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SVB

Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) was a commercial bank headquartered in Santa Clara, California, founded in 1983 to provide specialized financial services to technology startups, venture capital firms, and innovation-driven companies in the life sciences and healthcare sectors.^[1]^[2] As a subsidiary of SVB Financial Group, it managed approximately $212 billion in assets by early 2023, with a customer base concentrated in high-growth but volatile industries, over 90 percent of whose deposits exceeded federal insurance limits.^[3]^[4] SVB's growth relied on attracting large, uninsured deposits from tech ecosystems amid low interest rates, which it invested heavily in long-duration U.S. Treasury and mortgage-backed securities, creating acute interest rate and liquidity risks that senior management failed to adequately hedge or monitor.^[3]^[5] Rising Federal Reserve interest rates from 2022 onward generated substantial unrealized losses on these holdings—estimated at $15 billion by March 2023—prompting the bank to announce a $1.8 billion loss on asset sales and a planned equity offering, which ignited social media-fueled panic and a rapid deposit run exceeding $40 billion in a single day.^[3]^[6] California regulators closed SVB on March 10, 2023, marking the largest U.S. bank failure by assets since Washington Mutual in 2008, with the FDIC incurring initial resolution costs of about $20 billion to the Deposit Insurance Fund before selling most assets to First Citizens BancShares.^[4]^[7] Federal reviews attributed the collapse primarily to the bank's "textbook case of mismanagement," including inadequate board oversight, risk control breakdowns, and over-reliance on a narrow, correlated client base, rather than solely external monetary policy shifts.^[3]^[5]

Founding and Early Development

Establishment in 1983

Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) was founded on October 17, 1983, as a California state-chartered commercial bank and a member of the Federal Reserve System, with Silicon Valley Bank Financial Group serving as its holding company headquartered in Santa Clara.^[1] The initiative stemmed from the need to finance high-risk technology startups in Silicon Valley, which conventional banks avoided due to the absence of traditional collateral like real estate or inventory, instead relying on future cash flows and venture capital relationships.^[8] The bank was established by Bill Biggerstaff, a former Wells Fargo executive; Robert Medearis, a Stanford University professor; and Roger Smith, a Wells Fargo banker who became SVB's first CEO. These founders, connected through local business networks including informal gatherings, opened SVB's initial office on North First Street in San Jose to directly engage with the region's emerging tech ecosystem.^[9] By year-end 1983, SVB's assets totaled approximately $18 million, reflecting a targeted focus on early-stage companies in technology and life sciences sectors.^[1] From inception, SVB differentiated itself by offering specialized lending and deposit services tailored to innovation-driven firms, emphasizing personal relationships with entrepreneurs and venture capitalists rather than standardized credit metrics.^[1] This approach addressed a market gap in the early 1980s, when Silicon Valley's growth accelerated amid the personal computer revolution, but banking infrastructure lagged.^[10]

Initial Focus on Technology Sector

Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), established on October 17, 1983, as a state-chartered institution in Santa Clara, California, initially concentrated its operations on serving the nascent technology sector in Silicon Valley, particularly early-stage startups lacking traditional collateral.^[1] Founders Bill Biggerstaff, a former Wells Fargo executive, and Robert Medearis targeted this niche after recognizing that conventional banks avoided lending to unprofitable tech ventures reliant on venture capital infusions rather than steady revenue streams.^[11] This focus addressed a critical gap in financing for innovators in computer hardware, software, and related fields during the 1980s personal computing boom, where companies often operated at high burn rates with intellectual property as primary assets.^[1] SVB's early business model emphasized relationship-based banking tailored to tech entrepreneurs, offering services such as payroll processing, cash management, and modest credit lines secured against anticipated venture funding or contracts, rather than hard assets.^[11] Unlike larger commercial banks demanding proven cash flows, SVB built expertise in assessing startup viability through direct engagement with founders and venture capitalists, fostering long-term client retention from seed stage through initial public offerings.^[1] By 1987, the bank had begun trading on Nasdaq, reflecting initial growth from this specialized clientele, which included a significant portion of Silicon Valley's emerging growth firms in technology.^[11] This sector-specific strategy enabled SVB to navigate the high-risk, high-reward dynamics of tech financing, where failure rates exceeded 90% for startups but successes yielded outsized returns via equity stakes or repeat business.^[1] Early challenges included managing liquidity amid volatile funding cycles, yet the bank's deep immersion in the ecosystem—serving innovators who would later dominate sectors like semiconductors and biotech—positioned it as a de facto partner to nearly half of U.S. venture-backed technology firms by later decades, tracing back to its foundational emphasis on Silicon Valley's tech vanguard.^[1]

Growth and Expansion (1980s–2010s)

Building Relationships with Startups and VCs

Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) cultivated relationships with startups and venture capitalists (VCs) by addressing the financing gaps that traditional banks overlooked, particularly for early-stage technology and life sciences firms lacking conventional collateral. Founded in 1983 with initial assets of $18 million in Santa Clara, California, SVB targeted VC-backed companies from its outset, offering specialized lending products such as venture debt and revolving lines of credit secured against committed or anticipated VC funding rounds rather than hard assets. This approach allowed startups to extend runway between investment milestones, fostering loyalty among founders who viewed SVB as an understanding partner attuned to the irregular cash flows of high-growth ventures. By the 1990s, under CEO Ken Wilcox (1994–2011), SVB's bankers—many with prior tech or VC experience—provided not only capital but also advisory services on fundraising strategies and operational scaling, embedding the bank within Silicon Valley's innovation ecosystem.^[1] A key mechanism for strengthening VC ties was the "flywheel" effect, wherein VCs routinely directed portfolio companies to establish banking relationships with SVB immediately following funding rounds, channeling deposits and cross-selling opportunities back to the bank. This practice, prevalent from the late 1980s onward, positioned SVB as the de facto financial hub for the VC-startup cycle, with VCs benefiting from streamlined portfolio management and startups gaining rapid account setup and integrated services like foreign exchange hedging for international expansion. SVB further solidified these bonds through SVB Capital, launched in the 1990s, which co-invested in VC funds and direct deals, aligning the bank's interests with those of investors and providing proprietary deal flow insights. During the dot-com boom and recovery in the 2000s, SVB's organic growth and targeted acquisitions expanded its footprint while preserving niche expertise, enabling it to serve clients across the company lifecycle from seed stage to initial public offering (IPO).^[12]^[13] By the 2010s, these efforts had scaled SVB's client base to encompass nearly half of all U.S. VC-backed technology and life sciences companies, with over 50% of deposits originating from such entities by 2022—reflecting decades of relationship-building through data-sharing tools like SVB Analytics and ecosystem events that facilitated networking among founders, investors, and executives. SVB's emphasis on tacit knowledge of sector dynamics, including sensitivity to VC funding cycles, distinguished it from diversified competitors, though this concentration later amplified vulnerabilities during market downturns. The bank's model prioritized long-term ecosystem embeddedness over short-term profitability metrics, contributing to sustained growth from $40 billion in assets in the mid-2010s to over $200 billion by 2021.^[1]^[14]

Geographic and Service Expansion

Silicon Valley Bank began its geographic expansion beyond its Santa Clara, California headquarters in the early 1990s, opening its first East Coast office near Boston to serve emerging technology hubs.^[15] By 1996, the bank had established a broader national footprint with new offices in Austin, Texas; Seattle, Washington; St. Helena, California; Beverly Hills, California; and Boulder, Colorado, targeting venture-backed companies in these innovation centers.^[9] International expansion commenced in 1991 with the launch of Pacific Rim and Trade Finance groups, enabling cross-border services for clients without full overseas branches initially.^[9] Physical international offices followed in the 2000s, including an Israel office in 2008 and a U.K. branch to support global tech and venture ecosystems.^[11] These moves aligned with SVB's client base, which increasingly included multinational startups and venture capital firms requiring localized banking in regions like Europe and Asia.^[15] In parallel, SVB diversified its services from core deposit and lending products for early-stage tech firms to include venture debt financing, foreign exchange, and trade finance by the early 1990s, retaining clients as they scaled.^[9] The bank later added investment banking through SVB Securities and asset management via SVB Asset Management, expanding into capital markets and private equity services to cover the full lifecycle of innovation economy participants.^[15] This service evolution supported geographic growth by offering tailored solutions, such as international wire transfers and hedging, to clients operating across borders.^[9]

Business Model and Risk Profile Pre-2023

Client Base and Deposit Structure

Silicon Valley Bank's client base was heavily concentrated in the innovation economy, particularly venture capital-backed startups in technology, life sciences, and related sectors. The majority of its customers were early-stage companies, including many pre-revenue entities with annual revenues below $5 million, which relied on SVB for specialized banking services tailored to high-growth, equity-financed businesses.^[16]^[1] Venture-backed firms dominated this composition, accounting for over half of the bank's deposit relationships and reflecting SVB's strategy of embedding itself within the Silicon Valley venture capital ecosystem, where it also served VC firms and investors channeling funds to these startups.^[1]^[5] The deposit structure mirrored this client focus, featuring rapid inflows from venture funding rounds that often exceeded standard FDIC insurance limits. As of December 31, 2022, uninsured deposits comprised approximately 94 percent of SVB's total deposit base, totaling around $152 billion out of roughly $173 billion in overall deposits.^[5]^[1] This high uninsured ratio arose because startup clients deposited large, lumpy sums from equity raises—frequently in the tens or hundreds of millions—rather than steady retail or corporate payroll flows, resulting in a deposit portfolio that was both concentrated and sensitive to fluctuations in venture capital activity.^[5]^[1] Such a structure amplified liquidity risks, as deposits were not diversified across traditional consumer or small-business savers but tied to the cyclical fortunes of the tech and biotech startup funding environment.^[5]

