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Volksgrenadier

Volksgrenadier divisions were infantry formations of the German Wehrmacht introduced in September 1944, designed as a streamlined replacement for depleted regular infantry units through a new organizational structure that emphasized increased automatic firepower, motorized mobility, and reduced manpower requirements.^[1]^[2] These divisions arose from directives issued after the destruction of Army Group Center in Operation Bagration and the collapse of forces in Normandy, incorporating remnants of shattered units, Luftwaffe field divisions, and hastily trained replacements to form a total of dozens of such divisions by war's end.^[3]^[4] Each Volksgrenadier division typically comprised three regiments with reinforced grenadier battalions equipped with more machine guns and assault guns relative to personnel, fewer artillery pieces, and greater reliance on bicycles and trucks over horses to facilitate rapid deployment amid fuel shortages.^[1]^[5] Deployed in critical operations such as the Ardennes Offensive, where units like the 18th and 62nd Volksgrenadier Divisions achieved initial penetrations against Allied lines, their performance highlighted both the efficacy of the updated tactics in defensive and counterattack roles and the overarching limitations imposed by inadequate training, equipment shortages, and strategic overextension.^[4]

Origins and Development

Strategic Context of Formation

By mid-1944, the German Wehrmacht confronted acute manpower shortages stemming from sustained high casualties across multiple fronts, exacerbated by the failure to achieve decisive victories and the intensification of Allied and Soviet offensives. Between June and August 1944 alone, German forces incurred over one million losses in killed, wounded, missing, or captured personnel, compounding earlier attrition from operations in Italy, the Eastern Front, and the Atlantic Wall defenses.^[6] These shortages were particularly dire following the Soviet Operation Bagration (launched June 22, 1944), which annihilated much of Army Group Center and inflicted approximately 450,000 German casualties, effectively destroying 28 divisions.^[7] Concurrently, the Allied Normandy landings on June 6, 1944, led to the near-total destruction of 25 out of 38 committed German divisions in the West, with overall casualties reaching 290,000 by the campaign's end in August.^[8]^[8] This cascade of defeats shifted German strategy from offensive maneuvers to a defensive posture, as directed by Adolf Hitler and the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), prioritizing the conservation of resources through leaner formations capable of holding fortified lines with maximized infantry effectiveness per available soldier. Standard infantry divisions, often reduced to 20-30% of authorized strength due to irreplaceable losses in men and materiel, could no longer sustain mobile warfare, necessitating a doctrinal pivot toward static defense and counterattack reserves.^[9] The multi-front strain—facing Anglo-American forces in the West, Soviets in the East, and partisans elsewhere—rendered traditional divisional structures untenable, prompting OKW to emphasize units that economized on personnel while enhancing firepower density to prolong resistance against superior enemy numbers.^[10] In response, Hitler issued directives in September 1944 for the rapid reconstitution of depleted units into Volksgrenadier divisions, aiming to salvage remnants from shattered formations and integrate fresh conscripts into a streamlined model suited for defensive attrition warfare. This reorganization, formalized around mid-September, reflected a pragmatic acknowledgment of resource limits, with the first such divisions assembling from survivors of Normandy and Eastern Front battles, enabling Germany to field approximately 27 new Volksgrenadier units by late 1944 despite ongoing hemorrhaging of combat power.^[9] The initiative underscored the causal link between summer 1944 catastrophes and late-war adaptations, forgoing offensive ambitions in favor of buying time through fortified, manpower-efficient infantry.^[11]

