Non-attached members
Non-attached members, also known as non-inscrits in French, are Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who do not belong to any of the formally recognized political groups within the institution.[1] These MEPs typically represent national parties or independents whose ideological positions or strategic choices prevent affiliation with groups that require at least 23 members from seven or more member states sharing political affinities.[1][2] Unlike grouped MEPs, non-attached members operate individually or in loose coordination, with their parliamentary rights—such as speaking time, committee assignments, and budget allocations for political activities—governed by specific rules set by the Parliament's Bureau.[3] They receive dedicated funding for information and political activities, administered separately from group budgets, but lack collective influence in key bodies like the Conference of Presidents, where they hold one non-voting seat.[3][4] In the 10th European Parliament (2024–2029), approximately 30 MEPs are non-attached, comprising a heterogeneous mix drawn from diverse national contexts, including smaller or non-mainstream parties across the ideological spectrum.[5] This status allows flexibility but limits procedural advantages, such as enhanced agenda-setting power afforded to larger groups.[2]Definition and Legal Framework
Definition and Terminology
Non-attached members, formally designated as such in the European Parliament's organizational rules, are Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who choose not to join or are ineligible for any of the Parliament's cross-national political groups.[1] These individuals operate independently of group structures, which are formed based on shared political affinities and require a minimum of 23 MEPs from at least seven member states to establish.[1] The status ensures that MEPs cannot simultaneously belong to multiple groups, preserving the integrity of group-based parliamentary organization.[1] The terminology originates from the French "non-inscrits," literally meaning "non-registered" or "non-enrolled," and is commonly abbreviated as NI in official parliamentary records and proceedings.[6] This designation highlights their lack of inscription into a political group, contrasting with the structured affiliations that dominate parliamentary activities, such as committee assignments and plenary debates.[7] Non-attached status does not imply formal independence from national parties, as MEPs may still align with domestic political entities while forgoing European group membership.[8]Formation Rules for Political Groups
Political groups in the European Parliament are established pursuant to Rule 32 of the Parliament's Rules of Procedure, which permits Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to organize into groups based solely on shared political affinities, explicitly prohibiting formations grounded in national parties, offices, or technical considerations.[9] This requirement ensures that groups reflect ideological coherence rather than parochial or procedural alignments, fostering transnational parliamentary cooperation.[10] To qualify as a political group, a minimum threshold of 23 MEPs is required, drawn from at least one-quarter of the EU Member States—currently seven out of 27—ensuring broad geographic representation across the Union.[1] [10] MEPs from the same national party cannot form or dominate a group independently, and no MEP may simultaneously belong to more than one group, as stipulated in Rule 33, which underscores the exclusive nature of group membership to prevent overlapping allegiances. These numerical and compositional criteria, adjusted downward from 25 MEPs following the 2019 elections to account for the reduced Parliament size post-Brexit, aim to balance inclusivity with viability for effective group functioning.[11] Formation occurs primarily during the constitutive session at the start of each parliamentary term, typically within one month of the Parliament's opening after European elections, though groups may also reconstitute following significant membership changes, such as expulsions or withdrawals, provided the deadlines and criteria are met.[10] Declarations of group formation must be submitted to the President of the Parliament, who verifies compliance with the rules before granting official recognition, including entitlements to resources like funding, staff, and committee representation.[1] MEPs unable or unwilling to join an existing group or meet these thresholds for a new one default to non-attached status, highlighting how stringent formation rules inherently delineate the boundaries of group affiliation.[10]| Criterion | Requirement |
|---|---|
| Minimum MEPs | 23 |
| Minimum Member States represented | 7 (one-quarter of 27 EU states) |
| Basis of formation | Political affinity only; no national, technical, or office-based groups |
| Membership exclusivity | One group per MEP; no dual affiliations |
| Timing | Within one month of term start or relevant membership changes |
Role and Limitations in the European Parliament
Procedural Rights and Participation
