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Pirate code

Pirate codes, known formally as articles of agreement, were binding contracts voluntarily entered into by members of pirate crews to regulate shipboard conduct, allocate captured plunder, and impose punishments for violations during the from roughly 1690 to 1730. These agreements emphasized crew consensus in electing officers and deciding major actions outside battle, with provisions typically mandating equal shares of treasure after deductions for the , , and injury funds, alongside bans on , fighting, and concealing slaves or valuables. Notable surviving examples include those attributed to in 1721, which stipulated democratic voting on key matters, no tolerance for cowardice with penalties up to death, and rest for musicians on Sundays, as documented in early 18th-century trial records and narratives. Earlier variants, such as Morgan's 1660s code, influenced later pirate versions by prioritizing and to sustain prolonged cruises, though enforcement relied on brutal measures like or execution to deter infractions in the absence of external authority. While romanticized as egalitarian precursors to modern governance, the codes fundamentally prioritized operational efficiency and profit retention over ideology, reflecting pragmatic adaptations to the high risks of raiding where or disorder could doom the venture.

Definition and Characteristics

Core Components of Pirate Codes

Pirate codes, formally termed , constituted a set of bylaws ratified by to regulate conduct, , and aboard pirate vessels during the late 17th and early 18th centuries. These documents typically comprised 10 to 20 addressing operational, economic, and disciplinary matters essential for maintaining cohesion among autonomous, multinational crews operating without state oversight. Primary accounts, such as those in Captain Charles Johnson's A General History of the Pyrates, preserve examples from captains like John Phillips and , revealing pragmatic rules designed to incentivize collective effort and deter . A fundamental component involved the equitable division of plunder, where spoils from captures were inventoried and distributed by predefined shares: captains often received two shares, quartermasters and other officers 1.5 to 2 shares, surgeons and mates 1.5 shares, and able seamen one share each, with boys receiving half. This structure, evident in Roberts' 1722 articles, aimed to align incentives by rewarding leadership and skill while ensuring broad participation in rewards, contrasting sharply with naval hierarchies where officers claimed disproportionate portions. Compensation for injuries formed another core element, stipulating fixed payments from a common fund—such as 800 for loss of a right arm or 100 for an eye— to mitigate risks of combat and provide for disabled crew members, as detailed in precedents adapted into later codes. Disciplinary provisions emphasized order through severe penalties, including for , death for or , and for lesser infractions like from the or of duties. Codes universally mandated of and ship readiness, prohibiting and requiring weapons to be kept oiled and clean, as in Phillips' rules captured in 1724. Governance articles promoted , granting every man an equal vote in electing officers and major decisions, with captains removable by majority vote, fostering accountability absent in or naval service. Additional rules often barred , private quarrels, and in some cases women or boys aboard to prevent distractions, though enforcement varied by . These elements collectively sustained functionality in high-stakes, transient alliances, with variations reflecting specific threats like gambling's potential to incite violence or the need for vigilant preparedness against naval pursuit.

Distinctions from Naval and Merchant Ship Regulations

Pirate codes diverged fundamentally from naval regulations, such as the Navy's established in 1661 and revised in subsequent decades, which imposed a rigid military hierarchy emphasizing unquestioning obedience to commissioned officers appointed by the . Under naval rules, captains wielded near-absolute authority in all matters, with violations like punishable by death or severe flogging to maintain discipline in state-sanctioned warfare. In contrast, pirate codes, as exemplified by ' articles from 1720 on the Royal Fortune, granted crew members voting rights on major decisions, including the and potential removal of captains by majority vote, reflecting a proto-democratic structure born of necessity to sustain voluntary outlaw crews without external enforcement. Merchant ship regulations, governed by signed articles of between masters and , prioritized commercial efficiency and protection under captains selected by ship owners or , with bound to fixed wages for the voyage duration rather than profit-sharing. These agreements typically outlined duties like and obedience but lacked participatory , allowing captains broad discretion over routes and operations without input, as the served private commercial interests rather than venture. Pirate codes, however, formalized equal shares of plunder—often one share per crewman, with captains receiving two—alongside injury compensation from a communal fund (e.g., 600 for loss of a right under Roberts' rules), incentivizing investment in success and combat readiness, unlike the wage-based merchant system or naval distributions skewed heavily toward officers. Enforcement in pirate codes relied on elected quartermasters to oversee daily affairs, arbitrate disputes via crew juries, and limit captain power outside battle, with agreed punishments like or death for theft or applied transparently to all, including leaders. Naval centralized punishment under captains or courts-martial, often involving summary floggings or executions to deter indiscipline in hierarchical fleets. Merchant regulations enforced compliance through contractual penalties or captain-imposed discipline, but without the pirate emphasis on mutual oaths and prohibitions like or idle weapons, which ensured all hands remained armed and vigilant— a stark contrast to crews not expected to engage combatants. This crew-centric accountability in pirate codes fostered cohesion among deserters and volunteers, avoiding naval or voyage-bound servitude.

