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Occupational licensing

Occupational licensing refers to government regulations mandating that individuals obtain a state-issued license, often involving education, exams, fees, and experience requirements, before legally practicing a specified occupation, with the stated purpose of verifying competence and protecting consumers from harm. In the United States, these requirements affect approximately 25 percent of the workforce, a sharp increase from about 5 percent in the 1950s, encompassing fields from medicine and law to cosmetology and interior design.^[1]^[2]^[3] Empirical analyses reveal that occupational licensing functions primarily as a barrier to entry, restricting labor supply and interstate mobility while raising wages for incumbents by 10 to 15 percent, though at the cost of reduced overall employment and elevated prices for services.^[4]^[5]^[6] Studies consistently find scant evidence that licensing enhances service quality in low-risk occupations, such as hair braiding or floristry, where incompetence poses minimal public danger, yet it disproportionately burdens low-income and minority workers seeking entry-level jobs.^[7]^[8]^[9] Proponents defend licensing in high-stakes domains like dentistry or engineering, where it may yield marginal safety gains, but broader expansion has drawn criticism for enabling incumbent protectionism over consumer welfare, prompting reform efforts to sunset unnecessary rules and adopt universal recognition across states.^[10]^[11] Overall, quantitative assessments indicate net welfare losses from over-licensing, as higher costs and supply constraints outweigh purported quality benefits in most cases.^[12]^[13]

Definition and Core Concepts

Definition and Scope

Occupational licensing constitutes a form of government regulation whereby individuals must obtain explicit permission, in the form of a state-issued license, to legally engage in a specified profession or vocation. This permission is granted only after satisfying mandatory entry barriers, which may include formal education, apprenticeships, competency examinations, fees, bonding, or minimum experience thresholds, as determined by regulatory authorities.^[14] Unlike voluntary private certifications, which signal skills but do not prohibit unlicensed practice, occupational licensing renders unauthorized work illegal, subject to civil or criminal penalties enforced by government agencies or licensing boards.^[15] These boards often include incumbent practitioners who influence standards, potentially embedding protectionist elements alongside public safety aims.^[16] The scope of occupational licensing encompasses hundreds of occupations across sectors, ranging from high-stakes fields like medicine, dentistry, and engineering—where licensure originated to mitigate asymmetric information and ensure baseline competence—to low-risk services such as cosmetology, pest control, and tour guiding.^[17] In the United States, where licensing is predominantly managed at the state level with minimal federal oversight, coverage has broadened dramatically; roughly 5 percent of the workforce required licenses in the 1950s, escalating to approximately 22-25 percent by the 2010s and persisting at similar levels into the 2020s.^[18]^[9] This expansion affects over 1,000 distinct job titles nationwide, with interstate variations: for instance, California mandates licenses for over 200 occupations, while states like Texas and Florida cover fewer but still substantial numbers.^[19] Empirical data from the U.S. Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor Statistics indicate that licensing disproportionately impacts women, minorities, and lower-income workers, who are overrepresented in licensed service occupations, while generating annual compliance costs exceeding $200 billion in forgone wages and higher consumer prices due to restricted entry.^[20]^[21] Globally, analogous systems prevail in Europe and other developed economies, though with varying stringency; for example, the European Union harmonizes some professional qualifications via directives but leaves much to member states, resulting in lower overall prevalence than in the U.S.^[22] Licensing's breadth underscores its role as a pervasive labor market institution, influencing mobility, entrepreneurship, and pricing across economies.

Stated Rationales and Justifications

Proponents of occupational licensing primarily justify it as a mechanism to safeguard public health, safety, and welfare by restricting practice to individuals who demonstrate minimum competence through verified education, training, and examinations. This rationale posits that in occupations where errors can cause significant harm—such as medicine, engineering, or electrical work—consumers face information asymmetries that prevent them from distinguishing qualified providers from unqualified ones, necessitating government intervention to mitigate market failures and reduce risks of substandard services.^[8]^[23]^[24] Licensing requirements are also defended as tools for standardizing professional entry criteria across jurisdictions, ensuring uniform educational prerequisites and ethical standards that promote reliability and accountability. State regulators, for example, argue that mandatory credentials filter out practitioners likely to deliver inferior or dangerous work, thereby elevating overall industry quality and consumer confidence without relying solely on post-harm litigation or private certifications.^[25]^[26] Furthermore, advocates claim licensing fosters professionalism by incentivizing investments in human capital, such as specialized training, which incumbents might otherwise underprovide in unregulated markets due to high mobility costs for workers or free-rider problems among peers. This is said to create structured career pathways and self-regulating boards that enforce ongoing compliance, though empirical assessments of these outcomes vary, with some studies indicating limited evidence of superior service quality relative to certification alternatives.^[23]^[27]

Historical Development

Origins in Guilds and Early Regulations

Medieval guilds emerged in Europe during the 11th and 12th centuries amid urban revival and economic expansion following the disruptions of Germanic invasions, evolving from earlier Roman collegia into formalized associations of merchants and artisans.^[28] Merchant guilds initially focused on regulating long-distance trade and contracts, while craft guilds, proliferating from the 12th century onward in regions like England, Italy, and France, oversaw specific occupations such as weaving, baking, and metalworking.^[28]^[29] These entities secured charters or letters patent from monarchs, city councils, or lords, which conferred monopolistic privileges to exclude non-members from practicing the trade within their jurisdiction, effectively functioning as early licensing bodies.^[28] Entry into guilds was tightly controlled to maintain member privileges and purported quality, requiring candidates to complete apprenticeships lasting 5 to 9 years under a master craftsman, during which they learned skills through hands-on labor often starting in childhood.^[28] Apprentices advanced to journeyman status, needing further experience and savings, before submitting a "masterpiece"—a complex work demonstrating proficiency—to gain full mastership, alongside payment of fees and sometimes a guild banquet.^[29] These barriers, which grew stricter over time with added requirements like family sponsorship or wealth thresholds, limited supply in the labor market, enabling guilds to restrict output, influence wages, and extract higher prices from consumers.^[29]^[30] Guilds enforced occupational standards through internal courts, annual audits, and inspections by appointed "searchers" who examined workshops, goods, and finished products for defects, with penalties including fines, confiscation, or expulsion for violations.^[28]^[30] In cities like Paris, bakers faced seizure of substandard bread for charitable donation, while broader craft regulations extended to pricing, working conditions, and competition bans.^[29] Such mechanisms addressed information asymmetries in pre-industrial markets by signaling competence to buyers, yet historical evidence indicates they often prioritized cartel-like stability over innovation or consumer welfare, as guilds lobbied against inter-city trade and new entrants across Western Europe from roughly 1200 to 1800.^[30] Early state-backed regulations complemented guild authority, particularly for emerging professions; for example, royal decrees in 13th-century England and France imposed apprenticeship mandates on various trades, culminating in statutes like England's 1563 Statute of Artificers, which standardized training durations and restricted geographic mobility to protect local guild monopolies.^[28] These pre-modern systems laid the groundwork for formalized licensing by blending self-regulation with sovereign enforcement, though their decline began in the 16th century with Reformation-era dissolutions in England and accelerated in the 18th century amid Enlightenment critiques of mercantilist restrictions.^[28]

Expansion in the United States and Europe (19th-20th Centuries)

![Title Page of the Medical Register Wellcome L0040962.jpg][float-right] In the United States, the modern framework of occupational licensing emerged in the late 19th century, primarily among the medical and legal professions around 1870.^[31] State licensing laws enacted during this period established medical boards to license and discipline physicians, marking a shift from largely unregulated practice to formalized state oversight.^[32] This development reflected efforts by established practitioners to restrict entry and elevate standards amid rapid professionalization, with licensing requirements often justified as protecting public health from unqualified competitors.^[33] By the early 20th century, licensing extended to additional occupations, including dentists, pharmacists, and trades such as barbers, which in some states demanded up to three years of training by 1900.^[34] The expansion accelerated during the Great Depression of the 1930s, as governments imposed licensing on more trades like embalmers and cosmetologists to limit competition and stabilize employment for incumbents.^[35] Despite this growth, occupational licensing covered only about 4-5 percent of the workforce by the mid-20th century, concentrated in services rather than manufacturing-dominated sectors.^[35] Empirical data indicate a gradual increase in regulated occupations from 1870 onward, with states enacting statutes for a wider array of practitioners in response to urbanization and immigration pressures.^[36] In Europe, occupational regulation during the 19th and early 20th centuries paralleled U.S. trends but was often more deeply rooted in guild traditions and state-supervised professional bodies, particularly on the continent.^[37] In the United Kingdom, professionalization advanced through acts like those regulating medicine and pharmacy, emphasizing registration and examinations over broad trade licensing. Continental nations such as France and Germany enforced stricter state control via mandatory qualifications and oversight for key professions like law and engineering, driven by industrialization and national unification efforts from the 1850s to 1914.^[38] This period saw licensing expand modestly beyond elite professions, influenced by similar motives of quality assurance and market protection, though less aggressively than in the U.S. due to entrenched apprenticeship systems and varying degrees of centralization.^[39]

Post-WWII Proliferation and Recent Reforms (1950s-2025)

Following World War II, occupational licensing requirements proliferated across the United States, shifting from coverage of approximately 4.5 percent of the workforce in the late 1940s to over 25 percent by 2015.^[7] ^[40] This expansion accelerated in the 1950s and continued through the postwar economic boom, as state legislatures responded to lobbying from professional associations seeking to limit competition and standardize practices in emerging service sectors.^[41] By 2008, nearly 30 percent of the workforce faced licensing mandates, encompassing occupations from traditional fields like medicine to lower-risk activities such as interior design and floristry.^[42] Economic analyses attribute this growth to rent-seeking by incumbents, who influenced state-level boards to impose education, examination, and fee barriers that raised entry costs without commensurate public safety gains.^[43] The proliferation extended beyond the U.S. to Europe, where postwar reconstruction and welfare state expansions prompted similar regulatory increases, though data comparability is limited; for instance, the European Commission noted rising professional qualifications directives amid harmonization efforts from the 1960s onward.^[31] In the U.S., licensing coverage reached 22 percent of jobs by 2021, surpassing unionization rates and affecting mobility, particularly for low-income and minority workers.^[9] Empirical studies, including those by economist Morris Kleiner, link this trend to wage premiums for licensees (around 15 percent) but also to reduced employment and higher service prices, prompting scrutiny of licensing's net benefits.^[44] Reform efforts gained momentum in the 2010s amid evidence of overregulation. The 2015 White House report highlighted licensing's role in exacerbating labor shortages and recommended periodic reviews.^[23] States introduced "certificate of public necessity" tests and sunset provisions to evaluate requirements' validity. By 2020, 10 states enacted major deregulations, targeting occupations like barbers and cosmetologists.^[45] The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated changes, with all 50 states issuing temporary waivers for licensing to fill critical shortages in healthcare and other fields, some of which transitioned to permanent policies.^[3] Universal licensing recognition laws, allowing out-of-state credentials to expedite interstate mobility, proliferated post-2013; as of 2024, 26 states had adopted such reforms, with eight additions since 2020.^[46] Examples include Ohio and the District of Columbia's 2021 laws easing barriers for those with criminal records, and Pennsylvania's 2024 regulations under Act 53 removing outdated conviction hurdles.^[47] ^[48] In 2025, indices ranking state burdens—such as the Archbridge Institute's—identified Oregon and Tennessee among the most restrictive, fueling advocacy for further reductions to enhance competition and economic fluidity.^[49] Despite these advances, licensing persists in over 1,000 occupations across states, with ongoing debates over balancing consumer protection against entry barriers.^[50]

