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Southern Transitional Council

The Southern Transitional Council (STC) (Arabic: المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي, romanized: al-Majlis al-Intiqālī al-Janūbī) is a political and military organization based in southern Yemen, established in May 2017 to advance the self-determination and eventual independence of the region corresponding to the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Headed by President Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, a former Aden security chief, the STC emerged from the Southern Hirak movement, which has long protested perceived northern domination and marginalization since Yemen's 1990 unification. Backed primarily by the United Arab Emirates, the council fields forces such as the Security Belt and Elite forces that have secured key southern governorates including Aden, Abyan, and Lahij against Houthi advances. The STC's formation followed the collapse of central authority amid Yemen's , positioning it as a governing entity in the south through military gains, including the 2018 capture of from Houthi control and the 2020 declaration of self-administration. While participating in the Saudi-led coalition against the and integrating into Yemen's since 2022—with al-Zoubaidi as vice chairman—the council maintains demands for southern sovereignty, leading to recurrent clashes with the internationally recognized government over power-sharing and resource control. Notable achievements include establishing administrative structures like economic and security committees to foster stability and development in controlled areas, though controversies persist over alleged restrictions on civic freedoms and unilateral actions straining alliances, such as the 2019 Riyadh Agreement aimed at coalition unity. The STC's pragmatic , including overtures toward normalization with to counter Houthi threats, underscores its strategic focus on regional security over ideological alignment with northern or Iranian-backed factions.

Background

Historical Context of Yemen Unification and Southern Grievances

The Republic of was formed on May 22, 1990, through the unification of the () and the (), marking the end of over a century of division following the Ottoman Empire's collapse and colonial rule in the south. The merger was initially driven by pan-Arabist aspirations and promises of economic complementarity, with the south's relatively advanced infrastructure, higher literacy rates (around 50% in the south versus lower in the north), and port facilities in seen as bolstering the north's tribal-dominated, less industrialized economy. However, unification proceeded hastily without resolving deep disparities in political systems—the north's conservative, patronage-based governance under President clashing with the south's Marxist-oriented —leading to immediate tensions over power-sharing and resource allocation. These frictions escalated into the 1994 , triggered by southern leaders' unilateral declaration of on May 21, 1994, after months of escalating disputes including Saleh's consolidation of military control and perceived favoritism toward northern tribes. The conflict, lasting from May to early July, pitted southern forces against northern-backed troops, resulting in the south's military defeat, the exile of key southern figures like Vice President , and the purging of socialist elements from the government. Northern victory entrenched Saleh's dominance, but it exacerbated southern resentments through reprisals, including the execution of over 50 southern officers accused of and the dissolution of southern military units. Post-war, southern grievances intensified due to systemic economic marginalization and northern favoritism, as the once-prosperous —home to 70% of Yemen's reserves and key export revenues—experienced rapid decline marked by rates exceeding 40% by the early , land expropriations by northern elites, and in revenue distribution that disproportionately benefited Sana'a. Infrastructure in former provinces like and deteriorated, with public services collapsing amid reports of northern appointees dominating civil service jobs (up to 80% in some sectors) and arbitrary dismissals of southern retirees without pensions. These factors, compounded by cultural impositions such as the reversal of southern gains and assassinations of southern activists, fostered a of colonial-like domination by the north, laying the groundwork for organized separatist sentiments without immediate calls for violence.

Rise of the Southern Hirak Movement

The Southern Hirak movement, also known as al-Hirak al-Janubi, originated in 2007 as a decentralized protest initiative led primarily by retired military officers from southern Yemen, who had been dismissed en masse following the 1994 civil war that solidified northern dominance after unification. These officers, along with civilian activists, mobilized against systemic discrimination, including the forced retirement of over 100,000 southern public sector employees, widespread land seizures favoring northern elites, and the economic stagnation of former South Yemen ports and industries, which saw GDP per capita in the south plummet from higher pre-unification levels to among Yemen's lowest by the mid-2000s. The movement's initial demands centered on restoring southern rights, such as reinstating jobs, returning confiscated properties, and addressing unequal resource distribution, rather than immediate secession, reflecting a causal link to the north's centralization policies that eroded southern self-sufficiency established under the independent People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (1967–1990). Protests erupted first in and al-Dali governorates, with intermittent demonstrations throughout 2007 demanding political reforms and justice for southern grievances. By 2008, the Hirak had expanded to other southern areas like Lahij and Abyan, drawing thousands to rallies that highlighted the north's monopolization of power post-1990 unification, where southern institutions were dismantled and northern tribes gained disproportionate influence in Sana'a's government. The movement's nature, coordinated via informal networks rather than a rigid , allowed rapid mobilization but also exposed participants to targeted repression by security forces loyal to President . Government responses escalated from arrests to lethal force, with clashes in 2007–2009 resulting in at least several dozen protester deaths and hundreds injured, as security units dispersed gatherings using live ammunition and mass detentions. This suppression, documented in reports of extrajudicial killings and , radicalized the Hirak, shifting its rhetoric toward full by late 2009 and fostering armed groups amid Saleh's portrayal of the movement as a foreign-backed . Official Yemeni sources downplayed the protests as tribal agitation, but independent analyses attribute the violence to Sana'a's refusal to concede on core southern demands, exacerbating alienation and setting the stage for the movement's evolution into a proto-separatist force.

Formation

Establishment in 2017

The Southern Transitional Council (STC) was formally established on 11 May 2017 in by , the former governor of the , shortly after his dismissal by Yemeni President on 27 April 2017. The formation followed widespread protests in southern against al-Zoubaidi's ousting, which protesters viewed as an attempt by the internationally recognized government (IRG) to undermine southern interests amid ongoing competition for control in territories liberated from Houthi forces in 2015. Al-Zoubaidi, a key commander in the anti-Houthi coalition backed by the , positioned the STC as a representative body for southern , drawing from factions of the (Hirak). The STC's initial structure included 26 members, comprising southern politicians, tribal leaders, and figures aligned with separatist goals. This council aimed to administer southern governorates and advocate for or enhanced , reflecting grievances over economic marginalization and political exclusion since Yemen's unification. The IRG immediately rejected the STC's formation, labeling it an unconstitutional challenge to national unity, while the STC aligned itself with the broader anti-Houthi coalition despite tensions. Preceding the official launch, al-Zoubaidi's 4 May 2017 speech in , known as the "Historic ," articulated the council's foundational principles, emphasizing the restoration of southern statehood and rejection of northern-dominated governance. The STC's creation marked a shift from grassroots Hirak protests to an organized political-military entity, leveraging UAE-supported Security Belt Forces for territorial influence in and surrounding areas. This establishment intensified intra-anti-Houthi rivalries, setting the stage for future conflicts over southern control.

