Chief of Naval Operations
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) is a four-star admiral who serves as the highest-ranking officer in the United States Navy, acting as the principal naval advisor to the President of the United States and the Secretary of the Navy while functioning as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[1] Under the statutory authority outlined in 10 U.S.C. § 8033, the CNO bears responsibility for the overall organization, training, and equipping of naval forces to ensure combat readiness, with precedence over all other naval officers in Department of the Navy duties.[2] The position entails directing the Navy Staff and coordinating with other military branches on joint operations, emphasizing strategic planning, resource allocation, and operational effectiveness in maintaining maritime superiority.[3] Established by the Naval Appropriations Act signed into law on March 3, 1915, the CNO office marked a pivotal shift toward centralized naval leadership amid growing demands for modern fleet operations and war planning.[4] Admiral William S. Benson became the inaugural CNO on May 11, 1915, assuming duties under the Secretary of the Navy with initial focus on fleet mobilization and preparation for potential conflicts, including World War I.[5] Over the subsequent century, the role expanded significantly during major conflicts such as World War II, where CNOs like Admiral Ernest J. King directed global naval campaigns, underscoring the office's evolution from administrative coordinator to key architect of expeditionary warfare doctrine.[6] As of August 25, 2025, Admiral Daryl Caudle holds the office as the 34th CNO, prioritizing sailor well-being, manning efficiency, and readiness amid challenges like ship maintenance delays and personnel shortages.[7] The CNO's influence extends to advising on naval innovation, cyber operations, and integrated deterrence strategies, reflecting adaptations to contemporary threats from peer competitors in contested domains.[8] While the office has navigated internal debates over budget priorities and force structure, its core mandate remains rooted in delivering warfighting capability through empirical assessment of operational needs rather than doctrinal conformity.[9]Legal and Administrative Framework
Statutory Basis and Appointment Process
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) is a statutory position established under Title 10 of the United States Code, particularly in sections 8032 and 8033, which define the office's structure, appointment, and principal duties. Section 8032 creates the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) to provide professional assistance to the Secretary of the Navy, Under Secretary, and Assistant Secretaries on matters including the preparation of the Navy, military requirements, strategic plans, training, and logistical support.[10] This office operates under the direct authority of the Secretary of the Navy, ensuring alignment with departmental policy while maintaining operational focus on naval forces.[10] Section 8033 specifies that the CNO shall be appointed by the President from officers on the active-duty list in the line of the Navy who hold the grade of rear admiral or above and are eligible to command at sea.[11] The appointment requires confirmation by the Senate, following standard procedures for senior military officers, which include nomination submission, review by the Senate Armed Services Committee, public hearings, and a floor vote.[11] The CNO serves a four-year term, commencing upon Senate confirmation and assumption of duties, but may be reappointed successively; however, the officer serves at the pleasure of the President and can be removed at any time without cause.[11] While serving, the CNO holds the permanent grade of admiral.[11] The statutory framework emphasizes the CNO's role as the principal naval advisor to the President and Secretary of the Navy on warfighting requirements, without granting independent command authority over forces, which remains vested in combatant commanders and fleet units.[11] This structure, codified post-World War II reforms but rooted in the 1915 Naval Appropriations Act that initially created the position, balances professional military input with civilian oversight.[5]Rank, Term, and Qualifications
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) holds the permanent grade of admiral, a four-star rank in the United States Navy.[12] This rank positions the CNO as the senior-most commissioned officer in the naval service, with precedence over all other Navy officers except when specific exceptions apply under naval regulations.[13] The CNO is appointed by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a statutory term of four years.[11] The appointee serves at the pleasure of the President, permitting removal prior to term completion or, in some cases, reappointment or extension beyond four years, as seen in historical precedents where terms varied due to national security needs or administrative decisions.[11][5] Statutory qualifications limit selection to active-duty flag officers of the Navy, defined as officers in pay grades O-7 (rear admiral, lower half) through O-10 (admiral).[11] No additional formal educational, experiential, or certification requirements are prescribed by law, though selections typically favor officers with proven records in fleet command, joint operations, and strategic planning to ensure effective execution of the role's advisory and oversight functions.[13]Core Responsibilities and Authority Limits
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) serves as the principal naval advisor to the Secretary of the Navy, reporting directly to that office while presiding over the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) to assist in executing naval policies.[14] Under 10 U.S.C. § 8033, the CNO transmits plans and recommendations to the Secretary regarding the organization of the Navy, including force structure, training programs, and equipping requirements, and acts as the Secretary's agent in carrying out approved directives.[11] This includes supervising Navy personnel and organizations, as well as Marine Corps elements when specifically directed by the Secretary, while maintaining overall readiness through budgeting, resource allocation, and efficiency investigations.[14][11] As a statutory member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the CNO fulfills duties outlined in 10 U.S.C. § 151, providing professional military advice on naval strategy to the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council, independent of service-specific chains.[11] This advisory role extends to strategic planning, such as long-term war plans and joint operations assessments, ensuring the Navy's contributions align with broader national defense objectives without compromising JCS independence.[14] The CNO also performs additional functions assigned by the President or Secretaries under 10 U.S.C. §§ 171 and 3104, such as personnel management and acquisition oversight.[11] The CNO's authority is strictly limited by statute and regulation, remaining subject to the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of the Navy at all times.[11][14] Notably, the CNO does not exercise operational command or control over Navy forces once assigned to unified or specified combatant commands, which operate under the combatant commanders' authority in the operational chain of command leading to the President.[15] Instead, the CNO's role focuses on preparing, training, and equipping forces for transfer to these commands, with no executive authority to direct tactical operations or override combatant commander decisions.[15] This separation, reinforced by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, prevents dual chains of command and ensures unified operational direction during conflicts.[15] The CNO's supervision over Marine Corps matters is further restricted to areas not reserved exclusively for the Commandant of the Marine Corps.[14]Organizational Structure and Support