Non-attached members, also known as non-inscrits (NI), retain core procedural rights as individual Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), including the ability to vote on all legislative and non-legislative matters without restriction, submit written questions to EU institutions under Rule 144, and participate in Question Time pursuant to Rule 143.[10] They may also table amendments in committee proceedings as per Rule 224 and deliver personal statements during plenary sessions under Rule 180.[10] However, unlike MEPs affiliated with political groups, non-attached members lack collective mechanisms for amplifying their input, requiring them to secure individual support from other MEPs to advance motions or amendments effectively.[8] In plenary debates, speaking time for non-attached members is allocated separately after distributions to political groups, calculated proportionally to their overall numbers and often doubled to accommodate linguistic and procedural diversity among them, as outlined in Rule 178.[12] This allocation ensures minimal representation but remains subordinate to group priorities, resulting in fewer opportunities compared to grouped MEPs, who benefit from coordinated slots.[8] Non-attached members may request extraordinary plenary debates or question time sessions if at least 36 of them support the initiative, per Rules 168 and 142, though this threshold is rarely met given their typical small numbers—fewer than 50 in most terms.[10] They also hold a non-voting representative position in the Conference of Presidents, allowing observation but not decision-making influence under Rule 26.[10] Regarding committee participation, non-attached members can be appointed to standing committees and delegations via nominations under Rules 216 and 229, and they receive access to proceedings and documents on par with other MEPs.[10] Nevertheless, they are excluded from coordinators' meetings, which shape agendas and rapporteur assignments, and rarely secure chair or vice-chair positions, which are reserved primarily for political groups.[10] This limits their strategic input, as they cannot nominate shadow rapporteurs or participate in fact-finding missions or oral questioning of the Commission as routinely as group members do.[8] The Bureau of the Parliament determines their specific parliamentary status and rights under Rule 31, ensuring baseline equity but reinforcing group advantages in resource allocation and influence.[13]Funding, Resources, and Influence
Non-attached members receive collective financial support from the European Parliament's budget (item 400, totaling €67.5 million in 2024) for a shared secretariat and political and information activities, administered via direct payments or reimbursements by the Parliament's secretariat without independent management or carry-over of unused funds.[10] This contrasts with political groups, which receive proportional allocations based on membership size as of 1 January each year, manage funds autonomously, and may carry over up to 50% of unused amounts.[10] [14] The non-attached secretariat is funded directly by the Parliament but permits no employment of additional contractual staff from this budget, unlike political groups, which establish secretariats scaled to membership and hire such personnel.[10] Individual non-attached members retain equal access to per-MEP budgets for accredited parliamentary assistants (up to €30,769 monthly in 2025 for staff expenses) and standard allowances, such as the €350 daily subsistence rate.[10] [15] However, the absence of group-scale resources constrains collective administrative and operational capacity. These limitations curtail non-attached members' influence, as political groups leverage superior funding and staffing for enhanced coordination, research, events, and advocacy, securing advantages in committee roles, rapporteurships, and speaking time allocations.[10] Non-attached members lack formal coordinators in committees and must rely on individual efforts or ad hoc alliances, reducing their procedural leverage and impact on legislative outcomes despite retaining basic rights like tabling amendments.[10] Audited statements of non-attached expenditures are published by the Parliament, ensuring transparency but underscoring their dependent status.[10]Reasons for Non-Attachment
Ideological and Political Factors
Non-attached members frequently arise from ideological incompatibilities with the European Parliament's established political groups, which mandate a shared political affinity among members as per Rule 33 of the EP's Rules of Procedure.[16] This requirement ensures groups coalesce around coherent positions on core issues like EU integration, economic policy, and social matters, leaving MEPs whose views diverge significantly—often toward more extreme Euroscepticism, nationalism, or minority ideological stances—unable or unwilling to join.[17] For example, parties prioritizing uncompromised national sovereignty may reject group affiliation to avoid diluting their positions through transnational negotiations, as group membership implies acceptance of collective policy lines that could conflict with domestic mandates.