Infamy

Infamy is the condition of having an extremely bad reputation gained through actions deemed grossly criminal, shocking, brutal, or otherwise deeply disgraceful.^[1]^[2] This notoriety contrasts with fame by arising specifically from moral or ethical failings that provoke widespread condemnation, often enduring as a lasting stigma on individuals, events, or institutions.^[3] The word derives from Latin īnfāmis, meaning "of ill fame," formed by the prefix in- (not) and fāma (fame or report), entering English in the early 15th century via Old French infamie to denote public dishonor or evil reputation.^[3]^[4] Historically, infamy evolved from a social judgment into formalized penalties, with roots in ancient Roman law where infamia imposed juridical exclusion, stripping convicts of rights such as holding office, serving as witnesses, or contracting legally, based on offenses like corruption or sexual misconduct.^[5] This concept persisted into medieval canon law and early common law systems, where infamous crimes—typically felonies involving moral turpitude—disqualified individuals from testifying or voting, reflecting a causal link between personal depravity and civic unreliability.^[6] In modern contexts, infamy retains its essence as a marker of irreversible reputational damage from heinous acts, influencing legal frameworks like the U.S. Constitution's Fifth Amendment, which distinguishes "capital or otherwise infamous crime" to require grand jury indictment for severe offenses historically tied to infamy's disqualifying effects.^[5] While societal norms shift, infamy's core endures through empirical patterns: perpetrators of atrocities, betrayals, or systemic abuses achieve not fleeting scandal but perpetual association with vice, as evidenced in enduring historical records of figures stripped of honor for betraying trust or committing violence on scale.^[6] This distinction underscores causal realism in reputation—negative renown accrues not from mere visibility but from actions' inherent wrongness, independent of transient opinion.

Etymology and Conceptual Foundations

Linguistic Origins

The word infamy originates from the Latin noun īnfāmis, formed by the privative prefix in- ("not" or "without") and fāma ("fame," "reputation," or "public report"), literally connoting the lack of good fame or a state of public dishonor and ill repute.^[3]^[7] In classical Latin, infāmis described individuals or conditions marked by notoriety for vice or moral failing, positioning it as the direct antonym to honorable renown.^[8] The term transitioned into medieval European vernaculars through Old French infamie, attested from the 14th century, where it retained the core sense of disgrace or an infamous character, often evoking moral or social stigma.^[3] By the early 15th century, infamy entered Middle English, initially via Anglo-Norman influences, to signify public dishonor or evil reputation as the counterpart to fame.^[3]^[9] Its earliest documented English usage appears in the Rolls of Parliament of 1473, linking the concept to notorious deeds that eroded communal esteem, underscoring its role in denoting reputational antithesis to celebrated virtue.^[10] This linguistic trajectory across Latin, Old French, and Middle English preserved infamy's etymological essence as the inversion of fāma, emphasizing subjective public judgment over objective acclaim.^[3] Infamy refers to a formal legal status of disgrace and diminished civil capacity, imposed upon conviction for serious crimes such as felonies involving moral turpitude, which results in the loss of specific rights including testimonial competency and eligibility for certain public roles.^[11]^[12] This punitive designation contrasts with informal notoriety, which involves mere public awareness of wrongdoing without judicial validation or enforceable disabilities, as notoriety lacks the structured legal repercussions that bind societal exclusion.^[13] The condition of infamy arises not from general bad reputation but from adjudication of particular infamous acts—typically those undermining honor, property integrity, or communal order—effecting a degradation that causally preserves social trust by disqualifying unreliable actors from positions of influence.^[14] In opposition to fame, which bolsters credibility through positive recognition, infamy erodes it by evidencing a pattern of conduct incompatible with civic reliability, thereby deterring similar violations through the prospect of sustained exclusion rather than transient shame.^[11] Socially, infamy manifests as a marker of eroded standing, where the convicted individual's interactions face heightened skepticism, reflecting empirical associations between adjudicated serious offenses and elevated risks of future unreliability, distinct from the subjective judgments underlying unverified notoriety.^[13] This framework underscores infamy's role in upholding collective deterrence, as legal imposition amplifies the natural consequences of trust violation beyond anecdotal infamy.^[12]

