Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Comprehensive Agreement on Investment

The (CAI) is a negotiated between the and the from 2013 to 2020, designed to enhance reciprocal for investors by reducing barriers in sectors such as , , healthcare, and , while incorporating commitments to including and environmental protections. was reached on December 30, 2020, after 35 rounds of talks, with committing to lift equity caps and joint-venture requirements in over 40 sectors previously restricted to EU firms. The CAI's potential benefits included improved legal certainty for EU investments in China's vast market and a framework for addressing forced technology transfers and state subsidies, though critics highlighted enforcement challenges given China's regulatory opacity and history of non-compliance with international commitments. Ratification stalled in May 2021 when the voted to freeze the process indefinitely in response to Chinese sanctions on EU parliamentarians and entities over allegations of abuses in , prompting reciprocal EU sanctions against Chinese officials. As of October 2025, the agreement remains shelved, with trade officials stating no intention to revive it amid broader geopolitical tensions, including concerns over economic dependencies and China's assertive . The CAI's demise underscores the prioritization of values-based and supply-chain resilience over pure economic liberalization in EU-China relations, influencing subsequent de-risking strategies.

Historical Background

Origins and Motivations

Prior to the launch of negotiations, the Union's investment relations with were governed by approximately 25 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) between individual member states and , which provided fragmented protections and lacked comprehensive reciprocity. These outdated agreements, many dating back decades, failed to address evolving barriers such as ownership restrictions and forced technology transfers, prompting the EU to pursue a unified framework in 2013 to replace them and align with its common commercial policy. Economic motivations centered on rectifying persistent imbalances and asymmetries, as exports to lagged behind imports, culminating in a €164 billion goods deficit in 2019 driven by non-tariff barriers and discriminatory practices. enterprises encountered systemic hurdles in high-value sectors, including automotive , where enforced 50% caps via joint-venture mandates; , with prohibitions on wholly foreign-owned entities; and , featuring equity limits and approval delays that favored domestic competitors. The CAI initiative reflected a push for empirical reciprocity, enabling investors to penetrate 's vast more equitably while binding recent Chinese liberalizations to prevent reversals. On a strategic level, the agreement emerged amid concerns over China's "" industrial strategy, unveiled in , which allocated state subsidies exceeding $300 billion to achieve self-sufficiency in advanced technologies like semiconductors and , often through coercive joint-venture requirements that facilitated involuntary technology spillovers from foreign firms. EU policymakers viewed these policies as causal contributors to non-market distortions, including overcapacity and unfair , positioning the CAI as a to mitigate such risks via enforceable disciplines on subsidies and transfers without pursuing wholesale economic disengagement. This approach prioritized targeted reforms over ideological , grounded in the recognition that sustained bilateral investment flows—reaching €180 billion in EU outward FDI stock to China by 2019—underpinned mutual growth despite asymmetries.

Negotiation Timeline

Negotiations for the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) between the and the began with the EU's adoption of a negotiating in October , followed by the first round of talks in January 2014 during an EU-China summit. Initial rounds from 2014 to 2018 emphasized exploratory discussions on core issues such as and investment protection, with progress marked by incremental concessions on sectoral openings, though substantive breakthroughs remained limited amid differing priorities on state-owned enterprises and labor standards. The pace accelerated in 2019 under the incoming , which prioritized concluding the deal amid the US-China trade war's disruptions to global supply chains, leading to heightened bilateral urgency for reciprocal investment terms. By late 2020, after 34 prior rounds, negotiations intensified with offering verifiable commitments, including pledges to ratify Conventions Nos. 29 and 105 on forced labor within two years of the agreement's , addressing EU demands for improved labor protections without enforceable dispute mechanisms beyond consultation. The 35th and final round, held from December 6 to 30, 2020, resulted in an on December 30, formalizing concessions on access to sectors like , , and , while secured commitments for balanced investor protections. This seven-year process, spanning 35 rounds, represented empirical advancement in reciprocal market liberalization, though critics noted persistent gaps in mechanisms for commitments.

Key Provisions

Market Access Liberalization

The Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) primarily sought to liberalize by committing to eliminate or reduce quantitative and qualitative restrictions on EU investors in designated sectors, thereby addressing longstanding asymmetries where EU markets were more open than 's. These commitments were outlined in legally binding schedules annexed to the agreement, focusing on removing joint-venture mandates, equity caps, and outright bans that previously limited . In , pledged to permit full for EU firms across non-strategic subsectors, including production of transport equipment, health equipment, and chemicals, eliminating the prior requirement for joint ventures in many cases. This marked a shift from 's pre-CAI negative list, which restricted or prohibited foreign in over 40 categories, often mandating local partnerships that diluted control and facilitated technology spillovers. The automotive sector received targeted liberalization, with agreeing to remove and phase out joint-venture requirements, including for traditional passenger vehicles and new energy vehicles, allowing EU investors greater autonomy in operations and ownership. This addressed prior caps, such as the 50% foreign equity limit and restrictions on multiple joint ventures per firm, which had constrained EU automakers' expansion despite 's status as the world's largest vehicle market. Services sectors saw openings in /telecommunications, where China committed to lifting the outright investment ban, permitting EU firms up to 50% equity ownership subject to national security reviews. In healthcare, EU investors gained access to establish wholly foreign-owned private hospitals and facilities, removing joint-venture mandates that had previously barred standalone operations. These provisions extended to , enabling full ownership in and removal of equity caps in certain subsectors, aiming to reciprocalize access amid China's rapid services market growth. Additionally, the agreement prohibited forced technology transfers as a for , binding to refrain from administrative coercion via joint-venture requirements or approvals, though enforcement relied on state-to-state dispute mechanisms rather than investor-state . Pre-CAI, such practices were prevalent, with EU firms reporting indirect pressures in restricted sectors numbering around 50 on 's evolving negative lists.