Historical Origins

Precedents in Privateering and Buccaneering

Privateers operated under formal articles of , which served as contractual frameworks signed by officers and crew before voyages, outlining the division of captured prizes, compensation for injuries, and behavioral expectations to maintain order and legality under letters of marque. These documents typically allocated shares proportionally, with captains receiving larger portions—such as double shares in some cases—while ensuring equitable distribution among the crew to incentivize participation and loyalty, a practice that mirrored naval prize systems but emphasized crew consent. For instance, during the , privateer articles from , included provisions for injury compensation and prize shares, functioning as a safety net against the risks of uncertain captures, with nearly 800 American privateers capturing around 600 British vessels between 1775 and 1783. Buccaneers in the during the mid-17th century adapted similar agreements known as chasse-partie or charter parties, which governed joint expeditions against targets and divided spoils into fixed shares—often totaling 400 to 600 per vessel—among participants, with surgeons and carpenters receiving extra for specialized roles. These rules emerged among hunters of wild cattle on and in the 1630s–1640s, evolving into formalized codes by the 1650s that prohibited , enforced no-quarter policies in battle, and prescribed severe punishments like for or to preserve group cohesion during raids. Prominent Henry Morgan employed such systems in operations like the 1671 raid, where over 1,400 men crossed the under agreed terms that prioritized collective discipline and equitable loot distribution, as described in contemporary accounts. These privateering and buccaneering precedents directly informed later pirate codes by establishing democratic processes, standardized share-based economies, and onboard judicial mechanisms, transitioning from state-sanctioned ventures to autonomous crew while retaining core elements of mutual accountability and incentive alignment. Unlike rigid naval hierarchies, these agreements empowered crews through on key decisions, fostering in high-risk environments, though privateer legality often hinged on wartime commissions, blurring into when revoked.

Development During the Golden Age of Piracy (1716–1722)

The Golden Age of Piracy, from 1716 to 1722, marked a peak in formalized pirate codes as crews, often comprising former privateers and sailors displaced by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, sought structured self-governance to sustain operations against naval pursuits and internal discord. These articles evolved from ad hoc agreements into comprehensive rules ratified by vote, prioritizing crew consensus over autocratic command to foster loyalty and efficiency in capturing prizes. Primary accounts, compiled in Captain Charles Johnson's 1724 A General History of the Pyrates, preserve several such codes, though their authenticity derives from cross-verification with trial testimonies and gazettes rather than uncritical acceptance of Johnson's narrative blend of fact and embellishment. Bartholomew , elected captain in June 1719 after mutinying against his prior commander, implemented one of the era's most elaborate codes aboard his flagship Royal Fortune by 1720, enforcing democratic voting on destinations and oversight of provisions to balance the captain's tactical authority. His articles mandated equal shares of spoils—captain receiving two, 1.5, others one—while prohibiting , requiring sobriety in battle, and prescribing or death for or theft, reflecting pragmatic incentives for cohesion amid Roberts' capture of over 400 vessels before his death on February 10, 1722. This code's emphasis on discipline and welfare, such as medical care for injuries, distinguished it from naval hierarchies, enabling sustained predation from the to . Concurrent developments included the 1721 articles of George Lowther and , who, after seizing the Delivery in May off , adopted rules dividing plunder equally with double shares for gunners, banning women and boys aboard to avert disputes, and imposing for cowardice—provisions echoed in Boston News-Letter reports of their depredations. These codes arose causally from the necessities of multi-ship flotillas requiring unified conduct, as fragmented crews risked collapse under stress, evidenced by Lowther's brief alliance dissolving into independent terrorizing of shipping until 1723. By 1722, intensified royal patrols under the Piracy Acts curtailed such innovations, yet the codes exemplified pirates' adaptive realism in replicating merchant efficiencies without state sanction.

Establishment Process

Negotiation and Ratification Among Crew Members

Pirate crews negotiated through democratic deliberation, with each member providing input on provisions covering plunder division, behavioral standards, and operational rules. These discussions generally preceded voyages or followed the capture of a suitable , allowing crews to tailor codes to their circumstances and prevent future conflicts. Ratification demanded , distinguishing pirate governance from hierarchical naval structures. Each crewman signed the articles or made their mark if unable to write, formalizing commitment and entitling participants to shares, voting rights, and protections under the . This act was solemnized by an of honor, sworn on a , , or comparable object to invoke binding obligation. Individuals could decline terms prior to agreement, ensuring voluntary adherence and crew cohesion. Such processes, rooted in 17th-century precedents, persisted into the (circa 1716–1722), fostering internal order amid external lawlessness. Breaches post-ratification invoked specified penalties, reinforcing the code's authority.

