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Assassination of Anwar Sadat

The assassination of Anwar Sadat occurred on October 6, 1981, when the president of Egypt was shot and killed by Islamist militants during a military parade in Cairo commemorating the eighth anniversary of Egypt's 1973 attack on Israel in the Yom Kippur War. The attackers, disguised as soldiers in a military truck, included Lieutenant Khalid al-Islambouli of the Egyptian Army, who led a squad from the Egyptian Islamic Jihad group; they hurled grenades and fired automatic weapons at Sadat's reviewing stand, also wounding Vice President Hosni Mubarak and others before being subdued. The primary motivation was Islamist opposition to Sadat's 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty, which they viewed as a betrayal of Islamic principles and pan-Arab solidarity, compounded by grievances over his suppression of religious dissent and economic policies favoring Western alignment. Sadat succumbed to his wounds en route to a military hospital, marking the first successful assassination of a sitting Egyptian leader and prompting Mubarak's immediate succession, who vowed continuity of the peace process despite domestic unrest. The plot, though partially uncovered by Egyptian security beforehand, exposed vulnerabilities in Sadat's protection despite U.S. training for his guards, and led to the trial and execution of Islambouli and four accomplices in 1982, while highlighting the rising threat of jihadist networks in Egypt.

Background

Sadat's Rise and Key Policies

was born on , 1918, in Mit Ab al-Kawm, , and entered the Egyptian Military Academy in 1936, graduating in 1938. During , he engaged in anti-British activities, resulting in his imprisonment by authorities. In the , Sadat met and joined the Officers , a group of nationalist officers opposing influence and the monarchy. On July 23, 1952, the Officers, led by Nasser, executed a coup that overthrew King Farouk, establishing a republic; Sadat played a supporting role and later served as editor of the state newspaper al-Gumhuriyya from 1953. Under Nasser's presidency, Sadat held various ministerial positions and was appointed vice president in 1969. Following Nasser's death on September 28, 1970, Sadat assumed the role of acting president and was formally elected on October 15, 1970, in a national plebiscite. In May 1971, Sadat launched the "Corrective Revolution," a purge targeting Nasser-era officials and military leaders perceived as threats to his authority, which included arresting over 100 individuals and reshaping the government to reduce Soviet influence. Domestically, Sadat shifted Egypt's economy through the ("open door") policy initiated around 1974, which encouraged foreign investment, private enterprise, and decentralization to counter the stagnation of Nasserist , though it exacerbated inequality and corruption. These reforms aimed to diversify the economy beyond state control, attracting Western capital while relaxing some political restrictions. On the foreign front, Sadat expelled approximately 20,000 Soviet military advisors and technicians on July 18, 1972, citing their failure to support Egypt's military needs, marking a pivot from Soviet alignment toward the . He initiated the October 1973 against Israel on October 6 to reclaim the , achieving initial successes that restored Egyptian military prestige and facilitated subsequent diplomacy. Seeking peace, Sadat addressed the Israeli on November 19, 1977, leading to the signed on September 17, 1978, mediated by U.S. President , which outlined a framework for Egyptian-Israeli peace. This culminated in the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty on March 26, 1979, resulting in Israel's withdrawal from in exchange for normalized relations, though it isolated Egypt in the . For these efforts, Sadat shared the with Israeli Prime Minister in 1978.

