Matthew Goodwin
Matthew Goodwin is a British political scientist, author, pollster, and commentator specializing in populism, electoral politics, immigration attitudes, and public opinion shifts in Western democracies.[1][2] His research highlights how cultural anxieties over identity, rapid demographic change, and elite-driven progressive policies contribute to voter support for national populist movements, rather than attributing these trends primarily to economic insecurity.[3][4] Goodwin has held academic posts at the Universities of Manchester, Nottingham, and Kent, where he served as Professor of Politics from 2015 until recently focusing more on independent analysis and polling.[5][6] Notable achievements include authoring influential books such as Revolt on the Right (2014, Political Book of the Year), which empirically dissected the UK Independence Party's rise, and the Sunday Times bestseller Values, Voice and Virtue (2023), critiquing the divergence between a values-driven "new elite" and the traditionalist majority.[7][8] He has been recognized with appointments like the Social Mobility Commission (2022) and as a European Young Leader (2018), though his data-informed challenges to institutional orthodoxies on diversity and globalization have drawn criticism from progressive-leaning academic and media circles for amplifying majority sentiments often dismissed as reactionary.[5][9]Early Life and Education
Childhood and Upbringing
Matthew Goodwin was born and raised in St Albans, Hertfordshire, England.[1] He grew up in a single-parent, working-class family residing in a terraced house on the outskirts of the city, where financial difficulties were prevalent and his mother worked extended hours to provide for the household.[10] Goodwin has described these circumstances as challenging, emphasizing the economic pressures that shaped his early environment.[10] As the first member of his family to attend university, his upbringing underscored a trajectory of social mobility from modest origins.[1]Academic Background
Goodwin obtained a Bachelor of Arts degree with first-class honours in Politics and Contemporary History from the University of Salford in 2003.[11] He pursued postgraduate studies at the University of Western Ontario, earning a Master of Arts in Political Science in 2004.[11] Goodwin completed his Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science at the University of Bath in 2007, under the supervision of Professors Roger Eatwell and Anna Cento Bull.[11][12] His doctoral thesis employed life history interviews to analyze the backgrounds, motivations, and attitudes of activists within the British National Party (BNP), forming the empirical foundation for his subsequent book New British Fascism: Rise of the British National Party (2011).[11]Academic Career
Key Positions and Institutions
Goodwin commenced his academic career at the University of Manchester, where he worked at a self-funded research institute focused on political studies.[2] Following this, he advanced to the position of Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Nottingham.[4] In 2015, Goodwin was appointed Professor of Politics in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent, a role that encompassed responsibilities at Rutherford College.[1] [2] That year, he also received an Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Senior Fellowship to investigate the dynamics of Britain's 2016 European Union membership referendum.[1] He retained the professorship until July 2024, at which point he accepted voluntary severance from the institution.[13] [14] Parallel to his university appointments, Goodwin held the position of Senior Visiting Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, known as Chatham House, contributing to research on international politics and populism.[15] [2] As of 2025, he maintains an independent academic profile without a primary university affiliation, emphasizing continued scholarly output outside traditional institutional structures.[13]Research Contributions on Populism and Extremism
Goodwin's research on populism and extremism has primarily focused on the empirical drivers of support for radical right parties in Britain and Europe, emphasizing cultural anxieties over immigration, national identity, and elite distrust rather than solely economic deprivation. In his 2011 Chatham House report, Right Response: Understanding and Countering Populist Extremism in Europe, he analyzed the rise of parties like the British National Party (BNP) and UK Independence Party (UKIP), attributing their appeal to widespread public concerns about rapid demographic change and perceived failures of mainstream parties to address these issues, drawing on electoral data and surveys from multiple European countries.[16] The report, based on quantitative analysis of voter attitudes, argued that populist extremism thrives on unmet grievances rather than inherent voter irrationality, recommending policy responses that engage these concerns substantively rather than through marginalization.