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Speculation

Speculation entails engaging in financial transactions with the intent to profit from anticipated short-term price fluctuations in assets such as stocks, commodities, or currencies, rather than from their intrinsic value, dividends, or long-term productive returns.^[1] This practice contrasts with investment, which prioritizes fundamental economic productivity, and hedging, which aims to mitigate risk; speculators instead assume additional risk to capitalize on perceived mispricings or trends.^[2] In market operations, speculation facilitates liquidity by providing counterparties for hedgers and aids price discovery through the aggregation of diverse expectations about future conditions.^[3] Empirical analyses of futures markets indicate that speculative activity often dampens volatility rather than amplifying it, as speculators absorb excess supply or demand shocks that would otherwise distort prices.^[4] However, excessive speculation has been linked to asset bubbles, such as the Dutch Tulip Mania of the 1630s and the South Sea Bubble of 1720, where detached expectations from fundamentals led to sharp corrections.^[5] Critics argue it diverts resources from real economic activity, yet causal evidence remains mixed, with some studies attributing instability more to leverage and herding than speculation per se.^[6]

Definition and Scope

Core Concepts and Distinctions

Speculation entails the purchase or sale of assets, such as securities, commodities, or currencies, with the primary objective of generating profits from anticipated short-term fluctuations in their market prices rather than from intrinsic value or dividends.^[7]^[8] This activity inherently involves assuming substantial risk, as participants wager on directional price movements driven by factors like supply-demand imbalances, economic data releases, or geopolitical events, often without a commitment to holding the asset long-term.^[9] Empirical studies indicate that speculative trading volumes can amplify market volatility, with data from U.S. equity markets showing intraday speculation accounting for up to 20-30% of daily trading activity in high-frequency environments as of 2023.^[10] A core distinction lies between speculation and investment: the former prioritizes exploiting price discrepancies or momentum over brief horizons, frequently employing leverage or derivatives to magnify outcomes, whereas investment allocates capital toward assets anticipated to yield returns through fundamental productivity, such as corporate earnings growth or rental income, typically over years or decades.^[11]^[12] For instance, a speculator might short a stock based on technical chart patterns expecting a rapid decline, while an investor purchases shares in a company with strong balance sheets for sustained appreciation; historical analyses of market returns, including S&P 500 data from 1926 to 2023, reveal that long-term holding strategies outperform short-term speculative timing in aggregate, with annualized returns of approximately 10% versus frequent underperformance in speculative trades.^[13]^[14] Speculation also differs from gambling in its reliance on informational edges and probabilistic assessments rather than pure randomness. Gambling constitutes zero-sum games where outcomes hinge on chance events, such as lottery draws, with house edges ensuring long-term losses for participants; in contrast, speculation can exhibit positive expected value when informed by economic analysis, as evidenced by arbitrage opportunities or predictive models that exploit inefficiencies, though empirical overlaps exist in behavioral patterns like overconfidence leading to losses.^[15]^[2] Unlike hedging, which deploys positions to offset existing exposures—such as a producer locking in commodity prices via futures to mitigate downside—speculation affirmatively embraces unhedged risk to capitalize on volatility, often in directional bets absent underlying operational needs.^[16] These boundaries, while conceptual, blur in practice, as leveraged speculation in options or cryptocurrencies mirrors gambling's risk profile, with 2022 crypto market data showing over 70% of retail participants incurring net losses amid hype-driven trades.^[17]^[18]

Forms of Speculation

Speculation occurs across diverse asset classes and instruments, where participants engage in transactions driven by anticipated price changes rather than intrinsic value or productive use. Primary forms include equity, commodity, currency, derivatives, real estate, and emerging digital assets, each characterized by varying degrees of leverage, liquidity, and volatility. These activities often rely on short-term market predictions, with speculators assuming risks to capitalize on inefficiencies or trends.^[7]^[9] Equity Speculation involves trading shares of publicly listed companies, typically focusing on volatile stocks like penny stocks or growth equities, where prices can fluctuate rapidly due to news, earnings reports, or sentiment shifts. Day traders and swing traders exemplify this form, entering and exiting positions within hours or days to profit from intraday or short-term swings, often using technical analysis or momentum indicators. For instance, speculation in technology stocks surged during the dot-com era, leading to sharp valuations detached from fundamentals. This form enhances market liquidity but can amplify bubbles, as seen in the 2021 meme stock frenzy involving GameStop, where retail speculators drove prices up over 1,500% in weeks before corrections.^[7]^[9]^[19] Commodity Speculation centers on futures contracts for physical goods such as oil, gold, agricultural products, or metals, allowing bets on supply disruptions, geopolitical events, or demand cycles without physical delivery. Speculators provide counter-parties to hedgers, absorbing price risk in exchanges like the CME Group, where positions can be highly leveraged—often 10:1 or more—amplifying gains or losses. Historical examples include the 2008 oil price spike to $147 per barrel, partly fueled by speculative long positions amid perceived shortages, before crashing with demand signals. This form aids price discovery by incorporating global information but has drawn scrutiny for exacerbating volatility, as evidenced by CFTC reports on position limits to curb excessive speculation.^[19]^[7] Currency Speculation, or forex trading, entails buying or selling currency pairs like EUR/USD based on interest rate differentials, economic data releases, or central bank policies, with daily global turnover exceeding $7.5 trillion as of 2022. Leverage ratios up to 500:1 enable outsized positions, making it accessible yet perilous; George Soros's 1992 short of the British pound netted over $1 billion by anticipating devaluation from ERM pressures. Speculators here exploit carry trades—borrowing low-yield currencies to fund high-yield ones—but face risks from sudden interventions, as in the 2015 Swiss franc unpegging that wiped out leveraged accounts.^[20]^[9] Derivatives Speculation encompasses options, futures, and swaps, which derive value from underlying assets and permit directional bets or volatility plays without principal ownership. Options trading, for example, allows premium payments for rights to buy/sell at strike prices, profiting asymmetrically from correct volatility forecasts; the Chicago Board Options Exchange handles billions in notional value daily. This form's leverage—where a 1% asset move can yield 100% option returns—facilitates hedging support but contributed to events like the 1998 LTCM collapse from failed arbitrage models. Regulators monitor it via bodies like the SEC to prevent systemic risks from over-leveraged exposures.^[21]^[19] Real Estate Speculation involves acquiring properties or land anticipating appreciation from urban growth, infrastructure, or flipping, often with mortgage leverage magnifying returns. Unlike financial markets, it ties to tangible assets with illiquidity and holding costs; the U.S. housing boom pre-2008 saw speculators buy multiple homes, inflating prices by 80% in some regions before the subprime crash exposed over-leveraged bets. This form influences local economies by signaling development but can distort supply, as in Vancouver's foreign-driven speculation prompting 2016 taxes on empty homes.^[22] Cryptocurrency Speculation represents a high-volatility extension into digital assets like Bitcoin or altcoins, traded on platforms such as Binance with 24/7 access and minimal regulation. Prices swing wildly—Bitcoin rose from $4,000 to $69,000 between 2019 and 2021 on adoption hype before halving—driven by retail frenzy, whale manipulations, or macroeconomic flights to alternatives. With leverage up to 100:1 on futures exchanges, it mirrors commodity trading but lacks physical backing, leading to events like the 2022 FTX collapse from speculative overexposure. While innovative for decentralized finance, it exhibits casino-like traits, with studies showing 70-80% of trading volume from short-term speculators rather than long-term holders.^[23]^[24]

