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Columbine effect

The Columbine effect refers to the pattern of copycat mass shootings and thwarted plots inspired by the April 20, 1999, massacre at in , where students killed 12 students and one teacher, wounded 21 others, and then committed suicide. This event, the deadliest in U.S. history at the time, established a template for subsequent attackers who emulated its tactics, manifesto-style writings, and quest for notoriety. Empirical analyses have identified at least 21 school shootings and 53 foiled plots attributable to over the ensuing 15 years, with perpetrators often sharing demographic similarities such as age, sex, and ethnicity with Harris and Klebold. Spatio-temporal statistical models detect clustering of such events following high-profile incidents, supporting a contagion mechanism driven by media coverage that glorifies perpetrators and disseminates operational details. The effect underscores causal pathways from publicity to imitation, where vulnerable individuals interpret media portrayals as pathways to infamy, prompting behavioral mimicry independent of underlying predispositions like mental illness or social isolation, though these factors may interact. Controversies center on media responsibility, with evidence indicating that detailed reporting correlates with elevated risks of recurrence, yet proposals for coverage guidelines face resistance amid First Amendment concerns. Columbine's legacy persists, influencing policy shifts toward threat assessment and influencing over 80 documented copycat attempts worldwide.

Origins and Definition

The 1999 Columbine Massacre

On April 20, 1999, Eric Harris, aged 18, and Dylan Klebold, aged 17, both seniors at in , executed a premeditated on the school, killing 12 students and 1 teacher while wounding 23 others before dying by from self-inflicted gunshot wounds. The perpetrators arrived in the school's around 11:10 a.m., armed with semiautomatic firearms—including Harris's Intratec TEC-DC9 pistol and Hi-Point 995 carbine rifle—and shotguns, along with over 90 homemade explosives such as pipe bombs and two large duffel-bag bombs filled with propane tanks and gasoline intended to cause mass casualties in the cafeteria. Planning for the attack began at least a year earlier, with Harris and Klebold documenting their preparations in journals and videos, acquiring weapons through straw purchases and , and testing bombs in remote areas; the operation aimed to exceed the body count of the 1995 but largely failed when the primary explosives malfunctioned. Harris, the apparent leader, expressed in his writings a profound for , admiration for figures like , and fantasies of god-like destruction, traits aligned with psychopathic tendencies including lack of and . Klebold's entries, by contrast, revealed chronic depression, feelings of worthlessness, and , positioning him as a more passive participant who enabled Harris's aggression while seeking death as escape. The assault commenced at 11:19 a.m. with gunfire outside the targeting fleeing students, followed by entry into the building where they fired indiscriminately in hallways and the , detonating small pipe bombs to sow chaos; most deaths occurred in the , where victims were shot at close range. By 12:00 p.m., after roaming the and attempting to larger bombs, the pair retreated to the and shot themselves, ending the 47-minute amid a response involving over 100 officers who secured the perimeter but delayed entry due to protocols emphasizing officer safety. Initial coverage, broadcast live from the , amplified public shock but included significant inaccuracies, such as reports of up to 25 deaths, multiple additional gunmen in trench coats, and false claims of hostages or ongoing bombs, stemming from unverified witness statements and chaotic on-site reporting that prioritized speed over confirmation. These errors, later corrected, contributed to early misconceptions about the perpetrators as part of a "Trench Coat Mafia" clique, despite evidence showing Harris and Klebold had limited social ties to such groups.

Emergence of the Columbine Effect Concept

The concept of the Columbine effect crystallized in the immediate aftermath of the , 1999, , as agencies documented patterns of emulation among individuals planning similar attacks. Federal investigators, including FBI behavioral analysts, observed that thwarted threats in late 1999 and 2000 often involved explicit references to as a template, with aspiring perpetrators expressing intent to replicate or exceed its scale for personal infamy. This early detection stemmed from threat assessment protocols that identified shared scripting behaviors, such as adopting operational details from the original event, marking a shift in how authorities framed rampage violence as potentially replicable rather than isolated. The term encapsulates the phenomenon wherein the incident's tactics, including coordinated assaults and improvised explosives, along with the shooters' documented grievances and achieved notoriety, functioned as a disseminated for . Criminologists positioned this within established theories of in deviant behavior, where high-visibility violent acts supply actionable models that lower barriers to replication for predisposed individuals seeking resolution through spectacle. Early discussions emphasized the event's role in normalizing such scripts across isolated actors, distinct from prior diffuse patterns. By 2000, FBI reports underscored these emulation dynamics as a core in adolescent threat evaluations, influencing the conceptual framing without yet quantifying . This recognition informed nascent preventive strategies, viewing not merely as an aberration but as a catalytic in the of targeted violence.