[18] Eurosceptic MEPs, in particular, often remain non-attached when their opposition to supranational authority exceeds the boundaries of groups like the Identity and Democracy (ID) or European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), which tolerate limited reformism but enforce internal cohesion on integration-related votes.[19] Data from voting analyses show non-inscrits exhibiting lower cohesion with mainstream groups, reflecting ideological outliers such as radical anti-federalism or resistance to EU fiscal transfers, which hinder alignment despite numerical thresholds for group formation (at least 23 MEPs from seven member states).[20] In the 2019–2024 term, for instance, non-attached MEPs included representatives from parties like Hungary's Fidesz during its initial post-election period, driven by tensions over rule-of-law conditions and migration policies that clashed with ECR demands for moderated nationalism.[21] Political factors compound these ideological rifts, as national party platforms emphasizing cultural conservatism, economic protectionism, or non-interventionist foreign policies (e.g., skepticism toward NATO or EU sanctions on Russia) create mismatches with groups' pro-EU leanings or compromise-oriented agendas.[22] Empirical studies confirm policy compatibility as the dominant driver of affiliations, with non-attached status persisting for MEPs whose left-right or GAL-TAN (Green/Alternative-Libertarian vs. Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist) positions fall outside group medians, prioritizing ideological purity over procedural advantages like enhanced speaking time or funding.[18] This dynamic has grown with rising fragmentation, as smaller or regionally focused parties—such as certain far-left or extreme-right factions—lack the ideological overlap needed for viable alliances, opting instead for independence to preserve voter-aligned stances unfiltered by group discipline.[23]Expulsions, Withdrawals, and Strategic Decisions
Expulsions from political groups in the European Parliament often stem from violations of group statutes, including policy divergences or involvement in scandals that undermine collective values. For instance, on October 17, 2025, the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) group expelled the three MEPs from Slovakia's Smer-SD party, citing a breach of core values related to foreign policy positions perceived as insufficiently supportive of Ukraine amid its conflict with Russia.[24] The expelled MEPs, including Ľubica Janíková and others from the delegation, transitioned to non-attached status, with Smer-SD spokesperson Monika Beňová criticizing the decision as punishing a preference for "peace above war."[24] Similarly, on March 4, 2025, S&D suspended two MEPs amid investigations tied to the Qatargate corruption scandal, relocating them to the non-attached ranks pending immunity proceedings requested by Belgian prosecutors.[25] Voluntary withdrawals occur when MEPs or delegations deem group membership incompatible with their ideological commitments, prioritizing autonomy over collective resources. The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MEPs withdrew from left-wing groups following the 2014 European elections, rejecting alignments that conflicted with their stances on migration, climate policies, and EU foreign interventions.[26] In July 2024, Czechia’s Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) MEPs exited The Left group for analogous reasons, including opposition to group positions on migration and environmental regulations, viewing continued affiliation as a compromise of programmatic integrity.[26] These exits reflect a calculated assessment that non-attached status preserves doctrinal purity despite forfeiting group funding and procedural advantages. Strategic decisions to forgo or abandon group attachment frequently arise among MEPs from parties emphasizing national sovereignty or rejecting supranational compromises. Romanian MEP Diana Șoșoacă, elected in 2024, declined overtures from potential groups, citing imposed conditions on issues like LGBTIQ rights as unacceptable dilutions of her positions; she stated, “I wasn’t looking for a group, they were looking for me, and they put conditions on it ... they want to be politically correct.”[26] Such choices enable MEPs to evade mandatory group voting cohesion under Rule 34 of the Parliament's Rules of Procedure, allowing freer alignment with national mandates or personal convictions, though at the cost of diminished influence in committee assignments and plenary debates.[1] This approach is common among sovereignist or extremist factions wary of the ideological concessions required for group formation thresholds of 23 MEPs from at least seven member states.[1]Historical Evolution
Inception in Early Directly Elected Parliaments (1979–1994)