Historical Development

Early Commodity and Trade Speculation

Early forms of commodity speculation emerged in ancient civilizations through forward contracts, where merchants agreed to buy or sell goods at predetermined prices for future delivery, exposing parties to price risk for potential profit. In ancient Mesopotamia around 1750 BC, the Code of Hammurabi included provisions regulating sales and loans that facilitated such agreements on agricultural produce and livestock, allowing traders to speculate on harvest outcomes or transport costs.^[25] Similarly, Greek and Phoenician merchants in the classical era used forward contracts for shipping olive oil, wine, and grains across the Mediterranean, betting on favorable price differentials between ports or seasonal variations.^[26] These practices, while primarily hedging tools for producers, enabled speculation by intermediaries who anticipated market shifts without physical possession of goods.^[27] In medieval Europe, commodity speculation intensified during international trade fairs, such as the Champagne fairs in France from the 12th to 13th centuries, where merchants negotiated forward contracts for wool, spices, and textiles based on expected future prices. Italian city-states like Venice and Genoa further developed these into standardized contracts traded at emerging bourses, with speculators arbitraging price discrepancies across regions or hoarding goods to influence markets.^[28] For instance, Venetian traders in the 14th century speculated on pepper and silk imports from the East, leveraging bills of exchange to finance positions that profited from delays or shortages.^[25] These activities, though often condemned by the Church as usury-adjacent, provided liquidity to trade routes and reflected causal links between supply disruptions—such as Crusades-induced scarcities—and price volatility exploited by savvy participants.^[29] The 17th-century Dutch Republic marked a pivotal expansion in organized commodity speculation, exemplified by Tulip Mania from 1634 to 1637, when contracts for rare tulip bulbs—traded as futures and options on the Amsterdam exchange—saw prices surge up to 20-fold before collapsing, with single bulbs fetching equivalents of 10 annual skilled wages at peak.^[30] This bubble arose from viral demand for status symbols amid economic prosperity, fueled by notarial contracts allowing leveraged bets without bulb delivery, highlighting how speculation amplified scarcity signals into self-reinforcing price spirals.^[31] Concurrently, the Dutch East India Company (VOC), chartered in 1602, introduced tradable shares tied to spice and commodity voyages, enabling public speculation on long-term trade outcomes, with initial offerings raising 6.4 million guilders from diverse investors anticipating monopoly profits from Asian goods.^[32] These innovations laid groundwork for modern exchanges by institutionalizing price discovery through speculative participation.^[33]

Modern Financial Expansion

The modern phase of financial speculation expanded significantly in the mid-20th century, transitioning from primarily commodity-based activities to sophisticated instruments tied to currencies, interest rates, and equities. This shift was catalyzed by the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, which ended fixed exchange rates and enabled currency speculation through futures contracts.^[34] The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), originally founded in 1898 as the Chicago Butter and Egg Board, launched the world's first financial futures contracts on foreign currencies in 1972, marking a pivotal expansion into non-commodity speculation.^[34]^[35] Concurrent innovations in pricing models further propelled this growth. In 1973, Fischer Black and Myron Scholes published their options pricing formula, which used stochastic calculus to value European call and put options under assumptions of constant volatility and risk-free rates, enabling systematic trading and hedging.^[36] This model underpinned the establishment of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) in 1973, the first dedicated options market, which standardized contracts and attracted speculative volume.^[36] By providing a replicable hedging strategy via dynamic portfolio adjustment, the Black-Scholes framework reduced perceived risks, drawing institutional and retail participants into options speculation.^[37] Deregulatory measures in the 1980s amplified market access and leverage. The U.S. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 phased out interest rate ceilings on deposits, allowing banks to compete more aggressively and fostering speculative lending practices.^[38] In the UK, the "Big Bang" reforms on October 27, 1986, abolished fixed commissions, introduced electronic trading, and ended single-capacity trading rules on the London Stock Exchange, boosting cross-border speculation and globalizing financial flows.^[39] These changes, combined with technological advances like computerized trading systems, led to exponential growth in derivatives markets; by the early 1990s, the notional value of over-the-counter derivatives exceeded $20 trillion, reflecting heightened speculative activity.^[40] This era also saw the proliferation of interest rate and equity index futures, with the CME introducing Eurodollar futures in 1981 to speculate on short-term rates.^[41] Such instruments allowed bets on macroeconomic variables, contributing to market liquidity but also episodes of volatility, as evidenced by the 1987 stock market crash where program trading and portfolio insurance strategies—rooted in derivatives—exacerbated declines.^[42] Overall, these developments transformed speculation from niche commodity trading to a cornerstone of global finance, with annual futures and options volume surpassing billions of contracts by the late 20th century.^[43]

Theoretical Framework

Speculation Versus Investment

Investment operations, as defined by value investing pioneer Benjamin Graham in his 1949 book The Intelligent Investor, require thorough analysis promising safety of principal and adequate returns, whereas operations lacking these elements constitute speculation.^[44] This framework emphasizes fundamental analysis of an asset's intrinsic value—derived from earnings, assets, and cash flows—over short-term market fluctuations, positioning investment as a disciplined pursuit of long-term wealth preservation and growth with controlled risk.^[45] Speculation diverges by prioritizing anticipated price movements, often short-term, without equivalent reliance on underlying fundamentals, resulting in elevated risk levels comparable to gambling.^[46] Speculators typically employ strategies like momentum trading or leverage to amplify potential gains from volatility, accepting the possibility of substantial principal loss in exchange for outsized returns, as evidenced in high-frequency trading or options betting where outcomes hinge more on timing than valuation.^[47] Key differentiators include time horizon, analytical depth, and risk tolerance: investments favor extended holding periods (often years) grounded in discounted cash flow models or balance sheet strength, while speculation targets rapid turnover (days or weeks) via technical indicators or sentiment shifts.^[45] Although no universal regulatory boundary exists—per U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission practices—speculative activities frequently involve derivatives or illiquid assets, heightening systemic exposure absent in diversified, value-oriented portfolios.^[48] Empirical studies, such as those analyzing 20th-century market returns, show investors outperforming speculators on a risk-adjusted basis when adhering to Graham's criteria, underscoring the causal link between rigorous analysis and sustained performance.^[45]

