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ANA Special Operations Command

The Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) was the elite special operations component of the Afghan National Army, established in 2011 as a division-level headquarters overseeing commando and special forces units modeled on U.S. special operations structures. Comprising approximately 17,000 personnel organized into two special operations brigades with ten kandaks (battalions) of commandos and special forces, ANASOC conducted high-risk missions including raids on insurgent leaders, counter-terrorism operations, and support to conventional forces, accounting for about 70 percent of Afghanistan's offensive military actions during its active period. These units, trained extensively by U.S. and NATO special operations forces at facilities like Camp Commando, demonstrated higher combat effectiveness and lower attrition rates compared to regular Afghan army formations, though their operational success heavily relied on foreign air support, intelligence, and logistics. ANASOC's structure evolved to include specialized elements such as the Ktah Khas counter-terrorism unit and Mobile Strike Force brigades, enabling rapid response capabilities across Afghanistan's regions, but systemic challenges including , leadership failures, and dependence on external enablers undermined long-term sustainability. In the lead-up to the , ANASOC units fought tenaciously in isolated engagements, such as recapturing districts without reinforcement, but were ultimately overwhelmed by numerical superiority, supply shortages, and the broader disintegration of following the U.S. withdrawal. Many commandos faced execution upon surrender or were absorbed into ranks, marking the effective end of ANASOC as an independent force, with surviving veterans contributing to networks monitoring insurgent threats.

Overview

Mission and Role

The Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) functioned as the centralized authority for directing and executing within the Afghan National Army, with a core mission to organize, recruit, train, equip, and deploy elite forces capable of conducting high-impact missions against insurgent threats. Established in , ANASOC oversaw units including commando kandaks and special forces kandaks, emphasizing capabilities in direct action raids, , and disruption of enemy leadership and networks to support broader goals aligned with the Afghan constitution. ANASOC's role extended to countering Taliban and other insurgent groups through targeted operations that conventional ANA units were less suited to perform, such as rapid assaults on high-value targets and intelligence-driven strikes in contested areas. By 2018, the command had grown to authorize over 11,000 personnel across two special operations brigades and ten kandaks, focusing on building self-sustaining Afghan special warfare capacity while partnering with coalition forces for advisory support under NATO's Resolute Support Mission. This structure aimed to defend territorial sovereignty and prevent Afghanistan from serving as a terrorist safe haven, though operational effectiveness often depended on integration with international partners. In doctrinal terms, ANASOC prioritized unconventional warfare tactics modeled on U.S. principles, including and , to enable precise, low-footprint interventions that minimized civilian risks while maximizing insurgent attrition. Units under ANASOC command were deployed across Afghanistan's areas, with at least one battalion per region to address localized threats, contributing to the ANA's overall objective of independent security provision by the mid-2010s.

Organizational Structure

The ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC) was headquartered in and structured to command elite and special warfare units optimized for , unconventional operations, and national-level missions, with a total authorized strength peaking at around 22,000 personnel before the 2021 government collapse. Its core tactical elements consisted of ten Special Operations Kandaks (SOKs), each a battalion-sized unit of approximately 800 commandos trained for raids, clearing operations, and high-risk engagements, initially aligned with regional ANA corps but later consolidated under brigade-level oversight. These SOKs formed the backbone of ANASOC's commando forces and were grouped into two to four regional Special Operations s as the command matured; the 1st Special Operations was activated on August 20, 2013, at Thunder in Paktya Province to enhance command and control for eastern operations, followed by the 2nd for western and additional brigades up to the 4th by 2018. Each typically included multiple SOKs supplemented by companies for flexibility in supporting conventional ANA units. Complementing the commandos, ANASOC incorporated the Afghan National Army Special Forces (ANASF), comprising four dedicated Special Forces Kandaks (1st through 4th) focused on advising partner forces, village stability operations, and long-term through . Elite sub-units included the Ktah Khas (KK), a - to company-sized counterterrorism force equivalent to tier-one , which conducted raids. Support components rounded out the structure, including a kandak for sustainment, a kandak for targeting and , a for communications, and the National Mission Brigade, established on July 31, 2017, which assumed control of the 6th SOK (a "national kandak" based in ) and KK for strategic reserve and crisis response roles. This brigade-level organization aimed to enable independent ANASOC operations while integrating with advisory elements, though persistent challenges in and attrition affected full manning.