Initial Establishment and Expansion

The establishment of Volksgrenadier divisions was formalized by a German High Command directive dated 5 September 1944, which ordered the reorganization of 27 depleted infantry divisions into the new Volksgrenadier type to address manpower shortages through streamlined structures.^[5] This pragmatic measure reduced divisional strength to a nominal 10,072 men, compared to approximately 15,000–17,000 in earlier standard infantry divisions, by limiting each of the three grenadier regiments to two battalions rather than three, while compensating with increased automatic weapons for defensive firepower.^[12] Personnel were drawn primarily from veteran cadres of disbanded units, supplemented by limited conscripts from replacement pools, enabling quicker reconstitution amid resource constraints.^[13] Expansion proceeded rapidly despite logistical challenges, with additional Volksgrenadier divisions formed from remnants of shattered formations and new levies; by late 1944, at least 25 new divisions had been designated as such, building on 18 partially raised earlier in the year.^[14] This effort prioritized efficiency, merging traditional supply trains into platoon-level elements within infantry battalions to minimize overhead and enhance mobility.^[12] The process reflected adaptive ingenuity, as divisions achieved operational readiness in weeks rather than months, with units integrating bazookas and submachine guns at scale to offset numerical inferiority.^[12] By mid-December 1944, approximately 13 Volksgrenadier divisions were committed to the Ardennes Offensive, demonstrating the formation program's speed in generating combat-capable forces from improvised assemblies under severe shortages of vehicles, artillery, and trained reserves. These units, often at 60–80% strength, relied on cadre experience to maintain cohesion, underscoring the shift toward economical, defensively oriented infantry as a realistic response to attrition rather than expansive mobilization.^[13]

Organizational Structure

Divisional Composition

The Volksgrenadier division was organized around three grenadier regiments, each comprising two battalions to emphasize infantry-heavy defensive formations while reducing the need for regimental-level officers and staff that three-battalion structures demanded in prior division types.^[15]^[16] This fused regimental design conserved specialists and administrative overhead, yielding a more streamlined profile than the Type 1944 infantry division, which adopted a similar two-battalion per regiment layout but incorporated comparatively heavier support and reconnaissance elements better suited to semi-mobile operations.^[16] Supporting the infantry core was a single artillery regiment for concentrated fire support, alongside dedicated anti-tank and engineer battalions to enable rapid fortification and localized countermeasures against breakthroughs.^[15] Reconnaissance was handled by one battalion, often configured for terrain-bound scouting rather than extensive mechanized probing, aligning with the division's emphasis on static defense.^[15] Anti-tank battalions, frequently augmented by assault gun detachments, provided organic armor-defeating capacity without dependence on unattached panzer elements, adapting to prevalent mechanized threats through integrated, division-level firepower.^[9]

Regimental and Battalion Levels

The Volksgrenadier regiment was structured with two infantry battalions, a heavy support company, and an antitank company, designed to optimize firepower within constrained manpower. This configuration, outlined in Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) Kriegsstärkenachweisungen (KStN) lists from September 1944, reduced the regiment's total strength to approximately 2,228 men compared to over 3,000 in earlier infantry regiments, allowing for denser allocation of automatic weapons and anti-tank assets at lower levels.^[17]^[18] Each battalion comprised three rifle companies and one heavy weapons company, with an authorized strength of around 800 men, significantly less than the 1,000-plus in standard 1943-type battalions. The rifle companies emphasized squad-level combat power through nine-man squads equipped with light machine guns (often MG42 variants) and submachine guns like the MP40 or StG 44, enabling higher rates of automatic fire per soldier. This shift traded quantity of personnel and support weapons—such as fewer heavy mortars—for concentrated grenade and Panzerfaust distribution, with squads typically carrying multiple anti-tank grenades and at least one Panzerfaust per team to counter armored threats directly.^[17]^[12] The heavy weapons company per battalion included two machine-gun platoons with eight MG42 heavy machine guns, an infantry gun platoon with four 7.5 cm leIG 18 guns, and a mortar platoon with six 8 cm Granatwerfer 34 mortars, providing mobile fire support while maintaining the battalion's reduced footprint. Regimental-level heavy elements, such as the 13th Company's four additional 7.5 cm guns and eight 12 cm mortars, supplemented battalion assets but were offset by the overall emphasis on infantry close-assault tactics over sustained artillery barrages. These trade-offs, per OKH directives, aimed to enhance tactical flexibility and defensive density against superior Allied firepower and mobility.^[18]^[12]

