Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Stepan Bandera

Stepan Andriyovych Bandera (1 January 1909 – 15 October 1959) was a nationalist leader and head of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists' revolutionary faction (OUN-B), dedicated to achieving independence through militant resistance against , Soviet, and German domination. Born in in under Austro-Hungarian rule, Bandera rose in the OUN by organizing assassinations of officials, including in 1934, for which he was sentenced to death (later commuted to ) by a . Released in 1939 amid Polish defeats, Bandera led the OUN-B split emphasizing and total independence, cooperating tactically with against the Soviets until his followers' unilateral proclamation of Ukrainian statehood in on 30 June 1941 prompted his arrest and internment in until late 1944. Postwar, exiled in under Western protection, he directed anti-Soviet guerrilla operations via the , sustaining the Ukrainian Insurgent Army's () fight against communist consolidation despite heavy losses. Bandera's legacy embodies Ukrainian resistance to imperial rule but sparks debate over OUN-B's wartime violence, including pogroms against and the UPA's massacres of Poles in , actions occurring largely under his imprisonment yet tied to his uncompromising ideology of ethnic homogeneity for statehood. Assassinated by KGB operative using spray—after surviving prior Soviet attempts—Bandera's underscored Soviet fears of persistent separatism, later fueling his veneration as a in struggles while drawing condemnation from and narratives emphasizing collaborationist stains over anti-totalitarian defiance.

Early Life

Family Background and Childhood

Stepan Bandera was born on 1 January 1909 in the village of , located in within the (now part of , ). He was the second of eight children in a Catholic headed by his father, , a parish priest ordained in 1906 after studying at the Theological Academy. Andriy's wife, Myroslava (née Hlodzinska), also hailed from a longstanding Galician clerical lineage, which reinforced the family's religious and cultural milieu amid the multi-ethnic empire's eastern fringes. The Bandera household in rural embodied traditional village life under Habsburg rule, with Andriy serving as the local Greek Catholic priest and engaging in community leadership, including brief service in Symon Petliura's forces during the 1918–1921 independence struggles. Stepan's early childhood unfolded in this environment of piety and nascent national consciousness, shaped by his parents' devotion to cultural preservation against pressures that intensified after annexed in 1919 following . His siblings included three sisters and four brothers, among them Bohdan, who later faced Soviet persecution, reflecting the family's entanglement in broader resistance patterns even from youth. Bandera's upbringing emphasized discipline and faith, with his father's clerical duties instilling a sense of duty amid economic hardships typical of rural priestly families, where resources were modest and supplemented by farming. By his pre-teen years, the shift to administration brought restrictions on Ukrainian-language education and religious practices, fostering early resentment toward interwar Poland's policies of , though Bandera himself remained focused on familial and activities until adolescence.

Education and Early Influences

Stepan Bandera attended a Ukrainian-language in from 1919 to 1927, where teachers emphasized patriotic Ukrainian lessons amid Polish administration's restrictions on Ukrainian education. The curriculum and local environment, marked by interwar Polish policies limiting Ukrainian cultural expression, fostered resentment toward non-Ukrainian rule and reinforced ethnic identity. In 1928, Bandera enrolled in the Faculty of Agriculture and Forestry at , studying ; he completed coursework intermittently but was repeatedly expelled and rearrested for nationalist activities, ultimately not graduating. During his student years, he engaged in paramilitary-style youth groups, including the organization and Sokil gymnastics society, which promoted physical discipline, , and resistance to assimilation under Polish governance. These experiences shaped Bandera's early commitment to militant , influenced by the suppression of Ukrainian institutions in interwar , where Galicia's Ukrainian minority faced land reforms favoring Poles and restrictions on use in . His father's clerical role in the , which often intersected with nationalist circles opposing and , further embedded anti-imperial sentiments, though Bandera's radicalization accelerated through student networks advocating armed struggle for independence.

Rise in Nationalism

Participation in Youth Organizations

During his secondary school years in from 1919 to 1927, Stepan Bandera participated in youth organizations that emphasized national consciousness and physical preparedness amid administration of . He engaged in the scouting movement, which promoted patriotism, self-reliance, and outdoor skills as a means of fostering identity among youth suppressed by interwar policies. Bandera also joined the Sokil society, a gymnastics and sports group aimed at building and discipline, often with underlying nationalist objectives to counter efforts. These activities aligned with early expressions of activism in the region, where groups served as incubators for resistance against perceived . By the mid-1920s, Bandera held roles in leadership alongside peers, indicating his rising influence within these circles. Such organizations provided Bandera with foundational experiences in organized , transitioning from educational and recreational pursuits to more militant engagements later in the decade. and Sokil, while ostensibly apolitical, often overlapped with proto-nationalist networks that prioritized sovereignty over multi-ethnic state frameworks.