Historical Development

Predecessors and Early Initiatives

The modern elements of the Afghan National Army (ANA) evolved from early post-2001 efforts to build elite units capable of conducting raids, reconnaissance, and operations, initially drawing personnel from conventional ANA battalions. The concept for dedicated forces was developed by the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A), a U.S.-led coalition entity focused on partnering with and training Afghan counterparts to target insurgent networks. In 2006, an initial cadre of Afghan trainees underwent specialized preparation in Jordan, providing the foundational skills for subsequent unit formations and emphasizing tactics modeled on Western doctrines. This training initiative addressed gaps in the ANA's early capabilities, where conventional kandaks (battalions) lacked the specialized training for high-risk missions in rugged terrain against and holdouts. By 2007, the ANA established its first two Commando Kandaks through the repurposing of soldiers from an existing conventional battalion, enabling rapid deployment for offensive operations without starting from scratch. These units underwent a rigorous selection process, including 10 weeks of basic training followed by advanced courses at Camp Morehead, approximately 6 miles south of , under mentorship from U.S. Army , French special operators, and contractors. The approach prioritized combat effectiveness over ethnic quotas initially, though later expansions incorporated diversity requirements that sometimes diluted unit cohesion. Parallel early efforts laid groundwork for ANA Special Forces kandaks, initiated as a distinct program under Brigadier General Ed Reeder's direction within CJSOTF-A, aiming to form operational teams akin to U.S. Special Forces A-detachments for village stability and long-term advisory roles. Training cycles for these candidates involved accelerated 8-week programs followed by 26 weeks of on-the-job qualification, reflecting resource constraints and the need to balance commando expansion with special forces development. By March 2008, initial ANA commando elements demonstrated operational readiness, conducting independent missions that validated the efficacy of coalition-led in building self-sustaining capabilities.

Creation of Commando Kandaks

The Commando Kandaks were established to provide the Afghan National Army (ANA) with elite light infantry units capable of executing complex counterinsurgency operations. The program originated in September 2006, drawing from existing ANA infantry personnel to form specialized battalions through intensive training modeled on U.S. Army Ranger regimens. This initiative addressed the need for forces with superior mobility, firepower, and tactical proficiency beyond standard ANA capabilities, initially planned as one kandak per regional corps. Training commenced at facilities like Camp Morehead near , where candidates underwent a demanding curriculum led by U.S. mentors, emphasizing small-unit tactics, raids, and endurance under combat conditions. The first cohort, selected from the 201st , completed the inaugural course and graduated as the 1st Commando Kandak on July 24, 2007, under Colonel Fareed Ahmadi's command. This unit, comprising approximately 600 personnel, was immediately deployed for operations, conducting its initial mission in September 2007 alongside partnered U.S. forces. Subsequent kandaks followed a similar formation process, with the 2nd assigned to the 203rd and others aligned to the 205th, 207th, and 209th , ensuring each ANA corps had dedicated commando assets. By 2009, four kandaks were fully operational, with a fifth in training, totaling around 3,000 commandos structured for rapid response and integration with conventional forces. These units operated under corps command initially, focusing on high-risk missions while building ANA self-sufficiency through partnered advisory roles.