Aidarus al-Zoubaidi's Role and Initial Declaration

, born in 1967, emerged as a key military and political figure in southern , serving as supreme commander of the Southern Resistance forces and later as governor of from December 2015 to April 2017. Appointed by President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi during the Saudi-led coalition's campaign against Houthi forces, al-Zoubaidi oversaw local security operations, including the UAE-trained Security Belt Forces, which played a pivotal role in recapturing from Houthi control in July 2015. His tenure aligned with growing southern separatist sentiments, rooted in perceived economic neglect and political marginalization since 's 1990 unification, though al-Zoubaidi initially operated within Hadi's framework. In April 2017, dismissed al-Zoubaidi as governor, citing allegations of disloyalty and undue prioritization of southern autonomy over national unity. This sacking, amid tensions between Saudi-backed loyalists and UAE-supported southern elements within the , catalyzed al-Zoubaidi's shift toward overt separatism. Leveraging his command of southern militias and backing from the —which provided training, funding, and logistical support to Security Belt units—al-Zoubaidi positioned himself as the preeminent leader of southern political aspirations. On May 11, 2017, al-Zoubaidi formally declared the establishment of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in , framing it as a transitional authority to represent southern and address grievances against the government and Houthi threats. The initial outlined the STC's role in coordinating southern resistance efforts, restoring order in liberated territories, and advocating for southern , potentially including or reversal of the 1994 unification outcome. Comprising southern political, tribal, and military figures aligned with the Hirak independence movement, the council under al-Zoubaidi's chairmanship quickly consolidated control over key southern governorates, establishing parallel governance structures that challenged Hadi's authority. This move, while decried by Hadi as illegitimate, reflected underlying causal drivers of southern alienation, including resource disparities and demographic dominance by northern elites post-unification.

Ideology and Objectives

Core Goals of Autonomy or Independence

The Southern Transitional Council (STC), formed on May 11, 2017, explicitly aims to restore sovereignty over the territories of the former , which maintained independence from 1967 until unification with in 1990. This objective centers on achieving full separation from the northern regions, framed by STC leadership as essential for and the reclamation of pre-unification state institutions. STC Aidarus al-Zoubaidi has reiterated this goal in international forums, stating in September 2023 that the council seeks "the return of the southern state, with complete sovereignty," to be pursued through negotiations with the internationally recognized Yemeni government. In practice, the STC's pursuit of materialized through the declaration of self-rule on , 2020, following its seizure of and other southern governorates amid stalled implementation of the November 2019 Riyadh Agreement, which had aimed to integrate STC forces into a unified structure. This move asserted administrative control over southern institutions, including governance in 22 districts across Abyan, , Dhale, Lahij, and Shabwa provinces, as a step toward establishing an independent federal entity. While the STC has occasionally endorsed federal arrangements within as interim measures, its foundational documents and public positions prioritize outright , with al-Zoubaidi describing separation in September 2025 as a to restore southern membership in international bodies like the . The council's independence agenda includes building parallel state mechanisms, such as a southern national army and economic policies oriented toward export revenues from ports like and oil fields in Hadramaut, to demonstrate viability as a sovereign entity. Proponents within the STC argue that unification has irreparably disadvantaged the south, necessitating to enable autonomous development, though critics, including Saudi-backed Yemeni officials, view these goals as undermining national unity efforts. As of 2025, the STC continues to condition participation in broader Yemeni processes on recognition of southern self-rule as a prerequisite for any two-state resolution.

Causal Factors Driving Separatism: Economic Marginalization and Northern Dominance

Following the 1990 unification of North and South Yemen, economic policies centralized resource control in Sana'a, dominated by northern elites, exacerbating southern perceptions of marginalization. The South's previously socialist economy, characterized by state-owned enterprises and land reforms, underwent rapid and , resulting in widespread job losses for southerners as northern interests acquired former public assets. This shift dismantled southern economic structures without equitable compensation or reintegration, leaving thousands unemployed and fostering resentment over northern favoritism in appointments, where approximately 80% of positions were allocated to northerners despite the South's population share. Oil production, concentrated in southern governorates such as Hadramaut's Masila Basin and Shabwa, generated significant revenues—accounting for up to 70-75% of government income pre-war—but these funds were funneled through northern-controlled institutions without proportional reinvestment in the . Southern grievances intensified as oil exports, valued at $1.418 billion in , primarily benefited central networks rather than local , with southern actors complaining of unbalanced access and exclusion from revenue-sharing mechanisms. Concurrently, northern settlers and officials confiscated vast tracts of southern land—estimated to equal the area of —displacing communities and undermining agricultural livelihoods, further entrenching economic disenfranchisement. These dynamics of northern dominance manifested causally in southern by eroding the perceived benefits of unity, as declining oil production strained patronage systems that disproportionately favored the North, rendering southern unrest a direct response to resource extraction without local returns. By 2007, accumulated economic disparities—compounded by job and disputes—catalyzed the Southern Hirak movement, which articulated demands for redress as precursors to autonomy claims later formalized by the Southern Transitional Council. This marginalization, rooted in post-unification power imbalances rather than inherent regional differences, underscored causal realism in separatism: southern actors pursued to reclaim economic agency from a system structurally tilted against them.

