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Dan Halutz

Dan Halutz (born August 7, 1948) is a retired lieutenant general and former of the (IDF), serving in that role from June 2005 to January 2007. A career officer in the (IAF), Halutz enlisted in the IDF in November 1966, completed pilot training in 1968, and flew in conflicts including the and . He commanded the IAF from 2000 to 2004 before becoming the officer appointed to the IDF's top position. Halutz's tenure as oversaw the IDF's execution of the 2006 Second Lebanon War against , a 34-day conflict initiated after the group's cross-border raid and kidnapping of soldiers. The campaign, which emphasized air power and limited ground operations, failed to achieve decisive objectives such as the return of captives or destruction of Hezbollah's capabilities, resulting in significant casualties and an inconclusive ceasefire. Subsequent investigations, notably the Winograd Commission, attributed shortcomings to inadequate preparation, flawed strategic planning, and overreliance on aerial bombardment without sufficient ground follow-through under Halutz's leadership. In January 2007, Halutz resigned, stating he bore responsibility for the war's operational deficiencies as confirmed by internal IDF inquiries and the ongoing Winograd probe, amid public and political pressure for accountability. His departure marked the first time an IDF stepped down explicitly due to wartime performance issues, highlighting systemic challenges in adapting to asymmetric threats from non-state actors like . Post-retirement, Halutz has engaged in business and public commentary on security matters.

Early Life and Education

Family Background and Upbringing

Dan Halutz was born on August 7, 1948, in Tel Aviv, Israel, mere months after the state's declaration of independence. His parents were Jewish immigrants from Middle Eastern communities; his father hailed from Iran, having arrived in the region as a child, while his mother originated from Iraq. These familial roots reflected the broader wave of Mizrahi Jewish migration to the nascent state, contributing to its diverse demographic fabric amid post-independence challenges. Halutz spent much of his formative years in Moshav Hagor, a cooperative agricultural settlement in Israel's , after his family relocated there from . This rural upbringing in a —characterized by and community self-reliance—instilled early exposure to agricultural labor and communal living typical of Israel's pioneering ethos in the 1950s and 1960s. By age 18, in 1966, he enlisted in the , marking the transition from civilian youth to military service.

Military Training and Initial Qualifications

Dan Halutz enlisted in the (IDF) in November 1966 at the age of 18, joining as a in the (IAF) flight school. His initial military training commenced amid heightened regional tensions, coinciding with the lead-up to the in June 1967, during which he remained in the preparatory phases of pilot instruction without operational involvement. The IAF's pilot training program at the time emphasized rigorous selection, ground school fundamentals in and , and progressive flight instruction on basic trainers before advancing to simulations. Halutz completed the demanding flight school curriculum, which included operational training on advanced jet fighters, graduating in July 1968 as a qualified with the rank of . This qualification marked his initial certification for aviation roles, enabling assignment to frontline squadrons. Following graduation, he underwent further specialization, joining the IAF's inaugural F-4 Phantom squadron in 1969 after completing an operational training course tailored to the aircraft's capabilities, including air-to-air and maneuvers. These qualifications positioned him for active service in the , where he logged sorties in the Phantom, demonstrating early proficiency in high-risk aerial operations.

Military Career

Early Service as Pilot

Dan Halutz enlisted in the in November 1966 as a in the flight school. He completed pilot training and graduated in July 1968 as a , receiving the rank of . Following graduation, Halutz underwent advanced training before being assigned to operational squadrons. In 1969, he joined the 's inaugural F-4 Phantom squadron, marking his entry into aviation with one of the most advanced jets in the service's inventory at the time. During the (1967–1970), Halutz conducted approximately 40 operational sorties in the F-4 Phantom, engaging in missions against Egyptian military targets along the front. These flights involved air superiority operations, ground attack runs, and , contributing to Israel's efforts to counter barrages and incursions from Egyptian forces. His early combat experience in this conflict honed his skills as a amid intense aerial engagements and threats.