Types and Mechanisms

Categories of Licensed Occupations

Occupational licensing applies to professions across diverse sectors, with states regulating over 1,000 distinct occupations in aggregate, though only about 100 are commonly licensed nationwide. Major categories include healthcare, personal care services, construction and skilled trades, legal and professional services, education, and transportation. These groupings often align with perceived risks to public health, safety, or economic integrity, but licensing prevalence varies: several dozen occupations like physicians and barbers require licenses in all 50 states, while others like florists are regulated in three or fewer.^[51] Healthcare Professions
This sector encompasses the largest share of universally licensed occupations, focusing on roles with direct patient interaction or diagnostic responsibilities. Physicians, surgeons, and dentists must complete doctoral-level education, clinical training, and pass standardized exams such as the United States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE) or National Board Dental Examinations before state licensure, which is mandatory in every state.^[51] Registered nurses and licensed practical nurses require associate or diploma programs followed by the National Council Licensure Examination (NCLEX), with over 3 million nurses licensed as of 2023.^[52] Allied health fields, including pharmacists (requiring PharmD degrees and NAPLEX exams), physical therapists, and radiologic technologists, similarly demand accredited training and competency testing, licensed nationwide to mitigate risks of misdiagnosis or procedural errors.^[52] Personal Care and Cosmetology Services
Occupations involving aesthetic or body care services are licensed in all states for core roles like barbers and cosmetologists, who typically complete 1,000 to 1,500 hours of vocational training and pass state exams on sanitation and techniques.^[51] Massage therapists, regulated in 45 states as of 2024, require 500-1,000 hours of instruction emphasizing anatomy and ethics to prevent injury from improper application.^[51] These licenses aim to enforce hygiene standards, though empirical reviews question their necessity given low inherent risks compared to healthcare.^[51] Construction and Skilled Trades
Trades affecting building integrity or infrastructure safety, such as electricians, plumbers, and general contractors, require state licenses after apprenticeships (often 4-8 years), trade school, and exams on codes like the National Electrical Code.^[52] Building contractors and land surveyors, licensed in most states, must demonstrate project management experience and surveying precision to avoid structural failures; for example, surveyors pass the Fundamentals of Surveying exam for initial certification.^[52] These categories emphasize enforcement of safety regulations, with reciprocity agreements in some states facilitating interstate work. Legal and Professional Services
Lawyers constitute a core licensed profession, requiring Juris Doctor degrees, passage of state bar exams (e.g., the Multistate Bar Examination), and moral character evaluations, with licensure universal across states.^[52] Related fields like accountants (certified public accountants via CPA exams) and engineers (Professional Engineer licenses after FE/PE exams) are licensed in most states to uphold standards in financial reporting and design integrity.^[52] Education and Child Services
Teachers and school counselors require state certification, involving bachelor's degrees, pedagogy coursework, and exams like the Praxis series, renewed periodically with professional development.^[52] Childcare providers and family counselors, licensed in varying degrees across states, often need background checks and training in developmental psychology to ensure child welfare.^[52] Additional categories include transportation (e.g., commercial driver's licenses via federal-state CDL programs for hazardous materials haulers) and funeral services (directors licensed in most states after embalming training). Licensing in niche areas like athletic training (most states) or auctioneering (many states) reflects sector-specific consumer protection rationales, but coverage diminishes for lower-risk pursuits.^[51]

Licensing Requirements and Processes

Occupational licensing requirements in the United States generally mandate that applicants demonstrate minimum levels of education, training, or experience, pass competency examinations, submit to background checks, and pay associated fees before practicing in a regulated occupation.^[51]^[9] These elements vary significantly by state and occupation, with state governments overseeing the process through professional boards or departments of labor and consumer affairs.^[24] For instance, among 102 lower-income occupations analyzed across states, median requirements include approximately 281 days of education or apprenticeship, passage of one exam, and fees exceeding $260, though some fields like cosmetology or barbering demand up to 1,500 hours of training.^[53] The application process typically begins with submission of forms to the relevant state licensing authority, often online via portals like Pennsylvania's PALS system or New Jersey's Division of Consumer Affairs platforms, where applicants verify eligibility through plain-language questions and documentation.^[54]^[55] Required proofs include transcripts for educational credentials, affidavits or employer letters for work experience, and sometimes evidence of moral character or absence of criminal history via fingerprint-based checks.^[56] Examinations, administered by state boards or third-party providers, assess technical knowledge and are mandatory for most professions; failure often necessitates reapplication and additional fees after a waiting period or retake limit.^[51]^[53] Fees cover application processing, exam administration, and initial licensure, ranging from $50 for basic renewals in some New York professions to over $1,000 cumulatively for fields like opticians in certain states, excluding preparation costs.^[57]^[58] Processing times can extend several months due to verification steps, during which applicants may obtain limited permits for supervised practice in select occupations like occupational therapy.^[59] State-specific databases, such as those maintained by the National Conference of State Legislatures, catalog these details for over 40 occupations, highlighting interstate inconsistencies that complicate compliance.^[60]

Renewal, Fees, and Enforcement

Renewal of occupational licenses in the United States typically occurs every one to two years, depending on the state and profession, with state licensing boards mandating submission of renewal applications, payment of fees, and often proof of continuing education (CE) completion.^[24] For instance, occupational therapists in many states must renew biennially and complete 20 hours of CE, while nurses in Massachusetts require 15 contact hours every two years.^[61]^[62] CE requirements aim to ensure ongoing competency but vary widely; professions like law, nursing, and engineering commonly mandate 20-30 hours per renewal cycle, sourced from approved providers such as accredited universities or professional associations.^[63] Failure to meet renewal criteria results in license expiration or lapse, potentially barring practice until reinstatement, which may involve additional fees or exams.^[64] Renewal fees are collected by state boards or departments and range from $25 to $500 or more, averaging $100-300 annually across occupations when adjusted for frequency, though exact amounts differ by jurisdiction and license type.^[65] For health-related licenses, a analysis of select states found average annual renewal fees as low as $24 for certain categories, but higher for others like occupational therapy at $110-$150 biennially.^[66]^[67] These fees fund board operations, including inspections and administration, but critics argue they impose ongoing financial burdens without proportional benefits in quality assurance, as evidenced by stagnant or minimal CE mandates in low-risk fields.^[68] Enforcement of licensing laws is handled by state regulatory boards, which investigate complaints, conduct audits, and impose penalties for unlicensed practice or violations such as inadequate CE or ethical breaches.^[3] Penalties include civil fines—often $500 to $5,000 per violation—license suspension, revocation, or injunctions against practice, as seen in Connecticut where boards can levy up to $1,000 fines for infractions warranting criminal penalties.^[69] Enforcement relies on consumer reports, routine compliance checks, and inter-agency coordination, but data indicate uneven application, with some boards prioritizing revenue over public protection due to self-funding models.^[70] In cases of repeated non-compliance, practitioners face felony charges in certain states for unauthorized practice, underscoring the coercive nature of these regimes.^[26]

Theoretical Foundations

Economic Justifications: Market Failures and Public Protection

Proponents of occupational licensing invoke public interest theory, positing that government intervention corrects market failures where unregulated competition fails to ensure adequate service quality or safety. Under this framework, licensing establishes mandatory minimum competency standards to filter out unqualified practitioners, thereby reducing consumer uncertainty and potential harm in occupations involving complex or high-stakes services.^[71] This rationale draws from economic models addressing adverse selection, such as Hayne Leland's 1979 theory of minimum quality standards, which demonstrates that in markets with asymmetric information, appropriately set licensing thresholds can enhance welfare by preventing a "lemons" problem where low-quality providers dominate and drive out higher-quality ones.^[72] A primary market failure cited is asymmetric information, where consumers lack the expertise or opportunity to evaluate providers' skills prior to or even after service delivery, particularly in fields like medicine or emergency medical services. Licensing mitigates this by serving as a credible signal of competence, lowering search costs and encouraging investment in human capital, as low-quality entrants are barred from competing on price alone.^[73] For instance, in healthcare—where approximately 73% of occupations require licensing—consumers cannot readily assess diagnostic accuracy or treatment efficacy, justifying standardized entry requirements to foster trust and expertise.^[26] Licensing is also defended on grounds of negative externalities, where incompetent practice imposes costs on third parties beyond the direct consumer, such as public health risks from faulty electrical work or transportation accidents caused by unskilled drivers. By enforcing competence thresholds, licensing internalizes these externalities, protecting societal welfare from diffuse harms that markets might under-address due to dispersed costs.^[26] In high-risk domains like architecture or trucking, this public protection argument holds that unregulated entry could amplify systemic risks, with licensing boards certifying skills to avert broader damages like structural failures or roadway hazards.^[71]

Critiques: Barriers to Entry and Rent-Seeking from First Principles

Occupational licensing requirements, such as mandatory education, examinations, and fees, elevate the fixed costs of entering a profession, thereby restricting the supply of labor in licensed fields.^[74] These barriers deter potential entrants who lack the resources or time to comply, shifting the labor supply curve leftward and diminishing overall competition. Empirical analysis indicates that licensing reduces labor supply by 17-27% in affected occupations, with licensed sectors expanding 20% slower than unlicensed ones over time.^[74] From a foundational economic viewpoint, such restrictions artificially constrain the number of service providers, leading to higher equilibrium prices and wages without corresponding increases in productivity or output. The elevated wages accruing to licensed practitioners represent economic rents—supernormal profits derived from limited competition rather than marginal productivity gains.^[75] Incumbents, having already incurred compliance costs, gain disproportionately from these barriers, as new entrants face the same hurdles amid reduced market access. Research attributes 15% wage premiums in licensed occupations partly to these rents, which redistribute income from consumers (via higher prices) to workers without enhancing service quality commensurately.^[76] This dynamic incentivizes self-interested behavior, where existing professionals advocate for expanded licensing scopes to perpetuate exclusivity, exemplifying rent-seeking where resources are expended on influencing regulation rather than value creation. Causally, absent demonstrable market failures like widespread information asymmetries or externalities that licensing effectively mitigates, these barriers impose deadweight losses by underallocating labor and stifling innovation.^[77] Practitioners' lobbying for stringent rules—often through trade associations—transforms licensing boards into mechanisms of cartel enforcement, prioritizing incumbent protection over public welfare. Studies confirm that such regulations correlate with diminished labor mobility and fewer entrepreneurial opportunities, as entry costs compound across states with non-portable credentials.^[76] Reforms targeting unjustified barriers, such as substituting certification for licensing, could restore competitive pressures and align incentives toward efficiency.^[41]