Level Playing Field Measures

The Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) incorporates disciplines aimed at mitigating distortions from state intervention in China's economy, particularly through rules on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and subsidies, to promote competitive neutrality for foreign investors. These measures require SOEs, which account for approximately 30% of China's GDP, to operate according to commercial considerations without discriminatory favoring domestic suppliers over EU firms. SOEs must also maintain in their operations, including providing information upon request to assess compliance with market-oriented behavior, thereby addressing advantages derived from state backing that undermine fair competition. On subsidies, the CAI mandates notification by of all subsidies granted to SOEs or other entities above specified thresholds, with provisions for transparency through public disclosure and response to inquiries, targeting practices that create overcapacity and market distortions. This responds to of subsidy-driven excesses, such as in , where EU investigations identified countervailable subsidies leading to global oversupply; for instance, the 2016 anti-subsidy duties on hot-rolled flat steel products addressed rates up to 66.5% tied to state support. Similarly, pre-CAI solar panel cases revealed dumping margins of 47.6% to 67.9% in , linked to subsidized overproduction that eroded EU manufacturers' from 20% to under 5% globally. These distortions, where state subsidies lower costs below competitive levels, causally flood markets and displace unsubsidized producers, as evidenced by EU defense actions comprising 18 measures against imports by 2017. Unlike broader WTO rules, CAI's commitments are enforceable through binding state-to-state dispute settlement specific to investment-related distortions, allowing consultations, panels, and potential retaliation without investor-state . This mechanism complements WTO processes but focuses on investment contexts, prohibiting forced technology transfers and certain industrial policies that favor domestic firms, though critics note gaps in comprehensive subsidy coverage compared to multilateral standards.

Sustainable Development Commitments

The Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) incorporates a dedicated on , encompassing , , and related governance elements such as . Parties commit to upholding high levels of protection in these areas, explicitly prohibiting the reduction of standards to encourage or retain , and affirming adherence to internationally recognized principles, including those derived from the (ILO) fundamental conventions and multilateral environmental agreements. A core precondition for the CAI's provisions was China's ratification of specific ILO conventions addressing and rights. committed to ratifying ILO No. 29 (, 1930), which prohibits all forms of forced or compulsory labor, and No. 105 (Abolition of Forced Labour , 1957), which bans forced labor as a means of political or labor ; additionally, the requires effective domestic of No. 98 (Right to Organise and , 1949), which had ratified in 1997 but with noted implementation gaps. fulfilled the ratifications of Conventions 29 and 105 on August 12, 2022, bringing its total ratified ILO conventions to 28, including six of the eight fundamental ones. These steps establish a verifiable baseline for labor commitments, though pre-CAI assessments by the ILO highlighted 's non-ratification of conventions as a persistent gap relative to global standards. On the environmental front, the CAI mandates commitments to combat , including alignment with the , and prohibits exploitative practices such as using labor or environmental standards as disguised trade barriers. Governance aspects emphasize transparency and anti-corruption measures tied to sustainable practices, with parties agreeing to promote frameworks like the . Enforcement of these commitments relies on bilateral mechanisms, including regular dialogues through a dedicated committee and consultations to address non-compliance, supplemented by a tailored state-to-state dispute settlement process involving an panel of experts for matters. Unlike trade pacts such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for (CPTPP), which permit private enforcement or sanctions, the CAI lacks such provisions, limiting remedies to diplomatic engagement or potential suspension of benefits under general dispute rules. This structure renders the commitments primarily aspirational, as effective implementation depends on domestic without verification tools, potentially undermining causal links between textual obligations and tangible outcomes in China's regulatory context.

Ratification Efforts and Suspension

European Union Internal Processes

Following the reached on 30 December 2020, the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) text entered the 's internal procedural phases, beginning with legal scrubbing to verify alignment with EU law and international commitments, succeeded by into the 24 official EU languages. The released the consolidated draft text on 22 January 2021, ahead of completing these technical refinements, marking the transition toward formal submission for institutional endorsement. Classified as a mixed agreement due to its coverage of both EU-exclusive competences (such as ) and shared competences (including certain elements), the CAI required unanimous approval, European Parliament consent, and subsequent by each member state's national parliament and, where applicable, regional assemblies. The and advanced the process by prioritizing the agreement's core provisions, deliberately excluding comprehensive investment protection standards—such as investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms—from the initial framework, with commitments to pursue those in parallel or future talks. Business advocacy groups, including BusinessEurope, actively supported progression of the CAI within EU institutions, arguing it would expand opportunities for European firms in key Chinese sectors and impose disciplines to mitigate asymmetries in competitive conditions, thereby bolstering resilience in EU export-dependent industries amid critiques framing such as undue corporate influence. These positions drew on empirical assessments of bilateral flows, highlighting the need for reciprocal openings to sustain and in and services sectors exposed to competition.

Chinese Retaliatory Sanctions

In response to the European Union's sanctions imposed on March 22, 2021, targeting four Chinese officials and one entity over alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang, China announced retaliatory measures on the same day against ten EU individuals and four entities.690617) The Chinese countermeasures included asset freezes, travel bans to China, and prohibitions on transactions or cooperation with Chinese individuals or organizations, affecting five Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Human Rights, the think tank Europe Service Network (ESN), the Alliance of Democracies Foundation, and the EU's Political and Security Committee.690617_EN.pdf) China's Foreign Ministry described the EU sanctions as interference in internal affairs that "seriously undermined the political foundation of -EU relations," explicitly linking the retaliation to the broader diplomatic fallout, including the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI). On March 26, 2021, spokesperson announced that would suspend procedures for approving the CAI, stating that the EU actions had "poisoned the atmosphere" for economic cooperation. This move escalated the dispute from targeted personal sanctions to institutional leverage, with 's broader list contrasting the EU's narrower scope of four individuals and one entity. The retaliatory sanctions directly impeded CAI ratification, as the resolved on May 20, 2021, to withhold consent until lifted its measures, effectively stalling the agreement's implementation. This sequence illustrated how the human rights-linked sanctions exchange shifted focus from under the CAI to reciprocal political penalties, halting progress on commitments despite the deal's prior conclusion in December 2020.