Causal Factors and Mechanisms

Role of Media Coverage and Contagion

The intensive media coverage of the on April 20, 1999, which spanned thousands of hours across television networks and featured repeated dissections of the perpetrators' planning, weaponry, and tactics—including the failed use of bombs and the sequence of armed entry—effectively disseminated a detailed operational blueprint for imitation. This 24/7 saturation reporting, unprecedented in scope due to emerging cable news cycles, portrayed the attackers not merely as criminals but as figures achieving notoriety, thereby reinforcing through social learning mechanisms where vulnerable individuals internalize and replicate observed actions for similar recognition. Such glorification, often prioritizing dramatic visuals and psychological speculation over restraint, created a cultural "script" that subsequent perpetrators have followed, as evidenced by their emulation of specific elements like targeted school assaults and conclusions. Empirical patterns reveal how this coverage amplifies contagion, with studies documenting short-term elevations in threats and attempts following high-profile events modeled on . A 2015 analysis of mass killings from 1982 to 2013 identified a statistically significant increase in the likelihood of another incident within 13 days of a publicized shooting, attributing this temporal clustering to media-driven diffusion of methods and motivations. Post-, reports have noted surges in school threats mirroring the event's profile, such as bomb-related warnings, occurring in the immediate aftermath of coverage or similar attacks, linking these spikes directly to the recirculation of tactical details. The FBI's examination of patterns highlights how publicized perpetrator journals and videos from inspired dozens of explicit copycat plots, where attackers referenced the original event's logistics as a template, demonstrating causal propagation via accessible media narratives rather than coincidence. Media outlets have faced criticism for perpetuating this cycle by resisting voluntary guidelines that curb notoriety, such as limiting perpetrator names, images, and excerpts in favor of victim-centered , ostensibly to safeguard and revenue. The No Notoriety initiative, launched in 2013 by survivors of mass shootings including , advocates evidence-based protocols to disrupt emulation—drawing from research showing reduced imitation when coverage avoids heroizing perpetrators—yet major networks have largely prioritized comprehensive disclosure, citing despite data indicating harm amplification. This reluctance persists even as peer-reviewed work underscores that altering styles, like emphasizing over attacker agency, could mitigate diffusion without compromising informational duties.

Perpetrator Psychology and Ideological Influences

Eric Harris, the primary architect of the Columbine attack, displayed classic psychopathic traits including , , , and a drive for dominance, as evidenced by his detailed journals expressing contempt for perceived inferiors and fantasies of god-like power through violence. Dylan Klebold, in contrast, exhibited profound depressive tendencies marked by self-loathing, , and emotional dependency, yet participated actively in the premeditated planning without evidence of delusions or hallucinations typical of severe psychotic disorders. Their motivations centered on personal agency in executing against a world they viewed as unjust, with Harris's writings emphasizing a Darwinian "" worldview where the strong eradicate the weak, rather than external societal scapegoats. Contrary to narratives portraying the perpetrators as passive victims of relentless , forensic reviews of their social interactions reveal they maintained friendships, dated, and even intimidated peers themselves, with Harris deriving satisfaction from manipulating and others rather than being consistently victimized. Their journals and videos articulate premeditated rage rooted in and a —Harris viewing himself as intellectually and morally elite, Klebold echoing themes of existential despair—debunking the oversimplified "" trope that ignores their proactive role in fostering through behaviors. This internal pathology, unaddressed by interventions despite warning signs like Harris's prior juvenile , underscores failures in recognizing and intervening on individual accountability over collective excuses. Ideologically, Harris drew explicit inspiration from Nazi figures, particularly , whom he researched extensively and referenced admiringly in writings as a model for racial and social purification, including swastikas and phrases echoing Mein Kampf's themes of elimination of the "unfit." Anti-Christian sentiments permeated their actions and , with Harris mocking religious beliefs as weak delusions in his journals and targeting students perceived as devout during the , framing the massacre as a rejection of moral constraints in favor of self-deified retribution. Both perpetrators engaged in self-mythologizing through extensive documentation—journals, videos, and websites—constructing a heroic of transcendence via destruction, which appealed to their narcissistic need for posthumous legacy over mere . Columbine-inspired copycats often mirror these psychological profiles, exhibiting combinations of , , and that fuel fantasies of and scripted , as seen in perpetrators who explicitly cite Harris and Klebold as for achieving notoriety through mass violence. Empirical analyses of shooters reveal a consistent drive for personal glorification and grievance resolution via , with minimal causal weight assigned to external factors like or access absent the perpetrator's deliberate intent and ideological scripting. Research distinguishes these endogenous motivations—rooted in untreated personality disorders and unchecked agency—from transient influences, emphasizing that copycats prioritize emulating the duo's perceived through detailed and over random or impulsive acts.

