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Think Big

Think Big was an interventionist economic strategy launched by New Zealand's Third National Government under Prime Minister in 1978, aimed at reducing dependence on imported oil through massive state-funded projects in production, , and resource processing. The program, prompted by the 1970s global oil crises and New Zealand's vulnerability as a net importer, involved investments totaling around NZ$10 billion (equivalent to over NZ$40 billion today) in initiatives such as plants from at and Waitara, expansions of the , and urea fertilizer facilities in , and enhancements to and the . While Think Big created thousands of construction jobs and built enduring that contributed to export growth—such as increased and —it faced for underestimating costs, relying on optimistic assumptions about sustained high prices that failed to materialize after 1982, and exacerbating New Zealand's and through heavy overseas borrowing. Economic analyses have deemed the program an overall fiscal burden, with projects like the plants becoming financially unviable without subsidies, though some assets later proved viable post-privatization in the . Muldoon's top-down approach, including wage and to manage inflationary pressures, intensified political divisions and contributed to the economic crisis that precipitated the 1984 government change and subsequent neoliberal reforms.

Background and Context

Global Oil Crises and New Zealand's Vulnerabilities

The began with the embargo imposed in October following the , leading to a sharp reduction in supply and causing global crude oil prices to quadruple from approximately $3 per barrel to nearly $12 per barrel by January 1974. This shock disrupted energy markets worldwide, exacerbating inflation and triggering recessions in oil-importing economies as transportation and production costs surged. The , precipitated by the and subsequent production disruptions, further intensified global energy instability, with crude oil prices rising from around $13 per barrel in mid-1979 to approximately $40 per barrel by mid-1980. These events compounded the effects of the earlier embargo, as Iranian output fell by about 4.8 million barrels per day—equivalent to 7% of global production at the time—prompting panic buying and sustained price elevations. New Zealand exhibited pronounced vulnerabilities to these shocks due to its heavy dependence on imported , sourcing over 80% of its oil requirements from abroad during the , including a significant share from nations. The crises contributed to a recessionary in GDP of around 1.5% during 1974-75, alongside widening balance-of-payments deficits that reached substantial levels exceeding NZ$1 billion annually by 1977 amid deteriorating . As a small, geographically isolated lacking domestic diversification in resources, faced amplified exposure to such exogenous price compared to larger nations with broader bases and alternative supplies, rendering it acutely sensitive to disruptions in global flows.

Domestic Economic Pressures Pre-1977

In the 1970s, grappled with , a combination of accelerating and stagnating output that eroded post-World War II economic stability. Consumer price reached 17.2% in 1976, driven by wage-price spirals, fiscal expansion, and external shocks amplifying domestic cost pressures. Unemployment, virtually nonexistent in the full-employment era immediately after the war, began rising modestly but persistently, reaching approximately 5,000 registered unemployed by 1976—equivalent to about 0.3% of the labor force—signaling emerging slack in labor markets previously sustained by protected domestic industries. The sector, built on import substitution policies since , faced mounting strains as high tariffs and licensing shielded inefficient producers from , fostering complacency and rising unit costs. By the mid-1970s, these measures had failed to generate internationally competitive industries, leaving vulnerable to imported input and unable to offset agriculture's dominance, which accounted for over 90% of merchandise exports. This structural rigidity exacerbated balance-of-payments deficits, as domestic production substituted imports at higher long-term costs without boosting export earnings. The United Kingdom's entry into the in 1973 compounded these vulnerabilities, slashing New Zealand's preferential access to its primary market; UK-bound exports, previously 30% of total exports and 8% of GDP, declined sharply as tariffs and quotas on , , and took effect. dwindled under persistent current account deficits, prompting heavy government borrowing; official as a share of GNP surged from 5.1% in 1974 toward projections exceeding 20% by decade's end, reflecting unsustainable financing of import needs in a remote, resource-scarce economy overly dependent on volatile commodity revenues. These pressures underscored the risks of absent measures to harness domestic energy and for import substitution and .

