Silicon Valley Bank
Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) was a commercial bank founded in 1983 and headquartered in Santa Clara, California, that specialized in financial services for technology startups, venture capital firms, and innovation-driven companies.[1][2] By late 2022, it held approximately $209 billion in assets, ranking as the 16th-largest bank in the United States, with a client base concentrated in the tech sector where over 90% of deposits were uninsured and thus vulnerable to rapid outflows.[3] SVB's growth accelerated dramatically from 2019 to 2021, tripling in size amid low interest rates and abundant venture capital funding that funneled deposits into the bank, which it then invested heavily in long-duration U.S. Treasury and mortgage-backed securities without adequate hedging against rate changes.[1] This strategy exposed the bank to severe unrealized losses when the Federal Reserve raised interest rates sharply starting in 2022 to combat inflation, devaluing its bond portfolio by billions and eroding capital as tech sector slowdowns prompted deposit withdrawals.[4] On March 9, 2023, SVB announced plans to sell securities at a loss and seek capital, sparking a classic bank run accelerated by social media coordination among uninsured depositors, leading to $42 billion in outflows in a single day and the bank's failure on March 10—the second-largest in U.S. history by asset size.[5][4] Federal regulators, including the FDIC and Federal Reserve, attributed the collapse primarily to SVB's senior management's "textbook case of mismanagement," including inadequate interest rate risk controls, concentrated funding risks from uninsured tech deposits, and over-reliance on growth without robust oversight, compounded by supervisory delays in addressing known vulnerabilities despite the bank's designation for heightened regulation post-2018.[4][6] In response, the FDIC seized SVB, created a bridge bank, and facilitated its assets' transfer to First Citizens BancShares, while systemic measures like the Bank Term Funding Program were introduced to stem contagion, backstopping all deposits to avert broader panic despite initial uninsured exposure.[5][7] The episode underscored causal vulnerabilities in regional banks pursuing yield in prolonged low-rate environments, where quantitative easing inflows masked risks until policy normalization exposed them.[8]