Emergence of Islamist Opposition in Egypt

Following Anwar Sadat's ascension to the presidency on October 15, 1970, after Gamal Abdel Nasser's death, he initiated the release of thousands of political prisoners, including prominent members who had been incarcerated during Nasser's crackdown on Islamists in the and . This amnesty, implemented gradually throughout the early 1970s, aimed to consolidate Sadat's power by enlisting former figures as a counterweight to lingering Nasserist and leftist factions within 's political and intellectual spheres. In exchange for renouncing violence, the was permitted to engage in proselytizing (da'wa) activities, marking a revival of organized Islamist influence after nearly two decades of suppression. University campuses emerged as primary incubators for this resurgence, where Sadat initially encouraged Islamist student associations (jama'at al-Islamiyya) to offset secular leftist dominance among youth. By the mid-1970s, these groups had gained control of student unions at major institutions like and Al-Azhar, leveraging religious discourse to address grievances over moral decay, Western cultural infiltration, and economic hardships exacerbated by Sadat's (economic opening) policies starting in 1974, which favored a crony capitalist class amid rising and . Islamist literature, drawing on ideologues like —executed in 1966 for his advocacy of against perceived apostate regimes—circulated widely, radicalizing segments of the student body beyond the Brotherhood's gradualist approach. Parallel to the Brotherhood's institutional growth, more militant factions splintered off, rejecting societal integration in favor of takfir (declaration of Muslims as unbelievers) and hijra (withdrawal to form pure communities). The most notable was wa al-Hijra (Excommunication and Emigration), founded around 1975 by Shukri Mustafa, a former Brotherhood member influenced by Qutb's writings; the group operated clandestinely, viewing Sadat's as jahiliyya (pre-Islamic ignorance). In July 1977, Takfir militants kidnapped and murdered Sheikh Muhammad al-Dhahabi, a former government of awqaf (religious endowments) seen as complicit in state corruption of , prompting a nationwide security crackdown that dismantled the cell but highlighted the deepening radical undercurrent. This incident, involving over 100 arrests, underscored how Sadat's tolerance had inadvertently fertilized extremist ideologies, as returning prisoners and unchecked campus preaching fused anti-regime sentiment with calls for Islamic governance. The late 1970s intensified Islamist grievances, particularly after the 1978 and the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty, which isolated regionally and were framed by opponents as a capitulation to and abandonment of . Combined with perceptions of Sadat's personal extravagance and alliances with the , these policies alienated conservative Islamists who had initially benefited from his liberalization, paving the way for groups like —formed in the late 1970s from ex-Brotherhood militants—to prioritize violent overthrow of the regime as a religious imperative. By 1981, this opposition had evolved from marginal proselytizing to structured conspiracies, reflecting a causal chain from state-sponsored revival to unchecked amid policy-induced disillusionment.

The Plotters and Ideology

Formation and Structure of Egyptian Islamic Jihad

The (EIJ), also known as al-Jihad or Tanzim al-Jihad, formed in the late 1970s amid growing Islamist discontent with President Anwar 's policies, including his peace treaty with and suppression of religious opposition. It originated as a splinter from broader Islamist networks, drawing radicals who viewed Egypt's government as apostate and advocated immediate armed , rejecting the Muslim Brotherhood's post-1960s emphasis on gradualism after Sayyid Qutb's execution. Early cohesion came through figures like , who led the Cairo branch and penned The Neglected Duty (circa 1980), a declaring defensive obligatory against rulers failing to enforce , thereby providing ideological justification for targeting Sadat. The group solidified around 1979, prioritizing the overthrow of the regime over mass mobilization. EIJ's structure emphasized secrecy and operational security, functioning as a decentralized network of small, semi-autonomous —typically 5-10 members each—to evade detection by authorities. These included of professionals and students for and , alongside infiltrated military units for ; the latter proved critical, as evidenced by the army led by Colonel Abbud al-Zumar, which recruited Lieutenant Khalid Islambouli for the Sadat assassination. Overall membership numbered several hundred core operatives, coordinated by a central or based in , with Ayman emerging as a key strategist in the late after joining from Brotherhood circles. This cellular model, supplemented by weapons training and reconnaissance, enabled precise, high-impact strikes rather than sustained , aligning with the group's elitist vanguardist approach.

Ideological Motivations and Grievances

The assassins from (EIJ) adhered to a Qutbist interpretation of , drawing from Qutb's doctrine that equated contemporary secular Muslim regimes with jahiliyyah—a state of pagan ignorance requiring violent to restore (hakimiyyah). This framework enabled takfir, the declaration of Muslim rulers as apostates, positioning as a legitimate target for elimination to pave the way for an governed by . EIJ leaders, including , viewed such regimes as tyrannical barriers () to God's rule, mandating offensive not merely as defense but as proactive duty against internal infidelity before external threats. Central to their animosity was Sadat's pursuit of peace with via the 1978 and the 1979 Egypt- Peace , which they condemned as capitulation to the "Zionist entity" and abandonment of obligatory against occupiers of Muslim lands, including . EIJ fatwa-like justifications framed the treaty as , prioritizing U.S. aid and over pan-Arab and pan-Islamic solidarity, thus betraying the ummah's cause and enabling Israeli dominance. Sadat's 1977 visit and public embrace of Israeli leaders further symbolized this perceived humiliation, alienating radicals who saw it as fraternization with infidels at Islam's expense. Domestically, Sadat's (open door) policy from 1974 onward liberalized the economy, inviting Western investment and consumerism, which EIJ decried as moral corruption eroding Islamic values and fostering under a facade of secular . His regime's suppression of Islamist —exemplified by the 1981 arrest of approximately 1,500 members and radicals ahead of a planned speech—intensified perceptions of Sadat as a repressive stifling sharia revival. Khalid Islambouli, the operation's triggerman, echoed this by shouting "I have killed " during the attack, invoking Quranic imagery of tyranny while citing vengeance for imprisoned kin and defense of Islamic honor. These cumulative grievances culminated in the assassination as a catalyst for revolutionary upheaval against Sadat's "un-Islamic" order.

