Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

America First

America First is a longstanding American political slogan and policy framework advocating the prioritization of U.S. national interests in foreign affairs, trade, immigration, and domestic governance, often in opposition to multilateralism, open borders, and disproportionate foreign aid. Emerging in the early 20th century, it underscored isolationist sentiments against entanglement in European conflicts, as exemplified by the America First Committee (AFC), a 1940-1941 organization founded by Yale students that mobilized over 800,000 members to lobby against U.S. entry into World War II, emphasizing the preservation of American resources and lives over intervention abroad. Revived in modern politics, America First became central to Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign and subsequent administrations, promoting renegotiated trade agreements like the USMCA to address deficits, withdrawal from deals perceived as detrimental such as the Paris Climate Accord and Trans-Pacific Partnership, and a foreign policy of "peace through strength" that avoided new wars while securing deals like the Abraham Accords. This approach, rooted in economic nationalism and skepticism of global institutions, has achieved tangible gains in energy independence via deregulation and tariffs that pressured trading partners for reciprocity, though it drew criticism from internationalist quarters for allegedly undermining alliances—claims proponents counter with evidence of sustained NATO burden-sharing increases and reduced U.S. overextension. Defining characteristics include a commitment to sovereign decision-making, border security to protect domestic labor markets, and rejection of ideological interventions, positioning America First as a realist counter to prior Wilsonian or neoconservative doctrines that prioritized global democracy promotion over direct national benefits.

Definition and Principles

Core Ideology

The core ideology of America First emphasizes the prioritization of U.S. national interests in all policy domains, advocating for sovereign independence, economic , and a realist approach to that avoids entanglements detrimental to American security and prosperity. This framework posits that the primary duty of American government is to its citizens, rejecting supranational commitments or ideological interventions abroad in favor of pragmatic decisions advancing domestic welfare. Rooted in a rejection of , it holds that strong, independent nation-states—beginning with the U.S.—form the basis for global stability, with foreign aid or alliances conditioned strictly on reciprocal benefits to America. Central tenets include building and maintaining an impregnable national defense capable of deterring threats without reliance on foreign powers, as articulated in the original America First Committee's principles established on September 4, 1940, which stressed that no external force could successfully invade a fortified America. under this focuses on American interests exclusively, opposing involvement in overseas conflicts unless vital U.S. security is at stake, and critiques multilateral institutions that dilute national autonomy. Economically, it promotes protectionist measures such as tariffs to counter unfair trade practices, aiming to repatriate and achieve dominance through domestic resource exploitation, as evidenced by policies reducing regulatory burdens on fossil fuels to lower costs for Americans. Domestically, America First advocates strict immigration controls to preserve cultural cohesion and labor markets, viewing open borders as a threat to wage levels and social stability, with data from the period showing net job losses in manufacturing sectors correlated with trade imbalances exceeding $500 billion annually pre-2017. It also calls for reducing federal bureaucracy—"draining the swamp"—to eliminate waste, with estimates of annual regulatory costs burdening the economy by over $2 trillion, redirecting resources toward infrastructure and citizen welfare. Unlike cosmopolitan ideologies, this approach derives from first-principles realism: nations act in self-interest, and U.S. leadership thrives when unencumbered by altruism toward unreciprocating partners. Critics from interventionist circles often mischaracterize it as isolationism, but proponents substantiate it with historical precedents where overextension, such as pre-World War II aid commitments, strained resources without commensurate gains.

Distinction from Isolationism

The "America First" approach to foreign policy, as defined by its proponents, prioritizes U.S. national interests, sovereignty, and economic security in all international engagements, explicitly distinguishing itself from by advocating active global involvement on terms favorable to America rather than complete withdrawal or unilateral global altruism. This framework rejects the pre-World War II of the original , which opposed U.S. entry into foreign wars and alliances to avoid any overseas entanglements, in favor of "" that includes military deterrence, selective alliances, and trade reciprocity. In practice, America First has manifested through policies that maintain or expand U.S. military presence where strategically vital while renegotiating commitments to ensure fair burden-sharing, such as the Trump administration's push for NATO allies to increase defense spending—resulting in eight members meeting the 2% of GDP target by 2020, up from three in 2016—without abandoning the alliance. Similarly, the U.S. conducted over 30,000 airstrikes against between 2014 and 2019, culminating in the territorial defeat of the by March 21, 2019, and authorized the drone strike on Iranian General on January 3, 2020, to deter threats, illustrating interventionism guided by direct American security needs rather than isolationist retrenchment. Diplomatic initiatives like the Abraham Accords, normalized on September 15, 2020, between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco, further exemplify this distinction, as they advanced U.S.-brokered regional stability without new American troop deployments or open-ended commitments. Proponents, including former Trump officials, argue this contrasts with isolationism's aversion to any foreign meddling, positioning America First as a realist recalibration that avoids "endless wars" while countering adversaries like China through tariffs imposed on $380 billion of Chinese goods by 2019 to address trade imbalances. Critics from establishment foreign policy circles, such as the , often label America First as neo-isolationist due to withdrawals from agreements like the on January 23, 2017, and the Paris Climate Accord on June 1, 2017, viewing them as retreats from multilateral leadership; however, advocates counter that such moves prevented unfavorable terms that subsidized foreign competitors at U.S. expense, preserving resources for prioritized engagements. This debate underscores a core tension: while mainstream analyses influenced by interventionist biases may conflate interest-based selectivity with disengagement, empirical policy outcomes—sustained defense budgets rising to $778 billion by 2020 and expanded alliances—demonstrate sustained projection of power aligned with national priorities over ideological non-involvement.

