Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Jack-in-the-box effect

The jack-in-the-box effect describes a mode in certain turreted armored vehicles, most notably Soviet- and Russian-designed main battle tanks such as the and series, where an internal detonation of stored propels the skyward following a penetrating hit. This occurs due to the design's reliance on a carousel positioned directly beneath the , which houses up to 28 ready-to-fire rounds in a confined, unarmored or lightly protected space vulnerable to , heat, or shockwave propagation from external impacts. The resulting of propelling charges generates explosive overpressure exceeding the 's retention strength, ejecting it dozens of meters while often condemning the crew to near-certain fatality. Unlike Western tanks, which segregate in isolated compartments with blow-out panels to vent blasts externally, this layout prioritizes a lower and faster reload at the cost of heightened risk under combat damage. Observed empirically through open-source video footage and wreckage analysis, the effect gained prominence during the 2022 , where anti-tank guided missiles and drones frequently triggered it against T-72B3 and T-90M variants, contributing to high loss rates documented by visual confirmation databases. This vulnerability underscores causal trade-offs in tank engineering: compact integration enables a three-person but amplifies secondary , a flaw unmitigated in upgrades despite known exploits from prior conflicts like the . While remedial measures like reduced loads or supplemental storage have been proposed, persistent observations indicate incomplete adoption, rendering affected designs susceptible to precision strikes exploiting this deterministic failure pathway.

Overview

Definition and Mechanism

The jack-in-the-box effect describes a in turreted armored vehicles, such as tanks, where an internal ammunition generates explosive that ejects the violently from the hull, often propelling it several meters into the air. This phenomenon, also termed "turret toss," typically follows a penetrating hit that ignites stored charges, leading to a of multiple rounds and rendering the vehicle a while posing extreme risk to the crew. The mechanism originates from ammunition storage configurations lacking compartmentalization or blow-out panels to direct blast energies outward. In affected designs, ready-use rounds—comprising up to 28 projectiles and charges—are held in an carousel directly beneath the basket, integrated into the fighting compartment without physical separation from the . Upon penetration by anti-tank munitions like shaped-charge warheads, fragments or can detonate the exposed propellants, initiating a rapid deflagration-to-detonation transition. The confined volume traps expanding gases, exceeding the structural limits of the ring—the weakest seam—causing the 10- to 20-ton to separate and launch upward, often with lethal fragmentation to nearby personnel. This effect is exacerbated in Soviet-era and derivative tanks, such as the and series, where design priorities for compactness and autoloading prioritized internal space efficiency over crew survivability features present in contemporary Western counterparts, like isolated rear-stowed ammunition with venting panels. While not exclusive to these platforms—any turreted vehicle with vulnerable ammo storage can exhibit similar failures—the prevalence correlates with the absence of mitigation measures, as evidenced by footage from conflicts showing consistent turret ejections in impacted vehicles.

Historical Origins

The jack-in-the-box effect originated in Soviet design innovations during the , stemming from the prioritization of compact vehicle profiles, reduced sizes, and rapid firing rates over compartmentalized ammunition storage. Post-World War II evaluations of combat revealed the advantages of sloped armor and mobility, but Soviet planners aimed to further minimize silhouette and production complexity to enable mass deployment. This led to the elimination of the traditional four-man by automating loading, with the carousel autoloader emerging as the solution; it positioned ready-to-fire rounds in a rotating tray under the basket, integrated into the crew compartment for immediate access. The , prototyped in the late 1950s and entering Soviet service in 1966, marked the first operational implementation of this system, holding about 28 main gun rounds in the exposed alongside manual stowage for additional . Penetration of the ring or could ignite propellants in this unarmored, unvented arrangement, generating that exploited the 's ring as a weak seam, propelling it upward like a while destroying the interior. This vulnerability arose from doctrinal trade-offs favoring offensive tempo—enabling reloads in 7-10 seconds versus 15+ for manual systems—against that isolated ammo in hull rear bins with blow-out panels. Subsequent designs refined but perpetuated the flaw: the , simplified for export and mass production starting in 1971, retained a similar carousel holding 22 rounds, with the rest in less protected hull niches, amplifying detonation risks under modern shaped-charge threats. Earlier Soviet tanks, like the T-54/55 series produced from 1946, relied on manual loading with ammo distributed in fender bins and racks, prone to but rarely producing the isolated ejection due to absent concentration. The effect's prevalence awaited shaped-charge warheads in the 1960s-1970s, though Soviet testing likely identified it internally, as evidenced by persistent design inertia despite known crew safety compromises.