Contributions to Market Mechanisms

In economic theory, speculation contributes to market mechanisms primarily through enhancing price discovery, where prices reflect aggregated information from diverse market participants. Friedrich Hayek emphasized that prices serve as signals conveying dispersed knowledge that no single actor possesses, and speculative trading accelerates the incorporation of this knowledge by rewarding those who anticipate future conditions accurately.^[49]^[50] This process enables markets to coordinate economic activities efficiently without central planning, as speculators exploit discrepancies between current prices and expected fundamentals.^[51] Milton Friedman argued that profitable speculation inherently stabilizes prices by counteracting deviations from equilibrium values, as speculators buy undervalued assets and sell overvalued ones, thereby narrowing spreads between spot and expected future prices.^[52]^[53] This stabilizing effect arises because unprofitable speculation leads to losses, selecting for trades that align prices closer to fundamentals over time.^[54] Traditional speculative theory, as outlined by Holbrook Working in 1960, similarly posits that speculators smooth price fluctuations by storing commodities during surpluses and releasing them during shortages, reducing intertemporal volatility.^[55] Speculation also facilitates risk allocation by allowing hedgers—such as producers and consumers—to transfer price risk to speculators willing to bear it for potential gains, thereby enabling smoother production and consumption decisions.^[56] This mechanism improves overall market efficiency, as speculators' willingness to absorb uncorrelated risks diversifies systemic exposure and supports hedging activities essential for real economic transactions.^[3] Furthermore, speculative arbitrage corrects mispricings across related assets or markets, promoting informational efficiency and reducing opportunities for persistent deviations from rational valuations.^[57]

Economic Benefits

Liquidity Provision and Price Discovery

Speculators enhance market liquidity by serving as counterparties to hedgers and other traders seeking to manage risk, thereby increasing trading volume and market depth. In futures markets, where hedgers aim to lock in prices against adverse movements, speculators absorb the offsetting positions, which would otherwise face limited takers. This activity narrows bid-ask spreads and reduces transaction costs; for instance, analysis of crude oil futures shows that speculative participation provides essential liquidity, enabling hedgers to execute trades efficiently without significant price concessions.^[58] Empirical data from commodity exchanges further demonstrate that periods of elevated speculative trading correlate with higher turnover and lower implied liquidity premiums, as measured by metrics like the Amihud illiquidity ratio.^[59] In addition to liquidity, speculation facilitates price discovery by incorporating forward-looking information into current prices through active trading based on expectations of future conditions. Unlike hedgers focused on risk transfer, speculators analyze supply-demand fundamentals, macroeconomic signals, and other data to form price forecasts, bidding up or selling down assets accordingly. This process accelerates the reflection of new information in market prices; studies on agricultural commodity futures reveal that greater speculative involvement improves the speed and accuracy of price adjustments to shocks, such as weather events or policy changes, outperforming markets with minimal speculation.^[60] For example, in grain markets, speculative flows have been shown to reduce pricing errors relative to cash markets, where discovery relies more on physical transactions.^[3] While some analyses find short-term liquidity consumption during intense speculative episodes, long-term evidence supports net benefits, with speculative activity smoothing price paths and enhancing overall efficiency per theoretical models like those of Milton Friedman, validated in empirical tests on futures data.^[4] These mechanisms collectively promote capital allocation toward productive uses, as prices better signal scarcity or abundance to producers and consumers.^[61]

Risk Allocation and Hedging Support

Speculators facilitate risk allocation by willingly assuming price risks that hedgers—such as commodity producers or consumers—seek to transfer away from their core operations. In futures markets, hedgers establish positions to offset exposures in the underlying asset, effectively locking in prices and mitigating uncertainty, while speculators take the opposing side to profit from anticipated movements. This dynamic enables efficient risk distribution, as speculators often possess superior diversification opportunities or risk tolerance compared to hedgers focused on production or consumption.^[19]^[62] The presence of speculators enhances hedging support by providing necessary liquidity and counterparties, without which hedgers might face wider bid-ask spreads or incomplete risk offsets. For instance, in agricultural commodities like wheat or soybeans, producers hedge short positions against future price declines, relying on speculators to absorb the long-side risk; empirical analysis of Commitment of Traders reports shows that increased speculative net long positions correlate with improved market depth, allowing hedgers to execute larger volumes at lower costs. This risk transfer aligns with theories positing that speculators earn a premium for bearing systematic risks, as articulated in Keynes' concept of normal backwardation, where futures prices average below expected spot prices to compensate speculators.^[63]^[64] Studies of commodity futures, including oil, copper, and grains, provide evidence that speculative participation reduces overall price volatility, thereby strengthening hedging efficacy rather than undermining it. For example, data from pre- and post-financialization periods indicate that speculators' diversification across assets dampens localized shocks, enabling hedgers to achieve more stable outcomes; one analysis of five commodity markets validated dynamic interactions where speculative flows support spot-futures convergence, benefiting hedgers' utility gains. Without speculators, hedging demands could go unmet, forcing hedgers into costlier alternatives like physical storage or forward contracts with limited scalability.^[65]^[66]^[67]

Information Generation and Mispricing Correction

Speculators contribute to information generation by allocating resources to research and analyze dispersed data on asset fundamentals, such as earnings prospects and economic indicators, then trading on these insights to realize profits. This process incentivizes the production and incorporation of private or superior interpretations of public information into market prices, as uninformed trading alone cannot sustain such efforts without the prospect of gain from informed speculation.^[68] In financial markets, short sellers exemplify this mechanism by identifying overvaluations or fraud, thereby disseminating corrective signals through downward price pressure. For example, short positions taken by investors like Jim Chanos in 2001 highlighted Enron's accounting irregularities ahead of its collapse, accelerating the reflection of adverse information in stock prices. Similarly, efforts by Bill Ackman against monoline insurers in the mid-2000s uncovered risks tied to subprime exposure, aiding broader market awareness.^[68] Empirical evidence supports that short selling enhances pricing efficiency by mitigating overpricing persistence. Boehmer and Wu (2010) analyzed U.S. equities from 1988 to 2005 and found that higher short interest correlates with reduced post-earnings announcement drift—a proxy for slow information incorporation—indicating speculators accelerate the adjustment of prices to new data.^[69] Restrictions on short selling, conversely, amplify mispricings; Jones and Lamont (2002) examined U.S. stocks from 1926 to 1933 and documented that constraints lead to significant overpricing relative to fundamentals, with affected stocks underperforming by up to 19% annually post-relaxation.^[70] Arbitrage-oriented speculation further corrects deviations by exploiting temporary discrepancies, such as between spot and futures prices or across correlated assets, forcing convergence toward intrinsic values informed by fundamentals. Theoretical models and event studies of regulatory bans, like those in 2008, confirm that limiting such activity increases volatility and delays correction, as prices detach further from efficient levels without countervailing trades.^[71] Overall, these dynamics underscore speculation's role in aggregating and validating information, though effectiveness depends on low barriers to entry and sufficient arbitrage capital.^[68]