[17] A cornerstone of his contributions is the 2014 book Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain, co-authored with Robert Ford, which utilized British Election Study data and original surveys to profile UKIP and BNP voters as predominantly older, white, working-class men with low educational attainment who prioritize cultural preservation and oppose multiculturalism.[18] The analysis demonstrated that support for these parties stemmed from a "cultural backlash" against post-1990s mass immigration and EU integration, with regression models showing immigration attitudes as stronger predictors of radical right voting than unemployment or income levels. This work challenged earlier academic emphases on economic determinism, highlighting instead the role of authoritarian values and national identity in sustaining demand for anti-establishment parties.[3] Goodwin extended this framework internationally in the 2018 book National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy, co-authored with Roger Eatwell, proposing the "four Ds" model—distrust of elites, destruction of the national community via immigration, relative deprivation, and dealignment from legacy parties—as causal mechanisms for populism's global surge, supported by cross-national polling data from sources like the European Social Survey. The book differentiated populism from outright extremism, portraying the former as a rational response to liberal overreach rather than pathology, with evidence from elections in the US, UK, and continental Europe showing populist gains correlating with rising non-EU migration stocks (e.g., UK net migration exceeding 300,000 annually pre-Brexit).[3] On extremism specifically, Goodwin's peer-reviewed studies, such as his examination of BNP activism, revealed that extreme right parties attract committed ideologues through selective recruitment but struggle with broader electability due to reputational stigma, based on ethnographic data and membership surveys from 2006–2009.[19] In a 2012 Chatham House analysis, he presented survey evidence indicating that while far-right supporters exhibit higher tolerance for violence, most remain non-violent, with transitions to extremism linked to personal grievances and online radicalization rather than party mobilization alone. These findings underscored the need for data-driven counter-extremism strategies focused on addressing root cultural drivers, influencing policy discussions at institutions like the UK Home Office.[20]Media and Public Engagement
Broadcasting and GB News Role
In January 2025, Matthew Goodwin commenced his role as a permanent presenter on GB News, initially hosting State of the Nation on Wednesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays at 8 p.m., succeeding Jacob Rees-Mogg on those weekdays.[21] The program features Goodwin's commentary on contemporary political developments, including immigration policy, electoral trends, and the rise of populist movements, drawing on his academic background in these areas.[4] By July 2025, his airtime was reduced to Fridays amid reported scheduling adjustments at the network.[22] The show, later rebranded as Friday Night with Matt Goodwin, continues to air weekly at 8 p.m., offering extended discussions on Britain's socioeconomic challenges and policy critiques, often emphasizing data-driven analyses of public opinion shifts toward national conservatism.[23] Goodwin's tenure has included high-profile segments, such as debates on urban demographic changes and housing allocation, where he cited statistics indicating over 50% of London's social housing occupied by non-UK-born residents.[24] He also contributes opinion pieces to GB News's digital platform, reinforcing his on-air arguments with polling data and historical precedents.[25] Prior to his dedicated GB News slot, Goodwin made guest appearances on various UK broadcast media, including discussions on platforms like Spectator TV addressing Islamism, Brexit, and ethnic identity distinctions in British politics.[26] These interventions established his reputation as a contrarian voice challenging mainstream narratives on multiculturalism, though his full-time pivot to GB News—a channel positioned as an alternative to perceived biases in legacy broadcasters—marked a shift toward more consistent television exposure.[4]Columns and Public Speaking
Goodwin contributes regular columns to The Spectator, where he analyzes British political trends, electoral dynamics, and cultural shifts.[27] He also writes for UnHerd, focusing on populism, national identity, and critiques of elite institutions, as seen in his 2020 piece examining Boris Johnson's enduring appeal amid policy challenges.[28][29] In the Daily Mail, Goodwin has authored opinion pieces on immigration's societal impacts, such as a June 27, 2025, column arguing that unchecked migration, crime, and demographic changes have rendered London unrecognizable.[30] Other Daily Mail contributions include a July 3, 2025, analysis of Keir Starmer's immigration policies and their economic costs, a May 7, 2024, warning about the Green Party's alliances on issues like trans rights and foreign policy, and an October 17, 2020, examination of educational disparities facing white working-class boys.[31][32][10] His columns often draw on empirical data from polls and voting patterns to challenge prevailing narratives in academia and media, emphasizing voter alienation from progressive orthodoxy.