European Parliament's Rejection

On May 20, 2021, the European Parliament adopted a non-binding resolution suspending consideration of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), with 599 votes in favor, 30 against, and 58 abstentions. The resolution explicitly conditioned any future ratification on China lifting its retaliatory sanctions—imposed in March 2021 on four members of the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Human Rights and other EU entities following the EU's sanctions on Chinese officials linked to abuses in Xinjiang—and demonstrating verifiable progress in ratifying and enforcing International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions, particularly those addressing forced labor. Proponents framed the decision as essential for upholding the Parliament's credibility on human rights, arguing that proceeding amid Beijing's sanctions would undermine EU leverage on issues like Xinjiang detentions and labor standards. Critics of the suspension, including business associations and analysts, contended that it reflected , prioritizing symbolic posturing over pragmatic economic gains for EU firms facing asymmetric Chinese market barriers. Without the CAI's reciprocal investment protections, European companies continued operating under China's restrictive rules—such as joint-venture mandates and pressures—while volumes remained robust, exceeding €700 billion annually from 2021 onward despite the freeze. This outcome empirically disadvantaged EU investors more than China, as the agreement's unratified market access commitments (e.g., in sectors like and ) offered no enforceable recourse, yet imbalances persisted with EU imports from China outpacing exports by roughly 2:1 ratios through 2024. The Parliament's action effectively halted CAI ratification indefinitely, with no substantive progress reported since 2021, as Chinese sanctions on EU parliamentarians remained in place. By May 2025, EU trade officials explicitly dismissed any interest in revival, emphasizing reliance on existing WTO frameworks and verifiable trade data over aspirational investment pacts amid ongoing geopolitical frictions. This stance underscored a causal prioritization of short-term diplomatic signaling—despite persistent human rights concerns and trade asymmetries—over long-term structural reforms in bilateral investment flows.

Economic and Strategic Implications

Projected Benefits for EU Businesses

The Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) was anticipated to deliver substantial gains for businesses by liberalizing entry into key Chinese sectors previously restricted or subject to joint-venture requirements. China committed to opening manufacturing areas including chemicals, , electric vehicles, and healthcare products, allowing full ownership for investors without performance mandates in most cases. These concessions, binding China's prior unilateral liberalizations, exceeded obligations by establishing enforceable rules on and non-discrimination. Economic assessments projected that CAI implementation would enhance bilateral investment flows, supporting EU export growth in services and goods while fostering cross-border . Modeling indicated potential for significant expansion in EU-China trade volumes, aiding post-pandemic recovery through diversified revenue streams in a market serving 1.4 billion consumers. Sectors like chemicals and machinery stood to benefit from reduced barriers, enabling EU firms to capture untapped opportunities estimated in billions of euros annually via stabilized supply chains and protections against arbitrary expropriation. Following the agreement's freeze in May 2021, enterprises have encountered persistent regulatory hurdles and opaque practices in , amplifying the opportunity costs of non-ratification. As of 2025, the lack of CAI-enforced reciprocity has heightened expenses for firms pursuing adjustments amid global shifts, with reports highlighting foregone efficiencies in market entry and operational stability.

Potential Risks from Chinese State Practices

The dominance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in sectors of the , bolstered by extensive subsidies, creates non-market advantages that could undermine fair competition for EU investors. OECD data indicate that public support to manufacturing firms, including direct subsidies and indirect measures such as preferential financing, averaged 4.5% of revenues for covered firms between 2005 and 2019, with rates reaching 4-7% in sectors like aluminum. These supports, often lacking , enable SOEs to maintain pricing power and that distorts returns for foreign entities, a risk amplified post-CAI suspension as unratified disciplines fail to impose commercial operation requirements on SOEs. The CAI sought to address SOE distortions through rules mandating market-oriented behavior, including prohibitions on using SOEs for non-commercial objectives and notification requirements for subsidies above defined thresholds, thereby providing EU investors with and dispute mechanisms. Without , however, persistent opacity in Chinese subsidy practices—estimated by the to include indirect forms several times larger than official figures—exposes EU firms to competitive disadvantages, as seen in sectors like where backing sustains overcapacity. Forced technology transfers and (IP) infringements represent additional empirical risks, with EU businesses frequently encountering coercive joint venture mandates that compel IP disclosure for prior to the CAI negotiations. A 2020 European Commission assessment characterized such practices as systemic, citing cases where foreign firms suffered "irreparable harm" from inadequate IP enforcement and transfer pressures. The agreement's provisions explicitly banned forced transfers and required fair treatment of IP, offering a causal restraint absent since the May 2021 freeze, leaving EU investors reliant on domestic Chinese courts or WTO channels with limited efficacy against state-linked actors. These risks, while verifiable through firm-level data and trade disputes, remain addressable via targeted EU tools such as anti-subsidy investigations and bilateral dialogues, avoiding overreliance on amid volumes surpassing €700 billion in goods by 2023. Such interdependence underscores the need for over isolation, as CAI's unactivated rules highlight leverage lost but recoverable through renewed negotiations or sector-specific safeguards.

Controversies and Debates

Human Rights and Labor Concerns

Critics of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) argued that its provisional agreement on December 30, 2020, coincided with escalating international scrutiny of alleged abuses in China's Uyghur Autonomous Region, potentially signaling endorsement without sufficient leverage for reform. The European Parliament's resolution in June 2021 explicitly linked the agreement's suspension to these concerns, citing reports of mass detentions, forced labor, and cultural suppression based on survivor testimonies, leaked documents, and of facilities. A UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights assessment released on August 31, 2022, concluded it was "reasonable to believe" that torture, ill-treatment, and forced labor patterns in amounted to serious violations, potentially , drawing from over 40 interviews and public evidence, though limited by lack of direct access to the region. Chinese authorities have consistently denied these allegations, characterizing facilities as voluntary vocational training centers for poverty alleviation and counter-terrorism, with no verification confirming or systematic forced labor at scale. The CAI's sustainable development chapter included commitments to uphold International Labour Organization (ILO) core principles, such as freedom of association and elimination of forced labor, with provisions prohibiting the lowering of labor standards to attract investment and establishing state-to-state dispute settlement mechanisms for non-compliance. Supporters highlighted these as progressive, noting China's subsequent ratification of ILO Conventions No. 29 (Forced Labour, 1930) and No. 105 (Abolition of Forced Labour, 1957) on August 12, 2022, bringing its total to six of eight fundamental conventions, potentially influenced by international trade pressures including the CAI negotiations. Critics, including environmental and labor advocacy groups, contended the chapter's enforceability was inadequate, relying on consultative consultations and binding arbitration only after exhaustion of remedies, falling short of stronger investor-state mechanisms in agreements like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and offering limited deterrence against state-directed violations. Proponents of economic engagement argued that integrating into global trade frameworks has empirically driven incremental labor reforms, such as expanded ILO and domestic laws on minimum wages and contracts since the 2000s, outperforming isolationist approaches that risk entrenching opacity without causal pathways to accountability. Empirical analyses of 's post-WTO accession period show correlations between foreign investment inflows and localized improvements in worker protections, though broader stagnation persists, underscoring engagement's mixed record over punitive . The European Parliament's May 20, 2021, vote to freeze emphasized reciprocity amid sanctions on MEPs, but business assessments indicated that suspension disrupted , indirectly affecting EU labor interests through forgone export revenues tied to CAI provisions.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement Debates

The investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism, a feature in many bilateral to allow investors to arbitrate claims against host states for treaty breaches, was explicitly deferred in the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), with negotiations slated for Phase II on investment protection standards following the 2020 agreement in principle. This deferral reflected ongoing efforts to modernize ISDS, potentially incorporating appellate mechanisms and excluding intra- disputes, amid broader debates on balancing investor protections with state regulatory autonomy. Proponents, including business lobbies, emphasized ISDS's necessity to safeguard European investors from China's judicial opacity, where local courts often exhibit protectionism favoring domestic parties, as evidenced by empirical studies showing significant bias in first-instance cases when plaintiffs and courts share jurisdictional ties. Critics, frequently from and left-leaning political factions within the , argued that ISDS provisions risked granting corporations undue veto power over regulations, potentially chilling policies on environmental or labor standards despite safeguards in modern treaties limiting claims to discriminatory or expropriatory acts without compensation. Empirical data from over 1,000 known ISDS cases counters this by indicating investors prevail against states in approximately 38 percent of decided arbitrations, with states winning outright in 58 percent and settlements in the remainder, underscoring that tribunals rarely undermine legitimate regulatory measures but often address arbitrary expropriation or unfair treatment. In the CAI context, such protections were seen as particularly vital for shielding EU firms from practices like coerced technology transfers in joint ventures, which persisted despite China's 2019 Foreign Investment Law prohibiting them, as documented in U.S. Trade Representative reports citing ongoing coercive acquisition tactics in sectors like semiconductors and . Unlike the , which prioritized robust ISDS for protection amid diverse legal systems, the CAI's emphasis on market access over immediate protection standards shifted debates toward whether state-to-state mechanisms alone—enshrined in the agreement's Section V—sufficed for , potentially leaving investors reliant on domestic remedies in China's system, where foreign claims face challenges. The EU Parliament's May 2021 freeze on ratification halted Phase II, precluding resolution and fueling arguments that absent ISDS, the treaty inadequately mitigated risks from asymmetric , with UNCTAD analyses highlighting China's selective engagement with favoring negotiation over binding international remedies. This impasse underscored causal tensions: while ISDS empirically promotes stable capital flows by deterring host-state opportunism, its omission in CAI amplified advocates' wins but exposed EU investors to unmitigated hazards in a with documented opacity.

Geopolitical Tensions with the

The announcement of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) on December 30, 2020, elicited immediate criticism from the , framing the deal as a strategic misstep that legitimized 's economic practices amid escalating U.S.- rivalry. U.S. described the agreement as "weak" on January 5, 2021, arguing it failed to shield European workers from "the predation of the ." This reflected broader Republican concerns under the outgoing Trump administration that the EU's haste demonstrated naivety toward Beijing's state-driven model, especially following the U.S.- Phase One trade deal's implementation in February 2020, which had already highlighted Washington's pivot toward worker protections and reciprocity in trade. The incoming Biden administration amplified these tensions, with officials signaling displeasure over the lack of prior consultation despite transatlantic alliances, including intelligence-sharing frameworks like the Five Eyes. A tweet from a senior Biden aide underscored the president-elect's unhappiness with the timing, just weeks before his inauguration, viewing the CAI as undermining coordinated Western pressure on China. European leaders countered by asserting strategic autonomy, emphasizing that the EU need not seek U.S. permission for bilateral agreements, a stance rooted in long-standing debates over independent trade policy. Critics noted U.S. hypocrisy, given America's own historical engagement with China, including billions in annual investments and the Phase One accord, which imposed fewer enforceable labor standards than the CAI's provisions on forced labor ratification. Some analyses suggested the CAI could align with U.S. interests by multilaterally binding to and commitments, potentially complementing American efforts to enforce reciprocity rather than constituting a of transatlantic unity. The for Strategic and Studies (CSIS) argued in 2021 that the deal offered a "diplomatic opportunity" for the U.S. to leverage EU-negotiated benchmarks in its own policy, countering narratives of EU disloyalty amid Biden's focus on allied coordination. However, the absence of joint deliberation exacerbated perceptions of EU , straining relations as Washington prioritized de-risking from over selective engagement.