Development of Special Forces

The development of special forces in the Afghan National Army built upon the foundational commando kandaks by incorporating dedicated Afghan National Army Special Forces (ANASF) elements, emphasizing advanced tactical training and operational autonomy under U.S. mentorship. Plans for ANASF were formulated in 2009, aiming to create specialized teams capable of independent direct action and unconventional warfare missions. These efforts expanded the special operations framework beyond conventional commando roles, integrating small-unit special forces teams modeled after U.S. Army Special Forces operational detachment-alpha structures. By 2011, with the establishment of the ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC), special forces development accelerated through unified command structures that oversaw both commandos and emerging ANASF units. U.S. Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan provided intensive training, including the first ANASF Qualification Course at Camp Morehead, focusing on skills like reconnaissance, sabotage, and advising Afghan irregular forces. This period saw the growth of special operations kandaks (SOKs), each incorporating eight ANASF teams alongside commando companies, enabling scalable operations in counterinsurgency environments. Expansion continued into the mid-2010s, with long-term goals by targeting 72 ANASF A-teams organized into four kandaks under a dedicated group. The 10th SOK was established in early 2015, reflecting sustained growth in personnel and capabilities, partly funded by reallocating positions from conventional ANA units to bolster ANASOC's effectiveness. emphasized self-sufficiency, with Afghan instructors increasingly leading courses, though U.S. advisors remained critical for doctrinal refinement and integration until the 2021 . By this phase, ANASOC had evolved into a battle-tested force of approximately two brigades and ten SOKs, demonstrating higher retention and combat performance compared to regular ANA units.

Establishment of Unified Command

The Afghan National Army (ANA) established the Special Operations Command (ANASOC) in 2011 to consolidate oversight of its disparate elite units, including the Commando Brigade and emerging Special Forces elements, which had previously operated under fragmented command structures within the broader ANA. This unification aimed to streamline planning, training, and deployment for high-risk missions, particularly counterinsurgency operations against Taliban and affiliated insurgents, by centralizing resources and expertise at a dedicated headquarters. The decision reflected lessons from earlier decentralized efforts, where commando kandaks formed since 2007 had proven effective but lacked integrated special operations doctrine and support. ANASOC headquarters was formally activated in April 2011 by the ANA , with initial basing at Camp Morehead in Wardak Province, approximately 25 kilometers south of . The command was structured as a two-star headquarters initially, overseeing approximately 4,000 personnel across special operations kandaks, enabling rapid response capabilities independent of conventional ANA . This establishment marked a shift toward a professionalized framework, modeled partly on partner practices, to build Afghan-led forces capable of independent action amid transitioning security responsibilities from international partners. By late 2011, ANASOC had integrated operational control of six commando kandaks and begun incorporating specialized intelligence and support units, enhancing overall in contested areas. The unification under ANASOC addressed prior inefficiencies, such as varying training standards and logistical dependencies, by standardizing selection and protocols, which contributed to a reported increase in successful independent operations by 2012. However, early challenges included reliance on advisors for sustainment and the need for expanded recruitment to scale capabilities, as the command grew to encompass over 10,000 personnel by 2015 through additional kandak activations. This foundational structure persisted until 2017, when President elevated ANASOC to corps status, further formalizing its role within the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.

Training and Capabilities

Recruitment and Selection

Recruitment for the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) primarily draws from serving personnel within the regular Afghan National Army (ANA), with candidates volunteering for specialized roles in Commando Kandaks or Afghan National Army (ANASF) units. Volunteers from the broader ANA pool undergo initial screening at provincial recruiting , including verification of national identification, age requirements (typically 18-28 years, with possible waivers), and character references from two village elders and a official. This process aims to ensure loyalty and basic suitability before advancing to specialized vetting. Vetting for ANASOC candidates incorporates enhanced biometric and background checks, often supported by U.S. Command () technologies to screen for insurgent ties or criminal history, particularly for transfers from other units. Medical pre-screening follows, conducted by the of Defense's commissar offices, with final approval required prior to selection testing. Incentives such as an additional $50 monthly pay supplement Commando service to attract qualified applicants. Selection involves a rigorous physical and tactical assessment, such as the multi-day evaluation courses modeled on U.S. standards, where candidates—often numbering around 200 per cycle—endure endurance tests, obstacle courses, and combat simulations to demonstrate resilience and aptitude. rates are high; for instance, early ANASF selections from the Brigade saw 145 volunteers reduced to 69 passers after a one-week in 2007. By 2011, to preserve experienced personnel, ANASF expanded to regular ANA soldiers, requiring completion of basic training and demonstrated performance. Advanced ANASF candidates are typically drawn from Commandos with at least four years of service, emphasizing operational experience alongside physical criteria.