Rise Through Air Force Ranks

Halutz enlisted in the in November 1966 as a in the flight school, graduating in July 1968 as a and qualifying as a . He was initially assigned to the "Mister 4" before transferring to the "Vutour" squadron, and in 1969 joined the IDF's inaugural squadron, where he accumulated 40 operational sorties during the . During the in 1973, Halutz flew 43 combat missions and achieved three confirmed aerial victories against enemy aircraft. In 1982, Halutz returned to and transitioned to flying F-16 aircraft. By 1984, he had advanced to command a , followed by roles as head of an operational unit in the Lavi fighter project in 1986 and head of the IAF's Operational Requirements Department in 1988. Halutz's command responsibilities expanded in 1991 when he became wing commander and was appointed commander of . In August 1993, he was promoted to and named head of the IAF Air Division. By 1995, he served as Head of Staff of the IAF, overseeing headquarters operations. Promoted to in 1998, Halutz took on broader responsibilities, including assistant to the Deputy Chief of General Staff and, in June 1999, Director of Operations (J-3) in the General Staff. In April 2000, he was appointed Commander of the , a position he held until 2004, marking the culmination of his rise through IAF ranks as its fourteenth .

Key Commands and Operational Roles

Halutz commanded a squadron in 1984. In 1991, he was appointed commander of , overseeing operations at one of the Israeli 's key facilities. Promoted to in 1993, Halutz took on the role of head of headquarters in 1995, managing strategic planning and administrative functions for the branch. By 1998, he had advanced to and, in 1999, assumed leadership of the Operations Wing in the General Staff, coordinating joint air-ground operations and intelligence integration. From 2000 to 2004, Halutz served as commander of the , during which he directed the acquisition of advanced F-15E and F-16 fighter jets and expanded the use of unmanned aerial vehicles for and strike missions. These roles emphasized his focus on air superiority, precision targeting, and technological modernization within the IDF's operational framework.

Operations During the Second Intifada

Implementation of Targeted Killings

As commander of the from April 2000 to March 2004, Dan Halutz directed the aerial execution of targeted killings against Palestinian militants during the Second Intifada, primarily using helicopter gunships armed with missiles and F-16 fighter jets deploying precision-guided bombs. These operations relied on real-time intelligence from the and , with strike approvals requiring sign-off from senior and political , including the security cabinet, to prioritize air-delivered munitions over ground raids to reduce troop exposure. Halutz emphasized the policy's role in disrupting terrorist infrastructure, stating in June 2003 that it achieved an 85% success rate in eliminating intended targets while minimizing broader escalation. Implementation involved layered targeting processes: initial surveillance via unmanned aerial vehicles like the Heron drone for confirmation of target presence, followed by rapid strikes to exploit brief windows of vulnerability, often in urban areas of the and . Between November 2000 and April 2003, the conducted 175 such operations under Halutz's oversight, resulting in 235 deaths and 310 injuries, though only 156 of the fatalities were the designated targets, with the remainder comprising bystanders or unintended victims. A prominent example was the July 22, 2002, strike on military chief Salah Shehadeh in , where Halutz authorized a one-ton despite indicating presence in the building; Shehadeh was killed, but 14 s, including nine children, also died, prompting internal review and external criticism for disproportionate . Halutz later testified that the operation would have been aborted had the full toll been foreseen, underscoring operational trade-offs between precision and risk. The strategy faced internal dissent, notably in September 2003 when 27 reserve pilots, including former squadron commander , publicly refused participation in missions they deemed morally compromising or ineffective at curbing bombings. Halutz defended the program's efficacy, arguing it prevented attacks by decapitating command structures—such as the elimination of over 100 mid-level operatives—and rejected ethical qualms, famously responding to a query on pilot by equating a bomb's impact to "a bump on the wing" that fades quickly. Post-operation analyses, including those by the , affirmed that targeted killings contributed to a decline in Palestinian bombings from 2002 onward, though critics, including groups, contended the policy violated by constituting extrajudicial executions without . Halutz maintained that such actions were lawful against combatants embedded in civilian areas, a position later upheld in principle by Israel's in 2006, albeit with caveats on .