Equipment and Logistics

Infantry and Support Weapons

The primary individual weapon for Volksgrenadier infantry remained the Karabiner 98k bolt-action rifle, with approximately 309 allocated per battalion alongside a higher emphasis on automatic weapons to prioritize short-range suppressive fire.^[17] Submachine guns, particularly the MP40, supplemented this, but allocations shifted toward the Sturmgewehr 44 (StG 44) assault rifle in assault-oriented rifle companies, with estimates of up to 55 StG 44 per three-company battalion grouping for enhanced volume of fire at typical engagement distances under 300 meters.^[17] These early StG 44 deployments, intended to equip select Sturm platoons within Volksgrenadier formations raised from September 1944, marked one of the weapon's initial widespread infantry integrations beyond specialized units.^[17] Machine gun support centered on the MG 42 general-purpose machine gun, with 8 heavy-configured MG 42 per battalion heavy company and additional light machine guns (often MG 42 variants) totaling around 30 per battalion, yielding denser automatic coverage than prior infantry tables for defensive positions.^[17] Anti-tank capabilities at the squad and platoon level featured Panzerfausts distributed to rifle squads (typically 1-2 per squad based on 1944 issuance directives) and Panzerschrecks in dedicated Panzerjäger companies, with 54 launchers per battalion-level AT unit to counter armored breakthroughs without relying on divisional heavies.^[15] Limited organic assault gun support included occasional StuG III attachments per 1944 equipment tables, prioritizing mobility over towed pieces.^[15] Defensive fire support drew from 6 x 81 mm (8 cm) mortars per battalion and 4 x 75 mm leichte Infanteriegeschütz 18 guns, enabling rapid, localized barrages while omitting heavy towed artillery to streamline formation lightness.^[17] Divisional Nebelwerfer rocket launchers, reduced to battalion strength of 18-21 tubes in some waves, provided concentrated area saturation for infantry holding lines, compensating for artillery shortages through high-volume, short-duration salvos.^[15]

Transport, Artillery, and Supply Considerations

Volksgrenadier divisions prioritized animal-powered transport to address severe fuel shortages, substituting horses and mules for motorized vehicles in towing artillery, supply wagons, and equipment. Each division typically required 4,000 to 6,000 horses for these purposes, far exceeding the 200 to 300 motorized vehicles available, which were reserved primarily for command and essential reconnaissance roles. This reliance on equine transport reduced dependency on petroleum—already critically limited by Allied bombing and resource constraints—but imposed slower march rates and vulnerability to weather, as horses required forage and rest that motorized alternatives did not.^[19]^[6] Artillery organization reflected similar economization, with the divisional regiment structured into four battalions: one of lighter 75mm guns (typically 12-16 pieces) for rapid support, two battalions of 105mm howitzers (12 guns each), and one of 150mm howitzers (12 guns), yielding about 36 medium and heavy tubes in total. Compared to standard 1944 infantry divisions, which fielded three battalions often emphasizing more 105mm and 150mm pieces for sustained fire (up to 48-60 heavy-caliber guns in some configurations), Volksgrenadier artillery was scaled back to conserve ammunition, trained crews, and draft animals—each gun battery needing 6-12 horses for mobility. Emphasis fell on mobile field pieces suited for counter-battery roles rather than prolonged barrages, aligning with defensive doctrines amid resource scarcity.^[20]^[12] Supply considerations underscored these constraints, as horse-drawn columns limited daily advance to 15-20 km under ideal conditions, far below motorized norms, and struggled with mud or snow as seen in the Ardennes Offensive of December 1944. Ammunition distribution favored infantry small arms over artillery shells to maximize combat endurance, with initial dumps holding 15,000 tons across Army Group B but rapid depletion due to poor forward delivery—horse teams could haul only fractions of the tonnage managed by trucks. Overall divisional transport capacity was effectively halved relative to mechanized peers, prioritizing immediate tactical needs over sustained operations and contributing to stalled momentum when fuel for limited vehicles ran dry.^[6]^[21]

Manpower and Training

Sources of Personnel

Volksgrenadier divisions drew personnel from remnants of frontline units decimated on the Eastern Front, providing a cadre of battle-hardened soldiers to form the divisions' nucleus. These experienced troops, often survivors from destroyed infantry divisions, were supplemented by transfers from Luftwaffe field divisions and other services, such as the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division's remnants used to organize the 560th Volksgrenadier Division in October 1944.^[9] This integration aimed to instill cohesion and tactical proficiency in newly formed units amid Germany's manpower shortages following the Soviet Operation Bagration in summer 1944.^[22] The divisions typically incorporated 40-50% experienced personnel as a core, with the remainder filled by conscripts under the total mobilization decrees issued after the July 1944 assassination attempt on Hitler, drawing from 17- to 18-year-old recruits and older reserves previously deemed unfit or assigned to rear duties. For instance, the 257th Volksgrenadier Division sourced 40% of its manpower from veteran pools, enabling a structured hierarchy over purely novice formations.^[23] Unlike the paramilitary Volkssturm militia, Volksgrenadier units remained professional Wehrmacht entities, subject to regular army conscription and organization rather than local levies. Divisions like the 12th Volksgrenadier were built around veteran cadres to facilitate rapid operational readiness, contrasting with green units reliant on untrained fillers. This approach prioritized causal effectiveness through seasoned leadership, though overall personnel quality varied by the availability of Eastern Front survivors and inter-service transfers.^[24]^[25]