The Assassination

Planning the Operation

The planning of the assassination was spearheaded by key figures within (EIJ), including , the group's ideologue, and Abbud al-Zumar, a in Egyptian who co-founded EIJ and envisioned the operation as part of a broader coup attempt against Sadat's regime. Al-Zumar, leveraging his army connections, identified the annual military victory parade on —marking the eighth anniversary of Egypt's 1973 attack on —as an optimal opportunity, given Sadat's guaranteed attendance and the presence of armed soldiers. Initially conceived around 1979 amid growing Islamist grievances over Sadat's with and suppression of religious opposition, the plot shifted from a full military takeover to after Sadat's September 1981 mass arrests of over 1,500 Islamists, which included relatives of potential recruits and accelerated the timeline. Faraj's manifesto, Al-Farīḍah al-Ghāʾibah (The Neglected Duty), published in early 1981, provided the theological rationale, declaring against "apostate" rulers like —who enforced secular laws and allied with non-Muslims—a personal religious obligation superseding defensive struggles against external foes, thus justifying preemptive violence to restore Islamic governance. This text, drawing on thinkers like , was distributed among EIJ cells and reportedly influenced the plotters directly, with Faraj coordinating logistics while al-Zumar handled military elements. A from Sheikh , endorsing Sadat's death as lawful, further legitimized the act within circles. Recruitment focused on sympathetic army personnel to minimize detection; al-Zumar approached Khalid al-Islambouli, a 23-year-old radicalized by the of his older brother (an EIJ member) during Sadat's , offering him leadership of the in late summer 1981. Islambouli, stationed at a base near and assigned to the 's rocket-launcher truck, eagerly accepted, recruiting three subordinates—Atta Zubayr, Ibrahim Abd al-Aziz, and Hussein Badr—who shared anti-Sadat sentiments fueled by Islamist preaching in mosques. The team, all low-ranking enlisted men and s, underwent informal training in a remote area, practicing coordinated attacks with smuggled weapons including 9mm pistols, knives, and hand grenades concealed under uniforms. Operational details emphasized surprise and escape: the squad would halt their truck near Sadat's viewing stand using a , then rush the amid the chaos of the , firing bursts and hurling explosives before attempting to seize a for evasion or link up with EIJ supporters. Funding came from mosque donations and small EIJ contributions, avoiding large transfers to evade surveillance, while the plotters maintained operational security by limiting knowledge to a core cell of about a , excluding broader EIJ factions like Ayman al-Zawahiri's network. Al-Zumar later claimed in that the assassination deviated from the original coup blueprint, which aimed to rally army units post-killing, but execution proceeded as a standalone due to time constraints. Despite warnings of unrest, Egyptian security underestimated the parade's vulnerability, as plotters exploited routine protocols without triggering alarms.

Events of October 6, 1981

On October 6, 1981, Egyptian President attended a in Cairo's to mark the eighth anniversary of Egypt's crossing of the during the 1973 . The event featured formations of infantry, armored units, and low-flying aircraft, with Sadat positioned on a reviewing stand flanked by Vice President , cabinet members, military leaders, and foreign diplomats including the Cuban ambassador and an Omani general. As the parade continued, a carrying four personnel in uniform approached the stand; these men, members of led by Islambouli, abruptly stopped the vehicle approximately 20 meters away. Islambouli and his accomplices—disguised as an artillery crew—leapt from the , hurling multiple hand grenades toward the platform, several of which detonated while others failed to explode. Shouting anti-government slogans including "I have killed the ," Islambouli then fired bursts from a , joined by his comrades who unleashed indiscriminate automatic weapons fire lasting about two minutes. Sadat rose from his seat, possibly in response to the initial blasts, and was immediately targeted by gunfire. The stand descended into pandemonium, with attendees diving for cover amid smoke, debris, and blood; some were trampled in the scramble while others remained frozen in shock. Egyptian security forces and guards reacted within seconds, returning fire and neutralizing three of the assailants on the spot, while Islambouli and a fourth were subdued and arrested shortly thereafter.