Current Status and Future Outlook

Ongoing Stalemate Factors

The lifting of China's sanctions on members and the Subcommittee on in April 2025 failed to unlock the impasse, as the maintains that broader preconditions—encompassing verifiable progress on , market access reciprocity, and cessation of economic coercion—remain unmet. Official EU statements post-lifting, including from the Parliament's leadership, emphasized that the move restores only basic dialogue channels without altering the freeze on the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), imposed after the Parliament's May 2021 rejection resolution. The EU's institutionalization of de-risking policies constitutes a structural barrier, redirecting priorities from investment liberalization toward supply chain diversification and dependency reduction. The Critical Raw Materials Act, adopted by the European Parliament and Council in March 2024 and entering force in May 2024, mandates strategic projects to secure non-Chinese sourcing for 34 critical minerals, where China controls over 60% of global refining capacity, explicitly framing over-reliance as a vulnerability exacerbated by opaque state practices. Complementing this, the Anti-Coercion Instrument, adopted in February 2023, equips the EU with retaliatory measures against economic leverage tactics like the 2021 sanctions, signaling a doctrinal shift that views deepened CAI ties as incompatible with safeguarding economic sovereignty. These frameworks, rooted in empirical assessments of bilateral asymmetries, have absorbed political capital that might otherwise advance CAI revival. Trade frictions and evidentiary imbalances further solidify the deadlock, with EU probes into Chinese state subsidies—culminating in provisional duties on electric vehicles up to 38% in July 2024 and definitive tariffs averaging 20.7% imposed in October 2024—highlighting non-reciprocal distortions that undermine CAI's intended . data record a €396 billion EU goods deficit with in 2023, widening to approximately €304 billion in 2024 amid subdued EU exports, which constitute just 8.3% of total EU outbound ; such disparities, unmitigated by CAI's stalled provisions on subsidies and technology transfers, erode negotiators' incentives. The July 2025 EU-China summit exemplified this inertia, yielding no procedural advancements on CAI despite China's overtures, as leaders reiterated de-risking imperatives amid escalating global tensions. No legal filings, interinstitutional consultations, or ratification milestones have transpired since March 2021, per tracking, underscoring a policy of indefinite suspension amid unaddressed causal risks from China's state-directed economy.

Prospects for Revival or Alternatives

In May 2025, senior officials explicitly stated there is "no intention" of reviving the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), citing persistent concerns and lack of reciprocity from as insurmountable barriers. This position was reiterated amid 's April 2025 offer to lift sanctions on members—imposed in 2021 over criticisms—in a bid to unblock , but diplomats dismissed it as insufficient without verifiable reforms. Pro-revival advocates, including some business lobbies, argue that amid escalating U.S. tariffs under President Trump, renegotiating CAI could secure market access concessions from , reducing EU export losses estimated at €20-30 billion annually from current trade frictions. Alternatives to a comprehensive revival include targeted sectoral agreements, such as those on electric vehicles (EVs) or renewables, which could deliver verifiable gains like reduced non-tariff barriers without broad commitments. For instance, -China talks in 2025 have explored EV-specific pacts to mitigate distortions, serving as a model for plurilateral WTO initiatives on disciplines. Without CAI, the EU incurs higher compliance costs from unilateral tools like the 2023 , which imposed €1.5 billion in probes by mid-2025, versus potential CAI-enforced transparency yielding 10-15% improved access for EU firms in services sectors per pre-2021 modeling. Yet, empirical non-compliance risks—evident in China's failure to fully ratify ILO conventions despite 2020 pledges—tilt toward diversified partnerships, with EU FDI shifting 12% toward economies like and since 2022. Key variables for any shift include mutual sanction lifts or independent ILO audits of Chinese labor practices, but as of October 2025, the trajectory favors derisking via bilateral deals with aligned partners over CAI revival, prioritizing economic resilience amid global supply chain fragmentation. This pragmatic pivot aligns with data showing EU-China trade volumes holding at €800 billion in 2024 despite tensions, underscoring engagement's baseline value while hedging against enforcement gaps.