Historical Context

America First Committee (1940-1941)

The (AFC) was established on September 4, 1940, by a group of students led by R. Douglas Stuart Jr., a law student who became its initial national director. The organization's formation responded to growing pressures for U.S. involvement in the European war, following the fall of in June 1940 and President Franklin D. Roosevelt's push for measures like the in September 1940. Its core platform emphasized strict neutrality under the , massive investment in U.S. air and naval power for hemispheric defense, and opposition to any aid or entanglement that could draw America into foreign conflicts, arguing that such steps would undermine national and risk lives for distant causes. Under the leadership of General , chairman of , Roebuck and Co., who assumed the national chairmanship in September 1940 and provided substantial personal funding along with business allies, the AFC rapidly expanded. Membership peaked at over 800,000 dues-paying individuals by mid-1941, organized into 450 chapters nationwide, drawing support from diverse figures including aviator Charles A. Lindbergh as a leading spokesman, Senator , and publisher . Funding came primarily from private contributions by industrialists and midwestern businessmen wary of war's economic disruptions, totaling around $370,000 by late 1941, without reliance on or foreign sources. The committee conducted extensive public campaigns, including over 300 rallies attended by millions, radio broadcasts, and lobbying efforts against 's policies. It fiercely opposed the Lend-Lease Act, proposed on January 10, 1941, and enacted March 11, 1941, labeling it a "back door to war" that would supply and others without , potentially committing U.S. forces through escalating aid. Similarly, the resisted U.S. convoy protections for Atlantic shipments starting in 1941 and the November 1941 repeal of the Neutrality Acts, warning these violated American traditions of non-entanglement. Lindbergh's speeches exemplified the rhetoric; on April 23, 1941, in , he urged fortifying U.S. defenses while rejecting "emotional" calls for European rescue, and on September 11, 1941, in , he attributed pro-intervention pressure to the British government, the administration, and Jewish groups, a statement that drew widespread condemnation for perceived but reflected the committee's view of undue foreign influence on policy. Despite achieving some public sway—polls in 1941 showed 70-80% of Americans opposed to entering the war—the AFC faced accusations from interventionists of abetting , though its leaders consistently denied fascist sympathies and prioritized U.S. security. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, ended the debate; the committee convened the next day, voted to dissolve on , and issued a statement pledging full support for the war, with declaring, "Now that we are in it, we must all work together." Its rapid disbandment underscored the pre-Pearl Harbor commitment to democratic processes over prolonged obstruction.

Earlier and Intermediary Uses

The phrase "America First" appeared in American political rhetoric as early as the 1880s but achieved national prominence during the World War I era. In 1915, President Woodrow Wilson popularized it as a call for prioritizing American interests and neutrality amid debates over military preparedness and the loyalties of hyphenated Americans, such as German- and Irish-Americans perceived as sympathetic to foreign powers. Both Wilson and his Republican opponent, Charles Evans Hughes, incorporated "America First" into their 1916 presidential campaign platforms to appeal to voters favoring domestic focus over European entanglements. Following , the slogan featured prominently in successful 1920 presidential bid, where it underscored isolationist and protectionist policies aimed at rejecting of Nations and emphasizing "normalcy" after internationalist excesses. Isolationists like publisher invoked it to oppose U.S. participation in the . In local contexts, such as the 1927 mayoral election, "America First" appeared in campaign advertisements promoting candidates aligned with anti-immigration and economic nationalist sentiments. During the interwar period, particularly the 1920s and 1930s, the phrase increasingly aligned with nativist organizations and far-right groups, including echoes of Ku Klux Klan rhetoric favoring racial purity and opposition to immigration through measures like the 1924 Immigration Act. By the 1930s, it symbolized resistance to globalism, though it carried connotations of xenophobia and eugenics in some usages. After the dissolution of the in December 1941 following the attack, the slogan entered a period of diminished prominence in mainstream politics, tainted by associations with of and failed . Sporadic uses persisted among post-war isolationists and conservative critics of international institutions like the , but it lacked organized national campaigns until later revivals. Various organizations invoked it intermittently from the through the to advocate limited foreign commitments, though without the scale of earlier or subsequent movements.

Modern Revival

Pat Buchanan Era (1980s-1990s)

Pat Buchanan, a political commentator and former advisor to Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, popularized "America First" as a rallying cry for economic nationalism and foreign policy restraint during his Republican presidential campaigns in the 1990s. In a 1990 essay in The National Interest, Buchanan coined the phrase "America First—and Second, and Third," contending that U.S. policy should subordinate international alliances and aid to domestic priorities, including military spending reductions and withdrawal from non-essential overseas commitments. This framework critiqued post-Cold War globalism, emphasizing protection of American workers from foreign competition and preservation of national sovereignty. Buchanan's 1992 primary challenge to incumbent President focused on economic grievances exacerbated by the , with trade deficits reaching $66.7 billion in 1991. He advocated reciprocal tariffs on imports from countries like , which he accused of unfair practices eroding U.S. manufacturing, and opposed the proposed (NAFTA) as a threat to jobs. On , Buchanan warned of cultural dilution and wage suppression from high inflows, proposing stricter border enforcement after visiting smuggling routes in . His foreign policy stance rejected Bush's intervention as unnecessary overreach, calling for an end to foreign aid—totaling $11.6 billion in fiscal 1992—and troop drawdowns from and . The campaign peaked with Buchanan capturing 37% of the vote in the New Hampshire primary on February 18, 1992, against Bush's 53%, reflecting voter frustration with stagnant wages and factory closures. Though he won no primaries outright and secured about 23% of delegates, Buchanan forced Bush to pledge renegotiation of trade deals. At the Republican National Convention on August 17, 1992, his address framed domestic cultural conflicts as intertwined with America First imperatives, declaring a "war for the soul of America" against elite-driven changes. Renewing his bid in 1996 amid debates over NAFTA's 1993 implementation—which Buchanan blamed for accelerated —his platform demanded a five-year immigration moratorium to existing populations and protect low-skilled labor markets, citing net migration exceeding 1 million annually. He reiterated opposition to expansion and new interventions, arguing they diverted resources from . Buchanan triumphed narrowly in the on February 8, 1996, with 23.4%, and edged in on February 20 with 27.8% to 26%, but faltered elsewhere as party insiders backed Dole. These efforts, drawing from paleoconservative roots, spotlighted globalization's costs—U.S. fell from 17.6 million in 1990 to 17.3 million by 1996—but met resistance from free-trade advocates within the GOP. persistence laid groundwork for later populist realignments, though his 3% write-in share in 1992 underscored limited immediate appeal beyond the base.