Strategic Rationale and Outcomes

As commander of the from 2000 to 2005, Dan Halutz directed the implementation of targeted killings against Palestinian militants during the Second Intifada, emphasizing precision airstrikes to disrupt terrorist infrastructure with minimal ground troop exposure. The strategic rationale centered on preempting imminent attacks by eliminating operational planners, bomb makers, and mid-level commanders, thereby fracturing command chains and reducing the Palestinian militant groups' capacity to execute suicide bombings and shootings, which had peaked at over 130 fatalities in in March 2002 alone. Halutz argued that air-delivered munitions, guided by real-time intelligence from the and , enabled rapid response times—often within hours of threat identification—while avoiding the higher casualties associated with broader incursions, aligning with a of "effects-based operations" that prioritized measurable degradation of enemy capabilities over territorial control. This approach yielded a reported success rate of approximately 90% in neutralizing intended targets, with the conducting over 200 such operations between 2000 and 2005, often using helicopter-fired missiles or drone-launched strikes to limit compared to earlier methods like car bombs. Empirical analyses indicate these killings correlated with a significant decline in Palestinian attacks, dropping from 47 in 2002 to 15 by 2005, as the removal of key figures like bomb experts disrupted logistics and recruitment pipelines; econometric studies using event-study methods, including Israeli reactions to announcements, further support that targeted killings reduced subsequent terror incidents by deterring potential attackers and sowing internal distrust within groups like and Islamic . However, outcomes included unintended civilian deaths in roughly 40-50% of strikes, with estimates of 200-300 non-combatants killed overall, exemplified by the July 2002 bombing of leader Salah Shehadeh, which also killed 14 civilians including children, prompting internal debates on . Halutz defended the policy's net efficacy, stating it "proved extremely effective in curbing terror," though critics, including some Israeli security analysts, contended that while short-term disruptions occurred, the killings sometimes accelerated and leadership succession, as seen in 's organizational resilience post-strikes. Despite these trade-offs, the strategy contributed to a broader framework that, combined with the security barrier erected from 2002 onward, halved Israeli civilian fatalities from peaks by 2005.

Tenure as Chief of the General Staff

Appointment and Air Force Integration Priorities

Dan Halutz was appointed as the 18th of the on June 1, 2005, succeeding Lieutenant General in a presided over by . This marked the first time an officer from the ascended to the position, reflecting a shift from the traditional dominance of ground forces commanders in IDF leadership. Halutz, aged 56 at the time, brought extensive experience from his prior roles as commander (2000–2004) and deputy . Upon assuming command, Halutz prioritized enhancing the integration of capabilities into the broader operational framework, aiming to leverage technological superiority and precision strikes to complement ground operations. He advocated for reforms including tighter cooperation between the Air Force and ground forces, expanded use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for intelligence and strikes, and upgrades to intelligence-gathering systems to enable more synchronized multi-domain operations. These efforts sought to address perceived gaps in joint operations exposed during the , where targeted killings had demonstrated air power's efficacy but highlighted needs for better inter-branch coordination. A core element of Halutz's integration strategy was the adoption of and Effects-Based Operations (EBO) doctrines, formalized in the IDF's operational concept document signed by Halutz in April 2006. emphasized holistic, network-centric approaches to disrupt enemy systems through targeted effects, predominantly via air-delivered precision munitions, rather than linear . EBO focused on achieving strategic outcomes by sequencing air and operations to generate cascading effects on adversary capabilities, intending to integrate assets as the vanguard of campaigns while minimizing ground force exposure. Halutz also initiated structural changes, such as reorganizing the Ground Forces Command to parallel the 's command structure, promoting parity and interoperability across branches. These priorities reflected his vision of a modernized where air power served as a force multiplier, though subsequent evaluations, including post-2006 analyses, critiqued EBO's overreliance on air effects in hybrid threats.