References

  1. [1]
    Key elements of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement - EEAS
    Dec 29, 2020 · The CAI will ensure that EU investors achieve better access to a fast growing 1.4 billion consumer market, and that they compete on a better ...
  2. [2]
    EU-China agreement: Milestones and documents - EU Trade
    The EU and China reached an agreement in principle on investment in December 2020, with the agreement in principle signed on January 22, 2021. 2020 was set as ...<|separator|>
  3. [3]
    [PDF] EU AND CHINA COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT
    After almost seven years of negotiations, on 30 December 2020, the EU and China agreed on an investment deal, although its official signing is yet to take place ...<|separator|>
  4. [4]
    The Rise and Demise of the EU-China Investment Agreement - CSIS
    Mar 20, 2023 · The EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) proved short-lived. After seven years of negotiations, only five months passed ...
  5. [5]
    EU-China investment deal leaves a lot to be desired | Merics
    The facts: The pace of EU-China negotiations on the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) intensified significantly as 2020 drew to a close.
  6. [6]
    EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI)
    The CAI was designed as a stand-alone investment agreement that does not include trade issues (thus excluding substantive rules on public procurement, subsidies ...
  7. [7]
    Preliminary Failure of EU-China Comprehensive Agreement
    In May 2021, however, ratification of the CAI was put on hold after the EU imposed punitive measures against China for human rights violations and China ...Missing: controversies | Show results with:controversies
  8. [8]
    EU 'has no interest' in reviving stalled investment deal with China
    May 15, 2025 · The European Union has “no intention” of trying to revive a stalled investment deal with China, according to a senior diplomatic official.
  9. [9]
    EU-China Relations After the 2024 European Elections: A Timeline
    Oct 16, 2025 · The EU has dismissed the possibility of reviving the shelved Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) with China, despite recent ...
  10. [10]
    The rise and fall of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on ...
    This article aims to better understand how the concept plays out in policy practice by focusing on its discursive use in the rise and fall of the EU-China ...
  11. [11]
    Investment agreement between EU and China | DLA Piper
    Jan 14, 2021 · Today, the legal framework for investments between the EU and China is generally based on 25 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) which have ...
  12. [12]
    The EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment: A First ...
    Feb 5, 2021 · The EU-China Comprehensive Investment Agreement (CIA) has held 35 rounds of negotiations since its launch in 2013. At the beginning of the ...Missing: pre- | Show results with:pre-
  13. [13]
    [PDF] EU-CHINA COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT
    Dec 30, 2020 · It is intended to replace bilateral investment treaties (BITs) between China and particular EU Member States. The EU and China have been in ...
  14. [14]
    China-EU trade in goods: €164 billion deficit in 2019
    Mar 20, 2020 · The EU had a trade in goods deficit (meaning larger imports than exports) with China, which varied between €104 billion and €164 billion.
  15. [15]
    [PDF] EU-China-trade-and-investment-in-challenging-times.pdf - Bruegel
    The EU's trade deficit with China has grown to USD 220 billion. Figure 1.1: EU trade with China (USD billions). Source: UNCTAD. The EU's trade deficit with ...<|separator|>
  16. [16]
    Is 'Made in China 2025' a Threat to Global Trade?
    The Chinese government has launched “Made in China 2025,” a state-led industrial policy that seeks to make China dominant in global high-tech manufacturing.What is China 2025? · What are the criticisms of... · How do China's actions...
  17. [17]
    Timeline of China-EU investment agreement negotiations
    Dec 31, 2020 · From Nov. 30 to Dec. 4, 2015, the eighth round of negotiations was held in Brussels, Belgium. The two sides achieved significant progress on the ...<|separator|>
  18. [18]
    [PDF] EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment
    The EU-China CAI aims to establish a uniform legal framework for investment, covering market access, sustainable development, and level playing field issues.
  19. [19]
    China to ratify ILO forced labour conventions in 'major signal' to EU
    China had agreed to pursue ratification of the two ILO conventions as a compromise over forced labour, an issue that had stalled the investment deal talks with ...
  20. [20]
    EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (EU-China CAI)
    Sharing. On 30 December 2020, the EU and China reached an agreement in principle on a comprehensive agreement on investment (CAI) during a prolonged 35th round ...Missing: talks | Show results with:talks
  21. [21]
    EU-China Comprehensive Investment Agreement - ABC Group
    From December 6 to 11, 2020, China and the EU held the 35th round of negotiations on the Comprehensive Agreement on Investments (“CAI”), a bilateral treaty ...
  22. [22]
    The EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI)
    Jan 19, 2021 · The European Union and China endorsed the CAI deal on December 30, 2020. ... 35 tortuous rounds of negotiations. “The European Commission and the ...
  23. [23]
    Key elements of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement
    Automotive sector: China has agreed to remove and phase out joint venture requirements. China will commit market access for new energy vehicles. Financial ...
  24. [24]
    An overview of the China/EU Comprehensive Agreement on ...
    The CAI is widely appraised as an ambitious move to create significant opportunities for investors from the EU and China and to strengthen the economic ties ...
  25. [25]
    Key elements of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on ...
    Examples of market access commitments by China: Manufacturing;; Automotive sector;; Financial services;; Health (private hospitals);; R&D (biological resources); ...<|separator|>
  26. [26]
    EU Commission Publishes Text of EU-China Comprehensive ...
    Jan 27, 2021 · Significantly, China agrees to lift the requirement in a number of sectors that European investors operate in China through a specified type ...Missing: priority | Show results with:priority
  27. [27]
    Progress on difficult terrain: The EU-China investment agreement
    Jun 28, 2021 · This tackles the issue of forced technology transfer, e.g. through forced joint ventures as the sole form of market entry for foreign investors.Missing: automotive | Show results with:automotive
  28. [28]
    EU-China: The agreement explained - EU Trade - European Union
    China has made significant commitments to guarantee EU companies access to the Chinese market. The CAI binds the autonomous openings made by China in the last ...Missing: motivations | Show results with:motivations
  29. [29]
    The Practical Implications of the EU China Investment Deal - Orrick
    Jan 19, 2021 · The principles of the CAI are transparency, a level playing field, sustainable development and market access between EU and China. To give a ...Missing: motivations | Show results with:motivations
  30. [30]
    L_2017146EN.01001701.xml - EUR-Lex - European Union
    On 13 May 2016, the European Commission ('the Commission') initiated an anti- subsidy investigation with regard to imports into the Union of certain hot-rolled ...
  31. [31]
    EU imposes provisional anti-dumping duties on Chinese solar panels
    Jun 3, 2013 · The European Commission today decided to impose provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of solar panels and key components (i.e. cells and ...Missing: steel pre- CAI
  32. [32]
    EU Imposes Anti-Dumping Measures on Some Chinese Solar Panels