Infamy in Ancient and Medieval Legal Systems

Roman Law

Infamy (infamia) in Roman law constituted a formal civil penalty entailing loss of reputation and partial diminishment of legal capacity (capitis deminutio minima), imposed for offenses or pursuits involving moral turpitude that undermined civic trust and republican virtues. Emerging during the early Republic, its foundations appear in the Twelve Tables (c. 450 BCE), which prescribed sanctions for behaviors like perjury and certain thefts linked to dishonor, though the doctrine systematized through praetorian edicts and statutes such as the lex Julia de adulteriis coercendis (18 BCE) under Augustus.^[15] This mechanism enforced accountability by stigmatizing actions empirically associated with societal erosion—such as adultery, false testimony, or engaging in base professions like acting, gladiatorial combat, or tavern-keeping—without resorting to capital or corporal penalties, thereby preserving legal order through exclusion rather than elimination.^[16] The consequences of infamy were multifaceted, primarily restricting participation in public life and impairing contractual and testimonial competence. Infames were disqualified from holding magistracies, entering the senate, or voting in assemblies (comitia), as these roles demanded unquestioned integrity to uphold the mos maiorum. In private law, they faced incapacity to act as guardians (tutores), enter binding contracts without oversight, or serve as witnesses in court, where their testimony held no probative value absent independent corroboration.^[15] Judicial infamy arose from conviction in quaestiones perpetuae for crimes like extortion (de repetundis) or embezzlement, while censorial infamy stemmed from periodic reviews noting moral lapses, both calibrated to deter corruption by severing access to communal power structures. Under the Empire, infamy expanded via imperial constitutions, applying to broader categories such as debtors evading obligations or those convicted of calumny (malicious litigation), yet retained its core function as a graduated sanction tying legal status to observable ethical conduct.^[16] This approach reflected causal reasoning: behaviors eroding reciprocal trust in contracts and governance warranted proportional disablement to sustain institutional stability, evidenced by the system's endurance from Republic to late antiquity without reliance on summary executions for non-violent infractions. Restoration was possible through ignoscere by censors or emperors, but rarity underscored infamy's role in perpetuating a merit-based civic hierarchy grounded in verifiable probity.

Canon Law

In medieval canon law, the concept of infamy was systematically codified in Gratian's Decretum, compiled around 1140 CE, which synthesized earlier ecclesiastical decrees and adapted Roman legal distinctions to serve the Church's disciplinary needs. This framework distinguished between infamia iuris (infamy of law), arising automatically from the commission of grave offenses such as heresy, simony, rape, or dueling, and infamia facti (infamy of fact), imposed judicially or inferred from public notoriety of scandalous conduct like adultery or persistent moral delinquency.^[17] These categories ensured that infamy functioned as an objective penalty rather than mere subjective repute, emphasizing empirical evidence of wrongdoing over unverified opinion.^[18] Infamy applied uniformly to both clergy and laity, imposing severe ecclesiastical disabilities to maintain institutional purity. For clergy, it created an irregularity barring ordination, the exercise of holy orders, or holding benefices, while for laity, it revoked eligibility for sacraments, ecclesiastical office, or valid testimony in church courts.^[17]^[19] Excommunication frequently accompanied or entailed infamy, further excluding the infamous from communal worship, burial rites, and legal standing as plaintiffs or witnesses, as their moral turpitude rendered their accounts empirically unreliable.^[20] Purgation of infamy required proven repentance, often over two to three years, or papal dispensation for infamia iuris, underscoring the Church's insistence on verifiable reform.^[17] This mechanism upheld moral absolutism in church governance by excluding individuals whose conduct demonstrated untrustworthiness, thereby safeguarding doctrinal integrity against erosion from unchecked leniency or relativism. By prioritizing causal links between observed sins and diminished credibility, infamy countered potential institutional decay, ensuring that forgiveness demanded tangible evidence of amendment rather than presuming rehabilitation without scrutiny.^[21]^[20]