Investment and Asset Management Strategies

Silicon Valley Bank's investment strategy prior to 2023 relied on deploying excess deposits from its venture capital and technology-focused client base into a portfolio dominated by long-duration, high-quality fixed-income securities, primarily U.S. Treasury bonds and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS), to generate yield amid limited traditional lending opportunities.^[3]^[5] By the end of 2022, investment securities comprised approximately 55% of total assets, totaling $116 billion out of $211 billion, with about 78% classified as held-to-maturity (HTM).^[3] The HTM portfolio, which grew from $15 billion in 2018 to $98 billion in 2021, featured securities with weighted-average durations of around 6.2 years, and roughly 65% maturing beyond five years, exposing the bank to prolonged interest rate sensitivity.^[3]^[5] A key decision in asset classification occurred in January 2021, when SVB shifted a greater proportion of its securities to HTM status, which deferred recognition of unrealized losses by avoiding fair-value accounting under available-for-sale (AFS) rules; by Q1 2022, HTM holdings reached $99 billion compared to $27 billion in AFS.^[3]^[17] This approach aligned with funding from short-term, non-maturity deposits—89% of liabilities by late 2022, with 94% uninsured—drawn from concentrated sources in private equity and startups, which the bank viewed as stable despite their volatility.^[3]^[5] Assets had tripled from $71 billion in 2019 to $211 billion by year-end 2022, driven by pandemic-era inflows, prompting investments in these securities rather than diversified loans.^[3] Interest rate risk management was inadequate, with SVB removing hedges in early 2022 to prioritize short-term net interest income over long-term economic value protection, despite breaching internal interest rate risk (IRR) limits since 2017.^[3]^[5] The bank did not effectively address the duration mismatch between long-term assets and short-term liabilities, relying on optimistic deposit duration assumptions adjusted in April 2022 to evade economic value of equity (EVE) breaches without substantive hedging.^[3] By December 2022, this resulted in $15.2 billion in unrealized HTM losses and $2.5 billion in AFS losses as rates rose from 0.25% in March to 4.5%.^[5] Management's emphasis on growth and earnings—tied to compensation metrics like return on equity without risk adjustments—contributed to these lapses, as board oversight failed to enforce robust scenario testing or contingency planning.^[3]^[5]

Prelude to Collapse (2020–2023)

Effects of Low Interest Rates and Pandemic Boom

The Federal Reserve slashed the federal funds rate to a target range of 0–0.25% on March 15, 2020, in response to the economic shutdowns triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, extending a low-rate policy framework that had kept rates below 2.5% since the 2008 financial crisis with only brief interruptions.^[18] These persistently low rates compressed yields on short-term safe assets like cash equivalents, pushing venture capital firms and investors toward high-growth technology startups to generate returns exceeding near-zero benchmarks.^[19] Concurrently, massive fiscal stimulus packages, including the CARES Act signed on March 27, 2020, injected trillions into the economy, fueling speculative investment in tech amid remote work shifts and digital acceleration.^[20] This combination catalyzed a venture capital funding boom, with global VC investments reaching a record $671 billion in 2021, driven by optimism in unprofitable but scalable tech firms.^[21] U.S. venture exit values alone hit $290 billion in 2020, surpassing prior years, as startups raised equity rounds and parked excess funds in specialized banks like Silicon Valley Bank (SVB).^[22] SVB, embedded in the Silicon Valley ecosystem as a preferred depository for startups and VC firms, experienced explosive deposit growth: total deposits rose from $61.8 billion at year-end 2019 to $189.2 billion by year-end 2021, with over 90% uninsured and concentrated among fewer than 100 tech clients by late 2022.^[23] ^[24] SVB's lending opportunities remained constrained, as pandemic-fueled startups relied more on equity than debt financing, leaving the bank with surplus liquidity in a yield-starved environment.^[25] To manage this, SVB allocated a substantial portion—over 40% of assets by 2022—into a held-to-maturity (HTM) portfolio of long-duration U.S. Treasuries and agency mortgage-backed securities, which offered slightly higher yields than shorter-term alternatives amid the low-rate backdrop.^[5] This strategy initially supported profitability, with SVB reporting net interest income growth and asset expansion from $71 billion to over $200 billion during the period, but it entrenched duration mismatch vulnerabilities by locking in low fixed rates for extended periods.^[26] The tech-centric deposit base, swollen by boom-time equity inflows rather than diversified operational revenues, amplified SVB's exposure to sector-specific downturns once funding enthusiasm waned.^[3]

Shift to Higher Interest Rates

The Federal Reserve initiated a series of interest rate hikes in 2022 to combat inflation that had surged following the COVID-19 pandemic stimulus measures and supply chain disruptions. On March 16, 2022, the federal funds rate target range was raised from 0–0.25% to 0.25–0.50%, marking the first increase since 2018.^[27] Subsequent hikes accelerated: to 0.75–1.00% on May 4, 1.50–1.75% on June 15, 2.25–2.50% on July 27, 2.25–2.50% wait no, July 27 to 2.25-2.50%, September 21 to 3.00–3.25%, November 2 to 3.75–4.00%, and December 14 to 4.25–4.50%.^[27] By year-end, the effective rate had climbed over 400 basis points from its pandemic-era lows, inverting the yield curve and pressuring long-duration assets.^[28] SVB's asset-liability mismatch amplified the effects of this policy shift. The bank had deployed surging deposits from the low-rate environment into long-term U.S. Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities, with a significant portion classified as held-to-maturity (HTM), shielding them from immediate mark-to-market accounting but exposing the portfolio to duration risk.^[1] As rates rose, bond prices fell inversely, generating unrealized losses estimated at over $15 billion on SVB's HTM securities by late 2022, equivalent to roughly 80% of its Tier 1 capital.^[5] These losses remained latent until liquidity pressures forced realizations, but they eroded the bank's underlying solvency buffer amid the rapid yield increases.^[29] The rate environment also strained SVB's deposit base. Higher borrowing costs curbed venture capital funding, which had fueled tech-sector growth and deposit inflows during accommodative policy; VC investment volume dropped over 50% year-over-year in 2022, prompting startups to draw down cash reserves held at SVB.^[1] Deposits, which had ballooned to $198 billion by year-end 2021, began contracting in the second half of 2022 as clients sought higher yields elsewhere or reduced burn rates, with outflows totaling about $20 billion by Q4.^[30] This dynamic tested SVB's reliance on uninsured, volatile tech deposits without commensurate hedging against rate normalization.^[31]

The March 2023 Collapse

Announcement of Losses and Capital Raise

On March 8, 2023, Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), a subsidiary of SVB Financial Group (SVBFG), disclosed a significant restructuring of its securities portfolio to bolster liquidity amid deposit outflows and rising interest rates. The bank reported selling $21 billion in available-for-sale (AFS) securities, primarily long-duration mortgage-backed securities and U.S. Treasuries, realizing an after-tax loss of approximately $1.8 billion.^[1]^[5] This move crystallized previously unrealized losses on the bank's held-to-maturity (HTM) and AFS portfolios, which had accumulated due to the inverse relationship between bond prices and interest rates following the Federal Reserve's rate hikes since 2022.^[32] SVB also anticipated an additional $100 million in restructuring charges related to breaking hedges and other portfolio adjustments.^[1] To address capital needs stemming from the losses and ongoing deposit pressures, SVBFG announced plans to raise $2.25 billion through a private placement of common stock and warrants, engaging common equity investors and potentially other securities.^[33]^[34] Concurrently, SVB secured $15 billion in advances from the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) of Des Moines to provide immediate liquidity support.^[1] The announcement emphasized that these actions aimed to "significantly strengthen" the balance sheet, with SVB's CEO stating in the mid-quarter update that the measures would position the bank to navigate market volatility while continuing to serve its tech and startup clients. However, the disclosure highlighted vulnerabilities in SVB's asset-liability mismatch, as the bank's deposit base—largely uninsured and concentrated in volatile venture capital and tech sectors—had grown rapidly without corresponding low-cost funding diversification.^[5] The mid-quarter update was released after market close, revealing that SVB's securities portfolio, which constituted over 50% of total assets, faced substantial mark-to-market declines estimated at $15 billion unrealized prior to the sale.^[1] Federal Reserve analyses later noted that SVB's decision to sell AFS securities, rather than relying solely on HTM holdings, was driven by liquidity strains from $42 billion in net deposit withdrawals in the prior week, prompting the need for verifiable capital infusion to reassure depositors and investors.^[5]^[32] This event marked a pivotal shift from SVB's earlier Q4 2022 earnings report in January, which had shown net income of $275 million despite acknowledging unrealized losses, underscoring the accelerating impact of higher-for-longer rate expectations on the bank's duration-risk exposure.^[35] Following SVB's announcement on March 8, 2023, of a $1.8 billion loss from asset sales and a planned $2.25 billion capital raise, concerns rapidly escalated among tech sector clients via social media platforms, particularly Twitter (now X). Venture capital firms, including Peter Thiel's Founders Fund, instructed portfolio companies to withdraw deposits immediately, initiating a cascade of outflows that same day; Founders Fund itself transferred out tens of millions before the bank's liquidity was exhausted.^[36] This action, disseminated through professional networks and online channels, amplified fears of insolvency, as SVB's heavy reliance on uninsured deposits from startups—over 90% of its $175 billion total—made it vulnerable to coordinated digital withdrawals.^[34] By March 9, social media posts from influential figures, such as investor David Sacks, who warned of systemic risks if deposits were not protected and urged movement to larger banks, fueled broader panic among depositors.^[37]^[38] Tweets and threads highlighting SVB's unrealized losses on long-term bonds, combined with real-time updates on withdrawal queues via banking apps, created a feedback loop of sentiment-driven fear; econometric analysis of Twitter data from January to March 2023 showed negative sentiment spikes correlating with deposit flight, distinct from traditional media coverage.^[39]^[40] In just five hours that day, customers requested $42 billion in withdrawals—nearly 25% of SVB's total deposits—overwhelming the bank's digital platforms and leaving it with a negative cash balance of about $1 billion by close of business.^[34]^[41] This episode marked the first major bank run primarily accelerated by social media, where viral narratives outpaced regulatory responses and traditional communication channels.^[42] Research from the FDIC and academic studies attributes the speed to the tech-savvy client base's ability to act en masse via apps, rather than physical queues, though underlying balance sheet weaknesses—such as duration mismatch in bond holdings—provided the factual basis for the alarm.^[41]^[43] Critics, including some regulators, noted that while social media amplified contagion, SVB's failure stemmed from inadequate liquidity buffers against such rapid, uninsured outflows, with over 85% of deposits exceeding FDIC limits.^[5] The panic subsided only after federal intervention on March 10, guaranteeing all deposits, but it exposed how digital platforms can compress traditional run timelines from days to hours.^[34]