Empirical Evidence and Studies

Documented Copycat Incidents and Patterns

The on April 16, 2007, involved , who killed 32 people and wounded 17 others before taking his own life; in a mailed to , Cho explicitly praised the perpetrators as "martyrs" and drew parallels to their actions as justification for his rampage. Cho's writings and videos referenced grievances similar to those expressed by Harris and Klebold, including feelings of societal rejection, though his attack differed in scale and lacked the planned explosive devices central to the plot. In the shooting on February 14, 2018, killed 17 people and injured 17; investigations revealed Cruz had extensively researched the Columbine massacre online, including details of the perpetrators' weapons, tactics, and planning, as part of a broader pattern of studying prior mass shootings years before his attack. Cruz's included searches for Columbine-specific elements, such as the shooters' methods, indicating emulation in preparation rather than direct ideological alignment. Qualitative patterns in documented copycat incidents include tactical , such as the use of multiple firearms for rapid entry into schools and attempts to maximize casualties through coordinated attacks, often inspired by 's failed plot and its emphasis on media notoriety. Perpetrators frequently produce manifestos echoing Harris and Klebold's themes of revenge against perceived bullies or elites, with explicit nods to as a model for infamy. Online communities known as "Columbiners" have emerged since the early 2010s, comprising individuals—often adolescents—who glorify Harris and Klebold through posts, , and discussions romanticizing the attack as a form of or tragedy porn. These groups, active on platforms like and , share leaked materials and debate the perpetrators' motives, fostering emulation among vulnerable youth; for instance, some members have been linked to foiled plots where attackers cited Columbine fandom as motivation. FBI assessments distinguish executed attacks from foiled ones, noting that over 100 plots since 1999 involved explicit emulation, including planned "" attire or bomb-making inspired by the original event's details, often uncovered through online communications or school tips. In the , has amplified these patterns, with recent cases like the December 16, 2024, Abundant Life Christian School shooting in , where the 15-year-old perpetrator wore attire mimicking Harris's, signaling direct visual homage amid broader shooter fascination. Such incidents underscore emulation through symbolic gestures rather than identical replication, with classifying many as aspirational copycats halted pre-execution. Empirical analyses of mass shooting trends indicate a post-1999 uptick in public s, with databases documenting an acceleration in incidents following the event. The investigative database, tracking incidents involving four or more fatalities in public settings from 1982 onward, records 31 such events from 1982 to 1999, rising to over 100 by 2025, with notable clusters in the years immediately after Columbine, such as 2000-2002. Similar patterns emerge in the Violence Project database, which identifies in perpetrator manifestos and planning, showing temporal clustering of school-based attacks post-1999. Time-series studies employing models have quantified short-term contagion windows, typically spanning 10-16 days after a high-profile . Towers et al. (2015) analyzed 1982-2011 U.S. (three or more deaths, excluding gang or felony-related), finding that each event elevates the probability of another by up to 0.001 baseline risk within 13-16 days, driven by media amplification rather than baseline violence fluctuations. This effect persists after controlling for demographic factors like and socioeconomic variables, with no corresponding rise in overall rates, isolating contagion to rare, publicized . Further econometric assessments differentiate correlation from causation by incorporating lagged media coverage metrics and instrumental variables for event salience. Jetter and Walker (2020) examined 2006-2017 data, revealing that a one-standard-deviation increase in news airtime for a correlates with a 15-20% spike in subsequent incidents over 1-2 weeks, robust to controls for rates, , and regional violence baselines. Schoene and Shmargad (2021) used spatio-temporal models on shootings (1990-2017), detecting copycat elevations in adjacent states within 2-3 weeks, attributing ~10-15% of variance to prior proximity and coverage intensity, net of access to firearms and youth demographics.
StudyData PeriodKey MetricContagion WindowControls Applied
Towers et al. (2015)1982-2011Mass killings (3+ deaths)13-16 daysPopulation, time trends, event type
Jetter & Walker (2020)2006-2017Public mass shootings1-2 weeksMedia exposure, economic factors, gun laws
Schoene & Shmargad (2021)1990-2017School shootings2-3 weeksGeography, demographics, firearm availability
These analyses underscore media-linked spikes without evidence of long-term escalation in general violence, emphasizing event-specific imitation over structural drivers.