[28] Goodwin has occasionally contributed to Spear's magazine, addressing wealth, politics, and Brexit-related economic concerns.[33] As a public speaker, Goodwin delivers keynote addresses and lectures globally on topics including populism's rise, Brexit's implications, electoral volatility, and the interplay of immigration with national cohesion.[34][35] He is represented by agencies such as the London Speaker Bureau and A-Speakers, facilitating engagements for corporations, conferences, and policy forums.[36][37] Notable appearances include the Ludgate Lecture on November 16, 2023, discussing elite influences on politics, and a September 3, 2025, speech in Helsinki critiquing mass immigration's effects on host societies.[38][39] Goodwin has spoken hundreds of times, often integrating data-driven forecasts with first-hand polling insights to audiences seeking analysis beyond mainstream commentary.[40]Major Publications
Academic and Analytical Works
Goodwin's academic scholarship centers on empirical analyses of electoral politics, populism, and the radical right, drawing on survey data, voting records, and contextual factors to explain shifts in voter alignments. His work emphasizes the role of immigration attitudes, cultural grievances, and economic insecurity in driving support for non-mainstream parties, often challenging prevailing narratives of voter irrationality by highlighting measurable predictors like age, education, and regional deprivation. With over 10,000 citations across platforms like Google Scholar, his publications have influenced studies on dealignment from traditional parties and the rise of national populism in Western democracies.[3][41] Among his monographs, Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain (2014, co-authored with Robert Ford, Routledge) provides a data-driven account of UK Independence Party (UKIP) and British National Party (BNP) gains, attributing them to a coalition of economically left-behind voters and culturally conservative ones alienated by multiculturalism and EU integration; the book analyzes British Election Study data from 1974–2010, showing radical right appeal strongest among white working-class men in deindustrialized areas.[3] Similarly, New British Fascism: Rise of the British National Party (2011, Routledge) dissects the BNP's 2000s surge, using membership records and local election results to argue its growth stemmed from localized ethnic competition and failing integration policies rather than generalized economic downturns alone, with peak support in wards where white British populations exceeded 90%.[3] Collaborative efforts include Brexit: Why Britain Voted to Leave the European Union (2017, co-authored with Harold D. Clarke and Paul Whiteley, Cambridge University Press), the first major academic examination of the 2016 referendum, which integrates multilevel modeling of individual attitudes and aggregate data to quantify immigration's salience—finding it outweighed economic concerns for Leave voters, who prioritized sovereignty and border control based on pre-referendum polls of over 30,000 respondents.[3][7] National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy (2018, co-authored with Roger Eatwell, Penguin UK) extends this framework transnationally, positing "four Ds" (distrust in elites, destruction of national identity, deprivation of opportunities, and dealignment from parties) as causal drivers of populist waves, supported by cross-European voting trends from 1980–2016.[3] In peer-reviewed journals, Goodwin's articles further operationalize these themes. "The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind" (2016, The Political Quarterly, co-authored with Oliver Heath) uses referendum polling to demonstrate how low-education, older voters in peripheral regions felt culturally displaced, correlating Leave support with indices of social conservatism (r=0.65 in multivariate models).[3] "Taking Back Control? Investigating the Role of Immigration in the 2016 Vote for Brexit" (2017, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, co-authored with Carla Milazzo) employs logistic regression on Understanding Society survey waves, revealing immigration concern as the strongest predictor of Leave voting (odds ratio 2.1), independent of socioeconomic status.[3] Other contributions, such as "Britain After Brexit: A Nation Divided" (2017, Journal of Democracy, co-authored with Robert Ford), apply post-referendum data to forecast persistent polarization, with 60% of 2016 Leavers viewing immigration as a cultural threat per YouGov tracking.[3] These outputs, grounded in quantitative rigor, have shaped debates on voter realignments, though critics in progressive outlets question their emphasis on cultural factors over structural inequalities.[42]Bestselling Books