Role of Captains in Initiating Codes

Captains typically assumed a leading role in initiating pirate codes by proposing preliminary articles of agreement, drawing upon precedents from privateering commissions, customs, or prior pirate crews to establish a framework for discussion. This approach expedited the process amid the high-stakes formation of crews, where rapid was essential to avoid internal or external threats. Proposals often emphasized equitable shares of plunder—such as double portions for captains and quartermasters—and strict penalties for infractions like or , reflecting the captain's strategic interest in cohesion and operational efficiency. While ultimate ratification required crew assent, often unanimous, the captain's initiative shaped the core provisions, as evidenced by the attribution of specific codes to individual leaders in contemporary accounts. For example, ' 1721 articles, which included rules mandating sobriety during engagements and compensation for injuries (e.g., 800 for limb loss), adapted elements from his mentor Howell Davis' earlier code, illustrating how captains propagated and refined terms across voyages. This pattern appears in surviving documents from the , where captains like Roberts or John Phillips influenced the initial drafting to align with their command style, subject to democratic vote. The captain's prominence in initiation stemmed from their elected status and navigational expertise, positioning them to broker compromises that balanced incentives for loyalty against the temptations of mutiny. Primary records, such as those compiled in 1724, portray captains not as dictators but as facilitators whose proposals mitigated the anarchic risks of ungoverned crews, fostering self-enforcing contracts that sustained piracy's profitability—Roberts alone capturing over 400 vessels before his 1722 death. Failure to secure approval could lead to captain replacement, underscoring the conditional nature of their initiatory authority.

Enforcement Mechanisms

Disciplinary Procedures and Punishments

Disciplinary procedures in pirate codes emphasized enforcement to maintain order among autonomous , with the typically overseeing outside of battle, including investigating violations, settling disputes, and administering punishments for minor infractions as stipulated in the articles. Serious offenses often required crew judgment, where pirates voted on guilt and penalty, reflecting the democratic that allowed crew veto over captains and to prevent in their . Crew members swore oaths upon ratifying the articles, binding them to honor under threat of severe reprisal, which ensured compliance through mutual accountability rather than top-down naval . Punishments varied by offense but were codified to deter , such as from —punishable by or —to safeguard shared plunder essential for crew cohesion. during battle or striking a fellow pirate aboard ship incurred or , with the latter involving abandonment on a remote with minimal provisions like a and powder, often leading to slow by or . Lesser violations, like quarreling on board, were prohibited outright and resolved either by —potentially flogging with the cat-o'-nine-tails—or deferral to shore-based duels to avoid onboard violence that could jeopardize the vessel. Harsh measures such as —dragging the offender under the hull on ropes, risking lacerations from and —were reserved for extreme cases, though less common than whippings or irons to immobilize the guilty. These penalties, drawn from privateering precedents but adapted for pirate , prioritized deterrence through severity, as crews lacked state-backed and relied on internalized fear of reprisal to sustain operations during the (c. 1716–1722).

Judicial Functions on Pirate Vessels

Pirate vessels maintained internal order through a system of elected officers and crew consensus, with the serving as the primary judicial authority for routine disputes and discipline outside of combat. Elected by majority vote, the quartermaster mediated conflicts between crew members, enforced provisions of the pirate code, and imposed punishments for infractions such as , unclean weapons, or minor quarrels, often without needing further approval. This division of authority prevented the captain—limited to navigational and battle decisions—from abusing power, as the quartermaster could actions harming crew interests. For irreconcilable personal disputes, the acted as referee in structured duels on land: disputants fired pistols back-to-back before advancing with cutlasses if both shots missed, ensuring a decisive resolution under supervision to avoid prolonged feuds that could undermine ship cohesion. assemblies functioned as a collective judiciary for interpreting ambiguous violations, relying on majority votes or juries to determine guilt and penalties, a mechanism that incentivized self-enforcement by aligning individual incentives with group survival and plunder shares. Serious offenses against the collective, such as from the common prize, , or mutinous behavior, required full to impose severe sanctions like —with the offender abandoned on an island with minimal provisions—or death, which demanded near-unanimous consent to deter predation within the anarchic structure. The captain judged crimes directly threatening the vessel during voyages, such as sabotage, but remained accountable to override, as evidenced by depositions like that of Captain in 1718 for refusing engagement. Punishments were codified upfront in articles of agreement, such as 40 lashes for code breaches on John Phillips' ship in , ensuring predictability and reducing arbitrary rule. This quasi-democratic judiciary, rooted in precedents, prioritized operational efficiency over retribution, as unchecked internal conflict historically doomed prior ventures by dissipating manpower and trust essential for high-risk raiding. Empirical accounts from captured pirates confirm low incidence of major breaches under such systems, attributing stability to the quartermaster's daily oversight and veto power, which curbed leader opportunism more effectively than in contemporary naval hierarchies.