Training Programs

Training for ANA Special Operations Command personnel was centralized at the School of Excellence, part of Camp Commando near , which handled selection, assessment, and advanced instruction for commandos, , and support elements. This facility hosted concurrent programs, enabling the preparation of up to 2,000 soldiers annually by 2018 through rigorous, multi-phase curricula emphasizing combat proficiency and operational readiness. The flagship Commando Course spanned 12 to 14 weeks, incorporating phases of physical conditioning, advanced marksmanship, small-unit tactics, demolitions, , and live-fire maneuvers under simulated combat conditions. Trainees, selected from experienced , faced high attrition rates to ensure only elite performers advanced, with instruction delivered by Afghan cadre supplemented by U.S. advisors focusing on tactical innovation and . Graduates earned the Commando tab, qualifying them for assignment to kandaks within the Afghan National Army Commando Corps. Special Forces training within ANASOC built on Commando foundations, modeling U.S. Operational Detachment-Alpha teams through extended instruction in , intelligence operations, and raids. Specialized programs included the eight-week Armorer Course for weapons maintenance on commando-specific equipment and the Cobra Strike Maneuver Course for mobile strike kandaks, enhancing mobility and strike capabilities post-Commando graduation. U.S. advisors played a pivotal role across these efforts, conducting partner-led training evolutions to transition leadership to Afghan instructors while addressing doctrinal gaps.

Equipment and Doctrine

The Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) utilized a combination of U.S.-provided modern weaponry and retained Soviet-era equipment for its and special forces kandaks. Standard small arms included the as the primary infantry weapon, alongside 9mm pistols for sidearms. Machine guns such as the M249 (5.56mm) and M240B/G (7.62mm) provided capability, while specialized roles employed the M24 and MK-19 grenade launchers. Legacy systems like the PKM machine gun, RPK light machine gun, and rocket-propelled grenade launchers remained in use, reflecting the mixed inventory inherited from prior Afghan forces. Protective and load-carrying gear consisted of jackets and trousers—predominantly pattern for commandos—along with helmets, black boots, and load-bearing vests. emphasized mobility, with Humvees (HMMWVs in variants like 1114 and 1151) serving as primary transport, supplemented by pickups and International 7-ton trucks for . The Special Mission Wing (SMW), activated in July 2012, incorporated Mi-17 helicopters for air mobility and insertion, alongside , enabling rapid deployment across . However, equipment maintenance challenges persisted due to logistical constraints and low technical literacy among personnel, leading to underutilization of advanced items like encrypted radios and devices. ANASOC doctrine drew from U.S. principles, focusing on missions such as raids, ambushes, cordon-and-search operations, and against high-value targets. kandaks operated as rapidly deployable , emphasizing and with operations typically limited to under 72 hours to maintain operational tempo without extensive self-sustainment. followed evolving ANA frameworks, with ANASOC reporting directly to the Chief of General Staff and integrating with corps-level elements, though draft doctrines like ANA Regulation 1-3.6 on awaited full field-testing as of 2012. Tactics prioritized intelligence-driven strikes and unity of effort with advisors, but practical implementation often faced hurdles from uneven and reliance on external support.

