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Solidarnost

Solidarnost (Russian: Солидарность) is a liberal-democratic political movement in Russia founded on 13 December 2008 by prominent opposition figures including Boris Nemtsov, Garry Kasparov, and Ilya Yashin to promote democratic values and oppose the centralizing authority of the Kremlin under Vladimir Putin.^[1] The movement sought to unite non-systemic opposition forces through activism, coalition-building, and public demonstrations against electoral irregularities and governance practices perceived as undemocratic.^[1] Solidarnost played a key role in mobilizing protests following the disputed 2011 parliamentary elections, drawing over 100,000 participants to Moscow's Bolotnaya Square in opposition to alleged vote rigging and authoritarian consolidation.^[2] Key members such as Vladimir Kara-Murza and Vladimir Milov contributed to these efforts, alongside Nemtsov, who served as a central leader until his assassination in 2015 near the Kremlin—an event widely attributed to political motives and highlighting the risks faced by the movement.^[1]^[2] Despite achieving visibility as a leading extra-parliamentary opposition entity, Solidarnost has encountered systemic repression, including arrests, administrative barriers, and harassment, limiting its operational scope in Russia's controlled political environment.^[1] The movement's persistence amid adversity underscores its defining characteristic of resistance to centralized power, though it has struggled with internal coordination and broader electoral impact due to state dominance over media and institutions.^[1] Ilya Yashin remains a prominent figure, embodying Solidarnost's commitment to liberal principles despite personal detentions and the exile or imprisonment of allies.^[1]

Origins and Founding

Pre-2008 Context

The political landscape in Russia during the mid-2000s was marked by the consolidation of power under President Vladimir Putin, with the pro-Kremlin United Russia party achieving dominance in elections through mechanisms widely criticized as manipulative, including administrative resource abuse and media control that marginalized opposition voices. In the December 2007 parliamentary elections, United Russia secured 64.3% of the vote and a constitutional majority, but reports from organizations like Human Rights Watch documented systemic irregularities such as voter intimidation, ballot stuffing, and the denial of access to polling stations for independent observers, contributing to the effective exclusion of non-systemic parties.^[3] These practices reflected a broader erosion of democratic competition, as regional governors—appointed rather than elected since 2004 reforms following the Beslan school siege—aligned local administrations with federal priorities, stifling regional autonomy and opposition organizing.^[4] Opposition forces, particularly liberals advocating for rule of law, free markets, and civil liberties, remained fragmented and weakened by internal divisions and external pressures, exemplified by the marginal performance of parties like the Union of Right Forces (SPS), which garnered just 0.89% in the 2007 Duma elections, failing to meet the 5% threshold for proportional representation due to limited media exposure and state-orchestrated barriers. The SPS, formed in 1999 as a coalition of democratic reformers, had previously struggled in 2003 elections (obtaining 12.7% but losing influence amid Kremlin crackdowns), highlighting the challenges of sustaining liberal platforms in an environment favoring managed democracy. This disunity among groups such as Yabloko and SPS prevented effective challenges to United Russia's hegemony, fostering a perception among activists that ad hoc coalitions were insufficient against institutionalized authoritarianism.^[5] Precursor protests, notably the Dissenters' Marches initiated on December 16, 2006, in Moscow, amplified grievances over electoral fraud, corruption, and the curtailment of freedoms, drawing thousands to demand constitutional adherence and an end to Putin's indefinite power extension via the anticipated Medvedev succession. Subsequent marches, such as those on March 3, 2007, in Saint Petersburg and April 14, 2007, in Moscow, organized under the Other Russia coalition, faced severe restrictions, with authorities banning permits, deploying riot police, and arresting participants, underscoring the regime's intolerance for public assembly and galvanizing calls for opposition consolidation. By late 2007, these events exposed the limits of fragmented dissent, as arrests of figures across ideological lines—liberals, nationalists, and leftists—revealed a shared repression that incentivized unified action among democratic reformers against the tandemocracy's entrenchment.^[3]^[6]^[4]

Formation and Initial Organization

Solidarnost was officially launched on December 13, 2008, during a founding congress in the Moscow suburb of Khimki, initiated by key figures from Russia's fragmented liberal opposition seeking to consolidate democratic forces beyond established party affiliations.^[4] Prominent co-founders included Boris Nemtsov, a former deputy prime minister, Ilya Yashin, a young activist recently expelled from the Yabloko party for his involvement, and Garry Kasparov, the chess grandmaster and leader of the earlier Other Russia coalition.^[1] The initiative responded to the perceived failures of prior opposition alliances, such as the Other Russia bloc formed in 2006, by prioritizing a flexible, non-partisan platform to advocate for electoral integrity and civil rights amid tightening government controls on dissent.^[1] Unlike registered political parties, Solidarnost adopted a decentralized, movement-based structure without formal membership registries or hierarchical leadership, emphasizing voluntary participation from diverse liberal groups to evade registration hurdles and state repression.^[4] Early organization relied on ad hoc coordinating committees drawn from participants to plan rallies and advocacy efforts, fostering broad involvement while avoiding the bureaucratic constraints that had marginalized other opposition entities.^[7] This model drew initial support from ex-members of parties like Yabloko and Union of Right Forces, as well as remnants of the Other Russia coalition, though ideological and personal frictions limited full unification.^[1] The founding documents outlined core demands for honest elections, judicial independence, and expanded freedoms, positioning the group as a catalyst for systemic reform rather than a conventional electoral vehicle.^[4]

Ideology and Goals

Liberal Democratic Principles

Solidarnost's ideology centers on classical liberal tenets, prioritizing the inviolability of individual rights—such as freedom of expression, association, and private property—as bulwarks against the centralization of power characteristic of Russia's post-Soviet governance.^[8] The movement views these rights not as concessions from the state but as inherent limits on government authority, essential for preventing the arbitrary exercise of power seen under both Soviet rule and contemporary authoritarian structures. Free markets are advocated as a mechanism to dismantle cronyistic alliances between state officials and select business elites, fostering competition and innovation over rent-seeking and corruption enabled by political favoritism.^[9] Separation of powers, with independent judiciary, legislature, and executive branches, is emphasized to ensure accountability and rule of law, contrasting sharply with the fused executive dominance that has eroded checks and balances since the early 2000s.^[10] This framework explicitly rejects Soviet-era collectivism, which subordinated personal liberties to collective state goals, resulting in widespread suppression of dissent and economic inefficiency through central planning. Post-1990s developments, marked by the consolidation of oligarchic networks under state patronage rather than genuine market liberalization, are critiqued as a perversion of capitalism that perpetuates inequality and undermines merit-based prosperity. Solidarnost proponents argue that empirical outcomes in other post-communist states validate these principles: for instance, Poland's adoption of liberal economic reforms and institutional separations post-1989 correlated with a decline in perceived corruption, yielding a 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index score of 54, compared to Russia's 26, where weak separations enable elite capture. Similarly, Estonia's emphasis on property rights and judicial independence facilitated rapid integration into global markets and reduced graft, as evidenced by its CPI score of 76. These cases illustrate how decentralized power and market freedoms can curb systemic corruption more effectively than centralized control. Critics, however, contend that Solidarnost's adherence to liberal individualism disregards Russia's entrenched cultural and historical preference for robust state authority to ensure stability amid geographic vulnerabilities and past upheavals, such as the 1990s economic collapse that discredited rapid liberalization.^[11] Public opinion surveys reflect this, with majorities favoring a "strong hand" leadership model—over 70% in 2019 polls endorsed centralized decision-making for national security—viewing unchecked individualism as conducive to disorder rather than prosperity.^[12] Such perspectives attribute limited traction for liberal ideals to a societal prioritization of collective security over abstract rights, rooted in centuries of autocratic governance that equated state strength with survival.^[13]

