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Southern Movement

The Southern Movement, known in Arabic as al-Hirāk al-Janūbī or colloquially as Hirak, is a separatist political and paramilitary organization founded in 2007 in southern Yemen by dismissed military officers and civilians protesting post-unification marginalization. It seeks the restoration of an independent South Yemen, encompassing the territory of the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen with its pre-1990 borders, driven by grievances over economic deprivation, land confiscations, and northern political dominance following the 1990 unification and 1994 civil war. Initially manifesting as peaceful demonstrations demanding equal and restitution for southern retirees, the evolved amid government crackdowns into a broader campaign, mobilizing large protests and establishing coordination councils across governorates like , Lahij, and Abyan. By , amid Yemen's Arab Spring upheaval, Hirak gained momentum, rejecting participation in national dialogues and prioritizing secession. The movement's armed wing, the Security Belt Forces and Elite Forces, emerged with UAE backing during the 2015 Saudi-led intervention against Houthi rebels, enabling territorial gains including the port city of . This culminated in the 2017 formation of the (STC) as Hirak's political umbrella, which declared self-rule in 2019 and administers much of southern despite clashes with Yemeni government forces and accusations of authoritarian tactics. Controversies include internal factionalism, such as Hadhrami and Yafai rivalries, and external critiques of abuses, though supporters attribute southern stability relative to Houthi-held areas to STC governance.

Historical Background

South Yemen's Independence and Unification

The and Colony, under British control since 1839, faced escalating nationalist insurgencies during the from 1963 to 1967, culminating in the withdrawal of British forces on November 30, 1967. The National Liberation Front (NLF), a Marxist-oriented group, emerged victorious over rival factions like the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), seizing power and proclaiming the People's Republic of Southern Yemen (PRSY) as the first independent Marxist state in the Arab world. In June 1969, a radical faction within the NLF consolidated control, renaming the country the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in 1970 and adopting a constitution that emphasized scientific socialism, land reforms, and nationalization of key industries. The PDRY aligned closely with the Soviet Union, receiving military and economic aid that sustained its regime amid internal purges and border skirmishes with North Yemen, including wars in 1972 and 1979. Economic stagnation and political repression marked the PDRY's later years, exacerbated by declining Soviet support following Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms in the late 1980s. Intermittent unification talks with the (YAR) in the north, ongoing since 1972, gained momentum as the waned, with both sides facing fiscal pressures—North Yemen from falling oil prices and remittances, South from subsidy losses. On May 22, 1990, the PDRY and YAR formally merged to form the Republic of , with of the north's General People's Congress (GPC) as president and Ali Salem al-Bidh of the south's (YSP) as vice president. A joint parliament was established, blending 301 GPC seats with 111 YSP seats, and a new was ratified in May 1991, promising a and parliamentary elections. Initial unification fostered optimism for and pan-Arab unity, with southern ports like envisioned as a free-trade hub complementing northern . However, disparities in military integration, resource allocation, and governance structures—northern tribal networks dominating over southern state-centric institutions—quickly bred resentments, setting the stage for southern declarations of in May 1994 and a brief that ended with northern victory by July 7, 1994. The 1994 conflict, rooted in unaddressed power imbalances rather than ideological divides alone, resulted in the exile of southern leaders and the dismantling of YSP influence, though it failed to resolve underlying grievances over perceived northern exploitation of southern assets.

Post-Unification Marginalization and Grievances

Following 's unification on May 22, 1990, southern leaders anticipated equitable power-sharing under the new , but northern rapidly centralized authority, marginalizing southern institutions and the (YSP). This imbalance escalated into the 1994 civil war, triggered by southern secession on May 21, 1994, and ending in northern victory by July 7, 1994, after which integration promises from the Cairo Declaration—such as balanced representation and economic equity—were largely ignored. Southern grievances intensified as Saleh amended the in 1994 to , excluding YSP figures like , who fled abroad. Politically and institutionally, southerners faced systemic exclusion, with local councils established in granted minimal authority, fostering distrust in Sana'a's governance. In the military and security sectors, tens of thousands of southern officers and personnel were forcibly retired post-1994, often with inadequate pensions, while northern loyalists dominated promotions and commands, perceived as deliberate . Employment extended to civilian jobs, exacerbating in the south, where pre-unification indicators like and had surpassed the north's despite lower GDP per capita. Economically, the south suffered neglect, including the decline of Aden port—once a key regional hub—which saw reduced traffic and investment post-unification, overshadowed by northern priorities. Oil revenues from southern fields, such as al-Maseela starting in July 1993, disproportionately flowed to northern elites rather than local , fueling exploitation claims. Land appropriation by northerners, including seizures of properties and businesses after , affected up to 42% of land in areas like according to southern accounts, altering economic opportunities. Demographically, an influx of northern migrants and settlers post-unification shifted southern population balances, with southerners—comprising a smaller share than the north's four-to-fivefold majority—viewing it as deliberate dilution of their identity and resources. Socially, southern women experienced setbacks in rights and employment, as unification integrated more conservative northern norms, reversing pre-1990 gains in . The Yemeni government has denied systemic discrimination, attributing disparities to national challenges, but these accumulated resentments provided the foundation for later separatist activism.

