Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

NBA lockout

An NBA lockout constitutes a work stoppage imposed by team owners on following the expiration of the agreement, halting operations, access to facilities, and player transactions until a new accord is reached. These events have transpired four times in history, including brief interruptions in 1995 and a referees' lockout that year, but the 1998–1999 and 2011 player lockouts stand as the most consequential, each truncating the regular season and erasing hundreds of scheduled games. The 1998–1999 lockout, spanning from July 1998 to January 1999, stemmed from owners' demands to reform salary structures amid rising payrolls that they contended eroded profitability after the 's and surge. It compelled a 50-game season commencing in February 1999, with the new introducing a softer , mid-level exceptions, and -sharing adjustments that curbed player earnings as a percentage of -related income from approximately 57% to 55%. The 2011 lockout, enduring 161 days from July 1 to December 8, similarly arose from owners' assertions that 22 of 30 teams operated at losses, necessitating reductions in guaranteed contracts, a harder , and a player share drop to 50% of -related income. Resolving just before Christmas, it shortened the 2011–12 season to 66 games per team, inflicted an estimated $400 million in lost player salaries and $200–300 million in , and prompted some to compete overseas, though it ultimately fostered a decade of labor peace through the ensuing . These lockouts underscored the tension between maximizing player compensation and sustaining franchise financial viability, yielding systemic reforms that prioritized competitive parity over unrestricted spending.

Background and Context

Historical Labor Relations in the NBA

The (NBPA) was founded in 1954 when guard initiated efforts to organize players by contacting established representatives from each NBA team, amid conditions where players lacked pensions, allowances, minimum wages, or health benefits, with average salaries around $8,000. The NBA did not formally recognize the NBPA until April 1957, following rejected player demands in 1955 and threats of strikes, including Cousy's discussions with officials about potential union affiliation; this led to an initial agreement abolishing informal "whisper fines" imposed on complaining players, establishing a $7 daily , and increasing playoff bonus pools. Early negotiations focused on basic protections, with a pension plan agreed upon in 1961 but not fully implemented until 1964, after players threatened to boycott the first televised , securing NBPA status as the exclusive bargaining representative. The league's first formal agreement revisions came prior to the 1968-69 season, raising minimum salaries and standardizing player contracts, though owners retained significant control via the tying players indefinitely to teams. In 1970, amid a three-year labor deal that further increased minimums, NBPA president filed an antitrust suit challenging the reserve system and blocking the NBA-ABA merger until resolved in players' favor, culminating in a 1976 agreement introducing modified free agency with draft-pick compensation for signing teams and a $4.3 million fund for affected players. Labor relations evolved toward by the 1980s, with a 1983 four-year deal establishing the NBA's first —set at 53% to 57% of defined basketball-related income—and guaranteeing jobs for 253 , reflecting owners' concerns over escalating costs amid expansion and TV deals. Unlike other major sports, NBA conducted no full work stoppages through this period, relying instead on threats and litigation, while owners imposed no lockouts until 1995; agreements emphasized gradual concessions on mobility and pay, driven by competitive balance needs as player leverage grew from rising revenues and star power. By the late 1980s, a 1987 six-year extension maintained the cap structure while reducing draft rounds, setting precedents for future disputes over revenue splits and restrictions.

Economic Fundamentals of NBA Revenue and Salaries

The National Basketball Association (NBA) generates revenue primarily through Basketball-Related Income (BRI), defined in the league's Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) as the aggregate operating revenues tied to basketball activities, including gate receipts, broadcasting and media rights fees, sponsorships, merchandising, advertising, concessions, and suite revenues, but excluding certain non-basketball sources like arena naming rights or property taxes. This structure pools revenues across teams to promote financial stability, with BRI audited annually to ensure accurate allocation. NBA league-wide BRI has grown substantially over decades, reaching approximately $11.3 billion in the 2023–2024 season, up 13% from the prior year, driven largely by lucrative media deals and global expansion. Historical figures reflect this trajectory: revenues hovered around $2–3 billion annually in the early but surged post-2010s due to television contracts exceeding $2.6 billion per year by 2016. Key drivers include national , which accounted for over 40% of BRI in recent years, alongside ticket sales and sponsorships that benefit from the league's 30-team structure and international appeal. To address disparities between large- and small-market teams, the NBA implements inter-team , where high-revenue franchises contribute a portion of their local BRI—typically 20–50% depending on the source—to a central pool redistributed equally among all teams, supplemented by league-wide national revenues. This mechanism, formalized in CBAs since the , mitigates losses for smaller markets; for instance, in 2016–2017, revenue-sharing transfers totaled about $200 million, with four large-market teams funding over 70% of it. Owners argue it fosters competitive balance, though audits reveal ongoing debates over inclusions like rights. Players receive a defined share of total BRI under the , historically ranging from % to % in a sliding scale tied to league performance, with the pool divided among teams via a system to prevent overspending. Pre-1998, players held a guaranteed 53% share, but rapid growth—fueled by TV deals—prompted owner pushback in labor disputes over escalating payrolls outpacing profits. This percentage directly funds player compensation, excluding benefits like pensions, ensuring salaries scale with BRI but capping total expenditures to maintain owner incentives for generation. The , a "soft" limit per team, is calculated annually as approximately 44.74% of projected BRI divided by 30 teams, adjusted for and growth projections, setting the maximum payroll without penalties for the 2025–2026 season at around $154.6 million. Teams can exceed it via exceptions (e.g., Bird rights for re-signing veterans), but a progressive —escalating from $1.50 per dollar over the cap to higher rates for repeat offenders—discourages chronic overspending, with revenues funding player benefits. This ties directly to BRI fluctuations: rising revenues expand the cap, but disputes arise when owners seek tighter controls to offset operational costs like arena maintenance, which averaged $213.5 million per team in 2020–2021 amid dips. The system's design balances talent distribution and financial sustainability, central to negotiations.

Pre-Modern Lockouts

1995 Preseason Lockout

The 1995 NBA preseason lockout, the league's first work stoppage in its history, began on July 1, 1995, after the expiration of the prior collective bargaining agreement () on June 30, 1995, and lasted until a tentative agreement was reached on August 8, 1995. Triggered by disputes over salary caps, , and player compensation amid rising league revenues from a new television contract, the lockout halted all league operations, including player payments and offseason activities, but did not cancel any regular-season games as it occurred entirely during the preseason period. Owners, led by Commissioner , sought to impose a six-year that included a hard and restrictions on player salaries to control escalating payrolls, which had grown significantly following the 1994-95 season's no-strike, no-lockout truce. (NBPA), under Executive Director Charles Grantham, rejected ratification of the owners' proposal on June 23, 1995, demanding further negotiations on issues like free agency rights and pension contributions, viewing the owners' terms as overly restrictive on player earnings. The lockout immediately suspended advance payments to players for the 1995-96 season, affecting hundreds of millions in , and barred access to team facilities, intensifying financial pressure on players during the offseason. Negotiations stalled initially due to the owners' insistence on linking the to a new $750 million national television deal with and Broadcasting, which promised increased revenues but required labor stability for broadcast commitments. By mid-July, federal mediators intervened, facilitating talks that addressed NBPA concerns over salary rollbacks and cap exceptions, though owners maintained leverage through unified front and the threat of prolonged shutdown. The dispute highlighted growing tensions over the league's , where player salaries had risen to approximately 60% of basketball-related income, prompting owners to prioritize cost controls to sustain viability. Resolution came on August 8, 1995, with a tentative that softened some owner demands, including a flexible with exceptions for bird rights and mid-level contracts, while increasing minimum player salaries and pension funding; the deal was ratified by players in September 1995, averting any preseason disruptions and allowing training camps to proceed. Although brief, the lockout set a for future labor conflicts, exposing underlying disagreements on revenue distribution that resurfaced in subsequent disputes, and underscored the NBPA's strategy of decertification threats to counter owner bargaining power.