Specific Policy Positions

Solidarnost called for decentralizing authority from the federal center in Moscow, specifically advocating the abolition of appointed governorships and the reinstatement of direct elections for regional leaders, which President Vladimir Putin eliminated on December 13, 2004, to consolidate executive control amid the Beslan school siege aftermath.^[14] This position stemmed from the view that centralized appointments foster loyalty-based patronage networks, enabling unchecked corruption and stifling regional initiative, whereas elected governors would align incentives with local accountability and reduce Moscow's overreach into fiscal and administrative decisions.^[15] The movement emphasized rigorous prosecution of corruption linked to Putin's inner circle, citing documented cases of embezzlement in state contracts and resource extraction, such as inflated procurement in the energy sector where billions in rubles were siphoned through opaque dealings involving figures like Igor Sechin and Gennady Timchenko.^[16] Leaders like Boris Nemtsov, a co-founder, argued in reports that such graft, empirically tied to siloviki dominance since 2000, erodes economic productivity by prioritizing rent-seeking over investment, proposing independent judicial probes and asset seizures as causal remedies to deter elite impunity and restore rule of law.^[15] On economic policy, Solidarnost opposed resource nationalism, critiquing state control over hydrocarbons as a driver of inefficiency and cronyism, as evidenced by Gazprom's mismanagement under Putin-appointed leadership, which Nemtsov quantified as losses exceeding $1 trillion in value from 2000 to 2008 due to non-market pricing and export restrictions.^[16] Instead, it favored partial privatization of energy assets to introduce competitive markets, reasoning from economic principles that private ownership incentivizes efficiency gains—such as cost reductions and technological upgrades—over state monopolies prone to political interference, drawing on Nemtsov's prior experience reforming Russia's gas industry in the 1990s.^[15] Internally, Solidarnost debated social welfare expansion versus fiscal restraint, with fiscal conservatives like Vladimir Milov prioritizing budget cuts to curb deficits (Russia's federal budget deficit reached 3.4% of GDP in 2009 amid oil price volatility) and limit state dependency, while others supported modest safety nets to mitigate poverty spikes from market transitions, reflecting tensions between liberal minimalism and pragmatic equity without endorsing expansive entitlements.^[1] Nationalists criticized these stances as eroding sovereignty by aligning with Western models, portraying decentralization and privatization as concessions that weaken centralized defense against external influences.^[1]

Major Activities

Strategy-31 and Freedom of Assembly Campaigns

Strategy-31, a recurring series of civic actions, commenced on July 31, 2009, with an unsanctioned gathering at Moscow's Triumfalnaya Square, where Solidarnost members joined other opposition figures to invoke Article 31 of the Russian Constitution, which stipulates that "citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to assemble peacefully, without weapons, hold rallies, meetings and demonstrations, marches and pickets."^[17]^[18] The initiative, framed as a direct constitutional test rather than a partisan rally, scheduled protests on the 31st day of every month containing 31 days to symbolize and enforce the assembly guarantee, deliberately bypassing municipal permit requirements that organizers viewed as pretextual barriers to dissent.^[19] Solidarnost's engagement emphasized disciplined, nonviolent conduct to underscore regime noncompliance with legal norms, with participants like Ilya Yashin advocating for peaceful persistence despite predictable police interventions.^[20] Empirical outcomes included routine dispersals by riot police; for instance, the debut event saw roughly 80 detentions out of 400 attendees, while the December 31, 2010, Moscow action resulted in at least 130 arrests amid efforts to enforce a gathering limit of two persons.^[21]^[22] Subsequent rallies, such as on January 31, 2010, replicated this pattern of brief assemblies met with swift clearances, yielding data on enforcement practices that activists cited as proof of systemic curtailment—hundreds arrested across actions, often including bystanders, without protester-initiated violence.^[23] These campaigns maintained a focus on legalistic framing to claim moral and juridical high ground, avoiding broader political slogans in favor of pure rights assertion, though police responses—deploying barriers, detentions, and occasional force—provided stark illustration of assembly restrictions in practice. Critics, including regime-aligned commentators, contended that the unsanctioned format needlessly escalated tensions and ignored a public inclination toward order, shaped by fatigue from post-Soviet instability and conflicts like the Chechen wars, where surveys indicated majority preference for stability over disruptive activism.^[24] Solidarnost's adherence to non-escalation tactics, however, preserved the movement's integrity against charges of provocation, positioning it as a benchmark for constitutional fidelity amid observed erosions.^[17]

Involvement in Electoral Protests

Solidarnost played a pivotal role in initiating the 2011 Russian parliamentary election protests by organizing an unsanctioned rally on December 5, 2011, at Chistye Prudy in Moscow, following the December 4 vote marred by allegations of widespread fraud. Although the group held a permit for a modest gathering of 300 participants in Revolution Square, thousands converged at the alternative site to decry ballot-stuffing and carousel voting documented through video footage disseminated by opposition figures like Alexei Navalny, with whom Solidarnost leaders coordinated closely. Ilya Yashin, a prominent Solidarnost coordinator, addressed the crowd before his arrest alongside Navalny, highlighting the movement's emphasis on empirical evidence of irregularities such as multiple voting and tampered protocols.^[25]^[26]^[27] The protests evolved into the broader "For Fair Elections" campaign, in which Solidarnost participated by supporting parallel vote tabulations and observer networks that identified discrepancies between official results and independent counts, particularly in urban centers like Moscow where United Russia received 46.4% officially but pre-election polls and monitor assessments suggested underreporting of opposition support by up to 15-20 percentage points in key precincts. These efforts amplified Navalny's video exposures of fraud, such as urn stuffing captured on state-installed webcams, prompting demands for annulment of results and new polls. The December 10 Bolotnaya Square rally drew 25,000 to 100,000 participants nationwide, with Solidarnost aligning with diverse opposition factions to focus on verifiable violations rather than unsubstantiated grievances.^[28]^[29]^[30] During the March 4, 2012, presidential election, Solidarnost continued involvement through protests against persisted fraud claims, including inflated turnout figures and coerced voting, though mobilization waned compared to parliamentary unrest, with urban demonstrations peaking at tens of thousands while rural areas showed minimal engagement reflective of stronger regime support there. Independent analyses confirmed statistical anomalies indicative of manipulation, yet critics, including Kremlin-aligned commentators, argued that opposition claims exaggerated fraud scale to garner Western sympathy, noting that Vladimir Putin's official 63.6% victory aligned with pre-election rural polling where discontent was lower. Verifiable urban turnout data from protests underscored genuine elite dissatisfaction, but limited penetration beyond major cities constrained broader impact.^[31]^[32]^[33]