FDIC Seizure and Immediate Aftermath

On March 10, 2023, the California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation declared Silicon Valley Bank insolvent and closed it after depositors withdrew $42 billion—nearly 25% of its $166 billion in total deposits—the previous day, prompting the FDIC's appointment as receiver.^[5]^[44] At closure, the bank held $209 billion in assets and $175.4 billion in deposits, making the failure the second-largest by assets in U.S. history.^[45]^[46] The FDIC immediately created Silicon Valley Bridge Bank, N.A., transferring all deposits and substantially all assets to maintain operational continuity, with loan payments and other services proceeding as scheduled.^[47] Depositors gained full access to funds, including uninsured amounts beyond the $250,000 federal limit, starting March 13, 2023, via ATMs, wires, checks, and other channels.^[47] Senior management was dismissed, and Tim Mayopoulos, former CEO of Fannie Mae, assumed leadership of the bridge bank to oversee day-to-day functions.^[47] Losses to the Deposit Insurance Fund were projected to be recovered through a special industry assessment, avoiding immediate taxpayer expense.^[47] The seizure averted total deposit loss but fueled immediate contagion fears, with shares of regional banks like First Republic dropping sharply and venture capital firms urging portfolio companies to diversify banking ties.^[46] Tech startups, SVB's core clients, reported acute liquidity strains, as the bank had provided over $30 billion in venture debt and held significant custody of startup payrolls and operations.^[48] Regulators' March 12 announcement of systemic deposit protections for SVB and the concurrent Signature Bank failure stabilized markets short-term, though it highlighted vulnerabilities in uninsured tech-heavy deposits exceeding 90% of SVB's base.^[47]^[34]

Causal Analysis of Failure

Interest Rate and Duration Risk Mismanagement

Silicon Valley Bank's exposure to interest rate risk stemmed from a significant duration mismatch between its assets and liabilities. The bank's securities portfolio, comprising primarily long-term fixed-rate mortgage-backed securities and U.S. Treasury bonds held in the held-to-maturity (HTM) category, had a weighted-average duration of 6.2 years as of December 31, 2022.^[1] In contrast, its liabilities consisted largely of short-term, uninsured deposits from technology startups and venture capital firms, which exhibited near-zero duration due to their on-demand nature and sensitivity to market conditions.^[3] This gap exposed SVB's economic value of equity to declines when interest rates rose, as the present value of long-duration assets fell more sharply than that of short-duration liabilities.^[3] Management exacerbated this vulnerability by aggressively extending the duration of its investment securities during 2022, even as the Federal Reserve began signaling rate hikes to combat inflation. SVB's balance sheet grew rapidly from deposit inflows during the low-rate pandemic period, leading executives to deploy excess liquidity into higher-yielding, longer-term bonds rather than shorter-duration or floating-rate alternatives that could better align with liability maturities.^[1] The bank had previously employed interest rate hedges, such as swaps, to mitigate duration risk but discontinued most of them in early 2022 amid expectations of persistently low rates, a decision that left the portfolio unbuffered against the subsequent 525 basis point increase in the federal funds rate over the year.^[5] Federal Reserve examiners had flagged elevated interest rate risk in SVB's internal models as early as 2021, noting potential economic value declines of up to 45% under stress scenarios, yet management did not sufficiently adjust its strategy or bolster capital buffers.^[3] By late 2022, rising rates had generated unrealized losses of approximately $15 billion on SVB's HTM portfolio, equivalent to over 90% of the bank's total equity of $16.1 billion.^[49] These losses remained hidden from regulatory capital calculations under U.S. accounting rules, which exclude HTM mark-to-market adjustments, masking the institution's true solvency risk.^[50] When deposit outflows accelerated in early March 2023 amid broader market concerns, SVB was forced to liquidate portions of its AFS (available-for-sale) securities at a realized loss of $1.8 billion to meet liquidity needs, triggering the disclosure of the HTM unrealized losses and eroding confidence.^[1] This sequence underscored a failure to conduct robust scenario analysis or maintain adequate duration gap monitoring, as evidenced by the bank's internal risk committee overlooking the portfolio's sensitivity to parallel yield curve shifts.^[51] Ultimately, the mismanagement transformed a manageable interest rate repricing into a balance sheet impairment that precipitated the liquidity crisis.^[52]

Liquidity and Uninsured Deposit Vulnerabilities

Silicon Valley Bank's deposit base was highly vulnerable due to its heavy reliance on uninsured deposits, which comprised approximately 94 percent of its total deposits as of December 31, 2022.^[5]^[1] These deposits, totaling around $165 billion out of $173 billion, were primarily from technology startups, venture capital firms, and related entities, creating a concentrated and correlated risk profile prone to synchronized withdrawals during sector downturns.^[53] Uninsured deposits, exceeding the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's $250,000 coverage limit per depositor, lacked the stability provided by insured funds, amplifying the bank's exposure to liquidity shocks as depositors could rapidly transfer funds via digital platforms without incurring losses up to the insured threshold.^[34] This composition exacerbated liquidity vulnerabilities, as SVB funded long-duration, interest-rate-sensitive assets—such as mortgage-backed securities and Treasury bonds—with short-term, demand deposits that could be withdrawn on short notice.^[3] The bank's liquidity risk management failed to adequately account for the potential for rapid outflows from uninsured depositors, particularly in a high-interest-rate environment where asset values declined, limiting the availability of high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) to meet demands.^[5] Supervisors later identified weaknesses in managing liquidity risks tied to nontraditional and uninsured deposits as a contributing factor to the failure, noting insufficient stress testing for scenarios involving concentrated client runs.^[54] The vulnerabilities manifested acutely during the March 2023 bank run, when customers initiated withdrawals of $42 billion on March 9 alone—equivalent to nearly 25 percent of the bank's $166 billion in total deposits—leaving SVB with a negative cash balance and forcing the sale of securities at a realized loss to cover outflows.^[5]^[55] This unprecedented pace, driven by social media-amplified panic among uninsured tech-sector clients, overwhelmed SVB's liquidity buffers, as the bank lacked diversified funding sources or sufficient unencumbered liquid assets to withstand the digital-era run's speed and scale.^[3] Over two days, attempted withdrawals approached the entirety of uninsured deposits, underscoring how the absence of deposit insurance and client concentration transformed a solvency concern into an immediate liquidity crisis.^[56]

Governance and Oversight Deficiencies

The board of directors at Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and its holding company, SVB Financial Group (SVBFG), failed to provide effective oversight of risk management practices amid rapid growth from $60 billion in assets in 2019 to over $200 billion by 2022, lacking sufficient experience in managing large financial institutions.^[3] ^[5] Examiners determined that board members did not possess relevant expertise in large-scale bank risk management, which impaired their ability to challenge management's risk assessments and ensure alignment with the institution's scale.^[5] The board received inadequate information on key vulnerabilities, such as interest rate exposures and liquidity shortfalls, and did not hold senior executives accountable for addressing them, treating supervisory feedback as routine compliance rather than existential threats.^[3] SVB's management prioritized short-term profitability and deposit growth over robust risk controls, removing interest rate hedges in early 2022 despite rising rates and conducting flawed stress tests that understated potential losses on the bank's $40 billion held-to-maturity securities portfolio.^[3] ^[5] The chief risk officer, appointed in 2021 with limited prior experience, departed in April 2022 without a successor, leaving gaps in oversight during a period of escalating unrealized losses exceeding $15 billion by late 2022.^[3] Incentive compensation for executives, including CEO Gregory Becker and CFO Daniel Beck, was linked primarily to metrics like return on equity and total shareholder return, with no meaningful incorporation of risk management performance, encouraging behaviors that amplified vulnerabilities such as concentrated uninsured deposits from tech startups (over 90% of deposits).^[3] Internal governance frameworks proved deficient, with an ineffective three-lines-of-defense model that failed to mitigate concentration risks in venture capital-backed clients and inadequate liquidity testing lacking granular deposit outflow assumptions.^[5] Despite supervisory matters requiring attention issued in April 2022 for weak interest rate risk modeling and board oversight of compensation, SVB delayed corrective actions, including unreliable internal models that masked the severity of economic value of equity breaches under rising rates.^[3] The board's risk and audit committees did not sufficiently escalate these issues, contributing to a culture where growth targets overshadowed contingency planning, such as diversified funding sources beyond volatile venture funding cycles.^[5]