Initial Activism and Polish Repression

Stepan Bandera engaged in early nationalist activism through youth organizations such as , the Ukrainian scouting movement, which instilled paramilitary discipline and anti-Polish sentiments during his teenage years in the . By 1927, he joined the (UVO), a clandestine group conducting sabotage against Polish administration in , marking his shift to militant opposition to Polish rule over Ukrainian territories. In spring 1929, Bandera became a founding member of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), formed by merging UVO with other groups to pursue armed struggle for independence, and quickly rose to head and efforts in by 1930 due to his organizational skills. Polish authorities responded to rising with intensified repression, including mass arrests of OUN members and the "pacification" of to November 1930, during which security forces raided over 1,000 villages in , demolishing properties and churches in retaliation for boycotts and protests against policies. faced repeated arrests between 1931 and 1934 for organizing illegal OUN activities, such as distributing propaganda and coordinating attacks on officials and collaborators, which escalated OUN's of to undermine control. These measures, aimed at suppressing nationalist agitation, instead radicalized the movement, with advocating for retaliatory violence against perceived oppressors. The culmination of Bandera's initial militant phase was the OUN-orchestrated assassination of Interior Minister on June 15, 1934, in , carried out by agent Hryhoriy Matseyko to protest repressive policies; Bandera, as regional OUN executive, was implicated in planning and funding the operation. Arrested shortly before the killing along with other leaders, he stood trial in from October 1935 to January 1936, where sixteen OUN members were convicted of organizing the murder; Bandera received a death sentence, commuted to under , and was confined in Wronki . This repression solidified Bandera's status as a symbol of resistance within Ukrainian nationalist circles, despite the government's view of OUN actions as .

Leadership in the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN)

Organizational Role and Factional Split

Bandera ascended within the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), established on February 3, 1929, by in to unify independence efforts through militant nationalism. Joining soon after its formation, Bandera directed the OUN's youth wing in by 1929 and advanced to head the propaganda department in 1931, focusing on anti- messaging and recruitment. In June 1933, at age 24, he became krai provodnyk (regional leader) of the OUN executive in , the organization's stronghold in -occupied , where he oversaw approximately 20,000 members by the mid-1930s and orchestrated acts of sabotage, boycotts, and targeted killings against administrators and collaborators to undermine rule. The assassination of Konovalets by Soviet agent on May 23, 1938, in intensified internal rivalries over succession, as Konovalets had informally designated Andriy Melnyk, a conservative , as heir, favoring a centralized, elitist structure amenable to alliances with authoritarian states. Bandera, representing younger revolutionaries from who prioritized decentralized cells, mass activism, and unrelenting terror against all occupiers, rejected Melnyk's authority, viewing it as insufficiently radical for achieving Ukrainian statehood amid escalating repression and impending . Tensions peaked after Bandera's release from imprisonment in and brief Soviet detention, leading to the OUN's formal in early 1940: Melnyk convened a conference in in August 1940, solidifying OUN-M (Melnykite) control over diplomatic channels and foreign sections, while Bandera's faction, OUN-B, emerged as the dominant revolutionary wing in proper, commanding the majority of active militants estimated at over 80% of OUN personnel by 1941. Ideologically, OUN-B under stressed totalitarian discipline, purges of suspected disloyalty, and preparation for popular uprising, contrasting OUN-M's emphasis on hierarchical loyalty and pragmatic negotiations; Bandera enforced this through a 10-point revolutionary code adopted in 1941, mandating death for treason and prioritizing armed struggle over compromise. The split, while fragmenting resources—OUN-M retained émigré networks and some contacts, OUN-B controlled underground networks in —enabled Bandera's faction to execute independent operations, though it drew criticism from Melnykites for adventurism that risked alienating potential allies.