1996 Offseason Disputes

In June 1996, following the expiration of key provisions from the previous collective bargaining agreement (CBA), NBA owners and the (NBPA) negotiated a new six-year labor deal to govern player salaries, , and related terms through the 2001-02 season. The agreement maintained the existing soft structure but introduced modifications to free agency rules and rookie wage scales, aiming to balance competitive equity with player mobility. These talks built on the resolution of the 1995 preseason lockout, where owners had sought greater cost controls amid rising payrolls that averaged 57% of basketball-related income (BRI). Disputes intensified in early July over the allocation of approximately $50 million in profits from NBA television contracts with and , which the league classified as non-BRI funds not subject to full player . Owners argued for applying only 50% of these profits toward the calculation, citing contractual recoupment clauses for the networks, while the NBPA demanded 100% inclusion to uphold the 53-57% BRI player share established in prior agreements. This disagreement stemmed from broader tensions over revenue definitions, including potential exclusions for arena and luxury suites, which owners viewed as essential for small-market viability amid uneven league profits. On July 9, 1996, the NBA imposed a lockout, halting offseason activities such as signings and player transactions until the revenue issue was resolved. Unlike the extended 1995 stoppage, this action lasted mere hours, with both sides reaching a later that day: the disputed funds were partially integrated into BRI, preserving the overall structure without derailing the upcoming 1996-97 season. The swift resolution averted broader economic fallout, as revenues had grown to over $1.2 billion annually, but highlighted ongoing owner concerns about escalating player costs—top exceeding $5 million per year—and the need for mechanisms like a to enforce discipline.

1998–99 Lockout

Prelude and Triggering Events

The 1995 agreement (CBA) between the NBA and the (NBPA) included an opt-out clause permitting owners to reopen negotiations after three seasons if player salaries exceeded 51.8 percent of basketball-related income (BRI). By the 1997-98 season, player compensation had risen to approximately 57 percent of BRI, prompting owners to invoke the provision amid concerns over escalating costs and profitability. Owners cited financial strain, asserting that more than half of the league's 29 teams operated at a loss during 1997-98, with aggregate annual losses exceeding $300 million across the league; the NBPA contested these figures, arguing that only a minority of teams were unprofitable after accounting for owner-related expenses like debt service and arena amortizations. On March 23, 1998, the owners voted 27-2 to reopen the , accelerating talks set to conclude the season's labor pact by June 30. Negotiations commenced in , with owners demanding structural changes including a hard to replace the existing soft cap, elimination of exceptions like the provision for re-signing own free agents above the cap, and an initial proposal to slash player salaries by up to 40 percent while capping team payrolls at around $40 million. The NBPA countered by seeking higher minimum salaries and protections for veteran contracts, viewing the owners' push as an attempt to redistribute revenue shares amid booming league income from television deals and expansion fees. Discussions stalled in late June as the sides diverged on core issues of revenue split and payroll predictability, with owners insisting on guaranteed cost controls to ensure long-term viability despite record BRI growth to over $2 billion. The formally expired at midnight on June 30, 1998, without a successor agreement, triggering the lockout on that halted all league activities, including free agency and summer leagues. This impasse stemmed from owners' emphasis on curbing escalating player costs—average salaries had tripled since the early to about $2.6 million—against the union's defense of free-market contract rights forged after the 1994-95 players' strike.

Key Negotiation Stalemates

The primary stalemate centered on the division of basketball-related income (BRI), with NBA owners seeking to cap players' share at 57 percent—down from the effective average exceeding that threshold due to escalating contracts—while implementing strict enforcement mechanisms to ensure financial predictability across teams. Players, represented by the (NBPA), resisted any reduction, arguing that the league's revenue boom, driven by lucrative television deals and global expansion, justified maintaining or increasing their portion, which had grown alongside stars like commanding salaries up to 35 percent of team payrolls. This impasse persisted after owners opted out of the 1995 agreement on March 23, 1998, with initial talks collapsing by late June over owners' insistence on tying player costs directly to BRI fluctuations without player veto power. A second major deadlock involved structure, as owners proposed a hard cap linked to 57 percent of BRI, eliminating exceptions like the rule that allowed teams to exceed the cap for re-signing their own free agents, which they viewed as inflating costs and undermining competitive balance. The NBPA countered by defending the existing soft cap system with exceptions, warning that a hard cap would restrict player mobility and suppress salaries, particularly for mid-tier veterans reliant on those provisions. Owners further demanded a luxury tax starting at 57 percent of BRI, with escalating penalties, and a maximum individual salary of 30 percent of the team cap (projected at about $11 million annually), rejecting player proposals for higher minimums and unrestricted escalators that would exacerbate spending. These proposals, presented in July 1998 just before the lockout's start on July 1, were dismissed by players as an existential threat to their earning power, leading to repeated breakdowns despite sessions in and November. Additional friction arose over contract guarantees and ancillary benefits, with owners pushing to limit sign-and-trade deals, rookie scale contracts, and agent fees to curb indirect cost growth, while players sought protections like full no-trade clauses and expanded health benefits amid the league's $2 billion annual BRI. Although owners conceded to a framework in October 1998 without a hard cap, the union's refusal to accept capped maximums or reduced Bird rights prolonged the standoff, culminating in the NBPA's brief decertification in December 1998 to enable antitrust before reforming and agreeing to binding arbitration. This series of impasses, rooted in owners' claims of widespread unprofitability among 20 of 29 teams versus players' emphasis on overall league prosperity, delayed resolution until January 20, 1999.

Resolution and Aftermath

The lockout concluded on January 20, 1999, after 204 days, when the NBA owners and the (NBPA) ratified a new six-year agreement (). Key provisions included a reduction in the players' share of basketball-related income (BRI) from approximately 57% to a band of 53-55%, with defined exceptions allowing teams to exceed payroll caps under certain conditions. The agreement introduced individual maximum salaries capped at $14 million for players with 10 years of service, a soft with exceptions for sign-and-trades and mid-level exceptions, and a penalty on teams exceeding the cap threshold to promote competitive balance. Owners viewed the deal as essential for addressing escalating payrolls that had reached 62% of BRI in some seasons, while the NBPA secured guarantees against a hard cap that would have severely limited player mobility. The settlement averted a full season cancellation but resulted in the forfeiture of 464 regular-season games and the , representing about 32% of the scheduled slate. The 1998-99 season commenced on February 5, 1999, compressed into 50 games per team over three months, which led to player fatigue, elevated injury rates, and diminished on-court quality, including league-wide effective field goal percentages dropping to 46.6%—the lowest in the three-point era up to that point. Despite these challenges, the captured the NBA championship, defeating the in the Finals, marking the first title for both franchises in the lockout era. Long-term, the CBA's mechanisms, including and payroll restraints, contributed to the league's financial stabilization and revenue growth, which surged from $2.1 billion in BRI during the lockout year to over $4 billion by the mid-2000s, underpinning and global outreach. However, the lockout strained player-owner relations, with NBPA Billy Hunter decrying the owners' aggressive tactics, and it set precedents for future disputes by highlighting the leverage of work stoppages in enforcing economic reforms. Attendance had already declined 15-20% in select markets pre-lockout due to concerns over rising ticket prices amid uneven team competitiveness, but the new system's emphasis on helped mitigate such issues over time.

2011 Lockout

Origins in Expiring

The 2005 collective bargaining agreement () between the (NBA) and the (NBPA) was scheduled to expire at midnight on June 30, 2011, prompting the league's 30 team owners to impose a lockout starting July 1, 2011, which halted all operations, free agency, and player transactions. Under the expiring , players received approximately 57% of basketball-related income (BRI), a encompassing ticket sales, , merchandising, and concessions, which had grown significantly to over $4 billion annually by 2011 due to lucrative deals and . Owners argued that this structure, combined with escalating player salaries—averaging $5.8 million per player—and inflexible contract rules, rendered the unsustainable, with 22 of 30 teams reportedly operating at a collective loss of $300–370 million per season. In pre-expiration negotiations, which intensified in May 2011 after earlier informal discussions, owners proposed slashing players' BRI share to 47%—a reduction of about $800–900 million annually—while advocating for a harder , elimination of mid-level exceptions, shorter maximum contract lengths (from 6 to 3 years for non-superstars), and restrictions on sign-and-trade deals to enhance competitive balance and curb spending by high-payroll teams. These demands stemmed from audited financials owners presented to the NBPA, highlighting disparities where small-market franchises struggled against revenue-rich teams like the Lakers and Knicks, though the union contested the figures' accuracy, citing practices such as arena and related-party transactions that inflated deficits. The NBPA, led by Billy Hunter, countered with offers to cap their share at 53–54% of BRI and minor concessions on contract guarantees, emphasizing that players had already accepted revenue-sharing mechanisms in to support struggling teams and that overall league profitability—bolstered by a $24 billion TV deal extension talks—undermined the owners' dire portrayal. The originated from fundamentally divergent views on economic : owners prioritized long-term viability through cost containment, viewing the soft and opt-outs as enablers of that eroded margins despite rising revenues, while framed their position around historical contributions to and rejected concessions without audited into owners' finances, including non-basketball income streams. This foundational disagreement over the expiring CBA's terms set the stage for protracted , with owners leveraging their financial —many deriving income from diverse portfolios—to withstand a work stoppage, unlike reliant on season-derived . Early proposals failed to bridge the gap, as the NBPA decertified as a in October 2011 to pursue antitrust litigation, underscoring the high stakes tied to the CBA's sunset provisions.