Policy and Institutional Responses

Transformations in School Security Measures

Following the 1999 Columbine High School massacre, American schools implemented zero-tolerance policies more stringently, mandating automatic expulsions or suspensions for offenses involving weapons, drugs, or violence, building on the 1994 Gun-Free Schools Act but expanding to broader behavioral infractions by the early 2000s. These policies aimed to deter threats through swift, non-discretionary enforcement, with federal guidelines encouraging their adoption to qualify for funding. Threat assessment teams emerged as a core response, formalized in the 2002 report from the U.S. and of Education's Safe School Initiative, which analyzed 37 pre-Columbine attacks and recommended multidisciplinary teams to evaluate student behaviors, identify risks, and intervene early rather than relying solely on punishment. By the mid-2000s, many districts established such teams comprising educators, counselors, and to conduct structured of reported threats, shifting focus toward prevention over reaction. Physical security upgrades proliferated, including widespread installation of metal detectors at entrances—particularly in urban high schools—starting in 1999-2000, alongside cameras and locked entry points, with surveys showing over 20% of public schools adopting detectors by 2000. Standardized protocols also became routine, training students to barricade classrooms and silence during drills, a practice that gained traction immediately post-Columbine and was codified in state laws by the early . Empirical studies indicate these measures reduced immediate access to certain vulnerabilities, such as unauthorized weapons entry in equipped schools, but showed limited overall impact on preventing targeted mass attacks by determined perpetrators, who often bypassed detectors or planned around lockdowns. Zero-tolerance enforcement correlated with sharp rises in suspensions—doubling from 1.7 million in 1999-2000 to over 3 million by 2010-2011—yielding high false positives for non-violent youth and diverting resources from mental health supports, despite some expansions in counseling post-2002. Critics, including analyses from the , argue zero-tolerance eroded by minimizing individualized hearings, leading to disproportionate punishments for minorities and students with disabilities without proven safety gains, as expulsion often exacerbates isolation rather than resolving root causes. Threat assessments, while identifying transient risks effectively in some cases, faced implementation flaws like over-reliance on subjective reports, stigmatizing normal adolescent behaviors and fostering a punitive climate over supportive interventions. Overall, post-Columbine security investments—totaling billions federally—prioritized visible deterrence but lacked robust causal evidence linking them to sustained declines in rates, which remained statistically rare.