Controversies and Debates

Internal Management Critiques vs. External Factors

The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) sparked debate over whether internal mismanagement or external macroeconomic pressures bore primary responsibility, with official investigations attributing the failure predominantly to leadership and governance shortcomings despite the challenging interest rate environment. The Federal Reserve's review concluded that SVB's senior management failed to address basic interest rate risk (IRR) in its investment portfolio, which grew rapidly without adequate hedging or diversification, leading to unrealized losses exceeding $15 billion by late 2022 as the Federal Reserve hiked rates from near-zero levels to combat inflation.^[3] This internal lapse was compounded by the absence of a chief risk officer (CRO) for nine months—from April to December 2022—during which the bank ignored internal warnings about liquidity vulnerabilities tied to its 94% uninsured deposit base, heavily concentrated in volatile tech and venture capital sectors.^[3]^[5] Critics of management, including regulators, highlighted governance deficiencies, such as an ineffective board that did not sufficiently oversee risk practices or enforce internal controls, allowing the bank's asset duration mismatch—holding long-term securities funded by short-term deposits—to persist unchecked.^[3]^[5] The bank's board, lacking expertise in key areas like cybersecurity and IRR modeling, approved aggressive growth strategies from $62 billion in assets in 2019 to over $209 billion by 2022 without corresponding risk mitigation, including minimal use of interest rate swaps or derivatives to offset potential losses.^[51]^[57] SVB's emphasis on deposit growth over liquidity buffers left it exposed when depositors withdrew $42 billion in a single day on March 9, 2023, amplifying the unrealized losses into a liquidity crisis.^[3] Proponents attributing greater weight to external factors pointed to the Federal Reserve's unprecedented rate hikes—525 basis points between March 2022 and March 2023—as the trigger for devaluing SVB's held-to-maturity securities, which comprised 57% of assets and featured average durations far exceeding peers.^[58] However, analyses counter that such rate normalization was anticipated post-COVID stimulus, and SVB's outlier exposure—unlike diversified competitors who hedged or shortened durations—reflected deliberate choices rather than unforeseeable shocks, as evidenced by internal models underestimating IRR by factors of 10 or more.^[3]^[59] The Office of Inspector General's review reinforced this, noting SVB's business model prioritized short-term profitability via low-yield, long-duration investments amid low rates, rendering it brittle when policy tightened—a vulnerability internal stress tests failed to address despite regulatory prompts.^[5] Ultimately, while external rate pressures precipitated the March 2023 run, empirical assessments from regulatory probes emphasize that SVB's failure stemmed from controllable internal errors, including inadequate scenario planning and over-reliance on a niche, flighty deposit base, rather than exogenous forces alone; comparable banks weathered the same environment through prudent hedging and diversification.^[3]^[60] This view aligns with first-principles risk assessment, where banks must prepare for plausible adverse scenarios like rate reversals, a standard SVB neglected in pursuit of growth.^[51]

Role of DEI Initiatives and ESG Investments

Critics of Silicon Valley Bank's governance have argued that the institution's emphasis on diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives contributed to deficiencies in risk management oversight, particularly given the absence of a chief risk officer from April 2022 until January 2023 and the composition of its risk committee, which lacked members with specialized experience in bank risk management.^[61] In its 2022 proxy statement, SVB highlighted the diversity of its board, noting that 45% of directors were women, alongside representation including one Black director, one Hispanic director, and one LGBTQ+ director, while downplaying expertise in core banking risks amid rapid growth fueled by tech-sector deposits.^[62] Proponents of this view, including analyses from conservative policy outlets, contend that such DEI priorities may have incentivized selections based on demographic criteria over proven competence in interest rate and liquidity risk, exacerbating the bank's vulnerability to the Federal Reserve's rate hikes starting in March 2022.^[61] However, federal examiners and independent reviews, such as the Federal Reserve's material loss review, attributed governance failures primarily to inadequate internal controls and board oversight of interest rate duration mismatches, without citing DEI as a direct causal factor.^[5] Regarding environmental, social, and governance (ESG) investments, SVB positioned itself as a leader in sustainable finance, with significant lending to climate technology startups and community projects aligned with ESG principles, but these exposures were not material to its balance sheet collapse, which stemmed largely from unrealized losses on long-duration U.S. Treasury and mortgage-backed securities held to hedge deposit growth rather than ESG-specific assets.^[63] Some observers have critiqued SVB's ESG focus for potentially neglecting the "G" (governance) pillar, arguing that an overemphasis on environmental and social lending distracted from rigorous stewardship of traditional banking risks like asset-liability matching amid rising rates.^[64] For instance, the bank's aggressive pursuit of "sustainable" tech ecosystem financing, while aligning with ESG mandates from investors and regulators, coincided with insufficient hedging against the 4.5 percentage point increase in short-term rates by March 2023, leading to a $1.8 billion realized loss on securities sales announced on March 8, 2023.^[65] Empirical assessments, including those from financial academics, find no quantitative evidence that ESG allocations drove the failure, as such loans represented a minor fraction of assets compared to the $40 billion in securities portfolio losses.^[63] Nonetheless, post-collapse analyses suggest that ESG's integration into SVB's strategy may have amplified cultural pressures within the firm to prioritize growth in "impact" sectors over conservative risk protocols, contributing indirectly to oversight lapses.^[66] Mainstream media and regulatory narratives have largely dismissed DEI and ESG as peripheral to SVB's demise, emphasizing macroeconomic factors like Federal Reserve policy instead, though such sources often exhibit institutional biases favoring progressive frameworks that understate governance trade-offs from social initiatives.^[67] In contrast, sector-specific critiques highlight how SVB's DEI-driven board diversity boasts in public filings masked a lack of Silicon Valley veterans with deep expertise in banking cycles, potentially weakening challenge functions during the 2021-2022 deposit surge from $62 billion to $189 billion.^[62] Empirical data from the collapse underscores that while DEI and ESG did not constitute the proximate causes—unlike the 91% uninsured deposit base and unhedged duration gap—they reflect broader tensions in financial institutions where non-financial priorities can erode focus on causal risk drivers like asset sensitivity to yield curve shifts.^[5]

Regulatory Laxity and Fed Policy Influences

The 2018 Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act raised the asset threshold for enhanced prudential standards under Dodd-Frank from $50 billion to $250 billion, exempting banks like SVB—which had $49 billion in assets at the end of 2017—from requirements including annual supervisory stress tests, liquidity coverage ratios, and net stable funding ratios.^[3] SVB's assets subsequently grew rapidly to $211 billion by December 2022, remaining below the threshold and thus avoiding these measures, which might have prompted earlier identification of its concentrated interest rate and liquidity risks.^[5] Federal Reserve supervisors rated SVB's management as satisfactory in 2021 and 2022 despite repeated warnings about inadequate risk management, failing to require timely remediation such as hedging interest rate exposures or diversifying funding sources.^[3] This supervisory leniency reflected broader regulatory standards calibrated for smaller institutions, where the Fed did not apply the same intensity of oversight as for systemically important banks, contributing to undetected vulnerabilities in SVB's portfolio of long-duration, fixed-rate securities that comprised over 50% of its assets by late 2022.^[3] Post-failure analyses, including the Fed's internal review, attributed SVB's collapse partly to these "low regulatory standards" and delayed supervisory actions, though internal mismanagement remained the primary driver.^[3] Critics of the 2018 deregulation, including some economists, argue it reduced capital and liquidity buffers for mid-sized banks, enabling unchecked growth without proportional safeguards, while proponents contend the thresholds appropriately tailored rules to bank size and that SVB's executives bore responsibility for exploiting the flexibility.^[68] Federal Reserve monetary policy amplified these risks through a decade of near-zero interest rates and quantitative easing following the 2008 crisis, which incentivized banks to extend asset durations in pursuit of yield, assuming persistent low rates; SVB's securities portfolio, heavily weighted toward mortgage-backed securities with average durations exceeding seven years, yielded an effective duration mismatch against short-term deposits.^[26] The Fed's aggressive rate hikes starting in March 2022—lifting the federal funds rate from 0.25% to 5.25% by July 2023—triggered unrealized losses estimated at $15-18 billion on SVB's held-to-maturity securities, eroding capital as deposits fled amid rising alternatives like money market funds.^[29] While the policy shift addressed inflation empirically linked to prior accommodation, it exposed banks without adequate hedges, with SVB's failure illustrating how such normalization, absent robust internal controls, could precipitate liquidity crises in rate-sensitive institutions.^[69] The Fed's review emphasized that while external rate environment mattered, SVB's strategic choices—not policy per se—forewent basic mitigations like interest rate swaps, underscoring supervision's role in enforcing resilience.^[3]