Escalation and Player Responses

The NBA's cancellation of the entire preseason schedule on October 4, 2011, marked an initial escalation, followed by the scrapping of the first two weeks of the regular season on October 10, as owners sought leverage amid stalled talks over revenue splits and salary caps. Players, represented by the National Basketball Players Association (NBPA), responded by rejecting multiple owner proposals, including a November 14 offer that would have reduced their share of basketball-related income (BRI) from approximately 57% to around 50-51%, prompting the NBPA to file a "disclaimer of interest" to effectively disband the union and enable antitrust litigation against the league. This decertification move, supported by a vote of over 200 players (exceeding the threshold of 130 needed to trigger a formal election), aimed to challenge the lockout as an illegal restraint of trade, with NBPA executive director Billy Hunter arguing it preserved players' legal rights after negotiations yielded insufficient concessions on contract guarantees and luxury tax structures. On 15, 2011, decertified players filed an antitrust lawsuit in U.S. District Court in , seeking to declare the lockout unlawful and obtain damages for lost wages estimated at $350 million per month; a preliminary granted by Judge on November 18 temporarily lifted the lockout, though it was quickly stayed pending , highlighting the tactic's disruptive potential but also its legal vulnerabilities under labor law precedents favoring . Internal player divisions emerged, with figures like forward advocating aggressively for decertification as early as November 2 to force owner concessions, while NBPA president urged unity despite growing financial pressures that led many players to train overseas or sign short-term contracts in and elsewhere, mitigating but not eliminating income losses exceeding $400 million collectively by late November. These responses underscored the players' strategy of leveraging legal threats and public demonstrations of readiness to play—such as pickup games and exhibitions—to counter owner claims of fiscal unsustainability, though the approach risked prolonging the impasse and eroding fan support.

Settlement Terms and Immediate Effects

The NBA owners and players' association reached a tentative on a new on November 26, 2011, ending the 149-day lockout after extensive negotiations. The deal established a 10-year , with an opt-out clause after the sixth year, fundamentally altering the league's economic structure to address owners' concerns over rising costs and revenue disparities. Central to the settlement was a revised revenue split of basketball-related income (BRI), reducing players' guaranteed share from 57 percent under the prior agreement to a band of 49 to 51 percent, starting at 51.15 percent for the 2011–12 season and including escalators tied to league revenue growth. Additional economic provisions included a flat of $58.044 million for the upcoming season, stricter thresholds with escalating penalties to discourage excessive spending, and restrictions on mid-level exceptions for teams above the cap, aimed at promoting competitive . terms were tightened, limiting maximum lengths to five years for re-signing own players (four for others), with reduced raises and new rules requiring players to forfeit salary equivalent to the remaining term. Ratification followed swiftly, with players approving the deal on December 8, 2011, after the union's brief decertification and reformation, enabling resumption of operations. Training camps opened on December 9, and the commenced on December 25 with a compressed 66-game schedule per team, eliminating 16 games each and shifting the to conclude by June 19, 2012. Immediate financial impacts included prorated salaries reflecting the shortened season and canceled preseason games, though league revenues declined only about 10 percent despite the 20 percent reduction in games, buoyed by strong television and ticket demand. Owners recouped some losses through deferred payments and revenue guarantees, while players faced short-term income hits but gained system safeguards against future revenue erosion.

Common Themes and Strategies

Owners' Arguments: Financial Sustainability and Competitive Balance

Owners contended that the existing agreements (CBAs) threatened the league's long-term financial health, citing widespread operating losses among franchises as evidence of unsustainable economics. In the lead-up to the 2011 lockout, NBA Commissioner reported that 22 of the 30 teams incurred losses totaling approximately $370 million in the 2010-11 season, with projections of $400 million in league-wide deficits for the prior year. These figures, derived from owners' audited , highlighted escalating player compensation—consuming about 57% of basketball-related (BRI)—against stagnant or uneven growth, particularly for small-market teams reliant on national media deals and local attendance. Owners argued that without revenue-sharing adjustments and payroll restraints, many franchises faced risks or forced sales, undermining the league's viability amid rising operational costs like arena maintenance and player benefits. This financial strain, owners maintained, stemmed from a system where high-revenue teams subsidized losses elsewhere via BRI distribution, but insufficiently to offset aggressive spending on talent. Small-market owners, such as those from and , emphasized that their limited local media markets and sponsorships generated far less income than counterparts in or , yet the soft and exceptions allowed big-market clubs to exceed spending limits through bird rights and mid-level exceptions. In negotiations for both the 1998-99 and lockouts, owners proposed reducing the players' BRI share to 40-50% and implementing revenue guarantees for low-performing teams to foster stability, arguing that unchecked escalation in guarantees—rising from $20 million per player in the early to over $100 million by —eroded profit margins and deterred investment. Critics, including players' union executives, contested the loss calculations as inflated by aggressive and related-party transactions, but owners countered that independent audits confirmed the disparities, necessitating systemic reforms for generational . On competitive balance, owners asserted that financial inequities directly fueled on-court disparities, with big-market teams elite talent via superior cash reserves and revenue advantages, resulting in dynasties and fan disengagement from non-contenders. During the talks, they advocated a hard cap, shortened contract lengths, and escalated luxury taxes to curb "superteam" formations, claiming the prior system's flexibility enabled outliers like the 2000s Lakers and Celtics to dominate while small-market squads like the Clippers or languished in rebuilds. Historical data supported their view: pre-1999 lockout, variance correlated with odds, prompting the introduction of a threshold that owners credited with narrowing gaps, though they sought stricter enforcement post-2011 to address persistent imbalances where top spenders won 70% of titles from 2000-2010. Owners rejected players' counterproposals for unrestricted free agency, arguing such measures would exacerbate bidding wars and talent concentration, ultimately harming league parity and global appeal.

Players' Positions: Share of Revenue and Contract Rights

The (NBPA) maintained that players deserved to retain a substantial share of basketball-related income (BRI), typically around 57% as established in prior agreements, emphasizing their pivotal role in driving league revenues through on-court performance, endorsements, and market expansion. In the 1998–99 lockout, the NBPA resisted owners' demands for mechanisms like a hard and that would limit players' access to revenue growth, arguing these would disproportionately benefit owners amid rising BRI from television contracts and ticket sales. Similarly, during the 2011 lockout, NBPA executive director Billy Hunter rejected initial owner proposals slashing the share to 47%, countering with 53% to reflect players' contributions to BRI increases exceeding 400% since the early , fueled by global broadcasting deals. On contract rights, the NBPA advocated for preserving fully guaranteed multi-year deals, maximum contract lengths of up to six years for re-signing with one's own team, and free agency protections such as Bird rights, which allow teams to exceed the to retain their players. These elements were viewed as essential to player security and leverage, contrasting with non-guaranteed structures in other leagues, and the union opposed rollbacks that would shorten durations or cap raises, as proposed by owners to curb escalating payrolls in high-revenue markets. The NBPA argued that such rights incentivize performance and in talent development, with any erosion risking diminished player mobility and overall league competitiveness. Ultimately, these positions stemmed from the union's that revenue shares and contract guarantees directly correlated with players' , honed through decades of negotiations amid disputes over BRI audits and owner financial disclosures.