Potential Drawbacks and Criticisms

Volatility Amplification Claims

Critics of speculation, including some post-Keynesian economists, argue that increased speculative activity in financialized markets leads to heightened price volatility by distorting fundamental values through herd behavior, excessive leverage, and feedback loops between derivatives trading and spot prices.^[72] For instance, during periods of financialization, speculative positions in commodities are claimed to amplify swings beyond supply-demand fundamentals, as seen in alleged contributions to oil price spikes around 2008, where futures trading volume surged alongside volatility.^[73] Such views often attribute volatility amplification to speculators' short-term focus, which purportedly exacerbates mispricings and rapid reversals, particularly in leveraged instruments like futures contracts.^[74] Empirical evidence, however, provides limited support for these amplification claims across major asset classes. A comprehensive review of studies on commodity futures finds mixed results, with no consistent demonstration that speculation raises prices or volatility; instead, many analyses indicate speculators respond to rather than cause volatility, entering markets during turbulent periods to provide liquidity.^[75] In grain futures markets during the interwar period at the Chicago Board of Trade, increased speculator participation correlated with existing volatility but did not statistically elevate it, suggesting attraction to high-volatility environments rather than causation.^[76] Similarly, a U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission analysis of futures markets concluded that speculative trading is not destabilizing and often reduces overall volatility by absorbing risks from hedgers.^[4] In energy markets, investigations into oil price dynamics amid geopolitical risks reveal only weak links between speculative net positions and volatility transmission, with fundamentals like supply disruptions dominating price movements.^[77] Exceptions appear in niche cases, such as day-trading speculators in expiring futures contracts, where unpredictable trades can temporarily heighten intraday volatility due to thin liquidity.^[78] Broader peer-reviewed assessments, including meta-analyses, underscore that while speculation may contribute to short-term fluctuations in illiquid segments, it does not systematically amplify long-term volatility in well-functioning markets, countering narratives from sources prone to anti-financial bias.^[6] These findings align with causal analyses showing speculators' role in dampening rather than exacerbating deviations from efficient pricing.

Behavioral Errors and Overconfidence

Speculators often exhibit cognitive biases that deviate from rational decision-making, leading to systematic errors in assessing risks and opportunities. These behavioral errors, rooted in psychological tendencies rather than informational asymmetries, include overconfidence, where individuals overestimate their predictive abilities and underestimate uncertainty in asset price movements. Empirical studies demonstrate that such biases are particularly pronounced in speculative trading, where high-stakes, short-term bets amplify the tendency to ignore probabilistic outcomes.^[79] Overconfidence manifests in financial markets through inflated self-attribution of success, where traders credit personal skill for gains while attributing losses to external factors, fostering excessive risk-taking in speculative positions. This bias correlates with higher trading frequency, as overconfident individuals perceive private information as superior, prompting more trades than warranted by available evidence. For instance, analysis of brokerage data from the 1990s revealed that individual investors who traded most actively underperformed benchmarks by approximately 6.5% annually, net of fees, attributable in part to overconfidence-driven disposition effects and overtrading.^[80] Market-wide, overconfidence contributes to elevated trading volumes that exceed levels explainable by liquidity needs or information flow. Research on emerging markets, such as Turkey from 2002 to 2007, found that periods of rising stock returns heightened investor overconfidence, resulting in trading volumes up to 20% above baseline predictions, independent of fundamentals. Similarly, cross-sectional studies link overconfidence proxies—like analyst forecast dispersion—to increased market turnover, with overconfident cohorts exhibiting 15-30% higher activity than calibrated peers.^[81]^[82] Gender differences further underscore overconfidence's role, with male traders displaying greater bias and trading 45% more frequently than females, yielding net returns 1.4% lower per year after costs, as evidenced in large-scale U.S. discount brokerage datasets spanning 1991-1996. In speculative contexts like cryptocurrencies or options, this error exacerbates volatility, as overconfident participants chase momentum without adequate diversification, leading to amplified drawdowns during corrections. While some argue overconfidence aids entrepreneurial risk-taking, empirical returns data consistently show net welfare losses for retail speculators, with transaction costs alone eroding 1-2% of annual performance for frequent traders.^[83]^[84] Critics of behavioral explanations, including those from efficient market proponents, contend that apparent overconfidence may reflect unobservable skill heterogeneity rather than error, yet longitudinal tracking of trader performance reveals persistence in underperformance, undermining such rationalizations. Interventions like mandatory cooling-off periods or bias-awareness training have shown modest reductions in overtrading in experimental settings, suggesting malleability but limited scalability in high-speculation environments. Overall, these errors highlight speculation's vulnerability to human psychology, where overconfidence not only impairs individual outcomes but also contributes to aggregate market inefficiencies.^[85]^[79]