The first direct elections to the European Parliament on 7–10 June 1979 marked the inception of non-attached membership in the context of universal suffrage, with 410 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) elected from nine member states. Of these, 400 joined one of seven political groups, while 10 MEPs (2.44%) remained non-attached, or non-inscrits. These non-attached MEPs included representatives from smaller or ideologically distinct national parties, such as certain regionalists or independents, who did not align with existing groups due to insufficient compatible partners or principled opposition to transnational affiliations. Non-attached status conferred limited procedural rights compared to group members, including reduced access to speaking time in plenary, committee assignments prioritized for groups, and no collective funding for staff or activities, though individual MEPs retained personal allowances.[27] At the time, Parliament's rules permitted political groups to form with a minimum of nine MEPs sharing political affinities and representing at least three nationalities, without stringent multinational distribution requirements. This low threshold facilitated the creation of smaller groups like the Group for the Technical Coordination and Defence of Independent Groups and Members (CDI, 11 seats), which absorbed potential independents such as Gaullists and other non-mainstream conservatives, and the Group of European Progressive Democrats (DEP, 22 seats). Consequently, non-attachment was rare, as MEPs from fringe ideologies—often far-right, communist dissidents, or nationalists—could coalesce into technical or affinity-based groups rather than remain isolated. The system's emphasis on voluntary political alignment, rooted in the Parliament's pre-1979 practices, prioritized cohesion for influence but left non-attached MEPs as marginal actors, comprising under 5% of seats.[28][29] In the subsequent 1984–1989 term, following elections on 14–17 June 1984, the Parliament expanded slightly to 434 MEPs with Greece's full integration, yet non-attached members dwindled to 7 (1.61%), reflecting further group consolidation amid eight formations, including the Group of the European Right (16 seats) for nationalists. The 1989–1994 term saw enlargement to 12 states and 518 MEPs after Spain and Portugal's accession, with non-attached rising modestly to 12 (2.32%), still below 5%, as 10 groups emerged to accommodate diverse post-Cold War ideologies. Throughout this period, non-attachment persisted primarily among MEPs whose national parties lacked transnational equivalents or rejected compromise, underscoring the early Parliament's dynamics of limited fragmentation before stricter group-formation rules (raising thresholds to 23 MEPs from one-third of states by 1993) incentivized affiliation.[30][31][29]Growth Amid Party Fragmentation (1994–2014)
During the fourth European Parliament term (1994–1999), the number of non-attached members rose to 27, comprising 4.8% of the total 567 MEPs, compared to 12 (2.3%) in the prior term.[32] This increase stemmed partly from the dissolution of the Technical Group of the European Right following the 1994 elections, leaving its members without affiliation, alongside the inability of smaller nationalist and regionalist parties to meet group formation thresholds or integrate into emerging alliances like the new Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN).[28] The fifth term (1999–2004) saw relative stability, with non-attached members holding steady at 26 seats out of 626 MEPs (4.2%), as some independents joined groups like the Europe of Democracies and Diversities (EDD) or Independence/Democracy (IND/DEM) after its formation in 2004.[32] However, underlying fragmentation persisted, driven by the proliferation of national parties emphasizing sovereignty, regionalism, and opposition to further integration post-Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties, which hindered cohesive transnational grouping.[33] The 2004 enlargement dramatically amplified this trend by adding 154 MEPs from ten new Central and Eastern member states, introducing post-communist successor parties, agrarian movements, and nationalists whose platforms often diverged from Western-dominated groups.[34] In the sixth term (2004–2009), non-attached membership averaged around 29 out of 732–785 MEPs (approximately 3.7–4%), but fluctuated higher—reaching up to 44 at points—due to failed group formations and internal splits, such as those in IND/DEM.[20][35] Many Eastern MEPs from parties like Poland's Self-Defence or Latvia's For Human Rights remained unattached, as ideological mismatches and insufficient numbers from seven states prevented new groups, while mainstream alliances like the EPP and PES selectively admitted members to preserve cohesion.[33] The seventh term (2009–2014) continued this pattern amid the eurozone crisis, with non-attached numbers starting at around 30–35 out of 736–754 MEPs and peaking above 40 following 2009 election gains by eurosceptic and radical parties, including the UK's British National Party (three seats) and France's National Front (initially unattached before smaller formations).[34][35] The 2007 addition of 34 MEPs from Bulgaria and Romania further diversified the chamber, but similar integration barriers persisted for outliers like ethnic minority or anti-EU parties. Overall, this era's growth reflected causal factors including electoral volatility, stricter post-enlargement group rules (requiring 25 MEPs from one-quarter of states), and deliberate exclusions by established groups wary of reputational risks from associating with non-mainstream ideologies.[6]Contemporary Dynamics and Eurosceptic Trends (2014–Present)