Legal and Tactical Maneuvers

The NBA owners initiated legal action on August 2, 2011, by filing a federal lawsuit in the Southern District of New York seeking a that the league's lockout complied with antitrust laws and that the nonstatutory labor exemption shielded it from such challenges, even if the NBPA decertified. This move preempted anticipated player lawsuits, allowing owners to select a venue perceived as favorable due to precedents upholding similar exemptions in sports labor disputes. The suit also included an charge against the NBPA for allegedly bargaining in by threatening decertification. In response, the NBPA pursued decertification as a tactical escalation to dissolve its union status and enable antitrust litigation, mirroring strategies used in the . On November 14, 2011, after rejecting the owners' latest proposal, the NBPA filed a " of interest" with the , effectively dissolving the union more rapidly than formal decertification would allow and permitting players to sue the league as individuals. This maneuver aimed to challenge the lockout and proposed restrictions—such as revenue splits and contract limits—as anticompetitive under the Sherman Act. Players followed by filing class-action antitrust lawsuits on November 15, 2011: one in the Central District of California and a primary complaint in the , where a federal judge had previously handled NFL-related antitrust claims. The Minnesota venue selection sought a court potentially receptive to player arguments against the labor exemption post-decertification, pressuring owners amid mounting lost revenue from canceled games. These filings invoked irreparable harm from the lockout's extension into the season, seeking injunctions to resume operations under the prior . The dueling lawsuits intensified negotiations, with both sides leveraging judicial timelines; a preliminary hearing was set, but players agreed to dismiss the suits as part of the , , tentative ending the lockout. This resolution required the NBPA to recertify as a and forgo further antitrust claims, underscoring how the legal threats—without full —facilitated compromise on and system changes. Owners' early declaratory action preserved leverage, while players' antitrust pivot highlighted the fragility of the labor exemption once protections lapsed.

Broader Impacts

Financial Consequences for Stakeholders

The , spanning from July 1 to December 8, led to the cancellation of the entire preseason and the first 16 regular-season games for each of the league's 30 teams, resulting in approximately 250 lost games overall. These disruptions caused direct financial losses estimated at $400 million for team owners in foregone ticket sales, concessions, and local broadcasting revenue, with a comparable $400 million in lost player salaries prorated for the shortened season. Owners in small- and mid-market teams bore a disproportionate burden, as they depend more heavily on gate receipts and arena-related income compared to large-market franchises bolstered by national media deals; pre-lockout data already showed 22 of 30 teams operating at a collective deficit of $370 million in the 2010-11 season, a situation the work stoppage intensified without immediate offsetting gains from protected television contracts. Players experienced acute short-term salary withholdings, with average annual earnings of about $5.85 million in 2010-11 translating to roughly $1.6 million lost per player across the missed games, though top earners with guaranteed multiyear deals faced proportionally smaller relative impacts while and mid-tier players suffered more severely due to shorter contracts and performance incentives. (NBPA) estimated total player compensation at risk exceeding $2.2 billion for the full season, but the lockout's resolution preserved most deferred payments while imposing new caps on future earnings growth. In the longer term, the ensuing favored owners by reducing players' share of basketball-related income (BRI) from 57% to a banded 49.5-50.9%, yielding annual givebacks valued at over $300 million through enhanced among teams and stricter mechanisms, which addressed systemic losses and improved competitive balance without requiring widespread franchise relocations or contractions. This shift prioritized league-wide financial viability, as evidenced by only a 10% revenue decline in the compressed 66-game 2011-12 season despite a 20% reduction in games played. Ancillary stakeholders, including operators, sponsors, and local vendors, incurred collateral losses from diminished attendance-driven spending on parking, merchandise, and hospitality, with some estimates placing league-wide ancillary impacts at up to $800 million by late , though empirical analyses suggest the broader economic ripple effects on host cities were overstated relative to in elsewhere. Sponsors like those tied to individual teams reported strained relationships and delayed activations but few outright withdrawals during the 161-day . Television networks, while missing live content, mitigated damages through contractual makeup provisions and preseason reruns, preserving much of their $930 million annual rights fees intact.

Effects on Game Quality and Fan Engagement

The 2011 NBA lockout, which spanned 149 days from July 1 to November 26, 2011, forced a compressed 2011-12 regular season starting December 25 with only 66 games per team, limiting training camps and preseason preparation to as little as two weeks for some players. This rushed timeline led to suboptimal physical conditioning, as athletes lacked access to team facilities, medical staff, and structured regimens during the dispute, increasing vulnerability to injuries and disrupting early-season performance. A study analyzing NBA injury data from 2005 to 2016 found a substantial rise in moderate and severe injuries during the lockout-affected 2011-12 season compared to prior years, attributing it partly to inadequate recovery periods and the intensity of back-to-back games in the condensed schedule. High-profile cases, such as guard missing games due to issues, exemplified how the lack of offseason integration with team trainers contributed to elevated absence rates among stars, potentially lowering overall on-court execution and strategic depth in initial matchups. While the shortened season intensified competition—eliminating filler games and enforcing higher stakes per contest, which some observers noted enhanced perceived quality through relentless effort—the persistent injury wave strained rosters and prompted more conservative play styles to mitigate risks. Reports from experts warned pre-season that the absence of collaborative environments heightened soft-tissue strains and accumulation, effects borne out by elevated game absences in the first half of 2011-12. However, analyses indicated that raw injury incidence rose primarily from the sheer volume of in a truncated period rather than uniquely from lockout-induced , suggesting that while quality dipped temporarily due to personnel disruptions, the core athleticism and skill level remained intact for most teams. Fan engagement suffered acutely during the lockout, with widespread frustration manifesting in public sentiment; a poll conducted amid the dispute revealed 39.5% of respondents felt "fed up" with players and owners alike, reflecting alienation from canceled exhibitions, preseason hype, and the uncertainty of missing the full season. Attendance for the 2011-12 regular season declined by approximately 10% from the previous year, attributable to the shortened schedule and lingering resentment over lost games, though this moderated as the campaign progressed. Television ratings faced initial skepticism, with concerns that the work stoppage had eroded casual viewership, yet networks like ABC achieved a 3.3 household rating across 15 broadcasts—down slightly but stable given the disruptions—and overall league metrics rebounded robustly post-lockout. By season's end, the NBA demonstrated in fan retention, as the compressed fostered urgency and rivalries, contributing to soaring viewership trends that set the stage for lucrative deals. The lockout's disruption redirected some attention to alternatives like overseas play or exhibitions by players, but core enthusiasts returned en masse, underscoring that while short-term disengagement occurred due to perceived on both sides, the league's value and star power facilitated a swift recovery without permanent erosion of loyalty.

Long-Term Structural Changes to the League

The 2011 NBA lockout culminated in a new agreement () that fundamentally altered the league's economic framework, prioritizing owners' demands for cost certainty and competitive balance over players' preferences for revenue guarantees and flexibility. Central to these changes was a reduction in players' share of basketball-related income (BRI) from approximately 57% under the prior to a banded structure of 49-51%, with the exact split varying based on total league revenues to incentivize overall growth while capping player payouts during high-revenue years. This adjustment, ratified in December 2011, was projected to save owners over $200 million annually in player salaries relative to pre-lockout projections, addressing concerns about escalating payrolls amid uneven team profitability. Salary cap mechanics underwent significant hardening, retaining a "soft" cap with exceptions but introducing a steeper penalty to deter chronic overspending. The tax rate escalated progressively—starting at $1.50 per dollar over the cap for first-time offenders and reaching $5 per dollar for repeat violators over multiple seasons—effectively imposing a de facto hard cap on high-spending teams like the and [Los Angeles Lakers](/page/Los Angeles Lakers). Contract durations were restricted to a maximum of five years for extensions with a team's own players (four years for free agents signed by other teams), with annual raise limits capped at 8% for re-signing players and 5% for new acquisitions, curbing the long-term, high-value deals that had previously enabled superteam formations. These provisions, combined with tightened rules on sign-and-trade transactions and Bird rights (which allow teams to exceed the cap to retain their own players), aimed to flatten payroll disparities and promote parity across large- and small-market franchises. Revenue sharing among teams expanded substantially, with small-market owners receiving a larger portion of central league revenues to offset local disparities, funded partly by contributions from high-revenue clubs. This system, formalized at around 50% of local revenues pooled for redistribution, addressed pre-lockout data showing nearly half of teams operating at losses, fostering long-term without requiring a full hard . Empirical analyses post-2011 indicate these reforms contributed to modest improvements in competitive balance, as measured by reduced payroll-revenue correlations and narrower gaps in win percentages between top and bottom quartiles of teams, though critics argue the soft cap's exceptions still permitted outliers like the Miami Heat's . The CBA's 10-year term, with an opt-out clause after six years exercised in , set a for periodic renegotiation amid rising deals, influencing subsequent agreements like the 2023 CBA's second apron thresholds.