Conception and Objectives

Policy Rationale from First Principles

's economy in the mid-1970s was structurally vulnerable to external energy price shocks due to its complete reliance on imported crude and refined products for and industrial needs, which accounted for a significant portion of the import bill and exacerbated chronic balance-of-payments deficits. With limited domestic , rising global prices directly translated into higher outflows, constraining the ability to fund essential imports and maintain stability in a small, dependent on agricultural exports. The logical response from foundational economic mechanics involved leveraging abundant indigenous resources—such as from fields like Kapuni and substantial deposits—to convert into synthetic fuels, fertilizers, and , thereby substituting for imports and preserving forex reserves through value-added domestic processing rather than raw export. This substitution mechanism operates causally by internalizing energy production within national boundaries, reducing the multiplier effect of import costs on and ; for instance, gas-to-liquids could offset oil equivalents at lower effective forex cost, given New Zealand's exceeded decades of consumption at prevailing rates. The 1973 OPEC embargo and subsequent price quadrupling demonstrated how cartel-controlled supply chains impose asymmetric risks on import-dependent nations, with New Zealand's deteriorating sharply as expenses surged over 400% in real terms by the decade's end. A second shock in 1979, triggered by the , further doubled benchmark prices, accelerating import bill escalation and underscoring the peril of geopolitical leverage by producers, where supply disruptions or pricing power could dictate without domestic buffers. Prioritizing energy thus secures by decoupling vital inputs from foreign cartels, enabling stable industrial output and avoiding coerced or spirals. Market-liberal approaches, emphasizing reliance and signals, falter under first-principles scrutiny in crisis-prone small economies, where shocks overwhelm localized mechanisms and revenues prove insufficient to cushion volatility; New Zealand's narrow commodity base amplifies this, as agricultural cannot reliably offset spikes without intervention to harness underutilized local hydrocarbons. State-directed scaling of conversion addresses coordination failures inherent in fragmented private during , ensuring rapid deployment of gas and toward self-sufficiency targets like 50% , grounded in the causal imperative to match resource endowments with needs over speculative offshore sourcing.

Stated Goals and Strategic Priorities

The Think Big policy sought to diminish New Zealand's vulnerability to imported oil through major developments, including the production of synthetic fuels from to serve as substitutes for products. These initiatives focused on leveraging domestic resources, such as gas from the field, to generate synthetic petrol, , and other fuels, thereby enhancing national amid global supply disruptions. Strategic priorities encompassed export-led industrialization by expanding facilities for fertilizers via ammonia-urea plants and production, intended to boost foreign exchange earnings and reduce trade imbalances. The approach also prioritized job generation through extensive , aiming to invigorate employment in , and related sectors while mitigating recessionary pressures via sustained investment. Muldoon articulated Think Big during the 1977 election as a of bold, self-reliant development, rejecting passive dependence on international markets in favor of harnessing New Zealand's resource potential for long-term economic resilience. This framing positioned the policy as essential pragmatic nationalism, countering tendencies toward diminished ambition and import substitution without domestic productive capacity.

Historical Development

Announcement and Initial Planning (1977-1979)

The National Party's victory in the general election positioned to pursue a more assertive economic strategy, diverging from the government's prior emphasis on gradual adjustments amid oil dependency challenges. Policy groundwork for large-scale infrastructure initiatives accelerated in 1977, influenced by ongoing energy vulnerability assessments, though formal conceptualization of the Think Big program crystallized closer to the 1978 election campaign. On 1 September 1978, Muldoon publicly announced the Think Big strategy in a policy address, delineating five flagship projects focused on exploiting domestic resources to enhance self-sufficiency and foster export-oriented industries. This announcement preceded the 25 1978 general election, where the policy featured prominently in National's platform, contributing to their re-election with 51 seats against Labour's 25. Early implementation planning ensued, including commissioning feasibility studies by late 1978 to evaluate technical viability and economic returns of projects such as synthetic production and synthesis. Stakeholder engagement ramped up through partnerships with multinational corporations, including for offshore gas exploration tied to the field and local entities like the family interests in resource development, to leverage expertise and capital. Initial funding mechanisms relied on overseas loans, with borrowing costs ranging from 10% to 12% amid elevated global interest rates, marking a shift toward to underwrite domestic investment. The second oil shock in 1979, precipitated by the and resulting in oil prices surging from US$13 to US$34 per barrel, intensified urgency, prompting approvals for accelerated project progression in mid-1979. These decisions committed the government to a total envelope of approximately NZ$10 billion over the subsequent decade, prioritizing energy infrastructure to mitigate import reliance equivalent to 70% of consumption at the time.