In the 8th European Parliament (2014–2019), non-attached members initially numbered 52, representing 6.92% of seats following the constitutive session after the May 2014 elections.[36] This figure temporarily surged to around 100 in October 2014 amid flux in group formations, as several Eurosceptic delegations, including France's National Front, awaited or debated alliances before the Europe of Nations and Freedoms (ENF) group coalesced in June 2015 with 36 members focused on national sovereignty and anti-federalism.[37] The non-attached cohort included Eurosceptic outliers such as Greece's Golden Dawn (2 MEPs) and independents from Poland and the UK, reflecting fragmentation among right-wing nationalists unable or unwilling to meet the 25-MEP, seven-country threshold for groups due to ideological divergences or insufficient transnational coordination.[38] Overall Eurosceptic representation reached 29% of the Parliament (221 MEPs), driven by gains in the wake of the Eurozone crisis and migration pressures, though most consolidated into the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) and ENF groups, leaving non-attached as a residual for purist or isolated skeptics.[37] The 9th European Parliament (2019–2024) saw non-attached members stabilize at 57 seats (approximately 8%) in the July 2019 constitutive session, fluctuating to around 50 by term's end amid expulsions and withdrawals.[39] [40] Composition featured Eurosceptic parties like Bulgaria's Revival (Volya) and Romania's Alliance for the Union of Romanians, alongside independents and those ousted from groups, such as certain Alternative for Germany (AfD) affiliates post-internal ID disputes.[41] Eurosceptic MEPs comprised about 31% overall when including non-attached, bolstered by post-Brexit nationalism and COVID-19 policy critiques, yet improved organization into Identity and Democracy (ID, successor to ENF) and European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) limited non-attached growth by absorbing moderate skeptics, confining the category to harder-line or domestically focused elements resistant to group compromises.[42] Post-2014 dynamics highlight persistent Eurosceptic trends in non-attached ranks despite group consolidations, with numbers hovering at 7–8% of seats as ideological rigidity and national variances hinder full integration.[37] Temporary spikes, like the 2014 peak, underscore causal factors including election-driven surges (e.g., 2014's "Eurosceptic earthquake" yielding anti-EU gains in France, UK, and Denmark) and procedural hurdles, where failure to align across seven states strands delegations.[43] This fragmentation reflects deeper causal realism in Eurosceptic politics—prioritizing sovereignty over diluted alliances—yet non-attached status curtails procedural rights, incentivizing eventual grouping while sustaining dissent against EU integration, as evidenced by consistent representation of anti-federalist voices amid rising populism.[44] By 2024, such trends amplified rightward shifts, with non-attached serving as a barometer for unaccommodated skepticism amid broader parliamentary polarization.[45]Composition by Parliamentary Term
10th European Parliament (2024–2029)
The 10th European Parliament, elected from 6 to 9 June 2024 and convened on 16 July 2024, features 30 non-attached members (Non-Inscrits), comprising 4% of the total 720 MEPs.[5] These independents represent 12 member states and encompass ideological diversity, including far-left parties rejecting group affiliations, nationalist formations excluded from right-wing alliances, and minor or satirical outfits lacking sufficient scale for group formation.[5] Unlike the immediate post-election period, where provisional non-attachments exceeded 40 due to ongoing group negotiations, the figure stabilized at 30 by late July 2024 following the establishment of new groups like Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) and Patriots for Europe, which absorbed many initially unaligned eurosceptics.[46] Prominent national contingents include five MEPs from Slovakia's Direction – Social Democracy (Smer-SD), a party aligned with Prime Minister Robert Fico's government, which prioritizes national sovereignty and has critiqued EU sanctions on Russia, precluding S&D membership.[5] Greece contributes five non-attached MEPs: three from the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), which historically declines GUE/NGL affiliation to preserve ideological purity, and two from the right-wing Democratic Patriotic Movement NIKI.[5] Germany's single representative, from the satirical Die PARTEI, reflects niche protest politics, while Denmark's two from the Denmark Democrats underscore nationalist reservations about broader ECR integration. Smaller presences include independents or minor parties from Cyprus, Czechia, France, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, and Lithuania.[5] Non-attached status limits these MEPs' procedural influence, as they lack group funding, dedicated staff, and voting coordination, though they retain full committee and plenary participation rights.762337) By October 2025, the cohort remained at 30, with no significant shifts reported beyond routine substitutions for vacancies, reflecting the term's early solidification of group boundaries amid heightened fragmentation from rising sovereignist and leftist dissent.760403_EN.pdf) This composition highlights the Parliament's mechanism for accommodating outliers, preventing monopolization by mainstream groups while constraining their collective leverage.[1]9th European Parliament (2019–2024)