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV)
The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) functions as the core headquarters staff supporting the Chief of Naval Operations in directing naval forces, developing policies, and managing resources under Title 10 U.S. Code authorities.[16] It assists the Secretary of the Navy by providing executive oversight for readiness, training, equipping, and sustaining over 330,000 active-duty sailors, 100,000 reservists, and associated civilian personnel as of fiscal year 2025.[17] OPNAV coordinates cross-functional efforts in strategic planning, operational support, and program execution, including leadership of working groups for factors like operational readiness and infrastructure analysis.[18] OPNAV's structure centers on the CNO and Vice Chief of Naval Operations, augmented by Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations (DCNOs) who head N-code directorates focused on domain-specific responsibilities.[16] These include:- N1 (DCNO for Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education): Oversees total force requirements, policy, and infrastructure coordination with entities like the Joint Staff.[19]
- N2/N6 (DCNO for Information Warfare): Manages intelligence capabilities, cybersecurity, and command/control systems integration.[18]
- N3/N5 (DCNO for Operations, Plans, and Strategy): Directs operational planning, politico-military affairs, and fleet management support.[20]
- N4 (DCNO for Logistics, Maintenance, and Infrastructure): Handles sustainment, supply chain, and facilities policy, including fire and emergency services standards.[21]
- N8 (DCNO for Integration of Capabilities and Resources): Leads programming, budgeting, and resource sponsorship, including divisions like N82 for fiscal management and N84 for test/evaluation.[22][23]
Official Residence and Perquisites
The official residence of the Chief of Naval Operations is Tingey House, designated as Quarters A and located within the Washington Navy Yard in Southeast Washington, D.C..[26] Constructed in 1804 during the yard's early development, the Federal-style brick dwelling originally served as the home of the Navy Yard's commanders, including Master Commandant Thomas Tingey, for whom it is named..[26] It has functioned as the CNO's residence since 1977, providing secure and convenient housing proximate to naval administrative facilities..[26] Prior to this assignment, CNOs resided in other flag officer quarters or private accommodations in the National Capital Region..[27] In addition to standard four-star admiral compensation, which includes basic pay exceeding $18,000 monthly as of fiscal year 2025, the CNO receives a position-specific personal money allowance of $4,000 annually under 37 U.S.C. § 414, intended to cover incidental expenses associated with the office.. This allowance replaces other personal money entitlements for flag officers in such senior roles and is subject to federal income tax withholding..[28] Other perquisites encompass official transportation via dedicated staff cars and access to military aircraft for official travel, personal aides (typically two to three Navy officers), and administrative support from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, all funded through appropriated Navy resources to facilitate unencumbered execution of duties..[29] These entitlements align with those provided to other service chiefs, emphasizing operational efficiency over personal luxury..Relationship to Other Naval and Joint Entities
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) serves as the principal military adviser to the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) on the conduct of war and the utilization of naval forces and resources.[30] Under the direction of the SECNAV, the CNO is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping naval forces for assignment to unified and specified combatant commands, while exercising supervision over functions such as readiness, logistics, and personnel management within the Department of the Navy.[30] The CNO takes precedence over all other officers of the naval service, except in specific ceremonial contexts involving the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and acts as the senior uniformed leader in advising the SECNAV on strategic naval policy.[2] This relationship ensures civilian oversight, with the CNO transmitting all Department of the Navy communications to the President and SECDEF through the SECNAV.[30] Within the naval hierarchy, the CNO maintains direct oversight of key subordinate entities, including the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Deputy Chiefs, and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) staff, which implement naval programs and policies.[13] The CNO also coordinates with naval component commands, such as U.S. Fleet Forces Command, providing guidance on force structure and readiness without exercising direct operational control over deployed units.[31] Relations with the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy involve enlisted advisory input on personnel welfare and morale, reflecting the CNO's role in sustaining the enlisted force. In joint contexts, the CNO functions as one of nine members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), offering naval expertise to the President, National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and SECDEF on military strategy and operations.[32] As a JCS member, the CNO participates in deliberations led by the Chairman but holds no command authority over joint forces; instead, the CNO supports combatant commanders by allocating naval assets under the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which separates service chief advisory roles from operational command vested in unified commanders.[30] The CNO must inform the SECNAV of all significant JCS actions or decisions affecting naval interests, ensuring alignment between service-specific and joint priorities.[2] This structure promotes interoperability with other services, as evidenced by joint exercises and integrated planning, while the CNO advocates for naval requirements within JCS consensus-building processes.[33]Historical Development
Predecessor Roles and Early Reforms (1900–1915)
In 1900, Secretary of the Navy John D. Long established the General Board of the United States Navy through General Order No. 544, dated March 13, 1900, to advise on strategic planning, fleet preparation for war, and coastal defense.[34] The board, comprising senior officers including the Admiral of the Navy and chiefs of key bureaus, represented an early reform aimed at centralizing naval advisory functions amid post-Spanish-American War modernization efforts, though it lacked direct operational authority over the decentralized bureau system.[35] Prior to 1915, naval operations lacked a unified military head; the Secretary of the Navy oversaw administration through autonomous bureaus such as Navigation, Ordnance, and Construction, with operational planning fragmented across aides and the emerging Division of Fleet Operations established in 1909.[36] This "Naval Aide System" divided responsibilities among aides for material, personnel, inspections, and operations, reflecting a civilian-led structure that prioritized administrative efficiency over integrated command, as evidenced by the Navy's challenges in coordinating during early 20th-century exercises.