Government Implementation and Funding (1980-1984)

The implementation of the Think Big program during the early 1980s was coordinated primarily through newly established or expanded state-owned enterprises, including Petrocorp Exploration Ltd., which led efforts in utilization and development as part of joint ventures with private partners. Administrative execution emphasized centralized government oversight under the National administration, with delegated to these entities to accelerate timelines amid domestic shortages. By 1980, initial phases transitioned from to active , focusing on leveraging domestic resources like the gas field for . Funding relied on a combination of overseas borrowing and public-private partnerships, often structured as 50/50 splits to share costs and risks. The raised funds through loans, contributing to a peak in that reached approximately NZ$4.5 billion by the mid-1980s, directed toward outlays estimated at over NZ$10 billion across the program's portfolio. Private sector involvement, such as Mobil's partnership in initiatives, supplemented public funds but required guarantees amid volatile global markets. This model aimed to mitigate fiscal strain on domestic budgets while advancing national self-sufficiency goals. Key milestones included the 1982 groundbreaking for the synthetic fuels plant, a flagship project converting to and via Mobil's methanol-to- , marking the operational ramp-up of energy initiatives. As global oil prices declined sharply from 1982 onward—dropping over 50% by 1986 due to oversupply—adaptations involved scaling back full synthetic petrol output at facilities like , redirecting capacity toward higher-value to improve economic viability. These adjustments preserved investments despite reduced returns from oil-linked products. The program's momentum halted following the National Party's defeat in the July 1984 general election, with the incoming government under suspending further expansions and initiating reviews that led to partial asset sales, such as minority stakes in Petrocorp. This transition effectively wound down aggressive implementation by late 1984, shifting focus from growth-oriented borrowing to fiscal consolidation amid inherited debt burdens.

Key Projects

Energy Infrastructure Initiatives

The synthetic fuels plant in , a cornerstone of the Think Big energy initiatives, commenced construction in the early 1980s and opened in 1986 as the world's first commercial-scale facility converting to synthetic fuels via the methanol-to- () process. The plant processed primarily from the nearby field to produce synthetic petrol, with operations focusing on high-octane and other hydrocarbons until production of synthetic petrol ceased in 1997. Complementing Motunui, the Kapuni plant in , operational from 1982, utilized for and production, supporting energy-derived output integral to the program's resource utilization goals. This facility processed gas from the Kapuni field, discovered in , to generate between 240,000 and 270,000 tonnes of annually, leveraging intermediates akin to pathways. Gas infrastructure expansions centered on the field, discovered offshore in 1969 and brought into production in 1979, which supplied up to a significant portion of New Zealand's gas needs for downstream projects. Development involved substantial investment in pipelines and processing to feed and power generation, peaking as a primary domestic source during the . Hydroelectric capacity was bolstered by the on the , with construction starting in 1978 and the facility achieving full operation by 1990, featuring four turbine generators for a total installed capacity of 432 MW. Designed as New Zealand's second-largest hydro dam, it harnessed the river's flow for base-load to support industrial expansion. Proposals for in , aimed at converting local coal reserves into synthetic gas for fuels or chemicals, were explored but scaled back due to technical and economic challenges, resulting in only pilot-scale efforts rather than full commercial plants. These initiatives sought to diversify feedstocks amid oil vulnerabilities but did not advance to the scale of gas or projects.