Common Provisions

Division of Spoils and Compensation

Pirate codes commonly prescribed the equitable of spoils to maintain cohesion and align incentives with the high risks of predation. Captured prizes were valued or sold, with proceeds distributed in shares proportional to and skill; the typically received two shares, the one and a half to two, skilled positions such as or carpenter one and a quarter to one and a half, and ordinary members one share each. This structure, rooted in privateering precedents, ensured officers bore greater responsibility while affording relatively egalitarian portions compared to naval hierarchies. In ' articles aboard the Royal Fortune in 1720, the captain and quartermaster claimed two shares per , the , , and one and a half shares, other petty officers one and a quarter, with the receiving full shares but barred from advancing credit for supplies; no individual could access until the crew collectively reached £1,000 in value per man. Similar provisions appeared in John Phillips' 1723 code, where shares followed rank-based premiums, emphasizing collective restraint on to prevent disputes. Compensation for combat injuries was drawn from the prior to share , providing a form of absent in legitimate service. Roberts' allotted £800 from public funds for of a limb or crippling injury, scaled downward for lesser disabilities. Phillips' articles specified 600 or six slaves for a right , 500 for a left , 400 for a right leg, 300 for a left leg, and 100 for an eye. Buccaneer customs preceding formalized codes involved ad hoc divisions post-raid, with captains claiming larger portions amid frequent quarrels, as seen in Henry Morgan's 1671 Panama expedition where uneven sparked among the 1,200-man force. These mechanisms, documented in Charles Johnson's 1724 A General History of the Pyrates and corroborated by records, reflected pragmatic adaptations for sustaining voluntary crews in illicit enterprises.

Behavioral and Operational Rules

Behavioral and operational rules in pirate articles of agreement emphasized discipline, conflict prevention, and vessel readiness to sustain crew cohesion during extended voyages. These provisions, drawn primarily from surviving codes documented in Captain Charles Johnson's 1724 A General History of the Pyrates, addressed interpersonal conduct and shipboard routines to minimize disruptions that could compromise raids or survival at sea. Violations often carried severe penalties, including or execution, reflecting the crews' need for self-enforced order absent external authority. Prohibitions on women and young boys aboard ship were widespread, intended to avert jealousy, distractions, and morale erosion; for instance, ' articles mandated death or for infractions. was routinely banned to curb debt-induced quarrels, as seen in multiple codes where it threatened crew harmony. Fighting or striking fellow crew members on board was forbidden, with disputes deferred to shore-based duels using pistols or swords under supervision, promoting restraint during operations. Operational mandates focused on maintenance and vigilance: crews were required to keep personal arms clean and serviceable at all times to ensure combat preparedness. Lights-out curfews, typically at 8 or 9 p.m., enforced rest cycles, while rules demanded ship cleanliness to prevent disease in confined quarters. faced harsh reprisals like on uninhabited islands with minimal provisions, deterring abandonment during critical pursuits. from the ship or comrades warranted execution, underscoring the codes' role in safeguarding collective resources. These rules, varying slightly by , collectively fostered an environment prioritizing efficiency over indulgence.

Provisions for Injuries and Welfare

Pirate codes during the frequently stipulated compensation for crew members who sustained severe injuries, such as the loss of limbs, during battles or raids, with payments drawn from the vessel's of captured prizes. These provisions functioned as an rudimentary form of , incentivizing full commitment in under a "no prey, no pay" pay structure where crews shared risks and rewards equally but faced high injury rates without state-backed support. Amounts were predefined to minimize disputes, often scaled by injury severity— for instance, articles from the late awarded 600 for loss of a right arm, 500 for a left arm, and 100 for loss of an eye. A explicit example appears in the 1723 articles of Captain John Phillips aboard the , which mandated 800 —or an equivalent proportion of prizes—for any man who lost a limb or became a cripple in service, with lesser hurts compensated proportionately from the collective spoils. Similar clauses in other codes, such as those of and George Lowther, reinforced this by tying payouts to verified combat-related harm, assessed by the or to prevent . This system addressed the economic reality that disabled pirates risked indigence upon dispersal, as merchant vessels offered no such safeguards and naval provided minimal care. Welfare extended beyond lump-sum payments to include ongoing support for the incapacitated, such as retained shares of future prizes or surgical mandates, ensuring retention and morale. Captain ' articles, while not detailing exact injury tariffs, incorporated medical insurance-like reimbursements for combat wounds, funded collectively to sustain long-term viability amid frequent engagements. relied on consensus, with violations like denying valid claims punishable under general disciplinary rules, reflecting the codes' emphasis on against the perils of piratical life. These measures, absent in contemporary legitimate contracts, arose from self-interested necessity to align efforts with group success in a high-risk enterprise.