Infamy in Early Modern Contexts

Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth

In the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, infamy (infamia) represented a grave civil penalty imposed on szlachta nobles convicted of heinous offenses, including robbery (rozbój), theft, and violent crimes such as rape or assault. This sanction, more punitive than mere banishment, rendered the offender (infamis) an outlaw (wyjęty spod prawa), devoid of legal protection and subject to summary execution if encountered without safe conduct.^[22] Infamiści forfeited their noble honor (cześć), prohibiting them from bearing arms, serving in public capacities, or invoking noble privileges like exemption from certain taxes.^[23] Embedded in the szlachta's customary and statutory legal framework—reinforced by acts affirming noble liberties, such as the Nihil Novi constitution of 1505—infamy enforced aristocratic self-discipline amid the Commonwealth's decentralized, elective monarchy. Nobles branded infamous lost eligibility to vote or deliberate in the Sejm, the legislative assembly dominated by the szlachta (comprising roughly 10% of the population), and faced exclusion from land inheritance claims, severing their economic and political lineage.^[22] This peer-adjudicated stigma targeted behaviors risking systemic corruption, such as treason or debt evasion, by leveraging reputational costs to preempt factional disruptions in a polity reliant on noble consensus rather than royal absolutism.^[24] Following the Union of Lublin on July 1, 1569, which unified the Kingdom of Poland and Grand Duchy of Lithuania into a single commonwealth, infamy gained heightened application against magnate overreach, curbing abuses like unauthorized fortifications or clientelistic violence that threatened noble equality (złota wolność). Courts, often sejmiks (local noble assemblies), decreed infamy to restore order, as seen in cases where convicted magnates were stripped of estates and barred from confederations—ad hoc noble alliances—thus channeling deterrence through honor rather than frequent armed enforcement.^[22]^[23] Despite its severity, infamy's efficacy waned in the 18th century amid political decay, yet it exemplified the szlachta's causal preference for social ostracism over coercive state mechanisms to regulate elite conduct.^[22]

Iberian Peninsula and Inquisition Practices

In the Iberian Peninsula, the Spanish and Portuguese Inquisitions employed sambenitos—distinctive penitential garments—as tangible instruments of infamy to publicly stigmatize convicted heretics, Judaizers, and conversos from the late 15th century onward. Established in Spain in 1478 under Ferdinand II and Isabella I, and in Portugal in 1536, these tribunals mandated that penitents wear sambenitos during auto-da-fé ceremonies, large public spectacles where sentences were pronounced before crowds that could number in the thousands.^[25]^[26] The garments, typically yellow tunics adorned with red San Benito crosses for reconciled penitents or painted flames and devils for the unrepentant, symbolized perpetual disgrace and were designed to deter religious deviation by embedding shame within communal memory.^[27] Following the auto-da-fé, sambenitos were removed from the wearer and suspended in prominent church locations, such as cathedral naves or monastery sacristies, where they remained on display for generations—often centuries—to extend infamy beyond the individual's lifetime and implicate descendants.^[25] In Spain, Inquisition records from tribunals like those in Toledo and Seville document thousands of such garments hung by the 16th century, with embroidered names and offenses ensuring visibility; for instance, in Tui, Galicia, sambenitos from 1616–1621 convictions persisted in church displays until secular reforms in the 19th century removed them.^[28] This practice causally reinforced religious orthodoxy by associating physical markers with social exclusion, as families of the infamous faced marriage restrictions and economic ostracism, thereby perpetuating hierarchies that prioritized Catholic purity over ethnic or confessional diversity.^[25] The rituals' efficacy in social control stemmed from their visibility and durability, transforming abstract infamy into enduring communal enforcement mechanisms that outlasted executions, which were reserved for relapsed or unrepentant cases comprising fewer than 1% of prosecutions per tribunal archives.^[29] In Portugal, similar displays in Lisbon's Tribunal of the Holy Office extended shame to moriscos and New Christians, with sambenitos hung post-1540 autos-da-fé to signal perpetual vigilance against crypto-Judaism, as evidenced by surviving inventories from the 18th century.^[30] These practices, while critiqued in modern historiography for their theatricality, empirically sustained doctrinal conformity by leveraging public humiliation to inhibit apostasy, as Inquisition ledgers from 1480–1700 reveal declining rates of detected relapse in stigmatized lineages compared to unmarked populations.^[25]^[29]