Organizational Structure

Leadership Hierarchy and Presidency Council

The leadership hierarchy of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) is centralized under President , who has held the position since the organization's founding on May 21, 2017, and exercises primary executive authority over its political, military, and administrative decisions. Al-Zoubaidi, a former governor of and key figure in southern secessionist politics since the 1990s, also serves as vice chairman of Yemen's (PLC), a role that integrates STC interests into broader anti-Houthi governance while maintaining the council's autonomous southern focus. Supporting the president is the Presidency Council, functioning as the core executive body comprising vice presidents and deputy leaders responsible for regional oversight, policy implementation, and coordination with affiliated military units. Vice presidents, appointed directly by al-Zoubaidi, include Abdulrahman al-Mahrami, who acts as deputy president and chairs meetings of the Supreme Executive Leadership, as well as figures like former Hadramawt governors Faraj al-Bahsani and Ahmad bin Burayk, tasked with representing eastern provinces and expanding STC influence. This council structure emphasizes personal loyalty to al-Zoubaidi, with appointments often favoring military commanders and southern tribal or political elites aligned with UAE-backed . Subordinate to the Presidency Council are administrative and advisory organs, including the —chaired by Ali Abdullah al-Kathiri—which provides legislative input on southern governance, and the General , which handles operational coordination. In a 2025 restructuring, al-Zoubaidi appointed Ali al-Kathiri as Secretary-General of the Presidential Body to streamline , alongside Abdulrahman Jalal Shaher al-Subaihi in a parallel secretarial role, reflecting efforts to formalize hierarchy amid territorial expansions and tensions with the . This tiered setup prioritizes rapid decision-making in contested areas like and Hadramawt, where STC control relies on integrated civil-military command rather than broad democratic representation.

Affiliated Political and Civil Components

The Southern Transitional Council (STC) operates as a political umbrella encompassing various factions and entities from the Southern Hirak movement, integrating regional leaders and groups advocating for southern . Key internal divisions include the Tughma faction, aligned with STC President Aidarus al-Zubaydi and drawing from leaders in al-Dali, Lahij, and Hadramawt governorates, which historically opposed the rival Zurma faction within southern separatist circles. Additional components feature the Yafii wing and the Southern 33 group, which hold senior positions within the STC's structure despite the dominance of al-Dali-born leaders. Civil and political affiliates extend to collaborative networks of southern parties, civil society organizations, unions, and intellectuals, often convened in consultative forums to align on separatist goals. For instance, in May 2023, the Southern Consultative Meeting united these entities to endorse unified stances on southern governance and opposition to northern-dominated structures. Similarly, joint sessions in May 2025 involved the Southern National Dialogue Tent (SNDT) alongside representatives from political components and civil elites, focusing on strategic coordination amid Yemen's dynamics. These affiliations lack formal mergers but reflect alliances driven by shared grievances over post-unification marginalization, rather than pre-existing ideological parties. Notable Affiliated Factions and Entities:
  • Tughma Faction: Core separatist group overlapping with STC leadership, rooted in anti-Zurma rivalries and regional power bases in southern governorates.
  • Yafii Wing: Regional subgroup contributing to STC's executive roles, representing Yafi'i interests in separatist advocacy.
  • Southern 33 Group: Influential cadre appointed to high-level positions, aiding in broadening STC's intra-southern representation.
  • Southern National Dialogue Tent (SNDT): Civil-political forum engaging with STC on dialogue and self-rule initiatives.
These components prioritize restoring pre-1990 South Yemen sovereignty, though tensions persist over resource allocation and factional influence within the STC.

Military and Security Apparatus

Security Belt Forces and Elite Units

The Security Belt Forces (SBF) form the core paramilitary arm of the Southern Transitional Council's (STC) security structure, established in March 2016 under United Arab Emirates (UAE) auspices to bolster counter-terrorism and internal security in southern Yemen following the liberation of Aden from Houthi control. Comprising roughly 15,000 fighters divided into four territorial brigades, the SBF maintains primary operations across Aden, Lahij, Abyan, and al-Dhali' governorates, focusing on combating al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) affiliates, conducting patrols, and enforcing local order. UAE-provided training, funding, and equipment have enabled the SBF to function as a specialized force, with units like the Rapid Intervention Forces handling high-intensity engagements, though formal subordination to the Internationally Recognized Government's (IRG) Ministry of Interior was stipulated under the November 2019 Riyadh Agreement and reaffirmed by STC decree in November 2021. Commanded overall by Brigadier General Muhsin al-Wali, a key STC loyalist, the SBF features regional sector leaders such as Brigadier General Jalal al-Rubaie in , Abdullatif al-Sayyed in Abyan, and Hussein al-Saidi in Lahij, reflecting tribal recruitment patterns—predominantly from the Yafai —and direct alignment with STC Aidarus al-Zoubaidi's directives despite nominal IRG oversight. The forces have executed targeted operations, including clashes against AQAP in during 2018 and the 2023 Operation Swords of Haws offensive in Abyan, while also intervening in intra-anti-Houthi rivalries, such as the 2019 escalations against IRG-aligned units. Affiliated elite units augment the SBF's capabilities, notably the Shabwani Forces and Hadrami Forces, both formed in 2016 as UAE-trained contingents for stabilization and counter-insurgency in eastern and central southern . These units, financed and supplied by the UAE, have integrated into STC operations, with the Shabwani Forces conducting anti-AQAP sweeps in Shabwa—such as a February 2018 operation—and pledging loyalty to the STC amid territorial contests, while the Hadrami Forces secure and Hadramawt against jihadist threats and rival factions. Though distinct in recruitment and geography, these elite formations operate in coordination with SBF brigades to consolidate STC control, exemplified by joint defenses in Shabwa against Islah-affiliated groups in 2022.