Empirical Evidence on Economic Impacts

Effects on Wages and Employment

Empirical studies using cross-state variation in licensing requirements consistently find that occupational licensing increases wages for incumbents by limiting entry into the occupation, functioning as a supply restriction that elevates labor prices. Morris Kleiner and Evan Soltas, analyzing U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey data from 2015-2018 via two-way fixed effects regressions on state-occupation licensing shares, estimate a 15% wage premium in fully licensed occupations relative to unlicensed benchmarks, with premiums ranging 15-20% after controlling for worker characteristics.^[10] Earlier work by Kleiner and Alan Krueger, based on a 2008 national labor force survey, similarly reports an average 15% wage markup attributable to licensing coverage.^[78] These effects stem from reduced competition, as licensing requirements—such as exams, fees, and training hours—deter potential entrants, allowing licensed workers to capture rents akin to cartel pricing in labor markets.^[7] On employment, the evidence points to net reductions, as the wage gains reflect fewer total jobs rather than productivity-driven expansion. Kleiner and Soltas document 18-27% lower employment in licensed state-occupation cells, with a baseline 29% drop in fully licensed cases, offset partially by 3-5% higher hours per worker among those employed.^[10] This aligns with theoretical expectations: barriers raise marginal costs of entry, contracting overall labor supply and quantity demanded at higher wages, though demand may shift outward if licensing signals quality.^[10] Other analyses, including replications of prior claims of positive employment effects for licensed workers, show that expansions in licensing stringency—measured by added requirements across states from 2017-2022—correlate with declining employment rates, contradicting earlier findings like Gittleman et al. (2018) that did not isolate regulatory changes.^[1] Employment losses are pronounced for low-skilled or mobile workers, as licensing delays market entry by 1-2 years on average and hampers occupational switching.^[79] Heterogeneity exists across occupations and demographics: wage premiums are larger in low-skill fields like cosmetology (up to 20%), where barriers exceed quality rationales, while employment contractions hit entrants hardest, reducing fluidity by 5-10% in licensed sectors.^[80] Meta-analyses confirm near-universal wage elevation but ambiguous or negative aggregate employment impacts, with no robust evidence of net job creation.^[81] These patterns hold after addressing endogeneity via instrumental variables on historical licensing adoption, underscoring causal barriers over selection effects alone.^[10] Overall, licensing reallocates income toward licensed incumbents at the expense of broader employment access, yielding deadweight losses estimated at 12% of occupational surplus.^[10]

Effects on Prices and Consumer Welfare

Occupational licensing restricts entry into professions, thereby reducing the supply of services and elevating prices for consumers. Empirical analyses across multiple occupations, including healthcare and personal services, consistently demonstrate that stricter licensing regimes correlate with price increases ranging from 3% to 16%.^[82] For example, in fields like dentistry and optometry, licensing barriers have been shown to raise service costs by limiting practitioner numbers, with no commensurate gains in output quality justifying the hikes.^[83] These price elevations impose direct costs on consumer welfare by decreasing affordability and access, particularly for routine services demanded by lower-income households. A structural model of U.S. state-level licensing estimates an average welfare loss equivalent to 12% of total occupational surplus, with consumers bearing approximately 30% of the incidence through higher expenditures.^[12] ^[10] While some consumers exhibit higher willingness to pay—offsetting up to 80% of price rises via perceived value—the net effect remains a deadweight loss from reduced consumption and competition.^[10] Federal assessments reinforce that licensing-induced supply constraints yield fewer service options and elevated costs without proportional benefits in safety or efficacy, exacerbating inefficiencies in markets like childcare and veterinary care.^[84] Cross-state comparisons further indicate that deregulation in select occupations lowers prices by enhancing labor mobility and entry, thereby boosting overall consumer surplus.^[85]

Effects on Service Quality and Public Safety

Empirical research on the effects of occupational licensing on service quality reveals limited evidence of positive impacts, with many studies indicating no measurable improvements or even reductions in quality due to decreased competition. Proponents argue that licensing addresses asymmetric information between providers and consumers, ensuring higher standards, yet a comprehensive review of U.S. data found that stricter licensing requirements do not consistently correlate with better outcomes in consumer satisfaction or performance metrics.^[23] ^[40] For instance, analyses of online review platforms like Yelp, which provide direct consumer feedback on service quality, show that licensed providers in regulated occupations such as cosmetology and home services receive ratings comparable to or lower than unlicensed competitors, suggesting that market signals like reviews serve as effective substitutes for licensing in informing consumer choices.^[86] ^[87] In specific low-risk occupations, licensing has demonstrated negligible effects on quality proxies such as error rates or customer outcomes. A study of real estate agents in Illinois found that mandatory continuing education—a core licensing mechanism—did not improve transaction success rates, client retention, or overall service performance, as measured by sales volume and repeat business.^[82] Similarly, in fields like interior design and floristry, where public health risks are minimal, empirical comparisons across states with varying licensing stringency reveal no differences in reported service defects or consumer complaints attributable to regulation.^[88] These findings align with broader economic analyses indicating that licensing often elevates entry barriers without commensurate gains, potentially leading to complacency among incumbents and reduced innovation in service delivery.^[89] Regarding public safety, evidence similarly underscores a lack of causal benefits from licensing in most occupations, particularly those not involving high-stakes health interventions. Cross-state studies of cosmetology and barbering, for example, report no increase in injury or infection incidents in jurisdictions without licensing, challenging claims of safety enhancements through mandatory training and exams.^[90] ^[91] In higher-risk areas like dentistry, some research identifies correlations between stringent licensing and lower malpractice rates, but these are confounded by underlying education and certification standards, with no isolated effect from state-specific licensing variations.^[41] Overall, a synthesis of peer-reviewed work concludes that while licensing may marginally signal competence in professions with inherent information asymmetries, it fails to deliver verifiable safety improvements across the spectrum of regulated occupations, often at the expense of access to services.^[85]^[92]

Effects on Labor Mobility and Interstate Portability

Occupational licensing requirements often lack interstate portability, necessitating workers to meet new state-specific criteria such as exams, fees, or additional training upon relocation, which raises the effective cost of moving and discourages interstate migration.^[93] Empirical analyses indicate that this non-portability acts as a barrier, with the between-state migration rate for individuals in occupations requiring state-specific licensing exams being 36 percent lower than for unlicensed occupations, controlling for factors like occupation type and demographics.^[94] Similarly, occupations with stringent state-unique requirements exhibit the largest reductions in interstate mobility compared to those with more standardized or reciprocal arrangements.^[95] Reciprocity agreements, where states mutually recognize licenses, partially mitigate these effects by facilitating smoother transitions and correlating with higher interstate migration rates in licensed fields relative to non-reciprocal licensed occupations.^[96] For instance, data from the American Community Survey show that licensed workers in reciprocal professions migrate across states at rates exceeding those in non-reciprocal ones, though overall migration remains suppressed compared to unlicensed workers.^[96] However, reciprocity coverage is limited—applying to fewer than 20 percent of licensed occupations in many states—and does not eliminate barriers like continuing education disparities or administrative hurdles.^[97] Broader trends link the expansion of licensing to declining U.S. interstate migration rates, which fell from about 3.5 percent of the population annually in the 1990s to under 2 percent by the 2010s, coinciding with licensing coverage rising to affect over 25 percent of the workforce.^[98] Licensing also constrains job-to-job transitions across state lines, with studies finding negative associations between licensing stringency and cross-state labor flows, particularly in high-regulation sectors like healthcare and construction.^[99] While some evidence on aggregate migration effects is mixed due to confounding factors like economic cycles, causal estimates from occupation-level variations consistently demonstrate licensing's role in reducing mobility, especially for mid-skilled workers facing relicensing costs averaging $200–$1,000 per state plus time delays of months.^[96]^[80]

Impacts on Minorities, Low-Income Workers, and Entrants

Occupational licensing requirements, including fees, training hours, and exams, disproportionately burden racial and ethnic minorities by erecting barriers that correlate with lower representation in licensed professions. Empirical analyses indicate that occupations with stringent licensing—such as those mandating extensive education or experience—reduce the share of Black and Hispanic workers, as these groups often face higher costs and fewer resources to comply.^[100] For example, in accounting, the 150-hour education rule implemented in the 1980s significantly curtailed entry by minority candidates into the certified public accountant profession without commensurate improvements in audit quality.^[101] Such regulations favor incumbents with established networks, limiting upward mobility for underrepresented groups.^[102] Immigrants, particularly skilled foreign-born workers, encounter amplified obstacles from non-recognition of overseas credentials and mandatory retraining, which stifles their labor market integration. A 2023 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis study estimated that licensing decreases foreign-born employment in affected state-occupation pairs by approximately 20 percent compared to native-born workers, even after controlling for education and skills.^[103] This effect persists across racial lines, with persistent gaps in licensing attainment for non-white immigrants, exacerbating underemployment in fields like healthcare and trades where they hold relevant qualifications.^[104] Low-income workers face heightened exclusion due to direct costs—such as application fees averaging $200–$1,000 per occupation—and indirect burdens like lost wages during mandatory apprenticeships or coursework, which deter transitions from low-skill jobs. Research links expanded licensing to widened earnings inequality, with states having more regulations showing greater income dispersion from 1983 to 2019, as low-wage unlicensed workers struggle to access higher-paying licensed roles.^[105]^[102] These barriers compound for the working poor, who lack the capital or time flexibility of higher-income applicants, effectively rationing opportunities along socioeconomic lines.^[106] New labor market entrants, including young workers and recent graduates, experience reduced mobility as licensing mandates prior experience or prolonged education, hindering job switching and experimentation across occupations. Licensing correlates with diminished cross-occupation mobility, explaining up to 8 percent of declines in overall labor market fluidity, which delays skill acquisition and wage growth for novices without incumbent advantages.^[80]^[107] Entrants in unlicensed sectors may also suffer spillover effects, as licensing in complementary fields redirects labor supply, suppressing wages and employment prospects for unregulated entry-level positions.^[108] While some studies posit licensing aids entrants via quality signaling, evidence of net barriers predominates, particularly for those from disadvantaged backgrounds lacking mentorship or financial buffers.^[109]