Infamy in Common Law and Constitutional Traditions

English Common Law

In English common law, infamy attained formal recognition as a consequence of conviction for felonies or certain misdemeanors involving moral turpitude, rendering the convict incompetent to testify as a witness on the grounds of presumed untrustworthiness. This evolved in the legal framework established after the Norman Conquest of 1066, when royal courts centralized jurisdiction over serious crimes—initially including murder, rape, arson, robbery, and larceny—punishable by capital sanctions, corporal penalties, or total forfeiture of goods and chattels, which inherently stigmatized the offender as infamous and barred them from court participation to safeguard against perjury.^[31]^[32] Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765–1769) systematized the doctrine, defining infamous crimes as those evincing inherent dishonesty, such as felonies or crimen falsi offenses like forgery, perjury, or subornation, which disqualified the convict from bearing witness due to lost reputation and credit. Blackstone emphasized that attainder for felony "stains" the individual, excluding them from testimony in any proceeding, as their prior actions demonstrated a disposition incompatible with truthful evidence.^[33]^[32] The procedure of peine forte et dure exemplified infamy's application: applied from the 13th century until abolished in 1772, it subjected felons refusing to plead to gradual crushing under weights, equating their death to conviction and imposing posthumous infamy, including property forfeiture and perpetual dishonor. This reflected the common law's empirical inference that evasion of judgment in capital cases corroborated guilt and mendacity, thereby justifying exclusion from the testimonial process to maintain judicial integrity.^[34]^[35]

United States Constitutional Framework

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, ratified on December 15, 1791, mandates that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury," embedding infamy as a threshold for heightened procedural protections in federal prosecutions.^[36] This clause reflects the Framers' intent to import English common law distinctions, where infamy denoted crimes severe enough to undermine an individual's public trust and moral standing, thereby necessitating safeguards against arbitrary state power while preserving scrutiny for offenses posing risks to societal order.^[37] In Ex parte Wilson (1885), the Supreme Court clarified that "infamous crimes" under the Fifth Amendment include those punishable by imprisonment at hard labor for a term of years, equating the punishment's degrading nature—historically linked to common law's view of infamy as hard labor in a penitentiary—with the loss of civic credibility.^[14] This interpretation aligned infamy not merely with the crime's label but with its consequences, such as confinement involving "infamous punishments" that echoed colonial-era practices of corporal and labor-based degradation, thereby balancing accusatory protections against the need to prosecute threats to collective security.^[38] The constitutional framework further operationalizes infamy through exclusions tied to common law precedents, prohibiting infamous persons from serving on juries or holding public office to mitigate subversive or factious influences in governance.^[39] For instance, Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 stipulates that post-impeachment judgment extends to "removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States," effectively imposing infamy on convicted officials to safeguard republican institutions from moral corruption.^[40] The Framers regarded such infamy provisions as essential causal mechanisms for republican stability, countering the perils of ambitious or unvirtuous actors who could factionalize the polity, as articulated in their emphasis on character qualifications for electors and officeholders to ensure fidelity to the public good over private interests.^[41] This approach prioritized empirical safeguards—rooted in historical precedents of civic exclusion—over unchecked individualism, viewing infamy's disabilities as proportionate responses to behaviors empirically linked to betrayal of trust and communal disruption.^[6]

Legal Consequences and Civil Disabilities

Loss of Rights and Status

In Roman law, infamy (infamia) imposed partial civil disabilities short of full capitis deminutio, depriving affected individuals of key political rights such as voting in public assemblies, holding magistracies, or serving in certain capacities like guardianship or legal representation. This degradation, often decreed by censors or judicial sentences for offenses like fraud or public immorality, preserved personal liberty but curtailed active civic participation, as evidenced in Republican-era statutes like the Lex Julia de ambitu of 18 BCE, which attached infamy to electoral bribery.^[42] Canon law distinguished infamia iuris (infamy of law, attached automatically to certain crimes) from infamia facti (infamy of fact, via public notoriety or sentence), both generating canonical irregularity that barred clerics or aspirants from ordination, exercising orders, or holding benefices.^[17] For laypersons, this extended to civil effects where ecclesiastical infamy aligned with degrading secular punishments, such as loss of eligibility for public trusts, as codified in medieval decretals like Gratian's Decretum (ca. 1140), which equated civil infamy with canonical bars to status elevation.^[43] In English common law, bills of attainder—legislative declarations of guilt for treason or felony—enforced civil death through forfeiture of real and personal property, corruption of blood (barring heirs from inheritance), and perpetual ineligibility for office or parliamentary service.^[44] Historical applications, such as the 1459 attainder of the Duke of York under Henry VI, stripped estates valued at thousands of pounds annually, severing economic bases for rebellion and empirically limiting recidivist networks by redistributing lands to loyalists.^[44] Similar disabilities appeared in continental systems, like the Polish–Lithuanian infamia (16th–18th centuries), which voided contracts and disqualified nobles from sejm elections, ensuring accountability via status revocation.^[45] Across these traditions, infamy consistently entailed disenfranchisement—loss of suffrage rights—and incapacity for binding contracts or property transactions, as infamous status impaired legal personality, preventing evasion of penalties through self-dealing. Medieval English plea rolls document over 200 attainders between 1300 and 1500 imposing such restrictions, correlating with reduced repeat offenses among dispossessed felons by dismantling patronage ties.^[46] This mechanism causally enforced deterrence, as resource deprivation isolated offenders from allies and means, a pattern sustained into early modern inquisitorial practices where infamy nullified testamentary rights.^[44]