Notable Examples

Articles of Bartholomew Roberts

The articles of Bartholomew Roberts, also known as Black Bart, governed conduct aboard his vessels, including the Royal Fortune, during his piratical career from 1719 to 1722. Roberts captured over 400 ships in under three years, attributing his success in part to strict discipline enforced through these rules. Documented in Captain Charles Johnson's A General History of the Pyrates (1724), the eleven articles emphasized equal participation, prohibition of vices, and compensation for injuries to maintain crew cohesion and operational readiness. Johnson's account, the primary for these provisions, derives from accounts of captured pirates and trial records, though embellishments cannot be ruled out; nonetheless, the articles align with pragmatic needs of extended voyages, such as preventing and ensuring . Unlike looser codes of other captains, Roberts' banned gambling and imposed curfews, reflecting his teetotaling habits and focus on efficiency over indulgence. The articles, as recorded, are:
  1. Every man has a vote in affairs of moment; has equal title to the fresh provisions, or strong liquors, at any time seized, and may use them at pleasure, unless a scarcity (not private stowage) makes it necessary, for the good of all, to vote a retrenchment.
  2. Every man to be called fairly in turn, by list, on board of prizes because, (over and above their proper share) they were on these occasions allowed a shift of clothes: but if they defrauded to the value of one dollar in plate, jewels, or , was their punishment. If the robbery was only betwixt one another, they contented themselves to bestow a reward of one hundred dollars, who was he that gave information of it.
  3. No person to game at cards or dice for money.
  4. The lights and candles to be put out at eight o'clock at night: if any of the crew, after that hour still lingered, such as used them should run the risk of being shot at.
  5. Keep guns, powder, shot, and cutlasses clean and fit for service.
  6. Lights and candles must be put out at eight o'clock pm. Whoever was found drunk on board after that hour, should suffer the punishment of the crew's choice.
  7. No striking one another on board, but every cause of complaint, in criminal cases, to be heard and adjudged by the Quarter-Master, who had power to punish with whipping or short confinement.
  8. No man to talk of breaking up their way of living, till each had shared one thousand pounds. If in order to this, any man should lose a limb, or become a in their service, he was to have eight hundred dollars, out of the public stock, and for lesser hurts, proportionately.
  9. No man to conceal any taken, under pain of .
  10. The and Quarter-Master to receive two shares of a prize; the , , , and , one share and a half, and all other officers one share and a quarter.
  11. The musicians to have rest on the Day, only, by turns; but the rest of the week to relieve each other.
These rules facilitated fair spoils division—typically equal shares after officers' premiums—and deterred desertion through severe penalties like or , underscoring the criminal underlying pirate organization rather than egalitarian ideals. Roberts enforced them rigorously, executing violators to preserve command until his death on February 10, 1722, off Cape Lopez.

Articles of John Phillips

Captain John Phillips, an English pirate operating in the western Atlantic during the early 1720s, seized a sloop named Revenge off the coast of Newfoundland in August 1723 and converted it for with a crew largely consisting of unwilling fishermen and sailors pressed into service. To enforce order among this reluctant group of approximately 30 to 40 men, Phillips instituted a set of 16 articles of agreement shortly after the capture, which emphasized hierarchical command, equitable prize division, and harsh penalties for infractions. These rules were preserved through testimony during the trials of Phillips and his surviving crew members following his capture by mutineers in April 1724 near Cape Samana, , and subsequent execution by hanging in on April 18, 1724. The articles reflected a blend of naval and pirate , prioritizing combat readiness and loyalty amid a prone to . Phillips, who had previously sailed under pirate Thomas Anstis, allocated himself one and a half shares of all prizes, with key officers like the master, carpenter, , and gunner receiving one share and a quarter each, while ordinary got one share; and were divided equally by the and carpenter. Provisions for injuries during engagements offered 400 for loss of a and 800 for a limb, underscoring the risks of their . Disciplinary measures were severe to deter in a force-heavy operation. Desertion or withholding secrets from the company warranted with minimal provisions: one bottle of powder, one of , a small barrel of bread, and ten pounds. Theft or with company money resulted in burning the offender's prize share. infractions, such as failing to maintain loaded firearms or snapping weapons improperly in the hold, led to being set ashore; refusal to fight in an engagement carried the same penalty. Striking a fellow crew member, quarrelsome shooting or scalding, or excessive drinking during service invited majority-decided punishments, while carrying company money ashore without consent was prohibited. Operational rules enforced military-like efficiency. Weapons had to be cart ridged and brought on deck for firing, with no gaming allowed using company funds and no discussion of fights during peacetime. Article 15 uniquely mandated that no man lie with a ashore without bringing her aboard upon departure, punishable by death—a likely aimed at preventing via shore liaisons rather than moral restraint, given the crew's composition. Such strictures failed to prevent , as several crew members, resentful of forced service, overpowered and surrendered to authorities, providing the evidentiary basis for these articles' survival. The full articles, as attested in crew examinations, were:
  1. Every man shall obey civil command; the captain shall have one full share and a half in all prizes; the master, carpenter, boatswain, and gunner shall have one share and a quarter.
  2. If any man shall offer to run away or keep any secret from the company, he shall be marooned with one bottle of powder, one bottle of water, one small barrel of bread, and ten pounds.
  3. If any man shall steal anything in the company or play cards or dice for money, his share of the prize shall be burnt.
  4. If at any time of action any man shall keep his piece not in good order or not keep loaded, he shall be turned ashore.
  5. No man shall snap his arms in the hold, but every man shall bring his piece cart ridged up the deck to be fired.
  6. No man shall game for any of the company's money.
  7. Every man that shall snap, or shoot, or scald any other in quarrel shall suffer what punishment the and the majority of shall think fit.
  8. If any man shall lose a in time of engagement, shall have 400 ; if a limb, 800.
  9. If any man shall be unwilling to fight in an engagement which may happen to be offered to him, he shall be left ashore by his shipmates.
  10. The and carpenter shall divide the small arms and equally among the company.
  11. No man shall carry any of the company's money ashore without consent of the .
  12. No man shall strike another on shipboard, but any that does shall suffer what the and majority of the company shall think fit.
  13. No man shall drink to excess or be unruly in time of service.
  14. No man shall talk of fighting in time of peace.
  15. No man shall lie with a on shore, but shall bring her on board when he goes, on pain of death.
  16. He that shall snap any of the different from Article Seven shall suffer what the and shall think fit.