Industrial and Resource Development Projects

The Think Big initiative encompassed non-energy industrial projects aimed at processing domestic resources to substitute imports and generate exports, particularly in fertilizers, metals, and chemicals. A primary project was the ammonia-urea plant at Kapuni, commissioned in 1982 to convert natural gas into fertilizer for agricultural self-sufficiency, reducing reliance on imported nitrogenous products. The facility, utilizing gas from nearby fields under government contracts, initially targeted production to meet domestic farming needs, with ongoing operations yielding around 265,000 tonnes of urea annually from syngas synthesis and urea granulation processes. In the steel sector, the Glenbrook mill—operated by —received major expansions during the early to boost output from local and scrap inputs, enhancing domestic supply for and while aiming to slab products. These upgrades, including new furnaces and rolling facilities, significantly scaled amid global oil shocks that raised import costs. The Waitara methanol plant, operational from 1985, processed Maui field into for international markets, leveraging abundant domestic feedstock to diversify exports beyond traditional commodities. Constructed as a standalone facility adjacent to earlier infrastructure, it produced high-purity via and , with initial capacity supporting trade volumes that offset energy import vulnerabilities. Feasibility assessments for a new smelter were pursued under Think Big to exploit hydroelectric potential for energy-intensive reduction of imported alumina, but plans stalled due to power generation shortfalls and high capital demands, limiting realization to expansions at the existing Tiwai Point site rather than development.

Implementation Challenges

Technical and Logistical Hurdles

The Think Big energy infrastructure projects grappled with formidable engineering and geological obstacles that protracted timelines and escalated expenditures. Construction of the , intended to harness hydroelectric potential from the , encountered pervasive fracturing in the underlying bedrock, complicating foundation stability and necessitating extensive grouting operations. Unanticipated active faults traversing the dam site demanded additional seismic assessments and remedial anchoring, while pervasive rock breakage hindered excavation efficiency. These issues culminated in the project's delayed completion and budget overruns, with the dam opening later than initially projected in 1992. Parallel challenges arose in pioneering gas-to-liquids conversion at the synthetic fuels facility, the first commercial-scale implementation worldwide, which integrated production from field gas followed by Mobil's methanol-to-gasoline process. Scaling this nascent technology from pilot to industrial volumes involved iterative of catalytic reactors and process integration, imposing unforeseen technical refinements during the 1980s commissioning phase. Logistical impediments compounded these efforts, as New Zealand's limited domestic capacity compelled reliance on overseas procurement for specialized machinery and components, amplifying vulnerabilities to shipping disruptions and material scarcities prevalent in the post-1980 global economic downturn. Heightened union militancy during the era further impeded workflows, with frequent industrial actions across construction sites disrupting schedules and inflating labor expenditures.

External Market Shifts and Adaptations

The collapse in global prices from approximately $37 per barrel in 1980 to an average of $14 per barrel in 1986, driven by Saudi Arabia's increased and waning geopolitical tensions, fundamentally altered the assumptions underpinning Think Big's projects. initiatives, including the plant designed to convert into and then , relied on prices remaining above $25–$30 per barrel to compete with imported crude; the downturn rendered domestic uneconomic, as the cost of gas-to-liquids exceeded market alternatives. In response, the government mothballed the synthetic gasoline module at Motunui in 1987, shifting focus to methanol output for export to markets in Asia where demand for the chemical as a feedstock remained robust. This adaptation preserved some operational viability but required ongoing state subsidies to offset losses from the original high-cost design, with total government support for fuel projects exceeding NZ$10 billion in nominal terms across the program, including post-crash interventions to maintain infrastructure. Compounding these pressures, the dollar's pre-1984 peg at elevated levels—sustained by and wage-price freezes—amplified debt-servicing burdens for Think Big's overseas borrowings, as export revenues in lagged import costs. The currency's 20% in July 1984, prompted by a balance-of-payments , inflated the domestic value of foreign-denominated obligations, further straining adaptations to the oil market shift despite improving export competitiveness thereafter.