Formation and Early Activism

Launch of Protests in 2007

The Southern Movement, or al-Hirak al-Janubi, originated in 2007 as a response to longstanding grievances in southern Yemen stemming from the 1990 unification and the 1994 civil war, particularly the forced early retirement of approximately 100,000 southern military and civilian personnel with reduced pensions. Initial protests were led by the Society of Retired Military Officers, focusing on demands for job reinstatement, pension increases, and redress for economic discrimination. These actions marked the formal launch of organized demonstrations, beginning with small-scale sit-ins and marches in southern urban centers such as Aden. In spring and summer 2007, retired officers initiated street demonstrations against northern-imposed marginalization, including unequal resource distribution and governance favoring the north. The protests quickly expanded to include unemployed youth, former state employees, and students in provinces like Lahij, Abyan, Shabwa, Hadramawt, and Mahra, adopting the name al-Hirak to signify a coordinated pushback against perceived occupation-like control from Sana'a. Government security forces responded with arrests and violence from the outset, detaining protesters and using force to disperse gatherings, which escalated tensions but did not initially deter the non-violent character of the actions. By late 2007, the movement had organized nearly daily peaceful events, including rallies and festivals, though demands remained centered on economic restitution rather than immediate secession. This phase laid the groundwork for broader participation, with protests occurring intermittently across southern governorates like Aden and Dhale, highlighting systemic issues such as land expropriation and employment barriers for southerners. The Yemeni government's attribution of the unrest to "separatist" agitators, without addressing underlying causes, further fueled recruitment among disenfranchised groups.

Evolution Toward Secessionist Demands

The Southern Movement's protests, which began in amid grievances over economic marginalization and political exclusion following the civil war, initially centered on demands for reforms such as reinstatement of retired southern military officers, equitable distribution of oil revenues, restoration of confiscated lands, and greater local autonomy within a unified . These early actions were predominantly peaceful, involving sit-ins, marches, and rallies in cities like , focusing on ending northern dominance in resource allocation rather than outright separation. Yemeni government forces under President responded with escalating repression, including lethal force against demonstrators, arbitrary arrests, and attacks on media outlets sympathetic to the movement, which intensified southern alienation and eroded faith in reformist paths. Key incidents included the killing of four protesters by security forces in on October 14, 2007; the deaths of three demonstrators and wounding of 23-30 others in on May 21, 2009; the fatal shooting of protester 'Awwad Baram in Shahr on May 30, 2009; and clashes in Zanjibar on July 23, 2009, that left 12 dead, contributing to at least 21 confirmed protest-related fatalities by late 2009. Such actions, often justified by authorities as preserving "national unity," instead fueled perceptions of against southerners, with arrests targeting leaders on charges like "threatening national unity" and even detaining minors. This pattern of unyielding crackdowns radicalized segments of the movement, transforming initial calls for equity into explicit secessionist advocacy by late , as evidenced by protesters raising the pre-unification flag during rallies and articulating demands for restoring an independent southern state. The joining of prominent figures like Sheikh Tareq al-Fadhli in 2009, who endorsed amid ongoing violence, further solidified this trajectory, with the repression's failure to suppress dissent—coupled with persistent economic plunder, such as unequal oil profits from southern fields—undermining any viability of integrationist solutions. By 2010, had emerged as the dominant objective for core Hirak factions, reflecting a causal link between Saleh's coercive tactics and the movement's pivot from to , as peaceful reform avenues appeared exhausted and southern identity grievances hardened into irredentist resolve.

Involvement in Broader Conflicts

Role in the 2011 Yemeni Revolution

The Southern Movement, known as al-Hirak al-Janubi, intensified its longstanding protest activities during the 2011 Yemeni uprising, which erupted in late January amid the broader Arab Spring wave. While northern protests in Sana'a and primarily demanded President Ali Abdullah Saleh's resignation, economic reforms, and an end to , southern demonstrations in cities like emphasized grievances rooted in post-unification marginalization, including land seizures, job discrimination, and resource disparities. These actions built on al-Hirak's framework of weekly Friday rallies established since 2007, mobilizing through mosques, retired military networks, and youth activists to draw thousands into the streets. Key events included the "Day of Rage" on February 3, 2011, when around 20,000 protesters gathered in Aden alongside northern counterparts, chanting against Saleh's rule but incorporating calls for southern self-determination. Further escalations occurred on February 25, with large-scale marches in Aden resulting in at least one fatality from security forces' gunfire, highlighting the movement's exposure to repression similar to northern crackdowns. Al-Hirak leaders, such as those aligned with figures like Hassan Baoum, temporarily suspended overt secessionist slogans to forge tactical alliances with the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) opposition coalition and youth groups, framing the protests as a unified push against Saleh's authoritarianism. This coordination amplified pressure on the regime, contributing to Saleh's eventual agreement to transfer power in November 2011 under the Gulf Cooperation Council initiative. Despite these alignments, al-Hirak's participation underscored deep regional fractures, as southern activists viewed the uprising not merely as a but as an opportunity to contest Yemen's unified state structure imposed since 1990. Post-2011, the movement's involvement bolstered its organizational capacity and public support in the south, where polls indicated widespread backing for , though it faced government counter-mobilization and internal debates over versus full separation. The protests exposed the limits of national unity narratives, with al-Hirak's distinct demands persisting beyond Saleh's ouster and influencing subsequent southern political dynamics.