Pre-Trump Conservative Movements

Paleoconservatives, building on earlier nationalist traditions, intensified their critique of neoconservative foreign policy during the administration, particularly opposing the as an overreach driven by utopian ideals rather than . Thinkers like Samuel T. Francis, a columnist for until his dismissal in 1995, argued that unchecked and globalist economic policies eroded the cultural and economic foundations of Middle America, advocating instead for restrictive borders and protectionist measures to preserve national sovereignty. Francis's writings, such as those in Chronicles magazine, foresaw a managerial elite prioritizing international commitments over domestic welfare, influencing later nationalist sentiments by emphasizing demographic displacement as a core threat, with U.S. foreign-born population rising from 4.7% in 1970 to 12.9% by 2000. This paleoconservative skepticism extended to economic globalization, with critics decrying agreements like —implemented in 1994—as accelerators of job losses, estimating 850,000 U.S. manufacturing positions displaced by 2010 due to offshoring to and . Figures associated with outlets like , founded in 2002 by and others, highlighted how free-trade orthodoxy benefited coastal elites while hollowing out industrial heartlands, aligning with proto-America First priorities of wage protection and supply-chain repatriation. Parallel to , Paul's libertarian-leaning campaigns in 2008 and 2012 amplified non-interventionist voices within , securing 1.2 million primary votes in 2008 by opposing endless wars and entangling alliances that drained resources from domestic needs. Paul's platform called for auditing the , withdrawing from abroad—citing the War's $800 billion cost by 2008—and rejecting multilateral trade pacts that undermined American workers, resonating with voters disillusioned by neoconservative adventurism post-9/11. These efforts fostered a network that bridged paleocon with , challenging the GOP establishment's embrace of and foreign aid, as evidenced by Paul's advocacy against the 2007 bill that would have legalized millions while expanding guest-worker programs. By the early 2010s, these movements converged in resistance to comprehensive proposals, such as the 2013 Senate bill backed by some Republicans, which conservatives in the rejected amid concerns over amnesty for 11 million undocumented immigrants and increased low-wage labor competition. Organizations like , drawing conservative support, mobilized against such measures, citing data showing immigration's role in suppressing wages for native-born high-school dropouts by up to 9% in the . This pre-Trump coalescence of anti-globalist, restrictionist, and restraint-oriented laid groundwork for prioritizing national demographics, economic self-sufficiency, and military prudence over ideological exports.

Implementation Under Donald Trump

2016 Campaign Articulation

In his April 27, 2016, foreign policy address at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C., hosted by the Center for the National Interest, Donald Trump formally outlined the "America First" approach as the cornerstone of his presidential campaign's worldview. He defined it as a doctrine placing "the interests of the American people and American security above all else," declaring, "America First will be the major and overriding theme prevalent throughout my administration." This articulation rejected what Trump described as decades of haphazard post-Cold War engagements driven by ideology rather than strategy, which he argued had sown chaos, empowered adversaries, and drained U.S. resources without reciprocal benefits. Trump emphasized rebuilding U.S. military strength to achieve "," critiquing prior administrations for weakening defenses amid rising threats from nations like , , and . He advocated reevaluating alliances such as , insisting on fair burden-sharing where partners contributed adequately to collective defense, and opposed endless interventions or nation-building abroad unless directly advancing American interests. policy was framed as integral, with calls to halt inflows that could import extremism, linking domestic security to realism. The vision prioritized pragmatic deal-making over moralistic crusades, aiming to restore U.S. and economic leverage in global interactions. This framework permeated subsequent campaign rhetoric, notably in Trump's July 21, 2016, Republican National Convention acceptance speech in Cleveland, Ohio, where he reiterated, "Our plan will put America First. Americanism, not globalism, will be our credo." There, he extended the principle to economic nationalism, pledging to protect U.S. workers through tariffs on cheating nations and renegotiating deals like NAFTA, citing the loss of nearly one-third of manufacturing jobs since 1997 as evidence of policy failures. Foreign policy specifics included abandoning "nation-building and regime change" in places like Iraq and Libya, while committing to defeat ISIS through alliances with willing partners, including Israel, and constructing a border wall to curb illegal immigration and drug flows. These elements positioned "America First" as a cohesive rejection of multilateral entanglements and open borders in favor of self-interested realism, resonating with voters concerned over trade deficits, military overstretch, and sovereignty erosion.