Coordination with Broader Opposition

Solidarnost collaborated with diverse opposition factions, including nationalists, leftists, and anti-corruption activists, to amplify the 2011–2013 protests against parliamentary election fraud. These networked efforts emphasized unified demands for fair elections and political pluralism, culminating in the formation of the Opposition Coordination Council through online elections held October 20–22, 2012, which included Solidarnost representatives to coordinate broader strategies beyond single-group actions.^[34] The council's debates highlighted tactical alignments, such as synchronized public messaging on electoral transparency, though underlying tensions persisted over methods like ballot spoiling versus voter mobilization.^[35] Joint initiatives extended to anti-corruption advocacy, where Solidarnost supported exposés by figures like Alexei Navalny, integrating them into wider opposition platforms to expose systemic graft without endorsing all populist framing. Coordinated boycotts targeted state-controlled media, with opposition networks urging abstention from outlets like Channel One to undermine propaganda dominance, alongside international lobbying for sanctions on electoral manipulators. These efforts empirically correlated with Kremlin concessions, including President Putin's announcement on May 14, 2012, restoring direct gubernatorial elections—a reversal from the 2004 centralization—attributed by analysts to sustained protest pressure rather than internal policy evolution.^[36] However, alliance fragility undermined long-term efficacy, as Solidarnost's commitment to ideological purity—prioritizing liberal reforms over expedient ties with nationalists or communists—clashed with pragmatic calls for broader coalitions, leading to the council's dissolution by October 2013 amid strategic disputes. Critics, including within the opposition, noted that such divisions diluted impact, with empirical data showing protest turnout declining from 120,000 in Moscow on February 4, 2012, to smaller gatherings by mid-2013, reflecting causal breakdowns in unity over shared authoritarian critiques.^[37]^[35]

Leadership and Membership

Prominent Leaders

Boris Nemtsov served as a co-founder and leading public figure of Solidarnost, bringing his experience as a reformist politician from the 1990s, including his tenure as First Deputy Prime Minister under President Boris Yeltsin from March 1997 to August 1998.^[38] His prominence stemmed from his role in advocating market-oriented policies during Russia's post-Soviet transition and his subsequent criticism of authoritarian consolidation. Nemtsov was assassinated on February 27, 2015, by multiple gunshots while crossing a bridge near the Kremlin in Moscow, an killing that followed his vocal opposition to Russia's involvement in Ukraine and fit a pattern of targeted violence against high-profile regime critics, including journalists and exiles like Anna Politkovskaya in 2006.^[39]^[40] Ilya Yashin, a co-founder and key coordinator of Solidarnost since its inception in December 2008, emerged from a background in youth activism and municipal politics in Moscow, where he led the local Yabloko party branch before aligning with broader opposition networks. Multiple arrests marked his career, culminating in a December 9, 2022, conviction for "spreading false information" about the Russian armed forces, resulting in an eight-and-a-half-year prison sentence; he was released on August 1, 2024, via a multinational prisoner exchange but described the move as an "illegal expulsion" barring his return to Russia.^[41]^[42] Garry Kasparov, the former world chess champion who transitioned to political activism, participated in Solidarnost's federal political council and contributed his international profile to the movement's early efforts. Facing escalating pressure, including fabricated charges and physical attacks, Kasparov entered self-imposed exile in June 2013, relocating primarily to the United States and Croatia to evade potential imprisonment or passport revocation.^[43]^[44] The group's leadership reflected a mix of ex-officials like Nemtsov, career activists like Yashin, and public intellectuals like Kasparov, though this diversity drew critiques for embodying an urban-elite detachment that struggled to resonate with working-class Russians oriented toward economic pragmatism over systemic overhaul.

Participant Profiles and Recruitment

Solidarnost attracted a core of participants who were predominantly urban dwellers from Moscow and St. Petersburg, often highly educated professionals, intellectuals, and younger individuals aligned with liberal values. This demographic reflected broader patterns in Russian opposition activism, where urban youth and middle-class segments exhibited greater openness to anti-authoritarian sentiments compared to rural or working-class populations.^[45]^[46] The movement's grassroots base, while peaking at several thousand active supporters during key mobilization periods, demonstrated constrained national reach, with independent polling data indicating that sympathy for organized liberal opposition rarely exceeded 5-10% across Russia. This limited appeal stemmed from its concentration among educated city residents, who were overrepresented relative to the general populace, but underrepresented in provincial and industrial regions.^[47]^[48] Recruitment relied on decentralized methods, including personal dissident networks, online forums, and ad hoc coordination among like-minded activists, deliberately avoiding formalized dues or registration to circumvent restrictive laws on political associations. Critics, including pro-government commentators, argued this approach reinforced perceptions of exclusivity, as Solidarnost made scant efforts to incorporate ethnic minorities or provincial voices, alienating potential broader coalitions and fueling accusations of serving as a disconnected "fifth column" amid prevailing national solidarity narratives.^[49]^[50]

Government Response and Suppression

Legal and Repressive Measures

The Russian government utilized amendments to public assembly regulations to penalize Solidarnost's organization of unsanctioned protests, particularly during the Strategy-31 campaign asserting constitutional rights to assembly under Article 31. Violations of the Federal Law on Assemblies, as amended in 2012, resulted in administrative fines escalated from a maximum of 5,000 rubles (approximately US$165) to up to 300,000 rubles (about US$9,900) for individuals and even higher for organizers, alongside forcible dispersals by police using barriers and detentions.^[51]^[52] These measures were applied to Solidarnost-led gatherings, contributing to repeated arrests of participants and leaders for non-compliance with prior notification requirements and designated protest zones.^[53] Following the 2012 protests involving Solidarnost figures, such as the Bolotnaya Square events, authorities expanded use of anti-extremism provisions under Federal Law No. 114-FZ, prosecuting participants for alleged incitement or public order disruptions linked to opposition activities. Court records documented a surge in such cases, with over 400 individuals facing extremism-related charges from the 2012 demonstrations alone, including fines, short-term detentions, and in some instances criminal convictions for "mass riots" or justifying extremism.^[51]^[54] The Kremlin framed these legal actions as defenses against "color revolution" scenarios, citing intelligence assessments of foreign funding and orchestration behind domestic unrest, including Solidarnost's coalitions. President Putin publicly linked opposition protests to Western interference, arguing that measures like foreign agent designations—enacted via Federal Law No. 121-FZ in 2012 for NGOs with overseas ties—prevented destabilization akin to events in Georgia and Ukraine.^[55]^[51] Although Solidarnost itself evaded direct foreign agent labeling, affiliated civil society entities faced registration mandates, audits, and operational restrictions, justified by the regime as safeguarding national sovereignty from external influence.^[51]