[8] Reform momentum intensified under Secretary Josephus Daniels, appointed in 1913, who sought to streamline operations amid rising European tensions.[37] In February 1913, Daniels appointed Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske as the first Aide for Operations, a role tasked with coordinating fleet readiness, tactical doctrine, and war planning, effectively serving as a precursor to the Chief of Naval Operations position.[38] Fiske, an innovator in naval technology and gunnery, advocated vigorously for a centralized operational chief to counter bureaucratic inertia, arguing in 1914 that the Navy's divided structure hindered wartime preparedness.[39] Fiske's tenure highlighted systemic deficiencies, including inadequate integration between planning bodies like the General Board and daily operations, prompting Daniels to secure congressional funding via the Naval Appropriations Act of 1915 for establishing a dedicated Chief of Naval Operations.[37] This reform, enacted on March 3, 1915, marked the culmination of early 20th-century efforts to professionalize naval command, shifting from aide-based coordination to a statutory military leadership role while preserving the Secretary's ultimate authority.[8]Establishment and World War I Era (1915–1919)
 was established by an act of Congress on March 3, 1915, which created the office within the Department of the Navy to succeed the Division of Operations of the Fleet, in place since 1909.[36] This legislation designated the CNO as a rear admiral serving as a full member of the General Board of the Navy, tasked primarily with transmitting orders from the Secretary of the Navy to fleet commanders rather than wielding independent policy-making authority, reflecting compromises during naval reorganization debates.[8] Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels supported the creation to centralize operational advice, though reformers like Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, who had advocated for a stronger "Aide for Operations" role, viewed the final statute as diluting executive power.[8] Rear Admiral William S. Benson, previously commandant of the Philadelphia Navy Yard, was appointed the first CNO on May 11, 1915, assuming duties that included advising the Secretary on operational matters and coordinating with the General Board.[40] Under Benson's tenure, the office focused on enhancing fleet readiness amid escalating European tensions, including the expansion of naval aviation and submarine forces.[41] By 1916, organizational charts reflected the CNO's integration into the naval staff structure, emphasizing planning and logistics over direct command.[27] As the United States entered World War I on April 6, 1917, Benson directed the mobilization of the U.S. Navy, overseeing the rapid buildup from 211 ships and 4,000 aircraft in 1916 to over 1,200 vessels by 1918, with a focus on antisubmarine warfare and convoy protection in the Atlantic.[42] He played a key role in developing the U.S. Navy's first formal doctrine in 1917, emphasizing decisive fleet actions and coordination with Allied forces, while establishing the Navy's planning section to integrate operational strategy.[43] Benson's efforts included deploying destroyers to Queenstown, Ireland, in 1917 for convoy escorts, which contributed to reducing U-boat sinkings by 75% in protected routes by war's end.[40] Post-armistice, Benson represented the Navy at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, advocating for U.S. naval interests in treaty negotiations and demobilization planning.[42] He retired on September 25, 1919, after four years in office, having elevated the CNO's advisory influence despite statutory limits on authority.[4] This era laid foundational precedents for the office's evolution into a more centralized command role in subsequent decades.[41]Interwar Period and Naval Expansion (1919–1939)
Admiral Robert E. Coontz served as the second Chief of Naval Operations from November 1, 1919, to July 21, 1923, managing the postwar demobilization of the U.S. Navy, which had expanded to over 500 ships and 500,000 personnel during World War I.[44][45] Under his leadership, the Navy reduced its active fleet while preserving core capabilities amid budget constraints imposed by the isolationist policies of the Harding and Coolidge administrations.[6] Coontz's tenure coincided with the Washington Naval Conference of 1921–1922, which produced the Five-Power Naval Limitation Treaty signed on February 6, 1922, capping U.S. capital ship tonnage at 525,000 tons in a 5:5:3 ratio with Britain and Japan, respectively, and imposing a 10-year "holiday" on new battleship construction.[46] This agreement shifted emphasis from unchecked expansion to qualitative improvements in existing vessels, submarines, and aircraft carriers, though it scrapped incomplete battleships like the USS South Dakota class to comply.[47] Coontz advocated for treaty adherence while pushing for modernization within limits, including early experiments in carrier operations.[6] Admiral Edward W. Eberle succeeded Coontz on July 21, 1923, and served until November 14, 1927, prioritizing fleet training and organization despite treaty restrictions.[48] As a recognized training expert, Eberle testified before Congress to secure funding for personnel readiness and tactical exercises, emphasizing gunnery proficiency and combined arms integration.[49] His efforts maintained naval effectiveness during the "battleship holiday," with the fleet conducting annual problems that simulated Pacific scenarios, foreshadowing future conflicts.[50] Admiral Charles F. Hughes held the position from November 14, 1927, to September 17, 1930, focusing on fleet efficiency and the incorporation of new technologies like aircraft carriers and cruisers permitted under treaty loopholes.[51] Hughes outlined objectives to train the fleet to peak readiness and oversaw the design and deployment of vessels such as the Lexington-class carriers, converted from battlecruiser hulls to meet auxiliary tonnage allowances.[52] The London Naval Treaty of April 22, 1930, extended limitations through 1936, allowing the U.S. 10 cruisers and maintaining capital ship parity, though it frustrated advocates for unrestricted building amid rising Japanese militarism.[53] Under Admiral William V. Pratt from September 17, 1930, to June 30, 1933, the Great Depression slashed naval budgets by over 50%, forcing Pratt to balance modernization demands with severe fiscal austerity.[54] He prioritized strategic planning through the General Board and war gaming at the Naval War College, simulating carrier-centric operations despite limited new construction.[50] Pratt's tenure saw minimal expansion, with emphasis on maintaining a balanced fleet capable of defending U.S. interests in the Pacific. Admiral William H. Standley served from June 30, 1933, to January 1, 1937, navigating recovering budgets under the New Deal while confronting escalating global threats from Japan and Germany.[55] Standley supported the Vinson-Trammell Act of March 27, 1934, which authorized 102,000 tons of new cruisers and destroyers, marking the first significant peacetime expansion since the treaties and replenishing aging hulls.[53] He reorganized OPNAV divisions for better aviation and submarine integration, anticipating doctrinal shifts away from battleship dominance.[56] Admiral William D. Leahy, the final interwar CNO from January 2, 1937, to August 1, 1939, accelerated preparations amid Japan's invasion of China and European aggressions.[57] Leahy advocated for increased shipbuilding and personnel, securing funding for destroyers and auxiliaries under the 1938 Naval Expansion Act, which aimed to reach treaty maxima.[58] His focus on readiness included expanding neutrality patrols and fleet exercises, laying groundwork for wartime mobilization despite ongoing Depression-era limitations.[59] Throughout the period, CNOs contended with treaty caps that prioritized stability over supremacy, yet fostered innovations in aviation and strategy that proved vital by 1939.[47]World War II and Postwar Reorganization (1939–1953)