Fatal Wounds and Medical Response

Sadat sustained multiple gunshot wounds during the attack, including strikes to the chest and shoulder from rifle fire by the assassins, who also hurled grenades toward the reviewing stand. Reports indicate he was hit at least four times, with the bullets causing severe internal damage. The assault occurred around 12:30 p.m. local time on October 6, 1981, amid the military parade in Cairo's Nasr City, leaving Sadat in a coma with his uniform soaked in blood. He was immediately evacuated by helicopter to , where medical personnel attempted amid extensive blood loss. Efforts focused on addressing the trauma from the penetrating wounds, but Sadat succumbed approximately two hours after the shooting, officially pronounced dead at 2:40 p.m. due to intense and in the chest cavity. The hospital's proximity to the site—about 10 kilometers away—enabled rapid transport, yet the severity of the ballistic injuries proved insurmountable given the era's medical capabilities. An was conducted post-mortem, though detailed public findings remain limited.

Immediate Aftermath

Political Succession and Emergency Measures

, who had served as since 1975, immediately assumed the constitutional powers of the upon Sadat's death on October 6, 1981, as stipulated by Article 84 of Egypt's 1971 constitution, which designates the to act as interim in cases of presidential vacancy due to death or incapacity. The transition occurred without incident, averting fears of a or military coup, given Mubarak's background as a former air force commander and his low public profile compared to Sadat. On October 14, 1981, Mubarak was formally sworn in as president by the People's Assembly following nomination by at least two-thirds of its members, with his leadership subsequently affirmed by a national referendum on October 15 that reported near-unanimous approval. To stabilize the country amid the shock of the and potential unrest from Islamist elements, Egypt's declared a on October 6, , initially for one year, empowering security forces with authority for warrantless detentions, military tribunals, press censorship, and restrictions on public gatherings. This measure, rooted in Egypt's 1958 Emergency Law, was justified as necessary to counter threats from extremists opposed to Sadat's policies, including the , and it facilitated rapid arrests of suspected conspirators while imposing curfews in and heightened military presence at key sites. In a televised approximately seven hours after the , Mubarak emphasized continuity in foreign policy, including adherence to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and vowed to prosecute those responsible while maintaining national unity. The emergency regime proved enduring, with successive extensions by Mubarak's administration—often renewed every few years—citing ongoing challenges from Islamist groups, economic instability, and sectarian tensions, effectively suspending certain for over three decades until its partial lifting in 2012. Critics, including observers, later argued that these measures entrenched authoritarian control rather than addressing root causes of militancy, though Egyptian officials maintained they were essential for preventing broader . Under Mubarak's initial leadership, the succession and emergency protocols ensured short-term political continuity, though they also foreshadowed a model reliant on apparatus dominance.

Initial Investigation and Arrests

Following the assassination on October 6, 1981, during a in , Egyptian security forces immediately subdued and arrested the four assailants who had opened fire on President from a passing . The gunmen— Shawki Islambouli (the squad leader who fired the fatal shots), Attiya Ibrahim Attiya, Hussein Abbas Mohammed, and Abdel Hamid Abdel Salam Abdel Ali—were overpowered by and parade security personnel amid the chaos, which also resulted in the deaths of six other individuals and injuries to 28 more. Interrogations of the captured perpetrators quickly revealed links to the Egyptian Islamic (also known as al-Jihad), a militant Islamist group opposed to Sadat's with and his secular policies; Islambouli reportedly confessed during initial questioning to acting on religious motivations, shouting "I have killed the " at the scene. Vice President , who was seated beside and assumed interim control, promptly declared a and ordered a nationwide security crackdown, empowering intelligence and police to launch sweeping raids on suspected Islamist networks. Within days, investigations expanded beyond the shooters to uncover a broader , leading to the arrests of key figures including , the ideologue and operational leader of who authored a justifying the killing as a religious duty, and Abbud al-Zumar, a who helped plan the operation. Dozens more were detained for providing logistical support, such as weapons and safe houses, with evidence from seized documents and confessions implicating cells in and . The probe, conducted primarily by military prosecutors, resulted in formal indictments against 24 individuals by November 12, 1981, charging four with direct murder and the rest with , , or abetting the plot; among them was , a cleric accused of issuing religious sanction for the attack. Broader sweeps netted over 1,000 suspected extremists in the immediate aftermath, including peripheral figures like , a and Islamic Jihad member arrested in but later released for lack of direct involvement after appealing his detention. These arrests dismantled much of the group's visible structure, though some leaders evaded capture initially, highlighting gaps in pre-assassination intelligence despite Sadat's prior roundup of over 1,500 Islamists in September.