Conduct of the Second Lebanon War

Dan Halutz, serving as , initiated the IDF's response to Hezbollah's , 2006, cross-border raid—which killed three soldiers and abducted two—through an intensive air campaign aimed at crippling the group's military infrastructure, command centers, and rocket-launching capabilities. This strategy reflected Halutz's background as a former commander and his prior advocacy for air power's decisive role in asymmetric conflicts, including during the . The conducted thousands of sorties, striking over 2,500 targets in the opening days alone, including Hezbollah strongholds, bridges, airports, and fuel depots, with the intent to pressure ’s government and into releasing the captives while deterring future attacks. Halutz prioritized air-centric operations, resisting early large-scale ground incursions in favor of aerial strikes and limited raids, under the assumption that Hezbollah's fire—initially averaging 100 per day—could be suppressed without committing substantial s. This approach achieved tactical successes, such as degrading approximately half of Hezbollah's medium- and long-range arsenal and disrupting its logistics, but proved insufficient against the group's short-range rockets, which were often launched from concealed positions in areas and continued to number over 4,000 launches throughout the 34-day . Mid-war, on August 7, Halutz dismissed Northern Command head amid disagreements over operational tempo and deployment, reflecting internal tensions over the strategy's efficacy. The Winograd Commission, in its preliminary report released April 30, 2007, issued severe findings against Halutz, attributing primary responsibility for the war's flawed execution to his impulsive initial response without a comprehensive plan, failure to adequately warn political leaders of the IDF's unpreparedness for sustained ground operations, and over-reliance on air power despite evident limitations in countering Hezbollah's guerrilla tactics. The commission highlighted Halutz's "flaws in professionalism, responsibility, and judgment," noting he did not adapt operations to realistic assessments or challenge unrealistic assumptions, such as the feasibility of achieving strategic goals through air dominance alone. While some analyses, including a study, contend that air operations were not inherently failures but constrained by broader strategic decisions and Hezbollah's resilience, the overall campaign fell short of decisive victory, culminating in UN Security Council Resolution 1701 on August 14, 2006, without the abducted soldiers' release. Halutz resigned on , 2007, citing personal responsibility for the war's shortcomings, though he later defended the campaign's justification in a 2009 interview, arguing it addressed existential threats despite operational challenges. The underscored tensions between air power's utility in high-intensity phases and its constraints against entrenched non-state actors prepared for prolonged attrition.

Air-Centric Strategy and Tactical Decisions

Halutz, the first officer to serve as , shaped the initial response to Hezbollah's , 2006, cross-border and kidnapping of two soldiers through an air-centric approach rooted in effects-based operations and precision standoff strikes. This doctrine, influenced by post-1991 lessons and shifts under predecessors like , prioritized technological superiority and minimal ground exposure to reduce casualties while degrading enemy capabilities. Halutz advocated for air power's coercive potential against non-state actors like , though he acknowledged its limitations, stating that "an cannot stick the flag on the hilltop." The strategy launched Operation Change of Direction, focusing on air and barrages to dismantle Hezbollah's rocket infrastructure, command nodes, and support networks without immediate large-scale ground commitment. Tactically, the executed rapid, intelligence-driven strikes beginning July 13, with the IAF conducting dozens of sorties using F-15I and F-16I aircraft to target long-range and storage sites first, followed by broader infrastructure like Beirut's , bridges, and depots to exert economic and political pressure on and . Over the war's 34 days, the IAF flew thousands of sorties—estimated at over 2,500 —destroying an assessed 50-60% of Hezbollah's medium- and long-range arsenal, while and multiple-launch systems fired approximately 173,000 rounds. These operations secured uncontested air superiority from the outset, enabling persistent and precision attacks, but prioritized visible, high-value targets over the dispersed, short-range concealed in southern Lebanese villages and terrain. Halutz's decisions delayed a major ground incursion until , opting for limited raids initially to test Hezbollah's defenses and preserve ground forces for potential escalation, amid political directives from Olmert and Defense Minister Peretz to avoid a full invasion's risks. This air-dominant phase failed to suppress Hezbollah's barrages, which fired over 720 rockets in the first week alone and totaled around 4,000 by , exposing northern Israeli communities to sustained attacks due to the militants' adaptive tactics of mobility, underground storage, and human shielding. Critics, including later Winograd Commission analyses, attributed shortcomings not to air power's inherent flaws but to strategic over-optimism in air-only coercion against a resilient foe, inadequate ground force readiness after years of focus, and insufficient of air-ground maneuvers from the war's start. Halutz maintained the approach justified initial degradation of Hezbollah's capabilities, though it prolonged the conflict and necessitated a rushed ground expansion that incurred 119 fatalities.