Expansion and Control in Southern Governorates

The Security Belt Forces, serving as the STC's elite paramilitary wing, initially established a presence in and Lahij governorates following their formation in , focusing on counter-terrorism against (AQAP) and securing urban centers. By mid-2017, these units expanded into Abyan and al-Dhale to repel Houthi incursions along southern frontlines, integrating local militias and conducting joint operations that prevented territorial losses to northern-aligned forces. This early consolidation, numbering several thousand fighters, laid the groundwork for broader STC influence amid the anti-Houthi coalition's fragmentation. A pivotal expansion occurred in August 2022, when STC forces, including Security Belt and affiliated elite units, launched an offensive in Shabwa governorate, capturing key districts from the pro-government Giants Brigades on August 11 after clashes that displaced Islah-affiliated elements. Building on this momentum, the forces advanced into Abyan, seizing the strategic coastal town of Shuqra on and establishing checkpoints across rural areas previously contested by AQAP remnants and government loyalists. These operations, which involved coordinated armor and assaults, extended STC control over oil infrastructure in Shabwa and disrupted rival supply lines, though they drew condemnation from the for violating the Riyadh Agreement. In parallel, the STC asserted dominance over through a rapid deployment on June 20, 2020, ousting the Saudi-backed governor Ramzi Mahrous and expelling approximately 200 government troops in a near-bloodless backed by UAE air and naval assets. STC-aligned militias, including brigades pledging by 2023, have since maintained outposts and roadblocks across the , countering sporadic tribal and Houthi drone threats while securing its ports for potential economic leverage. By late 2023, these efforts had solidified STC administration in , despite ongoing disputes with Hadramaut and Mahrah tribal councils over eastern extensions. Through such incremental military assertions, the STC has achieved effective control over core southern governorates—Aden, Lahij, Abyan, al-Dhale, and Shabwa—encompassing roughly 20% of Yemen's territory and population, with partial sway in and Hadramaut via proxy forces totaling over 50,000 personnel. This network has prioritized internal stabilization, including AQAP suppression that reduced militant incidents by half in controlled areas between 2020 and 2023, though reliance on UAE logistics has fueled accusations of external dependency. ![STC roadblock in Socotra](./assets/Southern_Transitional_Council_-roadblock_Socotra(2)

International and Regional Relations

UAE Backing and Strategic Alignment

The (UAE) initiated support for southern Yemeni forces aligned with the Southern Transitional Council (STC) precursors during the 2015 Saudi-led intervention against the , funding local commanders to recapture from Houthi control in July 2015. This backing evolved into the formation of proxy militias, including the Security Belt Forces (SBF) in and the Hadrami Elite Forces, which the UAE trained and equipped starting around 2016 to counter perceived threats from Islamist groups like al-Islah, affiliated with the . By 2017, when STC leader —a former SBF commander—established the council on May 11, UAE financial and logistical aid had solidified these groups as STC-dominated paramilitaries, enabling territorial consolidation in southern governorates. UAE strategic interests in backing the STC center on securing maritime chokepoints like the Bab al-Mandab Strait and Port, vital for global trade routes comprising 12% of international commerce, while establishing a buffer against Houthi expansion and Iranian influence in the south. This alignment prioritizes countering (AQAP) and affiliates through localized forces, as evidenced by UAE-facilitated operations that diminished militant footholds in Shabwa and Hadramawt provinces by 2018. The UAE's partial troop drawdown in August 2019 shifted reliance to STC proxies, which then seized Socotra Island on June 21, 2020, enhancing UAE access to strategic outposts for monitoring traffic. Since 2022, the STC has led regrouping of these UAE-aligned units, including integrating disparate militias under centralized command to maintain southern stability amid Houthi threats. This partnership reflects UAE preferences for a partitioned Yemen, where STC in the south facilitates over ports and resources without direct Emirati occupation, diverging from broader unity goals. STC declarations of self-administration in April 2020 and participation in the Riyadh Agreement on November 5, 2019, underscore tactical alignment, with UAE aid ensuring STC leverage in anti-Houthi fronts while advancing Abu Dhabi's regional containment of political . Empirical outcomes include STC over 70% of southern territories by 2023, bolstered by UAE-sustained logistics that have sustained SBF operations exceeding 20,000 fighters.

Saudi Arabia: Riyadh Agreement and Ongoing Tensions

The Riyadh Agreement was signed on November 5, 2019, between the internationally recognized Yemeni government led by President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and the Southern Transitional Council (STC), under the auspices of Saudi Arabia in Riyadh. The pact aimed to unify anti-Houthi forces by integrating STC-affiliated military units into the Yemeni national army, establishing joint security committees, and allocating ministerial positions to southern representatives in a restructured cabinet, with Saudi Arabia overseeing a monitoring committee for implementation. This followed STC's seizure of Aden in August 2019, which exposed fractures within the Saudi-led coalition, as Saudi Arabia prioritized a unified front against the Houthis while viewing STC's separatist ambitions as a threat to Yemen's territorial integrity. Implementation faltered shortly after signing, with disputes over military command structures and cabinet nominations leading to renewed clashes between STC's Security Belt Forces and government-aligned troops in Abyan and other southern areas by early 2020. The STC's declaration of self-administration in on April 26, 2020, defied the agreement's unity provisions, prompting mediation efforts to revive stalled talks, including a July 2020 push for power-sharing that yielded partial military truces but no resolution on southern . Arabia's strategic concerns intensified, as full STC control over southern governorates risked fragmenting the anti-Houthi and undermining Riyadh's influence, particularly amid UAE backing for the STC that fueled perceptions of intra-coalition rivalry. Tensions persisted into 2022 when the STC joined the Saudi-brokered (PLC) as a replacement for Hadi's presidency, ostensibly recommitting to the framework, yet implementation gaps remained, with STC forces maintaining control over key ports and oil facilities in and Shabwa. By 2023-2025, escalated diplomatic pressure, proposing in official channels that the STC abandon self-rule declarations to resume full agreement compliance, amid sporadic skirmishes and support for rival tribal groups in eastern Yemen to counter STC expansion. These frictions reflect deeper causal divergences: 's emphasis on centralized Yemeni governance to contain Iranian-backed clashes with STC's push for southern , exacerbating coalition strains without derailing broader anti-Houthi operations. Recent STC statements on potential normalization with have drawn rebuke, highlighting 's wariness of unilateral STC moves that could isolate the south economically.