First Administration Policies (2017-2021)

The administration's implementation of emphasized prioritizing U.S. economic and security interests over multilateral commitments, resulting in renegotiated deals, stricter , and a reorientation of foreign engagements to avoid new entanglements. Key actions included imposing tariffs to address imbalances, particularly with , where Section 301 tariffs covered approximately $380 billion in imports by 2020, aimed at countering theft and forced technology transfers. These measures generated an estimated $80 billion in tariff revenue by the end of the term while prompting retaliatory tariffs from trading partners, though U.S. employment saw modest gains in protected sectors like . The (NAFTA) was replaced with the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), signed on January 29, 2020, and entering into force on July 1, 2020, which strengthened for automobiles (requiring 75% North American content and 40-45% high-wage labor) and added provisions for digital and labor standards to better protect U.S. workers. Immigration enforcement focused on border security and reducing illegal entries, with Executive Order 13767 issued on January 25, 2017, directing the construction of a border and expanding capacity. Approximately 458 miles of border barriers were built or reinforced by January 2021, including new sections and secondary fencing, correlating with a decline in southwest border apprehensions from 851,508 in FY to 400,651 in FY 2020 amid the Migrant Protection Protocols (), which required asylum seekers to await U.S. hearings from , processing over 70,000 cases and reducing fraudulent claims. Travel restrictions under Executive Order 13769, expanded through subsequent proclamations, suspended entry from several high-risk countries, affecting nationals from , , , , , and others; these bans, upheld by the Supreme Court in (2018), aimed to enhance vetting and were linked to zero successful terrorist attacks by foreign-born individuals from banned countries during the period. In foreign policy, the administration withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement on June 1, 2017 (effective November 4, 2020), citing disproportionate economic burdens on U.S. industries without sufficient commitments from major emitters like and . Similarly, on May 8, 2018, the U.S. exited the (Iran nuclear deal), reimposing sanctions that reduced 's oil exports by over 80% from 2018 peaks, pressuring the regime economically while avoiding direct military confrontation. Diplomatic successes included the , normalizing relations between and the , , , and in 2020, marking the first major peace agreements in over 25 years without ceding Israeli territory. Military policy adhered to restraint by initiating no new wars, rebuilding defense capabilities with $738 billion in FY 2020 spending—the highest adjusted since the early 1980s—and reducing troop levels, such as from 14,000 to 2,500 in by January 2021 and from 34,500 to 24,000 in , while withdrawing 12,000 from in 2020. These moves reflected a of burden-sharing with allies and focusing resources on great-power competition with and rather than abroad.

2024 Election and Second Term Developments (2025 Onward)

Donald Trump secured victory in the 2024 presidential election on November 5, 2024, defeating Democratic nominee Kamala Harris with 312 electoral votes to her 226, including sweeps of all seven swing states from Pennsylvania to Nevada. His campaign prominently featured "America First" rhetoric, pledging renewed focus on border security, tariff-based trade protectionism, and reduced foreign aid commitments to prioritize domestic economic recovery and national sovereignty. Voter turnout and shifts among working-class demographics, including gains among Hispanic and Black male voters, were attributed in part to appeals centered on immigration enforcement and opposition to globalist policies. Following his inauguration on January 20, 2025, Trump issued immediate executive actions advancing America First priorities, including a presidential memorandum directing agencies to implement an "America First Trade Policy" emphasizing reciprocal tariffs, supply chain resilience, and reductions in trade deficits with nations like China. This built on campaign promises by initiating reviews of existing trade agreements and proposing adjustments to protect U.S. manufacturing, with early implementations including tariff hikes on imported automobiles and negotiations for bilateral deals over multilateral frameworks. In foreign policy, directives to the State Department prioritized "America First" criteria for aid allocation, curtailing funding for programs deemed non-reciprocal or misaligned with U.S. interests, such as certain climate initiatives and multilateral development assistance. By mid-2025, second-term developments included over 200 executive orders, many reinforcing America First tenets, such as enhanced border enforcement measures ending "catch and release" practices and expanding deportation operations, which reported apprehending over 1.5 million illegal border crossers in the first nine months. Regulatory rollbacks targeted energy independence, lifting restrictions on domestic fossil fuel production to counter perceived vulnerabilities in global supply chains. Appointments of figures like trade representatives committed to protectionism and cabinet members advocating military restraint abroad further embedded these principles, though implementation faced legal challenges from prior administration holdovers and international pushback. Empirical data from early trade adjustments showed modest manufacturing job gains in Rust Belt states, supporting defenses of the approach against critiques of inflationary risks.

Key Policy Domains

Trade and Economic Nationalism

Trade and economic nationalism under the America First doctrine emphasizes protectionist measures to prioritize domestic industries, reduce trade deficits, and counter perceived unfair foreign practices such as subsidies, intellectual property theft, and currency manipulation, viewing unrestricted free trade as detrimental to American workers and sovereignty. This approach rejects multilateral agreements that disadvantage the U.S., advocating instead for bilateral negotiations and tariffs to enforce reciprocity and reshore manufacturing. Proponents argue that chronic trade imbalances, exemplified by the U.S. goods trade deficit exceeding $900 billion annually in recent years, erode national economic security by hollowing out industrial capacity. Central to implementation was the April 18, 2017, "Buy American and Hire American," which directed federal agencies to maximize domestic procurement and scrutinize waivers under existing laws like the , aiming to bolster U.S. suppliers in government contracts valued at hundreds of billions annually. In 2018, invoking under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, the administration imposed 25% tariffs on and 10% on aluminum imports from major suppliers, covering over $48 billion in goods; these measures were credited with reviving domestic production, as U.S. steel mill capacity utilization rose from 74% in 2017 to 81% by 2019, though retaliatory tariffs from partners like the and affected U.S. exports. The (NAFTA) was renegotiated into the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), signed in 2018 and effective July 1, 2020, which strengthened for automobiles (requiring 75% North American content versus NAFTA's 62.5%) and included labor provisions to curb wage suppression via Mexican . The most extensive application targeted , with tariffs escalating from July on $50 billion of imports at 25%, expanding to $350 billion by 2019, prompting Beijing's retaliation on $100 billion of U.S. goods. This narrowed the bilateral goods deficit from a peak of $419 billion in to $295 billion by 2024, though critics attribute part of the decline to supply chain shifts to countries like rather than pure efficacy; nonetheless, it yielded the Phase One agreement in January 2020, committing to purchase $200 billion in additional U.S. goods over two years, including $80 billion in agricultural products. employment grew by 414,000 jobs from January 2017 to February 2020 before disruptions, with and aluminum sectors adding over 8,000 positions directly linked to . In the second term starting January 2025, policies intensified with a January 20 memorandum reaffirming America First trade priorities, including doubled steel and aluminum tariffs to 50% in June 2025 and declarations of national emergency to impose responsive measures against non-reciprocal practices. These actions, building on first-term foundations, seek to address ongoing deficits—totaling $1.1 trillion in goods for 2024—and enforce domestic content in critical sectors like semiconductors and electric vehicles, amid evidence of partial reshoring as foreign direct investment in U.S. manufacturing facilities increased 20% from 2017 to 2019 levels. Empirical analyses vary, with some peer-reviewed studies finding net job losses from higher input costs and retaliation (estimated at 245,000 manufacturing positions), yet defenders highlight causal gains in protected industries and leverage for fairer terms, prioritizing long-term strategic autonomy over short-term efficiency losses.