Emergence of Armed Components During Civil War Onset

As the Houthi-Saleh alliance consolidated control over northern and central Yemen following their seizure of Sana'a on September 21, 2014, their southward offensive into southern governorates intensified longstanding southern grievances, prompting elements within the Southern Movement to shift toward armed self-defense. Local activists, tribal leaders, and former southern military personnel, many of whom had participated in the Movement's earlier protests, began forming informal militias in late 2014 and early 2015 to counter Houthi advances in regions like Lahij, Abyan, al-Dhali, and Shabwa, where the rebels sought to dismantle perceived pro-separatist networks. These groups drew on the Movement's grassroots base, including disaffected retirees from the pre-unification People's Democratic Republic of Yemen armed forces, who viewed the Houthi incursion as an existential threat to southern autonomy. The tipping point came in March 2015, as Houthi forces, allied with remnants of Ali Abdullah Saleh's military units, encircled and captured on March 19, displacing President . In response, ad-hoc proliferated across the south, arming civilians and Movement sympathizers with captured weapons and smuggled arms to mount urban guerrilla operations against Houthi positions. By April 2015, these efforts coalesced under the banner of the Southern Popular Resistance (al-Muqawama al-Sha'abiyya al-Janubiyya), a loose network of militias operating in , Lahij, and adjacent areas, which conducted ambushes and defended key infrastructure while coordinating loosely with Hadi's fleeing loyalists. This marked the Movement's operational militarization, with an estimated several thousand fighters engaging in the Battle of , though initial disorganization limited their effectiveness against better-equipped northern forces. The Saudi-led coalition's airstrikes commencing on March 26, 2015, transformed the dynamics, supplying ammunition, training, and intelligence to southern militias, which enabled ground offensives to reclaim territory. Southern fighters, comprising around 5,000-10,000 personnel by mid-2015, played a pivotal role in the coalition-backed liberation of by July 2015, expelling Houthi-Saleh units after months of street fighting that caused over 800 civilian deaths. These armed components remained ideologically tied to the Movement's secessionist goals, using the vacuum to assert control over southern ports and oil fields, though tactical alliances with the internationally recognized government masked underlying tensions over unification. The emergence solidified the south's military , setting the stage for formalized structures like the UAE-backed Security Belt Forces in 2016.

Establishment of the Southern Transitional Council

Founding in 2017

The (STC) was formally established on May 11, 2017, following a "Historical Declaration" issued on May 8 in by southern leaders seeking to consolidate separatist aspirations amid Yemen's . The founding came in direct response to escalating tensions with Yemen's Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) under President Abd Rabbu Mansur Hadi, particularly after the April 2017 dismissal of as governor of , which southern factions viewed as marginalization of their role in liberating southern territories from Houthi control in 2015. Al-Zoubaidi, a former Yemeni officer and key figure in UAE-backed southern militias, was appointed as the STC's first , assuming the title of of the Southern Armed Forces. The council initially comprised a 26-member body drawn from diverse southern political, tribal, and representatives, including a Praesidium for executive functions, positioning itself as a provisional government-in-waiting for the former People's (). This structure emerged from the broader Southern Movement (al-Hirak al-Janubi), a separatist effort launched in 2007, but the STC aimed to provide centralized political and leadership amid internal factionalism and dissatisfaction with the movement's decentralized protests. The STC's foundational objectives centered on achieving peaceful for Yemen's southern provinces, representing southern against perceived northern domination, and countering Islamist influences like the party within the IRG. Backed by the through support for affiliated forces such as the Security Belt Forces and Elite Forces, the council aligned with the anti-Houthi while asserting autonomy from Hadi's government, which it accused of failing to address southern grievances over and political inclusion post-1990 unification. Immediately upon formation, the STC claimed oversight of southern security apparatuses, setting the stage for future territorial control in and surrounding governorates, though this provoked IRG backlash and underscored the council's precarious balancing act between partnerships and goals.

2019 Self-Governance Declaration and Aden Control

In August 2019, escalating tensions between the (STC) and the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) culminated in armed clashes in , 's provisional capital. On August 1, 2019, sporadic fighting erupted between STC-aligned Security Belt Forces and Elite Forces against pro-IRG troops backed by the Saudi-led . The STC accused IRG elements of collaborating with Houthi infiltrators and failing to address security threats, while the IRG labeled the actions a separatist coup. Intense battles intensified on August 10, with STC forces launching coordinated assaults on key IRG-held sites, including the , defense ministry, and Central Security headquarters. By , STC militias had overrun most government positions, forcing IRG Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed and other officials to evacuate to and later . The takeover resulted in dozens of deaths, including coalition officers, and displaced IRG forces from the city. The STC's seizure of Aden established de facto control over southern Yemen's economic hub, including its and airport, enabling the group to assert administrative authority and collect revenues independently. STC leaders framed as a defensive measure to restore order and protect southern interests amid IRG mismanagement, such as unpaid salaries and allegations. This control represented a practical step toward southern , bypassing the fragile Riyadh Agreement framework that had previously aimed to integrate STC forces into IRG structures. Saudi Arabia responded by imposing an air and sea blockade on to pressure the STC, while mediating talks that led to the November 5, 2019, Riyadh Agreement. This deal outlined power-sharing, including STC representation in a new cabinet and joint security commands, though implementation faltered due to mutual distrust and ongoing skirmishes. The 2019 events solidified STC dominance in but deepened divisions, setting the stage for further assertions of autonomy.