Articles of and Lowther

The pirate articles attributed to Edward Low and George Lowther represent one of the few surviving documented codes from the early 18th-century Golden Age of Piracy, first published in the Boston News-Letter on August 1, 1723, and later referenced in A General History of the Pyrates (1724). Low and Lowther, who jointly commanded vessels from January to May 1722 after mutinying from the slave ship Aldermen Cockayne, adopted these rules to regulate crew behavior, plunder distribution, and discipline aboard their ships, such as the sloop Ranger. The code's first eight articles closely match those recorded for Lowther alone in A General History, with two additional provisions appearing in the Boston News-Letter version linked to Low, reflecting their collaborative operations in the Caribbean and Atlantic. These articles prioritized hierarchical share allocation while incorporating crew-majority decisions for punishments, emphasizing and deterrence against or . Compensation for combat injuries was fixed at 600 per lost limb, with provisions for ongoing support if the injured chose to remain aboard, underscoring a pragmatic system tied to engagement risks. Rules against concealing treasure above one piece of eight or defrauding crew members beyond one ryal mandated swift majority-voted penalties, aiming to prevent internal divisions that could undermine raids. The code also enforced and restraint during fights, prohibiting drunkenness or unauthorized firearm discharge in the hold, and rewarded vigilance by granting the best captured to the first crewman spotting a . The full articles, as compiled from these primary accounts, are as follows:
  1. The Captain shall have two full shares of everything; the Master one share and a half; the Doctor, Mate, Gunner, and Boatswain one share and a quarter.
  2. He that shall snap any of the Crew, or unlawfully discharge any Gun, to the hurt of any of the said Crew, shall be liable to the Punishment due to the said Offence, by the Majority of the Captain and Company.
  3. No Person to Game at any time to the value of One Piece of Eight.
  4. He that shall snap any of the Crew, or unlawfully keep any Secrets from the Company, he shall be punished at the Majority's Discretion.
  5. He that shall desert the Ship or his Quarters in time of Engagement, shall suffer what Punishment the Captain and Majority of the Company shall think fit.
  6. No Person to hoard or conceal any Gold, Jewels, Silver, or other Treasure, above the value of one Piece of Eight, but deliver the same to the Captain or Quartermaster, under pain of the Punishment mentioned in the foregoing Article.
  7. If any Man shall lose a Limb in the Engagement, he shall have 600 Pieces of Eight, or Six Hundred Dollars, unless it be a Surgeon's or Carpenter's, whose pay shall be double. The Company to take care of him while he lives, if he cannot help himself.
  8. Good Quarters to be given when called for.
  9. He that is drunk in time of Engagement, or discovers the least Fear, shall suffer what Punishment the Captain and Majority shall think fit.
  10. No Snapping of Guns in the Hold.
Enforcement relied on the captain's authority tempered by crew consensus, reflecting a balance between leadership and collective input to sustain cohesion during Low's notoriously violent campaigns, which captured over ten vessels in 1722 alone. Despite this structure, historical accounts indicate inconsistent adherence, as Low's crew later fragmented amid disputes, leading to Lowther's in 1723 and Low's presumed death by 1724.