Technical Aspects

Physical Principles Involved

The jack-in-the-box effect in turreted armored vehicles stems from the rapid of propellants, which generates a massive volume of hot gases within the confined fighting compartment. Upon ignition—often triggered by , incendiary fragments, or direct impact—the solid propellants in multiple rounds combust nearly simultaneously, expanding to occupy 700–1,000 times their original volume as high-pressure gases at temperatures exceeding 2,000°C. This creates overpressures that can reach several atmospheres in milliseconds, far surpassing the containment capacity of the internal storage racks or . The resulting pressure wave propagates through the compartment, seeking the due to the principles of and . In designs lacking dedicated venting or blow-out panels, the heavily armored hull resists lateral and downward deformation, channeling the force upward through the turret ring—a circumferential joint engineered for rotation but not for containing explosive loads. The acts uniformly across the ring's cross-sectional area (typically 2–3 in main battle tanks), exerting an upward force F = P × A (where P is and A is area) sufficient to overcome the turret's (20–30 tons) and , accelerating it to velocities of 20–50 m/s and heights of tens of meters via Newton's third law of motion. This phenomenon differs from high-explosive in that it primarily involves sequential cook-offs rather than a single , though of warheads can amplify the effect; the turret's ejection serves as an inadvertent , often mitigating total hull rupture but ensuring catastrophic crew loss from blast , fragmentation, and thermal effects.

Role of Ammunition Storage in Turreted Vehicles

In turreted armored vehicles, particularly Soviet-era designs like the T-72 introduced in 1973, ammunition storage plays a critical role in enabling the jack-in-the-box effect. These tanks employ a carousel autoloader positioned at the base of the turret, housing up to 22 ready-to-fire rounds directly in the fighting compartment shared with the crew. This configuration prioritizes rapid reloading and reduced crew size—eliminating the loader position—but positions high-explosive shells and propellant charges in close proximity to potential penetration points, increasing the likelihood of ignition from spalling or fragments upon impact. When a penetrates the or , it can initiate a among the stored rounds. The horizontal orientation of projectiles in the facilitates the propagation of fire, as burning from one round can quickly engulf adjacent , leading to a rapid that builds immense . Without compartmentalization or blow-out panels—features absent in these designs—the pressure exceeds the structural limits of the ring, the weakest seam, ejecting the turret violently upward while often incinerating the . This effect is exacerbated in "buttoned-up" vehicles with hatches sealed, trapping gases and preventing crew egress. Additional rounds stored in the hull, such as the remaining 28 in variants, contribute further if the initial blast propagates downward, but the turret-based remains the primary vulnerability due to its integration with the rotating fighting compartment. Analyses of losses indicate that this storage philosophy, driven by doctrinal emphasis on and over crew , results in catastrophic kills rather than mobility or crew kills seen in designs with isolated storage. In contrast, while not immune, vehicles mitigate risks through rear turret bustles or hull compartments with venting mechanisms, underscoring how ammunition placement directly influences explosion dynamics.

Notable Occurrences

Early Examples in Warfare

The jack-in-the-box effect manifested in early post-World War II conflicts, particularly with Soviet-designed tanks featuring ammunition stored in the turret basket or compartments, which lacked compartmentalization to direct blast outward. In the 1967 , Egyptian forces deployed approximately 100 IS-3M heavy tanks in the , where multiple vehicles suffered turret ejections after penetrations ignited onboard ammunition stores, as evidenced by well-documented photographs of destroyed hulks with turrets displaced significant distances from the chassis. These incidents, often resulting from Israeli and tank fire exploiting side armor weaknesses, demonstrated how ready rounds in the fighting compartment amplified the lethality of even partial penetrations, leading to total crew loss and vehicle destruction. The phenomenon became more prevalent during the 1973 , where over 2,000 Soviet-export T-55 and main battle fielded by and Syrian armies encountered Israeli defenses equipped with advanced anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) like the TOW and improved tank guns. Penetrating hits to the or sides frequently triggered secondary explosions of the 100-plus rounds stored in the and hull, propelling turrets airborne in a characteristic toss, with post-battle analyses attributing this to the absence of blow-out panels or isolated magazines in these designs. losses in the , for instance, included numerous catastrophic kills where ammunition rendered recovery impossible, contrasting with lower K-kill rates (defined as and negation without total destruction) observed in Israeli Western . U.S. evaluations of wreckage from these engagements confirmed that the radial layout increased detonation probability to over 50% upon penetration, informing later critiques of Soviet armor philosophy prioritizing production speed over crew survivability. These early cases, predating widespread video documentation, relied on battlefield photography, after-action reports, and inspections, revealing systemic design trade-offs in Soviet tanks that persisted into subsequent eras despite incremental upgrades like wet storage in later T-55 variants, which mitigated but did not eliminate the risk.