Controversies and Criticisms

Allegations of Owner Greed vs. Player Entitlement

During the 2011 NBA lockout, players and their union representatives accused team owners of greed, asserting that demands for a reduced share of basketball-related income (BRI)—from 57% to as low as 43% in initial proposals—prioritized excessive profits over fair compensation despite league revenues exceeding $4.2 billion in the 2010-11 season. NBPA executive director Billy Hunter described the owners' stance as driven purely by "greed," claiming it ignored the players' contributions to revenue growth and sought to extract concessions benefiting wealthy owners at the expense of athletes. Critics in media outlets echoed this, portraying the lockout as a clash where owners, many of whom were billionaires, exaggerated financial woes to justify slashing player pay amid record overall league earnings. Conversely, owners and officials alleged player entitlement, arguing that the existing system allocated an unsustainable portion of to players—averaging $5.15 million per in 2010-11—while 22 of 30 teams reported operating losses totaling around $300-370 million annually, particularly burdening small-market franchises with limited local media and ticket . NBA Commissioner attributed delays to "greedy" player agents urging resistance to necessary reforms for competitive balance and long-term viability, such as harsher penalties and a harder to curb payroll disparities that disadvantaged non-marquee markets. Some analysts and fan sentiments reinforced this view, criticizing players for clinging to guaranteed contracts and high splits without acknowledging the 's structural deficits, where player costs consumed over half of BRI despite uneven team profitability. These mutual recriminations masked verifiable economic pressures: while aggregate BRI was robust, per-team audits revealed widespread unprofitability outside large markets like and , with owners citing escalating player salaries against stagnant non-national revenue streams as the core issue. The eventual agreement, ratified in December 2011 after 149 days, reduced players' BRI share to a tiered 49-51% (effectively 50-50 in practice), imposed stricter system controls, and yielded owners an estimated $2 billion in additional value over 10 years, validating concerns over prior imbalances without fully resolving small-market vulnerabilities.

Antitrust Threats and Union Decertification

During the 1998–99 NBA lockout, the (NBPA) considered union decertification as a leverage tactic against owners seeking a hard and changes, but Billy Hunter opposed the move, arguing it risked long-term player protections under . Threats of antitrust litigation surfaced, with players potentially claiming the lockout constituted an illegal group boycott under the , but the strategy was not pursued, leading to a on January 20, 1999, that introduced a soft cap and without decertification. The 2011 lockout elevated antitrust threats to a central maneuver, as NBPA leadership, facing owners' demands for reduced basketball-related income (BRI) shares from 57% to as low as 43%, explored decertification to shed the non-statutory labor exemption shielding from antitrust scrutiny during . Decertification would dissolve the union's status under the National Labor Relations Act, enabling individual players or groups to sue the NBA for alleged monopolistic practices, including the lockout's restriction on player mobility and earnings, potentially seeking and injunctive relief. On August 2, , the NBA preemptively filed an charge with the (NLRB) and a federal , accusing the NBPA of bad-faith by threatening decertification and a parallel challenging the lockout's legality. Tensions peaked in November 2011 when, after rejecting the owners' final pre-suit offer of a 50/50 BRI split on , the NBPA filed a "disclaimer of interest" with the NLRB—functionally equivalent to decertification for antitrust purposes—allowing to pursue litigation without awaiting a full vote. That day, 225 , including like and , filed class-action antitrust suits in U.S. District Courts in and , alleging the lockout violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by conspiring to suppress wages and competition. The NBA countered with a motion for a temporary to halt the suits, arguing the labor exemption persisted until bargaining exhaustion, while federal judge Barbara Jones in scheduled hearings that pressured renewed talks. The threat ultimately yielded concessions without prolonged litigation; on November 26, 2011, parties reached a tentative for a 10-year with s at 49–51% of BRI, prompting the NBPA to abandon the and recertify on December 1 to ratify the deal by December 8, ending the 161-day lockout. This episode highlighted decertification's double-edged nature: it amplified leverage by invoking antitrust remedies but exposed vulnerabilities, as owners could exploit a fragmented front without cohesion, a underscored by prior failed decertification attempts in NBA history. Legal scholars noted the maneuver's reliance on of labor-antitrust interplay, with the NLRB's involvement ensuring no permanent occurred.

Public and Media Backlash

Public frustration with the intensified as the work stoppage extended from its start on July 1, 2011, depriving fans of preseason and regular-season games amid disputes over and lengths. Many supporters expressed outrage over the cancellation of up to 20 percent of the scheduled 82-game season, viewing both owners and players as prioritizing financial gains over the league's product, with fans bearing the primary cost through lost entertainment and ticket revenue declines. platforms amplified this discontent, with campaigns like #NBAFanVoice and the NBA Fanifesto enabling collective venting of resentment toward the protracted negotiations, which some fans likened to corporate greed eclipsing fan loyalty. Media outlets criticized the league's leadership for poor , particularly NBA Commissioner David Stern's dismissive rhetoric toward fans, and highlighted players' perceived entitlement given average salaries exceeding $5 million annually against the owners' arguments for long-term . Coverage emphasized that the lockout's 161-day duration, ending December 8, 2011, eroded goodwill, with reports of potential boycotts post-resolution as fans in markets like voiced intentions to abstain from attending games or purchasing merchandise. Pundits argued for greater from both sides, noting that the players' union decertification threat and owners' hardline stance fueled perceptions of mutual intransigence rather than collaborative problem-solving. The backlash extended to symbolic protests, such as Twitter-driven "Occupy NBA" movements mimicking broader economic unrest, underscoring fans' sense of disenfranchisement in a league generating billions in yet unable to avert shutdowns over splits—owners sought a 57 percent player share reduction from 57 to 47 percent initially. Post-lockout analyses revealed sustained fan , with some media attributing minimal dips (around 10 percent) to resilient viewership but warning of long-term trust erosion if similar disputes recurred. Overall, the episode reinforced critiques that labor conflicts in prioritize stakeholder battles over audience retention, with public sentiment tilting against ' public displays of solidarity amid evident financial strains on lower-earning athletes.