Relations with Hadi Government, PLC, and Anti-Houthi Coalition

The Southern Transitional Council (STC), established in May 2017, initially aligned with the anti-Houthi coalition led by but quickly entered into political and military competition with the internationally recognized government of President , which it accused of perpetuating northern dominance and failing to address southern grievances from Yemen's unification. Tensions escalated due to the government's reliance on northern-based parties like the General People's Congress (GPC) and the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (al-Islah), an Islamist group affiliated with the , which the STC viewed as obstructing southern autonomy and enabling infiltration by extremists in southern territories. Armed clashes between STC forces and Hadi-aligned troops intensified in 2018–2019, particularly in Aden and Abyan governorates, where STC-backed Security Belt forces defeated pro-Hadi militias, including those linked to Islah, culminating in the STC's seizure of Aden on August 10, 2019. To avert further fragmentation within the anti-Houthi front, Saudi Arabia mediated the Riyadh Agreement on November 5, 2019, between the Hadi government and STC, stipulating power-sharing in a new cabinet (with STC allocated six ministerial posts), integration of STC military units into national forces under Hadi's defense and interior ministries, and redeployment of rival forces outside Aden. Implementation faltered amid mutual accusations of violations; a December 2020 mechanism expedited some cabinet formations but failed to resolve force integrations or disarmament, as STC prioritized southern control over national subordination. On April 7, 2022, following Hadi's resignation and transfer of powers to the (PLC)—a Saudi-backed body comprising eight members, three from the STC—the council nominally unified anti-Houthi leadership, with STC figures like gaining influence. However, the PLC's inclusion of and GPC representatives perpetuated frictions, as evidenced by STC demands to expel affiliates from key posts and clashes over control in Shabwa and governorates in 2023–2024, where STC expanded against Islah-linked forces. The STC has criticized the PLC for inefficiency and northern bias, advocating enhanced southern representation while halting participation in some joint mechanisms by mid-2025 amid stalled economic reforms and salary payments. Within the broader Saudi-led anti-Houthi , the STC has contributed militarily against Houthi advances, particularly in southern fronts like and Shabwa, but its separatist agenda has strained unity, leading to parallel governance in STC-held areas and occasional obstructions of coalition operations perceived as favoring Hadi/ elements. Post-2023 Houthi escalations in the , the STC reaffirmed alignment against , offering cooperation with international partners including potential ties to counter Houthi naval threats, yet prioritizing southern independence over full integration into -led structures. These dynamics reflect a pragmatic but fragile anti-Houthi partnership, undermined by the STC's insistence on devolved powers and exclusion of Islamist influences, contrasting with the / vision of centralized restoration.

Major Conflicts and Territorial Gains

2018-2019 Escalations in Aden and Abyan

In January 2018, armed clashes erupted in between forces aligned with the Southern Transitional Council (STC), primarily the UAE-backed Security Belt Forces, and troops loyal to President , including units like the and First Coastal Defense Brigade. The violence began on when pro-Hadi forces blocked STC supporters from holding a in the , prompting STC demands for Hadi to dismiss officials perceived as influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated al-Islah party. Fighting intensified over the following days, with STC forces surrounding the presidential palace by January 30 and reports of at least 45 deaths, including civilians, as both sides exchanged artillery and small-arms fire. Hadi's government labeled the STC actions a UAE-supported coup attempt, while the STC accused Hadi loyalists of suppressing southern separatist aspirations; , leading the anti-Houthi coalition, mediated a temporary , but underlying rivalries over security control persisted. Tensions reignited in August 2018 when STC-aligned militias, leveraging their dominance in local security, seized key institutions in , including the Central Security headquarters and parts of the port, effectively sidelining Hadi-appointed officials without full-scale combat. This move expanded STC influence amid accusations that Hadi's administration favored northern Islamist elements, exacerbating fractures within the anti-Houthi coalition between Saudi-backed government forces and UAE-supported southern groups. By late 2018, sporadic skirmishes continued, including over 's airport, as STC pressured to replace Ahmed Obeid bin Daghr, whom southern factions viewed as beholden to al-Islah. Escalations peaked in 2019, particularly from March onward, with intermittent clashes in reflecting growing STC frustration over 's reluctance to integrate southern forces into national structures. The decisive confrontation unfolded in early August 2019, triggered by an assassination attempt on STC leader Aidarus al-Zubaydi on , which the STC attributed to allies. Heavy fighting broke out on between STC's Security Belt and Elite Forces against Hadi-loyal units, including Saudi-supported Presidential Protection Forces, culminating in STC seizure of the and most by August 10. The four-day battle killed over 40 people, displaced thousands, and exposed divisions, with UAE air support reportedly aiding STC advances while forces backed Hadi troops. Parallel violence extended to Abyan governorate in August 2019, where STC-affiliated Southern Giants Brigades clashed with 's 21st Armored Brigade and other government units amid disputes over territorial control and accusations of enabling (AQAP) incursions. On August 20, STC forces lost initial ground in Abyan to counterattacking troops but regained positions through Giants Brigades offensives, resulting in dozens of casualties and temporary STC dominance in key districts like Zinjibar. These Abyan engagements intertwined counter-terrorism efforts—where Giants had previously fought AQAP—with factional power struggles, as forces sought to exploit jihadist threats to undermine STC legitimacy; the fighting subsided after intervention but foreshadowed the November 2019 Riyadh Agreement.

2020 Aden Takeover and Self-Administration Declaration

Tensions between the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and the internationally recognized Yemeni government of President intensified in early April 2020, exacerbated by disputes over power-sharing under the Saudi-brokered Agreement of 2019. Clashes erupted on April 24, 2020, between STC-affiliated Security Belt Forces and government troops backed by the Giants Brigades in and adjacent areas like Lahj, leading to the deaths of at least 40 individuals over the following days. By April 25, 2020, STC forces had overrun key government positions in , including the presidential palace and military camps, expelling Hadi government ministers and officials who fled to or . The STC declared a across and southern governorates, assuming full executive, legislative, and judicial authority to manage security, services, and administration. On April 26, 2020, the STC formally announced the establishment of self-governance in southern Yemen, effective from midnight on April 25, citing the Hadi government's inability to counter Houthi advances and provide effective rule as justification. This declaration positioned the STC as the sole authority over southern institutions, including ports, airports, and economic resources, while pledging to continue fighting the Houthis within the anti-Houthi coalition framework. The government labeled the takeover a "treacherous coup," accusing the STC of undermining national unity, while condemned the move as a violation of the Agreement and deployed troops to mediate de-escalation. The , widely viewed as the STC's primary backer, did not publicly endorse the declaration but maintained support for southern forces.