Admiral Harold R. Stark assumed the role of Chief of Naval Operations on August 1, 1939, amid escalating global tensions, with primary responsibilities including the expansion of naval forces to counter threats from both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters.[60] His tenure focused on implementing the Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940, which authorized the construction of 1,300 additional ships and 18,000 aircraft to build a fleet capable of defending U.S. interests across two oceans.[61] Stark advocated for increased readiness, including convoy protection in the Atlantic following the fall of France in June 1940, though prewar constraints limited full mobilization until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.[62] Following Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed Admiral Ernest J. King as Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (COMINCH) on December 20, 1941, to restore Pacific command structures disrupted by the assault, which sank or damaged 18 ships including eight battleships.[63] King relieved Stark as CNO on March 10, 1942, under Executive Order 9096, which consolidated the COMINCH and CNO positions under one officer to streamline wartime command amid the Navy's rapid growth from approximately 383,000 personnel and 1,200 ships in December 1941 to over 3.4 million personnel and a vastly expanded fleet by 1945.[64] [63] In this dual role, King directed antisubmarine warfare that defeated the German U-boat campaign by mid-1943, coordinated carrier-based strikes across the Pacific, and integrated Allied naval efforts, emphasizing offensive operations over defensive postures despite initial resource shortages.[65] His strategic insistence on a "Germany first" policy with simultaneous Pacific offensives balanced Joint Chiefs debates, enabling victories such as the Battle of Midway on June 4–7, 1942, where U.S. carriers sank four Japanese carriers.[66] King retained both titles until December 15, 1945, when Chester W. Nimitz succeeded him as CNO, marking the separation of operational fleet command from administrative oversight as wartime exigencies waned.[13] Nimitz, who had commanded Pacific Fleet operations from December 1941, managed postwar demobilization, reducing active-duty personnel from 3.3 million in August 1945 to about 558,000 by June 1946 through discharge policies prioritizing combat veterans.[67] This contraction, coupled with fleet mothballing—over 5,000 ships placed in reserve—involved reallocating resources amid budget cuts from $100 billion in fiscal year 1945 to under $15 billion by 1947, while Nimitz advocated retaining carrier and amphibious capabilities for emerging threats.[67] The National Security Act of 1947, enacted on July 26, subordinated the Navy to a new Secretary of Defense within the Department of Defense, transforming the CNO from an independent operational head to the principal naval advisor and administrator, with membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasked solely with providing unified military advice to the President.[68] Admiral Louis E. Denfeld served as CNO from August 29, 1947, to November 2, 1949, navigating interservice unification debates that intensified over Air Force independence and strategic bombing primacy, culminating in the 1949 "Revolt of the Admirals."[13] This controversy arose from congressional scrutiny of the Navy's opposition to the Air Force's B-36 bomber program, perceived as diverting funds from carrier aviation; Denfeld's relief by President Harry S. Truman stemmed from his testimony criticizing unification's erosion of service autonomy.[69] Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, appointed CNO on November 2, 1949—the youngest to hold the post at age 53—supported defense reorganization to prioritize nuclear deterrence and forward naval presence amid the Korean War's outbreak on June 25, 1950.[70] [13] Sherman's tenure emphasized carrier task forces and Mediterranean deployments to counter Soviet expansion, but ended prematurely with his death from a heart attack on July 22, 1951, in Naples, Italy, after testifying before Congress on naval requirements.[70] These years solidified the CNO's role in a joint framework, adapting from wartime command to peacetime advocacy within constrained budgets and unified command structures.[68]Cold War Strategic Shifts (1953–1991)
Following the Korean War armistice on July 27, 1953, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) prioritized nuclear deterrence and fleet modernization amid President Eisenhower's "New Look" strategy, which emphasized strategic airpower and reduced conventional forces. Admiral Robert B. Carney, CNO from August 12, 1953, to August 17, 1955, directed post-war force structure reviews to integrate nuclear capabilities, including early advocacy for submarine-launched guided missiles, while managing budget constraints that halved active ship numbers from 1953 peaks.[4][71] Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, CNO from August 17, 1955, to August 31, 1961—the longest-serving in the role—oversaw the Navy's pivot to a nuclear-powered fleet, supporting Admiral Hyman G. Rickover's reactor programs that enabled USS Nautilus (SSN-571), the first nuclear submarine, to commence operations on January 17, 1955. Burke established the Special Projects Office on December 1, 1956, to accelerate the Polaris fleet ballistic missile program, deploying the first submarine USS George Washington (SSBN-598) on December 30, 1959, with 16 missiles each capable of delivering 1,200-mile range warheads, providing a survivable second-strike deterrent against Soviet land-based forces. He also developed force level rationales for 15–20 aircraft carriers to sustain global forward presence and prepared contingency plans for naval operations in limited nuclear exchanges, countering interservice rivalries over strategic roles.[72][73] During the 1960s and early 1970s, CNOs navigated Vietnam War demands alongside Soviet naval expansion, which grew from 900 ships in 1967 to over 1,200 by 1974, emphasizing submarine and surface threats. Admiral David L. McDonald (1963–1967) and Admiral Thomas H. Moorer (August 1, 1967–July 1, 1970) expanded riverine forces to 500 craft for coastal interdiction, delivering over 7 million tons of munitions via sea lift, while Moorer advocated retaining carrier-based tactical nuclear options despite arms control pressures. Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. (1970–1974) implemented Project Sixty, a high-low force mix deploying 40 additional surface combatants including patrol frigates for peacetime tasks, aiming to counter Soviet numerical superiority through distributed presence, though this approach faced criticism for prioritizing affordability over blue-water primacy.[4][74] In the 1980s, under Admiral Thomas B. Hayward (1978–1982), Admiral James D. Watkins (1982–1986), and Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost (1986–1990), the CNO formalized "The Maritime Strategy" in 1982–1986 editions, shifting from defensive sea denial to offensive forward operations against Soviet forces in the North Atlantic and Pacific, integrating 600-ship goals with allied coordination to exploit enemy vulnerabilities during wartime surges. Hayward founded the CNO Strategic Studies Group in 1981 to cultivate flag officer strategic expertise, influencing concepts like simultaneous theater campaigns that pressured Soviet resources, contributing to the USSR's 1980s naval overextension. By 1991, under Admiral Frank B. Kelso II (1990–1994), the Navy maintained 564 ships, including 37 SSBNs with Trident missiles, underscoring the CNO's role in sustaining deterrence without direct superpower naval conflict.[71][75][76]Post-Cold War Adaptations and Modern Challenges (1991–Present)