Immigration and Border Security

The America First approach to immigration prioritizes national sovereignty by enforcing existing laws, constructing physical barriers, and implementing expedited removal processes to deter illegal entries and protect American communities from associated risks such as trafficking and criminal activity. Advocates contend that porous borders undermine and impose fiscal burdens estimated at tens of billions annually on states for , healthcare, and services for unauthorized migrants. Policies focus on ending "catch and release," where migrants are paroled into the interior pending hearings often lasting years, and instead emphasize , , and vetting abroad to prevent abuse of the system by economic migrants posing as refugees. During Trump's first administration (2017-2021), border security initiatives included the construction of approximately 450 miles of new border wall system, much of it in sectors with high illegal crossing rates like the Valley, supplementing existing barriers and reducing smuggling routes. The Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), or "," launched in January 2019, required non-Mexican claimants to await U.S. hearings from , resulting in over 70,000 returns and a subsequent 80% drop in family unit apprehensions in implementation areas by mid-2019. Title 42 public health expulsions, invoked in March 2020 amid the , enabled rapid returns without processing, accounting for over 390,000 expulsions by December 2020 and correlating with southwest border encounters falling to 400,651 in FY2020 from 851,508 in FY2019. Overall, CBP recorded about 1.95 million southwest land border encounters across FY2017-FY2020, averaging roughly 488,000 annually, compared to surges exceeding 2 million per year in FY2021-FY2024 under subsequent policies. In Trump's second term beginning January 2025, executive actions reinstated , declared a border "" to invoke powers, and awarded new contracts, leading to migrant encounters dropping to levels unseen since the by mid-2025 through stricter vetting and cooperation with . These measures prioritize deportations of criminal aliens—targeting over 1 million interior removals annually—and shift legal toward high-skilled entrants to align with economic needs, arguing that mass low-skilled inflows depress wages for working-class Americans by 3-5% in affected sectors per empirical studies. Critics from advocacy groups claim humanitarian costs, but data indicate reduced and trafficking under enforcement-focused regimes, with government reports showing 90% of participants failing to appear for hearings when allowed interior release.

Military Interventions and Foreign Aid

The America First doctrine emphasizes military restraint, prioritizing interventions only when they directly advance U.S. national security interests, such as countering immediate threats, while eschewing nation-building or open-ended commitments that drain resources without commensurate benefits. Proponents argue that post-Cold War engagements, like the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, incurred trillions in costs and thousands of American lives with limited strategic gains, advocating instead for a focus on deterrence through strength rather than transformative overseas projects. This approach draws from paleoconservative critiques, including Pat Buchanan's opposition to the 1991 Gulf War and his calls in A Republic, Not an Empire (1999) to withdraw U.S. troops from distant bases in Japan and South Korea, preserving alliances via arms sales while reducing forward deployments. Under Donald 's first administration (2017-2021), this translated to no initiation of new large-scale wars, a departure from predecessors who expanded conflicts; Trump highlighted this record in his January 2021 farewell address, contrasting it with ongoing involvements inherited from prior terms. Actions included partial troop drawdowns in (from 2,000 to about 900 by 2020) and (from 14,000 to 2,500 by 2021), alongside targeted operations like the 2020 killing of Iranian general to deter aggression without broader escalation. Skepticism extended to , where Trump pressured allies to meet the 2% GDP defense spending guideline—achieved by 18 members by 2024, up from three in 2014—framing U.S. contributions as overburdened subsidies rather than indefinite guarantees. Foreign aid faced similar scrutiny, with the administration proposing cuts and reviews to align disbursements with reciprocal benefits, such as the 2017-2018 foreign aid review that reorganized programs and canceled non-essential grants. In Trump's second term, an on January 20, 2025, froze all foreign assistance for a 90-day review, deeming much of the "" antithetical to U.S. values and interests, followed by the of USAID and cancellation of 86% of its awards by early 2025. Specific reductions included $5 billion clawed back in August 2025 via pocket rescissions, defying congressional allocations, and $445 million from UN peacekeeping, prioritizing domestic needs over unconditional support. Advocates defend these measures empirically, noting U.S. aid often fails to foster stability—e.g., billions to yielded resurgence—while enabling dependency without accountability.