Articles of Henry Morgan and Buccaneers

The articles of agreement used by and crews were binding contracts signed by all participants prior to expeditions, outlining shares of plunder, conduct, and punishments to incentivize and deter in high-risk ventures. No original manuscripts from Morgan's expeditions survive, but primary details derive from Alexandre O. Exquemelin's 1678 De Americaensche Zee-Roovers (translated as The Buccaneers of America), where Exquemelin, serving as surgeon on Morgan's 1671 raid, documents the prevailing chasse-partie or "Custom of the Coast." These rules, formalized in writing as obligations enforceable by severe penalties, reflected pragmatic adaptations for loose alliances of independent hunters turned raiders, prioritizing equal risk-sharing and operational discipline over hierarchical authority. Key provisions included equitable division of spoils after deducting ship repairs and medical costs, with common sailors receiving one share each, the captain two shares, and specialists like the surgeon or carpenter receiving 1.5 to two shares based on expertise. Injury compensation was stipulated explicitly: 600 pieces of eight for loss of a leg below the knee, 800 for an arm, reflecting the economic value of labor in a manpower-scarce enterprise. Prohibitions barred women and boys from ships to avoid disputes, forbade gambling with coin (allowing only trinkets), and mandated readiness of arms, with lights out by 8 or 9 p.m. to conserve vigilance. Punishments enforced compliance harshly: theft from the company warranted on an with a , flask, and ; desertion or could result in immediate or . Targets were selected by majority vote among captains, with the proposer leading if approved, underscoring a proto-consensual suited to transient coalitions rather than permanent navies. Exquemelin's account, drawn from direct participation, aligns with legal records of charte-partie contracts upheld in Jamaican courts, though Morgan contested Exquemelin's portrayal of atrocities in a 1680s libel , securing without disputing the procedural codes. Morgan applied these during landmark raids, such as the 1668 sack of (June 11-12, yielding 70,000 pounds of silver and goods) and the 1671 Panama campaign, where on December 13, 1670, he rallied 1,846 men across 37 vessels at Old Providence Island, compelling signatures to the articles before departing for the January 28, 1671, overland assault that captured and burned , distributing spoils worth over 140,000 pounds sterling per share estimates. This framework enabled scaling from small hunter bands to large fleets, with causal effectiveness evident in sustained cohesion amid temptations of individual defection, though reliant on credible threats of retaliation.

Scholarly Interpretations

Claims of Proto-Democratic Governance

![Pirates signing the articles of agreement][float-right] Scholars such as Peter T. Leeson have argued that pirate codes established proto-democratic governance structures to foster order among self-interested criminals operating in an anarchic environment. Leeson posits that these codes functioned as constitutions, enabling democratic decision-making to minimize internal conflicts and maximize plunder efficiency, with crews electing captains and voting on key actions like pursuing vessels. For instance, captains held authority only during battle but could be deposed by majority vote for incompetence or , reflecting checks and balances that predated similar mechanisms in formal governments. Historians like portray pirate ships as sites of radical egalitarianism, where codes enforced participatory governance as a counter to the hierarchical tyranny of merchant and . Rediker highlights how elected quartermasters wielded significant power over provisions, disputes, and spoil division, often rivaling the captain to prevent abuse, thus creating a system of shared authority among the crew. This structure, according to Rediker, embodied early forms of , with all able-bodied pirates—regardless of origin—participating in votes on destinations, alliances, and conduct, fostering a brotherhood that sustained operations during the from approximately 1716 to 1722. Leeson further contends that these democratic elements arose from economic incentives rather than ideological commitment, as equal voting rights and leader accountability reduced shirking and risks in stateless seas, effectively generating self-enforcing rules for a voluntary criminal enterprise. Empirical evidence from surviving codes, such as those of , demonstrates provisions for crew on major decisions, underscoring how pirates innovated to align greed with success. While these claims emphasize proto-democratic traits, they are grounded in the pragmatic necessities of small crews numbering typically 100 to 300 men, where was feasible for survival.

Economic Incentives and Organizational Efficiency

Pirate codes incentivized cooperation through profit-sharing systems predicated on collective success, embodying the principle of "no prey, no pay," whereby crew members received only from captured spoils. This structure aligned individual self-interest with group performance, as shares were distributed equitably relative to naval precedents: captains typically claimed two shares, officers 1.5 or 1.25 shares, and crew one share, as stipulated in ' articles drafted around 1721. By mitigating free-rider problems in a lawless environment, such divisions reduced shirking during pursuits and combats, enhancing the likelihood of profitable ventures. Organizational efficiency stemmed from mechanisms that curbed internal predation and enforced . Democratic and removability of captains, often requiring crew votes, prevented autocratic abuse, while the quartermaster's role in overseeing provisions and disputes provided checks on leadership, as seen in cases like Charles Vane's 1718 deposition for perceived cowardice. Injury compensation schedules further promoted combat readiness; for example, codes offered 600 for loss of a right arm, incentivizing sustained engagement despite risks. Punishments like share forfeiture for or for theft deterred defection, preserving crew cohesion without state enforcement. These incentives yielded tangible efficiency gains, evidenced by outsized hauls such as Henry Every's 1695 capture distributing approximately £1,000 per pirate. Additional rules banning , excessive , and interpersonal minimized operational disruptions, channeling self-interest toward plunder rather than dissipation. Economist Peter Leeson argues that pirate governance, including codes, rationally emerged to solve anarchy's coordination failures, fostering voluntary order driven by rather than or .