Government Intervention and Bailout Mechanics

Deposit Insurance Extension and Moral Hazard

On March 12, 2023, following the closure of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) by California regulators on March 10, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Federal Reserve, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) invoked the systemic risk exception under Section 13(c)(4)(G) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, enabling the FDIC to protect all depositors at SVB and Signature Bank, including those exceeding the standard $250,000 insurance limit per depositor per bank.^[32]^[70] This decision transferred both insured and uninsured deposits—totaling approximately $175 billion in uninsured funds at SVB, representing 89% of its roughly $200 billion in deposits—to newly created bridge banks, ensuring full access to funds starting March 13 without reliance on the standard least-cost resolution that would have prioritized only insured amounts.^[71]^[47] The action aimed to avert broader contagion to the banking system amid rapid uninsured deposit outflows triggered by SVB's unrealized losses on long-duration securities.^[3] The extension imposed an estimated $20 billion cost on the FDIC's Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) for SVB's resolution, funded initially through DIF borrowings and later recouped via a special assessment on U.S. banks with at least $10 billion in assets, levied at 13 basis points on their March 31, 2023, assessment bases and collected quarterly starting in the first quarter of 2024.^[34]^[72] This ad hoc protection deviated from the FDIC's longstanding policy of excluding uninsured depositors in non-systemic failures, as seen in prior cases like Washington Mutual in 2008, where uninsured claims were subordinated.^[34] Critics, including economists and FDIC officials, highlighted the moral hazard risks, arguing that shielding uninsured depositors—often sophisticated entities like venture capital firms and tech startups—reduces incentives for depositors to monitor bank risk and for banks to maintain prudent asset-liability management, potentially encouraging future concentration of large, uninsured deposits in specialized institutions pursuing high-yield strategies.^[71]^[73] Empirical analyses post-crisis noted that such interventions signal de facto insurance for uninsured funds in perceived systemically linked banks, fostering excessive risk-taking akin to pre-deposit-insurance eras but without the discipline of market discipline on uninsured portions.^[74]^[75] The FDIC itself acknowledged that while deposit insurance mitigates runs, expansions amplify moral hazard by diminishing depositor vigilance, as evidenced by SVB's reliance on volatile, uninsured tech-sector funding without corresponding liquidity buffers.^[73] By October 2025, no permanent elevation of the $250,000 limit had occurred, though proposals for targeted expansions—such as for operational accounts or up to $20 million—faced opposition from regulators and analysts citing heightened moral hazard and fiscal burdens on the DIF, which stood at $117 billion as of June 30, 2023, after absorbing crisis losses.^[76]^[77] The SVB episode underscored tensions between short-term stability and long-term incentives, with ongoing debates emphasizing that repeated uninsured protections erode the credibility of insurance caps and invite riskier banking models, particularly in sectors with correlated depositor bases.^[78]^[79]

Systemic Risk Designation

On March 12, 2023, following the closure of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) by the California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation on March 10, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), in coordination with the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve, invoked the systemic risk exception under Section 13(c)(4)(G) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.^[80] This designation, approved by the Treasury Secretary and recommended to the FDIC Board of Directors, authorized the protection of all SVB depositors, including those with uninsured balances exceeding the standard $250,000 limit, to prevent broader financial instability.^[81] The decision was prompted by rapid deposit outflows totaling approximately $42 billion on March 9 alone, representing 25% of SVB's total deposits, which threatened contagion to other institutions with similar uninsured deposit concentrations and asset-liability mismatches.^[3] The systemic risk exception required a two-thirds vote by the FDIC Board and presidential concurrence in certain scenarios, but for SVB, it was executed swiftly through interagency consultation without direct taxpayer exposure, with resolution costs to be recouped from the banking industry via a special assessment.^[72] On March 13, 2023, the FDIC transferred SVB's $175 billion in deposits—93% of which were uninsured—to a newly chartered bridge bank, Silicon Valley Bridge Bank, ensuring full access for all depositors starting that day.^[47] This action stabilized immediate panic but highlighted SVB's $209 billion in assets and its role as a key lender to technology and venture capital firms, where failure could disrupt funding for startups reliant on concentrated deposits.^[82] Critics, including some industry analyses, argued the designation blurred lines between resolution authority and bailout mechanisms, potentially signaling implicit guarantees for uninsured deposits at mid-sized banks, though FDIC estimates pegged the net loss to the Deposit Insurance Fund at $16.1 billion for SVB, fully offset by a 2024 special assessment on banks with over $10 billion in assets.^[83] As of 2025, no further systemic risk designations have been applied to subsequent regional bank stresses, underscoring the exceptional nature of the SVB intervention amid heightened scrutiny of the exception's least-cost resolution mandate.^[82]

Acquisition and Post-Collapse Operations

First Citizens BancShares Takeover

On March 26, 2023, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as receiver for Silicon Valley Bank following its failure on March 10, announced that First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company—a wholly owned subsidiary of First Citizens BancShares, Inc., based in Raleigh, North Carolina—had agreed to assume all deposits and purchase substantially all assets of Silicon Valley Bridge Bank, N.A., the FDIC-operated bridge bank established on March 13 to hold SVB's assets and deposits during resolution.^[84] The agreement, finalized effective March 27, 2023, represented a whole-bank purchase and assumption transaction, enabling immediate access to all SVB deposits without loss to accountholders, including the approximately 85% that exceeded the FDIC's $250,000 insurance limit.^[84]^[85] Under the terms, First-Citizens acquired approximately $110 billion in assets, including $72.1 billion in loans, while assuming $56 billion in deposits at book value; the assets were purchased at a discount of about $16.5 billion from book value, reflecting adjustments for expected losses and operational continuity.^[86] The deal included a loss-sharing arrangement with the FDIC covering an estimated $60 billion in loans, under which the FDIC agreed to reimburse First-Citizens for a portion of net losses—initially structured as 80% FDIC/20% buyer for the first few years on certain commercial loans, tapering thereafter—over a five-year period to mitigate risks from SVB's concentrated venture capital and tech-sector exposures.^[87] In exchange, the FDIC received warrants for up to $500 million in First Citizens BancShares common stock, contingent on performance metrics, providing potential upside tied to the acquired portfolio's recovery.^[88] The transaction marked the resolution of the SVB crisis without invoking the systemic risk exception for broader taxpayer exposure, as the FDIC estimated it would reduce costs to the Deposit Insurance Fund by over $20 billion compared to liquidation; all 17 SVB branches reopened on March 27 as Silicon Valley Bank, a division of First-Citizens, preserving client relationships in the tech and innovation sectors.^[84]^[89] First Citizens BancShares, a conservative regional bank with $209 billion in assets pre-deal and a focus on commercial lending, viewed the acquisition as a strategic expansion despite the inherited risks from SVB's asset-liability mismatches.^[87] This FDIC-facilitated purchase prioritized depositor protection and market stability over competitive bidding, drawing from precedents like the 2008 IndyMac resolution.^[84]

Integration and Current Status as of 2025

Following the acquisition of Silicon Valley Bank's assets by First Citizens BancShares in March 2023, integration efforts have proceeded deliberately and at a measured pace to preserve SVB's specialized capabilities in serving the innovation economy, including tech startups and venture capital firms. First Citizens has maintained separate technology stacks and operational roadmaps for SVB and its core banking units, allowing SVB to retain its distinct client-focused infrastructure while gradually aligning with broader corporate systems. This approach, described as progressing "better than expected," has enabled SVB to stabilize operations without the disruptions that could arise from rapid consolidation, particularly given SVB's emphasis on customized services for high-growth sectors.^[90]^[91] As of October 2025, Silicon Valley Bank operates as a dedicated division of First Citizens Bank, continuing under the SVB brand to cater to clients in technology, healthcare, and venture funding, with a renewed emphasis on artificial intelligence-driven opportunities that have driven hundreds of new client acquisitions since the collapse. The SVB Commercial segment reported $2.09 billion in growth during the third quarter of 2025, primarily in Global Fund Banking, contributing to First Citizens' overall net interest income of $1.73 billion for the period. SVB remains active in sector-specific analysis, releasing its 2025 Healthtech Report on October 16, which highlighted record investments in provider operations boosting the healthtech landscape.^[92]^[93]^[94]^[95] While First Citizens has pursued broader expansions, such as the agreement to acquire 138 branches from BMO Bank in October 2025, SVB's structure as a semi-autonomous division persists, with discussions of potential rebranding underway but no changes implemented by late 2025. This configuration has supported SVB's role in First Citizens' national footprint, including expansions into markets like Boston, where SVB's long-standing presence complements the parent company's growth. The division's ongoing operations underscore a strategic pivot toward sustainable lending and advisory services tailored to innovation ecosystems, amid First Citizens' total assets exceeding $233 billion at the end of Q3 2025.^[96]^[97]^[98]