Associations with Bubbles and Systemic Risks

Speculation is frequently implicated in the formation of asset price bubbles, defined as episodes where prices deviate substantially from intrinsic values due to heightened trading activity and expectations of continued appreciation. Studies employing statistical tests, such as the supremum augmented Dickey-Fuller procedure, have identified bubble-like patterns in equity markets, with evidence of periodically collapsing bubbles in approximately 74% of examined stocks over specific periods. However, these detections do not conclusively establish speculation as the causal driver, as bubbles may arise from coordinated optimism among investors rather than speculative trading alone.^[86] Theoretical frameworks highlight how rational speculators can inadvertently amplify bubbles under certain conditions. In models incorporating noise traders—irrational participants who trade on sentiment—rational arbitrageurs may face limits to short-selling or risk aversion, allowing deviations from fundamentals to persist or overshoot. For example, introducing rational speculators into equilibrium models can destabilize prices, causing them to exceed fundamental values temporarily before correction. This dynamic underscores a key association: while speculation aims to exploit mispricings, it can prolong bubbles if arbitrage capital is constrained, as seen in simulations where speculator entry exacerbates volatility rather than immediately resolving it.^[87] Critics of the speculation-bubble link argue that such associations often conflate correlation with causation, attributing bubbles primarily to exogenous factors like expansive monetary policy or low interest rates that fuel credit expansion, rather than endogenous speculative flows. Empirical challenges persist, as standard bubble tests struggle to distinguish speculative fervor from rational responses to uncertain fundamentals, with existing theories failing to fully explain observed price patterns like gradual run-ups followed by crashes. In commodity markets, for instance, investigations into 2006-2008 price surges found mixed evidence; while speculative positions correlated with peaks, econometric analyses indicated that supply-demand imbalances and geopolitical factors were more proximate causes, undermining claims of speculation as the dominant bubble trigger.^[88]^[89] Beyond bubbles, speculation is linked to systemic risks through mechanisms like leverage and interconnectedness, where concentrated speculative bets amplify market-wide shocks during deleveraging. Leveraged speculation, often hedged by institutions, can create fragile balance sheets vulnerable to correlated losses, as positions unwind en masse under stress, propagating distress across counterparties. This was evident in analyses of financial innovation, where speculative demand for new assets increases tail risks without proportionally enhancing risk-sharing efficiency. Nonetheless, empirical measures of systemic risk, such as those based on marginal expected shortfall, show that speculative activity contributes to but does not uniquely originate interconnected vulnerabilities, which more fundamentally stem from undercapitalization and procyclical lending.^[90]^[91]^[92] Speculators can mitigate systemic risks by facilitating risk transfer and providing liquidity during stress, though this role reverses in herd-driven panics. Evidence from art markets, where speculative trading correlates with volume spikes and short-term flips during high-price episodes, suggests speculators both inflate and eventually deflate bubbles, acting as catalysts for correction once overvaluation becomes unsustainable. Overall, while associations exist, rigorous evidence favors viewing speculation as an amplifier of underlying disequilibria rather than their root cause, with policy responses targeting leverage limits proving more effective than curbing speculation outright.^[93]

Empirical Assessments

Evidence of Efficiency Improvements

Empirical studies in commodity futures markets demonstrate that speculative trading enhances informational efficiency by improving price discovery and reducing noise in pricing. In analyses of agricultural commodities such as corn, soybeans, live cattle, and feeder cattle, measures of speculative activity, including total speculation and excessive speculation via Working's T-index, were found to increase the information leadership shares of futures markets relative to spot markets.^[94] This effect persists across varying levels of market liquidity, with futures markets typically dominating price discovery (information leadership shares exceeding 50%), particularly in less liquid segments where speculators incorporate new information more rapidly than hedgers, who tend to diminish this function by prioritizing price locks.^[94] Similar patterns emerge in energy markets, where hedge funds acting as speculators contribute positively to price formation. Using daily data from August 2003 to August 2004 in crude oil and natural gas futures, researchers applied directed graph analysis to return processes derived from CFTC Large Trader Reporting System data, revealing that hedge fund trading enhances the price discovery role of futures markets by integrating disparate information flows effectively.^[95] This aligns with broader findings that speculative positions, often held by non-commercial traders, lead to faster convergence between futures and underlying prices, thereby correcting deviations from fundamental values.^[95] In equity markets, evidence indicates that speculation, including trades motivated by perceived gambling opportunities, supports efficiency by challenging mispricings and aiding information aggregation. A 2025 study analyzing U.S. stock trading data found that such speculative investors improve market efficiency, countering prior assumptions of purely destabilizing effects and suggesting their role in refining price signals through active participation.^[96] Additionally, speculative activity has been linked to increased liquidity, which empirically correlates with better informational efficiency across asset classes, as higher trading volumes from speculators narrow bid-ask spreads and facilitate quicker price adjustments to news.^[68] These results, drawn from trader classification and high-frequency data, underscore speculation's capacity to amplify market responsiveness without necessitating long-term holding.^[68]

Case Studies from Market Events

The Hunt brothers' attempt to corner the silver market in the late 1970s exemplifies destabilizing speculation through concentrated positions. Nelson Bunker Hunt and William Herbert Hunt, along with associates, accumulated over 200 million ounces of silver by early 1980 via futures contracts and physical holdings, driving prices from approximately $6 per ounce in 1979 to a peak of $49.45 per ounce on January 18, 1980.^[97] This surge reflected not underlying supply-demand fundamentals but leveraged bets on continued appreciation, culminating in "Silver Thursday" on March 27, 1980, when exchanges raised margin requirements and imposed liquidation rules, causing prices to plummet over 50% in days and inflicting $1.7 billion in losses on the Hunts.^[98] Empirical analysis of the event underscores how unchecked speculative hoarding can distort prices temporarily, but regulatory responses—including CFTC position limits implemented in 1981—prevented recurrence, with subsequent studies indicating such corners are outliers in liquid markets where arbitrageurs eventually counteract distortions.^[97] In contrast, the 1987 Black Monday crash highlights speculation's role in amplifying volatility via mechanical strategies, yet also its contribution to rapid recovery. On October 19, 1987, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 22.6%—the largest single-day percentage drop in history—triggered by overvaluation (P/E ratios exceeding 20), trade deficits, and computerized program trading tied to portfolio insurance, where speculators dynamically hedged by selling futures, exacerbating downward spirals as $10-15 billion in automated sell orders executed.^[99] Empirical investigations, including Brady Commission findings, attributed 30-40% of the decline to these speculative feedback loops rather than fundamental shifts, as no major recession ensued and markets rebounded 15% within two days due to bargain-hunting speculators providing liquidity.^[100] Post-event reforms like circuit breakers reduced future tail risks, with econometric models showing that speculative depth in futures markets mitigated broader contagion compared to less liquid eras.^[99] The 1998 collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) illustrates systemic risks from highly leveraged speculative arbitrage. The fund, employing Nobel-winning models for convergence trades across bonds and derivatives, amassed $100 billion in positions with 25:1 leverage by mid-1998; Russia's August default triggered divergences, yielding $4.6 billion in losses and eroding capital to 3% of assets.^[101] Empirical evidence from the episode reveals model failures under extreme covariance breakdowns—spreads widened 10-fold beyond historical norms—prompting a Federal Reserve-coordinated $3.65 billion bailout by 14 banks to avert fire sales destabilizing global credit markets.^[102] While LTCM's strategies aimed at mispricing correction, excessive leverage amplified shocks, but resolution studies confirm minimal long-term spillovers, as speculator unwindings were contained, reinforcing arguments for private risk-bearing over bailouts.^[103] The 2021 GameStop short squeeze demonstrates retail speculation's capacity to correct perceived over-shorting while generating frenzy-driven volatility. Coordinated via Reddit's r/WallStreetBets, retail traders bought shares and calls, propelling GameStop's price from $17.25 on January 4 to $483 intraday on January 28—a 2,700% rise—forcing short sellers like Melvin Capital to cover $6.65 billion in losses amid 140% short interest.^[104] Brokerage halts on platforms like Robinhood, citing clearinghouse collateral strains, fueled claims of intervention, but empirical brokerage data reveal participants as young, inexperienced speculators chasing momentum rather than fundamentals, with trading volumes spiking 20-fold.^[104] Analyses indicate the event exposed hedging inefficiencies—short rebate rates had signaled over-pessimism—but also transient mispricings, as shares reverted 90% by mid-year, underscoring speculation's dual role in liquidity provision and behavioral excess without systemic collapse.^[105]