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the U.S. Navy under Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Frank B. Kelso II confronted a strategic pivot amid force reductions driven by the "peace dividend," with active-duty end strength dropping from approximately 600,000 personnel in 1990 to about 400,000 by 1998. Kelso's tenure emphasized adaptation to lower-threat environments, culminating in the 1992 "...From the Sea" strategy, which shifted naval emphasis from blue-water sea control to littoral power projection and joint operations ashore, influencing divestments of older ships and investments in precision strike capabilities like Tomahawk missiles demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm.[77][78] Subsequent CNOs navigated post-Cold War fiscal constraints and the 1994 Bottom-Up Review, which targeted a 355-ship fleet goal but faced delays due to sequestration and competing priorities. Admiral Vern Clark, CNO from 2000 to 2005, introduced Sea Power 21 in 2002 as a framework for 21st-century operations, integrating concepts like Sea Strike for long-range precision fires, Sea Shield for networked defense, and Sea Basing for sustainment, while applying business efficiencies to counter post-9/11 budget pressures and the demands of global war on terror operations that deferred maintenance on approximately 30% of surface ships by 2005.[79][80] The September 11, 2001, attacks further redirected resources toward expeditionary missions, with carrier strike groups logging over 1,000 port visits annually in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, straining readiness as optempo exceeded sustainable levels.[81] Admiral Jonathan Greenert (CNO 2011–2015) prioritized undersea warfare dominance, electromagnetic maneuver warfare, and cyber integration amid the 2011 Budget Control Act's caps, issuing the 2012 Navigation Plan to align forces with the Asia-Pacific rebalance, including enhanced submarine deployments and investments in the Virginia-class program to maintain undersea superiority against emerging threats. His successor, Admiral John Richardson (CNO 2016–2019), advanced Distributed Lethality in 2015–2016 to disperse offensive capabilities across surface fleets, hardening individual ships against anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems and complicating adversary targeting, as outlined in the 2016 "A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority" that stressed decision superiority over mere information dominance in peer conflicts.[82][83][84] Modern challenges intensified with the 2018 National Defense Strategy's emphasis on great power competition, particularly China's naval expansion to over 370 ships by 2023 and Russia's hybrid threats, exposing U.S. Navy vulnerabilities in shipbuilding (e.g., delays in Columbia-class submarines) and recruitment shortfalls of 7,000 sailors in fiscal year 2023. Admiral Michael Gilday (CNO 2019–2023) launched Project Overmatch to prototype joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) architectures, aiming for data-centric warfare but facing integration hurdles with legacy systems. Current CNO Admiral Lisa Franchetti, assuming office in November 2023 as the first woman in the role, released "America's Warfighting Navy" priorities in January 2024, focusing on warfighting readiness, personnel resilience, and foundational enablers like maintenance, followed by Project 33 in September 2024 to achieve 80% combat surge capacity and full readiness against potential Chinese aggression by 2027 through unmanned integration, hypersonic defenses, and industrial base reforms.[85][86][87] These adaptations underscore the CNO's evolving role in balancing joint integration under Goldwater-Nichols reforms with service-specific innovations, amid persistent debates over fleet size versus technological edge in contested domains like the South China Sea.[76]Notable Chiefs and Leadership Impacts
Pioneering and Wartime Leaders
Admiral William S. Benson, the first Chief of Naval Operations, served from May 11, 1915, to September 25, 1919, and played a foundational role in establishing the office's authority and functions.[40] He secured assignment of material preparation duties to the CNO in June 1915, modernized naval districts, improved navy yards, initiated merchant vessel inspections for potential auxiliaries, and prioritized seaplane development alongside naval aviation advancements.[40] As a member of the Naval Consulting Board with Thomas A. Edison starting in fall 1915, Benson conducted an industrial census to assess war production capacity.[40] These efforts laid the groundwork for centralized naval administration amid emerging global threats. During World War I, following U.S. entry on April 6, 1917, Benson directed key operations including the implementation of a convoy system using destroyers and cruisers to transport millions of troops safely to France.[40] He oversaw the North Sea Mine Barrage from Scotland to Norway and antisubmarine warfare initiatives, deployed U.S. battleships to join the British Grand Fleet, and provided naval guns for French land operations.[40] Benson influenced the 1916 Naval Appropriations Act, which authorized construction of 10 battleships, 6 battle cruisers, 10 light cruisers, 50 destroyers, and 67 submarines, enabling rapid naval expansion to meet wartime demands.[40] He also advised at the 1918 Paris Peace Conference, advocating for U.S. naval interests.[40] In the lead-up to and early stages of World War II, Admiral Harold R. Stark served as the eighth CNO from August 1, 1939, to March 26, 1942, overseeing significant naval expansion during 1940–1941 and managing U.S. involvement in the undeclared Atlantic war against German submarines in late 1941.[62] Following the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941, Stark directed initial combat operations against Japan and the European Axis powers until his relief in March 1942.[62] Admiral Ernest J. King assumed the CNO role on March 18, 1942, while retaining his prior appointment as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet (COMINCH) from December 30, 1941, creating a unique dual command that unified strategic direction across theaters.[88] King's leadership emphasized aggressive operations in both the Atlantic and Pacific, advocating for at least 30% of resources allocated to the Pacific despite Allied "Germany First" priorities, as debated at the November 1943 Cairo Conference.[88] He implemented coastal convoys starting May 14, 1942, which curtailed U-boat successes, and supported pivotal victories like the Battle of Midway, while navigating inter-service resource disputes and adapting to events such as the July 1942 PQ-17 convoy disaster by shifting focus eastward.[88] King's tenure until December 1945 shaped U.S. naval strategy, prioritizing carrier-based warfare and amphibious assaults essential to Allied victory.[88]
Reformers and Strategic Thinkers