Modern Conflicts and the

In the , which escalated with Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, the jack-in-the-box effect has been prominently observed in the destruction of Russian main battle tanks, particularly and variants. These incidents occur when anti-tank munitions penetrate the turret or hull, igniting stored ammunition in the carousel autoloader beneath the turret, generating explosive overpressure that ejects the turret violently upward. Videos and photographs from the battlefield, including those geolocated to areas like Tsyrkuny north of during Ukraine's 2022 counteroffensive, frequently depict severed turrets separated by tens of meters from the hull, often accompanied by secondary explosions. Specific documented cases highlight the phenomenon's recurrence. On May 6, 2022, footage purportedly showing a T-72B3 's launched into the air following an attack was broadcast by Chinese state media and analyzed by defense observers, illustrating the effect's mechanics in real-time combat. Similarly, on July 6, 2022, forces released video evidence of a detaching amid a smoke plume after a strike, explicitly termed a "jack-in-the-box" event by analysts. Such occurrences have been reported across fronts, from the defense of in spring 2022 to ongoing attritional fighting in and oblasts through 2025, contributing to visual confirmation of over 3,600 losses by independent trackers, many exhibiting separation indicative of ammunition . The effect exacerbates crew casualties, as the lack of blow-out panels or isolated storage in these designs channels blast forces inward, often resulting in near-total fatalities for the four-person crew. Empirical evidence from wreckage patterns, such as those along Ukrainian roadsides documented in early 2022, underscores the design's vulnerability to modern anti-tank weapons like the , which target upper armor profiles where is densely packed. While Russian military analyses have occasionally attributed some detonations to inferior quality or external factors, battlefield footage consistently correlates penetrations with subsequent turret ejections, affirming the causal role of internal storage. This pattern has persisted into 2025, with reports of modified T-72s still succumbing to the effect despite ad-hoc protections against drones and artillery.

Design Comparisons and Implications

Soviet and Russian Tank Vulnerabilities

Soviet tank designs, including the , , and series, featured automatic loaders with carousels positioned directly beneath the turret in the fighting compartment, storing up to 28 ready rounds alongside the crew without barriers. This configuration prioritized rapid reloading, enabling a three-person crew and high fire rates, but exposed propellant charges to upon armor penetration. When struck, particularly in the or upper , fragments or ignite charges, triggering a that generates extreme ; the turret ring, the hull's weakest seam, fails, propelling the 20-25 ton dozens of meters skyward in the jack-in-the-box effect. This vulnerability manifested in the 1991 , where coalition strikes on Iraqi T-72s routinely caused total crew loss via ammunition cook-off, and recurred prominently in the 2022 , with visual evidence showing turrets ejected up to 150 meters. Russian variants like the T-72B3, T-80BV, and T-90A inherit this layout, despite upgrades such as Kontakt-1 or Relikt explosive reactive armor, which mitigate shaped-charge threats but fail against tandem warheads or repeated hits exposing internal storage. carousels hold high-explosive and kinetic rounds with exposed combustible casings, amplifying blast propagation compared to hull-stowed with blow-out vents. In , this design contributed to near-certain crew fatalities in penetrated vehicles, as secondary explosions consume the tank's interior, contrasting with survivable fires in compartmentalized systems. Efforts to mitigate, such as reduced loads or relocated blow-out hatches in later T-90M models, remain partial; core reliance on unprotected turret-basket storage persists, rendering these tanks susceptible to top-attack munitions like missiles, which exploit thin roof armor over ammunition. Soviet-era choices favored compactness and production speed over crew protection, a unchanged in exports and forces, yielding high rates in peer conflicts.