References

  1. [1]
    [PDF] The basketball lockout of 2011 - Bureau of Labor Statistics
    The 2011 NBA lockout lasted 149 days, starting July 1, reducing the season to 66 games, and resulted in 16 cancelled games. Players' revenue share was reduced.
  2. [2]
    This Date in the NBA: July | NBA.com
    This was the fourth lockout in the NBA's history. It would last 161 days, ending on December 8, 2011.
  3. [3]
    Season Review: 1998-99 | NBA.com
    The first three months of the 1998-99 season was lost due to a lockout, resulting in play beginning in February of 1999. The normal 82-game NBA season was cut ...
  4. [4]
    [PDF] Labor relations in basketball: the lockout of 1998-99
    1 There was a lockout of NBA referees by the league late in 1995 that lasted a month, but did not interrupt play because the league utilized re- placement ...
  5. [5]
    N.B.A. Superstars, Growth and Lockouts: The David Stern Years
    Jan 1, 2020 · The 2011 Lockout. Thirteen years after the 1998 lockout, the owners did it again. Claiming a majority of teams were losing money, the owners ...
  6. [6]
    About - National Basketball Players Association
    NBA alleged violation of its revenue sharing obligation. Tensions arose again in 1991, when the NBPA alleged that the owners were violating the revenue sharing ...
  7. [7]
    The History of NBA Labor
    The acrimony didn't block a new labor agreement however, as the NBPA came to a three-year labor agreement with the NBA in October of 1970 with an increase ...
  8. [8]
    Article 1 DEFINITIONS | NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement - 2023
    “Base Compensation” means the component of Compensation other than bonuses of any kind. “Basketball Related Income” or “BRI” means basketball related income ...
  9. [9]
    The NBA's Business Model - Investopedia
    Aug 13, 2025 · Basketball-related income includes broadcast rights, advertising, merchandising, and concessions, among other things.
  10. [10]
    [PDF] CBA 101 - NBA.com
    ... Basketball Related Income. (“BRI”) for each year of the CBA. This percentage will be guaranteed to the players so that if. Total Salaries and Benefits are ...<|separator|>
  11. [11]
    NBA Teams Surpassed US$ 11.3 Billion in Revenue in 2024
    According to Forbes, the NBA's 30 teams generated US$ 11.3 billion in total revenue during the 2023–2024 season, reflecting a 13% increase since 2022.Nba Revenues In 2024 · Nba Sponsors Roi · Gameday Revenue
  12. [12]
    NBA revenue statistics (2001-2022) - RunRepeat
    Mar 25, 2024 · The average revenue of an NBA franchise was $213.5 million in the 2020/21 season. · This is a 19% drop from the season before ($264 million).NBA revenue by year · NBA revenue by team · NBA ticket revenue by season
  13. [13]
    The Economics of the NBA: How Basketball Drives Billions in Revenue
    Feb 22, 2025 · The NBA's revenue comes from Basketball-Related Income (BRI), including ticket sales, media rights, merchandising, sponsorships, and ...
  14. [14]
    A confidential report shows nearly half the NBA lost money ... - ESPN
    Sep 19, 2017 · Four teams -- the Warriors, Knicks, Lakers and Bulls -- accounted for $144 million, or 71.5 percent, of those revenue-sharing transfers. There ...
  15. [15]
    How Does the NBA Salary Cap Work? - Front Office Sports
    Jul 10, 2025 · The salary cap changes every year, typically in increasing fashion, because it's tied to league revenue. For the upcoming 2025–2026 season ...
  16. [16]
    NBA Salary Cap FAQ
    A valuable tool for basketball professionals, and that it would become the springboard for a side career that let me experience the league in a way that few ...
  17. [17]
    BASKETBALL; N.B.A. Locks Out Players in First Work Stoppage
    Jul 1, 1995 · The lockout, the league said, cancels payments for the 1995-96 season that players were to receive before the season (some as early as today) ...
  18. [18]
    NBA LOCKS OUT PLAYERS FOR 1ST TIME IN HISTORY
    Jul 1, 1995 · - June 23, 1995: Team owners unanimously approve labor deal. Players table a vote on the proposal, asking union leaders to reopen negotiations ...
  19. [19]
    Significant Dates in the NBA Lockout - The New York Times
    Jan 6, 1999 · July 1, 1995 -- Owners impose a lockout after players refuse to vote on ratification of the new deal. Aug. 8, 1995 -- Owners and players reach a ...
  20. [20]
    WITH LOCKOUT, NBA FACES A FULL-COURT PRESS
    Jul 15, 1995 · On July 1, the NBA locked out its players after the National Basketball Players Association essentially rejected a six-year agreement the ...
  21. [21]
    NBA LOCKS OUT ITS PLAYERS AS LABOR BATTLE CONTINUES
    Jul 1, 1995 · The lockout, the league said, cancels payments for the 1995-96 season that players were to receive before the season (some as early as Saturday ...Missing: details | Show results with:details
  22. [22]
    The 1995 Basketball Lockout | Top 10 U.S. Sports Strikes and ...
    Mar 3, 2011 · The lockout lasted until September 1995 and no games were affected because the league was between seasons. As Houston Rockets' representative ...
  23. [23]
    PRO BASKETBALL;N.B.A. and Players Union Reach Agreement
    Jun 29, 1996 · The National Basketball Association and the players union reached an agreement in principle yesterday to all terms of a six-year collective ...
  24. [24]
    Nba Reaches Accord League, Players Agree On Five-Year Labor Deal
    Jun 29, 1996 · In the collective bargaining agreement that expired after the 1994 season, the players got only $500,000 a year for the use of their likenesses.
  25. [25]
    NBA, Players Union Head for Showdown Next Week
    Jun 22, 1996 · The NBA and the players decided to play the 1995-96 season and negotiate the remaining labor-management disputes after the season. The ...
  26. [26]
    NBA IMPOSES LOCKOUT AS TALKS HALT - Deseret News
    Jul 9, 1996 · The $50 million in dispute would come from profit sharing with NBC and TNT, the league's two TV rights holders. Once the networks recoup the ...
  27. [27]
    OFF THE HARDWOOD, NBA AND PLAYERS DISPUTE CBA FINE ...
    The dispute "involves some significant dollars" including luxury box, naming and pouring rights revenue, and whether they will be classified as Basketball ...
  28. [28]
    NBA Lockout Begins - CBS News
    Jun 30, 1998 · A lockout in the summer of 1995 lasted three months; in 1996 it lasted only a few hours. The old agreement was to run for six years, but the ...
  29. [29]
    BASKETBALL; It's Their Ball, and N.B.A. Owners Call for Lockout
    Jun 30, 1998 · But a three-year out clause enabled the owners to renegotiate the contract if players salaries exceeded 51.8 percent of basketball-related ...
  30. [30]
    Lockout View From the Other Side - The New York Times
    Dec 6, 1998 · In fact, by 1997-98, player salaries had soared to a staggering 57 percent of basketball-related income (each 1 percent increase represents ...
  31. [31]
    NBA Makes New Proposal - CBS News
    Sep 29, 1998 · ... income (BRI) that can be paid toward player salaries. Player payroll costs now account for 57 percent of BRI. In the owners' May 27 proposal ...
  32. [32]
    [PDF] Economic Issues in the 1998–1999 NBA Lockout and the Problem of ...
    Jan 1, 2000 · The owners claimed that the league had become unprofitable and that more than half the teams lost money in 1997–1998. However, the players ...
  33. [33]
    For N.B.A. Owners, 1999 Labor Deal Was Win With Regrets
    claiming losses of more than $300 million a year — are more determined than ever to ...
  34. [34]
    PRO BASKETBALL; Deflected Pact: N.B.A. Owners Reopening ...
    Mar 24, 1998 · ... vote overwhelmingly to void final three years of ... Owners Reopening Labor Agreement. Share full article. By Mike Wise. March 24, 1998.
  35. [35]
    “It Was All About Money”: An Oral History of the 1998-99 NBA Lockout
    Feb 14, 2019 · The 1998-99 NBA lockout spanned 204 days and resulted in the loss of about $500 million in total player salaries and more than $1 billion overall.Missing: prelude triggering
  36. [36]
    ANDERSON: NBA lockout explained - Yale Daily News
    Oct 12, 2011 · Claiming their teams were collectively losing over $300 million a year, owners argued to reduce players' salaries by 40 percent and to limit the ...
  37. [37]
    [PDF] Economic Issues in the 1998-1999 NBA Lockout and the Problem of ...
    One of the owners' demands was that the Bird exception be eliminated. ECONOMIC ISSUES IN THE LOCKOUT. The owners claimed that the league had become unprofitable ...
  38. [38]
    NBA RE-OPENS LABOR NEGOTIATIONS - The Washington Post
    Mar 24, 1998 · The contract now expires on June 30, 1998 instead of June 30, 2001. Stern said he is seeking "a fair agreement for players and owners" that ...
  39. [39]
    Revisiting the NBA's 1998 Lockout - Sports Illustrated