Broader Economic and Sectoral Impacts

Effects on Tech Ecosystem and Startups

The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank on March 10, 2023, triggered widespread panic among tech startups, many of which relied on SVB for operational banking, payroll, and lines of credit, leading to temporary liquidity disruptions as clients scrambled to withdraw funds amid fears of access denial.^[99] Hundreds of venture-backed companies faced potential payroll shortfalls and cash crunches, with some resorting to emergency measures like discounted sales or seeking alternative funding wires before the bank's seizure by regulators later that day.^[100] The hyperconnected nature of SVB's client base—estimated to include a significant portion of U.S. venture-backed tech firms—amplified the run, as venture capitalists and founders coordinated mass outflows via social media, exacerbating the liquidity strain.^[14] Federal intervention on March 12, 2023, via the FDIC's systemic risk exception guaranteeing all deposits averted direct financial losses for startups, but the episode intensified an already cooling venture capital environment strained by rising interest rates.^[101] Venture funding deals slowed further, with SVB's role in providing ecosystem-specific lending—such as venture debt to startups—creating a temporary void that pressured firms to diversify banking relationships toward larger institutions like JPMorgan Chase.^[102] This shift complicated cash management for growth-stage companies, contributing to delayed investments and a pivot toward profitability amid reduced tolerance for high-burn-rate models.^[14] Longer-term repercussions included heightened scrutiny of sector-specific banking risks, with SVB's failure underscoring vulnerabilities from deposit concentration in cyclical tech funding cycles, though the tech ecosystem demonstrated resilience without widespread insolvencies.^[103] By mid-2023, startups had largely stabilized operations, but the event lingered as a cautionary signal, prompting more conservative capital allocation by investors and a fragmentation of specialized financial services previously dominated by SVB.^[101] Empirical data from subsequent quarters showed no collapse in startup formation rates, but a marked decline in mega-rounds, aligning with broader macroeconomic pressures rather than SVB alone as the causal driver.^[104]

Implications for Regional Banking Stability

The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank on March 10, 2023, precipitated immediate contagion risks to other regional banks, manifesting in rapid deposit withdrawals and failures at institutions like Signature Bank (March 12, 2023) and First Republic Bank (May 1, 2023), which shared vulnerabilities such as high concentrations of uninsured deposits exceeding 90% in SVB's case and sensitivity to interest rate hikes on long-duration bond portfolios.^[32]^[3] These events amplified market perceptions of fragility in the $10–$250 billion asset class of regional banks, where six institutions experienced pronounced deposit outflows and equity depreciation amid broader sector panic.^[105] Deposit flight from regional banks intensified post-SVB, with uninsured depositors shifting to perceived safer havens like larger national banks or money market funds, contributing to industry-wide outflows that peaked in March 2023 before stabilizing by January 2024.^[106] FDIC data indicated that while total U.S. bank deposits contracted modestly, regional lenders faced acute liquidity strains, prompting the Federal Reserve's Bank Term Funding Program to backstop borrowing against securities at par value, averting a deeper crisis but underscoring pre-existing gaps in liquidity risk management.^[32] This episode revealed systemic underestimation of run risks in digitally enabled banking, where social media accelerated withdrawal signals across interconnected regional networks.^[3] By mid-2025, regional banking stability had largely recovered, with the KBW Regional Banking Index rebounding from March 2023 lows and deposit levels normalizing, though lingering unrealized losses on securities—estimated at over $500 billion sector-wide in early 2023—persisted amid elevated interest rates.^[106] Lending standards tightened, reducing credit availability for small- and medium-sized enterprises, while heightened regulatory scrutiny targeted liquidity and interest rate risk, yet without comprehensive reforms, vulnerabilities to similar shocks remain, particularly for banks reliant on volatile deposit bases.^[107] The FDIC's estimated $20 billion hit to the Deposit Insurance Fund from SVB alone highlighted fiscal costs to stability, reinforcing the need for enhanced resolution preparedness for large regionals, as pre-2023 assessments found FDIC planning inadequate for rapid failures.^[5]^[108]

Lessons and Ongoing Developments

Key Empirical Takeaways on Bank Runs

Over 94 percent of Silicon Valley Bank's (SVB) deposits were uninsured as of December 31, 2022, exposing the institution to heightened run risk since depositors beyond the $250,000 FDIC limit had incentives to withdraw preemptively during perceived distress.^[3]^[5] This concentration—largely from tech firms and venture capital entities holding operational cash—facilitated rapid contagion, as networked clients monitored shared signals like funding announcements. The run materialized acutely on March 9, 2023, after SVB disclosed $1.8 billion in securities losses and a $2.25 billion capital raise; depositors then withdrew over $40 billion that day, equating to about 25 percent of total deposits ($175 billion base), with management anticipating another $100 billion on March 10.^[3]^[56] Digital banking infrastructure enabled this velocity, permitting instant transfers via apps and wires, compressing what historically unfolded over days into hours. Social media platforms exacerbated propagation: venture capitalists and founders coordinated warnings online, accelerating uninsured outflows in a self-reinforcing panic distinct from pre-digital eras.^[41]^[109] For context, the 2008 Wachovia run saw $10 billion outflows over eight days, while SVB's scale and pace—85 percent of deposits at risk in 48 hours—highlighted modern frictions' role in liquidity evaporation despite post-2008 buffers like the liquidity coverage ratio.^[3]^[110] Fundamentally, the episode empirically validated classic Diamond-Dybvig dynamics in a contemporary setting: duration mismatches between long-term assets (SVB's bond portfolio) and demand deposits, combined with rising rates eroding mark-to-market values, ignited informed runs once solvency doubts surfaced.^[3] Uninsured status amplified uninformed panic, underscoring that deposit insurance caps inadequately deter runs in concentrated, high-value sectors without supplementary safeguards like diversified funding.

Lack of Major Regulatory Reforms by 2025

Following the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) on March 10, 2023, analysts and regulators anticipated potential reforms to address vulnerabilities exposed in regional banking, such as interest rate risk management, liquidity requirements, and enhanced supervision for mid-sized institutions previously exempted from stricter Dodd-Frank Act standards after the 2018 Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act.^[3] However, by October 2025, no comprehensive legislative or regulatory overhauls had been enacted specifically targeting SVB-like failures, with U.S. banking rules largely unchanged in core aspects.^[111] Proposals for reform, including reinstating enhanced prudential standards for banks with assets between $100 billion and $250 billion, faced significant opposition from the banking industry and Republican lawmakers, who argued that existing frameworks like Basel III—already in phased implementation—sufficed and that overregulation could stifle lending.^[112] The Federal Reserve's internal review in April 2023 attributed SVB's failure primarily to supervisory lapses rather than systemic regulatory gaps, recommending intensified enforcement of current rules on interest rate risk and unrealized losses rather than new mandates.^[3] Similarly, the FDIC's post-mortem analysis emphasized better liquidity monitoring but stopped short of advocating major statutory changes, noting that ad hoc interventions like the systemic risk exception for uninsured deposits proved effective in containing contagion.^[32] The Basel III Endgame rules, proposed by U.S. regulators in July 2023 to bolster capital requirements for large banks starting July 1, 2025, with full effect by 2028, represented incremental progress but were not a direct SVB response and applied unevenly to smaller regional players like SVB, which fell below key thresholds.^[113] Banking lobbies, including the Bank Policy Institute, contested the proposals as overly burdensome, projecting a 16-20% capital hike that could constrain credit without proportionally reducing failure risks, leading to delays and revisions amid legal challenges.^[114] Partisan gridlock in Congress further stalled broader efforts; Democratic initiatives to reverse 2018 deregulations gained no traction post-2024 elections, while GAO recommendations in March 2025 for improved oversight metrics remained advisory without binding implementation.^[112] This stasis reflected a consensus among Federal Reserve officials that SVB's issues stemmed from poor risk practices and rapid growth rather than irreparable flaws in the regulatory architecture, with empirical data showing U.S. banks' aggregate capital ratios at historic highs (Tier 1 around 13% in 2024) post-2023 stress tests.^[115] Critics from progressive think tanks, such as the Roosevelt Institute, decried the lack of action as favoring "too big to fail" institutions, but industry data indicated no recurrence of widespread runs, attributing stability to voluntary balance sheet adjustments and the Fed's Bank Term Funding Program extension through 2025.^[116] Absent major reforms, regulators shifted toward non-binding guidance, like FDIC proposals in October 2025 on "unsafe or unsound practices" for liquidity, signaling a preference for supervision over legislation.^[117]