    Dec 2, 2013 · The commission said the duties and agreement with Chinese exporters "are expected to stop the downward spiral of prices on solar panels."Missing: cases pre- CAI
  33. [33]
    https://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-rejects-appeal-to-scrap-trade-protection-on-chinese-solar-products-1488283366
  34. [34]
    EU-China investment accord fails to resolve subsidy disputes | PIIE
    Mar 10, 2021 · At least in one area, subsidies, the agreement falls short. The EU negotiating team clearly views the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment ...
  35. [35]
    [PDF] Is the European Union's investment agreement with China ... - Bruegel
    Or, the CAI could include rules, such as on subsidies, which will allow EU firms to compete on a more equal footing with Chinese firms in their home market. We ...
  36. [36]
    EU–China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment: An Appraisal ...
    May 26, 2021 · The EU-China CAI's sustainable section focuses on environment and labor, requiring high protection levels, but with limited enforcement and the ...<|separator|>
  37. [37]
    The Labor Provisions in the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement ...
    Jan 22, 2021 · The Parties recognise the right of each Party to determine its sustainable development policies and priorities, to establish its own levels of ...Missing: chapter | Show results with:chapter
  38. [38]
    China ratifies the two ILO Fundamental Conventions on forced labour
    Aug 12, 2022 · 29 prohibits the use of forced labour in all its forms and requires State parties to make forced labour practices punishable as a penal offence.
  39. [39]
    Ratifications of ILO conventions: Ratifications for China - NORMLEX
    Out of 28 Conventions ratified by China, of which 21 are in force, 3 Conventions have been denounced; 4 instruments abrogated; none have been ratified in the ...
  40. [40]
    https://brill.com/view/journals/jwit/23/4/article-p601_5.xml?language=en
  41. [41]
    [PDF] EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment
    Jan 22, 2021 · The text agreed upon in principle now undergoes legal scrubbing and after that will be translated into all official EU languages prior to being ...Missing: internal | Show results with:internal
  42. [42]
    [PDF] The EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment
    May 1, 2021 · On 22 January 2021, the Commission then published the dra agreement (before legal scrubbing and possible substanti- ve amendments that cannot ...Missing: translation | Show results with:translation
  43. [43]
    [PDF] The Challenges of the EU-China CAI: Analysis from a Two-Level ...
    With 13 billion EUR of investment in. China and 18 billion EUR flowing from China to the Union in 2014 (Rhodium Group, 2016), imbalanced. FDI flows ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  44. [44]
    Q&A: EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI)
    Both processes in the area of subsidies, the provisions in the CAI and the WTO reform, are complementary and mutually reinforcing.
  45. [45]
    EU-China deal can be important step to rebalance the relationship
    The agreement aims at increasing market access for investors and establishing rules that will improve the level playing field for European companies in China.
  46. [46]
    EU agrees China sanctions over Xinjiang abuses; first in ... - Reuters
    Mar 22, 2021 · My News. EU agrees China sanctions over Xinjiang abuses; first in three decades. By Reuters. March 22, 20213:50 AM PDTUpdated March 22, 2021.Missing: date | Show results with:date
  47. [47]
    China sanctions EU officials over Uyghur row – DW – 03/22/2021
    Mar 22, 2021 · China sanctions EU officials over Uyghur row. 03/22/2021 March 22, 2021. Beijing has said it will sanction several EU officials, including ...Missing: date | Show results with:date
  48. [48]
    Ministry of Foreign Affairs People's Republic of China
    Mar 22, 2021 · The European Union (EU) imposed unilateral sanctions on relevant Chinese individuals and entity on March 22, citing the so-called human rights ...
  49. [49]
    MEPs refuse any agreement with China whilst sanctions are in place
    May 20, 2021 · MEPs slam the recent Chinese sanctions against EU lawmakers and will not consider any talks on ratifying the EU-China agreement (CAI) while they remain.
  50. [50]
    EU parliament freezes China deal ratification until Beijing lifts ...
    May 21, 2021 · The European Parliament halted on Thursday ratification of a new investment pact with China until Beijing lifts sanctions on EU politicians.
  51. [51]
    Outlook for the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment ...
    Jun 24, 2021 · The deal must be approved by the European Parliament and the EU Council, which consists of all 27 heads of state, before it can become law.Missing: procedural steps
  52. [52]
    EU trade relations with China - European Union
    The deficit amounted to €305.8 billion in 2024, surpassing the €297 billion deficit of 2023, but lower than the record trade deficit of €397.3 billion reached ...
  53. [53]
    European Union Exports to China - 2025 Data 2026 Forecast 2000 ...
    European Union Exports to China was US$227.17 Billion during 2024, according to the United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade.
  54. [54]
    Europe's investment initiative with China | East Asia Forum
    Jan 24, 2021 · China agreed to open investment access to European manufacturing in electric cars, chemicals, telecoms equipment and health equipment with most ...Missing: liberalization machinery<|separator|>
  55. [55]
    [PDF] Impacts of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment
    The EU-China CAI will further strengthen regional economic integration and reshape globalisation, leading to long-term development. Stronger regional.Missing: projected gains
  56. [56]
    https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/asej.12330
  57. [57]
    EU–China relations in 2025: De-risking, rivalry, and the search for ...
    Oct 17, 2025 · The CAI was designed to open new sectors of China's economy to European investors and establish clearer rules on market access, transparency and ...
  58. [58]
    Far From Normal: An Augmented Assessment of China's State Support
    Mar 17, 2025 · OECD research covering firms in 13 sectors between 2005 and 2019 estimates that Chinese state support spending amounted to 4.5% of the revenues ...Introduction · Budgetary support · Below-market finance · Provision of goods and...
  59. [59]
    New OECD Analysis Shows Growing Role of State Enterprises in ...
    Jul 18, 2024 · That report estimated support to range between 4-7% of the annual revenue of Chinese firms, compared to support of just 0.2% of the annual ...
  60. [60]
    [PDF] Quantifying the role of state enterprises in industrial subsidies - OECD
    Jun 13, 2024 · While the finding that SEs obtain relatively more subsidies stems partly from China's larger use of government support in manufacturing and its ...
  61. [61]
    Liberalising the Chinese Market: State-Owned Enterprise ...
    Nov 4, 2022 · This article pins down one principal investment liberalisation discipline provided in the CAI – the state-owned enterprise (SOE) rule.
  62. [62]
    EU Concerns About Chinese Subsidies: What the Evidence Suggests
    OECD estimates suggest that these more indirect forms of support might be several times higher than the direct “official subsidies” (OECD, 2021).
  63. [63]
    [PDF] The state of play of industrial subsidies as of 2023 | OECD
    Jun 23, 2025 · Industrial subsidies reached in 2023 their highest level since the global financial crisis of. 2008-09, exceeding USD 108 billion in nominal ...
  64. [64]
    Poor IP protection in China causes 'irreparable harm' to EU companies
    Jan 14, 2020 · A new report by the European Commission says forcing foreign businesses to share their technologies in exchange for market access is a “systemic problem” in ...
  65. [65]
    Rethinking Technology Transfer Policy toward China - CSIS
    Nov 17, 2023 · The acquisition of technology using illicit or coercive techniques, such as requiring joint ventures or the forced transfer of IP, has been part ...