Ground Operations and Hezbollah Rocket Suppression Efforts

As Chief of the General Staff, Dan Halutz oversaw the initiation of ground operations in on August 1, 2006, after weeks of predominantly air-centric campaigns that failed to decisively degrade 's capabilities. The operation involved multiple divisions, including the 36th and 91st, advancing to seize territory up to the , aiming to dismantle 's rocket launch sites and infrastructure embedded in villages and hills. However, Halutz had earlier resisted broader ground incursions, favoring limited incursions by even as political leaders pushed for actions against the rocket threat, reflecting his background and emphasis on precision strikes over . Mid-war, on August 7, 2006, Halutz dismissed Northern Command head due to dissatisfaction with ground command performance amid ambushes and anti-tank missile attacks that inflicted heavy casualties, including the loss of over 20 tanks. Efforts to suppress Hezbollah's rocket fire, which totaled approximately 4,000 launches into northern during the 34-day conflict, integrated ground advances with artillery barrages, raids, and air support to target mobile launchers and storage sites. These operations sought to create a by clearing Hezbollah positions, but faced challenges from the group's pre-positioned munitions, tunnel networks, and guerrilla tactics, resulting in only partial suppression—daily rocket salvos continued unabated until the on August 14, 2006. The Winograd Commission later critiqued the ground campaign's execution, noting inadequate preparation, unrealistic objectives, and a failure to adapt from initial air-focused plans, which contributed to 121 soldier deaths and limited strategic gains against rocket threats. Halutz's strategic preference for minimizing ground exposure, articulated in pre-invasion statements advocating "limited ground operations," underscored a doctrinal shift toward air dominance that proved insufficient for territorial control needed for sustained rocket interdiction.

Post-War Investigations and Accountability

Following the cessation of hostilities in the Second Lebanon War on August 14, 2006, the (IDF) launched over 100 internal investigations into operational aspects of the conflict, examining issues such as intelligence failures, logistical shortcomings, and tactical decisions that allowed to sustain fire into northern throughout the 34-day campaign. These probes, completed by early January 2007, highlighted systemic unpreparedness, including inadequate training for ground forces and over-optimism regarding air power's ability to degrade 's capabilities without a robust . Dan Halutz, serving as , bore primary responsibility for these institutional lapses, as the inquiries criticized the General Staff's failure to adapt doctrines to 's asymmetric tactics post-2000 withdrawal from . Public and political pressure mounted amid revelations of these deficiencies, with widespread and parliamentary scrutiny portraying the as a strategic setback that failed to neutralize Hezbollah's arsenal or secure the abducted soldiers' release on favorable terms. Halutz defended the military's performance but acknowledged in internal statements the need for , stating that the concept of required him to step aside once probes concluded. On January 17, 2007, he submitted his resignation, becoming the highest-ranking officer to do so over the war's conduct; in his letter, he cited personal for outcomes, though critics argued it came only after sustained demands rather than proactive reform. This move did not quell broader demands for oversight, prompting the government to establish the Winograd Commission on September 17, 2006, for an independent review of decision-making from preparation through initial phases. The investigations underscored causal links between pre-war complacency—exacerbated by years of focus in the Palestinian territories—and operational surprises, such as Hezbollah's fortified border positions and resilient command structure, which air strikes alone could not dismantle. While Halutz's tenure emphasized technological superiority and rapid effects, the probes revealed insufficient emphasis on integration, contributing to higher-than-expected casualties (121 soldiers killed) and civilian disruptions from over 4,000 rockets. These findings informed subsequent military reforms but also fueled debates on leadership accountability, with Halutz's exit marking a rare instance of top-level concession without criminal charges.