Pre-War Militant Campaigns

In the early , Stepan Bandera served as the head of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) executive in , directing a campaign of , robberies, and targeted against Polish administrative targets in response to government repressions including the 1930 Pacification campaign. Under his leadership, OUN units conducted operations such as the 1931 assassination of mayor Tadeusz Hołówko and attacks on post offices and police stations to disrupt colonial rule. These actions escalated OUN militancy, shifting from internal fund-raising expropriations to direct confrontation with officials deemed responsible for policies suppressing Ukrainian national aspirations. The most prominent pre-war operation attributed to Bandera was the assassination of Polish Interior Minister on June 15, 1934, in , carried out by OUN operative Hryhoriy Matseyko using a disguised as a book. Bandera was indicted for ordering the hit and selecting the assassin, viewing Pieracki as the architect of anti-Ukrainian measures like concentration camps for Ukrainian activists. The plot stemmed from OUN's strategy to eliminate key figures enforcing and land reforms that marginalized Ukrainian communities in and . Bandera's arrest followed in July 1934, leading to the trial from November 18, 1935, to January 13, 1936, where he and associates and others faced charges for organizing the Pieracki murder and broader OUN . The sentenced Bandera to death, commuted to under a , reflecting the gravity of OUN's campaign which included over a dozen assassinations of officials by mid-1930s. Imprisoned in facilities like Wronki and the Mountains jail, Bandera continued clandestine OUN coordination until his release in amid the German invasion and . These campaigns solidified Bandera's reputation as a uncompromising within OUN, prioritizing violence over with authorities.

World War II Era

Cooperation with Nazi Invasion of Soviets

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B), headed by Stepan Bandera, pursued tactical cooperation with as a means to combat Soviet domination and advance Ukrainian independence goals. This alignment was rooted in OUN-B's vehement opposition to Bolshevik rule, viewing the anticipated German offensive as an opportunity to expel Soviet forces from Ukrainian territories. In the months preceding the invasion, OUN-B established contact with German military intelligence (), providing espionage networks in and preparing sabotage units to undermine Soviet defenses. In spring 1941, Bandera authorized negotiations that led to the formation of Ukrainian battalions under German oversight, including the —composed mainly of OUN-B activists and informally linked to Bandera—and the . These forces, totaling around 600-800 men across both units, were trained in German facilities and integrated into advance groups for , which commenced on June 22, 1941. The , commanded by —a key OUN-B figure—advanced from Krakow alongside the German 1st Mountain Division, conducting reconnaissance and engaging Soviet troops en route to . OUN-B "marching groups"—pre-positioned activists totaling several hundred—accompanied these units and German armies, tasked with securing rear areas, organizing local administration, and neutralizing Soviet officials and collaborators. By June 30, 1941, as German forces captured , OUN-B elements under Bandera's strategic direction had facilitated rapid advances by disrupting Soviet retreats and communications in and . On that date, , Bandera's designated deputy and head of the OUN-B executive, publicly proclaimed the restoration of Ukrainian statehood in Lviv's Prosvita hall, citing the German victory over Soviet forces as enabling Ukraine's ; this act was issued pursuant to Bandera's prior instructions for establishing a sovereign government. Such cooperation extended to OUN-B members forming units in occupied zones to maintain order and target perceived Soviet sympathizers, aligning with German anti-partisan efforts during the invasion's opening phase. , operating from German-occupied Krakow initially, coordinated these initiatives remotely, anticipating that military support against the USSR would compel to endorse Ukrainian autonomy. However, the partnership remained asymmetrical, with OUN-B leveraging the invasion for nationalist aims while exploited Ukrainian manpower without committing to .

Proclamation of Independence and German Arrest

On June 30, 1941, amid the German advance into Soviet-occupied Ukraine following launched on June 22, the revolutionary leadership of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B), under Stepan Bandera's direction, proclaimed the restoration of Ukrainian statehood in . , Bandera's appointed deputy, publicly read the Act of , declaring the establishment of a Ukrainian and expressing willingness to cooperate with the against Muscovite-Bolshevik occupiers. Bandera, who had positioned OUN-B activists to enter alongside German forces via pre-arranged "tourist" groups and the , endorsed the act through a naming Stetsko as of the new government. The aimed to capitalize on the power vacuum and German anti-Soviet momentum to assert sovereignty, reflecting OUN-B's integral nationalist goal of immediate despite tactical alignment with Nazi aims against the USSR. However, Nazi authorities, prioritizing direct administrative control over occupied eastern territories as without puppet states, rejected the unilateral declaration as it contradicted their plans for exploitation and colonization. German forces suppressed initiatives, banned political activities supporting the act, and arrested OUN-B leaders to enforce subordination. Bandera, located in Cracow at the time, refused orders to retract the proclamation, leading to his by the on July 5, 1941. He was transported to under , where interrogations failed to coerce withdrawal of the independence decree. By September 15, 1941, Bandera was transferred to Sachsenhausen concentration camp's special Zellenbau section for high-value political prisoners, remaining interned until late 1944 amid ongoing resistance to German oversight. This curtailed OUN-B's centralized but did not halt efforts toward state-building.