Assassinations and Imprisonments

Boris Nemtsov, a co-founder of Solidarnost in 2008 alongside figures like Garry Kasparov, was assassinated on February 27, 2015, while walking near the Kremlin in Moscow, just days before he planned to lead a rally protesting Russia's involvement in Ukraine.^[56]^[57] The killing involved four shots from behind, executed by Zaur Dadayev, a Chechen contract soldier formerly attached to Ramzan Kadyrov's Sever battalion, who confessed before retracting his statement, claiming coercion and citing Islamist motives linked to Nemtsov's support for Charlie Hebdo.^[58]^[59] In a 2017 military court trial, five Chechen men, including Dadayev, were convicted of the murder: Dadayev received 20 years, while brothers Anzor and Shadi Bakhayev, Temirlan Eskerkhanov, and Beslan Shavanov (who died during arrest) got life or extended terms, with the court attributing organization to Ruslan Mukhudinov, a fugitive Chechen associate, but without establishing higher-level command.^[59]^[60] Russian authorities maintained the probe targeted the direct perpetrators, denying state orchestration despite Nemtsov's prior FSB surveillance and criticisms of Putin, while the European Court of Human Rights later ruled the investigation ineffective for failing to pursue leads on potential Chechen leadership involvement or motives tied to Nemtsov's anti-corruption reports.^[61]^[62] Investigations yielded limited forensic recovery, including no murder weapon after it was discarded in the Moskva River, complicating ballistic tracing, though phone records and witness accounts linked the group; counterclaims emphasize Islamist radicals or personal vendettas within Chechen networks as drivers, absent public evidence of direct Kremlin directives.^[63]^[64] Ilya Yashin, a co-leader of Solidarnost since its 2008 founding, faced imprisonment amid post-2022 crackdowns on anti-war dissent, arrested on June 29, 2022, for a YouTube video alleging Russian atrocities in Bucha, Ukraine, and sentenced on December 9, 2022, to eight and a half years under laws penalizing "false information" about the military.^[41]^[65] He endured solitary confinement and reported punitive conditions before release on August 1, 2024, via a multinational prisoner swap involving Western detainees, a pattern seen in cases like Vladimir Kara-Murza's 25-year term for similar anti-invasion speeches, ending in the same exchange.^[66]^[42] These detentions correlate temporally with public opposition to the Ukraine conflict, though official narratives frame them as isolated legal responses to disinformation rather than coordinated suppression, with no documented orders linking them explicitly to Solidarnost activities beyond individual activism.^[67]

Controversies and Criticisms

Internal Divisions and Ineffectiveness

Solidarnost's operational effectiveness was undermined by persistent internal factionalism, particularly evident after the February 27, 2015, assassination of co-founder Boris Nemtsov, which highlighted disagreements over tactical priorities between pragmatic reformers and more confrontational activists.^[68] These tensions stalled key initiatives, such as efforts to consolidate the fragmented liberal opposition into a unified front capable of challenging the ruling regime electorally.^[1] A notable strategic error was the movement's advocacy for election boycotts and "vote protests," including calls to spoil ballots rather than engage voters through candidacy, as promoted by co-chair Ilya Yashin.^[69] This approach, intended to delegitimize polls, failed to erode regime turnout significantly or build alternative structures, alienating potential supporters who prioritized tangible stability amid economic uncertainties over symbolic rejection of flawed processes.^[69] Empirical data on protest participation reflects this ineffectiveness: while Solidarnost-backed rallies drew tens of thousands in Moscow during the 2011–2012 wave, subsequent mobilizations dwindled to far smaller scales by the late 2010s, with broader opposition events in 2019 attracting only thousands despite similar grievances.^[70] ^[71] The movement's repeated failure to register as a formal political party further exemplified these self-inflicted limitations, rooted in unresolved debates over ideology and leadership rather than solely external barriers; despite initial ambitions to unite democrats, internal disunity prevented meeting unification thresholds or crafting a cohesive platform.^[72] Proponents highlight resilience in sustaining advocacy under duress, yet evidence points to tactical rigidity—disregarding voter inclinations toward order and gradual reform—as a core contributor to marginalization, with no sustained growth in membership or electoral viability post-2012.^[73]

Allegations of Foreign Influence

Russian authorities have frequently accused Solidarnost of being influenced by foreign entities, particularly through indirect funding channels from organizations such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which have supported various Russian opposition initiatives. In September 2012, Russia ordered USAID to cease operations, citing its efforts to "influence political processes, including elections," with the agency having provided millions in grants to civil society groups prior to expulsion. Similarly, in July 2015, NED was designated "undesirable" by Russia, the first such blacklist entry under new legislation, after disbursing approximately $5.2 million to Russian organizations in 2013-2014 for activities deemed political. While no public financial trails directly link Solidarnost to these grants, prosecutors have applied analogous accusations to opposition figures associated with the movement, framing such support as part of broader hybrid interference aimed at regime change.^[74]^[75]^[76] Solidarnost co-founders and leaders, including Ilya Yashin and the late Boris Nemtsov, have denied receiving direct foreign funding, asserting that the movement relies primarily on grassroots donations, membership fees, and volunteer efforts within Russia. However, the group has acknowledged engaging in international networking, such as participating in global human rights forums and receiving moral solidarity from Western advocates, which Russian law interprets broadly under its "foreign agent" provisions enacted in 2012. These require registration for any entity with foreign financial ties conducting political activities, leading to scrutiny of opposition coalitions like Solidarnost without proven disbursements.^[51]^[77] Russian officials portray these alleged ties as sovereignty erosion akin to covert warfare, eroding national autonomy through proxy financing that amplifies domestic dissent. Proponents of the support counter that it advances universal principles of free expression and accountability, transcending borders without dictating agendas. Verifiable outcomes indicate limited efficacy: despite purported Western backing, Solidarnost's protests and advocacy from 2008 onward failed to alter key policies like electoral reforms or Kremlin control, underscoring the resilience of domestic nationalism against external pressures.^[78]^[79]

Impact and Legacy

Short-Term Political Effects

Solidarnost activists played a role in organizing and participating in the 2011–2012 protests against electoral fraud, which drew up to 120,000 participants in Moscow alone on February 4, 2012, marking the largest anti-government demonstrations since the Soviet era's end.^[37] These mobilizations pressured the Kremlin into concessions, including the restoration of direct gubernatorial elections announced by Vladimir Putin on December 15, 2011, shortly after the initial post-election rallies, and formalized by Duma legislation in April 2012.^[80] ^[81] The reinstatement, previously deemed unlikely by President Dmitry Medvedev, was explicitly linked by analysts to the protest wave's demands for political reforms.^[82] Solidarnost's efforts in exposing regime corruption through reports, such as Boris Nemtsov's investigations into elite embezzlement, amplified public discourse on graft during this period, though they yielded no immediate prosecutions.^[83] Levada Center polls reflected short-term impacts, with trust in United Russia dropping amid the scandal and protests; for instance, pre-election surveys showed declining support for the ruling party, exacerbating its perceived legitimacy crisis after officially securing only 49% of the vote amid fraud allegations.^[84] Putin’s personal approval also dipped to its lowest since 2000 by November 2011, per Levada data, before rebounding post-concessions.^[85] Critics, including political observers, contended these effects were largely illusory, as the regime co-opted reform rhetoric while embedding safeguards like municipal nomination filters in the new electoral law to limit opposition viability, ultimately consolidating power after Putin's March 2012 reelection.^[86] The concessions facilitated controlled outlets for dissent without altering underlying authoritarian structures, allowing subsequent crackdowns on protesters via cases like Bolotnaya Square.^[87]