Ideology and Objectives

Core Principles and Self-Determination Rationale

The Southern Movement, known as al-Hirak al-Janubi, centers on the principle of for southern Yemenis, advocating restoration of sovereignty over territories comprising the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, which existed from 1967 to 1990. This principle emerged as a response to perceived failures of the May 22, 1990, unification, which southern activists view as having centralized power in northern hands without equitable power-sharing or . The movement posits that aligns with international norms allowing peoples to freely determine their political status, framing southern as essential to rectify systemic exclusion rather than mere autonomy within a unified . Core tenets include demands for local control over resources, equitable , and preservation of southern , which the movement contrasts with northern tribal and Islamist influences. Initially launched in amid protests over land disputes and , al-Hirak sought reforms like job restoration for southern retirees and measures, but demands escalated to by 2008-2009 following violent government crackdowns, such as the October 2007 killing of four demonstrators in . Activists invoke historical narratives of southern self-rule under colonial administration and the PDRY era, portraying post-1994 outcomes—where northern forces defeated southern secessionists—as an that entrenched . The rationale rests on economic exploitation, with southern and gas fields, such as al-Maseela, generating up to 70% of Yemen's yet yielding minimal reinvestment in the south, where exceeds national averages and services like remain deficient. Politically, southerners decry marginalization, including forced retirements of officers, exclusion from senior ministries, and land seizures by northern elites, which deepened after the 1994 war's amnesty was undermined by treason trials of leaders like . Identity grievances amplify this, as the movement highlights demographic shifts from northern migration and cultural erosion, arguing that subsidizing a population of 25 million with southern resources—while serving only 6 million locals—undermines dignity and viability under unified governance. The , formed in 2017 as the movement's institutional arm, codifies these in calls for , viewing self-rule as the sole path to , , and redress absent from national dialogues like the 2013-2014 , which proposed but failed to address core inequities.

Economic and Political Visions for Independence

The (STC), as the primary institutional embodiment of the Southern Movement's independence aspirations, envisions a sovereign modeled as a federal state encompassing the pre-1990 territories, with a strong central authority balanced by local representation to address regional diversity. This political framework prioritizes as a corrective to post-unification marginalization, including systemic in and land expropriation by northern elites, positioning as essential for equitable and . STC leaders, such as Aidarus al-Zubaidi, have articulated this as a pathway to democratic institutions, including transitional mechanisms leading to elections and a new , while rejecting integration with northern entities dominated by Houthi influence or the internationally recognized . Economically, the STC's vision centers on achieving self-sufficiency by regaining over southern resources, particularly and gas fields in Shabwa and Hadramaut governorates, which account for the majority of Yemen's production—estimated at over 70% of national revenues currently flowing to or disputed areas. Independence would enable direct management of these assets, alongside the Balhaf and Aden's strategic port, to fund infrastructure development, attract foreign investment, and diversify into sectors like fisheries and , including plans for hotels and facilities. Proponents argue this would resolve chronic underinvestment in the south, where unification led to resource extraction without proportional benefits, fostering a stable economy less vulnerable to northern fiscal mismanagement and conflict spillovers. These visions, while rooted in historical grievances from the 1994 civil war and subsequent centralization, face internal challenges from factional divides within the Southern Movement and external dependencies, notably UAE support for and , which aligns with but does not fully dictate STC strategies. The STC maintains that offers a pragmatic alternative to Yemen's fragmented unity, potentially stabilizing the south through targeted anti-terrorism efforts and economic revival, though critics note risks of economic isolation without broader international recognition.

Organizational Structure and Leadership

Key Leaders and Decision-Making Bodies

The Southern Movement, initially a decentralized launched in 2007 by former southern officers primarily from al-Dali , lacked a centralized structure in its early years, relying instead on local coordinators and committees to organize demonstrations against perceived northern domination. This fragmented approach reflected the movement's origins but hindered unified until the formation of more formal bodies amid escalating dynamics. By 2017, the movement coalesced around the (STC), established on May 11 with an initial 26-member council led by Aidarus al-Zubaydi, a former Yemeni army general who had risen as a prominent secessionist figure since the mid-1990s. Al-Zubaydi, originating from al-Dali, serves as the STC's president and , wielding authority over strategic decisions including military alignments and governance in southern territories. Complementing this, the STC's , chaired by Ali Abdullah al-Kathiri, functions as a consultative and legislative body representing southern constituencies, with sessions addressing policy on and . The STC's executive framework includes a General Secretariat for administrative coordination, a Council of Advisors for policy input, and specialized authorities such as the Foreign and Expatriates Affairs Authority, enabling structured decision-making on alliances—particularly with the United Arab Emirates—and internal security. These bodies formalized the Hirak's evolution from protest coordination councils, like the 2010 Council of the Peaceful Movement to Liberate the South, into a quasi-governmental entity asserting control over Aden and adjacent governorates by 2019. Historical influences persist through figures like Ali Salem al-Beidh, the exiled former president of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, whose ideological legacy informs separatist rhetoric but does not translate to active operational roles.