Operational History

Initial Deployments and

The initial operational deployments of the Afghan National Army's (ANA) special operations elements, organized as Kandaks prior to the formal establishment of the ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC), focused on raids against insurgents as part of broader efforts. The 1st Kandak conducted its inaugural mission from September 12–14, 2007, in the Sherzad District of , approximately 30 miles southwest of , resulting in the capture of Haji Shir Khan, a known facilitator involved in weapons smuggling and attacks on coalition forces. Subsequent early engagements emphasized rapid assault and disruption of insurgent safe havens. In August 2008, ANA Commandos, advised by U.S. Special Operations Forces, launched an attack on a sanctuary in the Zeriko Valley of in western , killing several insurgents, destroying weapons caches, and forcing remaining fighters to flee, thereby weakening local command structures. These operations typically involved small-unit tactics, insertions, and intelligence-driven targeting to minimize civilian involvement while prioritizing high-value targets. The unification of Commando Kandaks and emerging special forces under ANASOC on April 7, , streamlined command for roles, with nine Special Operations Kandaks (SOKs) aligned regionally to ANA for missions supporting stability and disruption of networks. In the –2012 period, ANASOC units expanded beyond to include counter-narcotics integrated with , executing raids that combined with conventional forces to clear insurgent-held areas and secure population centers. This approach aimed to build indigenous capacity for independent operations, though early efforts relied heavily on advisory support for , , and air enablement to achieve measurable effects against reconstitution in eastern and southern provinces.

Major Engagements and Achievements

The ANA Special Operations Command's commando kandaks achieved notable successes in early efforts against forces. In February 2008, the 1st Commando Kandak executed Operation Say Laab in , deploying over 100 personnel via helicopter to multiple targets, resulting in the deaths of 29 fighters, including a shadow provincial governor. During the February 2010 Operation Moshtarak, aimed at clearing Taliban strongholds in Marjah, Helmand Province, Afghan commando companies from ANASOC participated alongside conventional ANA kandaks in joint clearing operations, contributing to the disruption of insurgent networks in central Helmand. ANASOC units also played a key role in responding to high-profile attacks, such as the January 2010 Kabul assaults, where a company from the 6th Commando Kandak subdued an insurgency incursion, earning recognition for bravery. In later years, ANASOC's kandaks maintained a high operational tempo, conducting raids that inflicted significant casualties on . For instance, in , the 201st Selab , a component of ANASOC, reported eliminating 1,891 and militants across 68 joint operations in eastern . These engagements underscored ANASOC's reputation for effectiveness in and operations, often achieving favorable outcomes in kinetic encounters despite broader challenges faced by forces.

Performance in Key Campaigns

ANASOC units excelled in targeted operations within the Helmand and campaigns, where they conducted raids that captured or killed numerous commanders and disrupted supply lines. Partnered with U.S. Forces, these commandos demonstrated integrated planning and execution, often operating at night to minimize casualties and maximize surprise, contributing to temporary clearances of insurgent strongholds. A 2009 assessment highlighted commando kandaks as a "bright spot" in the ANA, capable of independent planning alongside partners despite broader force limitations. In , commandos participated in missions, such as a 2013 operation inserting 60 personnel into high-threat areas to neutralize insurgent activity, showcasing their mobility and combat effectiveness under fire. By 2017, Afghan Special Security Forces—including —accounted for roughly 80% of ANA offensive actions nationwide, underscoring their outsized role in prosecuting the war against resurgence in southern hotspots. Performance metrics revealed strengths in tactical engagements, with low attrition rates and high kill ratios in partnered raids, but vulnerabilities emerged in sustained independent operations lacking U.S. air and logistical support. For example, in 2019 clashes in northern Afghanistan, 25 ANASOC commandos perished amid heavy fighting, illustrating exposure to Taliban ambushes without rapid reinforcement. Assessments noted that while ANASOC inflicted disproportionate insurgent losses—often through precision strikes—their gains eroded without conventional ANA hold forces, as Taliban adaptive tactics and local infiltration undermined long-term control.