Evidence on Inequality and Opportunity Barriers

Occupational licensing imposes significant barriers to entry that disproportionately affect low-income individuals, racial minorities, and other disadvantaged groups by requiring substantial upfront costs in time, education, and fees, which incumbents—often higher-income and established—can more easily meet.^[102] These requirements, such as 372 days of training for cosmetologists or exams for teachers, exclude those without resources for compliance, reducing access to stable, licensed jobs that offer higher wages and security.^[102] For instance, licensing has been shown to decrease employment among black barbers by 17.3% and among new Hispanic teachers by 2%, partly due to barriers like English proficiency mandates and residency rules.^[102] Racial and ethnic minorities face underrepresentation in licensed occupations despite comparable education levels, with workers of color substantially less likely to hold licenses than white non-Latino/a workers.^[110] Nationally, Latino/a workers are 11 percentage points less likely to be licensed, black workers 5 points less, and Asian workers 6 points less, leading to overrepresentation of white workers in high-licensing fields like law (83.3% white) and secondary teaching (82.1% white).^[110] Foreign-born workers, who comprise 82.4% of people of color in some datasets, encounter additional hurdles from unrecognized credentials and criminal record prohibitions, which disproportionately impact black and Latino/a men.^[110] Licensing contributes to earnings inequality by creating wage premiums for incumbents while restricting supply in low-skill sectors accessible to the disadvantaged, widening gaps over time.^[105] From 1983 to 2019, the licensing premium grew, particularly in high-paying occupations, increasing overall U.S. earnings inequality, with larger premiums observed for racial/ethnic minorities, younger workers, and those without college degrees—though minorities and non-college-educated workers are overrepresented in lower-wage licensed roles like personal care.^[105] At the county level, growth in licensed occupations correlates with a 3.9% to 15.4% rise in income inequality (measured by Gini coefficients).^[111] These regulations also hinder economic mobility by limiting labor market fluidity, particularly cross-occupation and geographic movement essential for low-income advancement.^[112] Empirical analysis indicates that licensing growth reduces absolute upward mobility by 1.7% to 6.7% at mean county levels, with states like Louisiana experiencing up to a 6.7% drop from adding 59 new licensed occupations between 1993 and 2012.^[111] By impeding job transitions and interstate relocation, licensing entrenches opportunity barriers for entrants, including immigrants and ex-offenders, who face amplified exclusion from licensed workforces.^[112]^[102]

Criticisms, Defenses, and Controversies

Primary Criticisms: Regulatory Capture and Overreach

Regulatory capture in occupational licensing occurs when licensing boards, dominated by industry incumbents, prioritize the interests of existing practitioners over public welfare by imposing stringent entry barriers that restrict competition and inflate earnings.^[113] Empirical analyses indicate that such boards, often composed primarily of licensees with limited public or consumer representation, systematically favor supply restrictions; for instance, economist Morris Kleiner's research demonstrates that licensing correlates with wage premiums of up to 18% across occupations, a pattern consistent with rent-seeking rather than safety imperatives, as higher barriers reduce labor supply without commensurate quality gains. This dynamic aligns with George Stigler's theory of economic regulation, where regulated entities capture agencies to secure economic rents, evidenced in licensing expansions driven by trade associations rather than legislative or public demand.^[26] A prominent case illustrating capture is the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners' enforcement actions against non-dentists providing teeth-whitening services, which the U.S. Supreme Court in 2015 ruled constituted anticompetitive conduct exempt from federal antitrust immunity due to insufficient state oversight, highlighting how practitioner-led boards suppress competition in adjacent markets.^[114] Studies on cosmetology boards further quantify capture through indices measuring licensee dominance in board composition and rulemaking, revealing that states with higher capture scores impose more onerous requirements, such as 1,000-2,000 hours of training for hair braiders despite low risk profiles, correlating with reduced entry and elevated prices without improved outcomes.^[115] Overreach is evident in the proliferation of licensing to low-risk occupations lacking plausible public safety rationales, where boards extend requirements beyond empirical necessities, stifling entrepreneurship and innovation. For example, until deregulation efforts in the 2010s, Louisiana mandated florists complete 300 hours of coursework for a license, a barrier affecting a field with negligible health hazards, as documented in de-licensing case studies showing no subsequent decline in service quality post-reform.^[116] Similarly, hairdressers in some states face training durations exceeding those for emergency medical technicians—up to 1,500 hours versus 120-150 hours—despite comparable or lower risks, an asymmetry critiqued in policy analyses as indicative of incumbent-driven expansion rather than evidence-based protection.^[117] Kleiner's longitudinal data across U.S. states confirms that such overregulation, covering over 1,000 occupations in aggregate, yields minimal verifiable benefits in quality or safety metrics while imposing compliance costs estimated at billions annually, underscoring causal links from board autonomy to unwarranted restrictions.^[118]

Defenses: Quality Assurance and Asymmetric Information

Proponents of occupational licensing maintain that it serves as a mechanism to assure service quality by enforcing minimum standards of competence, such as required education, examinations, and continuing training, thereby protecting consumers from incompetent practitioners who could cause harm, particularly in fields involving health, safety, or complex technical knowledge.^[26] This defense posits that without such barriers, low-quality providers would proliferate, eroding public trust and market efficiency, as governments can aggregate expertise to set thresholds that individual consumers cannot reliably assess.^[4] A core theoretical justification centers on asymmetric information, where consumers possess limited ability to evaluate practitioner skills ex ante, leading to potential adverse selection akin to Akerlof's "market for lemons," in which high-quality providers are driven out by uncertified low-quality entrants willing to undercut prices.^[119] Licensing mitigates this by functioning as a credible signal of quality, reducing search costs and information gaps; for instance, empirical models indicate it can resolve inefficiencies in markets where quality is opaque, potentially yielding gains in output quality for consumers who value reliability over the lowest price.^[13]^[100] Some targeted empirical evidence supports quality enhancements in specific contexts, such as a study of midwifery licensing reforms showing long-term reductions in infant mortality and pregnancy complications due to improved practitioner standards, suggesting causal benefits from heightened oversight in high-stakes services.^[120] However, defenders emphasize that even absent universal proof of quality uplift across occupations, the precautionary role of licensing in preventing rare but severe failures—evident in licensed professions like dentistry or engineering where malpractice rates correlate with regulatory stringency—justifies its persistence over unregulated alternatives prone to externalities.^[121]

Major Debates and Case Studies

A central debate in occupational licensing concerns its purported role in assuring quality and mitigating asymmetric information between providers and consumers, weighed against evidence of supply restrictions and elevated costs without commensurate benefits. Proponents argue that licensing screens out unqualified entrants, potentially reducing incompetence-related harms, yet empirical analyses often find scant support for quality improvements; for instance, cross-state comparisons of licensed versus unlicensed practitioners in fields like dentistry reveal no significant differences in patient outcomes or complaint rates, while prices rise 10-12% due to restricted entry. Critics, drawing on public choice theory, contend that licensing frequently enables regulatory capture by incumbents, as boards dominated by licensees impose barriers unrelated to safety, such as excessive training hours, yielding wage premiums akin to union effects—around 15% on average—but at the expense of employment and mobility. Recent data from 2017-2022 across U.S. states indicate that stricter licensing correlates with 2-5% lower employment rates in affected occupations, challenging claims of net public benefit absent rigorous cost-benefit scrutiny.^[122]^[123]^[1] Another debate focuses on licensing's labor market distortions, including reduced interstate mobility and barriers for low-skilled or immigrant workers, versus defenses emphasizing standardized competence in high-stakes fields. While asymmetric information rationales hold in medicine or engineering—where empirical reviews affirm licensing's role in averting errors—application to low-risk trades yields inefficiencies; a 2022 BLS analysis found licensing reduces migration by 20-30% for licensed workers, as reciprocity varies widely, yet quality metrics show no proportional safety gains in non-health occupations. This tension underscores causal realism: licensing may causally inflate wages via cartel-like effects but empirically hampers opportunity, with meta-analyses estimating 2.8 million fewer jobs nationwide from overbroad requirements.^[96]^[6]^[124] The Louisiana florist licensing regime exemplifies unnecessary regulation in a low-risk occupation, where until 2024, aspiring florists faced a subjective practical exam and 90-day apprenticeship, despite no evidence of harm from unlicensed arrangements; a field experiment by the Institute for Justice found consumers indifferent to licensed status and unable to distinguish quality, leading to a federal challenge in 2003 that highlighted arbitrary barriers, with reform finally eliminating the test in favor of a fee-only system on May 30, 2024. This case illustrates capture dynamics, as the board—composed largely of licensees—maintained rules benefiting established firms, costing entrants thousands in compliance while floristry poses negligible public health risks compared to plumbing or nursing.^[125]^[126]^[127] Hair braiding licensing provides a case study of disproportionate impacts on minority and immigrant entrepreneurs, particularly African women whose traditional skills require 1,000-1,500 hours of cosmetology training covering irrelevant topics like manicuring and chemical processing; in states like Texas and Massachusetts, pre-reform mandates excluded skilled braiders lacking formal education, reducing market entry and earnings potential, with Institute for Justice litigation since 1997 prompting deregulation in 17 states by 2019 via specialty certifications or exemptions that preserved cultural practices without safety lapses. Empirical outcomes post-reform show increased practitioner numbers and no rise in consumer complaints, underscoring how licensing erects causal barriers to self-employment for low-income groups, often justified by boards despite braiding's non-invasive nature.^[128]^[129]^[130] Arizona's 2019 universal license recognition law, enacted via HB 2569, serves as a reform case study testing portability's effects, automatically accepting out-of-state licenses for most occupations if held for one year, resulting in over 1,000 additional endorsements issued by 2022 and heightened worker inflows without documented quality declines, as monitored by the state board; this contrasts with Tennessee's targeted deregulations, such as 2012-2020 reductions for 19 occupations via sunset reviews, which correlated with 5-10% employment gains in deregulated fields per Mercatus analyses, though broader adoption lags due to incumbent resistance. These examples empirically validate deregulation's potential to boost supply and mobility—evidenced by Montana's similar 2021 universal recognition yielding 15% more license applications—while debates persist on safeguards for public-facing roles.^[131]^[132]^[133]