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May 17, 2024 · As many of you probably know, on March 10, 2023, SVB, with $209 billion in assets at year-end 2022, was closed by the state banking authority, ...
[33]
silicon valley bank collapse where are we now - Adams & Reese
Mar 16, 2023 · On Wednesday, March 8, 2023, Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) announced to investors that it needed to raise $2.25 billion to shore up its balance ...
[34]
Recent Bank Failures and the Federal Regulatory Response - FDIC
Mar 27, 2023 · My testimony today will describe the events leading up to the failure of SVB and Signature Bank and the facts and circumstances that prompted the decision.
[35]
Document - SEC.gov
SVB's Q4 2022 net income was $275M ($4.62/share), with $1.5B for the year. Loans increased, client funds decreased, and noninterest income rose.
[36]
The Collapse Of Silicon Valley Bank : Planet Money - NPR
Mar 14, 2023 · Silicon Valley Bank's implosion is the largest American bank failure since the 2008 financial crisis. The collapse triggered a crisis for tech startups.
[37]
David Sacks on X: "If the Fed doesn't protect deposits at SVB, will ...
If the Fed doesn't protect deposits at SVB, will you feel more compelled to move your money to a Big 4 bank (JP Morgan Chase; Citi; BofA; ...Missing: tweet | Show results with:tweet
[38]
Silicon Valley Bank failure has investors calling for government aid
Mar 11, 2023 · Venture capitalist and former tech CEO David Sacks called for the federal government to push another bank to buy SVB's assets, writing on ...Missing: warning | Show results with:warning
[39]
SVB and social media bank run: economists explain study | Fortune
May 2, 2023 · The economists who studied the tweets that predated the SVB bank run and implosion reveal how social media fuels financial panic.
[40]
Social media fuelled the bank run on Silicon Valley Bank - UPF
May 11, 2023 · The study focused mainly on tweets from the period leading up to the financial panic (from early January 2023) and the actual period of the bank ...
[41]
[PDF] Social Media as a Bank Run Catalyst - FDIC
Apr 18, 2023 · This paper investigates social media's role in the bank run that led to the failure of Silicon. Valley Bank (SVB) on March 10, 2023. Swaths ...
[42]
'The first Twitter-fuelled bank run': how social media compounded ...
Mar 16, 2023 · The speed at which Silicon Valley Bank collapsed has left experts questioning whether social media has opened up entirely new risks in the world of finance.
[43]
Public attention, sentiment and the default of Silicon Valley Bank
The unexpected announcement triggered panic and fear among depositors, who subsequently withdrew a massive $42 billion of deposits by the end of March 9, 2023.
[44]
California DFPI Announces Results from Review of the Supervision ...
Within the span of eight hours on March 9, 2023, SVB received deposit withdrawal requests of approximately $42 billion, representing nearly 25 percent of SVB”s ...
[45]
Silicon Valley Bank seized by FDIC after largest failure since ... - PBS
Mar 10, 2023 · The bank had $209 billion in assets and $175.4 billion in deposits as the time of failure, the FDIC said in a statement. It was unclear how much ...Missing: details | Show results with:details
[46]
Silicon Valley Bank is shut down by regulators in biggest ... - CNBC
Mar 10, 2023 · Financial regulators have closed Silicon Valley Bank and taken control of its deposits, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. announced Friday.Missing: seizure | Show results with:seizure
[47]
FDIC Acts to Protect All Depositors of the former Silicon Valley Bank ...
Mar 13, 2023 · Silicon Valley Bank was closed by the California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation on Friday, March 10, 2023, and the FDIC was ...Missing: seizure | Show results with:seizure
[48]
Silicon Valley Bank collapse signals trouble in CA tech - CalMatters
Mar 13, 2023 · Silicon Valley Bank's failure is a sign of weakness in the tech industry, and that could spell trouble for the state of California.<|control11|><|separator|>
[49]
Bank Failures Highlight the Shortcomings of Held-to-Maturity (HTM ...
Apr 8, 2024 · SBNY did not report its HTM duration on its 2022 10K, but it did report its securities portfolio duration debt duration of 4.23 years in 2022.
[50]
Signs of SVB's failure likely hidden by obscure 'HTM' accounting ...
Dec 14, 2023 · Panic among investors and depositors ensued, triggering a social-media-fueled bank run and ultimately leading to the bank's failure, said ...
[51]
Silicon Valley Bank: A Failure in Risk Management
Mar 14, 2023 · SVB failed due to insufficient board oversight, poor liquidity risk management, a liquidity crisis, and a lack of risk modeling for interest ...
[52]
Recent Bank Failures and the Path Ahead | FDIC.gov
Apr 12, 2023 · Mismanagement of interest rate risk was at the core of SVB's problem. Silvergate Bank, which announced plans to wind down and self-liquidate the ...
[53]
Lessons from Applying the Liquidity Coverage Ratio to Silicon ...
Mar 27, 2023 · SVB had $173.1 billion in deposits at the end of 2022. Of those, $165.4 billion were uninsured: $151.5 billion were uninsured deposits in U.S. ...Missing: vulnerabilities | Show results with:vulnerabilities
[54]
Liquidity Risk Management for Uninsured and Nontraditional Deposits
Supervisors have identified risk management weakness as a contributing factor to the 2023 bank failures. The Federal Reserve's report on Silicon Valley Bank's ...
[55]
$$42 billion in one day: SVB bank run biggest in more than a decade
Mar 11, 2023 · The withdrawals initiated by depositors and investors amounted to $42 billion on Thursday alone, according to the regulator. Despite being in ...
[56]
SVB customers tried to pull nearly all deposits in two days, Barr says
Mar 28, 2023 · Panicked customers withdrew $42 billion from the bank on March 9 on concerns that uninsured deposits were at risk.
[57]
Corporate Governance, Board Oversight & the 2023 Banking Crisis
May 14, 2024 · In this post we examine risk oversight and board composition gaps at SVB, and compensation practices at all three banks.
[58]
Interest Rate Risk, Bank Runs and Silicon Valley Bank
May 11, 2023 · An analysis explains some of the causes and consequences of bank runs, as well as policies that help safeguard banks' solvency.
[59]
Unraveling of Silicon Valley Bank: Causes and Implications - SMU
Mar 26, 2023 · Industry experts from SMU examine the Silicon Valley Bank failure, including the causes leading up to the failure and the implications for the future.
[60]
[PDF] The collapse of SVB: A mix of poor risk management and regulatory ...
By the end of 2022, the bank had unrealised losses of USD 15 billion, when its total equity was USD 16 billion. Bells should have already started ringing at ...Missing: unrealized | Show results with:unrealized
[61]
Did Silicon Valley Bank Prioritize Social Justice Over Risk ...
Mar 14, 2023 · After one of the biggest banks in the technology startup lending space collapsed last week, President Joe Biden tried to reassure Americans ...
[62]
Silicon Valley Bank's collapse is a lesson in failed ESG
Apr 12, 2023 · SVB promoted the diversity of its board in its 2022 proxy statement, noting that 45% of its board are women in addition to “one black,” “one ...
[63]
No, Diversity Did Not Cause Silicon Valley Bank's Collapse
Mar 15, 2023 · No, 'Wokeness' Did Not Cause Silicon Valley Bank's Collapse. Blaming workplace diversity or environmentally and socially conscious investments ...
[64]
What America's Recent Bank Failures Tell Us About ESG Phasing
Nov 17, 2023 · Silicon Valley Bank's obsession with sustainable financing and neglect for careful stewardship jeopardized its deposits, contributing to ...
[65]
The collapse of SVB and the perils of overlooking the “G” in ESG
Mar 28, 2023 · ESG investments are being unfairly attacked for the bank's failure. Blaming a general focus on ESG investing for the collapse of SVB is ...
[66]
[PDF] Too Woke to Fail? ESG and Silicon Valley Bank's Demise
Dec 13, 2024 · Using Silicon Valley Bank as a case study, this Article illustrates that SVB's integration of ESG in its business and investments was imperative ...
[67]
https://www.apnews.com/article/silicon-valley-bank-fdic-svb-california-d84764deb458371667ac7f850f430f22
[68]
Could Better Rules Have Saved Silicon Valley Bank? - Yale Insights
May 16, 2023 · Was the closure of Silicon Valley Bank in March a failure of regulation? A 2018 law and subsequent rules implemented by the federal banking ...<|separator|>
[69]
We're still learning from Silicon Valley Bank's failure | Stanford ...
Feb 25, 2025 · Stanford scholars Peter DeMarzo and Arvind Krishnamurthy drill down on bank stability and interest rate fluctuations as the SVB collapse hits its two-year mark.
[70]
[PDF] GAO-25-107023, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE ACT
Jan 23, 2025 · On March 12, 2023, the Secretary of the Treasury invoked the systemic risk exception with respect to SVB and Signature Bank, in two separate.Missing: collapse | Show results with:collapse
[71]
Experts flag moral hazard risk as U.S. intervenes in SVB crisis
Mar 13, 2023 · Some 89% of around $200 billion in deposits held by SVB at the end of 2022 was uninsured, according to the FDIC. Regulators have now removed ...
[72]
Special Assessment Pursuant to Systemic Risk Determination
Nov 29, 2023 · On March 12 and 13, 2023, the FDIC transferred deposits—both insured and uninsured—and substantially all assets of these banks to newly ...
[73]
“Successfully Managing Systemic Risk: Deposit Insurance in ... - FDIC
Sep 28, 2023 · While providing these benefits, deposit insurance can also lead to moral hazard and excessive risk-taking by making depositors less likely to ...
[74]
Why Have Uninsured Depositors Become De Facto Insured?
Dec 1, 2023 · The growth of uninsured depositor rescues raises serious concerns about moral hazard as well as fiscal costs. This growth also risks violating ...
[75]
Deposit Insurance, Bank Runs, and Moral Hazard
Sep 9, 2024 · Deposit insurance guarantees that depositors will get their money back should their bank fail. This assurance brings confidence to the market, ...