Shifts in Law Enforcement Active Shooter Protocols

Prior to the shooting on April 20, 1999, standard protocols for barricaded suspects or situations emphasized establishing a secure perimeter to contain the threat, negotiate if possible, and await specialized teams before entry, a practice rooted in minimizing officer risk and preserving evidence. This approach was applied during Columbine, where responding officers from Jefferson County Sheriff's Office and other agencies formed a perimeter but delayed building entry for over 30 minutes, allowing the perpetrators to continue their attack unchecked until they died by suicide. After-action reviews highlighted how this delay contributed to 13 fatalities and 24 injuries, prompting a reevaluation of tactics for dynamic, ongoing mass casualty events where shooters actively seek victims rather than barricade. In response, shifted toward an "immediate action" doctrine, training to enter the threat area without waiting for reinforcements or , prioritizing rapid neutralization to halt the killing phase. This evolution was formalized through initiatives like the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) program, established in 2002 at the with FBI support, which disseminated nationwide training emphasizing solo or small-team entries by patrol officers. By the mid-2000s, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FBI incorporated these principles into federal guidelines, such as the DHS's ": How to Respond" booklet, which stresses that "the immediate deployment of is required to stop the shooting and mitigate harm." Subsequent incidents tested and refined these protocols; for instance, critiques of the 2018 Parkland shooting, where initial officers hesitated outside , reinforced ALERRT and FBI emphases on overriding "perimeter mentality" through updated training metrics targeting entry within 3 minutes of arrival. Empirical data from Police Executive Research Forum analyses of 51 events from 2000 to 2012 show median neutralization times dropping to 3 minutes post-entry in cases with immediate action, compared to prolonged casualties in delayed responses, with officer-involved shootings occurring in 46% of incidents where entry was attempted early. These outcomes, drawn from after-action reports, indicate reduced victim fatalities in scenarios adhering to rapid entry, though challenges persist in coordinating multi-agency responses under stress.

Controversies and Debates

Skepticism Regarding Contagion Claims

Critics of the hypothesis argue that apparent clusters of mass shootings following high-profile events like often reflect statistical artifacts rather than causal imitation, particularly when accounting for the of rare events and underlying baseline rates. For example, econometric analyses of U.S. news coverage from 1990 to 2017 found no correlation between mass shooting reports and overall rates, indicating that any localized spikes do not propagate to broader societal violence. Similarly, self-exciting models applied to mass killings since 1966 reveal no significant contagion for incidents involving three or fewer fatalities, suggesting that higher-frequency smaller events overwhelm potential imitative effects with random variation. Attribution errors further undermine contagion claims, as temporal clustering post-event may conflate coincidence with causation amid stable drivers of violence such as socioeconomic stressors and untreated psychological distress. Longitudinal data show U.S. homicide rates declining from 5.5 per 100,000 in 1999 to 4.4 in 2014 despite intensified media focus on shootings, contradicting expectations of widespread imitative escalation. Alternative explanations prioritize individual perpetrator pathology, including acute crises, grievances, and subclinical issues prevalent in over 60% of cases examined in perpetrator databases, which manifest independently of media prompts and better predict attack planning. Debates over access highlight how determined actors circumvent availability constraints, with federal data indicating that 77% of shooters from 1966 to 2019 used legally obtained or family-provided guns, underscoring intent and opportunity-seeking over mere prevalence as decisive factors. Conservative-leaning analyses, such as those from , contend that emphasizing deflects from of personal failings like and , advocating pathology-focused prevention over media restrictions. In contrast, left-leaning perspectives in academic literature environmental amplifiers, yet rigorous controls in violence studies favor individual-level causal chains as primary, with effects, when present, exhibiting small magnitudes (e.g., 0.21 additional incidents per event) insufficient to explain trends.

Persistent Myths from Columbine Coverage

Initial media coverage of the on April 20, 1999, rapidly propagated narratives framing perpetrators as bullied social outcasts seeking , a portrayal originating from early statements and unsubstantiated reports amid the chaos of . These accounts, amplified by competitive , persisted despite subsequent investigations revealing a more complex picture of premeditated violence driven by the perpetrators' desire for rather than targeted retribution. Jefferson County Sheriff's Office records and the perpetrators' journals, released years later, indicated no disproportionate victimization and highlighted their own aggressive behaviors toward peers. A central myth depicted Harris and Klebold as isolated loners alienated by relentless torment, including from athletes, yet evidence from school records and peer accounts showed both maintained social circles, with Klebold attending with a date just days prior and both participating in activities like soccer and a . Their journals contained no references to as a catalyst, instead expressing broad contempt for and aspirations for mass destruction to achieve notoriety, underscoring personal agency in a year-long planning process involving construction and videos documenting their intentions. Similarly, claims of selective targeting of jocks, minorities, or lacked substantiation; the aimed for indiscriminate casualties, with failed cafeteria designed for maximum and subsequent shootings hitting of opportunity regardless of identity. No verified hit list existed, and forensic analysis confirmed random selection over grievance-based vendettas. Another enduring falsehood linked the massacre to Marilyn Manson's music as a corrosive influence on alienated youth, fueled by the perpetrators' occasional black attire and the era's over , but official probes found no causal connection, with accusations debunked as amid absent evidence in journals or videos. The Mafia label was also misapplied; while loosely acquainted with some members, Harris and Klebold were not core participants, absent from group yearbook photos, and the affiliation proved irrelevant to their motives. These myths, rooted in hasty post-event sensationalism, have sustained a public discourse emphasizing external victimhood over the evidentiary reality of ideological fixation on and deliberate choice, as detailed in over 1,000 pages of perpetrators' writings revealing psychopathic traits and rejection of accountability.