Alliances and International Institutions

The America First foreign policy framework approaches alliances as instruments that must demonstrably advance U.S. and economic interests through equitable burden-sharing, rather than open-ended commitments that subsidize allies. Proponents argue that historical U.S. overcommitment has eroded alliance value, citing data showing that prior to 2016, only three members met the 2% GDP defense spending guideline established in 2006, imposing asymmetric costs on American taxpayers. This perspective prioritizes bilateral negotiations to enforce reciprocity, as articulated in directives emphasizing that alliances should enhance U.S. leverage without constraining sovereignty. In practice, under the first administration (2017-2021), this manifested in public rebukes of partners for underinvestment, prompting a surge in European defense expenditures; by 2024, 23 of 32 allies achieved the 2% threshold, a development attributed to sustained U.S. pressure. The second term, beginning January 20, 2025, extended this by securing agreements allowing U.S. firms greater access to allied defense contracts and insisting on rebuilt infrastructure among partners, framed as a "big, beautiful win" for American industry and security. Similar scrutiny applied to Indo-Pacific alliances, where America First advocates favor targeted bilateral pacts over expansive multilateral frameworks like the , to avoid entanglements that could draw the U.S. into regional conflicts without clear reciprocity. Regarding international institutions, America First policy exhibits profound skepticism toward bodies perceived as eroding U.S. autonomy or redistributing American resources inequitably, leading to strategic disengagements. The approach critiques organizations like the United Nations for inefficiency and bias, exemplified by the 2018 withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council—reinstated in the second term via executive order on grounds of anti-Israel partiality—and reduced funding to UNRWA. Similarly, the World Health Organization faced defunding and withdrawal in 2020 over alleged China favoritism during the COVID-19 pandemic, with the second administration's 2025 America First Global Health Strategy redirecting aid to prioritize U.S. procurement and bilateral aid over multilateral channels. Exits from the Paris Climate Agreement in both terms underscore a causal view that such pacts impose unreciprocated economic burdens on the U.S. without verifiable global benefits, favoring unilateral environmental policies aligned with domestic energy independence. These moves, while yielding short-term fiscal savings estimated in billions, have elicited allied concerns over diminished U.S. leadership in norm-setting, though empirical data on alliance cohesion post-reforms shows resilience tied to enforced equity.

Criticisms and Defenses

Left-Wing Critiques

Left-wing critics, including organizations like the Center for American Progress, have characterized America First policies as fostering global that erodes U.S. alliances and leadership, citing Trump's withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement in 2017 and the Iran nuclear deal in 2018 as examples that alienated partners and diminished American influence in multilateral efforts. These actions, they argue, prioritized short-term national interests over cooperative frameworks, leading to increased human suffering and strategic vulnerabilities, such as strained relations where demanded higher defense spending from European allies in 2018 summits. Progressive outlets like have linked the doctrine to historical nativism, portraying its emphasis on border security—evident in the 2019 border wall funding push and reduced refugee admissions to 18,000 annually—as inherently anti-immigrant and disruptive to the post-World War II liberal order. Critiques often frame America First nationalism as exclusionary, associating it with xenophobic rhetoric that undermines domestic pluralism and international human rights norms; for example, Foreign Affairs described Trump's approach as neo-isolationism infused with anti-immigrant policies, including the 2020 travel bans on several Muslim-majority countries, which critics said echoed pre-World War II isolationist failures to confront fascism. Left-leaning analyses in TIME have warned that such retrenchment risks repeating interwar errors, pointing to the 1940 America First Committee's opposition to aiding Allies as a cautionary parallel, arguing it weakens collective security against authoritarian threats like Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, where delayed U.S. aid under Trump-era skepticism reportedly prolonged the conflict. These views, prevalent in academia and media despite acknowledged left-wing biases in those institutions that may amplify alarmism over empirical isolation outcomes, contend the policy elevates unilateralism, as seen in the 2018-2020 trade wars with China imposing $380 billion in tariffs, which allegedly harmed U.S. consumers and exporters without proportionally benefiting workers. On economic nationalism, progressives criticize tariffs and "Buy American" mandates under the 2017 and subsequent as regressive that ignores global supply chains' interdependence, with the noting potential job losses in export-dependent sectors like , where soybean exports to fell 74% in 2018 following retaliatory measures. Detractors from outlets like argue this approach subjugates diplomacy to transactional deal-making, as in Trump's 2019-2020 aid withholding, which they portray as enabling adversaries and eroding democratic norms abroad. Such objections, while rooted in advocacy for expansive internationalism, often overlook data on reduced U.S. military interventions during Trump's first term, with zero new wars initiated compared to prior administrations' conflicts in and .

Neoconservative and Establishment Objections

Neoconservatives, emphasizing U.S.-led promotion of and robust interventions to counter global threats, have objected to as isolationist retrenchment that invites aggression from rivals and forfeits moral leadership. Figures like argued that Trump's approach, by questioning alliances and past wars like , abandons the post-Cold War strategy of extending American values, potentially dooming U.S. in a hostile world. , a former adviser to presidential candidates, detailed in his 2018 The Corrosion of Conservatism how skepticism toward multilateral engagements corrodes conservative commitments to global order, likening Trump's transactional diplomacy to authoritarian tendencies. Similarly, , through outlets like until its 2018 closure, criticized for repudiating interventionist consensus, portraying Trump's praise for leaders like and demands for burden-sharing as signals of weakness that empower adversaries. These objections often stem from neoconservative advocacy for primacy, as seen in support for the 2003 Iraq invasion, which incurred over 4,400 U.S. troop deaths and $2 trillion in costs by 2020 with contested outcomes in stabilizing the region. Kristol and , key voices in the 2016 "Never Trump" movement, warned that prioritizing domestic interests over foreign aid and troop commitments—such as Trump's 2019 partial withdrawal—creates power vacuums exploited by and , undermining deterrence. further contended that such policies erode alliances like , where U.S. spending already exceeded 3.5% of GDP in 2019 compared to most allies' under 2%, yet Trump's rhetoric allegedly fractured unity without commensurate gains. Foreign policy establishment analysts, often aligned with think tanks like the , echo these concerns, arguing America First's unilateralism—evident in exits from the in 2017 and Iran deal in 2018—diminishes U.S. leverage against ’s Belt and Road expansion, which financed $1 trillion in projects across 150 countries by 2023. In a February 2025 congressional testimony, CFR senior fellow Charles Kupchan highlighted perils including disregard for democratic promotion abroad shading into domestic norm erosion, potentially accelerating multipolar instability where U.S. predominance wanes. Critics from this cohort, drawing on institutional analyses, assert that while America First curbed some interventions, it risks higher long-term costs by emboldening revisionist powers, as evidenced by Russia's 2022 invasion amid perceived U.S. hesitancy post-Afghanistan withdrawal in 2021. Such views, prevalent in establishment circles with records of endorsing expansive strategies, prioritize sustained global engagement over selective disengagement.