[76]
A Cure Worse Than the Disease: Massive Expansion in Deposit ...
Oct 9, 2025 · Some proposals have suggested increasing the deposit insurance limit from the current $250,000 to as much as $20 million. An increase of this ...Missing: extension | Show results with:extension
[77]
Oversight of Financial Regulators: Protecting Main Street Not Wall ...
Nov 14, 2023 · As of June 30, 2023, the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) balance totaled $117.0 billion, down $11.3 billion (8.8 percent) from year-end 2022, ...
[78]
Modernizing FDIC Insurance: Building Resilience in a Changing ...
Oct 15, 2025 · By extending coverage selectively, reforms aim to reduce systemic risks exposed in 2023, where uninsured deposits fueled rapid outflows. However ...
[79]
Rebuilding The Firewall Against “Moral Hazard” - Hoover Institution
Feb 11, 2025 · So, bailing out SVB's insured and uninsured depositors reduced the chances that the uninsured depositors in other banks would get nervous ...
[80]
Joint Statement by the Department of the Treasury, Federal Reserve ...
Mar 12, 2023 · ... Silicon Valley Bank will be borne by the taxpayer. We are also announcing a similar systemic risk exception for Signature Bank, New York ...
[81]
Bank Failures: The FDIC's Systemic Risk Exception - Congress.gov
Apr 23, 2024 · When Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and Signature Bank failed, the Treasury Secretary, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), ...
[82]
Federal Agency Efforts to Identify and Mitigate Systemic Risk from ...
Jan 23, 2025 · In March 2023, the federal government worked to stabilize the banking sector following the failure of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank.<|separator|>
[83]
FDIC Board of Directors Issues a Final Rule on Special Assessment ...
Nov 16, 2023 · FDIC Board of Directors Issues a Final Rule on Special Assessment Pursuant to Systemic Risk Determination ... Silicon Valley Bank and Signature ...Missing: exception | Show results with:exception
[84]
First–Citizens Bank & Trust Company, Raleigh, NC, to Assume All ...
Mar 26, 2023 · All deposits assumed by First–Citizens Bank & Trust Company will continue to be insured by the FDIC up to the insurance limit. As of March 10, ...Missing: takeover | Show results with:takeover
[85]
First Citizens Bank Enters into Whole Bank Purchase of Silicon ...
Mar 27, 2023 · As part of the agreement, First Citizens Bank will assume Silicon Valley Bridge Bank, N.A. assets of $110 billion, deposits of $56 billion and ...Missing: takeover | Show results with:takeover
[86]
Form 8-K - SEC.gov
Mar 27, 2023 · Under the terms of the Purchase Agreement, FCB acquired approximately $110.1 billion in assets, including approximately $72.1 billion in loans ...Missing: details | Show results with:details
[87]
[PDF] First Citizens Bank Announces Acquisition of Silicon Valley Bridge ...
Mar 27, 2023 · Note – Financial information for First Citizens BancShares, Inc. is as of December 31, 2022. Financial information for Silicon Valley Bridge ...
[88]
Silicon Valley Bank Sold to First Citizens in Government-Backed Deal
Mar 27, 2023 · As part of the deal, the F.D.I.C. will receive rights linked to the stock of First Citizens, which could be worth up to $500 million. The bank ...
[89]
First Citizens Bank Enters into Whole Bank Purchase of Silicon ...
Mar 27, 2023 · On March 27, 2023, the 17 legacy Silicon Valley Bridge Bank, N.A. branches will begin operating as Silicon Valley Bank, a division of First ...
[90]
SVB's integration with FCB going 'better than expected' - FinAi News
Silicon Valley Bank's integration with First Citizens Bank is going “better than expected.” Acquiring Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) in March was an opportunity ...
[91]
First Citizens, SVB taking integration slowly - FinAi News
Sep 30, 2024 · First Citizens Bank, Silicon Valley Bank are taking integration of their tech stacks slowly, keeping their individual roadmaps separate.
[92]
Silicon Valley Bank Client FAQs
In March 2023, Silicon Valley Bank was acquired by First Citizens Bank on March 27, 2023, marking a pivotal transition toward renewed strength and stability, ...
[93]
Financial Information - Quarterly Results | First Citizens BancShares
First Citizens BancShares Reports Third Quarter 2025 Earnings · Net interest income was $1.73 billion for the current quarter, an increase of $39 million over ...
[94]
SVB says AI wave has put it back on top in startup banking - San ...
May 7, 2025 · SVB, now part of First Citizens Bank, is thriving after its dramatic 2023 collapse, attracting hundreds of new clients amid AI innovation ...<|separator|>
[95]
Record Investment in Provider Operations Boosts Healthtech Sector
Oct 16, 2025 · Record Investment in Provider Operations Boosts Healthtech Sector; Silicon Valley Bank Releases 2025 Healthtech Report. Silicon Valley Bank logo ...
[96]
First Citizens CEO hints at possible Silicon Valley Bank rebrand
Oct 6, 2025 · First Citizens Bank may consider dropping Silicon Valley Bank name. · SVB continues serving innovation economy under First Citizens ownership.
[97]
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/first-citizens-bank-announces-boston-market-expansion-real-estate-purchase-302595315.html
[98]
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/first-citizens-takes-83-million-hit-tied-to-first-brands
[99]
Silicon Valley Bank collapse sends tech startups scrambling - CNN
Mar 10, 2023 · Rising interest rates have eroded the easy access to capital that helped fuel soaring startup valuations and funded ambitious, money-losing ...
[100]
Hundreds of Startups Face Crippling Cash Crunch If No One Buys ...
Mar 11, 2023 · Silicon Valley Bank's collapse has left hundreds of startups facing a cash crunch and payroll crisis. · A popular toy store held a 40% off sale ...Missing: liquidity | Show results with:liquidity
[101]
SVB's failure will have a ripple effect across technology for years
Mar 14, 2023 · The SVB collapse will also likely put the focus on startups to pivot to profitability and be more disciplined with their spending. "Companies ...
[102]
The Collapse of SVB: Implications for Start-ups and the Banking ...
Apr 20, 2023 · SVB was a large issuer of venture debt, and its dissolution may result in the drying up of venture capital-ecosystem lending. We believe the ...
[103]
How Silicon Valley Bank's collapse ripped through global tech
Mar 13, 2023 · Not long after California startups started pulling money out of troubled Silicon Valley Bank, entrepreneurs in other parts of the world woke up to the news.
[104]
After Silicon Valley Bank's Flameout, What's Next for Entrepreneurs?
May 16, 2023 · The SVB collapse had a profound impact on the startup ecosystem. SVB has been a trusted and beloved partner to startup founders and VCs for 40 ...
[105]
[PDF] Rushing to Judgment and the Banking Crisis of 2023;
Mar 1, 2025 · SVB's 4:06 p.m. ET announcement that it would raise capital.27 This was quite an unlucky proximity that SVB officials could not have anticipated ...
[106]
The US Banking Sector since the March 2023 Turmoil in - IMF eLibrary
Mar 5, 2024 · Between March 2023 and January 31, 2024, deposit outflows stabilized, and the KBW Regional Bank Equity Index rebounded. However, vulnerabilities ...
[107]
The Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) Collapse and Implications for Business
... bank linked to weakness in the tech sector more broadly and rising interest rates. Three factors likely led to the illiquidity of the institution, with the ...Missing: aftermath | Show results with:aftermath
[108]
[PDF] FDIC Readiness to Resolve Large Regional Banks
Dec 10, 2024 · In Spring 2023, the FDIC responded to the unanticipated rapid liquidity failures of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), Signature Bank of. New York ( ...
[109]
Silicon Valley Bank post-mortem cites social media, digital banking
May 8, 2023 · “While many internal factors made Silicon Valley Bank susceptible to a bank run, both social media and digital banking technology accelerated ...
[110]
Understanding the Speed and Size of Bank Runs in Historical ...
May 26, 2023 · In comparison, the most severe run recently was at Silicon Valley Bank, which lost 25% of its deposits in one day and was closed before an ...
[111]
What Has Changed Since Silicon Valley Bank Collapsed? Not Much.
May 18, 2025 · Two years ago, the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank sounded an alarm over vulnerabilities in the banking system. ... major new laws or regulations.
[112]
After 2023 Bank Failures—Here's Our Roadmap for Improving Bank ...
Mar 4, 2025 · For example, we found that Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank had strong capital measures in 2022 before they failed in 2023. Using ...
[113]
Agencies request comment on proposed rules to strengthen capital ...
Jul 27, 2023 · Under the proposal, large banks would begin transitioning to the new framework on July 1, 2025, with full compliance starting July 1, 2028.Missing: SVB | Show results with:SVB
[114]
Basel III Accord U.S. Finalization - Bank Policy Institute
U.S. and international regulators are currently implementing the Basel III framework, which includes rules around how much capital banks must hold to fund loans ...What Is Basel Endgame? · The Proposal Will Have Real... · Will It Make The Economy...
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Banking Laws and Regulations 2025 | USA - Global Legal Insights
Mar 11, 2025 · High-profile bank failures during 2023 intensified regulatory scrutiny of capital adequacy, risk management, and liquidity planning, prompting ...
[116]
One Year after Silicon Valley Bank's Collapse, Not Much Has ...
Mar 11, 2024 · One Year after Silicon Valley Bank's Collapse, Not Much Has Changed ... “Too Big to Fail” Banks Benefit from Crises and a Relative Lack of ...
[117]
Proposal Regarding Unsafe or Unsound Practices, Matters ... - FDIC
Oct 7, 2025 · Specifically, the proposal would define an unsafe or unsound practice as a practice, act, or failure to act, alone or together with one or more ...Missing: major | Show results with:major

SVB