Long-Term Influence on Russian Opposition

Solidarnost's emphasis on coordinated street protests and public exposure of regime corruption laid foundational tactics for subsequent opposition efforts, including Alexei Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation campaigns and the 2021 protests, where digital amplification built on earlier models of mass mobilization against electoral fraud.^[69] ^[88] The movement's framing of Vladimir Putin as a kleptocratic leader, advanced through reports by co-founder Boris Nemtsov, persisted in Navalny's investigative videos, sustaining a narrative of systemic graft that resonated in dissident discourse despite intensified censorship.^[1] Its rapid decline under government repression from 2012 onward exemplified the regime's capacity to fragment opposition through arrests and legal barriers, a pattern repeated in the splintering of Navalny's networks post-2021 and the broader opposition's inability to unify.^[89] Non-systemic liberal parties, inheriting Solidarnost's ideological space, consistently garnered vote shares below 5% in Duma elections throughout the 2010s and 2020s, with Yabloko at 3.0% in 2016 and PARNAS at 0.7%, reflecting stagnant support amid repression.^[90] This outcome underscored repression's long-term efficacy in confining dissent to margins, as successors struggled with coordination absent sustainable structures. While advancing liberal democratic ideals like rule of law and anti-corruption, Solidarnost faced criticism for prioritizing elite-driven protests over institution-building, exacerbating opposition polarization without offering scalable governance alternatives, a shortfall evident in the persistent fragmentation of post-2012 dissident groups.^[1] ^[89] Analysts note that its urban, intellectual base limited broader appeal, contributing to a legacy of symbolic resistance rather than transformative capacity in Russia's authoritarian landscape.^[91]

Recent Developments and Current Status

Post-2015 Decline

The assassination of Boris Nemtsov, a co-chair of Solidarnost, on February 27, 2015, near the Kremlin walls marked a critical turning point for the movement, instilling widespread fear among activists and prompting a transition to more underground and less public operations.^[56]^[92] This event exacerbated the challenges posed by intensified state repression, leading to diminished visibility and organizational momentum as key figures prioritized personal safety over overt mobilization. Compounding this shift was the Russian government's heightened popularity following the March 2014 annexation of Crimea, which propelled President Vladimir Putin's approval rating to 82% by April 2014, according to Levada Center polling data.^[93] Ratings remained elevated, fluctuating between 70% and 85% through 2015-2016 per the same independent pollster, reflecting a "Crimean consensus" that stifled opposition traction by fostering nationalistic unity and reducing incentives for dissent.^[94]^[95] Solidarnost's efforts to sustain protests or electoral challenges thus encountered a less receptive public environment, with regime support acting as a de facto barrier to mass participation. From 2016 to 2021, Solidarnost's initiatives grew sporadic and low-profile, often subsumed within broader opposition actions amid ongoing legal harassment and arrests. A notable instance involved support for the 2019 Moscow City Duma election protests, triggered by the disqualification of independent candidates including Solidarnost-affiliated figures like Ilya Yashin; however, authorities' response—detaining over 1,300 protesters by late August 2019—severely curtailed turnout and follow-through, limiting the events to symbolic gestures rather than transformative mobilizations.^[96]^[97] This pattern underscored a broader strategic retrenchment, with the movement focusing on endurance amid failures to adapt to the post-Crimea political landscape, as evidenced by the opposition's underwhelming results in the 2016 parliamentary elections.^[24]

Activities Amid 2022 Invasion and Beyond

Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, members of Solidarnost, many of whom were already in exile or soon imprisoned, publicly condemned the action as an act of aggression and imperial overreach by the Putin regime. Ilya Yashin, a co-founder of the movement, criticized the invasion in a pre-arrest YouTube video on March 2022, describing reports of atrocities in Bucha as genuine and labeling the military operation a "stupid and deadly sense of imperial revanchism" that endangered Russia's future. This led to his arrest on June 2022 under Article 207.3 of the Russian Criminal Code, which criminalizes "spreading false information" about the armed forces, resulting in an 8.5-year prison sentence in December 2022. Similar statements from other exiled Solidarnost affiliates framed the war as Putin's personal folly rather than a national consensus, emphasizing its roots in authoritarian consolidation rather than legitimate security concerns.^[98] Domestic activities within Russia became negligible due to intensified repressive measures, including expanded treason laws and Article 280.3 prohibiting "discrediting" the military, which carried penalties up to 15 years imprisonment and effectively equated anti-war dissent with betrayal.^[99] No verifiable large-scale protests or mobilizations attributable to Solidarnost occurred inside Russia post-invasion, as participants faced immediate detention; over 20,000 anti-war arrests were recorded in the first year alone, with ongoing crackdowns rendering organized opposition infeasible.^[100] Instead, efforts shifted abroad, where exiled members coordinated loosely with broader anti-war networks, such as the Russian Antiwar Committee, to amplify calls for troop withdrawal and sanctions.^[101] From 2023 onward, Solidarnost's visible role diminished amid the opposition's fragmentation, with key figures like Yashin—released in an August 2024 prisoner swap—focusing on international advocacy rather than unified action.^[102] Yashin joined rallies in Berlin in November 2024 and planned further events in March 2025, urging Western support for Ukraine and the release of domestic political prisoners, numbering over 2,000 by mid-2025.^[103]^[104] Prisoner advocacy became a primary low-profile endeavor, including public campaigns and diplomatic pressure for swaps, though internal divisions—evident in disputes over strategy and Ukraine policy—hampered cohesion.^[105] By 2025, Solidarnost operated as a largely dormant exiled network, critiqued for marginal impact amid widespread domestic war support; Levada Center polls indicated 75-78% approval for Russian military actions in Ukraine through mid-2025, with sympathy for liberal opposition figures remaining below detectable thresholds in representative surveys, reflecting broader societal alignment with regime narratives over dissent.^[106]^[107] This irrelevance stemmed from wartime unity enforced by repression and propaganda, rendering pre-invasion protest tactics obsolete without viable alternatives.^[108]