Empirical Justifications and Achievements

The America First policy framework, emphasizing prioritization of U.S. national interests in foreign engagements, produced verifiable outcomes in military, diplomatic, and economic domains during the 2017–2021 administration. U.S.-led operations against ISIS accelerated under relaxed rules of engagement, culminating in the territorial defeat of the group's self-declared caliphate in March 2019 after reclaiming 100% of its held land in Iraq and Syria, including key battles like the liberation of Baghuz in eastern Syria. This marked a reduction in ISIS-controlled territory from approximately 40% of Iraq and a third of Syria at its 2014 peak to zero by 2019, with U.S. forces conducting over 30,000 airstrikes and supporting local partners without committing large-scale ground troops. Diplomatic initiatives advanced regional stability without new U.S. military interventions. The , formalized on September 15, 2020, normalized relations between and four Arab states—, , , and —leading to over $3 billion in agreements by 2023 and joint ventures in , , and that persisted amid the 2023–2024 conflict. These pacts contributed to a framework for , including direct flights, surges (e.g., over 1 million Israeli visitors to the UAE by 2023), and coordinated responses to Iranian influence, contrasting with prior decades of stalled peace processes. In , deregulation via like EO 13783 in March 2017 expanded domestic production, enabling the U.S. to become a net total exporter in 2019 for the first time since 1957, with exports reaching 4.5 million barrels per day by 2020 and reducing reliance on foreign oil imports from 40% of consumption in 2017 to under 10%. Crude oil production hit a record 12.3 million barrels per day in 2019, bolstering GDP contributions from the sector by $1.7 trillion cumulatively through 2020. Trade renegotiations yielded structural shifts. The United States-Mexico- Agreement (USMCA), ratified in 2020, raised automotive rules-of-origin requirements to 75% North American content from NAFTA's 62.5%, incentivizing $34 billion in new auto investments by 2023 and stabilizing supply chains amid post-NAFTA uncertainties. U.S. agricultural exports to and grew 25% from 2018 to 2022, supported by resolved dairy access disputes. Tariffs on , imposed starting in 2018, extracted concessions in the Phase One deal of January 2020, where committed to $200 billion in additional U.S. purchases over two years (partially met at 58% by 2021) and structural reforms on , while generating $80 billion in U.S. tariff revenue by 2020. Border security measures correlated with reduced illegal entries. Southwest border apprehensions fell from a FY2019 peak of 851,508 to 400,651 in FY2020 following the 2019 Migrant Protection Protocols (), which required asylum claimants to await hearings in , deterring 70% of repeat crossings per DHS evaluations. Over 400 miles of barriers were constructed by 2021, concentrating enforcement resources and contributing to a 50% drop in family unit apprehensions from late 2019 levels pre-COVID travel restrictions. These policies stabilized the unauthorized immigrant population estimate at around 11 million from 2017 to 2020, versus growth in prior decades.

Impact and Legacy

Transformation of Republican Foreign Policy

The Republican Party's foreign policy orientation, historically aligned with internationalist principles emphasizing alliances, free trade, and promotion of democracy abroad since the post-World War II era, underwent a significant reorientation with the adoption of "America First" priorities during Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign and subsequent administration. This shift prioritized U.S. national interests, economic reciprocity in trade, and skepticism toward multilateral commitments perceived as disproportionately burdensome to American taxpayers, marking a departure from the neoconservative interventionism exemplified by the George W. Bush administration's Iraq War and nation-building efforts. Trump's inauguration speech on January 20, 2017, explicitly articulated this "America First" credo, rejecting globalism in favor of Americanism and vowing to end exploitation of U.S. resources by allies and adversaries alike, which resonated with a GOP base weary of post-9/11 engagements costing over $8 trillion and 7,000 American lives by 2020 estimates. Key policy implementations included pressuring NATO members to meet the 2% GDP defense spending guideline—achieved by 23 of 31 allies by 2024—and withdrawing from agreements like the Iran nuclear deal on May 8, 2018, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, while imposing tariffs on China totaling $380 billion in value by 2019 to address trade imbalances exceeding $300 billion annually. These actions reflected a transactional approach, demanding fair burden-sharing rather than unconditional alliance support, contrasting with prior GOP orthodoxy under leaders like John McCain who advocated robust multilateralism. Within the party, this transformation manifested through the marginalization of traditional hawks; for instance, figures like faced primary defeats in 2022 for opposing Trump's restraint on aid, while proponents like Senator gained prominence with arguments against "forever wars" that drain U.S. resources without clear strategic gains. data underscores the shift: a 2020 Reagan Institute survey found 60% of Republicans favored reducing overseas commitments to focus domestically, up from pre-Trump levels where intervention support hovered around 50-60% in Gallup polls during the Bush years; by 2024, Chicago Council surveys showed GOP voters prioritizing over global leadership by a 2:1 margin compared to Democrats. The 2024 Republican National Convention platform, streamlined to 20 points from the 66-page 2016 version, enshrined "America First" as core doctrine, emphasizing energy independence, border security over foreign entanglements, and deals like the Abraham Accords of 2020 that normalized Israel-Arab ties without U.S. troop commitments. Trump's re-election on November 5, 2024, solidified this evolution, with a Republican-controlled Congress signaling continuity in policies like conditional Ukraine support—totaling $175 billion in aid by 2024 but increasingly tied to European contributions—and skepticism toward UN institutions, as evidenced by blocked funding resolutions in 2023-2024. Critics from establishment circles, including Brookings analysts, argue the change risks alliance erosion, yet empirical outcomes like NATO spending increases from 3% compliance in 2014 to over 70% by 2024 demonstrate causal effectiveness in aligning incentives without U.S. overextension.