Internal Factions and Cohesion Challenges

The Southern Movement, known as al-Hirak al-Janubi, has faced persistent internal factionalism since its emergence in 2007, stemming from competing claims to leadership, resource allocation, and divergent visions for southern 's political future, ranging from federal autonomy within to outright . Factions broadly divide into non-religious, religious, and militant/tribal orientations, with no overarching unified structure, leading to independent operations and mutual accusations of undermining southern interests. Non-religious factions include the Supreme Council of the Revolutionary Movement, which split in September 2012 into the Ba‘um faction led by Hassan Ba‘um and the al-Baydh faction under ‘Ali Salim al-Baydh before reuniting amid fears of losing broader support; the League of the Free Sons of , established in 1951 and led by ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Jifri; and the National Conference of the Southern People, headed by Muhammad ‘Ali Ahmad, which fractured in 2012 over participation in Yemen's , prompting the creation of the Southern National Council for Salvation. These groups often prioritize elitist conferences, such as the First Southern Conference in from November 20-22, 2011, chaired by ‘Ali Nassir Muhammad, but lack grassroots control, exacerbating rivalries over representation. Religious factions encompass Salafi-oriented bodies like the moderate Lawfulness (Sharʻiah) Committee and the Islamic Awakening Movement under Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rab al-Salami, which focuses on rural aid; the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Party, whose southern branch has waned in influence post-2015 but occasionally aligns with separatist aims; and extremist elements tied to Ansar al-Shariʻah, an affiliate with southern operatives shifting toward anti-Houthi operations. Tribal and militant factions, such as the Southern Security and Military Council formed on September 19, 2014, by Nassir al-Nubah and led by Muhammad Qassim Tamah, operate primarily in regions like Yafiʻ, filling security vacuums but intensifying competition for arms and funding. Cohesion challenges have been compounded by leadership infighting, as seen in Hassan Ba‘um's 2013 demonstration in challenging ‘Ali Salem al-Beedh's authority, and disputes over diaspora-financed resources, including member donations of 100 Yemeni riyals and support from southern businessmen abroad. Ideological splits between moderates favoring federalism and radicals demanding separation, alongside historical regional rivalries—such as those between Dhaleh/Lahj and Abyan/Shabwa provinces rooted in the 1986 —have led to recurring conflicts over legitimate representation, with groups like the (formed in 2017) attempting consolidation under UAE backing yet facing resistance from eastern entities preferring local autonomy, like in Hadramawt. The 2015 war's militarization further entrenched these divides by arming factions independently, hindering unified southern bargaining and allowing external actors to exploit fractures for influence.

Military Role and Operations

Development of Security Forces

The development of aligned with the Southern Movement began in earnest following the UAE's military intervention in Yemen's in 2015, when Emirati forces supported southern commanders in recapturing from control in July of that year. These efforts initially relied on tribal militias and defected units from the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen's military, but transitioned to formalized structures with UAE funding, training, and equipping to counter both Houthis and jihadist groups like (AQAP). By subordinating local tribal fighters under centralized command, these forces aimed to provide internal security in southern governorates while filling vacuums left by the fractured Yemeni national army. The Security Belt Forces (SBF) emerged as the primary urban security apparatus, with initial establishment in in March 2016 under UAE auspices, numbering around 15,000 fighters drawn largely from the Yafei tribal confederation. Expansion followed rapidly: units formed in Lahij in June 2016 and Abyan in August 2016, incorporating approximately 2,500 additional fighters focused on AQAP containment. By 2019, estimates placed SBF strength at up to 90,000 personnel across , Abyan, Lahij, and al-Dhale, operating as hybrid forces blending police and paramilitary roles, though officially subordinate to the Yemeni Ministry of Interior. These units prioritized and border security, conducting operations against AQAP and affiliates, but their tribal recruitment often exacerbated local rivalries. Parallel to the SBF, UAE-backed Elite Forces developed in eastern southern provinces starting in 2016, including the Shabwani Elite Forces in Shabwa Governorate and the Hadhrami Elite Forces (HEF) in Hadramawt, with the latter specifically formed to expel AQAP from in 2016. Financed and supplied by the UAE, these forces—estimated in the thousands per unit—focused on coastal and patrols, leveraging local tribal knowledge for anti-jihadist sweeps and Houthi containment. The Southern Giants Brigades, established in 2018 with similar UAE support, augmented these capabilities along the coastline, emphasizing rapid-response tactics against infiltrating threats. Following the Southern Transitional Council's formation in May 2017, these disparate units coalesced under STC political oversight, enhancing operational cohesion despite persistent factional tensions. UAE financial reliability—often exceeding salaries from the internationally recognized Yemeni government—sustained recruitment and loyalty, enabling forces to hold key territories amid the 2018-2019 clashes with pro-government elements. This evolution marked a shift from reactive militias to a semi-professional apparatus, though dependency on foreign raised questions about long-term .

Engagements Against Houthis, Government Forces, and Terrorists

Southern Movement-affiliated forces, including the Security Belt Forces and Giants Brigades, have primarily engaged Houthi militants along southern frontlines to prevent advances into Aden and adjacent governorates. In 2015, southern resistance units that evolved into the Giants Brigades helped repel the Houthi seizure of Aden as part of the Saudi-led coalition's Operation Golden Arrow. The Security Belt Forces, formed in 2016, have since defended border regions in al-Dhali', Abyan, Lahij, and Shabwa against repeated Houthi incursions, often coordinating with UAE-supplied equipment. In January 2022, the Giants Brigades reversed Houthi territorial gains in oil-rich Shabwa province, recapturing key districts like Arma and Bayhan in under 10 days through rapid ground assaults. Further north, the Giants Brigades extended operations into , where on May 3, 2025, they repelled a Houthi in the Al-Jafrah area, engaging dozens of fighters in hours-long clashes that inflicted significant casualties on the attackers. These actions have positioned southern forces as a bulwark against Houthi expansion southward, though coordination with the Saudi-backed government remains limited. Tensions with the internationally recognized Yemeni government's forces, nominally allied against the , escalated into open conflict in 2019 amid disputes over command and resource control. Clashes erupted in on August 7, 2019, between STC-aligned Security Belt units and pro-Hadi troops backed by the Muslim Brotherhood-linked party, resulting in over 40 deaths and the government's eviction from key sites. By August 10, STC forces secured full control of , marking a secessionist hold on the provisional capital. Subsequent engagements included May 2020 battles in Abyan, where Hadi-loyal units launched attacks on STC positions, leading to heavy fighting and temporary shifts in local control before a fragile Agreement truce. Between 2018 and 2019, UAE-backed STC elements consolidated dominance in , al-Dali', Lahij, and Abyan through targeted operations against pro-Hadi and militias. These intra-coalition fights, totaling hundreds of fatalities, underscored southern grievances over northern dominance in the anti-Houthi alliance. Southern units have concurrently targeted jihadist groups, with the UAE-trained Security Belt Forces conducting counter-terrorism raids against (AQAP) and cells in urban and coastal areas. Established in 2016 for such purposes, these forces cleared AQAP remnants from and Lahij following the group's brief 2015-2016 hold on , contributing to the coalition's April 2016 liberation of the port city. In Abyan, Security Belt operations have directly confronted AQAP networks, which view them as primary adversaries alongside rivals. AQAP's retaliatory strikes, such as the August 11, 2023, suicide assault in Abyan that killed Security Belt commander Abdulaziz al-Majidi and three subordinates, prompted intensified southern sweeps, disrupting local cells and supply lines. By 2019, AQAP had launched periodic attacks on STC-allied positions in southern , eliciting defensive and preemptive actions that weakened the group's operational capacity in the region. These efforts, supported by UAE logistics, have reduced jihadist safe havens in southern territories compared to Houthi-held north.