Admiral William V. Pratt, serving as CNO from September 17, 1930, to June 30, 1933, advanced strategic planning by establishing a dedicated Planning Section within OPNAV to coordinate war plans with budgetary and administrative functions, enabling long-range shipbuilding projections amid the London Naval Treaty constraints.[89] He emphasized a command philosophy prioritizing operational efficiency over rigid bureaucracy, testing strategic concepts through Naval War College war games and annual fleet problems, while overseeing the fleet's full transition to oil fuel and early carrier aviation developments, including the operational integration of USS Lexington and USS Saratoga. Pratt's tenure institutionalized top-down strategic integration, countering interwar fiscal pressures by aligning naval policy with national economic realities, as outlined in his July 1932 Proceedings article advocating sustained power projection.[54] Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, CNO from August 17, 1955, to August 1, 1961, exemplified strategic innovation by creating the Special Projects Office in 1955 to accelerate the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile program, which delivered the Navy's first sea-based nuclear deterrent by 1960, comprising 41 submarines by the mid-1960s.[73] He reformed organizational structures by establishing the Bureau of Naval Weapons in 1959 to streamline missile and aviation procurement, cutting redundant programs to prioritize nuclear capabilities, and enhancing OP-93's long-range objectives group for integrated planning against Soviet threats.[90] Burke advocated finite nuclear deterrence over massive retaliation, influencing Eisenhower-era strategy by ensuring Navy targeting processes aligned with joint nuclear operations, while resisting 1958 Defense Reorganization Act centralization to preserve service autonomy in fleet modernization, including Forrestal-class supercarriers.[91] Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., CNO from July 1, 1970, to July 1, 1974, drove personnel and force structure reforms through over 100 "Z-grams" that decentralized authority, improved enlisted quality of life via relaxed grooming standards and expanded education programs, and institutionalized diversity by promoting minority and female advancement, including the first female admiral in 1972.[92] Strategically, he championed a "high-low mix" doctrine, divesting 14 older destroyers to fund 30 smaller, cost-effective patrol frigates (later canceled) and emphasizing antisubmarine warfare capabilities against Soviet naval expansion, while restructuring OPNAV to prioritize fleet readiness over Vietnam-era diversions.[93] These initiatives, though criticized for short-term morale boosts at the expense of long-term readiness, marked a causal shift toward a more adaptable, people-centric Navy amid post-Vietnam fiscal austerity.[94]Contemporary Figures and Recent Transitions
Admiral John M. Richardson served as the 31st Chief of Naval Operations from September 18, 2015, to September 10, 2019, emphasizing naval readiness, cultural reforms within the service, and integration of advanced technologies amid great power competition with China. During his tenure, Richardson oversaw the implementation of the 2018 National Defense Strategy's focus on peer competitors, including increased emphasis on distributed maritime operations and cyber capabilities.[4] Admiral Michael M. Gilday succeeded Richardson as the 32nd CNO on September 11, 2019, holding the position until November 2, 2023. Gilday prioritized accelerating technological integration, such as hypersonic weapons and unmanned systems, while addressing recruitment shortfalls and ship maintenance backlogs exacerbated by budget constraints and operational tempo. His leadership saw the Navy navigate supply chain disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic, with a reported 10% increase in opt-out rates for reenlistment by mid-2022 due to perceived policy shifts on standards. Admiral Lisa M. Franchetti became the 33rd CNO on November 2, 2023, as the first woman to hold the position, serving until her dismissal by President Donald Trump on February 1, 2025, without a publicly stated reason. Franchetti's priorities included enhancing fleet lethality through investments in the Virginia-class submarine program and joint force interoperability, amid ongoing challenges like a 15% shortfall in junior officer billets reported in fiscal year 2024. Her abrupt removal marked a rare political intervention in the role, previously insulated by statute from direct presidential dismissal except for cause. Following Franchetti's dismissal, Vice Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James W. Kilby assumed acting duties as CNO from February 1 to August 25, 2025, providing continuity during the transition.[95] President Trump nominated Admiral Daryl L. Caudle as the 34th CNO on June 18, 2025; the Senate confirmed him on July 31, 2025, and he assumed office on August 25, 2025.[96][97] Caudle, a submariner with command experience in U.S. Fleet Forces Command, has highlighted manning deficiencies—citing over 10,000 billets unfilled in surface forces—and delayed ship availabilities averaging 30% beyond schedule, advocating for streamlined maintenance and sailor welfare improvements like better housing and reduced uniform variants.[98][99]| Chief | Tenure | Key Focus Areas |
|---|---|---|
| John M. Richardson | 2015–2019 | Readiness, great power competition[4] |
| Michael M. Gilday | 2019–2023 | Technology acceleration, recruitment |
| Lisa M. Franchetti | 2023–2025 | Fleet lethality, submarine investments |
| Daryl L. Caudle | 2025–present | Manning, maintenance reforms[7] |
Controversies, Criticisms, and Reforms
Strategic and Operational Shortcomings
The Chiefs of Naval Operations have faced criticism for failing to provide consistent strategic guidance across tenures, resulting in a Navy that operates without a unified long-term vision and prioritizes short-term tactical adjustments over enduring strategic development. [101] Successive CNOs, from Admiral John Richardson's emphasis on "high-velocity learning" to Admiral Michael Gilday's focus on distributed maritime operations, have issued individualized navigation plans that lack continuity, exacerbating political churn and hindering fleet modernization against peer competitors like China. [101] This inconsistency stems from CNOs treating strategic documents as personal legacies rather than building on predecessors' frameworks, leading to neglected planning for contested domains such as the Western Pacific. [101] Operationally, the CNO's oversight has been linked to systemic readiness shortfalls, including chronic maintenance backlogs that reduced fleet availability to historic lows. By 2017, only 30% of Navy ships were fully mission-capable, a decline attributed to deferred upkeep and insufficient funding prioritization under prior CNOs, with projections for recovery pushed to 2022 amid ongoing shortfalls. [102] A 2024 Government Accountability Office report highlighted interrelated challenges in personnel training and spare parts procurement, where sailor shortages and supply chain delays inhibited basic ship maintenance, affecting over half of the amphibious fleet's operational status. [103] [104] These issues persisted into 2025, with amphibious ships averaging less than 50% readiness due to unaddressed depot-level repair inefficiencies. [104] A culture of poor self-assessment under CNO leadership has compounded these operational failures, fostering reluctance to acknowledge flaws and perpetuating hidden deficiencies. Admiral Gilday in 2022 attributed major surface fleet problems—such as the 2017 collisions of USS Fitzgerald and USS McCain, which killed 17 sailors—to an institutional aversion to criticism and minimization of errors, allowing systemic risks to accumulate unchecked. [105] Procurement missteps, including the Littoral Combat Ship program's delivery of underarmed vessels plagued by mechanical unreliability (with mission capability rates below 20% in some cases), reflect CNO-era decisions to pursue modular designs ill-suited for high-threat environments, diverting billions from proven platforms. [106] Since 2016, fleet size has contracted from 299 to around 290 battle force ships despite strategic needs, due to budget distractions and overambitious programs like the Gerald R. Ford-class carrier, which faced electromagnetic launch system delays exceeding two years under CNO scrutiny. [107] Critics argue these shortcomings arise from CNOs' divided responsibilities—balancing administrative duties with warfighting advice—diluting focus on core competencies like fleet sustainment amid external pressures, including congressional mandates for non-combat priorities. [101] GAO analyses underscore causal links between underinvestment in training (e.g., only 60% of required certifications met in key rates) and cascading maintenance failures, recommending CNO-led reforms in resource allocation that have yet to fully materialize. [103] While some defenses attribute woes to budgetary constraints, empirical data on peer navy expansions—China's fleet surpassing 370 hulls by 2024—highlight leadership accountability for not advocating sufficiently aggressive recapitalization. [108]Internal Navy Disputes and Interventions
