This article aims to introduce the different rules for navigation and the consequences for maritime operations in the Arctic, including the right to overflight.
[119]
BURYING THE ICEPICK: WHY AND HOW THE UNITED STATES ...
Apr 1, 2025 · Freedom of navigation has its roots in the 17th century, beginning with Hugo Grotius, the Dutch jurist who created the concept of mare liberum: ...
[120]
https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/publications/pt-1/
[121]
30 Year-Old Compromise Divides USA and Canada
Apr 12, 2019 · The USA and Canada have agreed to disagree about who holds the rights to the Northwest Passage. However, the 1988 compromise now appears to be cracking at the ...
[122]
Scholarly Papers - Arctic Yearbook
This article examines the legal utility of a US Freedom of Navigation Operation in the Arctic against Russian and Canadian maritime claims.
[123]
New Russian Law on Northern Sea Route Navigation - Belfer Center
Mar 9, 2023 · A new law regulating the navigation of foreign warships in the Northern Sea Route, whose legal regime has been the subject of a long-standing US-Russian ...
[124]
[PDF] The Russia-USA legal dispute over the straits of the Northern Sea ...
whether and in what extent there is freedom of navigation in the waters of these routes or ...
[125]
[PDF] Forward Presence and Freedom of Navigation in the Arctic
Jan 12, 2021 · First, the United States continues to dispute the statement that some of Russia's Arctic straits (in particular, the Vilkitsky, Shokalsky, ...
[126]
[PDF] 2024 Department of Defense Arctic Strategy - DoD
Jul 31, 2023 · DoD will continue to monitor potential threats to freedom of navigation in the Arctic, uphold lawful uses of the seas guaranteed to all ...
[127]
Russia's Proposed Extended Continental Shelf in the Arctic Ocean
May 24, 2021 · Russia's extended continental shelf as proposed would encompass 70 percent of the Arctic Ocean beyond the coastal states' EEZs.Missing: emerging | Show results with:emerging
[128]
New Arctic Maps reflecting CLCS recommendations on Russian ...
Mar 6, 2023 · ... Arctic Ocean seabed as an extension of Russia's continental shelf. Submissions by Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark await CLCS recommendations.Missing: emerging | Show results with:emerging
[129]
Canada extends continental shelf claim, increasing overlaps with ...
Dec 23, 2022 · Canada filed an addendum on Monday to extend its continental shelf in the Arctic, increasing significantly its overlaps with claims by Russia.Missing: emerging waters
[130]
Assessing US Extended Continental Shelf (ECS) Claims in the Arctic
Jul 10, 2024 · In the past, most issues of maritime borders between the Arctic states have been bilaterally resolved (Russia–Norway, Denmark–Canada) while some ...Missing: emerging | Show results with:emerging
[131]
Explainer: The Northwest Passage's Shipping Potential, Legal ...
Jul 28, 2025 · Between 2020 – 2024, 117 “complete” transits took place, made up of 48 (41%) yachts or other private vessels, 39 (30%) commercial vessels, 28 ( ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[132]
Russia's Gains in the Great Arctic Race - War on the Rocks
and will — Canada and Denmark continue to work with Russia in deconflicting their own extended continental shelf claims in the Arctic, or ...<|separator|>
[133]
[PDF] Department of Defense Report to Congress Annual Freedom of ...
Dec 31, 2017 · While not a defined term under international law, DoD uses “freedom of the seas” to mean all of the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea ...
[134]
[PDF] Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) - PACOM
Nov 4, 2022 · Freedom of navigation is guaranteed to all nations under int'l law and essential to global security and economic.
[135]
[PDF] U.S. Department of Defense Freedom of Navigation Program Fact ...
Mar 1, 2015 · Since 1979, U.S. Presidents have directed the U.S. Government to carry out a Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program to preserve this national ...
[136]
The U.S. Asserts Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea
Oct 27, 2015 · This particular operation was intended to assert that the United States does not recognize a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea or any other ...
[137]
US Freedom of Navigation Operations reveal its security strategy
Apr 24, 2023 · FONOPs are protests made by the DoD against “excessive maritime claims”. These protests challenge claims the DoD considers “unlawful maritime ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[138]
Chinese report challenges legality of US 'freedom of navigation ...
Aug 25, 2025 · On August 11, the US Department of Defense released its 2024 Fiscal Year annual "Freedom of Navigation" (FON) report, identifying China as the ...
[139]
China Protests U.S. South China Sea Freedom of Navigation ...
Mar 24, 2023 · A US warship conducted a freedom of navigation operation in the South China Sea, near the Parcel Islands, the day after China claimed it chased away the ship.
[140]
US' 'freedom of navigation operation' reduced to a clumsy ...
Aug 17, 2025 · The US' actions in the South China Sea undermine the principle of equality in international law and damage the multilateral framework ...Missing: criticisms | Show results with:criticisms
[141]
The Usefulness of "Redundant" Freedom of Navigation Operations
Jan 26, 2018 · In fact, excessive deference to Beijing can embolden rather than deter Chinese leaders from adventurous actions. It is in U.S. interests to ...
[142]
[PDF] How Much Risk Should the United States Run in the South China ...
Jul 30, 2020 · Although not typi- cally the focus of U.S. South China Sea debates, China's improving A2/AD capabilities are significantly reducing the U.S. ...
[143]
US Navy operations risk inflaming China tensions, study says
Jan 22, 2025 · New research found US operations to challenge China's excessive claims in the South China Sea fell short of expectations.
[144]
The Efficacy of the US Freedom of Navigation Operations in the ...
The US FONOPs are seen by several regional countries as necessary for maintaining rules-based international order and freedom of navigation in the South China ...Missing: effectiveness debates
[145]
The risks of US freedom of navigation operations in the South China ...
Jun 1, 2015 · FON operations are inherently dangerous. They may lead to close encounters both between warships and between aircraft.Missing: reduced | Show results with:reduced
[146]
[PDF] Analyzing CCP Perceptions of US Freedom of Navigation ... - DTIC
The research in this study includes Chinese state-controlled media responses to US FONOPs in the South China Sea from May 2015 to. November 2018 and transits of ...
[147]
US FONOPs in the South China Sea: Intent, Effectiveness, and ...
Jul 11, 2017 · US Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea are controversial. Indeed, the US targeting of China's “excessive” claims there.