Training Methods and Preparedness

Training for Volksgrenadier divisions was markedly abbreviated compared to pre-war standards, typically lasting 4 to 6 weeks from formation to operational readiness, reflecting the acute manpower shortages and urgent frontline needs in late 1944.^[26]^[9] This compressed timeline prioritized rapid assembly over comprehensive skill development, with recruits often drawn from replacement depots undergoing squad-level drills in basic infantry maneuvers, marksmanship, and defensive positioning rather than extended field exercises.^[9] Doctrinal emphasis shifted toward defensive operations, incorporating 1944 infantry manuals that stressed anti-tank tactics using Panzerfausts and close-quarters combat in fortified lines, supplemented by simulated engagements to mimic urban and hedgerow fighting.^[9] Training incorporated Wehrmacht-standard procedures, including ideological reinforcement akin to but distinct from Volkssturm militias, focusing on unit cohesion through repetitive platoon assaults and withdrawal drills under simulated artillery fire. However, shortages in live ammunition, vehicles, and heavy weapons frequently limited practical exercises to theoretical instruction and dry runs.^[26] Preparedness varied widely by division; for instance, units earmarked for the Ardennes Offensive in December 1944 received additional 1-2 weeks of specialized training in night fighting and forest movement starting early that month, yet many entered combat with incomplete familiarization on new equipment like the StG 44 assault rifle.^[9] Unit reports indicated that divisions such as the 12th Volksgrenadier suffered from insufficient cohesive training, contributing to inconsistent performance despite high motivation in some cases.^[27] Overall, this rushed preparation resulted in forces capable of static defense but vulnerable in maneuver warfare due to limited experience in coordinated advances.^[26]

Combat Operations

Engagements on the Western Front

![Volksgrenadiers advancing in Luxembourg during the Ardennes Offensive]float-right Volksgrenadier divisions were deployed to the Western Front in late 1944 to bolster defenses against advancing Allied forces following the Normandy breakout.^[28] These units, characterized by their lighter structure and reliance on terrain for defensive advantages, participated in several key engagements aimed at delaying or countering U.S. Army offensives.^[29] In the Hürtgen Forest battle from September 19 to December 1944, the 275th Volksgrenadier Division defended against U.S. First Army assaults, utilizing the dense woods, mud, and prepared positions to inflict heavy casualties and slow advances toward the Roer River dams.^[29] German forces, including the 275th, contributed to the overall U.S. losses of at least 33,000 killed, wounded, and non-combat casualties in the prolonged fight, which exhausted American divisions through attrition and environmental challenges.^[30] During the Ardennes Offensive, initiated on December 16, 1944, Volksgrenadier divisions such as the 212th, 26th, 277th, and 560th supported the 5th and 6th Panzer Armies' thrusts, securing initial breakthroughs against surprised U.S. defenses in the lightly held sector.^[28] These infantry formations cleared roads and held flanks, enabling panzer elements to penetrate up to 50 miles eastward in the salient's deepest points before Allied reinforcements and weather shifts halted the advance by late December.^[28]^[4] In subsequent defensive actions, such as Operation Nordwind launched on January 1, 1945, in Alsace, the 257th Volksgrenadier Division and others confronted U.S. Seventh Army units, contesting ground in the Low Vosges and plains to divert resources from the Bulge counteroffensive.^[31] German after-action reports indicate these divisions maintained lines amid severe attrition, with the 257th engaging in house-to-house fighting despite mounting losses from artillery and air interdiction.^[31]