Trials and Justice

Prosecution of the Conspirators

The trial of the conspirators in the of Egyptian President commenced on November 2, 1981, before a supreme military court in , involving 24 defendants primarily affiliated with . The accused faced charges of premeditated murder for killing Sadat and seven others during the military parade on October 6, 1981, along with conspiracy to overthrow the government. Proceedings were largely conducted in secret over 3.5 months, with the defendants entering pleas of not guilty; Lieutenant Khalid Islambouli, the shooter, publicly affirmed his role during an early session. Key figures included Islambouli, an artillery lieutenant who led the assault squad; , identified by prosecutors as the ideological mastermind who authored the group's justifying the killing; and Abbud al-Zumur, a reserve officer accused of coordinating logistics. The trial's final public session occurred on March 6, 1982, in a fortified army camp near , where defendants were absent due to prior disruptions, and power outages briefly halted proceedings. Several defendants, including Islambouli, denounced as a traitor for the Egypt-Israel and expressed no , framing the act as religious duty. On March 7, 1982, the three-judge panel delivered verdicts: five defendants, including Islambouli, Faraj, one sergeant, and two reserve officers directly involved in the attack, received death sentences—four for and Faraj for through . Seventeen others were convicted of lesser , receiving prison terms ranging from one year to , with al-Zumur and his relative Tariq al-Zumur sentenced to life. Two were acquitted for insufficient evidence, notably , whose role was deemed peripheral despite later associations with Islamist militancy. Convicted parties had 15 days to appeal to President , though clemency pleas were ultimately rejected.

Executions and Imprisonments

On March 6, 1982, Egypt's Supreme Military Court sentenced five Muslim fundamentalists to death for their direct involvement in the of President , with four convicted of and the fifth for providing the ideological blueprint that justified the attack. The condemned included Lieutenant Khalid al-Islambouli, the lieutenant who led the assault by firing on Sadat during the military parade, and , the Egyptian Islamic Jihad theorist whose pamphlet The Neglected Duty outlined the religious obligation to kill apostate rulers like Sadat. The death sentences were upheld by President on March 22, 1982, despite appeals for clemency. The five were executed by firing squad at dawn on April 15, 1982, at a military base near , marking a swift response to the conspiracy orchestrated by . Islambouli reportedly shouted anti- slogans and praised the act as service to during his final moments, reflecting the group's grievances over Sadat's with and perceived . Of the remaining 19 defendants in the trial of 24 total conspirators, 17 were convicted and received prison sentences ranging from one year to life imprisonment for aiding the plot, including roles in planning, weapons procurement, and logistical support. Two were acquitted due to insufficient evidence of complicity. Among those imprisoned for life was Abbud al-Zummar, a former army officer and key strategist in Egyptian Islamic Jihad who helped coordinate the operation but avoided execution. These sentences aimed to dismantle the jihadist cell responsible, though some convicts later received reductions or releases under subsequent amnesties.