References

[1]
[PDF] The political opposition in Russia - European Parliament
Solidarnost is a Russian liberal political movement. It was founded on 13 December 2008 by Russian democratic opposition, including Boris Nemtsov, Ilya Yashin, ...
[2]
Vladimir Kara-Murza | FRONTLINE | PBS | Official Site
He is a member of Solidarnost ("Solidarity"), which organized mass protests after national elections in 2011. Kara-Murza served as an adviser to Duma (Russian ...
[3]
World Report 2008: Russia | Human Rights Watch
Authorities banned or severely restricted a series of opposition demonstrations known as "Dissenters' Marches," which were nonetheless held across Russia.
[4]
2008 Human Rights Report: Russia - State.gov
Feb 25, 2009 · Throughout 2007, authorities participants and organizers of various "Dissenters' Marches" were harassed by authorities. In April 2007 in Moscow ...
[5]
[PDF] THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Mar 4, 2011 · The wars in Chechnya had a malign influence on the prospects for a liberal, democratic Russia. Under the influence of Vladimir Putin, the ...Missing: pre- | Show results with:pre-
[6]
Russia: Pressure Mounting On Opposition, Media - RFE/RL
Apr 24, 2007 · Petersburg police "overreacted" to the March of Dissent demonstrators because President Vladimir Putin was in town and they feared his wrath if ...
[7]
[PDF] Rethinking demobilisation: concepts, causal logic, and the case of ...
Attendees occasionally formed small 'steering committees,' but these were ad hoc, focused on realising and then assessing protest actions (Volkov 2015).<|separator|>
[8]
Russian liberalism - Historica Wiki - Fandom
Founded in 2008, Solidarnost ("Solidarity") is a coalition of liberal and leftist activists that emerged in response to growing authoritarianism. The movement ...
[9]
The Russian Spring Has Begun | Hudson Institute
Most Russians now understand that the current legal and economic system in Russia lacks the basic elements of a free-market system. The concept of private ...
[10]
Garry KASPAROV. How America Can Avoid Becoming Russia
Apr 21, 2025 · The Free Russia Forum was established to unite Russians, both inside the country and abroad, who believe in democracy, freedom, and human rights ...
[11]
Why Russia Doesn't Want to Liberalize
May 3, 2024 · The contemporary Russian Federation's reluctance to embrace Western liberalism is fundamentally rooted in a history of failed experimentation.
[12]
Is Putin right? Is liberalism really obsolete? - BBC
Jun 28, 2019 · Russia's president says liberal ideas are opposed by "the overwhelming majority" - but is he right?<|control11|><|separator|>
[13]
Putin and the Russian Tradition: Illiberal but Democratic?
President Vladimir Putin had instituted a number of illiberal policies, they argued that he is a democratically elected leader.
[14]
Russia: Putin Signs Bill Eliminating Direct Elections Of Governors
Dec 13, 2004 · Russian President Vladimir Putin yesterday signed into law a bill that eliminates direct gubernatorial elections across the country.
[15]
PUTIN: What 10 Years of Putin Have Brought - Путин. Итоги.
One of the direst results of Vladimir Putin's rule has been that Russia has sunk into a dark pit of corruption. Still worse is the fact that corruption in the ...
[16]
Putin. Corruption. An independent white paper - Путин. Итоги.
Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov have described the schemes in detail in their white papers “Putin – The Results” and “Putin and Gazprom”. Here is a brief ...
[17]
Strategy-31 – Free RUSSIA
Strategy-31 is a series of civic protests in support of the right to peaceful assembly in Russia guaranteed by Article 31 of the Russian constitution.
[18]
Chapter 2. Rights and Freedoms of Man And Citizen
Citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to assemble peacefully, without weapons, hold rallies, meetings and demonstrations, marches and pickets.
[19]
What is Strategy 31? | openDemocracy
Jul 30, 2010 · For the last 12 months Russian cities have witnessed regular demonstrations to protest restrictions on the right to assemble enshrined in ...Missing: Solidarnost | Show results with:Solidarnost
[20]
Strategy 31 Ends With Arrests - The Moscow Times
May 31, 2012 · Police detained dozens of opposition activists, including writer and politician Eduard Limonov, during a Strategy 31 rally Thursday on ...
[21]
[PDF] Dmitri Medvedev's Modernization Thaw - American Enterprise Institute
36 The Strategy 31 protest in Tri- umphal'naya Square on July 31 resulted in the arrest of eighty of the four hundred demonstrators, including for- mer ...
[22]
Russian police detain 130 in anti-government protests - Reuters
Dec 31, 2010 · Police detained at least 130 protesters at New Year's Eve rallies in Moscow and St Petersburg on Friday against restrictions on freedom of ...
[23]
Moscow Officials To Allow 'Strategy 31' Protest - Radio Free Europe
Jan 21, 2011 · Alekseyeva and Limonov held separate gatherings on December 31. Police detained 68 activists -- including Limonov and prominent opposition ...
[24]
Russia's Opposition Movement Five Years After Bolotnaia
Sep 29, 2017 · ... movements such as the group Strategy 31, the Left Front, and nationalist groups. 5. For criticism, see Clément (Citation2012) and Lasnier ...
[25]
Russia election descends into violence as riot police clash with ...
Dec 5, 2011 · Moscow riot police arrest opposition leaders Alexey Navalny and Ilya Yashin as crowds opposed to Vladimir Putin take to streets.
[26]
Russians stage protest against 'rigged' election - France 24
Dec 6, 2011 · Police said they arrested 300 people including prominent activist Ilya Yashin and opposition blogger Alexei Navalny after the protesters ...
[27]
What Does the Fate of Ilya Yashin Tell Us About Russia's Opposition?
Dec 15, 2022 · In 2011, Solidarnost organized a rally in Moscow to protest against fraud in the recent legislative elections. The event was an unexpected ...
[28]
Russians protest against election fraud (Snow Revolution), 2011-2012
The next day, another mass “For Fair Elections” campaign took place in Moscow to protest these findings, and another one took place two weeks later. At both ...
[29]
Monitors find Russian elections flawed - The Washington Post
Dec 5, 2011 · Distortions in Russia's parliamentary election suggest the ruling United Russia lost even more of the vote than reported.
[30]
An EU Court ruled that Putin's party rigged the 2011 Russian elections
Jun 6, 2017 · The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled last week that the 2011 Russian parliamentary elections were "unfair" and "compromised," ...
[31]
Russia's presidential election marked by unequal campaign ... - OSCE
Mar 5, 2012 · MOSCOW, 5 March 2012 – Although candidates in yesterday's presidential election in the Russian Federation were able to campaign unhindered, ...
[32]
(PDF) Statistical anomalies in 2011-2012 Russian elections ...
The approaches proposed here can be readily extended to quantify fingerprints of electoral fraud in any other problematic elections.
[33]
A coloured revolution in Moscow? | Opinions - Al Jazeera
Dec 12, 2011 · Or were voters in Russia merely sending a message to Putin to do better next time?
[34]
Russia: The Opposition Coordinating Council's Great Debates, Day ...
Below, you will find paraphrased transcripts of the first four debates on October 1, Day 1 of the qualifying stage. In posts to follow, RuNet Echo will provide ...
[35]
Column: Navalny - Russia's opposition hero cult - Reuters
Aug 21, 2013 · What was a protest movement has morphed into a one-man show called Alexei Navalny. The man who first fought Russian corruption with ...
[36]
Russia: The 'March of Millions' | Human Rights Watch
Jun 13, 2012 · On June 12, Russian political opposition and civic movements held another “March of Millions” mass demonstration in central Moscow.
[37]
Anti-Putin protesters march through Moscow | Russia - The Guardian
Feb 4, 2012 · Up to 120000 Russian anti-government protesters demand political reform as Putin supporters stage counter-rally.
[38]
Boris Nemtsov obituary | Russia - The Guardian
Mar 1, 2015 · Boris Nemtsov, who has died aged 55 after being shot, was a leading pro-market reformer in the first, tumultuous post-Soviet decade and a popular politician ...