Assessments and Challenges

Effectiveness and Strengths

The Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) was assessed as the most capable combat force within the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), leveraging specialized training to execute high-impact missions disproportionate to its size of approximately 14,000 personnel. U.S. military evaluations highlighted ANASOC's proficiency in raids, , and operations, often operating with greater initiative and lower casualty rates compared to conventional ANA units. This effectiveness stemmed from a rigorous selection process and a 16-week training regimen modeled on the U.S. Army Ranger program, which emphasized physical endurance, tactical skills, and small-unit leadership, supplemented by ongoing U.S. Special Forces mentoring. Key strengths included enhanced mobility and firepower, enabling ANASOC kandaks to conduct lightning strikes, penetrate enemy strongpoints, and maintain high operational tempo in contested areas. DoD reports noted that Afghan Special Security Forces, encompassing ANASOC, successfully sustained pressure on Taliban networks, disrupted high-value targets, and curtailed ISIS-K expansion through precise, intelligence-driven operations. Units demonstrated resilience in night operations and limited self-sustainment, holding ground against superior insurgent numbers in rural districts where conventional forces struggled. These capabilities allowed ANASOC to capture or kill numerous insurgents in targeted engagements, such as operations in Nangarhar Province in 2013 where commandos eliminated 22 fighters and detained 10 others, contributing to localized security gains. Overall, ANASOC's doctrinal focus on support and rapid response provided a force multiplier for ANDSF efforts, with U.S. advisors crediting their for fostering that exceeded broader Afghan military averages in kinetic outcomes and mission execution. Despite dependencies on coalition enablers like air support, ANASOC's operational independence grew over time, as evidenced by independent battalion-level actions that set conditions for follow-on conventional force presence.

Criticisms and Operational Limitations

The Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) faced significant operational limitations stemming from its heavy reliance on U.S. and advisory support for intelligence, air operations, and logistics, which constrained independent sustainment capabilities. Without embedded advisors, ANASOC units experienced degraded performance, as evidenced by increased and failures that undermined and execution. This dependence was particularly acute for elite elements like the Special Mission Wing, which required external enablers for high-value targeting and . Corruption within the broader Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) permeated ANASOC, manifesting in discrepancies, fuel theft, and equipment mismanagement that eroded and readiness. SIGAR assessments highlighted how systemic graft contributed to inflated personnel rosters and diverted resources, even among forces tasked with countering strongholds. Attrition rates, driven by harsh combat conditions, low pay relative to risks, and family pressures, averaged 18-20% annually across ANDSF units by 2017, with ANASOC commandos facing disproportionate casualties—over 2,000 killed between 2015 and 2021—further straining and retention. Leadership deficiencies, including inadequate non-commissioned officer development and ethnic favoritism favoring Pashtun recruits, limited ANASOC's ability to conduct decentralized operations across Afghanistan's diverse terrain. Expansion efforts from 2012 onward, which doubled kandak () strength to approximately 15,000 personnel by 2017, risked diluting standards through rushed and of less-vetted personnel, as noted in analyses of command opacity. Despite tactical successes in raids and clearances, ANASOC's small footprint—covering only high-priority districts—proved insufficient for nationwide , often requiring conventional ANA backups that suffered from similar institutional weaknesses. Sustainability challenges were compounded by maintenance shortfalls, such as delays in Mi-17 helicopter replacements critical for ANASOC mobility, leading to grounded aviation assets and reduced operational tempo. Critics, including U.S. military evaluators, argued that ANASOC's doctrinal emphasis on U.S.-style overlooked Afghanistan-specific factors like tribal dynamics and illiteracy rates exceeding 60% among recruits, hindering long-term adaptability. These limitations, while not negating ANASOC's role in inflicting losses, underscored vulnerabilities to prolonged attrition and external withdrawal.