Relation to Anarchist Concepts like Hydrarchy

Scholars Peter Linebaugh and coined the term "hydrarchy" to describe the dual maritime organizational forms in the early modern Atlantic: imperial hydrarchy imposed from above by states to enforce and naval discipline, and hydrarchy from below, the self-organizing structures developed by sailors and pirates to resist such control. In the context of piracy (roughly 1716–1722), pirate codes exemplified hydrarchy from below by establishing voluntary, contractual rules for shipboard , including elected captains with limited authority, crew councils for decisions, and equitable loot distribution, often diverging from the hierarchical naval models of the era. These codes, such as the Jamaica Discipline referenced in pirate articles, promoted collective welfare through provisions like compensation and penalties for dereliction, fostering a multiracial, egalitarian order that challenged state-sanctioned exploitation, as seen in crews under figures like , who operated until his defeat in 1722. This aligns with anarchist principles of and decentralized authority, where participants joined crews by and could desert or vote to replace leaders, absent external enforcement mechanisms. Economist Peter Leeson argues that pirate codes functioned as efficient "constitutions" in an anarchic environment, addressing problems like shirking and disputes through incentives and punishments tailored to the stateless high seas, enabling crews to sustain operations without oversight. For instance, codes typically allocated double shares to the and while ensuring broad , reflecting rational driving orderly rather than chaos, as evidenced by the estimated 5,000 pirates active in the early who adhered to such articles for mutual benefit. However, this parallels anarchist ideals selectively; while codes emphasized and reciprocity internally, they presupposed external predation, underscoring a pragmatic criminality over ideological . Interpretations linking pirate codes to broader anarchist concepts, such as hydrarchy's emphasis on fluid, water-based power resisting terrestrial hierarchies, draw from historical resistance patterns, including multiracial solidarity in crews (e.g., up to 60% Black pirates in Edward Teach's 1718 band) that defied racial divisions enforced by imperial powers. Linebaugh and Rediker frame this as a proletarian counterculture, with pirate vessels as mobile sites of autonomy inspired by earlier upheavals like the English Revolution (1640s–1660s), yet empirical realities reveal constraints: codes enforced via crew justice could be severe, and success depended on plunder viability until naval crackdowns, such as the 1722 executions at Cape Coast Castle, dismantled these structures. Thus, while evoking anarchist motifs of self-rule and mutual aid, pirate hydrarchy remained a transient, incentive-driven adaptation to maritime lawlessness, not a scalable model devoid of coercion.

Critiques and Realities

Failures and Hypocrisies in Application

Pirate codes, while providing a framework for internal order, were frequently undermined by inconsistent enforcement and self-serving actions that contradicted their egalitarian pretensions. often devolved into by rather than consensus, as seen with Edward Teach, known as , who intimidated his crew to enforce compliance, diverging from the embedded in many articles. This reliance on highlighted the pragmatic criminality underlying pirate , where codes served efficiency in plunder but faltered under individual ambition. The vaunted equality of pirate crews extended unevenly, primarily benefiting white male members; black pirates, who constituted up to 30% of personnel in some fleets between 1715 and 1725, often faced inferior status, with slavery continuing aboard ships despite selective freedoms granted to others. Codes prohibiting women and boys aboard were similarly hypocritical, violated in cases like the crew of Calico Jack Rackham, which included Anne Bonny and Mary Read in 1720, leading to internal discord and legal repercussions upon capture. Captains occasionally circumvented codes for personal gain, exemplified by Blackbeard's intentional beaching of the Queen Anne's Revenge on June 10, 1718, at Beaufort Inlet, stranding and 18 men to redistribute larger shares among 40 loyalists, bypassing required crew votes on such actions. Such breaches fueled mutinies, as crews deposed leaders for withholding spoils or evading profitable attacks, revealing the codes' vulnerability to the very greed they sought to regulate. These failures underscored that pirate articles were tools of short-term criminal , not enduring social contracts, prone to collapse amid interpersonal conflicts and opportunistic betrayals.

Underlying Violence and Criminal Pragmatism

Pirate codes enforced through brutal punishments, revealing the underlying necessary to maintain order among lawless crews engaged in and at . Infractions such as from the common store or often resulted in death by or , while lesser offenses like or in led to flogging, , or on uninhabited islands without provisions. These measures, documented in surviving articles from captains like in 1720, prioritized crew cohesion to maximize plunder efficiency rather than moral reform. The criminal pragmatism of these codes stemmed from the need to curb internal chaos in enterprises inherently reliant on external violence against merchant vessels and coastal settlements. Rules mandating equal shares of booty after the and quartermaster's cuts aimed to prevent disputes that could fracture raiding parties, as seen in articles prohibiting private trading or hiding treasure, punishable by severe penalties. Prohibitions on excessive drinking or women aboard served operational purposes, ensuring combat readiness during the (circa 1716–1722), when pirates captured over 2,500 ships through coordinated assaults involving cannon fire and boarding actions. Scholarly examinations highlight how this embraced as a tool for empowerment and control, with codes functioning as contractual in an anarchic where or betrayal threatened survival. While internal regulations like no raping prisoners appeared in some articles, they coexisted with widespread of captives—such as or whipping—to coerce surrender of valuables, underscoring that piracy's structure facilitated predation rather than restraint. Historical records from trials, including those of Edward Low's crew in 1723, reveal executions for code violations mirroring the savagery inflicted on victims, affirming the pragmatic calculus: deterred defection, enabling sustained criminal operations until naval suppression ended the era.

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