One prominent internal dispute involving the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) occurred during the 1949 "Revolt of the Admirals," stemming from tensions over inter-service roles, aircraft carrier development, and the B-36 bomber procurement amid post-World War II unification efforts.[109] CNO Admiral Louis E. Denfeld testified before Congress on October 5, 1949, diverging from Joint Chiefs Chairman General Omar Bradley's support for Air Force strategic bombing primacy, arguing that naval aviation required independent carrier-based capabilities to maintain balanced force projection rather than ceding atomic strike roles to land-based bombers.[110] This testimony, which highlighted Navy concerns over civilian oversight by Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson and perceived threats to naval missions, prompted Johnson's relief of Denfeld as CNO on November 1, 1949, replacing him with Admiral Forrest P. Sherman; Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan resigned in protest on July 26, 1949, prior to the hearings' climax.[111] The episode underscored fractures between uniformed Navy leaders and civilian authorities, with Denfeld's intervention via testimony aiming to preserve Navy equities but resulting in his ouster and short-term setbacks for supercarrier programs like the United States.[109] Decades later, the 1991 Tailhook scandal exposed deep cultural issues within Navy aviation communities, involving allegations of sexual assault and harassment by up to 83 women at the annual Tailhook Association convention in Las Vegas.[112] CNO Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, who attended the event, faced accusations of witnessing misconduct—including a "gauntlet" of assaults—and failing to intervene decisively, as detailed in subsequent investigations by the Navy Inspector General and congressional probes.[112] Kelso offered to resign in 1992 amid mounting pressure, but Secretary of the Navy H. Lawrence Garrett III accepted responsibility first and stepped down; Kelso continued as CNO until announcing early retirement on February 15, 1994, effective April 1, 1994, to allow the service to refocus beyond the scandal.[113] The Navy leveraged the crisis for reforms, reinforcing core values of honor, courage, and commitment through updated training and accountability measures, though critics argued leadership lapses reflected broader tolerance for a "top gun" bravado culture prioritizing operational bravado over ethical conduct.[112] In more recent instances, CNOs have intervened in internal readiness and accountability disputes, such as Admiral Michael M. Gilday's 2022 assessment attributing major surface fleet mishaps—like the 2017 USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain collisions that killed 17 sailors—to a pervasive culture of inadequate self-criticism and error concealment.[105] Gilday directed systemic reviews and unveiled a new surface force vision emphasizing rigorous self-assessment, training standardization, and leadership accountability to mitigate risks from understaffing and fatigue, drawing on empirical data from collision investigations that revealed procedural lapses and watchstander errors.[105] Similarly, during the 2020 COVID-19 outbreak on USS Theodore Roosevelt, CNO Gilday participated in the command investigation following Captain Brett Crozier's relief for publicizing crew health risks via an unsecure letter, affirming the decision while endorsing broader transparency reforms to balance operational security with sailor welfare.[114] These interventions highlight the CNO's role in adjudicating internal conflicts between tactical imperatives and institutional integrity, often prioritizing empirical safety data over insular traditions.[105]Broader Debates on Role Evolution
The evolution of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) role has sparked debates over its balance between service-specific leadership and joint military imperatives, particularly following major reorganizations. Established by the Naval Appropriations Act of 1916, the position initially emphasized operational oversight amid World War I preparations, but post-World War II reforms shifted emphasis toward administrative functions like budgeting and equipping, reducing direct command authority over fleets.[115] This transition intensified under the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which centralized operational control in unified combatant commanders while designating the CNO as a principal military advisor to the Secretary of the Navy and President, without command over forces in combat.[116] Critics argue this diminished the CNO's influence, transforming the role from a warfighting executor to a bureaucratic manager focused on readiness and procurement, potentially weakening naval cohesion in high-threat environments like Indo-Pacific competition.[117] A core contention centers on the inherent tensions in the CNO's dual responsibilities as head of the Navy and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Since 1949, when the JCS was formalized, successive CNOs have navigated conflicts between advocating for Navy priorities—such as carrier-centric power projection—and aligning with joint strategies that often prioritize Army or Air Force needs in resource allocation.[8] Proponents of reform, including analyses from the 1980s, contended that pre-Goldwater-Nichols parochialism among service chiefs hindered integrated operations, as evidenced by interoperability failures in Vietnam-era exercises.[118] However, detractors highlight that the act's emphasis on jointness has eroded service chiefs' authority, leaving the CNO with limited leverage over fleet execution; for instance, numbered fleet commanders now report directly to combatant commanders, bypassing OPNAV for tactical decisions.[117] This structure, formalized in 1986, has been blamed for delays in Navy-specific innovations, such as distributed maritime operations, as CNO guidance must filter through joint channels.[119] Recent discourse critiques the CNO's strategic consistency amid rapid technological shifts, including cyber and unmanned systems. Analyses point to successive CNOs issuing divergent navigation plans—e.g., Admiral John Richardson's 2016 emphasis on high-end warfighting versus Admiral Michael Gilday's 2022 focus on integrated deterrence—as fostering doctrinal instability rather than adaptive evolution.[101] Such individualism, per 2024 assessments, stems from short tenures (typically 2-4 years) and political pressures, undermining long-term fleet modernization; Navy shipbuilding delays, with programs like the Columbia-class submarine facing 20-30% cost overruns since 2017, exemplify how fragmented CNO priorities dilute accountability.[101] Defenders counter that systemic constraints, not personal failings, limit efficacy, advocating restoration of service chief input in operational planning to counter peer threats like China's anti-access/area-denial capabilities, which demand Navy-led sea control unencumbered by joint bureaucracy.[117] These debates underscore causal tensions: while joint reforms enhanced cross-service coordination—evidenced by successful 1991 Gulf War naval-air integration—they risk subordinating domain-specific expertise, prompting calls for legislative tweaks to empower CNOs in equipping for distributed lethality without reclaiming command.[120]List of Chiefs