Reforms, Alternatives, and Policy Responses

Deregulation and Reduction Efforts

Efforts to deregulate occupational licensing in the United States have centered on state-level initiatives to eliminate requirements for low-risk occupations and enhance interstate portability through universal recognition laws, driven by evidence that excessive licensing restricts employment and raises consumer prices without commensurate safety gains.^[84]^[85] Between 2015 and 2020, seven states enacted deregulation bills that removed licensing for 35 professions, including barbers, interior designers, and hair braiders.^[134] These reforms often target occupations where empirical studies show minimal public health risks from unlicensed practice, such as cosmetology services or egg candling.^[116]^[131] Arizona pioneered comprehensive reforms in May 2016, when Governor Doug Ducey signed legislation streamlining entry for over a dozen occupations, including reducing training hours for barbers and eliminating exams for certain appraisers, resulting in measurable increases in workforce participation.^[135] Florida followed with a 2020 law deregulating interior designers, hair braiders, nail polishers, and body wrappers, exempting these from state exams and fees previously deemed unnecessary for consumer protection.^[136] Similar de-licensing occurred in states like Tennessee and Nebraska, where legislatures sunsetted boards or shifted to voluntary certification for low-stakes fields, yielding faster market entry for practitioners.^[137] During the COVID-19 pandemic, over 30 states temporarily waived renewal fees and expedited approvals for healthcare and service roles, demonstrating feasibility without safety incidents.^[138] Universal license recognition laws represent a parallel deregulation strategy, allowing practitioners licensed in one state to obtain credentials in another via expedited processes rather than restarting requirements. As of 2024, 26 states, including Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, and Montana, have adopted such reforms since 2013, often applying to all licensed occupations with provisions for active practice experience and background checks.^[46]^[139] Montana's 2021 law, for instance, boosted applications from out-of-state nurses and electricians by waiving redundant training, increasing labor supply in rural areas.^[132] These policies address interstate migration barriers, where licensing differentials previously deterred 20-30% of potential movers in regulated fields.^[96] Empirical evaluations of these efforts indicate expanded employment and reduced prices, with no evidence of diminished service quality or safety. A review of de-licensing in multiple states found entry barriers fell by up to 50%, correlating with 5-10% employment gains in affected occupations, as new workers faced fewer hours of mandatory training or exams.^[88]^[140] Universal recognition in early adopters like Arizona led to a 15% rise in licensed professionals within two years, lowering costs for services like childcare by enhancing competition.^[1] Studies attribute these outcomes to causal reductions in artificial scarcity, though entrenched interests, such as trade associations, have mounted legal challenges to block further rollbacks.^[141]^[107]

Alternatives: Certification, Registration, and Market Signals

Certification involves a voluntary process where individuals or organizations verify competence through exams, training, or standards set by private bodies or government entities, without prohibiting unlicensed practice.^[142] Unlike licensing, certification allows free market entry while enabling certified practitioners to signal quality to consumers, potentially increasing earnings for those who obtain it without imposing barriers on uncertified workers.^[142] For instance, the National Institute for Automotive Service Excellence (ASE) certification for mechanics operates nationwide as a private, voluntary credential that demonstrates skills but does not restrict non-certified individuals from performing repairs.^[143] Empirical analysis from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics indicates that professional certifications, issued by nongovernmental bodies, correlate with higher wages and employment in fields like information technology and health care aides, suggesting they effectively signal abilities without the exclusionary effects of licensing.^[21] Registration represents a minimal regulatory approach, typically requiring only notification to a government authority of intent to practice an occupation, often with basic identification but no substantive exams, education, or performance standards.^[144] This method facilitates tracking for public records or consumer protection without creating entry barriers, contrasting with licensing's mandatory approvals.^[145] In California, for example, registration for interior designers involves simple filing without exams, allowing broader participation while maintaining a directory for verification.^[146] Proponents argue it supports accountability through disclosure without inflating costs, as evidenced by lower compliance burdens in registered versus licensed professions, though direct comparative studies on outcomes remain limited.^[147] Market signals encompass decentralized mechanisms such as reputation via consumer reviews, warranties, bonding, insurance, and repeat business, which incentivize quality through competition rather than government mandates.^[148] In unregulated or lightly regulated occupations like personal trainers or event planners, platforms enabling easy access to reviews—such as Yelp or Google—allow consumers to assess providers based on feedback, reducing information asymmetries without restricting supply.^[149] Research from the Cato Institute highlights how voluntary bonding or insurance in fields like construction substitutes for licensing by providing financial recourse for errors, fostering trust and entry; for example, plumbers in unlicensed markets often carry liability coverage to signal reliability.^[9] These signals promote efficiency, as low-quality providers face reputational penalties and exit, with studies showing no widespread quality decline in deregulated services compared to licensed ones.^[144]

Universal Recognition Laws and Portability Reforms

Universal recognition laws permit a state to grant occupational licenses to applicants who hold valid, in-good-standing licenses from another U.S. state, typically requiring a minimum period of licensure (often one to five years) and absence of disciplinary actions, thereby bypassing duplicative exams, education, or training requirements.^[139]^[150] These reforms address interstate barriers created by disparate state licensing standards, which affect over 20% of U.S. workers in licensed occupations and hinder mobility, particularly for military spouses and relocating professionals.^[132] As of July 2024, 21 states have implemented such laws, with Arizona pioneering the approach in 2017 through legislation covering more than 20 professions, including barbers, contractors, and real estate agents.^[151]^[152] Florida joined as the 21st state in 2024, extending recognition to a broad array of occupations while imposing modest fees and experience thresholds.^[151] Portability reforms extend beyond universal recognition to include reciprocal agreements and interstate compacts, which standardize licensing criteria across participating states to enable practice in multiple jurisdictions under a single credential.^[153] By 2023, 45 states had enacted at least one interstate compact, spanning nine professions such as nursing (via the Nurse Licensure Compact, active since 2000 with 41 member states), physical therapy, and emergency medical services, facilitating over 230 compact-related laws.^[154] These mechanisms reduce administrative burdens; for instance, compacts often require uniform background checks and education verification, allowing professionals to obtain multi-state privileges without full relicensing.^[155] States like Virginia, which adopted universal recognition in 2015 for select trades and expanded it, reported an 82.4% increase (1.31 percentage points) in licensed worker migration rates post-reform.^[156] Empirical outcomes demonstrate enhanced labor mobility and service access under these reforms. In Montana, following 2023 universal recognition implementation, new license issuances rose significantly for professions like electricians and cosmetologists, with data showing accelerated processing and higher out-of-state applicant volumes.^[132] A 2025 analysis of physician licensing found that universal recognition policies increased interstate practice, correlating with improved healthcare access in underserved areas by expanding the supply of providers without compromising quality metrics.^[157] However, variations persist: some states limit universal laws to specific occupations or add probationary periods, while compacts face challenges in uniform enforcement across non-member states.^[158] Overall, these reforms have proliferated amid evidence that licensing portability lowers entry costs—estimated at $1,000–$5,000 per license in fees and delays—boosting employment in mobile workforces.^[97]

Comparative Analysis by Jurisdiction

United States: State Variations and Federal Influences

Occupational licensing in the United States is regulated primarily at the state level, resulting in wide variations in the scope, stringency, and number of licensed occupations across jurisdictions. States license over 800 distinct occupations in at least one location, with requirements encompassing education, training hours, examinations, fees, and continuing education mandates that differ significantly.^[46] The 2025 State Occupational Licensing Index, which evaluates burdens across 254 occupations based on the total number of regulatory barriers such as entry prerequisites and renewal conditions, ranks Oregon as having the highest overall licensing burden, followed by Tennessee, Texas, Kentucky, and Florida.^[49] In contrast, Kansas, Missouri, Wyoming, Indiana, and New York impose the lowest burdens, reflecting fewer or less onerous requirements in these states.^[49] ^[159] Nationally, these regulations affect more than 20 percent of the workforce, though the prevalence varies by state depending on the economic reliance on licensed professions like healthcare and construction.^[49] These state-level differences influence labor mobility, as workers face barriers when relocating; for example, empirical studies indicate that stricter licensing in destination states can reduce interstate migration for licensed professionals.^[96] In response to such variations, 28 states have enacted universal licensing recognition laws by 2025, allowing practitioners with valid out-of-state licenses to transfer credentials upon meeting conditions like residency or substantial equivalence, thereby mitigating some portability issues.^[49] Reforms in states with high burdens, such as Texas's recent reductions in certain licensing prerequisites, demonstrate ongoing efforts to align regulations with public safety needs rather than expansive entry controls.^[160] Federal influence on occupational licensing remains limited, as the Tenth Amendment reserves primary authority to states, but executive actions and agency advocacy have encouraged reforms by highlighting anticompetitive effects. In June 2016, the Obama administration released guidance promoting best practices for states to eliminate unnecessary licensing requirements, estimating that excessive barriers cost consumers billions annually through higher prices and reduced service availability.^[161] President Trump's December 2020 executive order directed federal agencies to reduce occupational mobility barriers and urged states to review licensing for alignment with essential health and safety protections.^[162] Similarly, President Biden's July 2021 executive order on promoting competition identified occupational licensing restrictions as potential labor market impediments, prompting federal reports and state-level deregulation initiatives.^[163] The Federal Trade Commission has conducted multiple workshops and advocated against state licensing practices that unduly restrict competition, influencing policy without direct preemption.^[164] In limited federal domains, such as interstate transportation, agencies like the Federal Aviation Administration impose uniform licensing standards that supersede state rules.^[165] These efforts have correlated with increased state reforms, including procedural changes in over a dozen states since 2018 to streamline approvals and reduce training mandates.^[3]

European Union: Harmonization and National Differences

The European Union has pursued harmonization of occupational licensing through mutual recognition of professional qualifications, primarily via Directive 2005/36/EC, adopted on September 7, 2005, which establishes a framework for recognizing qualifications obtained in one member state for practice in another, facilitating labor mobility within the single market.^[166] This directive applies to regulated professions—those requiring specific qualifications for access—and includes automatic recognition for seven sectoral professions (e.g., doctors, architects) and a general system for others involving compensatory measures if substantial differences exist.^[167] Complementing this, the Services Directive 2006/123/EC seeks to eliminate barriers to cross-border service provision, including restrictions like economic needs tests and excessive licensing requirements, though implementation has been uneven.^[168] A 2024 European Court of Auditors report noted persistent administrative hurdles and proportionality issues in recognition processes, despite these efforts.^[168] Member states retain significant autonomy in designating regulated professions and setting qualification standards, leading to substantial national variations despite EU-wide principles. The EU's Regulated Professions Database identifies over 5,500 regulated professions across member states, but only about 600 are regulated consistently EU-wide, with the remainder subject to divergent national rules.^[169] Occupational licensing covers approximately 22% of the EU workforce, equivalent to around 47 million workers, concentrated in sectors like healthcare, crafts, and legal services.^[170] Stringency differs markedly: Germany exhibits the highest coverage at 33% of workers, followed by Croatia (31%) and Ireland (29%), often due to stringent craft and professional guild traditions; in contrast, Sweden, Latvia, and Denmark have lower rates of 14-15%, reflecting more market-oriented approaches with fewer entry barriers.^[171] These differences manifest in varying regulatory scopes and impacts on mobility. Central and Eastern European countries like the Czech Republic show high regulation in crafts (up to 39% of workers), while Southern states such as Italy and Spain emphasize liberal professions (e.g., lawyers, notaries) with 36-54% coverage among professionals.^[172] EU immigrants face reduced access to regulated occupations compared to natives, with licensing contributing to 17-27% lower labor supply in affected fields and elevated prices (e.g., 11% higher for dental services).^[170] Recent reforms, including Directive (EU) 2018/958 mandating proportionality tests for new regulations, aim to curb overreach by requiring evidence of necessity and less restrictive alternatives, yet enforcement relies on national compliance, perpetuating fragmentation.^[170]