Internal and External Controversies

The Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) encountered internal controversies primarily related to the misuse of its elite units for non-combat roles, such as providing personal security for Afghan political figures and regional strongmen, which undermined their intended focus. According to a 2020 assessment by the Special Operations Forces Advisory Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A), approximately 1,200 of roughly 19,000 ANASOC personnel—about 6%—were diverted for such tasks, often regionally isolated but persistent despite U.S. advisory efforts to curb them. This practice exacerbated resource strains and diluted operational readiness, as documented in SIGAR evaluations highlighting how elite forces were "mostly regionally isolated" in misuse but still subject to command pressures that prioritized over mission efficacy. Cultural practices within the broader Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), including ANASOC, fueled additional internal discord and morale issues, notably the persistence of —the sexual exploitation of boys by commanders and fighters. SIGAR's 2016 report on child sexual assault detailed over 5,000 alleged gross abuses by Afghan forces, many involving routine in security units, with U.S. advisors often directed to overlook incidents to preserve partnerships. While ANASOC's rigorous selection and U.S.-overseen training aimed to insulate it from such endemic problems in conventional ANA units, veteran accounts and investigations indicated tolerance or participation by some elite commanders, contributing to ethical tensions and operational distrust. Externally, ANASOC drew scrutiny for vulnerabilities, including rare but high-profile "green-on-blue" attacks where Afghan personnel targeted partners, eroding trust despite the command's relative discipline compared to regular forces. Although specific ANASOC-involved incidents were limited, broader ANDSF green-on-blue events—totaling 92 attacks since 2008, killing 150 troops—highlighted and cultural gaps that affected elite partnering, as U.S. advisors faced heightened risks in joint operations. Critics, including SIGAR analyses, attributed these to insufficient pre-deployment and Taliban infiltration, with ANASOC's dependence on U.S. enablers amplifying perceptions of fragility when support waned. organizations also documented pro-government forces' violations, such as extrajudicial killings and during ANASOC-led operations, though attribution to special operations units specifically remained sporadic amid the command's focus on high-value targeting.

Dissolution and Legacy

2021 Taliban Offensive and Collapse

The commenced in early May following the completion of U.S. troop reductions to below 2,500 personnel, enabling Taliban forces to capture over 50 district centers by mid-June through a combination of combat and negotiated surrenders. ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC) units, particularly commandos, were rapidly deployed as a mobile strike force to reclaim lost territory, including operations in Pul-e-Khumri in and districts across Faryab, , and Paktia in late June. These elite elements initially conducted counterattacks with reported successes in retaking some positions, but their operational tempo surged by approximately 30% compared to prior months, leading to mounting fatigue and unsustainable strain by July. ANASOC commandos faced severe setbacks in key engagements amid the escalating offensive. On June 17, approximately 50 commandos were ambushed while attempting to hold Dawlat Abad district center in , resulting in 24 fatalities, including Major Sohrab Azimi. Further losses mounted as forces encircled provincial capitals, with commandos suffering heavy casualties in isolated fights lacking reinforcement; by July, reports emerged of at least 22 commandos executed by fighters after attempting to surrender during evacuation efforts. Despite their advanced training and equipment, ANASOC's effectiveness eroded due to the abrupt cessation of U.S. , , and contractor-maintained following the final military withdrawals in July, which crippled resupply and mobility for these units. As the offensive accelerated in July and August, ANASOC's capacity to stem advances collapsed under compounded pressures. An attempt by commandos to retake City failed amid exhaustion and absence of supporting fires, contributing to the rapid fall of northern provinces like and Jowzjan. Widespread surrenders among regular Afghan National Army units created a cascading effect, isolating ANASOC elements and amplifying psychological operations that promised amnesty for defectors, further demoralizing elite troops already grappling with chronic corruption, such as inflated payrolls from that diverted resources. By mid-August, with the encircling after capturing , , and with minimal resistance, ANASOC remnants either disbanded, fled the country, or integrated into ad hoc defenses that proved ineffective against the insurgents' momentum. The command's dissolution on August 15 coincided with President Ashraf Ghani's flight from , marking the effective end of organized Afghan special operations capability. Analyses of the highlight ANASOC's overreliance on external enablers as a core vulnerability, despite comprising a small but highly trained cadre within the 182,000-strong Afghan National Army reported in April 2021; only a fraction of forces were combat-effective due to leadership failures and political interference that prioritized regime loyalty over operational coherence. tactics emphasizing non-kinetic surrenders—facilitated by intra-Afghan deals at district levels—exploited these weaknesses, bypassing direct confrontations with elites while U.S. policy shifts signaled abandonment, eroding will to fight even among commandos. Long-term factors, including endemic siphoning fuel and pay, compounded short-term shocks like the , rendering ANASOC unable to sustain independent .