Aides for Naval Operations (Predecessors)
The position of Aide for Naval Operations was created on December 3, 1909, by Secretary of the Navy George von L. Meyer as part of a departmental reorganization that divided administrative functions into specialized aideships, with the Aide for Naval Operations heading the Division of Fleet Operations to coordinate naval readiness, mobilization, and tactical planning under civilian oversight.[121] This role served as the primary uniformed advisor to the Secretary on operational matters, lacking the centralized staff authority later granted to the Chief of Naval Operations but addressing early 20th-century needs for streamlined fleet management amid naval expansion.[36] The office reflected ongoing debates over naval staff structure, influenced by figures like Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, who used the position to advocate for a general board and enhanced operational planning to counter bureaucratic fragmentation in the bureau system.[3] Three rear admirals held the position before its redesignation as Chief of Naval Operations under the Naval Appropriations Act of March 3, 1915 (38 Stat. 929), which formalized a more empowered office within the Department of the Navy.[27] The transition occurred amid World War I preparations, with the last Aide, Fiske, playing a key role in pushing for statutory recognition of a centralized naval operations directorate to improve efficiency over the existing aide-bureau model.[39]| No. | Name | Tenure Start | Tenure End | Appointing Secretary |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Richard Wainwright | December 3, 1909 | December 16, 1911 | George von L. Meyer |
| 2 | Charles E. Vreeland | December 16, 1911 | February 13, 1913 | George von L. Meyer |
| 3 | Bradley A. Fiske | February 13, 1913 | May 11, 1915 | Josephus Daniels |
Chiefs of Naval Operations
The position of Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) was created by an Act of Congress on May 11, 1915, to serve as the professional head of the U.S. Navy and principal naval advisor to the Secretary of the Navy.[13] The CNO, always a four-star admiral, also represents the Navy on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[13] The following table enumerates all 34 individuals who have held the office, ordered chronologically by tenure start date. Terms typically last four years but vary due to statutory limits, extensions during wartime, or early reliefs.[13]| No. | Name | Tenure |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | William S. Benson | May 11, 1915 – September 25, 1919[13] |
| 2 | Robert E. Coontz | November 1, 1919 – July 21, 1923[13] |
| 3 | Edward W. Eberle | July 21, 1923 – November 21, 1927[13] |
| 4 | Charles F. Hughes | November 21, 1927 – September 9, 1930[13] |
| 5 | William V. Pratt | September 10, 1930 – June 30, 1933[13] |
| 6 | William H. Standley | June 30, 1933 – January 1, 1937[13] |
| 7 | William D. Leahy | January 2, 1937 – March 1, 1939[13] |
| 8 | Harold R. Stark | March 1, 1939 – March 10, 1942[13] |
| 9 | Ernest J. King | March 10, 1942 – December 17, 1945[13] |
| 10 | Chester W. Nimitz | December 19, 1945 – December 15, 1947[13] |
| 11 | Louis E. Denfeld | December 15, 1947 – November 29, 1949[13] |
| 12 | Forrest P. Sherman | November 29, 1949 – July 20, 1951 (died in office)[13] |
| 13 | William M. Fechteler | July 30, 1951 – August 16, 1953[13] |
| 14 | Robert B. Carney | August 17, 1953 – August 17, 1955[13] |
| 15 | Arleigh A. Burke | August 17, 1955 – August 17, 1961 (three terms)[13] |
| 16 | George W. Anderson Jr. | August 21, 1961 – July 31, 1963[13] |
| 17 | David L. McDonald | August 1, 1963 – July 31, 1967[13] |
| 18 | Thomas H. Moorer | August 1, 1967 – July 1, 1970[13] |
| 19 | Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. | July 1, 1970 – July 1, 1974[13] |
| 20 | James L. Holloway III | July 1, 1974 – June 30, 1978[13] |
| 21 | Thomas B. Hayward | June 30, 1978 – June 30, 1982[13] |
| 22 | James D. Watkins | June 30, 1982 – June 30, 1986[13] |
| 23 | Carlisle A. H. Trost | June 30, 1986 – June 29, 1990[13] |
| 24 | Frank B. Kelso II | June 29, 1990 – February 23, 1994[13] |
| 25 | Jeremy M. Boorda | February 23, 1994 – April 23, 1996 (died by suicide)[13] |
| 26 | Jay L. Johnson | April 23, 1996 – July 2, 2000[13] |
| 27 | Vern Clark | July 2, 2000 – July 22, 2005[13] |
| 28 | Michael G. Mullen | July 22, 2005 – August 13, 2007[13] |
| 29 | Gary Roughead | August 13, 2007 – September 22, 2011[13] |
| 30 | Jonathan W. Greenert | September 23, 2011 – September 18, 2015[13] |
| 31 | John M. Richardson | September 18, 2015 – September 10, 2019[13] |
| 32 | Michael M. Gilday | September 10, 2019 – November 2, 2023[1] |
| 33 | Lisa Franchetti | November 2, 2023 – February 2025[1] |
| 34 | Daryl Caudle | August 25, 2025 – present[7] |
Timeline of Tenures
| No. | Name | Rank | Tenure |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | William S. Benson | Admiral | May 11, 1915 – September 25, 1919[4] |
| 2 | Robert E. Coontz | Admiral | 1919–1923[126] |
| 3 | Edward W. Eberle | Admiral | 1923–1927[126] |
| 4 | Charles F. Hughes | Admiral | 1927–1930[126] |
| 5 | William V. Pratt | Admiral | 1930–1933[126] |
| 6 | William H. Standley | Admiral | 1933–1937[126] |
| 7 | William D. Leahy | Admiral | 1937–1939[126] |
| 8 | Harold R. Stark | Admiral | 1939–1942[126] |
| 9 | Ernest J. King | Fleet Admiral | 1942–1945[126] |
| 10 | Chester W. Nimitz | Fleet Admiral | 1945–1947[126] |
| 11 | Louis E. Denfeld | Admiral | 1947–1949[126] |
| 12 | Forrest P. Sherman | Admiral | 1949–1951[126] |
| 13 | William M. Fechteler | Admiral | 1951–1953[126] |
| 14 | Robert B. Carney | Admiral | 1953–1955[126] |
| 15 | Arleigh A. Burke | Admiral | 1955–1961[126] |
| 16 | George W. Anderson Jr. | Admiral | 1961–1963[126] |
| 17 | David L. McDonald | Admiral | 1963–1967[126] |
| 18 | Thomas H. Moorer | Admiral | 1967–1970[126] |
| 19 | Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. | Admiral | 1970–1974[126] |
| 20 | James L. Holloway III | Admiral | 1974–1978[126] |
| 21 | Thomas B. Hayward | Admiral | 1978–1982[126] |
| 22 | James D. Watkins | Admiral | 1982–1986[126] |
| 23 | William J. Crowe Jr. | Admiral | 1986–1986[126] (Note: Short tenure before becoming Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) |
| 24 | Carlisle A. H. Trost | Admiral | 1986–1990[126] |
| 25 | Frank B. Kelso II | Admiral | 1990–1994[126] |
| 26 | Jeremy M. Boorda | Admiral | 1994–1996[126] |
| 27 | Jay L. Johnson | Admiral | 1996–2000[126] |
| 28 | Vern Clark | Admiral | 2000–2005[126] |
| 29 | Michael G. Mullen | Admiral | 2005–2007[126] |
| 30 | Gary Roughead | Admiral | 2007–2011[126] |
| 31 | Jonathan W. Greenert | Admiral | 2011–2015[126] |
| 32 | John M. Richardson | Admiral | 2015–2019[126] |
| 33 | Michael M. Gilday | Admiral | 2019–2023[126] |
| - | Lisa Franchetti | Admiral | November 2, 2023 – February 21, 2025[127][128] |
| - | James W. Kilby (acting) | Admiral | February 2025 – August 2025[95] |
| 34 | Daryl L. Caudle | Admiral | August 25, 2025 – present[7] |