Other Regions: Examples from Canada, Australia, and Developing Economies

In Canada, occupational licensing is decentralized and regulated primarily at the provincial and territorial levels, encompassing about 20% of the workforce across professions such as nursing, engineering, and skilled trades like plumbing.^[173]^[174] These requirements, enforced by over 400 regulatory bodies, mandate education, exams, and experience for entry, ostensibly to protect public safety, but they frequently impede labor mobility; for example, a licensed professional from one province may face requalification or additional assessments to practice elsewhere, despite federal labor mobility provisions under the Canadian Free Trade Agreement since 2017.^[175] In 2023, certifications for trades reached 42,021, a 3% increase from prior years, yet persistent shortages in fields like healthcare and construction persist partly due to these barriers, which disproportionately affect immigrants whose foreign credentials are often unrecognized.^[176] Australia's occupational entry regulations (OER) apply to numerous fields including electricians, builders, and health practitioners, setting mandatory qualifications, training hours, and sometimes exams that exceed baseline competency needs, thereby elevating entry costs and reducing workforce supply.^[177] Empirical analysis indicates these rules curb business dynamism, suppress employment in regulated sectors, and inflate consumer prices without commensurate quality gains, with macroeconomic modeling suggesting potential output losses from restricted adaptation to technological shifts.^[178]^[179] Reforms have accelerated, including a national licensing scheme for electrical trades implemented in March 2025 to enable seamless interstate practice without reapplication, alongside a Productivity Commission inquiry into broader harmonization projected to yield up to $10.3 billion in annual economic gains through reduced duplication.^[180]^[181] In developing economies, occupational licensing frequently adopts stringent entry controls for formal professions like medicine, law, and engineering, often inherited from colonial frameworks or international standards, but enforcement varies widely, fostering dual markets where informal, unlicensed work dominates to bypass barriers.^[182] These regulations, when rigorously applied, limit labor supply and exacerbate service shortages in high-need areas such as healthcare and construction, mirroring developed-world patterns of reduced employment and elevated wages for incumbents, though empirical data remains limited compared to OECD contexts.^[6] In regions like Latin America and parts of Africa, licensing bodies prioritize credential verification over practical skills, contributing to skill mismatches and informal sector reliance, where up to 60-80% of employment evades formal regulation, underscoring how such rules can hinder poverty alleviation by constraining low-skilled entry.^[183]^[184] Reforms in countries like India have sporadically eased requirements for trades, yet entrenched interests often sustain barriers that prioritize rent extraction over consumer access.^[100]