International Dimensions

UAE Backing and Strategic Partnership

The initiated military support for southern Yemeni factions associated with the Southern Movement shortly after joining the Saudi-led coalition intervention in on March 26, 2015, focusing on anti-Houthi operations in the south. This backing encompassed training and equipping local forces, including the completion of rehabilitation programs for Yemeni resistance members by UAE Armed Forces as early as November 25, 2015. By 2016, the UAE provided financial and to the Security Belt Forces, a unit comprising Southern Movement affiliates tasked with securing and surrounding areas. UAE assistance extended to the formation of the (STC) on May 21, 2017, which emerged as the political and military representative of the Southern Movement with explicit Emirati funding and logistical support. Key STC leaders, including President Aidarus al-Zubaydi, developed strong ties with , including hosting exiled figures and facilitating their operations from the UAE. This support enabled STC-affiliated forces to seize control of on August 10, 2019, amid clashes with Saudi-backed government troops, with UAE airpower reportedly aiding separatist advances. The partnership also facilitated the STC's expansion to on June 21, 2020, consolidating UAE influence over strategic islands. Strategically, the UAE-STC alliance aligned with Abu Dhabi's objectives of countering Houthi expansion, combating through joint operations, and securing maritime routes via southern ports like and . Despite a partial UAE troop withdrawal by mid-2019, influence persisted through proxy militias and financial channels, enabling the STC to regroup forces by 2022 for sustained southern governance. In September 2025, al-Zubaydi affirmed South Yemen's potential as a "distinguished partner" to the UAE in Gulf frameworks upon achieving . This enduring collaboration underscores UAE prioritization of pragmatic southern stability over unified Yemeni governance, though official denials of support persist amid tensions.

Tensions with Saudi-Led Coalition and Recognized Government

The (STC), representing the Southern Movement, experienced escalating tensions with the Saudi-led coalition and Yemen's internationally recognized government (IRG) primarily over territorial control and political authority in southern . In early August 2019, clashes erupted in following a Houthi on August 1 that killed several STC-aligned Security Belt Forces (SBF) members, which the STC attributed to complicity by the IRG-allied party. Fighting intensified on August 7 between STC forces and pro-IRG troops backed by , leading to the STC's seizure of , including the presidential palace, by August 10-11. The Saudi-led coalition condemned the STC's actions as a "coup" against the , deploying forces to counter the separatists and highlighting Riyadh's commitment to restoring President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi's authority over a unified . These events exposed fractures within the anti-Houthi coalition, as prioritized the IRG—viewed as the legitimate authority by the —while the STC pursued southern self-rule, accusing the IRG of corruption, northern dominance, and failure to address southern grievances rooted in the 1994 unification. Saudi mediation efforts culminated in the Riyadh Agreement on November 5, 2019, a power-sharing deal that integrated STC representatives into the IRG cabinet and unified military commands under Saudi oversight, aiming to end hostilities and redeploy forces—such as withdrawing STC units from to adjacent provinces like Lahj and Dhalea. However, implementation faltered due to mutual distrust, with the STC viewing the IRG as infiltrated by Islamist elements like , and unwilling to cede full southern control to the STC, fearing it would undermine the coalition's goal of a centralized Yemeni state. Persistent disputes have included sporadic violence and political maneuvering, such as IRG attempts to reassert influence in southern governorates and STC declarations of in April 2020, which prompted Saudi warnings against . By 2023, the relationship remained strained by historical animosities from Yemen's unification era, with the STC leveraging its control in and other areas to demand greater autonomy, while the Saudi-backed IRG—transitioning to the after Hadi's 2022 resignation—sought to marginalize separatist elements through cabinet reshuffles and military integrations that favored northern loyalists. These tensions reflect Arabia's strategic calculus of containing Houthi expansion without endorsing , often positioning as a reluctant arbiter amid divergences.