Insights from Contemporary Markets

Prediction markets, where participants speculate on event outcomes with real financial stakes, have demonstrated superior forecasting accuracy compared to traditional polls in recent elections. For the 2024 U.S. presidential election, platforms like Polymarket provided probabilities that closely aligned with final results, outperforming polling aggregates which underestimated the winner's margin.^[106] ^[107] This edge arises from speculators' incentives to incorporate dispersed information efficiently, as trading volumes on these platforms exceeded prior records by October 2025.^[108] In cryptocurrency markets, speculative activity on derivatives and unregulated exchanges drives the majority of price discovery for assets like Bitcoin. Analysis of trading data shows that futures contracts and offshore platforms contribute over 70% of information incorporation into spot prices, enabling rapid adjustments to new data despite high volatility.^[109] ^[110] When markets segment, such as during regulatory crackdowns, speculative venues maintain liquidity and prevent larger deviations from fundamentals.^[111] Retail speculation in meme stocks, exemplified by the January 2021 GameStop short squeeze, highlights speculators' capacity to exploit and correct institutional imbalances. Coordinated buying by retail traders, facilitated by online forums, forced hedge funds with heavy short positions to cover, resulting in a 1,500% stock price surge over two weeks and exposing over-leveraged bets.^[104] While this event amplified short-term volatility, subsequent studies indicate that informed retail participation can enhance overall market quality by challenging persistent mispricings.^[112] Empirical research across these venues confirms that speculative trading volumes predict underlying fundamentals, fostering efficiency in contemporary markets characterized by high-frequency data and global participation.^[113] However, periods of excessive speculation, as in crypto derivatives dominance, can lead to temporary price disconnects from real economic signals, underscoring the need for balanced liquidity provision.^[114]

Regulation and Policy Debates

Evolution of Regulatory Measures

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, U.S. regulatory efforts against speculation primarily occurred at the state level, targeting practices deemed akin to gambling, such as bucket shops that enabled off-exchange speculation without actual delivery of commodities. These entities proliferated in the 1880s and 1890s, prompting bans in states like New York by 1900 and federal scrutiny through anti-gambling statutes, though enforcement was inconsistent due to jurisdictional limits.^[115] State "blue sky" securities laws, beginning with Kansas in 1911, required licensing and disclosure for securities sales to combat speculative fraud, influencing over 40 states by the 1920s but failing to prevent the speculative bubble preceding the 1929 crash.^[116] The 1929 stock market crash, attributed in part to rampant margin speculation and manipulation, catalyzed comprehensive federal regulation. The Securities Act of 1933 mandated registration and prospectus disclosure for new securities to reduce speculative hype by ensuring investors received material information.^[117] Complementing this, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to supervise exchanges, enforce anti-fraud rules under Section 10(b), and curb manipulative speculation through measures like prohibiting wash sales, matched orders, and excessive short-selling via the uptick rule implemented in 1938.^[118]^[119] In parallel, the Grain Futures Act of 1922 regulated grain exchanges by requiring board approval and prohibiting manipulation, evolving into the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, which extended oversight to additional commodities, imposed federal position limits on speculators, and banned futures trading in onions by 1958 to address specific speculative abuses.^[120] Mid-century developments unified and expanded commodity regulation amid growing futures speculation. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 established the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) as an independent agency, granting it exclusive jurisdiction over futures trading, anti-fraud authority, and tools like position limits to mitigate excessive speculation's impact on prices.^[121] This addressed prior fragmentation, where over 200 congressional bills from the 1880s to 1920s had sought to ban or tax futures without success, reflecting a shift from outright prohibition to structured oversight.^[115] Deregulatory trends emerged in the 1980s under the Reagan administration, including the 1982 Futures Trading Act legalizing options on futures and easing some restrictions, though core anti-speculation measures like margin requirements persisted.^[120] The late 20th century saw deregulation accelerate with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 repealing Glass-Steagall separations, enabling banks to engage in investment activities including speculation, and the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 exempting over-the-counter derivatives from CFTC/SEC regulation, fostering unchecked speculative growth in swaps and credit default obligations.^[122] The 2008 financial crisis, linked to speculative excesses in housing derivatives, prompted re-regulation via the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, which mandated central clearing and reporting for derivatives to enhance transparency and limit systemic speculation risks, while the Volcker Rule restricted banks' proprietary trading to curb federally insured speculation.^[123] Post-Dodd-Frank adjustments, including 2018 rollbacks under the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, raised thresholds for enhanced oversight, reflecting ongoing tensions between curbing speculation and preserving market liquidity.^[124] Recent measures, such as temporary short-selling bans during 2020 market volatility and CFTC proposals for stricter position limits in energy commodities as of 2021, underscore persistent efforts to balance speculation's role in price discovery against risks of amplification.^[125]

Impacts and Critiques of Interventions

Regulatory interventions designed to mitigate excessive speculation, such as financial transaction taxes (FTTs), short-selling bans, position limits in futures markets, and circuit breakers, have been implemented across various jurisdictions with the aim of reducing volatility and stabilizing prices. Empirical analyses of FTTs, including the 2012 French implementation, indicate reductions in trading volumes but ambiguous effects on volatility, with some studies finding no decrease or even slight increases due to widened bid-ask spreads and slower price discovery.^[126]^[127] Similarly, position limits in commodity futures, intended to curb speculative accumulation, show no consistent dampening of volatility and often reduce market liquidity, potentially harming hedgers by limiting risk transfer mechanisms.^[128] These measures frequently lead to market distortions, such as shifts in trading activity to untaxed venues or reduced participation by informed traders, undermining overall efficiency.^[129] Short-selling bans, enacted during crises like the 2008 financial turmoil and the 2020 COVID-19 market crash, exemplify interventions that fail to achieve their stabilizing objectives. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's 2008 temporary ban on short sales of financial stocks did not halt price declines—in fact, affected stocks fell markedly during the ban period—and impaired liquidity and price efficiency without evidence of volatility reduction.^[130]^[131] European bans in 2020 similarly decreased trading volumes and liquidity while showing no protective effect against downturns, with critiques highlighting how such restrictions hinder informed selling, exacerbate information asymmetries, and prolong mispricing.^[132]^[133] Multiple studies across these events conclude that short-selling bans impose net costs on market participants by distorting supply-demand dynamics essential for accurate pricing.^[134] Circuit breakers, which halt trading upon extreme price movements to curb panic-driven speculation, also face substantial critiques for unintended consequences. China's 2016 market-wide circuit breakers accelerated price limit hits and induced "magnet effects" where trading intensified toward thresholds, amplifying volatility rather than mitigating it.^[135] U.S. implementations, while credited with brief pauses during severe declines, have been shown in simulations and empirical reviews to depress overall stock levels and alter price dynamics unfavorably if thresholds are too sensitive, potentially encouraging herding behavior among speculators.^[136]^[137] Critics argue these mechanisms interfere with natural market clearing, delaying resolution of imbalances and fostering uncertainty, as evidenced by post-1987 crash reforms that improved design but did not eliminate volatility spillovers.^[138] Broader critiques of these interventions emphasize their frequent failure to address root causes of speculative excesses, such as leverage or information failures, while imposing collateral damage on legitimate hedging and arbitrage activities that enhance market depth. Peer-reviewed evidence consistently points to reduced informational efficiency and higher transaction costs as common outcomes, with interventions like FTTs generating revenue at the expense of long-term capital allocation.^[139]^[140] Proponents' claims of reduced speculation often rely on volume drops as proxies, but causal analyses reveal these stem more from behavioral shifts than diminished excess, underscoring the challenges of targeted regulation in complex, adaptive financial systems.^[141]^[142]