    Sep 22, 2011 · Here is a look back at some of the memorable (and dubious) moments before, during and after the standoff.Missing: prelude triggering
  40. [40]
    NBA Owners Accept Luxury Tax - CBS News
    Oct 14, 1998 · The owners agreed Friday to accept the union's concept of a luxury tax on some contracts to see if such a system will slow salary growth.Missing: split | Show results with:split
  41. [41]
    The Legal Issues Behind the Looming NBA Lockout | HuffPost Sports
    Jun 21, 2011 · The players claimed that the lockout was an illegal "group boycott" under the antitrust laws and asked for a preliminary injunction to block ...<|separator|>
  42. [42]
    Lessons from the extremely ugly, post-lockout 1999 NBA season
    May 5, 2020 · The lockout-shortened season would be the only season in the 3-point era to dip below an effective field goal percentage of 47 (46.6 percent).Missing: effects | Show results with:effects
  43. [43]
    An Oral History of the Lockout-Shortened 1999 NBA Season
    Feb 19, 2019 · The 1998-99 season was infamous for its bad brand of basketball. Players were out of shape, offenses sputtered, and injuries mounted.Missing: prelude | Show results with:prelude
  44. [44]
    The 1998-99 NBA lockout 25 years later: How the league survived ...
    Oct 24, 2023 · The season before the Lakers added Magic and the Celtics picked up Bird ended with the Seattle SuperSonics beating the Washington Bullets in an ...Missing: prelude triggering
  45. [45]
    NBA lockout timeline - Los Angeles Times
    Nov 26, 2011 · July 1, 2011: The NBA locks out its players at 12:01 a.m. EDT as the collective-bargaining agreement expires. “We didn't see any options ...Missing: origins details
  46. [46]
    NBA Owners Are Inflating Loss Estimates, But They're Likely To Win ...
    Jul 1, 2011 · The league contends that 22 of the 30 teams lost money in the 2010-11 season, to the tune of about $370 million per season collectively. At the ...
  47. [47]
    NBA owners get financial concessions they wanted - SFGATE
    Nov 27, 2011 · The reduction in player salaries should offset the NBA's reported $300 million in annual losses, and provide total savings of about $3 billion ...
  48. [48]
    NBA Owners Say They Aren't Lying About Losing That Much Money
    Jul 6, 2011 · Deadspin published a report on how the New Jersey Nets used a tax loophole to make a $6 million profit look like a $27 million loss.
  49. [49]
    NBA lockout: 'Adequate basis' to doubt losses, union says - ESPN
    The NBA players' association will keep doubting the league's financial losses, since it made inaccurate projections before.Missing: demands | Show results with:demands
  50. [50]
    The two sides of the 2011 NBA lockout - Cornell blogs
    Oct 13, 2015 · While the player's outside option is a huge loss of earnings and financial opportunities. The owners aren't dependent on basketball revenue ...
  51. [51]
    Timeline: Key moments in the NBA lockout | Reuters
    Nov 26, 2011 · October 4 - NBA cancels entire 114-game preseason schedule and threatens to scrap first two weeks of the 2011-12 regular season if no new ...
  52. [52]
    NBA players reject league's labor offer - FOX Sports
    Nov 14, 2011 · The players' association rejected the league's latest proposal for a new labor deal Monday and began disbanding, paving the way for a lawsuit ...
  53. [53]
    NBA Lockout Ends: A Comprehensive Timeline From Five Wild Months
    Nov 28, 2011 · Here now are all of the important events of the 2011 NBA lockout. ... November 2, 2011: Paul Pierce reportedly leads a decertification push ...
  54. [54]
    NBA Lockout Heads to Court, Calling Season (and Jobs) Into Doubt
    Nov 21, 2011 · The lawsuit, which the association announced last week, will seek a legal judgment declaring the nearly five-month-old lockout illegal. In ...
  55. [55]
    Effects of NBA lockout felt by everyone involved | CBC Sports
    Oct 11, 2011 · NBA owners will lose $1 million US on average for every game cancelled because of the lockout, and players will lose an estimated $350 million a month.Missing: responses | Show results with:responses
  56. [56]
    Breaking down changes in new CBA - ESPN
    Nov 28, 2011 · The changes in the tentative agreement represent sweeping changes to the NBA's economic system. Here is a summary of the principal deal points as they relate ...Missing: 1998 | Show results with:1998
  57. [57]
    One year later, what did the lockout change? - CBS Sports
    Nov 26, 2012 · On this date a year ago, yours truly was dealing with the evils of sleep-deprivation and the psychological torture inflicted by 149 days of NBA ...
  58. [58]
    The 2011 Basketball Lockout | Stanford Law Review
    Jan 25, 2012 · The lockout substantially disadvantaged the National Basketball Players Association (the union), which was nonetheless able to revive at the eleventh hour of ...
  59. [59]
    NBA lockout's collateral damage - Milwaukee Journal Sentinel
    Nov 1, 2011 · The NBA estimates that 22 of 30 teams lost money in the 2010-'11 season, approximating $370 million collectively. Losses are not news to the NBA ...
  60. [60]
    The NBA Lockout Timeline - Grantland
    Nov 11, 2011 · The NBA Lockout Timeline · June 21, 2005: The league and union agree on a six-year labor deal with the previous accord set to expire in nine days ...
  61. [61]
    Owners Sacrificing Games (or Season?) in Bid to Balance NBA
    Oct 11, 2011 · NBA owners want strict new controls on payrolls, to close a widening gap between big-market and small-market franchises. They want shorter, smaller player ...Missing: sustainability | Show results with:sustainability
  62. [62]
    How "small market" owners took control - ESPN - TrueHoop
    Oct 25, 2011 · Eight owners signed a petition that demanded Stern address the small market/big market financial disparity they felt was a serious and growing ...
  63. [63]
    In NBA Lockout, Owners Take Wrong Path To Competitive Balance
    Oct 13, 2011 · Owners have spent much of the NBA lockout pushing for a harder salary cap to improve the league's competitive balance.Missing: financial sustainability
  64. [64]
    (PDF) Did the Players Give Up Money to Make the NBA Better ...
    Aug 6, 2025 · ... 2011 CBA. The NBA also instituted a new. revenue sharing scheme. The revenue sharing system will not be fully implemented until the 2013-14 ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  65. [65]
    Are NBA Policies that Promote Long-Term Competitive Balance ...
    Competitive balance is a key issue of the financial sustainability in sports ... competitive balance increased following the 1998 NBA lockout. However ...
  66. [66]
    NBA lockout analysis: Fight's just beginning for fractured NBPA
    Nov 12, 2011 · The union held a 57-43 BRI split during the previous CBA. Since the lockout started July 1, the NBPA's take has decreased from 53 to 52.5 to 52 ...
  67. [67]
    "Lessons from the NBA Lockout" by Matthew Parlow
    Several interpretations have been offered to explain the lopsided deal, including the financial strain on players during the lockout and the players' emotional ...
  68. [68]
    NBA files unfair labor practice charge and federal lawsuit against ...
    Aug 2, 2011 · The federal lawsuit seeks to establish, among other things, that the NBA's lockout does not violate federal antitrust laws and that if the ...
  69. [69]
    Roles are reversed in NBA lockout litigation - ESPN
    Aug 3, 2011 · In legal lexicon, the declaratory judgment mechanism allows the defendant (NBA owners) to become the plaintiff. And, most importantly, it ...
  70. [70]
    NBA Lockout: NBPA Files Disclaimer of Interest, Dissolving Union
    ... antitrust grounds. Like the NFLPA earlier this year, the NBPA will become a trade association. The move allows the NBPA to bypass the decertification process.
  71. [71]
    NBA Players Move Legal Fight To Minnesota - CBS News
    Nov 21, 2011 · The locked-out players filed class-action antitrust suits against the league last Tuesday in California and Minnesota. But the California ...Missing: maneuvers | Show results with:maneuvers
  72. [72]
    Players file suits against the NBA - The Boston Globe
    Nov 16, 2011 · NBA players filed an antitrust complaint against the league in Minnesota and filed another complaint in California last night.Missing: maneuvers | Show results with:maneuvers
  73. [73]
    N.B.A. and Players Update Lawsuits in Labor Battle
    Nov 16, 2011 · The N.B.A.'s lawsuit, filed Aug. 1, sought a declaratory judgment that its lockout of the players is legal and not subject to antitrust statutes ...
  74. [74]
    NBA players, owners let the lawyers do the sniping now - NBC Sports
    Nov 16, 2011 · The lawsuit in Minnesota seeks to throw Stern's tactics right back at him. ... The legal maneuvers are great and all, but at the end of the day ...
  75. [75]
    NBA lockout: Owners, players reach tentative agreement to start ...