Governance and Administration

Local Rule in Aden and Southern Territories

Following the Southern Transitional Council's (STC) military consolidation of Aden in 2018, it established administrative control over the city, displacing elements of the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) forces and assuming responsibility for local security and order. This control extended to key southern governorates including Abyan, al-Dhali', Lahij, and Shabwa through affiliated militias such as the Security Belt Forces, which enforce STC directives and maintain checkpoints. By early 2018, STC-aligned units had secured the Aden port and , for and revenue collection. On April 26, 2020, the STC unilaterally declared self-rule in and ten southern governorates, announcing the formation of an interim "Supreme Council for Management and Executive Bodies" to oversee ministries for interior, finance, justice, transportation, and local affairs. This structure centralized decision-making under STC President Aidarus al-Zubaydi, with sub-councils appointed to handle district-level administration, including salary disbursements for civil servants and basic utilities management. Although the declaration was formally suspended on July 29, 2020, amid Saudi-brokered negotiations under the Riyadh Agreement, the STC retained practical authority, operating parallel institutions that sidelined IRG appointees. Aden's local , comprising 16 elected members plus the , functions under STC oversight, though seven seats remained vacant as of recent assessments, reflecting ongoing factional disputes and capacity constraints. The STC has pursued administrative reforms, including restructuring reviewed in July 2025 by Deputy President Rahman al-Muharrami, aimed at streamlining and prioritizing southern recruits. remains a core pillar, with Elite Forces and Believing Youth units conducting patrols that have curtailed urban crime rates compared to pre-2018 levels, though enforcement often involves arbitrary detentions criticized by monitors. Service delivery under STC rule emphasizes economic stabilization, with the administration collecting port fees—estimated at $200-300 million annually—to fund salaries and fuel imports, mitigating blackouts that plagued prior to 2018. Efforts include coordinating distribution through affiliated bodies, as noted in May 2025 meetings with the Ministry of Social Affairs, though coverage remains uneven due to fuel shortages and Houthi disruptions to supply lines. In southern territories, local manifests through district committees that regulate markets and resolve disputes, fostering relative amid national fragmentation, but reliant on UAE logistical support for sustainability. By 2023, the STC formalized a "Supreme Executive Leadership" on May 8 to unify southern administrative factions, enhancing coordination across territories. Challenges persist, including governance overlaps with IRG remnants, which the STC has marginalized through purges of northern-affiliated officials, leading to accusations of exclusionary policies from sources aligned with the . Economic pressures, such as riyal depreciation, have strained service provision, prompting STC calls for autonomy to prioritize southern resource allocation over national redistribution. Despite these, STC control has enabled to host diplomatic missions, including India's opened on October 1, 2025, signaling functional administrative capacity.

Service Provision and Economic Stabilization Efforts

Following its declaration of self-administration on April 26, 2020, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) assumed control over key administrative functions in and other southern governorates, including oversight of local ministries responsible for basic services such as , , and health. STC-affiliated forces, including the Security Belt and units, prioritized security operations to curb unrest and , which the council claimed created conditions for service delivery by reducing disruptions from militias and smuggling networks. However, empirical data indicates limited success in provisioning; experienced supply averaging only 4-6 hours daily in 2023, exacerbated by shortages and reliance on imported , with no significant improvements reported by mid-2025. Water services under STC influence have similarly faltered, with residents in facing intermittent access due to damaged from prior conflict and inadequate maintenance funding, leading to reliance on private tankers amid risks from . and sectors saw interventions, such as STC-coordinated aid distributions backed by UAE partners, but systemic gaps persisted, including understaffing and closures tied to arrears for public employees, which reached months-long delays by 2025. The council's issued warnings in October 2025 about an escalating public service crisis in , calling for urgent interventions in and payments to avert collapse, reflecting internal acknowledgment of shortfalls. On the economic front, STC efforts focused on stabilizing southern finances through partial control of Aden Port revenues and attempts to redirect functions, including a 2020 takeover of branches to fund local operations amid disputes with the internationally recognized government. These measures aimed to curb and , with claims of fostering relative commercial stability in southern markets compared to Houthi-controlled areas, where exceeded 50% annually. Yet, outcomes included deepened liquidity crises, as STC's banking initiatives fragmented the , contributing to protests over currency shortages and rising costs by 2022-2025; no peer-reviewed data substantiates net stabilization, with Yemen's overall GDP contracting 20% from 2015-2023 under divided governance. STC leaders attributed persistent issues to northern sabotage and war-induced blockades rather than administrative inefficiencies, though independent analyses highlight and militia diversion of funds as causal factors.

Achievements and Positive Impacts

Counter-Terrorism Operations Against Al-Qaeda and ISIS

The Southern Transitional Council's affiliated paramilitary units, particularly the Security Belt Forces established in 2016, have prioritized counter-terrorism efforts against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Aden and surrounding governorates, conducting raids, arrests, and targeted killings to disrupt militant networks. These forces, integrated into STC command structures, operate alongside Elite Forces units focused on stabilization and security in areas like Abyan and Shabwa, where AQAP has historically exploited governance vacuums for recruitment and attacks. Such operations have included intelligence-driven sweeps that have neutralized AQAP cells responsible for bombings and assassinations, contributing to a localized reduction in high-profile attacks in STC-controlled territories since 2017. A notable occurred in August 2022 with the launch of the "Arrows of the East" operation in Abyan province, led by STC-aligned forces under Mukhtar al-Nubi, targeting AQAP strongholds in coastal and inland districts. This multi-axis campaign involved ground assaults and coordination with Yemeni government elements, resulting in the clearance of several militant hideouts and the deaths of dozens of AQAP fighters, though the group retaliated with ambushes and bombings. By late 2022, these efforts expanded into a joint government-STC counter-terrorism push in Abyan, focusing on dismantling AQAP's logistical networks and preventing infiltration from Houthi-held areas. Efforts against the in , a smaller presence primarily in central and eastern regions, have been integrated into broader STC operations but remain secondary to the AQAP in the . STC forces have disrupted ISIS-Yemen and financing nodes through patrols and detentions in southern ports, aligning with UAE-supported intelligence sharing that has limited the group's operational capacity in STC territories. As of December 2024, STC spokespersons affirmed continued unilateral operations under the "Arrows of the East" framework to combat both groups amid persistent AQAP resurgence attempts. These activities have enhanced southern 's resilience against jihadist expansion, despite challenges from inter-factional rivalries and resource constraints.