Arguments for Minimalist Approaches

Speculation facilitates efficient price discovery by incentivizing traders to act on new information, thereby aligning asset prices more closely with underlying fundamentals without the need for heavy regulatory oversight. Economists in the Austrian tradition, such as Ludwig von Mises, argue that speculators serve as risk bearers, absorbing uncertainties that hedgers seek to offload, which improves market liquidity and resource allocation.^[143] This process enhances economic welfare by enabling producers and consumers to manage risks at lower costs, as speculative activity bridges gaps between divergent expectations and actual supply-demand dynamics.^[9] Empirical analyses of commodity futures markets reveal that speculative positions correlate with reduced price volatility, contradicting claims that such trading inherently destabilizes markets. A study by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission examined trading data and found that increases in speculative activity were associated with lower volatility, suggesting that speculators stabilize prices through arbitrage rather than exacerbate swings.^[4] Similarly, theoretical models demonstrate how speculation contributes to hedging feasibility and informational efficiency, with evidence from agricultural markets showing speculators enabling farmers to lock in prices amid uncertainty.^[3] Proponents of minimalism contend that regulatory restrictions, such as position limits or transaction taxes, distort these mechanisms by deterring participation and raising barriers to entry, ultimately harming liquidity and innovation. For example, limits on speculative trading can suppress contrarian views essential for correcting overvaluations, as noted by finance scholars who warn that such interventions foster complacency among investors and amplify systemic errors during downturns.^[144] Historical episodes, including deregulated periods in derivatives markets, indicate no clear link between reduced oversight and increased instability, with post-regulation compliance costs often exceeding measurable risk reductions.^[145] Critics of expansive rules highlight that markets self-correct through profit-loss incentives, rendering broad prohibitions inefficient and prone to capture by incumbents who benefit from barriers to speculative competition.^[146]