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This paper proposes a novel approach to assessing the efficiency and distributional conse- quences of one important type of early labor policy – occupational ...
[37]
[PDF] Overview” & “Professionalization: Europe” - UNM Digital Repository
Licensing and regulation of practice were generally supervised more closely by state authorities on the continent, although with concessions to and cooperation ...Missing: 19th 20th
[38]
Professionalizing Legal Professions in England and Germany (1850 ...
The 19th century was a time of constant change, and this change brought with it legal reforms. If we look at non-European countries, the legal reforms were ...
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[PDF] Mass vocational education and training in Europe - Cedefop
This volume is intended to arouse interest in the history of European vocational education and training by examining its historical beginnings in the 19th ...<|separator|>
[40]
[PDF] Morris M. Kleiner Alan B. Krueger Working Paper 14308
During the early 1950s, less than 5 percent of the U.S. work force was covered by licensing laws at the state level (Council of State Governments, 1952). That ...Missing: WWII | Show results with:WWII
[41]
[PDF] Reforming Occupational Licensing Policies - Brookings Institution
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[42]
[PDF] Occupational Licensing: Protecting the Public Interest or ...
Jul 27, 2011 · In 2008, nearly 30 percent of the workforce was required to hold a license (Kleiner and Krueger 2010), up from around. 10 percent in 1970.Missing: WWII 1950s statistics<|separator|>
[43]
[PDF] NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION ...
Our empirical analysis leverages two new datasets that track the history of occupational licensing requirements in the United States, obtained from Carollo ( ...
[44]
[PDF] The Prevalence and Effects of Occupational Licensing in the U
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[45]
10 states have enacted major occupational licensing reforms since ...
Oct 2, 2020 · Since 2019, for instance, 10 states have taken major occupational licensing reforms. Here is a summarization of those reforms by the Badger Institute.<|separator|>
[46]
Policy Brief: 2024 Update to the Survey of Universal Licensing ...
Occupational licensing, which functions like a government permission slip to work, covers about a fifth of U.S. workers. However, states have generally not ...
[47]
Two significant new occupational licensing laws enacted in 2021
Feb 4, 2021 · The first significant record reforms of 2021 are occupational licensing laws enacted by Ohio and the District of Columbia.
[48]
State Finalizes Regulations to Implement Occupational Licensing ...
Oct 18, 2024 · New regulations to implement Act 53 will remove criminal record barriers to licensed professions for workers with old criminal records.
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State Occupational Licensing Index 2025 - Archbridge Institute
Aug 21, 2025 · Occupational licensing affects more than 20% of workers in the United States. The extent of occupational licensing greatly differs across ...
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New Report Reveals States With Heaviest Occupational Licensing ...
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Examples of occupations licensed in many states include: teachers, land surveyors, doctors, lawyers, cosmetologists, nurses, building contractors, counselors, ...
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The Costs of Occupational Licensing - The Institute for Justice
... licensing laws for 102 lower-income occupations require nearly a year of education or experience, one exam, and more than $260 in fees. 12 Not only do ...
[54]
Apply for or Renew Professional Licensing
Go to our online PALS site and sign in or create an account. · Select the board to apply to, and plain-language questions will appear to help you get started.
[55]
Pages - Professional and Occupational Boards and Committees
May 29, 2025 · Specific information, including applications, about each board and committee can be found below. Before starting the application process, it ...
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Occupational Licensing - The Council of State Governments
Beyond differences in education and training requirements to obtain a license, states also differ in how they process and issue licenses.
[57]
Fees Chart - HTML Test page - Office of the Professions
Initial Fee - $50. Renewal Fee - $50. Professional Photo ID Card - $30. Registered Specialist Assistant/Acupuncture - $115. Replacement of License Parchment - ...
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New York - Occupational Licensing
New York requires $275 in licensing fees, 275 days of education and about 2 exam. Fees for a license exceed $1000 for Optician, Vegetation Pesticide Applicator ...
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NYS Occupational Therapy:License Requirements
General Requirements, Fees, Partial Refunds, Education Requirements, Examination Requirements, English Proficiency, Limited Permits
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Occupational Licensing Legislation Database
This database tracks the state-by-state requirements, costs, training and other related details of 48 different licensed, certified or registered occupations ...
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OT CEU Requirements and Licensure Renewal by State - OT Potential
Jul 16, 2025 · License renewal applications due by June 1st of even years. Licenses renew June 30th. How many hours are required? OTs/OTAs need 20 hours.
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Mandatory Continuing Education for nurses - Mass.gov
Massachusetts nurses must complete 15 contact hours (CH) of continuing education every 2 years, with 1 CH equal to 60 minutes. No CE is needed for the first ...
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Continuing education requirements in the US: An overview
Dec 3, 2021 · Practitioners commonly required to continue their education include lawyers, teachers, accountants, nurses, engineers, psychologists, and pharmacists.
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Maintain Your License | AOTA
State license renewal requirements · Complete and submit a license renewal application to your state licensing entity. · Pay the required fee.
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Occupational Licensing Requirements by State - GL Solutions
Jun 28, 2023 · New research reveals the occupational licensing requirements for all 50 states—from the license renewal fees to the number of exams.
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[PDF] Annual License Renewal Fees for Select Health Occupations by State
... in the analysis unless unable to parse out renewal from primary occupational license). Results. Average Annual Renewal Fee by License Type. $24. 1.95. $. 10.
[67]
Steps to Get Your Occupational Therapy License State by State
Oct 22, 2019 · For renewal, you will pay a fee of $150 as an OT or $110 as an OTA and provide proof of 20 hours of continuing education (or 10 hours if it is ...Missing: average United
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[PDF] State Occupational Licensing Index | Archbridge Institute
6 The database contains information on 345 commonly regulated occupational titles, across. 155 different Standard Occupation Classification (SOC) codes. The ...
[69]
and (3) makes any violation of the occupational licensing law an ...
The law authorizes the licensing boards to impose civil fines on the same grounds that a criminal fine may be imposed. The fines are (1) up to $1,000 for a ...
[70]
[PDF] Occupational Licensing Review Act - The Institute for Justice
Feb 23, 2022 · The Act establishes state policy for occupational regulation, aims to increase opportunities, promote competition, and protect consumers, and ...
[71]
A Public Choice Analysis of Occupational Licensing
May 30, 2017 · Public Interest or Market Failure Theory defended licensing as protecting the public against service providers who were incompetent or ...
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Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality ... - jstor
Leland, Hayne. "Minimum Quality Standards and Licensing in Markets with. Asymmetric Information." In Occupational Licensure, edited by S. Rotten- berg.
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Occupational Licensing and Asymmetric Information | Mercatus Center
Jan 1, 2007 · Licensing is typically justified on the grounds that market mechanisms will not mitigate the problems associated with asymmetric information. In ...
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[PDF] How Much of Barrier to Entry is Occupational Licensing?
They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2018 by Peter Q ...
[75]
[PDF] Occupational Licensing and Economic Rents
Nov 2, 2015 · Occupational licensing can affect workers' access to jobs and wages, and can increase inequality by reallocating rents from lower-income ...
[76]
[PDF] Analyzing the Labor Market Outcomes of Occupational Licensing
Some economists have viewed such regulation through the prism of rent-seeking behavior and have empirically examined the economic effect of occupational.
[77]
[PDF] Reforming Occupational Licensing Policies - Brookings Institution
Specifically, he recommends that a state's decision to license an occupation be based on an analysis of its costs and benefits, that the federal government ...
[78]
[PDF] Analyzing the Extent and Influence of Occupational Licensing on the ...
Figure 1 shows trends in the growth of occupational licensing and unionization from. 1950 to 2008. 2. Licensing data for earlier periods are available only at ...
[79]
[PDF] Occupational Licensing and Labor Market Fluidity Morris M. Kleiner ...
These papers focus generally on cross-sectional employment outcomes rather than worker employment dy- namics. Recent papers have expanded this area of research.
[80]
Occupational Licensing and Labor Market Fluidity
This paper uses detailed micro data to bridge that gap and measure how much occupational licensing affects labor market dynamics and wage growth and uncover ...
[81]
[PDF] The Labor Market Effects of Occupational Licensing Policies
The standard justification for occupational licensing is that it protects consumers or the public from potential harm caused by unqualified service providers.
[82]
Does Continuing Education Improve the Quality of Services ...
... evidence that licensing raises prices by anywhere from 3 to 16%. 3. There is a lack of evidence that occupational licensing is successful at improving the ...
[83]
A Welfare Analysis of Occupational Licensing in U.S. States | NBER
Oct 17, 2019 · We find that licensing raises wages and hours but reduces employment. We estimate an average welfare loss of 12 percent of occupational surplus.
[84]
The Effects of Occupational Licensure on Competition, Consumers ...
Nov 7, 2017 · Some studies have found that the percentage of the U.S. workforce employed in occupations that require a license has grown substantially, and ...Missing: prevalence | Show results with:prevalence
[85]
The Effects of Occupational Licensure on Competition, Consumers ...
The evidence suggests two things: First, licensing requirements do not improve the quality of the goods and services provided by licensed occupations, and ...
[86]
Raising Barriers, Not Quality - The Institute for Justice
Oct 21, 2022 · This study tests claims that occupational licenses make consumers better off by screening out workers likely to provide inferior service.
[87]
[PDF] LICENSING AND SERVICE QUALITY: EVIDENCE USING YELP ...
Research has consistently found that occupational licensing creates market power and monopoly effects, including increased prices, a fall in the labor supply, ...<|separator|>
[88]
[PDF] How Does Occupational Licensing Affect US Consumers ... - The CGO
Dec 5, 2018 · Between a fifth and a third of American workers were required to have a license to legally work in 2018. This paper examines the existing ...Missing: definition | Show results with:definition
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[PDF] Licensing Occupations: Ensuring Quality or Restricting Competition?
Jan 9, 2006 · Ensuring Quality or. Restricting Competition? Morris M. Kleiner. 2006. W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. Kalamazoo, Michigan.
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[PDF] Occupational Licensing and Student Outcomes - American University
Friedman argues that occupational licensing creates barriers to entry for non-licensed individuals and increases producer protections against competition. By ...
[91]
Evidence Is Scarce That Licensing Improves Quality or Safety
Although proponents say licensing improves service quality and makes the public safer, most available evidence suggests it does not.
[92]
Occupational Licensing in the EU: Protecting Consumers or Limiting ...
This paper reviews the recent literature and policy developments on the subject, with a focus on the European Union. Suggested Citation. Mario Pagliero, 2019. " ...
[93]
Is Occupational Licensing a Barrier to Interstate Migration? | NBER
Dec 7, 2017 · We find that the between-state migration rate for individuals in occupations with state-specific licensing exam requirements is 36 percent lower.
[94]
Is Occupational Licensing a Barrier to Interstate Migration?
Occupational licensure may limit the interstate movement of workers because it adds to the cost of moving between states. We analyze the interstate ...
[95]
Is Occupational Licensing a Barrier to Interstate Migration?
Mar 28, 2018 · We show that occupations with state-specific licensing requirements, such as exams, experience the largest reductions in interstate migration, ...Missing: portability impact
[96]
Occupational licensing and interstate migration in the United States
The empirical evidence regarding the effects of state occupational licensing practices on interstate migration in the United States is mixed.Missing: prevalence | Show results with:prevalence
[97]
[PDF] Options to Enhance Occupational License Portability
The need to obtain a license in more than one state can reduce interstate mobility and practice, and may even lead licensees to abandon an occupation when ...
[98]
[PDF] Border Battles: The Influence of Occupational Licensing on Interstate ...
Oct 1, 2015 · Figure 1 shows the growth in occupational licensing coverage of the workforce and the decline in interstate migration rates. During this early ...Missing: portability | Show results with:portability
[99]
Occupational licensing has a sizeable impact on job mobility in the US
Mar 15, 2020 · Still, the analysis finds significantly negative associations between licensing coverage and all available measures of job mobility, incluing ...
[100]
Barrier to Entry or Signal of Quality? The Effects of Occupational ...
Recent papers have shown that occupational licensing can also enhance minority workers' labor market outcomes by reducing information asymmetries regarding ...
[101]
Occupational Licensing and Minority Certified Public Accountants
Jul 24, 2024 · Our research finds that the 150-hour rule significantly reduced minority entry to the CPA profession while generating, at best, no improvement in the quality ...Missing: immigrants | Show results with:immigrants<|separator|>
[102]
Occupational Licensing and the Poor and Disadvantaged
Occupational licensing raises the cost of goods and services, and often hurts those who simply want to find meaningful employment. Licensing is especially ...
[103]
Occupational Licensing as a Barrier to Entry for Immigrants
May 15, 2023 · We find that licensure reduces foreign-born employment in a state-occupation pair by nearly 20 percent relative to native-born employment.
[104]
Occupational Licensing and Immigrants
Natives and immigrants may differ in the types of occupational licenses they obtain and may therefore differ in the wage premiums they obtain by being licensed.
[105]
The Effect of Occupational Licensing on Earnings Inequality in the ...
Jul 9, 2025 · Our research examines the effect of occupational licensing on labor earnings inequality in the United States from 1983 to 2019.<|control11|><|separator|>
[106]
Occupational licensing and income inequality in the states
Nov 25, 2024 · Licensing can restrict employment and reduce market competition, which can then inflate wages for those in licensed professions. Existing ...<|separator|>
[107]
The spillover effects of labor regulations on the structure of earnings ...
There is also some evidence that occupational licensing increases earnings inequality because the wage returns to having a license appear at the upper end ...
[108]
The Spillover Effects of Occupational Licensing - Cato Institute
Apr 10, 2024 · Licensing can reduce other occupations' wages by raising barriers to entry in one occupation, thus redirecting labor supply to unlicensed ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[109]
Job Market Signaling through Occupational Licensing
In this paper, we test empirically whether occupational licensing reduces the racial wage gap among licensed workers by reducing asymmetric information about a ...
[110]
How occupational licensing limits access to jobs among workers of ...