[39]
Russia opposition politician Boris Nemtsov shot dead - BBC News
Feb 28, 2015 · The investigative committee said in a statement that several motives for the killing were being considered including "Islamic extremism". US ...
[40]
Boris Nemtsov: Murdered Putin rival 'tailed' by agent linked to FSB ...
Mar 27, 2022 · His murder in 2015 is the highest-profile political killing since Putin came to power. The authorities deny any involvement. Bellingcat, The ...
[41]
Russia: Opposition politician Ilya Yashin sentenced to eight and half ...
Dec 9, 2022 · Russia: Opposition politician Ilya Yashin sentenced to eight and half years in jail for denouncing Russia's war crimes in Ukraine. Reacting to ...Missing: Solidarnost | Show results with:Solidarnost
[42]
He Was Freed From a Brutal Russian Jail. Here's Why He Wanted to ...
Aug 5, 2024 · The dissident Ilya Yashin calls his release in a prisoner swap last week an 'illegal expulsion' by Russia that damages his ability to be heard at home.Missing: Solidarnost | Show results with:Solidarnost
[43]
Garry Kasparov Staying Abroad Over Russian Investigation Concerns
Jun 6, 2013 · Russian opposition activist Garry Kasparov says he will stay out of Russia “for the time being” over concerns he could be a deprived of his freedom if he ...
[44]
Garry Kasparov: Winter is Coming - ChessBase
Jan 2, 2016 · Fearing he would be stripped of his Russian passport, he went into exile abroad. Today, he divides his time between the United States and ...
[45]
Russian Youth and Civic Engagement - CEPA
Sep 29, 2020 · Focused studies of urban youth in Russia find them to be more liberal and opposition-minded than the rest of the population.Missing: Solidarnost | Show results with:Solidarnost
[46]
[PDF] RUSSIA'S 'GENERATION Z': ATTITUDES AND VALUES
This survey sheds light on the perceptions of Russian youth in very different realms of life: education, employment, politics and political participation, ...Missing: Solidarnost | Show results with:Solidarnost<|separator|>
[47]
Levada Center: Less than 10 percent of Russians support Navalny's ...
Oct 8, 2021 · Just 8 percent of Russians know of and support Alexey Navalny's “Smart Vote” initiative, according to the results of a survey conducted by ...Missing: opposition | Show results with:opposition
[48]
Levada Center
In June 2025, half of the respondents followed the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Three quarters supported the actions of the Russian armed forces.Putin's approval rating · About us · Socio-economic indicators · Press-releases
[49]
[PDF] Political Demand and Moscow's Middle Class Opposition”1
When United Russia was victorious in Moscow, carrying. 46.5% of the vote, people had a palpable feeling that their democratic rights had been violated. December ...
[50]
Russian Elite Opinion After Crimea
Mar 23, 2016 · For a time, this split stood in the way of any feeling of solidarity between protest leaders and the majority of the population. This level ...Missing: provinces | Show results with:provinces
[51]
Laws of Attrition: Crackdown on Russia's Civil Society after Putin's ...
Apr 24, 2013 · The so-called Strategy-31 rallies in defense of freedom of assembly have been taking place on the 31st day of each month with 31 days in ...
[52]
New Russian Law Assesses Heavy Fines on Protesters
Jun 8, 2012 · President Vladimir V. Putin signed into law on Friday a measure that will impose heavy fines on people who organize or take part in unsanctioned demonstrations.
[53]
NAVALNYY AND YASHIN v. RUSSIA - HUDOC
On 5 December 2011 the applicants took part in a public demonstration (a meeting) at Chistyye Prudy, Moscow, to protest against the allegedly rigged elections.
[54]
Russia: Surge in abuse of anti-terrorism laws to suppress dissent
Feb 19, 2024 · A disturbing escalation in the abuse of vague anti-terrorism and anti-extremism legislation in Russia has intensified since the beginning of Russia's full- ...
[55]
[PDF] Russian Foreign Policy and Putin's Fear of Revolution - Tufts Sites
”85 As he had following the color revolutions, President Putin claimed that foreign agents controlled the opposition movement. U.S. Secretary of State ...Missing: Solidarnost | Show results with:Solidarnost
[56]
Boris Nemtsov | Facts, Reforms, Opposition to Putin, & Assassination
Oct 5, 2025 · ... Boris Nemtsov was assassinated on February 27, 2015. ... The Kremlin denied any connection to Nemtsov's murder, calling the evidence a “ ...
[57]
Murder of the Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov and the ...
Mar 12, 2015 · Strongly condemns the killing of Boris Nemtsov in the most significant political assassination in recent Russian history, in which he was ...
[58]
Boris Nemtsov: A charismatic figure and fierce critic of Putin - BBC
Feb 28, 2015 · Boris Nemtsov, who has been shot dead in Moscow at the age of 55, was a charismatic figure within Russian politics, a liberal reformer who rose to prominence ...Missing: imprisoned assassinated
[59]
Boris Nemtsov murder: Five Chechens sentenced | CNN
Jul 13, 2017 · A Russian military court has sentenced five Chechen men found guilty in the killing of opposition leader Boris Nemtsov to lengthy prison terms.
[60]
Shedding light on the murder of Boris Nemtsov - PACE website
Two of the suspects – Zaur Dadayev, the gunman, and Anzor Gubashev, the getaway driver – confessed under interrogation to their parts in the murder. The five ...
[61]
Boris Nemtsov Tailed by FSB Squad Prior to 2015 Murder - bellingcat
Mar 28, 2022 · There is no evidence that Sukharev, Krivoshchekov or Sukhinin were involved in Nemtsov's murder. The method used to assassinate Nemtsov ...Missing: ballistic | Show results with:ballistic
[62]
Russia Condemned Over 'Ineffective' Nemtsov Murder Probe
Jul 11, 2023 · Nemtsov's family have long suspected Kadyrov of involvement in the killing and the Chechen ... States over the murder and other alleged ...Missing: gunmen | Show results with:gunmen
[63]
Five unanswered questions from the Boris Nemtsov murder trial An ...
Jul 13, 2017 · 4. Where's the evidence? After shooting Nemtsov, the gunman threw the murder weapon into the river. Divers searched for roughly a week, but they ...Missing: assassination | Show results with:assassination<|control11|><|separator|>
[64]
Who Killed Boris Nemtsov? - Hudson Institute
Oct 31, 2017 · There is no evidence, however, that Kadyrov is responsible for the murder of Nemtsov. If the conviction without evidence of the five accused ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[65]
Ilya Yashin: Kremlin critic jailed for eight and a half years, in latest ...
Dec 9, 2022 · A Moscow court on Friday sentenced Kremlin critic Ilya Yashin to eight years and six months imprisonment, according to Russian state media ...Missing: Solidarnost | Show results with:Solidarnost
[66]
Imprisoned Kremlin Critic Ilya Yashin Placed In Solitary Confinement
May 22, 2024 · Russian opposition politician Ilya Yashin, who is serving an 8 1/2-year prison term for his criticism of Moscow's invasion of Ukraine, has been ...Missing: Solidarnost | Show results with:Solidarnost
[67]
Russian opposition figure, Vladimir Kara-Murza, was released in ...
Aug 2, 2024 · Russian opposition figure, Vladimir Kara-Murza, was released in prisoner swap NPR's Leila Fadel speaks to Alina Polyakova, of the Center for ...Missing: Solidarnost | Show results with:Solidarnost
[68]
[PDF] Boris Nemtsov and Russian Politics - dokumen.pub
Andrey Makarychev, Alexandra Yatsyk (eds.) Boris Nemtsov and. Russian Politics. Power and Resistance. With a foreword by Zhanna Nemtsova.
[69]
The Vote Protest (Chapter 5) - Elections, Protest, and Authoritarian ...
... party registration and ballot access rules. In May, the Justice Ministry failed to register the organized opposition on the right and left despite evidence ...
[70]
10 Years Since Bolotnaya, the Biggest Protests of the Putin Era
Dec 9, 2021 · Ten years ago, tens of thousands Russians took to the streets in what became some of the largest political protests in modern Russian history.
[71]
Moscow protests: Opposition rally 'largest since 2011' - BBC