Long-term Consequences

Impacts on Egyptian Domestic Politics

Following Sadat's assassination on October 6, 1981, Vice President assumed the presidency through a smooth transition facilitated by the National Democratic Party and military leadership, avoiding immediate instability or power struggles. The regime declared a , which had been enacted shortly before the killing, enabling expanded security powers that included widespread arrests of suspected Islamist conspirators, such as members of and figures like . This crackdown neutralized the immediate jihadist threat but entrenched a security-focused approach, prioritizing regime stability over broader political liberalization. Mubarak's early governance emphasized continuity with Sadat's economic policies while adopting a more cautious, low-profile style that shunned the predecessor's bold reforms, reflecting lessons from the assassination's exposure of domestic fissures. He released approximately 1,500 non-Islamist political prisoners detained by , signaling with secular and leftist opposition, but intensified prosecution of Islamist militants responsible for the plot, reinforcing the military's role in suppressing radical groups. The emergency law, renewed repeatedly, persisted for three decades, curtailing and enabling surveillance that sustained authoritarian control amid growing Islamist activism, including from the . Long-term, the assassination accelerated Egypt's shift toward a conservative, stability-oriented polity under Mubarak's 30-year rule, which ended amid the 2011 uprising, but it also highlighted unresolved tensions from Sadat's era, such as economic inequality and Islamist grievances against secular governance. While averting a broader revolutionary challenge in 1981—due to fragmented opposition and public apathy toward the regime—the event underscored the limits of Sadat's balancing act between Islamism and secularism, fostering a political landscape where state repression coexisted with subterranean growth in organized religious opposition. This dynamic contributed to episodic violence and debates over political pluralism, though the core authoritarian framework endured until external pressures forced change.

Effects on Middle East Peace Process

Hosni Mubarak, who succeeded Sadat as president on , 1981, immediately reaffirmed Egypt's commitment to the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, stating that "I will continue the policy President Sadat started" and pledging to proceed with ongoing framework autonomy talks scheduled for October 25. responded by conditioning the final withdrawal phases on the continuity of the but proceeded after Mubarak's assurances, completing the pullout by April 25, 1982, as stipulated in the treaty. This ensured the treaty's survival despite initial fears that Sadat's death could unravel it, marking the first durable Arab-Israeli peace agreement. Under Mubarak, Egypt maintained formal compliance with the treaty, including diplomatic relations and border security cooperation, but pursued a "cold peace" characterized by limited economic and cultural ties, avoiding the warmer normalization Sadat had envisioned. Mubarak's administration prioritized domestic stability and re-engagement with the —Egypt rejoined the in 1989 after its 1979 expulsion over the treaty—over aggressive promotion of broader peace initiatives, which contributed to stalled progress on Palestinian autonomy negotiations. The assassination underscored the domestic political costs of peacemaking with , deterring other leaders from similar unilateral concessions and reinforcing a cautious approach to the broader , where 's influence shifted from trailblazer to reluctant broker. While the treaty provided a foundation for regional stability by removing —the world's most populous nation—from active conflict, it isolated temporarily and highlighted Islamist opposition as a persistent barrier to expanded normalization efforts. Over the subsequent decades, this dynamic contributed to a focused on bilateral ceasefires rather than comprehensive , with emphasizing roles in conflicts like the while subordinating treaty expansion to pan- solidarity.

Legacy for Islamist Movements

The assassination of Anwar Sadat by members of (EIJ) on October 6, 1981, positioned the perpetrators, particularly Khalid Islambouli, as enduring symbols of resistance within jihadist circles, with Islambouli lionized as "al-batal" (the hero) in propaganda imagery emphasizing martyrdom through white attire symbolizing purity and death, alongside firearms and radiant light denoting divine reward. This portrayal reinforced the ideological narrative of self-sacrifice against rulers accused of for policies like the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty, fostering a model of targeted violence that jihadist groups invoked to justify attacks on perceived traitors to Islamic governance. EIJ's success in penetrating a to execute the killing demonstrated the tactical feasibility of assassinations against entrenched secular regimes, elevating the group's visibility and contributing to its evolution under leaders like , who was imprisoned and tortured for suspected involvement, an experience that hardened his commitment to militant takfirism—declaring Muslim leaders infidels warranting death. While the act prompted immediate Egyptian crackdowns that fragmented domestic operations and reduced EIJ's local attacks by the , it radicalized survivors, shifting strategic emphasis from solely the "near enemy" (apostate governments) toward integrating assaults on the "far enemy" (Western powers supporting them). The merger of EIJ with in June 2001, spearheaded by Zawahiri and figures like , transmitted this legacy into global , infusing with EIJ's expertise in high-profile operations such as the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings and the , while perpetuating the doctrine of prioritizing against compromising Muslim rulers as a precursor to broader confrontation. This integration underscored the assassination's role in bridging localized Egyptian militancy with transnational networks, though it failed to destabilize Egypt's secular order, instead inspiring sporadic emulation like attempted killings of successors while highlighting the limits of such tactics absent mass mobilization.

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