National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy, co-authored with Roger Eatwell and published by Pelican Books on 25 October 2018, examines the rise of populist movements across Western democracies as a response to perceived failures of liberal elites. The book identifies four key drivers—distrust of the establishment, destruction of national identity, economic deprivation relative to elites, and dealignment from traditional political parties—and argues these forces represent a legitimate cultural backlash rather than mere extremism. It achieved Sunday Times bestseller status and was selected as a Financial Times Book of the Year.[6] Values, Voice and Virtue: The New British Politics, published by Penguin Books on 30 March 2023, analyzes the transformation of Britain's political landscape through a cultural lens, positing that a new progressive alliance of university-educated professionals and ethnic minorities has displaced the traditional Labour base of working-class voters.[43] Goodwin contends this shift prioritizes values and identity over economic class, leading to a "new elite" that enforces virtue signaling and marginalizes dissenting voices on issues like immigration and national identity.[43] The work, drawing on polling data and electoral trends, forecasted a Labour electoral victory but warned of underlying instabilities; it entered the Sunday Times non-fiction bestseller list at number 2 on 9 April 2023.[6]Political Analysis and Predictions
Views on Immigration and Multiculturalism
Goodwin has argued that the United Kingdom's adoption of multiculturalism as a governing philosophy has demonstrably failed, fostering parallel communities that resist assimilation and erode shared national values. He contends that this model, which prioritizes cultural relativism over integration, has been exacerbated by decades of high-volume immigration from culturally distant societies, leading to social fragmentation rather than cohesion. In a 2023 analysis, Goodwin described the policy as "very clearly failing," pointing to a "catastrophic erosion of social norms" where immigrants and their descendants fail to internalize British laws and customs.[44] Central to his critique is the lack of enforced integration, which he illustrates through empirical indicators of value divergence. For instance, following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks on Israel, Goodwin highlighted widespread pro-Hamas celebrations in British cities, including fireworks and flags in London, as evidence that multiculturalism enables the transplantation of illiberal attitudes without reciprocal adoption of host-country norms. He links this to demographic shifts, noting the Muslim population's growth from 1.6 million in 2001 to 3.8 million in 2023, with projections to 5.6 million by 2030, correlating with antisemitic attitudes 2-4 times higher among Muslims than the general population, per a 2017 Community Security Trust and Jewish Policy Research study. Goodwin argues these trends reflect policy failures in screening and assimilating migrants, allowing tribal grievances to supplant national loyalty.[44][45] On immigration scale, Goodwin emphasizes that net inflows—peaking at 906,000 in mid-2023 and averaging 431,000 annually thereafter—overwhelm societal capacity for absorption, driving irreversible demographic transformation. He projects that current trends will reduce the white British share of the population from 73% to 57% within decades, rendering native majorities obsolete by 2063 and intensifying identity-based conflicts. Supporting this with crime data, Goodwin cites 9,055 foreign national arrests for sex offenses, yielding a rate of 164.6 per 100,000 compared to 48 per 100,000 for British citizens, arguing mass immigration elevates public safety risks without commensurate economic benefits, as most recent non-EU arrivals contribute minimally to GDP growth.[46][47] Goodwin advocates replacing multiculturalism with an assimilationist framework that prioritizes cultural compatibility, caps immigration to sustainable levels, and enforces value convergence through policy measures like stricter border controls and integration mandates. He attributes the persistence of failing policies to an elite disconnect, where cosmopolitan classes insulated from grassroots impacts dismiss public concerns as xenophobic, despite polls indicating widespread acceptance of multiculturalism's collapse. In his view, addressing these realities requires national conservatism to restore sovereignty over borders and identity.[44]Perspectives on National Conservatism and Populism
Goodwin characterizes national populism as a durable electoral revolt against the perceived shortcomings of liberal democracy, rooted in four interrelated societal dynamics: profound distrust of distant elites, the erosion of national communities due to uncontrolled immigration and multiculturalism, relative economic deprivation among less-educated and older voters, and the progressive dealignment of these groups from mainstream parties.[48][49] These factors, he argues, stem from decades of globalization, rapid demographic shifts, and elite-driven cultural liberalization that have alienated a significant portion of the electorate, particularly in rural and deindustrialized areas, leading to support for figures like Donald Trump in 2016 and the Brexit vote in 2016 where 52% of Britons favored leaving the European Union.