    Nov 26, 2011 · The players also would have to dismiss their antitrust lawsuit in Minnesota, reconstruct the union and pass the deal by a majority vote of its ...
  76. [76]
    [PDF] NBA V. NBPA: Tactical Strike Or Tactical Blunder? - Law360
    Sep 20, 2011 · The NBA alleges that the NBPA has repeatedly threatened to decertify and commence an antitrust lawsuit, and seeks a declaratory judgment that (1) ...
  77. [77]
    N.B.A. and Players Reach Deal to End Lockout - The New York Times
    Nov 26, 2011 · The new agreement calls for a 50-50 split of basketball-related revenues between the owners and the players, about $2 billion for each side in current terms.
  78. [78]
    The Financial Impact Of The NBA Lockout - Forbes
    Nov 3, 2011 · An estimated $4.2 billion in league revenues and $2.2 billion in player compensation were on the line when the lockout began at the end of June.Missing: arguments | Show results with:arguments
  79. [79]
    NBA Lockout Costs League $800 Million...and Counting - Forbes
    Nov 16, 2011 · NBA Lockout Has Already Cost season $800 million and counting. But players are certainly justified to fight in the courts given the ...
  80. [80]
    NBA lockout puts Blazers relationships with sponsors at risk
    Nov 21, 2011 · No sponsor has pulled its funding from the team so far during a lockout that has lasted 144 days. But as the NBA owners and players continue ...Missing: losses | Show results with:losses
  81. [81]
    Temporal Trends and Severity in Injury and Illness Incidence ... - NIH
    Moderate and severe injuries were similar throughout the 11-year reporting period except for a substantial increase in the lockout-shortened 2012 season.
  82. [82]
    Injuries Are Costing NBA Stars Lots Of Playing Time During ...
    Jan 10, 2012 · One of the big concerns coming into the shortened 2011-12 NBA season was the toll it would take on players' bodies. Every season no matter ...
  83. [83]
    [PDF] Sports medicine researcher studies impact of lockouts, warns NBA ...
    Dec 12, 2011 · With the National Basketball Association (NBA) training camps now underway, serious injuries may come next. A national sports medicine.
  84. [84]
    NBA Lockout Could Put Players at Risk of Injury, Expert Says
    Nov 30, 2011 · The NBA lockout, which similarly prevented players from accessing team facilities and training staff, lasted 149 days. "These teams have a very ...Missing: quality | Show results with:quality
  85. [85]
    The NBA Lockout Has Increased Injury Rates - Team Rankings
    Feb 7, 2012 · The lockout has increased injuries only because more games have been played, and not because of the extra grind associated with back-to-back games.
  86. [86]
    https://www.statista.com/statistics/208398/fast-food-consumption-among-tv-viewers/
  87. [87]
    TV's Winners and Losers of the NBA Return (Analysis)
    Nov 30, 2011 · Opinions vary on whether the NBA work stoppage, which may have alienated the casual fan, will translate into a ratings hit for the league.
  88. [88]
    Despite Lockout, NBA Scores in Ratings | Next TV
    Apr 29, 2012 · ABC averaged a 3.3 US household rating, 3.83 million households and 5.4 million viewers for its 15 NBA games during the labor-shortened season, according to ...Missing: impact fan engagement
  89. [89]
    The 2011-2021 NBA collective bargaining agreement - ResearchGate
    The lockout concluded with a ten-year CBA, a mutual opt-out in 2017, and revenue sharing between 49 and 51 percent of basketball-related income. The league ...
  90. [90]
    Breaking Down The Breakdown: The NBA Lockout | The Dream Shake
    Jun 30, 2011 · Players agree to cut back salaries by $200 million over 10 years to alleviate giving up 17% annually in revenue sharing they retain $300 ...Missing: expiration date
  91. [91]
    [PDF] The 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement's Impact on Competitive ...
    This paper aims to determine whether competitive balance in the NBA improved under the 2011. CBA. The paper also determines which types of players' salaries ...
  92. [92]
    Billy Hunter on NBA Lockout: 'It's All About Greed' - SLAM Magazine
    It's all about greed,” Hunter said. “It ain't about nothing else.” So, yeah, not exactly a rosy outlook for the immediate future of the NBA.Missing: allegations | Show results with:allegations
  93. [93]
    NBA lockout analysis: Blame the owners - CSMonitor.com
    Oct 25, 2011 · ... lockout is not a fight between greedy owners and greedy players. It is a fight between selfish owners and selfish owners. The players, all ...
  94. [94]
    Tallying up the NBA lockout costs - ESPN - Dollars
    Dec 1, 2011 · The average player in the NBA made $5.15 million last season, meaning the average loss would be $1.03 million. But with the average salary ...
  95. [95]
    Stern blames 'greedy' agents for prolonged NBA lockout | CBC Sports
    Nov 12, 2011 · Commissioner David Stern blames "greedy" NBA agents for trying to scuttle a new labour deal and believes they are trying to push their ...Missing: criticisms | Show results with:criticisms
  96. [96]
    No sympathy for players in NBA lockout - The Suffolk Journal
    Player union president Derek Fisher claimed that it is well known that the players simply just want to play, claiming that a lockout is not a strike and they ...
  97. [97]
    Two Economists Explain the NBA Lockout - Grantland
    Oct 31, 2011 · What do the owners have to lose? Net revenues from the lost games and any decline in the value of their franchises due to fan alienation and ...
  98. [98]
    The NBA lockout ends: Winners and losers | The Week
    Jan 8, 2015 · The owners stand to make as much as an additional $2 billion over 10 years thanks to the new deal, says Ben Golliver at CBS Sports. And really, ...
  99. [99]
    N.B.A. Files Suit Against Players' Union - The New York Times
    Aug 2, 2011 · In its filing with National Labor Relations Board, the league said the union's threat to decertify and its lawsuit challenging the legality of ...
  100. [100]
    NBA Lockout: NBPA Rejects Deal, Announces It Will File ... - SB Nation
    Nov 14, 2011 · NBA Lockout: NBPA Rejects Deal, Announces It Will File For Decertification ... “We're prepared to file this anti-trust action against the NBA.<|separator|>
  101. [101]
    NBA Players File Antitrust Lawsuits Against League - CBS News
    Nov 17, 2011 · The locked-out players, including Carmelo Anthony and Kevin Durant, filed class-action antitrust lawsuits against the league on Tuesday in at ...
  102. [102]
    Lessons from the NFL and NBA Lockouts of " by Nathaniel Grow
    The NFL and NBA unions dissolved during 2011 lockouts to gain negotiating leverage, despite prior literature suggesting it was unlikely.
  103. [103]
    Fans lose in NBA lockout struggle - The Maneater
    Oct 25, 2011 · A while back I wrote about how the NBA lockout was detrimental to its overall success ... Fans lose in NBA lockout struggle. Michael Bracciano.Missing: backlash recovery
  104. [104]
    NBAFanVoice: NBA Fans Speaking Out Against Lockout
    Oct 18, 2011 · NBA fans and members of SB Nation from around the country are speaking up and speaking out against the NBA lockout. You can see all the links so ...
  105. [105]
    NBA Fans Are Ripping Players and Owners on NBAFanifesto.com
    Nov 15, 2011 · Red Auerbach wrote, “Greedy players…greedier owners. I no longer 'love this game.'” Tim wrote, “The NBA is dead to me.” Milt wrote, “For ...Missing: allegations | Show results with:allegations
  106. [106]
    NBA lockout battle with owners should remind players that ...
    Jul 1, 2011 · NBA lockout battle with owners should remind players that perception matters. July 1, 2011More than 14 years ago.
  107. [107]
    In NBA Lockout, Fans At Least Deserve Honesty - SB Nation
    Aug 25, 2011 · Fans are being deprived basketball during the NBA lockout. They at least deserve honesty from those taking the sport away. by Tom Ziller.
  108. [108]
    Fans, arena workers suffer through NBA lockout - The Oklahoman
    Oct 23, 2011 · “They're leaving the fan out in the cold.” In many cities, fans with opinions like Wallace's would and perhaps already have boycotted NBA ball.
  109. [109]
    #NBAFanVoice: Fans true losers in NBA lockout | Liberty Ballers
    Oct 17, 2011 · Here at SBNation, we're tired. Tired of the disingenuous rhetoric coming from David Stern. Tired of the bravado coming from the players.
  110. [110]
    Occupy NBA: How Twitter helped the fans have a voice in this lockout.
    Nov 28, 2011 · ... NBA fans staged their own Occupy NBA protest during the lockout. Would we march at the hotel that the players' union and owners were…
  111. [111]
    Why The NBA Lockout Wasn't So Bad After All - Forbes
    Dec 2, 2011 · A 66-game season with 990 total games just might be the right length. The good news for fans is that every game will count, and there won't be ...