Western and Other Designs

Western main battle tanks, such as the , , and , address vulnerabilities associated with the jack-in-the-box effect through ammunition storage configurations that isolate rounds from the crew compartment and incorporate venting mechanisms to direct potential detonations away from personnel. These designs emerged from post-World War II lessons emphasizing crew survivability over convenience, resulting in larger and reduced reliance on hull-stored ammunition near the turret ring. The U.S. prioritizes turret-based storage, housing up to 36 main gun rounds in a rear bustle compartment separated from the crew by a blast door and bulkhead; this setup includes blow-out panels on the compartment's roof, engineered to fail outward during a , thereby expelling pressure and fragments upward rather than laterally into the fighting compartment. The tank's combustible caseless further mitigates explosive yield by burning more controllably than traditional cased . Operational data from conflicts like the 1991 indicate no instances of turret detachment from internal detonations in tanks, attributing survivability to these features despite penetrations. In contrast, the German stores approximately 15 rounds in a rear magazine with blow-out panels for venting, while the remaining 27-30 rounds occupy hull-side bins forward of the driver, shielded by armored partitions and designed to contain or redirect . This hybrid approach balances ready access with partial isolation, though hull storage introduces residual risks if bins are breached. The British employs hull-centric storage for most of its 52 rounds, segregated in dedicated compartments aft and forward of the crew area, separated by bulkheads and equipped with roof vents to channel explosions externally; this configuration, informed by Cold War-era trials, enhances compartmentalization but relies on manual loading without an . Other non-Soviet designs, such as the French , integrate an in a bustle with crew isolation via armored doors and blow-out capabilities, carrying 22 ready rounds separately from 26 hull-stowed ones. The Israeli series innovates by relocating ammunition to a rear hull sponsons behind a heavy blast door, distancing it from the crew and engine-transmission layout to minimize propagation risks in urban combat scenarios. These variations reflect trade-offs in , weight, and readiness, but empirical outcomes in exercises and limited exposures—such as Leopard 2s in Syrian operations—show markedly lower rates of catastrophic turret loss compared to carousel-loaded Soviet derivatives.

Criticisms of Design Philosophies

The jack-in-the-box effect underscores criticisms of Soviet and Russian design philosophies that prioritize vehicle compactness, production , and autoloading at the expense of and compartmentalization. In , , and series tanks, the automatic loader's carousel stores 22 to 28 main gun rounds directly under the floor within the crew compartment, exposing the three-man to immediate risks upon armor . This configuration, a legacy of design choices to minimize height and weight for enhanced mobility across vast operational theaters, facilitates rapid firing rates but lacks physical separation between and personnel, leading to near-total crew fatalities in secondary explosions. Military analysts attribute this to a doctrinal emphasis on massed armored formations where individual losses are acceptable, as opposed to valuing sustained crew effectiveness. Critics further highlight the absence of blow-out panels or isolated stowage, features standard in contemporary Western main battle tanks like the , which store ready ammunition in the hull rear with armored doors designed to vent blast energies outward. Empirical evidence from conflicts, including the 1991 where coalition forces observed frequent T-72 turret ejections, and the ongoing with documented losses exceeding 1,000 such vehicles by mid-2023, demonstrates how penetrations to the turret ring or sides trigger , amplifying a single hit into a total kill. This vulnerability persists despite incremental upgrades like reactive armor, as the core ammunition layout remains unchanged, reflecting a reluctance to deviate from established paradigms favoring firepower and simplicity over survivability enhancements that could increase costs and complexity. Defenders of the philosophy argue it suits high-attrition scenarios with numerical superiority, yet detractors counter that modern precision-guided munitions and top-attack weapons exacerbate the flaw, rendering the design maladaptive to peer conflicts as seen in where survival rates for penetrated are markedly lower than for equivalents like the Leopard 2. Post-combat analyses indicate that while initial armor defeats may not always ignite , the integrated storage ensures that when they do—occurring in approximately 50-70% of turret-penetrating hits—the outcome is invariably catastrophic, prioritizing doctrinal assumptions over empirical adaptations from Cold War-era studies.