Engagements on the Eastern Front

Volksgrenadier divisions played a role in the initial stages of the Soviet Vistula-Oder Offensive, launched on January 12, 1945, where units such as the 45th Volksgrenadier Division defended positions along the Vistula River against overwhelming Soviet forces from the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts. These divisions, often understrength and facing numerical superiority exceeding 10:1 in some sectors, conducted tenacious rearguard actions that delayed Soviet breakthroughs, inflicting significant casualties through prepared defenses and counterattacks before conducting an orderly withdrawal over approximately 300 miles to the Oder River line by early February. German records indicate that such defenses contributed to Soviet losses estimated at over 295,000 killed during the offensive, highlighting the effectiveness of Volksgrenadier formations in attritional fighting despite material shortages.^[32]^[33] In the subsequent East Pomeranian Offensive, commencing February 24, 1945, remnants of Volksgrenadier divisions integrated into Army Group Vistula provided stiff resistance in pockets around key fortifications, including operations near Küstrin on the Oder. Divisions like the 548th Volksgrenadier, previously engaged in East Prussia, supported defensive efforts against Soviet advances aimed at securing flanks for the Berlin operation, achieving localized casualty ratios favoring German defenders at times exceeding 1:3 based on Wehrmacht after-action reports from encircled positions. These actions emphasized elastic defense tactics, with Volksgrenadier units leveraging terrain and limited artillery to blunt Soviet infantry assaults, though encirclements ultimately forced piecemeal retreats or surrenders.^[34] By the final phases in March-April 1945, surviving Volksgrenadier elements were absorbed into Army Group Vistula's ad hoc formations defending Pomerania, Silesia, and the Oder bridges, where they participated in counteroffensives like Operation Solstice (February 15-18) to relieve besieged garrisons. Despite tactical successes in holding defensive lines against superior Soviet armor and artillery, the broader collapse stemmed from strategic overextension and fuel shortages rather than inherent unit deficiencies, as evidenced by mass surrenders totaling over 200,000 German troops in May following the Soviet capture of Berlin—reflecting encirclement by multiple fronts rather than routs in direct engagements. German logistical logs from the period underscore that Volksgrenadier rearguards maintained cohesion longer than expected, preserving some operational mobility until fuel and ammunition exhaustion dictated capitulation.^[35]

Assessment and Legacy

Tactical Strengths and Achievements

Volksgrenadier divisions emphasized defensive resilience through optimized squad-level firepower, incorporating a higher density of automatic weapons like the MG42 machine gun and submachine guns to deliver intense short-range volumes of fire superior to standard infantry formations. This configuration supported localized counterattacks, enhancing unit cohesion under veteran non-commissioned officers who leveraged experienced cadres to maintain discipline amid high attrition.^[9]^[36] In the Hürtgen Forest campaign from September to December 1944, Volksgrenadier units such as the 275th Division executed tenacious defenses that exploited terrain advantages, significantly impeding U.S. First Army advances and inflicting disproportionate casualties despite lacking elite status. Their prepared positions and rapid reinforcement tactics delayed Allied breakthroughs for weeks, compelling American forces to commit additional divisions to overcome entrenched resistance.^[37]^[38] During the Ardennes Offensive on December 16, 1944, divisions including the 12th Volksgrenadier achieved initial penetrations against surprised U.S. defenders, advancing several kilometers in the northern sector through coordinated infantry assaults that outmaneuvered thin American lines. Benefiting from veteran leadership under commanders like Gerhard Engel, these units demonstrated tactical proficiency in exploiting gaps, sustaining momentum despite overall numerical disadvantages in manpower and armor.^[27]^[36]

Criticisms and Limitations

The Volksgrenadier divisions suffered from severe training deficiencies, as recruits—often drawn from Luftwaffe ground personnel, naval units, elderly reservists, and young conscripts—received only 2 to 4 weeks of abbreviated instruction focused on basic infantry tactics, rather than the rigorous preparation of regular Wehrmacht divisions. This hasty integration fostered low unit cohesion, with many formations exhibiting high rates of straggling, surrender, and desertion when subjected to sustained combat pressure, as evidenced by late-war German army analyses indicating morale collapse in undertrained units outside elite refits.^[39]^[40] Logistical constraints exacerbated these issues, particularly the dependence on horse-drawn transport for artillery and supplies, which comprised up to 80% of non-motorized movement in many divisions. In the Ardennes Offensive of December 1944, this reliance led to critical failures after initial penetrations, as horses struggled in deep snow and mud, disrupting resupply and causing flank units to disintegrate when forward momentum halted; horse units often failed to link with requesting formations, limiting operational sustainment to mere days.^[6]^[41]^[21] Specific operational breakdowns highlighted artillery shortfalls and vulnerability to counter-battery fire. The 559th Volksgrenadier Division, deployed in Lorraine during September 1944, launched attacks in the Gorze-Gremecey Forest area but rapidly lost cohesion against the U.S. 35th Infantry Division, undermined by ineffective artillery response to superior Allied barrages and limited heavy weapons integration, resulting in heavy casualties and positional collapse within days.^[42]^[14] ![Grenadiers advancing in Luxembourg during the Ardennes Offensive][float-right] These limitations stemmed from resource scarcity amid Germany's deteriorating war economy, rendering Volksgrenadier units ill-suited for prolonged defensive or offensive roles beyond short, surprise engagements.^[6]