Mar 11, 2022 · Occupational licensure—the legal permission to work in certain occupations—is typically justified in terms of its effects on public health ...
[111]
Too Much License? - Archbridge Institute
Apr 10, 2018 · Evaluating at mean levels of economic mobility, our empirical results suggest growth in state licensing is associated with a 1.7% to 6.7% ...
[112]
Occupational Licensing and Labor Market Fluidity | NBER
Jul 16, 2020 · We show that occupational licensing has significant negative effects on labor market fluidity defined as cross-occupation mobility.
[113]
A Primer on Occupational Licensing - Institute for Justice
Apr 1, 2008 · We asked Professor Morris M. Kleiner, a nationally recognized scholar on occupational licensing who teaches labor economics and public policy.
[114]
[PDF] OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING AND THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC ...
Public choice theory has long been the dominant lens through which economists and other scholars have viewed occupational li- censing.
[115]
[PDF] Policy Report - Center for the Study of Economic Liberty
Nov 2, 2020 · Regulatory Capture and Licensing. Boards. When economists view the regulation of an industry, they often highlight the potential for the.
[116]
The de-licensing of occupations in the United States
In this article, we identify and analyze those rare instances when occupational licensing laws have been eliminated—what we refer to as “de-licensing ...
[117]
Occupational licensing: Why a hairdresser trains longer than an EMT
Aug 29, 2019 · Licensing boards are highly susceptible to regulatory capture, in which the industry that the board is supposed to regulate has control of the ...
[118]
[PDF] Licensing Occupations: How Time and Regulatory Attainment Matter
Oct 1, 2013 · An approach that evaluates the various stages of occupational regulation can help capture and illuminate the role that licensing has in labor ...
[119]
[PDF] Occupational Licensing and Asymmetric Information: Post
If licensing is justified by asymmetric information, it is in times of crises that asymmetric information is likely to be most problematic. Market ...
[120]
Long-Term Health Benefits of Occupational Licensing
Midwifery provider quality improvements under state-level licensing regulations could improve life-cycle health outcomes, including mortality and longevity, ...
[121]
[PDF] The Costs and Benefits of Occupational Regulation
May 2, 1988 · justification for occupational regulation, other potential market failure ... Occupational Licensing Regulations on Consumers. 1986. Arrow, K ...
[122]
New Frontiers in Occupational Licensing Research | NBER
Apr 5, 2022 · Licensing an occupation requires trading off a lower labor supply and higher prices against the potential for improved worker quality and customer satisfaction.
[123]
The Uneasy Case Against Occupational Licensing (Part 1)
Nov 30, 2018 · Empirical research has found that licensing creates a significant wage premium, of a magnitude similar to the premium from unionization.
[124]
[PDF] Occupational Licensing and the Limits of Public Choice Theory
A. Does Licensing Improve Quality and Protect Health and Safety? Proponents of the public choice account sometimes point to the paucity of empirical evidence ...
[125]
[PDF] Testing the Utility of Licensing: Evidence from a Field Experiment on ...
This study examines hypothesized benefits associated with occupational licensing in one long-regulated industry in Louisiana—floristry—in order to determine ...
[126]
Louisiana Finally Fixes America's Dumbest Licensing Requirement
May 30, 2024 · Louisiana lawmakers approved a bill to end the testing requirement for florists. Going forward, only a fee will be required.
[127]
Louisiana Florists (first challenge) - The Institute for Justice
On December 18, 2003, the Institute for Justice filed a federal lawsuit on behalf of Meadows and two other would-be Louisiana florists against the Louisiana ...
[128]
Braiding - The Institute for Justice
When IJ launched its braiding initiative in 2014, 24 states required natural hair braiders to become licensed as barbers, cosmetologists, or hairstylists. These ...
[129]
Texas a Hair's Breadth Away From Cutting Braiding Laws
May 20, 2015 · “Licensing should be reserved for occupations that have a real and substantial safety problem or interest,” said Arif Panju, Brantley's ...
[130]
Time to Loosen Hair Braiders from the Knots of Red Tape
Feb 5, 2021 · MA lawmakers repealed the licensure requirement for hair braiders, which will set these skilled workers free from unnecessary regulations.
[131]
[PDF] The De-licensing of Occupations in the United States: An Update (1 ...
Jan 4, 2021 · In 2019 the state passed a bill (HB 2569)18 making Arizona the first state to universally recognize out-of- state occupational licenses.
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Universal licensure recognition: A case study of Montana
May 16, 2024 · We explore the experience of Montana, which recently enacted a ULR reform. Using data from the Montana Department of Labor & Industry (DLI) and interviews with ...
[133]
Occupational Licensing in Tennessee - The Institute for Justice
Tennessee has eased licensing barriers for ex-offenders and banned cities and counties from creating new municipal licenses. The state also created a new review ...Missing: deregulation | Show results with:deregulation
[134]
Deregulation Efforts Challenge State Licensing Laws - Articles
Sep 1, 2022 · Between 2015 and 2020, seven different states passed deregulation bills, which resulted in the delicensing of 35 professions.30 In the 40 years ...
[135]
State-Based Initiatives: Selected Examples
Arizona. Arizona. In May 2016, Governor Doug Ducey enacted a package of regulatory reforms relating to occupational licensing. As explained in a press release, ...
[136]
Florida Passes Major Occupational Licensing Reform But More ...
Jul 9, 2020 · Specifically, the new law eliminates licensing requirements for interior designers, hair braiders, hair wrappers, body wrappers, nail polishers, ...
[137]
Occupational Licensing Final Report: Assessing State Policies and ...
This report provides multiple policy examples on occupational regulation from the 11 original consortium states and five states added in 2018, ...
[138]
Reducing Licensing Barriers Will Get Millions Back to Work
State and local governments are temporarily and permanently reducing regulatory barriers for licensing and certification for dozens of jobs and professions.
[139]
State Reforms for Universal License Recognition - Institute for Justice
20 states have enacted universal license recognition. However, universal recognition laws can differ quite drastically from state to state.
[140]
[PDF] The Labor Market Effects of Occupational Licensing in the Public ...
In the U.S., occupational licensing is about twice as prevalent in the public sector than in the private sector. However, the influence of occupational ...
[141]
[PDF] The Path to Reform Through Federal Courts and State Legislatures
Legislatures can also address other aspects of deregulation, such as enhancing interstate license recognition. Still, advocacy litigation is a powerful ...
[142]
Private Certification as an Alternative to Occupational Licensing
May 31, 2018 · One possible alternative is voluntary certification. Under certification, free entry into a profession is allowed, but professionals are able to ...Missing: registration | Show results with:registration
[143]
There are alternatives to occupational licensing - Mississippi Center ...
Oct 14, 2020 · One of the most common examples is the National Institute for Automotive Service Excellence (ASE) designation for auto mechanics. No ...
[144]
[PDF] A Win-Win for Consumers and Professionals Alike:
Nov 15, 2018 · Private certification keeps licensing's benefit of market signaling but does so without its monopoly. Fraud-protected certification, which ...
[145]
Rethinking Occupational Licensing: Breaking Barriers - Policy Interns
Mar 26, 2025 · Other than policy reform, alternatives to occupational licensing include voluntary certification, registration and mandatory bonding, state ...
[146]
Occupational Licensing: A Barrier to Opportunity and Prosperity
Sep 13, 2021 · Occupational licensing laws establish mandatory minimum entry requirements that must be met for aspiring professionals to begin working.<|separator|>
[147]
Alternatives to Licensing - The Institute for Justice
Here, we highlight a few alternatives, using examples of unlicensed occupations from License to Work to illustrate how they can work in practice.
[148]
Five Alternatives to Occupational Licensing - Libertas Institute
Aug 24, 2022 · The Free Market. The free market may provide the best alternative to occupational licensing. · Easy Access to Reviews · Voluntary Certification.Missing: registration signals
[149]
Alternatives to occupational licensing - Empower Mississippi
Apr 19, 2022 · Market competition · Quality service self-disclosure · Voluntary certification · Voluntary bonding or insurance · Private causes of action.
[150]
What is universal licensing recognition? - State Policy Network
States across the country are adopting a policy called universal licensing recognition. What is this policy and how does it help everyday Americans?
[151]
Florida Becomes 21st State With Universal Licensure - Forbes
Jul 17, 2024 · Governor DeSantis made Florida the latest state to reduce barriers to employment by recognizing occupational licenses from other states.
[152]
Universal Recognition of Occupational Licenses Act
Occupational licenses often are barriers to worker mobility. One state will not recognize another state's license because personal qualifications differ.
[153]
Summary 2023 Occupational Licensing Trends
Apr 19, 2024 · Total nonfarm payroll employment changed little in August (+22,000) and has shown little change since April, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics ...
[154]
2022 Occupational Licensing Trends
Mar 17, 2023 · Forty-five states have adopted at least one compact and 230 pieces of occupational licensure compact legislation over nine different professions ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[155]
Portability - National Center for Interstate Compacts
A commonly cited argument for occupational licensing reform states that licensing results in restricted employment growth and higher wages for licensed workers, ...
[156]
How Virginia's occupational licensing reform has expanded worker ...
Apr 9, 2024 · “By license portability, the migration rate into states with universal recognition increased by 1.31 percentage points or 82.4% among ...
[157]
Universal Occupational Licensing Recognition and Healthcare Access
Oct 1, 2025 · Kleiner examine whether Universal Licensing Recognition (ULR)—a policy that allows out-of-state physicians to practice without relicensing— ...
[158]
Issue Brief on state approaches to universal licensing recognition
Oct 11, 2023 · This issue brief compares legislation in 22 states and outlines five key differences in state approaches to universal licensing recognition: ...Missing: examples | Show results with:examples
[159]
2025 State Occupational Licensing Rankings - GL Solutions
Aug 26, 2025 · The 2025 State Occupational Licensing Index measures licensing burdens across occupations and ranks all 50 U.S. states and D.C. In the report, ...Missing: 2020-2025 | Show results with:2020-2025
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Texas: Among the Worst States for Occupational Licensing
Aug 15, 2024 · For example, in Texas, barber licensing inflates wages by up to 22%, but this increase in wages comes at a cost to consumers, who pay higher ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[161]
New Steps to Reduce Unnecessary Occupation Licenses that are ...
Jun 17, 2016 · The White House put out a set of best practices for state policymakers to enact reforms to reduce the prevalence of unnecessary and overly broad occupational ...
[162]
Executive Order on Increasing Economic and Geographic Mobility
Dec 14, 2020 · The purpose of this order is to reduce the burden of occupational regulations in order to promote the free practice of commerce, lower consumer costs, and ...
[163]
Action on occupational licensing since executive order on ...
As we discussed previously, the power of the federal government to directly impact occupational licensing is limited because licensing is primarily determined ...
[164]
Selected Advocacy Relating to Occupational Licensing
The FTC has a long history of urging policymakers to reduce or eliminate unnecessary occupational licensing requirements imposed by state law or rules.
[165]
FTC Set to Examine Occupational Licensing - AAF
Mar 27, 2025 · Unsurprisingly, 62.2 percent of those employed in the legal occupations have a license while 71.3 percent of health care practitioners and ...Missing: workforce | Show results with:workforce
[166]
[PDF] DIRECTIVE 2005/36/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND ...
Sep 7, 2005 · Consequently, individuals holding professional qualifications which have been recognised pursuant to this Directive may not use such recognition ...
[167]
[PDF] B DIRECTIVE 2005/36/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND ...
Jun 20, 2024 · This Directive also establishes rules concerning partial access to a regulated profession and recognition of professional traineeships pursued ...
[168]
Special report 10/2024: The recognition of professional ...
Jul 1, 2024 · It aims to prevent member states from imposing excessive conditions on citizens from one EU member state wishing to carry out a regulated ...
[169]
Regulated Profession Database - European Commission
The database contains information on regulated professions, statistics on migrating professionals, contact points and competent authorities, as provided by ...Generic Names of Professions · An official EU website · Accessibility Statement
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[PDF] competition and regulation in professions and occupations | oecd
The range of jobs subject to professional regulation and occupational licensing has expanded across OECD members and accounts for up to 30% of employment in ...
[171]
[PDF] Occupational Licensing in the European Union
Licensing is most prevalent in some Central and Eastern. European countries and there is no clear difference between North and South. Countries with high ...
[172]
[PDF] Occupational Regulation in the EU and UK: Prevalence and Labour ...
... EU immigrants enter professions that are less likely to be subject to occupational regulation, but significant differences are found across countries. The ...
[173]
Regulators 101: An introduction to occupational regulation
Jul 16, 2021 · In Canada, about 20% of jobs currently require a license. To work in a regulated profession, practitioners must register with the appropriate ...
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Find out if your occupation is regulated or not
About 20 per cent of jobs are in regulated occupations. These include regulated professions (e.g., nursing) and skilled trades (e.g., plumbing). The law ...
[175]
What Is a Provincially Regulated Job? - Jobs, Immigration and Growth
If you are licensed in a provincially regulated occupation or trade, Canada's Labour Mobility rules make it easier to take your skills anywhere in the country.Missing: professions | Show results with:professions
[176]
The Daily — New registrations, certifications, and pathways ...
Dec 11, 2024 · The number of Canadians receiving certificates in trades increased by 3.0% to 42,021 in 2023. Despite this growth, the number of certifications ...
[177]
RDP 2024-06: Examining the Macroeconomic Costs of Occupational ...
Fifth, occupational licensing may affect productivity by limiting the ability of occupations to change and evolve as technology and consumer demand changes.
[178]
Occupational licensing – how much and what effects? - ecoscope
Mar 31, 2020 · These occupational entry regulations (OER) often reduce both business dynamism and employment, and generate higher prices for customers.
[179]
[PDF] Better occupational entry regulations: Policy implications of new ...
Sep 17, 2024 · Overly stringent OER can hinder economic dynamism, leading to higher prices, less choice, and less productivity. OER in Australia are more ...
[180]
National licensing for electrical trades - Treasury Ministers
Mar 23, 2025 · National licensing will enable people in electrical trades to work seamlessly across state and territory borders without reapplying for a separate licence or ...
[181]
[PDF] National licensing scheme for selected occupations
Modelling by the Productivity Commission estimates that occupational licensing reform could lift economic output by up to $10.3 billion.
[182]
Employment laws in developing countries - ScienceDirect.com
A number of countries, especially in Eastern Europe and West Africa, have recently undergone significant reforms to make employment laws more flexible.
[183]
Occupational Safety and Health in Latin America and the Caribbean
This policy brief addresses safety and security in the workplace in Latin America and the Caribbean.
[184]
Occupational Health and Safety in the Least Developed Countries
Examples are likewise given to show the real situation of health and safety in the least developed countries. Keywords: work culture, social environment, ...