Contributions to Southern Stability Amid National Chaos

The Southern Transitional Council (STC) has maintained physical control over security in and extensive southern territories, including Abyan, Lahij, Shabwa, and Dhale, thereby insulating these areas from the governance vacuums and unchecked Houthi expansions prevalent elsewhere in . This control, exercised through UAE-backed forces such as the Security Belt and Elite Forces, has enabled the STC to repel Houthi incursions along southern frontlines, including repeated advances in Abyan and Lahij provinces since 2018. STC-affiliated units have been described as the most significant ground presence opposing Houthi forces on these fronts, contributing to a relative containment of the group's southward momentum beyond early 2015 gains toward . Political violence in STC-controlled southern governorates declined by nearly 50% in 2021 compared to 2020, largely due to reduced intra-anti-Houthi clashes following the STC's consolidation of authority after the 2020 takeover and self-administration declaration. This stabilization contrasts with persistent high-intensity in Houthi-dominated northern and western , where events like drone strikes, artillery barrages, and territorial contests remain frequent. By establishing unified local command structures over fragmented militias, the STC has mitigated the anarchy seen in areas under the weakly coordinated , fostering conditions for limited economic activity and population inflows to southern hubs like amid nationwide displacement exceeding 4 million. These efforts have positioned the as a partial against national disintegration, with STC forces holding defensive lines that prevent Houthi spillover into key maritime access points and oil infrastructure, such as those in Shabwa and Hadramawt. However, this remains precarious, dependent on external UAE and vulnerable to internal southern factionalism, though it has empirically reduced event-based metrics relative to Houthi-controlled zones through 2022.

Controversies and Criticisms

Human Rights Allegations and Detentions

The Southern Transitional Council (STC) has faced allegations of arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, and primarily targeting perceived political opponents, journalists, activists, and defenders in areas under its control, such as and other southern governorates. (HRW) documented systematic violations by the STC against journalists, including prolonged arbitrary detention without charge, physical such as beatings and electrocution, and threats to coerce self-censorship or forced confessions. These abuses are part of a broader pattern where STC security forces, often affiliated with UAE-backed militias, have detained individuals suspected of affiliation with rival groups like the party or for criticizing STC policies. A prominent case involves lawyer Sami Yassin Ka'id Marsh, arrested by STC forces in March 2024 in without legal justification; reported his stemmed from his advocacy work, with concerns over his deteriorating health due to inadequate medical access and potential ill-treatment. STC authorities have held dozens of journalists for extended periods, some enduring years of incommunicado , as evidenced by HRW interviews with released detainees describing routine use of and psychological coercion. The U.S. State Department's 2024 report highlighted harsh conditions in STC-run facilities, including , denial of , and reports of , attributing these to efforts to suppress dissent amid territorial control. Mwatana for Human Rights, a Yemeni monitoring group, recorded over 1,499 violations in 2024 across conflict parties, with arbitrary detention and prominent in STC-controlled areas, often linked to suppressing southern opposition voices or anti-separatist activities. Earlier incidents include the 2021 torture of Abd al-Karim al-Khaiwani by UAE-backed STC forces, involving beatings and mock executions, as detailed by HRW based on victim testimony and medical evidence. These practices align with STC's security apparatus prioritizing control over legal accountability, though the group has not publicly acknowledged or investigated such claims, instead framing detentions as necessary counter-terrorism measures. Independent verification remains challenging due to restricted access, but corroborated accounts from multiple detainees underscore a pattern of .

Proxy Status and Internal Divisions Within Southern Movement

The Southern Transitional Council (STC) receives substantial military, financial, and operational support from the (UAE), leading many analysts to characterize it as a within Yemen's anti-Houthi . Formed in May 2017 with UAE assistance, the STC's forces, including the Security Belt and units, were trained and equipped by Emirati advisors, enabling rapid territorial gains in southern governorates like , Abyan, and Lahij. UAE funding covers salaries for thousands of fighters—estimated at up to 100,000 personnel—and sustains logistics, with reports indicating direct Emirati payments to STC-aligned militias as recently as 2022. This support diverges from Saudi Arabia's preferences, as the UAE prioritizes southern secessionist goals over Riyadh's unity-focused agenda, fostering proxy-like autonomy for the STC at the expense of the Saudi-led coalition's broader objectives. While STC leaders, such as , reject puppet status and emphasize local agency, the council's dependence on UAE resources—absent which its military networks risk collapse—undermines claims of full independence. Saudi Arabia provides limited, conditional aid to the STC, primarily through the () framework established in 2022, but tensions persist due to Riyadh's alignment with non-secessionist southern factions and its rivalry with UAE ambitions. STC integration into the followed UAE-Saudi negotiations, yet the council's actions, such as the August 2019 takeover against Saudi-backed government forces, exposed fractures, with Emirati withdrawals temporarily favoring Saudi influence before STC regrouping under UAE patronage. External backing amplifies proxy perceptions, as UAE strategic interests—securing maritime chokepoints like Bab al-Mandab and countering Iranian influence—align closely with STC expansion, while efforts focus on Hadhramaut's oil fields and anti-al-Qaeda operations, creating a tug-of-war over southern resources. Independent assessments from think tanks note that while the STC pursues genuine southern interests, its viability hinges on Gulf patrons, rendering it functionally proxy-dependent amid Yemen's fragmented war economy. The broader (Hirak), originating in 2007 protests against northern dominance, comprises heterogeneous factions—ranging from tribal alliances and Salafi militias to secular nationalists and ex-South socialists—fostering chronic internal divisions that the STC has both consolidated and exacerbated. Emerging as a unifying force, the STC absorbed many Hirak elements post-2017 but alienated others through authoritarian tactics, such as suppressing rival groups in and imposing centralized control, leading to clashes with entities like the Hadrami Elite Forces and the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (al-Islah), which favor over outright secession. Ideological rifts persist: Salafi-leaning units clash with STC's more nationalist bent, while tribal confederations in Shabwa and resist STC encroachment, viewing it as UAE-imposed rather than organically southern. These divisions manifested in violent confrontations, including the 2019 STC-government clashes in that killed over 400 and displaced thousands, and ongoing skirmishes in as of 2024, where local councils oppose STC self-rule declarations amid Saudi-UAE competition. Proxy influences deepen fractures, with UAE-backed STC forces confronting Saudi-supported al-Islah affiliates, fragmenting southern anti-Houthi efforts and enabling resurgence in unguarded areas. Despite STC claims to represent all southerners, surveys and reports indicate limited buy-in from eastern tribes, who prioritize resource shares over Aden-centric governance, perpetuating a patchwork of loyalties that hampers unified independence pushes.