  66. [66]
    Updating the EU strategy on China: co-existence while derisking ...
    Oct 31, 2024 · ... sanctions that China announced on some MEPs and European think tanks in March 2021. Since then, relations between China and the EU have ...<|separator|>
  67. [67]
    Unpacking an empty box? - SOMO
    Jul 8, 2021 · ... concerns about human rights violations in Xinjiang and political oppression in Hong Kong. The recent tit-for-tat sanctions between the EU ...
  68. [68]
    [PDF] OHCHR Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang ...
    Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People's Republic of China. 31 August 2022. Page 2. 2. Contents. Page. I. Introduction .
  69. [69]
    China responsible for 'serious human rights violations' in Xinjiang ...
    Aug 31, 2022 · A long-awaited report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) into what China refers to as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region ( ...
  70. [70]
    https://brill.com/view/journals/jwit/23/4/article-p601_5.xml
  71. [71]
    https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=1000:11110:0::NO:11110:P11110_COUNTRY_ID:103404
  72. [72]
    CAI and sustainable development: No sure-fire success - ARTNeT
    Feb 4, 2021 · The weak enforceability of the SD Section has been criticized as a major defect of the CAI and an improper compromise the EU has made with ...Missing: labor | Show results with:labor
  73. [73]
    A New Chapter in China's Stance on Labour Protection? An ...
    This article provides an assessment of these labour provisions and examines their impact on China's national, regional, and global stances on labour protection.Missing: criticisms | Show results with:criticisms
  74. [74]
    China and Economic Engagement: Success or Failure - House.gov
    Opponents of sanctions continue to refer to China as a concrete example of how economic engagement is a superior tool for bringing about change and opening up a ...
  75. [75]
    Explaining China's approach to investor‐state dispute settlement ...
    Aug 3, 2023 · To start with, the landmark EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) concluded in December 2020 does not contain any ISDS clauses.
  76. [76]
    The EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment - EJIL: Talk!
    Feb 9, 2021 · The European Union and China had reached an agreement in principle on investment, nearly seven years after negotiations began. This was met with shock, if not ...Missing: pre- | Show results with:pre-
  77. [77]
    Judicial local protectionism in China: An empirical study of IP cases
    This study finds that in first instance cases whether the plaintiff's residence coincides with the court's location has a positive and significant impact.Missing: opacity | Show results with:opacity
  78. [78]
    Does the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) Level the ...
    Feb 1, 2022 · The Comprehensive Agreement on Investments (CAI) between the EU and China has been approved in principle since 30 December 2020. EU-China ...
  79. [79]
    [PDF] Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Reality Check
    outcomes, namely: states won 58 percent of the cases, investors won 38 percent of the cases, and settlements represented 4 percent of the final awards.2 ...
  80. [80]
    [PDF] CHINA'S ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO ...
    May 14, 2024 · ... Investment Law banning forced technology transfer and the passage of the 2022 law providing stronger intellectual property (IP) protections).
  81. [81]
    The EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investments
    Feb 25, 2021 · The CAI will promote labor rights and rights related to environmental protection by encouraging sustainable business practices.
  82. [82]
    Facts and figures on investor–State dispute settlement cases
    Nov 26, 2024 · In the past 10 years, the number of treaty-based investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) cases has more than doubled.Missing: success | Show results with:success
  83. [83]
    China's position on the reform of the investor-state dispute ...
    Sep 19, 2024 · This paper argues that China's cautious and selective engagement with ISDS reflects a preference for negotiation and local legal remedies over international ...
  84. [84]
    Pompeo calls EU-China investment deal 'weak' - RFI
    Jan 5, 2021 · "As we stared at it, it was a weak agreement. It didn't protect the European workers from the predation of the Chinese Communist Party," Pompeo ...
  85. [85]
    [PDF] EU-China trade and investment relations in challenging times
    May 25, 2020 · On 14 February 2020, the US-China Economic and Trade Agreement (ETA) entered into force. It may mark a turning point in the Sino-American trade ...
  86. [86]
    China-E.U. Talks Hit Another Snag as Biden Camp Objects
    Jan 18, 2021 · Then it hit another snag: A tweet by a top aide to Joseph R. Biden Jr. signaled that the president-elect was not happy about the deal. The pact, ...
  87. [87]
    European sovereignty without strategic autonomy - Chatham House
    Jan 19, 2021 · That EU rush to agree the CAI angered some members of the Biden team, but the reaction of many in the EU was they do not have to ask permission ...
  88. [88]
    The EU's Investment Agreement with China Is a Diplomatic ... - CSIS
    Jan 5, 2021 · While the CAI could help guide U.S. policy, there is a caveat: doing business with China requires carefully identifying how to define concrete ...
  89. [89]
    China lifts sanctions against MEPs | News - European Parliament
    Apr 30, 2025 · On 22 March 2021, China imposed sanctions on 10 EU individuals and 4 entities, including five MEPs and the European Parliament's Human Rights ...Missing: retaliatory date
  90. [90]
    China to lift sanctions on members of European Parliament | Reuters
    May 16, 2025 · China has decided to lift sanctions on members of the European Parliament as well as on its subcommittee on human rights, the parliament's ...
  91. [91]
    https://siai.org/review/2025/10/202510282230
  92. [92]
    No progress in EU-China talks as tensions mount - Brussels Signal
    Jul 25, 2025 · EU-China talks stalled this week amid growing global tensions and an unwillingness to compromise on either sides.
  93. [93]
    Diplomacy In An Age of Disruption: The EU-China Summit
    Jul 22, 2025 · China also hopes to revive the stalled ratification of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), which has remained frozen since 2020 ...
  94. [94]
    No interest in reviving CAI, says EU Delegation in Beijing
    The European Union has “no intention” of trying to revive the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), according to Marjut Hannonen, head of trade for ...Missing: statements | Show results with:statements
  95. [95]
    Beijing offers to lift sanctions on MEPs, hoping to revive EU-China ...
    Apr 24, 2025 · The political dispute dates back to March 2021, when the 27 member states agreed to sanction four Chinese officials and one entity accused of ...
  96. [96]
    EU, China: Beijing Ready to Lift Sanctions on European Lawmakers ...
    Apr 24, 2025 · China is preparing to lift sanctions on European Parliament lawmakers in an effort to revive its stalled Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) with the ...
  97. [97]
    EU pivots trade ties to Asia in the face of U.S. protectionism
    Apr 25, 2025 · In 2023, the total value of goods traded between the EU and India reached 124 billion euros, making India the EU's ninth-largest trading partner ...
  98. [98]
    MERICS Forum: Engaging in times of tension - Views from Europe ...
    Jul 23, 2025 · A pragmatic deal on EVs could also serve as a template for a more-nuanced, sector-by -sector negotiation between China and the EU. While the CAI ...
  99. [99]
    China in Europe: April 2025 - Council on Foreign Relations
    Investment Agreement: The initial exchange of sanctions between China and the EU over Xinjiang in 2021 derailed the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) ...