References

  1. [1]
    Here's why Russian tanks keep getting decapitated in Ukraine
    Apr 13, 2022 · Known as the “jack-in-the-box effect,” this type of apocalyptic explosion is caused when a blast's heat or shockwave causes all the tank's ...
  2. [2]
    Russia's Most Advanced Frontline Tank Absolutely Detonates When ...
    Oct 9, 2023 · ... tanks are prone to what's known as the 'jack-in-the-box' effect. This involves ammunition stored beneath the main turret detonating as a ...
  3. [3]
    How the 'jack-in-the-box' flaw dooms some Russian tanks
    Apr 30, 2022 · The fault is related to the way many Russian tanks hold and load ammunition. In these tanks, including the T-72, the Soviet-designed vehicle ...
  4. [4]
    Russia's T-90 Tank Has a 'Jack-In-The-Box' Problem That Can't Be ...
    Sep 16, 2025 · -Its low profile comes from a three-man crew and autoloader, but the ammo carousel beneath the turret creates a lethal “jack-in-the-box” effect ...
  5. [5]
    Ukraine is decapitating Russian tanks due to a 'jack-in-the-box ...
    Apr 30, 2022 · ... jack-in-the-box effect," CNN reported. The issue lies in the fact that Russian tanks carry their supply of up to 40 shells in their turrets ...
  6. [6]
    Russia's tanks in Ukraine have a 'jack-in-the-box' design flaw | CNN
    Apr 28, 2022 · Russia's tanks in Ukraine have a 'jack-in-the-box' design flaw. And the West has known about it since the Gulf war · The 'jack-in-the-box” effect.
  7. [7]
    Russian Tank Explodes, Suffers Jack-In-The-Box Effect After Rolling ...
    Jun 1, 2022 · The Jack-in-the-box effect happens when a tank's ammunition compartment explodes, causing its turret to be violently torn off the rest of the ...
  8. [8]
    Watch: Ukrainians Score Jack-in-the-Box Effect as Russian Turret ...
    Jul 6, 2022 · A turret fell from the sky amid a plume of black smoke after it was blown clean off a Russian tank in what is known as a jack-in-the-box effect.
  9. [9]
    Autoloader - Army Guide
    Jul 25, 2006 · The first tank autoloader was used in the Soviet-designed T-64 main battle tank (MBT). Nowadays, the most modern tanks fitted with an autoloader ...
  10. [10]
    Autoloaders in Soviet tanks - Fuldapocalypse Fiction
    Mar 22, 2020 · Why did the Soviets so eagerly adopt autoloaders for their tanks? I don't have any direct primary sources supporting it, but I have some ...Missing: origin | Show results with:origin
  11. [11]
    What are some Russian battle tanks that use manual loading ...
    Feb 9, 2023 · The T-64 tank was the first Soviet tank with an auto loader, and we've never looked back. So, no modern Russian tank uses manual loading.Why did the Russians use a carossel autoloader instead of a bustle ...What was the first tank with auto loader? - QuoraMore results from www.quora.com
  12. [12]
    Why Do Russian Tanks Explode Violently When Hit? - Forbes
    Apr 1, 2022 · Any penetrating hit in the turret or hull can set off the ammunition, with a result sometimes describes as Jack-in-the-box effect: the force of ...
  13. [13]
    Why did the soviets change their autoloader's desing back and forth?
    Nov 8, 2021 · The T-72's autoloader design was made after the T-64's , in order to make it cheaper and more reliable , as in the first years of the T-64 the ...Why does Russia still use carousel autoloaders, when it's ... - RedditSoviet-Origin Turret Autoloaders : r/TankPorn - RedditMore results from www.reddit.com
  14. [14]
    Recurring problems of Soviet tank design
    Apr 4, 2013 · Soviet tanks have performed poorly in WWII, Korea, in the Middle East wars between the Israelis and Arabs and in Gulf War I, in the sense that ...
  15. [15]
    T-72 Tank Design - Fire Power - GlobalSecurity.org
    May 3, 2022 · The T-72 shares many design features with other tank designs of Soviet origin. Some of these are viewed as deficiencies in straight ...
  16. [16]
    [PDF] Soviet IS-3 'Stalin' Heavy Tank - Fort Benning
    Mar 29, 2019 · Many observers cite well-known photographs that showed a destroyed IS-3M with its turret blown off, and another of a rusty and mostly sand ...
  17. [17]
    M60 vs T-62: Cold War Combatants 1956–92 1846036941 ...