Fate of Personnel and Units

Following the capture of on August 15, , ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC) units, which had numbered approximately 22,000 personnel prior to the offensive, largely disintegrated amid the broader collapse of Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Elite kandaks (battalions) in provinces such as Helmand and mounted prolonged defenses against advances but were undermined by severed supply lines, absent air support, and defections among higher command, leading to encirclement and forced dispersal by mid-August. In instances of attempted surrender, forces executed captured ANASOC members, as documented in the June 16, , killing of 22 commandos from a unit in who had laid down arms under promised . In , surviving ANASOC elements, including the capital's commando unit, positioned for potential defense of International Airport (HKIA) but received no orders to engage after President Ashraf Ghani's flight and the government's effective dissolution, resulting in non-resistance and integration into the mass surrender of ANDSF formations. Some personnel provided limited security support at HKIA during the U.S.-led evacuation from August 14 to 30, 2021, amid chaos that saw over 120,000 individuals airlifted, though ANASOC-specific evacuations were ad hoc and prioritized those with U.S. ties via Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) pathways. Units formally ceased operations without dissolution ceremonies, their equipment— including U.S.-supplied vehicles and weapons—either abandoned, captured by fighters, or destroyed in place to prevent reuse. Post-collapse, ANASOC personnel faced targeted reprisals, with Taliban amnesty declarations undermined by extrajudicial executions and forced conscription of survivors into insurgent ranks, particularly those identified via captured payroll records. Estimates suggest thousands went into hiding, fled to neighboring countries like and , or joined nascent resistance groups such as the National Resistance Front in Panjshir, though operational capacity remained negligible without external support. In the diaspora, several hundred former commandos resettled in the United States and through SIV and humanitarian parole programs, where they have advocated for expanded veteran protections amid ongoing threats from Taliban affiliates. No ANASOC units reformed under subsequent Afghan administrations, marking the command's effective end as a cohesive entity.

Post-2021 Implications and Veterans

Following the rapid dissolution of the Afghan National Army (ANA) Special Operations Command during the Taliban's 2021 offensive, experienced a significant vacuum, enabling the to consolidate control without facing sustained elite opposition. The absence of ANA SOF units, which had previously conducted high-impact raids and held key terrain against insurgents, contributed to the unchecked expansion of governance and affiliated networks, exacerbating regional instability. This power consolidation has facilitated a permissive environment for terrorist groups, including ISIS-Khorasan, with over 23,000 militants from 20 organizations operating in the country as of August 2025, posing threats to neighbors like and beyond. The collapse's ripple effects extended to heightened cross-border militancy and geopolitical shifts, as the lack of a professional capability allowed forces to repurpose captured U.S.-supplied equipment previously contested by SOF, bolstering their operational reach. Neighboring states, such as , have faced intensified incursions from -aligned groups like Tehrik-i-Taliban , with security forces eliminating dozens of militants in border clashes as recently as September 2025. Globally, the precedent of elite Afghan units' failure to mount post-collapse resistance has informed U.S. and reassessments of security assistance, emphasizing dependencies on external enablers like air support that SOF could no longer access after August 2021. ANA SOF veterans have faced severe reprisals, with the systematically targeting former commandos through executions, , and manhunts, resulting in at least 110 killings of ex-Afghan National Defense and Security Forces personnel since . Over 20,000 commandos were reportedly left behind after the U.S. withdrawal, prompting urgent calls from U.S. lawmakers and veterans for rescue operations amid hunts. Many survivors fled to or went into hiding within , while others joined nascent resistance efforts like the National Resistance Front, though these lack the scale to challenge dominance. Resettlement efforts for ANA SOF veterans have been fraught with bureaucratic hurdles and rejections. In the UK, special forces vetoed over 2,000 credible asylum claims from Afghan commandos between 2021 and 2025, leaving many at risk of deportation to Taliban-controlled areas despite evidence of service in UK-funded units. The U.S. Special Immigrant Visa program facilitated evacuation for some during , but thousands remain stranded in third countries like , facing economic hardship and deportation fears as of 2023. By 2025, ongoing data breaches and policy delays have exposed relocated veterans to further targeting, underscoring persistent vulnerabilities for this cohort.

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