Economic and Fiscal Outcomes

Quantitative Measures of Costs and Benefits

The Think Big initiatives entailed total public and company investments of approximately NZ$8.2 billion between 1979 and 1985, equivalent to about NZ$29 billion in 2022 dollars, with some estimates for flagship projects reaching as high as NZ$11 billion in period dollars. These expenditures financed major and industrial developments but were marked by widespread capital cost overruns, averaging over 50% across key projects. For instance, the synthetic fuels facility experienced a 37% overrun totaling NZ$1.887 billion, while the Marsden Point refinery expansion saw a 102% overrun of NZ$1.84 billion.
ProjectOverrun Amount (NZ$m)Overrun Percentage
Ammonia-urea12594%
(Waitara)262102%
Tiwai Point potline23735%
Synthetic fuels1,88737%
expansion1,840102%
Steel expansion2,25061%
Rail electrification250150%
1,400142%
The program's financing relied heavily on overseas borrowing, contributing to a sharp escalation in gross public debt from just over NZ$4 billion in 1975 to nearly NZ$22 billion by 1984. In 1986, the government nationalized NZ$5.6 billion in debts from four energy corporations, including NZ$1.85 billion for the Synthetic Fuels Corporation and NZ$2.05 billion for Refining Company. This borrowing pressure elevated net to 54.8% of GDP by 1992, reflecting opportunity costs such as reduced fiscal flexibility for non-infrastructure spending. On the benefits side, the projects targeted substitution for oil imports, which accounted for 4% of New Zealand's GNP in amid global price shocks. Developments like the gas field enhanced domestic energy supply, yielding sustained output that offset some import dependence into the and beyond, though exact savings were diminished by post-1980s oil price declines. Ex-post assessments indicate variable returns across projects: synthetic fuels initiatives incurred net losses due to overruns and unfavorable market shifts, while gas provided positive long-term fiscal contributions through reduced foreign exchange outflows. Overall, construction-phase investments supported GDP growth at rates of 0.5-1% annually during peak implementation, primarily via rather than gains.

Job Creation and Short-Term Stimulus Effects

The Think Big projects provided a short-term macroeconomic stimulus through substantial public investment in , generating direct and indirect in sectors such as and between 1980 and 1984. These activities contributed to sustaining relatively low amid the early 1980s and oil shocks, with New Zealand's rate rising modestly from 1.5% in 1980 to 4.3% in 1983, lower than many peers experiencing double-digit increases. In resource-dependent areas like , initiatives including the plant and gas field utilization created jobs and bolstered local , temporarily stabilizing regional economies reliant on . Fiscal spending under the program exhibited front-loaded multiplier effects typical of outlays, with analyses estimating government consumption multipliers around 0.7 on impact, potentially higher for capital-intensive projects due to spillovers.
YearUnemployment Rate (%)
19801.5
19813.4
19823.8
19834.3
19844.5
The table above reflects modeled ILO estimates, illustrating the program's role in moderating labor market pressures during peak implementation. Independent economists noted that while employment gains were concentrated in , they offered immediate relief without displacing hiring.

Criticisms and Controversies

Economic Inefficiency Claims

Critics of the Think Big program argued that heavy government intervention in selecting industrial projects resulted in inefficient and stranded assets, as state-directed investments often failed to adapt to market shifts. For instance, the synthetic fuels initiative, aimed at producing liquid fuels from and to hedge against oil import dependence, became uneconomic following the mid-1980s collapse in global prices from over $30 per barrel in 1985 to under $15 by 1986, rendering the facilities underutilized and costly to maintain. Opponents, including economists and opposition figures, contended that such "picking winners" by the state bypassed signals, leading to investments that prioritized political goals over commercial viability. The program's financing through overseas borrowing exacerbated fiscal pressures, with public debt escalating from approximately NZ$4.2 billion in 1975 to NZ$21.9 billion by , much of it attributable to Think Big outlays estimated at around NZ$7 billion in total costs. This debt accumulation, critics claimed, precipitated the 1984 economic crisis by crowding out other expenditures and amplifying vulnerability to rising international rates, which climbed to double digits in the early . By 1985, payments on consumed nearly 19% of total government expenses, a sharp rise from lower levels pre-Think Big, fueling arguments that the borrowing binge imposed a long-term burden that necessitated drastic reforms post-1984 election. Mainstream media and contemporary analyses in the frequently dubbed certain Think Big ventures "white elephants," highlighting projects like expanded refineries and plants that underperformed amid falling prices and overestimated demand. These critiques, often from left-leaning outlets and observers, portrayed the initiatives as emblematic of overreach, where upfront —totaling billions in taxpayer funds—yielded suboptimal returns compared to market-driven alternatives, though empirical assessments of exact waste varied due to incomplete data. The resulting fiscal strain, per detractors, not only strained the budget but also eroded public confidence, contributing to the and subsequent policy reversals.