In the 9th European Parliament, convened following the elections of 23–26 May 2019, non-attached members (known as non-inscrits or NI) initially numbered 57 out of 751 MEPs, representing about 7.6% of the assembly. This figure was inflated by the 29 MEPs elected on the UK's Brexit Party list, who declined to join any recognized political group, alongside smaller contingents from national parties unwilling or unable to meet group formation thresholds, such as independents and minor far-right or Eurosceptic representatives.[47] The UK's departure from the EU on 31 January 2020 led to the automatic vacation of all 73 British seats, including the Brexit Party's, reducing the Parliament to 705 MEPs and sharply contracting the NI cohort to around 28 by early 2020.[48] Subsequent fluctuations arose from internal group dynamics, expulsions, and strategic withdrawals. A pivotal shift occurred in March 2021, when Hungary's Fidesz–KDNP alliance, holding 13 seats, ended its contested affiliation with the European People's Party (EPP) group—following a suspension in 2019 over rule-of-law disputes—and transitioned to non-attached status, citing irreconcilable differences on migration and EU federalism. This influx made Fidesz the largest single-party bloc within NI, comprising over 40% of its members at the time and shifting the overall NI profile toward nationalist-conservative orientations. Additional joiners included Greek independents like Alexis Georgoulis (expelled from The Left in 2023 amid internal party conflicts) and Eva Kaili (removed from the S&D group on 9 December 2022 following her arrest in a corruption probe involving Qatargate).[8] Other sporadic additions stemmed from national-level defections, such as Slovak or Polish MEPs distancing from mainstream groups, though NI remained ideologically heterogeneous, encompassing residual Eurosceptics, sanctioned extremists, and unaffiliated centrists.[17] By mid-term, NI stabilized at 40–45 members, reflecting a net increase from post-Brexit lows despite occasional movements, such as Five Star Movement MEPs briefly in NI before some aligned with Greens/EFA in 2019. The group's composition leaned rightward, with Fidesz dominating alongside figures like Greece's Ioannis Lagos (a former Golden Dawn affiliate, stripped of immunity in 2020) and scattered representatives from parties like Germany's Die Partei or Slovakia's Smer. Non-inscrits lacked group privileges, including funding, dedicated staff, and agenda-setting powers, limiting their procedural influence; they received minimal speaking time (proportional to size) and could not initiate reports or amendments independently. Nonetheless, individual NI MEPs participated in committees and plenary debates, often amplifying dissent on issues like EU fiscal policy and migration.[17][8] As the term progressed toward its July 2024 conclusion, NI grew to 50 members out of 720 MEPs (post-reallocations), equivalent to 6.9%, amid rising fragmentation from populist and conservative factions unable or unwilling to integrate into groups like ECR or ID. This expansion underscored broader trends of Eurosceptic detachment, with NI serving as a repository for MEPs facing group expulsions or pursuing independent platforms, though their lack of cohesion curtailed collective impact. Key data on NI evolution:| Period | Approximate NI Size | Key Drivers |
|---|---|---|
| July 2019 (post-constitutive session) | 57 | Brexit Party dominance; initial independents |
| Feb–Mar 2020 (post-Brexit) | 28 | Loss of UK seats |
| Apr 2021 | ~40 | Fidesz influx (13 MEPs) |
| Dec 2022–Apr 2024 | 45–50 | Expulsions (e.g., Kaili); minor defections |
8th European Parliament (2014–2019)
In the constitutive session following the 2014 European Parliament elections, the non-attached members (NI) comprised 52 MEPs, representing 6.92% of the total 751 seats.[36] These members originated primarily from Eurosceptic, nationalist, and independent parties across several member states, reflecting a surge in support for such forces amid economic discontent and migration concerns post-2008 financial crisis.[49] Unlike affiliated groups, NI members lacked collective speaking time, funding, and procedural privileges, operating individually or through ad hoc alliances, which limited their institutional influence despite numerical presence.[6] The initial NI composition was distributed as follows:| Country | NI Seats |
|---|---|
| Austria | 4 |
| Belgium | 1 |
| France | 23 |
| Germany | 2 |
| Greece | 5 |
| Hungary | 3 |
| Italy | 5 |
| Netherlands | 4 |
| Poland | 4 |
| United Kingdom | 1 |
| Total | 52 |