Impact on Testimony and Credibility

In canon law, the principle infamis non auditur—meaning "the infamous is not heard"—established that individuals branded with infamy, such as those convicted of serious crimes or moral turpitude, were disqualified from providing testimony in ecclesiastical courts due to their presumed propensity for perjury.^[47] This exclusion stemmed from the recognition that prior proven misconduct, particularly offenses involving deceit like forgery or perjury (crimen falsi), undermined the reliability of such witnesses, prioritizing the integrity of judicial proceedings over inclusive participation.^[48] The rule drew from Roman legal traditions adapted into canon law, where infamy (infamia) carried automatic civil disabilities, including evidentiary incompetency, to safeguard truth-seeking by barring those whose character had been judicially impeached.^[19] English common law similarly rendered witnesses convicted of infamous crimes—defined as treason, felonies, or crimen falsi—incompetent to testify, a doctrine inherited from canon law and justified by the empirical presumption that such individuals posed an elevated risk of falsehood under oath.^[49] This incompetency persisted through the 18th century, with courts excluding felons' testimony outright to prevent perjury, as articulated in treatises emphasizing character evidence of unreliability.^[48] Reforms began in the mid-19th century; for instance, England's Criminal Procedure Act of 1865 shifted the approach by permitting felons to testify while allowing prior convictions to be introduced for impeachment, reflecting a gradual move from absolute disqualification to credibility assessment, though the underlying distrust of recidivist liars remained.^[50] The evidentiary bar on infamous testimony rested on causal realism: a judicially confirmed history of law-breaking, especially deceitful offenses, rationally forecasts diminished veracity, as past disregard for oaths or societal norms correlates with future unreliability absent demonstrated reform.^[51] This approach debunked egalitarian assumptions of inherent witness redeemability by demanding verifiable behavioral change before restoring credibility, ensuring trials favored empirically grounded reliability over speculative inclusion.^[48] Historical precedents, unmarred by modern inclusivity mandates, underscored that admitting unvetted malefactors' words risked systemic perjury, a peril borne out by the era's reliance on character as predictive of conduct.^[49]