Recent Developments

Integration into Presidential Leadership Council (2022)

On 7 April 2022, Yemeni President transferred his executive powers to the (PLC), an eight-member body chaired by , during ongoing Saudi-brokered talks in aimed at unifying anti-Houthi factions amid the . The PLC's formation replaced Hadi's individual leadership with a collective executive to address governance fragmentation, with decisions requiring consensus among members. , president of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), was appointed as a vice chairman and one of three STC-affiliated members—alongside figures like Faraj Baoum—granting the STC formal representation and veto influence within Yemen's internationally recognized government. This integration, instigated by and the , sought to prevent the STC's control over southern territories from escalating into full , thereby preserving a against Houthi advances while incorporating southern interests into national decision-making. The was sworn in on 19 2022 in , the STC-controlled provisional capital, signaling tacit acceptance of southern administrative realities without resolving underlying separatist demands. STC participation provided legitimacy and access to international aid channels, but al-Zoubaidi emphasized that it did not abandon the council's goal of restoring southern , framing the move as a pragmatic step to counter Houthi threats and marginalize Islamist rivals like al-Islah. Initial outcomes included coordinated military efforts against in southern fronts, with STC forces leveraging resources for operations in Abyan and Shabwa provinces, though internal frictions over power-sharing persisted from the outset. The arrangement faced skepticism from analysts, who noted its reliance on Gulf patrons' balancing act—Saudi emphasis on versus UAE support for southern —potentially undermining long-term cohesion without addressing the STC's exclusion from northern governance structures. By late 2022, the had facilitated limited humanitarian corridors and salary payments to southern civil servants, crediting STC for stabilizing Aden's relative to Houthi-held areas, though verifiable on these gains remained sparse due to ongoing .

2023-2025: Expansion Efforts, Peace Process Marginalization, and Independence Signals

In May 2023, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) restructured its leadership by establishing the Supreme Executive Leadership under Aidarus al-Zubaydi, aiming to unify disparate UAE-backed southern forces including units and belts. This initiative included signing a National Charter with southern factions, which explicitly demanded to Yemen's pre-1990 borders, marking an institutional push toward autonomous . By January 2024, the STC formalized its legislative framework with the formation of the in , integrating executive and advisory bodies to consolidate administrative control over southern territories. These efforts extended to military regrouping, with August 2024 appointments enhancing oversight and counter-terrorism in STC-held areas, while September 2024 saw the creation of a joint coordination committee with Tareq Saleh's forces to bolster anti-Houthi operations. The STC also sought to expand influence into Hadramawt province, countering Saudi-backed groups like the Nation's Shield through targeted leadership appointments and alliances. In December 2025, following recent offensives codenamed Operation Promising Future, the STC claimed full control over all eight southern governorates. During this offensive, Saudi forces withdrew from Aden and its airport, contributing to the STC's consolidation of control. On 9 December, Brigadier General Tareq Saleh claimed that the STC offensive was carried out in order to "unite the military theater", and to prepare for an eventual offensive against the Houthis in northern Yemen. The offensive was seen as potentially damaging to the Houthis, as the STC and their allies worked to cut off the Houthis from their fuel and overland supply routes, and also part of the UAE's wider campaign to outflank Iran and its Axis of Resistance. Analysts were unsure if the STC would use the offensive to launch a renewed campaign against the Houthis, and they noted that any new operation against the Houthis would require substantial UAE military support. Subsequently, STC President Aidarus al-Zubaydi stated on the STC website that “the next goal must be Sanaa, peacefully or through war, until justice returns to its people and aggression is defeated.” Some analysts saw the STC's offensive as a way to prevent Saudi leaders from offering the Houthis any significant concessions in future peace talks, and to build their leverage over the Yemeni Government as well. Writing for the Guardian, Patrick Wintour noted that immediate secession would likely be difficult for the Southern Transitional Council, citing the mere partial recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic during the Western Sahara conflict. Throughout 2023-2025, the STC expressed frustration over its exclusion from key peace negotiations, particularly Saudi-Houthi talks, arguing that sidelining southern representatives undermined any viable resolution. In late 2023, amid escalating tensions, STC leaders lamented this marginalization, insisting on the inclusion of the "Southern Issue" to address separatist grievances and prevent renewed conflict. By September 2025, al-Zubaydi reiterated at that sustainable peace required southern participation, criticizing power-sharing arrangements within the as insufficient without autonomy guarantees. This stance contributed to ongoing obstructions of the internationally recognized government's institutional efforts, as noted in mid-2025 assessments, reflecting the STC's prioritization of southern over unified national frameworks. Signals of independence intensified in 2025, with al-Zubaydi publicly advocating a two-state solution as the only realistic path, given the improbability of dislodging Houthi control in the north. In September 2025 interviews, he described southern Yemen as "liberated" and prepared for independence, which he argued would isolate the Houthis, clarify international engagement, and enable diplomatic normalization including potential Abraham Accords membership with Israel. These statements, echoed in calls for global recognition of southern sovereignty, faced domestic backlash but aligned with the STC's long-term secessionist charter, positioning independence as a strategic counter to Houthi expansion and a means to secure external alliances. By October 2025, such overtures to Israel were framed by observers as a deliberate bid for legitimacy post-separation, amid stalled national peace processes. On December 7, 2025, hundreds of demonstrators took to the streets of Khor Maksar, Aden Governorate, calling for the secession of South Yemen.

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