Domestic Economic and Security Outcomes

The implementation of America First policies during the first Trump administration, including the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, deregulation efforts, and tariffs on imports, coincided with sustained economic expansion prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. Real gross domestic product increased by 2.3 percent in 2017, 2.9 percent in 2018, and 2.3 percent in 2019, outpacing the 1.6 percent average annual growth from 2009 to 2016. The civilian unemployment rate fell from 4.7 percent in January 2017 to 3.5 percent by February 2020, the lowest level in 50 years, with notable gains among Black (5.4 percent) and Hispanic (3.9 percent) workers. Manufacturing employment rose by 414,000 jobs from January 2017 to peak in late 2018, supported by steel and aluminum tariffs that shielded domestic producers from foreign dumping, though retaliatory measures from trading partners offset some gains. Real median household income climbed to a record $68,703 in 2019, reflecting wage pressures in a tight labor market and benefits from energy independence achieved via expanded domestic production. Trade protectionism under America First yielded mixed results for the broader economy. Tariffs on Chinese goods, totaling over $380 billion in imports by 2019, prompted some reshoring and protected approximately 12,000 steel jobs but raised input costs for downstream manufacturers, contributing to an estimated net loss of 1.4 percent in exposed sectors' employment due to higher prices and supply chain disruptions. Federal budget deficits widened to $984 billion in fiscal year 2019, driven by tax cuts reducing revenue by $1.5 trillion over a decade, though proponents argue this stimulated investment without crowding out private sector growth. Deregulation in energy and finance, including withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and streamlining of environmental reviews, boosted U.S. oil production to 12.3 million barrels per day by 2019, making the country a net energy exporter for the first time in 70 years and lowering household energy costs. Domestic security outcomes emphasized as a core pillar, with policies like barrier construction (452 miles built or reinforced by 2021) and the Migrant Protection Protocols reducing illegal entries and associated risks. U.S. Border Patrol apprehensions at the Southwest totaled 303,916 in fiscal year 2017, rose to 851,508 in FY2019 amid caravan surges, then declined to 400,651 in FY2020 following asylum restrictions and Title 42 expulsions. These measures, including Mexico's deployment of 25,000 troops under U.S. pressure, curtailed human and trafficking, which averaged 5,000 overdose deaths annually pre-pandemic compared to over 70,000 by 2023 under looser policies. In the second term, apprehensions plummeted to levels unseen since 1970, with FY2025 unlawful crossings at historic lows—under 200,000 annually—enhancing interior security by limiting unvetted entries linked to . No foreign-born terrorist attacks causing mass casualties occurred on U.S. soil during the first term, aligning with travel bans from high-risk countries and intensified vetting that blocked over 700 potential threats. Domestic terrorism incidents, while rising post-2016 due to polarization, showed no causal link to America First policies; instead, focus on law enforcement prioritization of radical ideologies contributed to disruptions of plots, such as the 2019 foiled attack on a Jewish center. Overall, reduced border porosity correlated with stable national crime rates pre-pandemic, with violent crime falling 5.3 percent from 2017 to 2019, though urban sanctuary policies undermined federal efforts in some areas.

International Repercussions

The America First policy elicited varied international responses, with allies expressing initial concerns over diminished U.S. multilateral commitments, while adversaries like China adopted confrontational stances amid escalating trade frictions. European leaders, particularly in NATO, faced pressure to enhance defense contributions, resulting in a landmark agreement at the 2025 NATO summit in The Hague to raise collective spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, including 3.5% on core military outlays—a direct outcome of U.S. insistence on equitable burden-sharing. This escalation from the prior 2% target, achieved despite resistance from nations like Spain, marked a tangible shift toward greater allied self-reliance, as evidenced by surges in spending from new members such as Sweden (from 1.5% to 2.2% of GDP post-2024 accession). In the , the policy facilitated the , signed in 2020 between and several Arab states including the UAE, , , and , fostering normalization without preconditions tied to Palestinian statehood. These agreements have yielded economic benefits, with projected creation of up to 4 million jobs and $1 trillion in regional activity through expanded trade, investment, and joint ventures in sectors like technology and energy. Security cooperation against shared threats, notably and its proxies, has intensified, contributing to a more integrated regional framework despite subsequent conflicts. Relations with China deteriorated into a protracted , initiated with U.S. tariffs on $300 billion in Chinese goods by 2019, prompting Beijing's retaliatory measures and vows to "stand firm" against further escalation. Recent tensions, including 's restrictions on rare earth exports in October 2025, led to U.S. threats of 100% tariffs, but tentative agreements averted immediate hikes, highlighting mutual despite efforts. The , wary of transatlantic strains, accelerated initiatives, boosting domestic defense and infrastructure investments in response to perceived U.S. , while navigating risks of becoming a "geopolitical " amid reduced guarantees. Overall, these repercussions underscore a recalibration of global s toward pragmatic , with empirical gains in burden-sharing and regional stabilization offsetting alliance frictions.