Controversies and Criticisms

Allegations of Human Rights Abuses

The (STC), the armed and political manifestation of the Southern Movement, has been accused by organizations of committing arbitrary detentions, , and enforced disappearances in southern , particularly in since assuming control in 2019. These allegations stem from STC security forces' operations against perceived opponents, including activists, journalists, and rival factions, amid the broader Yemeni conflict where multiple parties perpetrate similar violations. In March 2024, documented the arbitrary detention of lawyer Yassin Ka'id Marsh by STC authorities in , where he endured , beatings, and extended , raising concerns over his deteriorating health and the broader suppression of . The organization highlighted this case as emblematic of STC efforts to intimidate critics through incommunicado detention without . STC-affiliated forces have also faced scrutiny for targeting media professionals; a September 2025 detailed systematic abuses against journalists in STC-controlled areas, including arbitrary arrests, physical torture such as beatings and electric shocks, and enforced disappearances to curb reporting on and operations. In July 2024, reported that STC-linked militias seized a in operated by a local NGO, evicting staff and survivors of gender-based violence and halting critical services without justification, exacerbating vulnerabilities for women and girls in the region. The Yemeni monitoring group Mwatana for Human Rights recorded 1,499 violation incidents across conflict parties from late 2023 to mid-2024, attributing a portion to southern forces—including over 200 cases of arbitrary detention, , and in STC territories—reflecting a spike in such practices amid territorial consolidation efforts. Earlier allegations against Southern Movement affiliates include attacks on at least 12 schools in by Hirak elements between February and June 2011, as noted in a 2013 U.S. State Department report, which disrupted education and targeted perceived as northern-aligned. These claims, while documented by advocacy groups, occur in a context of mutual recriminations, with STC representatives often denying systematic abuses and attributing incidents to isolated actors or wartime necessities.

Accusations of Authoritarianism and Civic Restrictions

Critics, including international human rights organizations, have accused the (STC) of practices, such as suppressing dissent through military imposition and mirroring the governance style of its primary backer, the , where civic freedoms are tightly controlled. documented STC seizures of media institutions, including the SABA News Agency on June 2, 2021, and the Yemeni Journalists Syndicate office in on March 1, 2023, replacing staff with STC affiliates to curtail independent reporting. Civic restrictions have reportedly intensified through arbitrary detentions and suppression. In September 2020, STC forces used live to disperse demonstrations on Island, according to reports. The U.S. State Department noted that STC-affiliated Security Belt Forces arrested Fahmy al-Alimi on July 18, 2024, for STC criticism, holding him for five days and requiring pledges for approval. Local NGOs, via the Abductees' Mothers , recorded 51 arbitrary detentions by STC forces in 2023 alone. Further incidents include the violent takeover of the Yemeni Women Union Center in on May 26, 2024, blocking access and prompting safety concerns from . In May 2025, STC security forces assaulted and arrested women protesters in demonstrating against economic conditions, reflecting patterns of assembly restrictions documented by Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor. Mwatana for attributed 265 violations to the STC in 2024, including 161 arbitrary detentions and seven attacks on civic space, such as freedom of expression and press curbs. Human rights defenders have faced targeted abuses, with reporting the November 16, 2023, arrest and assault of lawyer Sami Yassin in amid fears for his health. detailed cases like Ahmed Maher's from August 6, 2022, to January 18, 2025, involving such as beatings and electric shocks, and the of Naseh Shaker since November 19, 2023. The STC's National Southern Media Authority has imposed prior approvals for media events, as reported by the Yemeni Media Freedoms Observatory in March 2024, contributing to broader claims of civic space contraction rated severely restricted by CIVICUS.

Achievements and Contributions

Stabilization and Security Gains in Southern Territories

The Southern Transitional Council's (STC) assumption of de facto control over in August 2019, following clashes with forces loyal to the internationally recognized Yemeni government, marked a turning point in local security dynamics. STC-aligned units, including the Security Belt Forces (SBF) and Elite Forces, consolidated authority in the city and surrounding areas, thereby curtailing the factional infighting that had plagued Aden since the 2015 Saudi-led intervention. This shift reduced sporadic violence between pro-government militias and southern groups, allowing for the reestablishment of basic governance functions under STC oversight. In counter-terrorism operations, SBF and Elite Forces have played a pivotal role in southern governorates such as Abyan, Shabwa, and Lahij, targeting (AQAP) and (ISIS) affiliates. These units conducted sustained campaigns that dismantled key terrorist cells, recaptured territories from jihadist control, and prevented major attacks, with notable progress reported in Abyan where terror elements suffered significant setbacks. U.S. government assessments have acknowledged the SBF's contributions to disrupting AQAP and ISIS networks, including arrests and neutralization of operatives amid the broader Yemeni conflict. By 2023, ISIS activities in Yemen had largely ceased following STC-linked offensives, reflecting a measurable decline in jihadist operational capacity in STC-held areas compared to pre-2019 levels. STC forces have also bolstered border security against Houthi incursions, defending strategic fronts in al-Dhali', Abyan, Lahij, and Shabwa through fortified positions and coordinated patrols. This has limited Houthi advances into southern , preserving and enabling limited economic recovery in ports like . While overall violence in Yemen remains high, ACLED indicates fewer organized armed clashes in STC-dominated southern territories post-2019 relative to northern or transitional zones, attributable to unified command structures under STC . These gains, however, rely heavily on UAE training and logistics, highlighting dependencies that could affect long-term sustainability.