[50] Rather than dismissing populism as irrational or authoritarian, Goodwin posits it as a rational backlash against systemic failures, evidenced by polling data showing majority opposition to high immigration levels—such as 2023 surveys indicating 60% of Britons view immigration as having a negative impact on culture—and calls for mainstream parties to address these grievances through policy reforms like stricter border controls to avert deeper fragmentation.[51] In his co-authored 2018 book National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy, Goodwin and Roger Eatwell emphasize that populist voters are not outliers but represent a "silent majority" whose concerns about sovereignty and identity have been marginalized by cosmopolitan elites, drawing on empirical studies like the European Social Survey showing rising anti-immigration sentiment correlating with economic insecurity since the 2008 financial crisis.[52] He rejects characterizations of populism as inherently anti-democratic, noting its compatibility with representative institutions when channeled constructively, as seen in the electoral gains of parties like Italy's Lega (17% in 2018 elections) and France's National Rally, which he attributes to unmet demands for national prioritization over supranational integration.[53] Goodwin aligns national conservatism with these populist impulses by critiquing traditional conservatism's capitulation to liberal internationalism, as articulated in his speeches at National Conservatism conferences, including his 2023 address in London on "The Failures of British Conservatism," where he faulted the UK's Conservative Party for presiding over net migration exceeding 1 million in 2022 despite repeated pledges to reduce it, thus fueling support for insurgent movements.[54] In a 2024 Brussels conference speech titled "Brexit Isn't Over—It's Only Just Beginning," he advocated reinforcing national sovereignty post-Brexit to counter elite-driven supranationalism, arguing that national conservatism offers a framework for reconciling populist demands with stable governance by emphasizing cultural cohesion and economic protectionism.[55] This perspective frames national conservatism not as fringe ideology but as an empirical necessity, supported by data on voter realignments where working-class support for left-wing parties has declined by up to 20 percentage points in countries like the UK since 2010, shifting toward conservative-nationalist alternatives.[56]Electoral Forecasting Track Record
Matthew Goodwin gained prominence for his early forecasting of the 2016 Brexit referendum outcome, authoring a report in early 2016 that anticipated a vote to leave the European Union, contrary to prevailing polling averages and expert consensus at the time.[57] The actual result saw 51.9% of voters choosing Leave on June 23, 2016, validating his emphasis on underlying socioeconomic grievances and immigration concerns among less-educated, left-behind communities, factors he argued were underrepresented in mainstream models.[58] However, Goodwin's track record includes notable misses, such as the 2017 UK general election, where he publicly bet against Labour achieving 34% vote share under Jeremy Corbyn, promising to eat his book Brexit: Why Britain Voted to Leave the European Union if they did; Labour secured 40.0%, resulting in a hung parliament and a weakened Conservative position.[59] This error stemmed from underestimating Corbyn's appeal to younger voters and the resilience of traditional Labour loyalties despite Brexit divisions. In the 2019 general election, Goodwin contributed to analyses highlighting Brexit's role in electoral realignment, predicting that clarity on Brexit delivery would favor Boris Johnson's Conservatives among working-class voters in the "Red Wall" seats; the party achieved an 80-seat majority with 43.6% vote share, capturing many former Labour strongholds as forecasted in his pre-election commentary on party volatility and national populist momentum.[60] [61] For the 2024 general election, Goodwin issued pre-vote predictions via his Substack, including a proprietary poll emphasizing Reform UK's surge among disaffected Conservative voters, forecasting significant vote shifts from Tories to Reform and a realignment toward national populism; Reform obtained 14.3% nationally (up from UKIP/Brexit Party levels), securing five seats and outperforming expectations in vote efficiency despite first-past-the-post constraints, while Labour's 33.7% vote yielded 412 seats in a landslide.[62] Post-election, he noted alignment with his calls on Reform's breakthrough and Labour's fragility, though uniform national swings were not precisely modeled.[63]| Election/Event | Goodwin's Key Prediction | Actual Outcome | Alignment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brexit Referendum (2016) | Leave victory driven by left-behind demographics | 51.9% Leave | Accurate[57] |
| UK General Election (2017) | Labour below 34% vote share | Labour 40.0%; hung parliament | Inaccurate[59] |
| UK General Election (2019) | Conservative gains in Red Wall via Brexit focus | Con 80-seat majority | Accurate[60] |
| UK General Election (2024) | Reform UK vote surge and realignment | Reform 14.3%, 5 seats; major shifts | Partially accurate (vote gains strong, seats limited)[62] |