Comparative Effectiveness and Historical Debates

Volksgrenadier divisions were structured to deliver 70-80% of the combat power of standard late-war infantry divisions in defensive operations, compensating for reduced manpower (typically 10,500-11,000 men versus 12,000-15,000 in regulars) through higher densities of automatic weapons like the MG42 machine gun and allocated assault guns, though their horse-drawn logistics halved mobility compared to motorized formations.^[43]^[9] Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) assessments rated many as equivalent to full divisions in static defense due to these firepower offsets, particularly when augmented by veteran cadres from rebuilt units, enabling effective holding actions against superior numbers.^[44] Offensive capabilities, however, suffered from inadequate training and transport, often limiting sustained advances. Historiographical debates center on their relative performance amid Germany's deteriorating strategic position. Proponents of effectiveness, drawing from unit records and veteran accounts, emphasize instances where cadre-led Volksgrenadier formations achieved localized successes through aggressive small-unit tactics and defensive firepower, inflicting disproportionate casualties on attackers—metrics analyzed by quantitative historians like Niklas Zetterling indicate German forces overall maintained 1.5:1 casualty infliction advantages over Western Allies into late 1944, attributable in part to such units' resilience rather than elite status.^[45] Critics, including analyses of Allied breakthroughs, argue their rushed formation from undertrained reserves rendered them futile against overwhelming materiel and air superiority, with Kampfstufe ratings (combat value classifications) frequently at III or IV—indicating partial effectiveness—reflecting systemic manpower dilution rather than tactical innovation.^[44] These views often overlook causal factors like Allied interdiction, privileging narratives of inevitable German collapse, though empirical data from division diaries show no independent morale breakdown beyond ammunition shortages and encirclements. In legacy, Volksgrenadier formations functioned as pragmatic stopgaps, extending coherent resistance by 3-6 months through optimized defensive economies, challenging post-war academic emphases on 1944 inevitability by demonstrating adaptive resource allocation amid total war constraints. Quantitative evaluations, such as those cross-referencing OKW returns with Allied reports, affirm their role in stabilizing fronts temporarily without evidence of ideological desertion spikes decoupled from material defeat, underscoring causal primacy of logistics over cohesion in late-war outcomes.

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[PDF] Operational Art in the 1944 Ardennes Campaign - DTIC
Dec 9, 2024 · Transportation problems 4urther aggravated the biggest logistical problem for the. Germans in the Ardennes: lack of fuel. The inability to ...
[45]
[PDF] The Lorraine Campaign - Army University Press
-. (See Figure 3.) Figure 1. German Volksgrenadier Division, 1944. 8. Page 14. Figure 2. German Panzer Division, 1944. Figure 3. German Panzer Grenadier ...Missing: directive | Show results with:directive
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[PDF] Some Allied and German Casualty Rates in the European Theater of ...
The list reveals that, even if the T/0 of the relatively weak. Volksgrenadier Division (11,197) be taken as a basis for comparison, two-thirds of the total ...
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How did the German volksgrenadier divisions perform compared to ...
Dec 8, 2021 · All German divisions were graded periodically by their higher commanders as to their readiness and capability, according to a scale of Kampfwert ...How Combat Performance of Volksgrenadier during late War? - RedditIs there any evidence that German volksgrenadiers were effective in ...More results from www.reddit.comMissing: per | Show results with:per
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Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and ...
Jan 6, 2020 · Niklas Zetterling's revised and update version of his excellent book Normandy 1944 is being re-issued. According to Amazon.com it will be ...Missing: Volksgrenadier | Show results with:Volksgrenadier