Broader Cultural Impact

Representations in Media and Entertainment

The 2003 film , directed by , draws loose inspiration from the Columbine massacre, depicting an ordinary school day culminating in a shooting by two students, and received the at the . Critics noted its minimalist style humanized the perpetrators without explicit motive, potentially aestheticizing the violence in a manner that echoed the event's banal lead-up. Documentary Bowling for Columbine (2002), directed by Michael Moore, examines the massacre alongside broader American gun culture, attributing influences like media fear-mongering to societal conditions enabling the attack, and won the Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature. Other true-crime productions, including the 2004 History Channel episode "Massacre at Columbine High" from Zero Hour and the 2014 Investigation Discovery segment "Columbine Massacre" from Killing Spree, reconstruct the perpetrators' planning and execution with archival footage and timelines, often emphasizing the shooters' journals and preparations. These formats replay specific details such as bomb-making attempts and targeting lists, which have been linked in analyses to providing replicable elements for imitation. In the digital era, platforms have hosted idolizing , including edited clips from school videos and manifestos shared as , with a 2024 investigation identifying persistent online "shrines" attracting youth born after 1999. Such portrayals contrast with victim-centered works, like the FBI's 2019 Echoes of Columbine, which prioritizes survivor accounts and prevention strategies over perpetrator glorification. Empirical data indicate that intensified media dramatizations post-Columbine correlated with spikes in threats; for instance, recorded a 280% increase in reported threats in the month following the event's extensive coverage, suggesting reinforcement of behavioral scripts through repeated exposure to detailed narratives. While some entertainment products exploit the tragedy for viewership— drew over 1 million viewers in its U.S. theatrical run—responsible depictions, such as those in We Are Columbine (2019), focus on and memorialization to mitigate .

Initiatives to Curb Imitative Violence

Following the , the FBI and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued guidelines encouraging media outlets to minimize sensationalized coverage of mass shooters, drawing parallels to established protocols for reducing contagion through restrained reporting on methods and personal details. These recommendations, echoed by the No Notoriety campaign launched in by ' families and experts, advocate for "no-notoriety" strategies such as naming perpetrators only once per story, avoiding their photos or manifestos, and prioritizing victim narratives to deny fame-seeking attackers the publicity that fuels imitation. Adopted variably by outlets like , which limits shooter names and focuses on , these policies aim to disrupt the " effect" observed in incidents referencing prior attackers. Efforts extended to social media monitoring in the late 2010s, with federal agencies like the FBI promoting behavioral threat assessment teams to scan online platforms for leaked plans or emulation signals, as detailed in Secret Service analyses of averted school attacks. Some school districts implemented surveillance tools to flag keywords related to mass violence, though a 2024 RAND report on K-12 threats highlights that while such monitoring has intercepted plots, it often captures non-credible chatter amid enforcement scalability issues. Law enforcement anonymity pushes, such as the 2019 Virginia Beach officials' refusal to release the shooter's name or manifesto, seek to starve digital subcultures of martyr figures, but compliance remains inconsistent due to public records laws. Empirical evidence on effectiveness is mixed: quantitative analyses post-2012 show a slight decline in overt media-driven emulation, with fewer attackers explicitly naming predecessors in manifestos, yet a parallel rise in anonymous online forums fostering indirect inspiration via shared ideologies rather than specific figures. In the 2020s, adaptations like FBI-led digital threat tracking have thwarted several plots by intervening in early online radicalization, but peer-reviewed contagion models indicate persistent vulnerabilities, as reduced mainstream notoriety shifts imitation to decentralized web spaces. Critics argue these measures infringe First Amendment protections by pressuring independent media and officials, potentially eroding public accountability without proven causal reductions in incidence rates, which have not uniformly declined.

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