Counter-Terrorism and Anti-Houthi Effectiveness

The Security Belt Forces and other southern militias affiliated with the (STC) played a pivotal role in the July 2015 liberation of from control, coordinating with UAE air and naval support to reverse the rebels' advance into southern following their March 2015 seizure of the capital . This operation marked a turning point, enabling southern forces to secure and adjacent governorates like Lahij and Abyan, thereby establishing a buffer against further Houthi incursions into the south. By mid-2015, these efforts had stabilized key urban centers, preventing the Houthis from consolidating power over Yemen's primary economic hub and port facilities. Subsequent anti-Houthi engagements demonstrated sustained effectiveness in territorial defense. In January 2022, STC-aligned Giants Brigades repelled a major Houthi offensive in Shabwa governorate, reclaiming areas previously infiltrated by the rebels and disrupting their supply lines toward the strategic Hadramaut region. Operations in Abyan and Dhale have similarly contained Houthi expansions, with southern forces leveraging local knowledge and UAE-provided equipment to maintain control over approximately 20% of Yemen's territory, including vital oil and gas infrastructure. These actions have limited Houthi access to southern ports and resources, contributing to the rebels' focus on northern fronts like . In counter-terrorism, UAE-backed southern units, including precursors to the Security Belt Forces, facilitated the April 2016 recapture of from (AQAP), which had governed the city as a since seizing it in early 2015 and generating up to $140 million annually from local and . The involved minimal combat as AQAP militants dispersed into rural areas, but it dismantled their urban stronghold and propaganda base, temporarily degrading their operational capacity in Hadramaut. STC forces have since conducted targeted raids, such as the 2023 "Arrows of the East" campaign in Shabwa and Abyan, aimed at AQAP and cells, resulting in the elimination of several mid-level operatives and seizure of weapons caches. Despite these gains, effectiveness against jihadist groups remains partial, as AQAP has adapted by embedding within tribal networks and launching asymmetric attacks on southern targets. Between 2022 and 2025, AQAP executed multiple bombings against Security Belt convoys in Abyan, killing over 20 STC-affiliated fighters in incidents including an August 2023 ambush near Azzan and an October 2025 assault on the 1st Support Brigade, exploiting governance vacuums and factional infighting. While southern forces have reduced AQAP's territorial holdings compared to pre-2016 peaks, the group's resurgence—evidenced by a 50% increase in claimed attacks from 2021 to 2023—highlights persistent vulnerabilities, including limited sharing and reliance on external .

Current Status and Outlook

Developments from 2020 to 2025

In April 2020, the (STC), the primary political body representing the Southern Movement, declared a state of emergency and assumed self-rule over and other southern governorates, seizing key institutions including the amid escalating clashes with Yemeni forces. This move, justified by the STC as a response to failures and Houthi threats, strained relations within the Saudi-led coalition but solidified STC control over much of the south. In June 2020, STC forces extended influence by deposing the recognized administration on Island, prompting accusations of a coup from government allies. By July 2020, under mediation via an "acceleration mechanism" for the 2019 , the STC rescinded its self-rule declaration and committed to power-sharing, leading to a cabinet in December 2020 with balanced northern and southern representation to integrate STC into the precursor structures. This arrangement temporarily eased tensions but failed to resolve underlying disputes over military integration and resource control, as STC-aligned forces like the Security Belt maintained authority in southern territories. In April 2022, following President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi's transfer of power, Aidarus al-Zubaidi, STC president, was appointed vice chairman of the newly formed , enhancing the Southern Movement's influence in anti-Houthi governance while the UN-brokered truce reduced frontline fighting. STC forces contributed to efforts against Houthi advances, particularly in Shabwa and Abyan, bolstering security in STC-held areas despite intermittent clashes with government-aligned Islamists. From 2023 onward, amid Houthi disruptions to shipping, the STC intensified diplomatic outreach for international recognition, positioning itself as a stabilizing southern backed by UAE and . Internal frictions persisted, with STC criticizing northern-dominated policies on economic aid and military command. In September 2025, al-Zubaidi escalated calls for a "two-state solution," advocating southern independence and stating that an independent South Yemen would join the Abraham Accords, normalize ties with Israel, and prioritize countering Iran-backed Houthis over unified Yemen restoration. This stance drew domestic backlash from unity advocates and highlighted UAE-Saudi divergences within the coalition, as STC maneuvers sought to leverage regional realignments for secessionist goals. As of October 2025, the Southern Movement maintains effective governance in Aden and surrounding provinces, with prospects hinging on stalled peace talks and external patronage.

Prospects for Independence Amid Fragmented Yemen

Yemen's has entrenched a partition, with the controlling the northwest including Sana'a since 2014, the (STC) dominating and much of the south since 2019, and the -backed (PLC) exerting nominal authority over non-Houthi areas without unified control. This fragmentation, exacerbated by rival foreign interventions—UAE support for the STC and backing for the PLC—has rendered national reunification improbable, as southern grievances rooted in post-1990 unification marginalization fuel secessionist demands. The , through the STC, explicitly pursues southern independence to restore the pre-1990 People's Democratic Republic of , viewing unification as a failed experiment marked by northern dominance and economic exploitation. STC President Aidarus al-Zubaidi articulated in September 2025 that southern independence would isolate the territorially and enable clearer international engagement, potentially stabilizing the region by separating southern governance from northern instability. The STC's military hold on key , bolstered by UAE-trained Security Belt and Elite Forces numbering over 100,000 fighters, provides de facto autonomy, with functioning as a southern administrative hub since the STC's . Popular support for independence remains strong in former territories, driven by al-Hirak protests since 2007 that evolved into armed resistance amid the war, though internal southern divisions—such as Hadhrami and Mahri tribal opposition to STC centralization—complicate unified secession efforts. Prospects hinge on resolving Saudi-PLC to , which prioritizes a federal under Riyadh's influence to counter Iran-backed , while STC-UAE alignment favors southern . Escalating Houthi-Israeli conflicts and stalled UN-mediated talks as of late 2024 underscore fragmentation's persistence, with analysts arguing a two-state outcome as the pragmatic path given irreconcilable ideologies and battle lines. However, without broader or economic viability—southern lacks oil revenues controlled by and faces aid dependency—formal independence remains elusive, potentially yielding prolonged hybrid autonomy amid ongoing low-level clashes.

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