Environmental and Sovereignty Debates

The , developed under the Think Big program, provoked environmental controversy through its inundation of the Cromwell basin, submerging over 400 square kilometers of land including agricultural areas and riparian zones critical to local . Construction in unstable terrain raised concerns about seismic risks and long-term ecological disruption, with opponents citing irreversible loss for despite the project's role in hydroelectric expansion. Empirical assessments post-completion documented altered river flows and patterns, underscoring trade-offs between benefits and downstream . Fossil fuel components of Think Big, including the gas-to-petrol facility and proposed at Synfuels, faced criticism for elevating carbon emissions amid global oil shocks, as production inherently yields higher outputs per energy unit compared to conventional refining. Detractors, including analysts, highlighted how these initiatives locked in dependencies, potentially exacerbating air quality issues and contributing to precursors from sulfur emissions in processing. Such projects exemplified causal tensions between immediate and deferred climatic costs, with limited contemporaneous emissions data but retrospective models indicating elevated footprints relative to imported alternatives. Sovereignty debates critiqued Think Big's reliance on foreign corporations for , such as multinational involvement in the Maui gas field development, which some argued diluted national resource autonomy despite the policy's intent to curb import vulnerabilities. Opponents contended that overseas borrowing and joint ventures exposed to external leverage, contrasting with the program's nationalist framing of resource domestication. Protests encompassed iwi objections to hydro schemes infringing on ancestral lands and waterways, as seen in Public Works Act challenges against , alongside actions against associated labor policies amid the 1980s wage constraints. groups mobilized against perceived ecological shortcuts, paralleling 2024 warnings from environmentalists that fast-track consenting legislation risks repeating Think Big-era oversights by prioritizing infrastructure over biodiversity and obligations.

Achievements and Defenses

Energy Independence Gains

The Think Big program's development of the and Kapuni gas fields provided with a sustained domestic supply of , reducing exposure to volatile international markets. The field, operational since the early , historically accounted for up to 80% of the country's gas production at its peak and continued to contribute approximately 17% as of 2019, supporting , industrial processes, and residential heating. Similarly, the Kapuni field's associated ammonia-urea plant, commissioned in 1982, maintained steady output for production, bolstering agricultural self-sufficiency and energy-derived inputs. The synthetic fuels facility, which began producing from in 1985, demonstrated long-term viability through adaptation; although synthetic petrol ended in 1997 due to falling prices, the plant was repurposed for output, with restarting operations in the 2010s and maintaining into the at capacities exceeding 650,000 tonnes annually. This flexibility buffered against the 1980s oil shocks, as gas-to-liquids processes substituted for a portion of imported crude-derived fuels, enabling to weather global price spikes more effectively than oil-dependent peers like . By the , the program's pivot to exports of value-added products from these assets generated significant . production at and the adjacent Waitara plant, combined with from Kapuni, contributed to exports valued at around NZ$1 billion annually in later assessments, with 1990s revenues in the hundreds of millions supporting balance-of-payments stability. These outputs diversified energy revenues beyond raw commodity sales, enhancing economic resilience derived from indigenous resources.

Long-Term Infrastructure Value

The Think Big program facilitated the construction of extensive infrastructure, including the Kapuni and gas gathering systems and high-pressure transmission pipelines spanning over 1,500 kilometers, which remain foundational to New Zealand's gas distribution network. These assets enabled the initial commercialization of the country's gas fields discovered in the , providing a domestic alternative to imported oil amid global supply disruptions. Although plants like were mothballed in the due to falling oil prices, the underlying pipelines and processing facilities have supported ongoing gas utilization for and industrial processes, contributing to without which import dependence could have intensified during subsequent price shocks. In the contemporary energy mix, derived from this underpins flexibility in power generation, accounting for approximately 9% of in 2023, particularly as a backup to resources during dry years. Gas also supplies key industries, comprising about 13.5% of total primary energy supply, with pipelines ensuring efficient delivery from Taranaki hubs to demand centers. Usage data from state-owned enterprises indicates sustained throughput, with annual gas consumption exceeding 150 petajoules in recent years, demonstrating the durability of these assets against narratives of wholesale obsolescence. multipliers are evident in areas like , where spurred ancillary industries and employment clusters that persist. Defenses from Muldoon-era advocates, including government economists, emphasized that the program's scale averted a potential collapse in balance-of-payments during the , when global prices quadrupled again; without accelerated domestic gas development, New Zealand's bill—already straining at over 80% foreign crude reliance—could have escalated by billions in adjusted terms. Post-hoc evaluations by analysts have credited select components, such as the Marsden Point refinery upgrade and gas lines, with internal rates of return exceeding 5% over decades when factoring in avoided costs and spillover effects, countering blanket inefficiency claims by highlighting causal links to reduced vulnerability.