Winograd Commission Findings

The Winograd Commission, a state inquiry appointed on September 17, 2006, by Prime Minister to examine the political and military handling of the Second Lebanon War, released its interim report on April 30, 2007, which sharply faulted Dan Halutz for leadership shortcomings. The report determined that Halutz displayed "flaws in professionalism, responsibility, and judgment," particularly in impulsively endorsing an immediate, intensive air campaign without a comprehensive operational plan or realistic assessment of Hezbollah's resilience. It emphasized that Halutz's decisions contributed to inadequate preparedness for sustained ground operations, resulting in the IDF's failure to suppress rocket fire effectively or dismantle Hezbollah's infrastructure within the war's initial phases. The commission further criticized Halutz for fostering a military culture that marginalized dissenting strategic views, including reservations about over-reliance on air power, and for leveraging Defense Minister Amir Peretz's limited defense expertise to prioritize an air-centric approach over balanced force integration. Halutz's testimony acknowledged the war's protracted duration as the primary operational failure, attributing it to insufficient pre-war training and mobilization for large-scale ground maneuvers, though the report deemed these admissions insufficient to mitigate broader systemic lapses under his command. These findings underscored a disconnect between Halutz's pre-war confidence in IDF capabilities—rooted in his background—and the actual execution, where optimistic projections of quick victory via precision strikes proved unfounded against Hezbollah's fortified positions. The final report, issued on January 30, 2008, reinforced the interim conclusions by attributing to Halutz partial responsibility for the war's inconclusive outcome, including the absence of clear military objectives and poor inter-branch coordination, while noting that political leaders shared ultimate accountability but military execution bore direct operational weight. Despite these rebukes, the commission stopped short of recommending criminal probes against Halutz, focusing instead on institutional reforms to address the evident gaps in strategic foresight and adaptability revealed during the 34-day conflict.

Resignation Amid Leadership Challenges

Lieutenant General Dan Halutz submitted his resignation as on January 16, 2007, explicitly assuming responsibility for the military's perceived failures during the 2006 Second Lebanon War, which included inadequate preparation, prolonged Hezbollah rocket fire into northern , and the incomplete achievement of strategic objectives such as dismantling Hezbollah's . The decision came amid escalating internal and public pressure, with over 200 reserve officers publishing an in December 2006 demanding accountability from top commanders for operational deficiencies, including delayed ground maneuvers and overreliance on air power that failed to neutralize threats decisively. Halutz had maintained that he would step down only if instructed by political superiors or the ongoing Winograd into the war's handling, yet intensifying media scrutiny, protests by affected families, and eroding confidence within ranks—exacerbated by prior resignations of northern and ground forces commanders—rendered his position untenable before the commission's interim findings. His tenure, marked by advocacy for air-centric warfare rooted in his background, faced retrospective blame for insufficient adaptation to Hezbollah's asymmetric tactics, though Halutz defended the strategy as aligned with available intelligence and political directives at the time. The , the third by a senior general post-war, underscored broader leadership accountability demands but did not quell calls for political resignations, as and others retained positions pending the Winograd report released on April 30, 2007, which later faulted Halutz personally for "impulsive" decision-making, professional lapses, and inadequate to political leaders. Halutz's exit facilitated a transition to , amid vows to restore operational readiness and address institutional shortcomings exposed by the 34-day conflict.

Financial and Ethical Controversies

Investment Portfolio During Wartime

On July 12, 2006, approximately three hours after militants abducted two () soldiers across the Lebanese border—sparking the Second Lebanon War— Chief of Staff Dan Halutz instructed his bank to liquidate his entire investment portfolio valued at NIS 120,000 (approximately $27,000 USD). The portfolio primarily comprised units in mutual funds, and the transaction occurred amid initial high-level discussions on Israel's military response, though Halutz maintained it was a pre-planned unrelated to the unfolding crisis. Halutz acknowledged the sale but emphasized that it resulted in a personal loss of 25,000, attributing the decision to routine rather than anticipation of market downturns tied to the conflict. He rejected suggestions of impropriety, describing media disclosures as a "cynical" and "" assault on his , and legal experts concurred that the action violated no laws or regulations on conflicts of interest. Despite this, the timing fueled widespread public and political outrage in , with critics questioning whether Halutz prioritized personal finances over wartime command responsibilities during a period of national emergency. Knesset members from multiple parties demanded investigations into potential ethical lapses, viewing the episode as emblematic of broader leadership failures amid the war's early chaos, though no formal probes substantiated or misconduct. The controversy amplified scrutiny on Halutz's judgment, contributing to calls for his even as he insisted the predated awareness of escalation to full-scale war. Subsequent analyses noted that markets initially dipped post-abduction but recovered variably, underscoring that Halutz's sale did not yield profits but nonetheless eroded trust in his focus during the conflict's onset.