    ... T-55–T-62 for the Soviets. These series do not, however, reflect the many ... A too-common sight in October 1973: this M60A1 suffered a catastrophic kill ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  18. [18]
    [PDF] Armor Mounted Maneuver Journal, Volume 132, Number 1 ... - DTIC
    Many observers cite well-known pho- tographs that showed a destroyed IS-. 3M with its turret blown off, and an- other of a rusty and mostly sand-cov- ered IS ...
  19. [19]
    Watch This Russian T-72 Tank Turret Get Absolutely Catapulted Into ...
    May 11, 2022 · According to a Chinese news broadcast, what they claim to be the turret of a Russian T-72B3 tank took to the skies on May 6 after an attack ...<|separator|>
  20. [20]
    Losses ∙ Russia ∙ WarSpotting — documented material losses in ...
    Confirmed losses 20597 lost1066 damaged ; Tanks. 3651 lost. 215 damaged ; Infantry fighting vehicles. 8140 lost · 286 damaged ; Infantry mobility vehicles. 532 lost.Ukraine · Spotting · Search · MapMissing: ammunition cook- off<|control11|><|separator|>
  21. [21]
    T-72: How a Feared Russian Main Battle Tank Became a “Jack-in ...
    Oct 8, 2025 · Once feared and ubiquitous, Russia's T-72 main battle tank is now synonymous with catastrophic losses from Desert Storm to Ukraine.
  22. [22]
    Technical Reflections on Russia's Armoured Fighting Vehicles - RUSI
    Apr 27, 2022 · So, the catastrophic losses of Russian and Ukrainian tanks are the result of several issues: the location of the tank's ammunition, which ...Missing: detonation | Show results with:detonation
  23. [23]
    War in Ukraine Puts Flaws of Russian-Made Armored Vehicles on ...
    Oct 4, 2023 · Ukraine also has T-72 and T-80 fleets, which it has replenished with ... This creates a "jack-in-the-box effect," wherein the turret is blown off, ...
  24. [24]
    Effectiveness of Abrams' blowout panels in real world combat. - Reddit
    Aug 26, 2021 · Blow out panels were never designed (nor capable of) preventing the loss of crew members in case of a penetration of the blast door. They ...Just incase if you guys think Ammo Blowout Panels dont work IRL ...Guys I need an explosion on the blowout panels drama : r/WarthunderMore results from www.reddit.comMissing: toss | Show results with:toss
  25. [25]
    What makes the M1A2 Abrams' blowout panels different, and do ...
    Sep 9, 2025 · A smaller crew allows for a smaller turret. Smaller turrets means a smaller, lighter tank. Smaller tanks are harder to see and hit and thus more ...What are blowout panels, and how do they improve the safety of ...Would the M1 Abrams' blowout panels still work if the the ... - QuoraMore results from www.quora.com
  26. [26]
    Russian tanks like T-90, T-80, T-72 store their projectiles inside the ...
    Aug 26, 2023 · So long as the ammo store communicates with the turret interior where the crew is, you have vulnerabilities. In the case of the Soviet and ...What are the main risks associated with the T-90's ammo storage ...Do Russians really drive their T72B3 tanks into battle without ...More results from www.quora.com
  27. [27]
    Fact file: Challenger 2 - BBC NEWS | UK
    Jan 7, 2003 · The crew compartment has an air filtering system, as well as a heating and cooling system, it is also separated from ammunition for increased ...
  28. [28]
    Which tanks store most of its ammunition away from the crew?
    Mar 23, 2020 · The Abrams can store most if not all of its ammunition in its turret bustle away from the crew, with a blast off panel if needed to contain fires.
  29. [29]
    Why doesn't the Challenger 2 tank have blowout panels? - Quora
    Nov 23, 2024 · The separated ammo storage with blowout panels or venting systems is not without its cost. It adds wieght & complexity, in the Abrams case ...How do Western tanks manage to keep ammunition separated from ...Where is ammo stored in tanks? How do they not run out? - QuoraMore results from www.quora.com
  30. [30]
    Failing by Design - Key Military
    May 16, 2022 · The carousel ammunition storage positioned beneath the turret has proved the Achilles' heel of Russian tanks. The T-90. The T-90 was planned ...<|control11|><|separator|>