Legacy and Reassessments

Impact on New Zealand's Energy Sector

The Think Big initiative catalyzed a shift in New Zealand's energy sector toward greater utilization of domestic resources, particularly following the 1979 Maui field discovery, which supplied feedstock for major projects. This included the synthetic fuels plant, operational from 1985, and the Marsden Point upgrade, which converted gas into and synthetic petrol, substituting for imported oil in transport fuels. At its peak, these facilities produced about one-third of the country's petrol requirements through the Mobil process. Natural gas production expanded to support these developments, with annual output reaching around 180 petajoules (PJ) in subsequent decades, enabling gas to comprise up to 30% of by 2002 as thermal peaking plants were commissioned. The policy's incentives for gas exploration and infrastructure laid groundwork for diversification, contributing to a mix where non-oil sources, including gas and , dominated stationary energy by the , reducing oil import vulnerability from over 90% of liquid fuels pre-Think Big to partial self-sufficiency in synthetics. Hydroelectric capacity also grew through Think Big-associated projects like the , completed in 1992 with 432 megawatts (MW) output, bolstering renewable baseload power and supporting amid gas commitments. Expertise developed in gas-to-liquids technologies fostered local engineering capabilities, influencing modern low-carbon transitions, such as hydrogen blending pilots by gas networks in the that leverage existing infrastructure for renewable gas integration.

Lessons for Contemporary Policy Debates

The Think Big program's experience underscores the risks of committing to large-scale infrastructure amid volatile global commodity prices, as the projects' economic viability hinged on sustained high oil prices that failed to materialize after the early 1980s. Evaluations assumed oil at around US$40 per barrel in constant terms, but prices collapsed to under US$15 by the mid-1980s, rendering synthetic fuel initiatives like the Motunui methanol plant temporarily unprofitable until gas feedstock adjustments in the 1990s. This highlights the need for contemporary policies to incorporate flexible mechanisms, such as phased implementation or hedging against price swings, rather than rigid targets insensitive to market signals—evident in recent oil fluctuations from US$120 per barrel in mid-2022 amid the Russia-Ukraine conflict to below US$70 by late 2023. In small, open economies like 's, which imported over 90% of its oil in the , state-directed investments can enhance energy sovereignty by diversifying domestic resources, reducing vulnerability to external shocks that amplify balance-of-payments pressures. While critics, including analyses from the New Zealand Initiative, decry Think Big as a net drain due to opportunity costs exceeding NZ$10 billion in adjusted terms, empirical reassessments credit it with foundational gains in gas exploration and hydro capacity that supported later exports and security. This suggests value in targeted state boldness over pure market reliance, particularly when global supply chains expose nations to geopolitical risks, as seen in 2022 supply disruptions; however, such interventions demand rigorous cost-benefit scrutiny to avoid subsidizing inefficiencies. Recent debates, including the Provincial Growth Fund's (PGF) US$3 billion allocation from 2018, illustrate tensions between empirical evaluation and ideological resistance to "big" government projects. A 2022 independent review found the PGF delivered tangible regional outcomes, such as 5,000+ jobs and upgrades, with decision-making improving over time through better regional input, contrasting Think Big's top-down approach. Yet, parallels emerge in criticisms of uneven returns and political allocation, prompting calls—echoed by economists like Easton—for development strategies that prioritize verifiable metrics over aversion to scale, as in ongoing 2024 fast-track consenting reforms aimed at accelerating without repeating past overruns. These experiences advocate assessing initiatives on causal impacts, such as long-term GDP contributions, rather than dismissing state roles outright in pursuit of amid persistent import dependencies.

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