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Discover how the Hunt brothers attempted to corner the silver market, leading to massive financial fallout and changing commodity trading forever.Creating a Short Squeeze in... · The Aftermath: Legal and...
[98]
Revisiting the Silver Crisis - ScienceDirect.com
This paper examines the Silver Crisis of the late 1970s, which resulted in a $150 million lawsuit against the Hunt Brothers.
[99]
Stock Market Crash of 1987 | Federal Reserve History
Stock markets raced upward during the first half of 1987. By late August, the DJIA had gained 44 percent in a matter of seven months, stoking concerns of an ...
[100]
[PDF] A Brief History of the 1987 Stock Market Crash with a Discussion of ...
Apr 20, 2007 · This paper reviews the events surrounding the crash and discusses the response of the Federal Reserve, which responded in a number of ways to ...
[101]
Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term Capital Management
When LTCM's speculations went sour in the summer of 1998, the impending liquidation of LTCM's portfolio threatened to destabilize financial markets throughout ...Missing: empirical | Show results with:empirical
[102]
Near Failure of Long-Term Capital Management
In September 1998, a group of 14 banks and brokerage firms invested $3.6 billion in LTCM to prevent the hedge fund's imminent collapse.Missing: empirical | Show results with:empirical
[103]
[PDF] Evidence from the Rescue of Long-Term Capital Management
This paper has provided two key empirical results regarding the events surrounding the resolution of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management. First, ...Missing: speculation | Show results with:speculation
[104]
Who participated in the GameStop frenzy? Evidence from brokerage ...
Overall, our results indicate that the GameStop frenzy was not a pure digital protest against Wall Street but speculative trading by a group of retail ...
[105]
The GameStop Episode: What Happened and What Does It Mean?
The GameStop episode goes to the heart of many regulatory issues in finance. It provoked a flurry of reactions from politicians and regulators.GameStop and Robinhood in... · Public Policy and Regulatory...
[106]
Are Betting Markets Better than Polling in Predicting Political ... - arXiv
Jul 11, 2025 · Overall, findings suggest that Polymarket was superior to polling in predicting the outcome of the 2024 presidential election, particularly in ...
[107]
Election results show potential of prediction markets, blockchain
Dec 6, 2024 · A prediction market was more accurate in forecasting the 2024 presidential election than traditional polls and pundits.
[108]
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-21/prediction-markets-boom-anew-as-volumes-surpass-2024-election
[109]
Price discovery in Bitcoin: The impact of unregulated markets
Derivatives products traded on three large unregulated crypto exchanges strongly dominate price discovery within the bitcoin market. •. The information ...
[110]
Price Discovery in Cryptocurrency Markets
When markets are more integrated, shocks to prices on all exchanges contribute to price discovery. However, when markets become segmented, those exchanges that ...
[111]
[PDF] Price Discovery in Crypto Currency Markets - LSE
In this paper we study how price discovery happens in the Bitcoin market. We build on our earlier paper, Makarov and Schoar (2018), which documents that crypto ...
[112]
[PDF] MEME INVESTORS AND RETAIL RISK - Boston College Law Review
lieve meme stocks will continue to impact markets. Thomas Hum, Most Traders ... the beneficial effects of experienced retail investors on stock market quality).
[113]
Role of Speculative Trade in Market Efficiency - Oxford Academic
We find that the volume of trade is predictive of fundamentals, suggesting that speculative trade is on average conducive to market efficiency.Missing: contemporary | Show results with:contemporary
[114]
Speculation and Valuing Innovation | Richmond Fed
We show empirically that speculation on financial markets creates a disconnect between the responses of stock prices and real outcomes to an innovation, as was ...
[115]
US Futures Trading and Regulation Before the Creation of the CFTC
December 22, 1938 – The Commodity Exchange Commission promulgates the first Federal speculative position limits for futures contracts in grains (then defined as ...
[116]
The SEC: A Brief History of Regulation - Investopedia
These state laws were meant to protect investors from worthless securities issued by unscrupulous companies and pumped by promoters.
[117]
DFI A Brief History of Securities Regulation
The first major federal legislation enacted in reaction to the stock market crash was the Securities Act of 1933 (33 Act). The 33 Act, administered by the newly ...
[118]
securities law history | Wex | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
The 1929 stock market crash led to the 1933 Securities Act and 1934 Exchange Act, creating the SEC, and emphasizing disclosure. State laws pre-existed.
[119]
Timeline - 1930s - SEC Historical Society
The Securities Act of 1933, enacted on May 27, was the first general federal law to regulate the issuance of securities. The Act required certain issuers of ...
[120]
A History of Futures Trading in the United States – EH.net
The Futures Trading Act of 1982 amended the Commodity Futures Trading Act of 1974. The 1982 act legalized options trading on agricultural commodities and ...
[121]
The Commission | CFTC
When the CFTC was created in 1974 with the enactment of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, most futures trading took place in the agricultural sector ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[122]
[PDF] A Brief History of the U.S. Regulatory Perimeter
Aug 2, 2021 · This perimeter—a changing mix of positive grants and negative restrictions—runs through the history of American financial regulation. It elides ...
[123]
(PDF) The evolution of financial regulation before and after the crisis
Aug 7, 2025 · PDF | On Jan 22, 2014, Carlo Panico and others published The evolution of financial regulation before and after the crisis | Find, read and ...
[124]
A Brief History of Financial Regulation in the USA - SideDrawer
Apr 10, 2025 · Discover the evolution of US financial regulation—from early debates to Dodd-Frank reforms and upcoming FINCEN rules—a concise regulatory ...
[125]
Market Manipulation Under US Federal Law - Rahman Ravelli
Feb 7, 2021 · The key market manipulation regulations are in the 1933 Securities Act, 1934 Exchange Act, 1936 Commodity Exchange Act, and Title 18 of the US Code.Structure Of U.S. Federal... · Whats Is The 1934 Exchange... · F. Extraterritorial...
[126]
[PDF] The Impact of Financial Transaction Taxes on Stock Markets
Abstract: We focus on the impact of the French 2012 financial transaction tax (FTT) on trading volumes and volatility. We extend the empirical research by ...
[127]
[PDF] Financial TransacTion Taxes in Theory and PracTice | Urban Institute
The evidence on volatility is similarly ambiguous: empirical studies have found both reductions and increases in volatility as a result of the tax.<|separator|>
[128]
Do Position Limits on Futures Trading Benefit Commodity Markets?
Dec 2, 2022 · Position limits do not dampen volatility, can hurt hedgers, and reduce liquidity in futures markets, which spills over to the spot market.
[129]
[PDF] Studies Highlighting the Damaging Impacts of a Financial ...
Studies show transaction taxes cause declines in trading volume, increased costs, market shifts, increased bid-ask spreads, and slow price discovery.
[130]
Market Declines: What Is Accomplished by Banning Short-Selling?
The 2008 ban on short sales failed to slow the decline in the price of financial stocks; in fact, prices fell markedly over the two weeks in which the ban was ...<|separator|>
[131]
Short Selling Bans are a Mistake - Brookings Institution
These bans are mistakes, as shown by the US experience in 2008; they do not prevent declines in financial stocks, but do impose significant costs on capital ...
[132]
[PDF] Market impacts of the 2020 short selling bans
Jan 11, 2024 · For shares subject to the. 2020 short selling bans, market liquidity, trading volumes and volatility decreased; moreover, short selling bans did ...
[133]
Market impacts of the 2020 short selling bans - Wiley Online Library
Oct 24, 2023 · Our estimation finds that the bans are associated with a deterioration in liquidity and trading volumes, and a decrease in volatility, without evidence of ...Abstract · LITERATURE REVIEW · EFFECTS OF THE BANS ON... · CONCLUSION
[134]
[PDF] The Effectiveness of Short-Selling Bans (GCS) - State Street
In addition to the weight of empirical evidence suggesting that short-selling bans have limited impact on stemming price declines, existing studies also suggest ...
[135]
The impacts of circuit breakers on China's stock market - ScienceDirect
In the presence of circuit breakers, investors' behavior will accelerate the arrival of price limits. We also document significant downward magnet effects for ...
[136]
The dark side of stock market circuit breakers | MIT Sloan
Feb 16, 2023 · Circuit breakers are meant to restore stability. But new research shows that they can amplify volatility and depress stock prices if not properly designed.
[137]
The Dark Side of Circuit Breakers
Apr 5, 2023 · We show that a circuit breaker tends to lower the overall level of the stock price and significantly alters its dynamics.
[138]
[PDF] Effects of the short sale circuit breaker on the stock market
The circuit breaker fails to reduce intraday volatility and intraday price declines, especially for the most volatile stocks in the market. This is not a small- ...<|separator|>
[139]
Financial transaction taxes and the informational efficiency of ...
We estimate the impact of the FTT on trading volume, volatility, bid ask-spread, and market composition (i.e., we address the debate on whether the tax affects ...
[140]
[PDF] The Impact of Transaction Tax on Stock Markets: Evidence from an ...
The theory that the increased transaction tax would reduce market volatility is not supported by our empirical evidence. On the tax revenue, I conclude that ...
[141]
Financial Transaction Taxes: FAQs - Investment Company Institute
There is no evidence that imposing a transaction tax reduces stock price volatility (see Question 15). An FTT could discourage trading, particularly short-term ...
[142]
The Empirical Case for a Financial Transaction Tax
Jul 14, 2021 · A financial transaction tax would help reduce financial speculation, while its revenue could be used to promote investment and growth.
[143]
Speculation - Mises Institute
Investment purchases were made outright as opposed to on margin, which was considered speculative. Investments were held for the long-term; speculations were ...
[144]
Should Financial Speculators Be Stopped?
Jan 26, 2015 · One Stanford expert, however, says that such restrictions would create more harm than good. They would limit healthy contrarian skepticism among investors.Missing: minimal | Show results with:minimal
[145]
Regulation Without Reason | American Enterprise Institute - AEI
Jan 28, 2009 · The argument that the failure of unregulated financial institutions was the result of their lack of regulation is clearly unsustainable; it ...<|separator|>
[146]
Arguments For and Against Financial Regulations Essay Example
Rating 4.8 (327) Without financial regulations, there would be problems associated with consumer exploitation, market inefficiencies, and financial instability in various ...