Modern Interpretations and Debates

Felon Disenfranchisement and Rehabilitation

In the United States, 48 states revoke voting rights from individuals incarcerated for felonies, with Maine and Vermont as exceptions allowing incarcerated felons to vote.^[52] This practice stems from state constitutions and statutes treating felony convictions as temporary or permanent markers of infamy, suspending electoral participation to preserve the integrity of the ballot. Variations persist post-release: 11 states impose lifetime bans barring restoration except via executive clemency, while others condition rights on parole or probation completion.^[52] Florida exemplifies restrictive evolution; its 1968 constitutional reenactment of felony disenfranchisement maintained a near-permanent ban until 2018's Amendment 4, which aimed at automatic restoration but was curtailed by legislative requirements for fines and fees repayment, effectively limiting uptake amid administrative hurdles and concerns over incomplete rehabilitation.^[53] ^[54] Empirical analyses of disenfranchisement's rehabilitative impact yield mixed results, with no consensus on causation. State-level data from 2000–2018 indicate no statistically significant correlation between disenfranchisement stringency and recidivism rates, suggesting exclusion neither substantially deters nor exacerbates reoffending.^[55] However, labeling theory posits that infamy's stigma can amplify antisocial identities, potentially elevating recidivism through diminished social bonds, as observed in longitudinal studies of ex-offenders facing collateral sanctions.^[56] Contrasting claims of reintegration benefits from restoration lack robust causal evidence; unchecked rights revival risks eroding electoral trust, as isolated cases of restored felons attempting ineligible voting—such as in Florida post-Amendment 4—highlight enforcement challenges and fraud vulnerabilities, though overall incidence remains low relative to total restorations.^[57] Infamy's enduring utility lies in signaling unfitness, deterring recidivism via reputational costs rather than mere exclusion. Felony bars on public office-holding further instantiate infamy's deterrent role, preventing convicted individuals from positions of trust where corruption risks amplify. State laws in over 40 jurisdictions disqualify felons from elected roles, correlating with fewer documented abuses in barred offices compared to systems permitting candidacy; for instance, felony convictions often void prior elections or bar future runs, reducing opportunities for repeat offenders to exploit authority.^[58] ^[59] Disparities in impact—disenfranchising roughly one in 22 voting-age Black adults versus one in 115 non-Black—trace primarily to elevated felony rates among minorities, driven by disproportionate involvement in index crimes like homicide and robbery per uniform crime reports, rather than isolated bias in adjudication.^[60] This causal chain underscores infamy's alignment with public safety over equitable redistribution of rights, as reforms prioritizing restoration without verified behavioral change correlate with sustained or rising community crime burdens.^[61]

Criticisms, Reforms, and Enduring Utility

Critics of infamy, particularly civil rights organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), have characterized it as an archaic remnant of discriminatory practices, disproportionately affecting racial minorities and echoing Jim Crow-era disenfranchisement tactics.^[62] The ACLU has pursued legal challenges, such as in Gruver v. Barton, contending that such laws undermine democratic participation without advancing public safety, positioning the United States as a global outlier in restricting voting rights post-conviction.^[63] However, these arguments often overlook empirical evidence of recidivism; Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) data indicate that 68% of state prisoners released in 2008 were rearrested within three years, rising to 83% within nine years for the 2005 cohort, suggesting that infamy's disabilities reflect ongoing risks rather than mere prejudice.^[64] This high reoffense rate, documented across multiple BJS studies, underscores a causal link between serious criminal histories and future threats, challenging claims that infamy serves no rehabilitative or protective function.^[65] Reform efforts have proliferated since the late 1990s, with 26 states and the District of Columbia expanding rights restoration for felons, including repeals of lifetime bans in places like Delaware (2016) and partial automatic restorations post-sentence in states such as California (via Proposition 17 in 2010, later expanded).^[66] Proponents argue these changes facilitate reintegration by removing barriers to employment and civic engagement, potentially lowering recidivism through social inclusion.^[67] Yet, evidence on deterrence remains mixed; while some analyses find no direct marginal effect from disenfranchisement alone, broader infamy provisions historically signaled unfitness for trust-dependent roles, preserving incentives against grave offenses by extending consequences beyond incarceration.^[68] Reforms risking dilution, such as immediate full rights restoration, may erode this signaling in high-recidivism contexts, as BJS longitudinal data show sustained offending patterns that correlate with incomplete accountability.^[69] Infamy retains empirical utility in maintaining social order, particularly in societies reliant on reputational cues for cooperation; common law traditions applied it rigorously to disqualify infamous persons from testimony, reflecting a first-principles recognition that felony convictions empirically predict unreliability.^[6] Periods of stricter application, as in early American jurisprudence, aligned with lower baseline crime rates prior to 20th-century expansions of rights, where causal mechanisms like diminished credibility deterred repeat violations by limiting post-conviction influence.^[70] Equity-focused arguments for abolition, often advanced by advocacy groups, underweight this data-driven rationale, as high recidivism—evident in BJS findings of over 50% reincarceration within five years for many cohorts—favors calibrated retention to protect high-trust institutions from infiltration by proven violators.^[71] Thus, while reforms address reintegration for low-risk cases, wholesale erosion overlooks infamy's role in causal deterrence and risk allocation, substantiated by persistent offending statistics.^[64]