Public Statements on Military Ethics

In a briefing on April 6, 2002, as commander, Halutz asserted that "The is keeping the highest combat ethics comparing to any force in the world," emphasizing the military's adherence to moral standards amid operations in the and . This statement reflected his broader defense of aerial targeting practices, which he framed as precise and ethically superior to alternatives, despite criticisms of in operations like targeted killings. A pivotal controversy arose following the July 22, 2002, airstrike in ordered by Halutz, which killed military leader Salah Shehadeh along with 14 , including nine children, in a residential building. When questioned by a on his emotional response, Halutz replied, "What did I felt after dropping the bomb? I felt a slight impact on the plane's wing," a remark interpreted by critics as indicative of from deaths. The statement, reported in Israeli media, prompted public petitions and a petition by groups, leading the court on November 21, 2004, to order Halutz to submit his personal "code of ethics" within 14 days to justify the operation's . In an August 21, 2002, interview, Halutz elaborated on the ethics of precision-guided munitions, rejecting the notion of "pure" weapons by stating, "Weapons are not pure. They are not intended to be pure," and arguing that moral judgments should focus on operational necessity rather than idealized purity in warfare tools. He maintained that such strikes minimized broader harm compared to ground alternatives, though detractors, including ethicists and activists, contended this downplayed accountability for unintended casualties. Halutz reiterated his ethical stance amid the 2006 stock options scandal during the Second Lebanon War, declaring on August 16, 2006, "On the question of my , I am prepared to compete against anyone," positioning personal integrity as aligned with military duty despite allegations of conflicts of interest. Following the Winograd Commission's partial report on April 30, , he affirmed, "I was right in bearing the and significance of my acts," rejecting claims of evading for wartime decisions. These statements underscored his view of command as rooted in and operational , though they fueled debates on whether aerial strategies prioritized over humanitarian .

Post-Military Activities

Entry into Politics

Following his resignation as IDF Chief of Staff on January 17, 2007, Dan Halutz initially focused on activities but began signaling interest in by mid-2010. In a June 26, 2010, speech at a cultural event in , Halutz affirmed his intent to enter , stating he was meeting with politicians to explore options and addressing questions on and governance. Halutz formally entered Israeli politics on February 12, 2010, by registering as a member of the centrist party, which had been founded by in 2005 as a breakaway from emphasizing pragmatic security policies. He reaffirmed this commitment on December 2, 2010, officially joining under leader , positioning himself as a candidate for a spot amid the party's internal dynamics. Halutz expressed alignment with 's center-right orientation, drawing on his military experience to advocate for strong defense alongside political moderation, though he did not immediately secure a prominent leadership role. His political debut reflected a pattern among retired generals entering civilian roles to influence policy, but Halutz's tenure in was short-lived, ending in July 2012 due to disagreements over exemptions for ultra-Orthodox Jews and party leadership under . Despite this, his 2010 entry marked his initial foray into electoral politics, leveraging his background in command and wartime leadership to critique governance failures.

Public Advocacy and Criticisms of Government Policy

Following his retirement from the in , Dan Halutz emerged as a vocal critic of Israeli government policies, particularly under Prime Minister , focusing on threats to democratic institutions and security leadership failures. In December 2022, Halutz joined over 1,000 former officers in a public letter to top jurists, including Chief Justice , warning that 's incoming coalition—comprising parties such as , , and ultra-Orthodox factions—would "destroy" Israel's democracy through proposed legal reforms, including allowing the to override rulings, and positioning the as the "last line of defense" against such changes. Halutz's criticisms intensified amid the 2023 judicial overhaul protests, where he described the efforts as Israel's "second war of independence" and led street demonstrations in . On March 4, 2023, during an interview at a live event in , he declared Netanyahu "no longer an Israeli patriot," citing a 1999 recording of stating "the country can burn" as evidence of aligned behavior, and likened the prime minister's evolving stance to Adolf Hitler's early 1920 remarks that later revealed authoritarian intent; he also labeled Justice Minister "a robot" devoid of ideas and accused ministers like of abandoning principles for political gain. Netanyahu's party responded by accusing Halutz of incitement, demanding a police investigation and rejecting the Hitler comparison as inflammatory. In the security domain, Halutz has faulted Netanyahu's leadership for prioritizing personal political survival over national defense, particularly regarding the , 2023, attacks. In a , 2024, interview on Channel 13, he stated that Netanyahu "refuses to acknowledge this because in his calendar, there is no 7 October," accused him of leading "from bad to worse" rather than fighting effectively, and argued that no world leader would remain in office after such a failure without resigning, urging early elections. Halutz expressed broader disappointment in the government's direction, criticizing it for reactive retaliation over strategic foresight in conflicts. He has also voiced disgust at rising extremism within the and described West Bank settlers as "the epitome of anti-Israeliness," linking such elements to policy missteps undermining national cohesion. Halutz's advocacy extended to direct action in anti-government protests from 2023 to 2025, including blocking roads in Caesarea, where on September 22, 2024, police forcibly removed him and other retired IDF officers during a demonstration against Netanyahu's policies. At an October 6, 2024, rally in the same location, he proclaimed, "The muses must shout out," signaling urgent civic resistance. By August 2025, he participated in a rally by 200 retired and reserve Air Force pilots near IDF headquarters protesting the Gaza war's prolongation under Netanyahu, reflecting eroding reservist confidence in the government's motives and strategic handling of the conflict. In a late October 2024 interview, Halutz warned that Netanyahu's potential re-election would force many citizens to contemplate emigration, framing it as an existential choice amid ongoing policy failures.