Aug 10, 2019 · Protesters hold a Russian flag during a demonstration in Moscow on 10 August 2019. Reuters Thousands of demonstrators demanded free elections in a rally in ...
[72]
[PDF] Electoral Sources of Authoritarian Resilience in Russia
Naval'ny failed to register his Party of Progress and establish any coalition ... The failure of political parties to contain potential discontent and the ...
[73]
Prospects of the Russian protest movement - Atlantic Council
Oct 28, 2019 · As these kinds of protests in Russia become increasingly common, polls tell us that Russians have been losing confidence in President Vladimir Putin.
[74]
Russia expels USAID development agency - BBC News
Sep 19, 2012 · The US Agency for International Development is forced to end operations in Russia after Moscow accuses it of meddling in politics.
[75]
Russia Shuts Down USAID Activities - Radio Free Europe
Sep 18, 2012 · On September 19, the Russian Foreign Ministry accused USAID of seeking to "influence political processes, including elections of various types, ...
[76]
Russia warns US as NGO blacklisted as 'undesirable' - BBC News
Jul 30, 2015 · According to Russian official data, the NED gave financial assistance worth about $5.2m (£3.3m) to various Russian organisations in 2013-2014.
[77]
Putin critics hit back over charge of Western funding - Reuters
Dec 13, 2011 · A documentary accusing Golos of using Western money to work against Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and his United Russia party in the poll.Missing: Solidarnost declassified
[78]
National Endowment for Democracy is first 'undesirable' NGO ...
Jul 28, 2015 · Russia has had a law against “foreign agents” – local NGOs that receive funding from abroad to carry out “political” activities – on the books ...Missing: Solidarnost | Show results with:Solidarnost
[79]
Russian opposition leader faces accusations of foreign funding
Aug 12, 2013 · Russian prosecutors accused opposition leader Alexei Navalny on Monday of illegally receiving foreign funding for his campaign to oust an ...
[80]
Kremlin Makes Concession on Gubernatorial Vote
Jan 16, 2012 · President Dmitry Medvedev once declared that direct gubernatorial elections would not return to Russia in 100 years.
[81]
Russia's Duma Passes Bill Restoring Gubernatorial Elections
Apr 25, 2012 · Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (left) and Prime Minister and President-elect Vladimir Putin walk after taking part in the State Council ...
[82]
The Reinstated Gubernatorial Elections in Russia: A Return to Open ...
Aug 9, 2025 · In the wake of a series of vocal national protests against electoral fraud following the State Duma elections of December 2011, President ...
[83]
Anti-Corruption and the Fight for Democracy in Russia | Wilson Center
Mar 9, 2018 · Russian activists Nikita Kulachenkov and Mikhail Maglov will talk about their work exposing corruption in Russia from abroad and the impact that ...
[84]
[PDF] Electoral Fraud, Protests, and Political Attitudes in Russia
The lead-up to the December 2011 Duma elections saw a decrease in support for Putin,. Medvedev, and United Russia, the ruling party, according to Levada ...
[85]
Poll Shows Drop for Putin, Party - The Moscow Times
Nov 8, 2011 · But his approval rating, down from 66 percent in a Levada poll conducted Oct. 21-24, was the lowest since August 2000, when he was dogged by the ...
[86]
Putin's Tricks, or Where Do Elections Go? - Institute of Modern Russia
Feb 1, 2013 · One of the riddles of the first year of Vladimir Putin's “new” presidency has been the return of direct gubernatorial elections and their ...
[87]
Putinism Under Siege: The Protesters and the Public
After the December 2011 State Duma elections, the Russian opposition and civil society quickly launched large protest rallies in response to electoral fraud.
[88]
Alexei Navalny Taught Russia's Opposition How to Mobilize
Feb 21, 2024 · Alexei Navalny's movement attempted a kind of mass mobilization rare among earlier liberal dissidents. He resisted the effort to stifle Russian ...
[89]
A Beginner's Guide to Russia's Fragmented Opposition
Mar 6, 2023 · The political repression driven by the invasion of Ukraine has drastically altered the landscape of Russia's disparate opposition.
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https://oxfordre.com/politics/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-2242
[91]
[PDF] Who Supports the War? And Who Protests? The Legacies of Tzarist ...
Sep 8, 2023 · The social divides help explain why there has been no mass opposition to autocracy and the war.
[92]
https://imrussia.org/en/the-rundown/event-briefings/2640-the-implications-of-political-violence-in-putin%25E2%2580%2599s-russia
[93]
https://www.statista.com/chart/28383/putin-approval/
[94]
Putin's approval rating - Левада-Центр
Do you approve the activities of V. Putin as the President (Prime Minister) of Russia? Approve. Disapprove. No answer ...Ratings · Approval of the authorities · Assessment of situation in the...
[95]
How Authentic is Putin's Approval Rating? - Carnegie Moscow Center
The annexation of Crimea has remained popular over the past year: 88% approved of it in March 2014, and approximately the same number still does.
[96]
Thousands march in Moscow demanding open city elections | Russia
Aug 10, 2019 · Scores arrested in biggest opposition rally in six years, prompted by disqualification of independent candidates.
[97]
Russia: Run-up to local Moscow election marred by unprecedented ...
Sep 6, 2019 · The Moscow City Duma election on 8 September were marred by new deeply disturbing crackdown on human rights in Russia with thousands of ...
[98]
Russian opposition figure Ilya Yashin: 'If Ukraine is handed over to ...
May 27, 2025 · The former Moscow city councilor, who was imprisoned for opposing the war in Ukraine, urges Western countries to continue supporting Kyiv.Missing: Solidarnost | Show results with:Solidarnost
[99]
Persecution of the anti-war movement report: Three Years into ...
Mar 5, 2025 · Since 2022, we have recorded the highest number of «anti-war» prosecutions (against no less than 185 people) in Moscow. The second place is ...
[100]
Speeches in court : 10 Russian anti-war activists
Oct 3, 2025 · High-profile Russian politicians jailed for standing up to the Kremlin also made anti-war speeches in court, including Ilya Yashin of the ...
[101]
The Russian Antiwar Committee
uniting Russians opposed to war. We coordinate efforts, support anti-war Russians, and create a space for solidarity, action, ...
[102]
Ukraine protects Europe from Kremlin aggression, Russian dissident ...
Aug 1, 2025 · Yashin was imprisoned in 2022 for criticising Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and released last year, along with 15 other prisoners in ...Missing: Solidarnost | Show results with:Solidarnost
[103]
Russian opposition announces new anti-war rally in Berlin for March ...
Dec 12, 2024 · Russia's exiled opposition politicians Vladimir Kara-Murza, Yulia Navalnaya and Ilya Yashin have announced a new anti-war protest rally scheduled to take place ...Missing: Solidarnost 2022-2025
[104]
Sick and forgotten: The lives of over 100 Russian political prisoners ...
May 27, 2025 · The UN Human Rights Committee in Russia reports that there are still more than 2,000 political prisoners incarcerated in the country, at least ...
[105]
Interview: Kara-Murza Seeks To Soothe Russian Opposition ...
Oct 7, 2025 · Exiled Russian opposition politician Vladimir Kara-Murza sought to ease tensions that erupted among Kremlin foes abroad over a decision by the ...
[106]
The conflict with Ukraine in April 2025: attention, support, attitude ...
May 19, 2025 · The survey by the Levada Center was conducted April 17 – 23 2025, among a representative sample of all Russian urban and rural residents.
[107]
Record Share of Russians Support Peace Talks, But Many Also ...
Sep 11, 2025 · But while many of the August poll's respondents favor peace talks over war, 78% of them also support the actions of the Russian army, which has ...
[108]
Russia Future Watch – I. Russian Opposition and Russian Resistance
May 30, 2025 · Many people consider the “Russian opposition” to be impotent, and few believe that it can defeat Russian President Vladimir Putin and ultimately transform the ...