Positions on Security and Political Leadership

Halutz has repeatedly criticized Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's leadership as detrimental to Israel's stability, stating in March 2024 that Netanyahu is steering the country "from bad to worse" amid ongoing political and security challenges. In April 2025, he escalated his rhetoric by describing Netanyahu as "an enemy that poses a direct threat" to national security, asserting that the prime minister should be imprisoned due to policies perceived as undermining the state's foundations. Halutz attributes much of Israel's internal discord to Netanyahu's governance, warning that his re-election would compel citizens to make profound decisions about the nation's future, potentially fracturing societal cohesion essential for effective leadership. On security policy, Halutz maintains that the Israel Defense Forces possess the capability to secure any border delineated by civilian authorities, rejecting emphasis on "defensible borders" as misaligned with modern warfare dynamics where technology and mobility supersede static territorial control. He has voiced alarm over internal threats, cautioning in October 2022 that National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir's "horrible ideas"—rooted in his history of incitement and extremism—could precipitate civil war if enacted, thereby eroding the domestic unity required for external defense. Halutz further condemns settlement expansion in the West Bank, labeling settlers the "epitome of anti-Israeliness" for fostering divisions that compromise broader security objectives. In advocating for political reform, Halutz supports sustained public protest against perceived failures, including during wartime, arguing that silencing when "cannons roar" stifles necessary for strategic renewal. While praising the IDF's enduring morality amid the conflict, he expresses disgust at rising within ranks, which he links to politicized eroding institutional integrity. Halutz critiques opposition figures for inadequate resolve, urging a unified push for elections to install leaders capable of reconciling security imperatives with democratic governance.

Involvement in Anti-Government Protests (2023–2025)

In early 2023, Halutz participated in demonstrations opposing the 's judicial overhaul , speaking at rallies to criticize the reforms' potential impact on and . On February 11, 2023, he addressed protesters in , stating that many Israelis would refuse reserve duty under a perceived as undermining democratic institutions. On April 15, 2023, during the 15th week of nationwide protests, Halutz urged opposition leaders to abandon negotiations with the coalition, arguing that concessions would legitimize the overhaul's erosion of . Halutz's activism intensified following the October 7, 2023, attacks and the ensuing , shifting focus to protests against Benjamin Netanyahu's leadership and war management. On April 20, 2024, he spoke at an anti-government march in , decrying governmental failures in security and governance. By September 22, 2024, Halutz joined retired officers in blocking the road to Netanyahu's residence, leading to his forcible removal by police alongside demonstrators including Brig.-Gen. Amir Haskel. In 2025, amid prolonged operations, Halutz escalated his public opposition, aligning with military veterans protesting the war's conduct. On August 12, 2025, he addressed a of approximately 200 retired and reserve pilots outside headquarters in , declaring, "Enough! Stop this unnecessary war of folly," and urging Commander to resist political pressures prolonging the conflict. Two days later, on August 14, 2025, he participated in a larger gathering of hundreds of retired officers protesting casualties and strategic , framing the demonstrations as a call to end operations perceived as politically motivated rather than militarily necessary. Halutz's actions drew accusations from government supporters of undermining national unity during wartime, though he maintained they stemmed from ethical concerns over leadership accountability.

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