Internment and Limited Wartime Activities

Following the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B)'s proclamation of Ukrainian statehood in on June 30, 1941—without securing prior German consent—Bandera, who was in negotiating with Nazi authorities, was arrested by the on July 5, 1941. The arrest stemmed from Bandera's refusal to rescind the declaration, which conflicted with German plans to administer occupied Soviet territories directly rather than permit Ukrainian autonomy. Initially held in Gestapo prisons including Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse and , Bandera was transferred to near in early 1942. At Sachsenhausen, Bandera was confined in the camp's special Zellenbau block, designated for prominent political detainees such as foreign leaders and resisters, which spared him the forced labor and mass atrocities endured by general inmates but imposed strict isolation and surveillance. Conditions allowed limited access to reading materials and occasional correspondence, though direct communication with OUN networks was heavily curtailed by German oversight. His internment, spanning from July 1941 to September 1944, restricted Bandera's operational role, leaving OUN-B field activities—such as forming auxiliary police units and later guerrilla resistance—under deputies like Roman Shukhevych, while Bandera maintained symbolic authority without real-time influence. Bandera's limited wartime engagements during captivity included drafting ideological memoranda on Ukrainian nationalism's alignment with anti-Soviet aims, smuggled out sporadically to guide OUN strategy, though he later critiqued excessive with German forces undertaken without his input. On September 27, 1944, amid the Wehrmacht's retreat and Soviet advances, German officials released Bandera from Sachsenhausen under conditional terms to mobilize Ukrainian insurgents against the , relocating him to for recruitment efforts that yielded minimal organized units before the war's end. This brief post-release phase involved nominal coordination with elements but was constrained by mutual distrust and impending defeat, preventing substantive military contributions.

Postwar Period

Release from Captivity and Exile Leadership

In late September 1944, amid the advancing , German authorities released Stepan Bandera from under an informal agreement aimed at securing cooperation with the [Ukrainian Insurgent Army](/page/Ukrainian_Insurgent Army) (UPA) to counter the Soviet offensive. The release, dated variously as September 27 or 28, reflected Germany's strategic pivot to utilize nationalists against the Eastern Front's deteriorating situation, though Bandera's faction maintained its goals. Following his liberation, Bandera initially remained under supervision in but resumed directing OUN-B operations, negotiating with German officials for the formation of Ukrainian military units to combat Soviet forces. These efforts yielded limited results, as Bandera prioritized anti-Soviet resistance over full collaboration, aligning with the UPA's ongoing in . By early 1945, as Allied forces closed in, he relocated westward, evading capture and establishing a base in the American occupation zone of . Postwar, Bandera settled in , where he reorganized the OUN-B's foreign structures among displaced persons and , serving as the group's from 1947 onward. From this position, he coordinated propaganda, intelligence networks, and logistical support for the UPA's armed struggle against Soviet consolidation, rejecting compromises with the rival OUN-M faction and insisting on to achieve statehood. U.S. protection shielded him from Soviet demands, enabling sustained direction of the anti-communist until his in 1959. This emphasized operations, in emigre communities, and advocacy for Western recognition of the cause amid tensions.

Anti-Soviet Operations and Security Measures

Following his release from German captivity on September 28, 1944, Stepan Bandera re-established leadership over the OUN-B faction from exile in the American occupation zone of Germany, directing anti-Soviet operations through the organization's underground network in . As head of the OUN-B Provid, Bandera oversaw the (UPA), which OUN-B controlled, conducting against Soviet reoccupation forces from late 1944 into the early 1950s. UPA units focused on small-scale tactics, including of Soviet infrastructure, assassinations of officials, raids to undermine Bolshevik authority, and defense of local populations against deportations and terror. Bandera's directives, conveyed via couriers and limited clandestine communications, emphasized a anti-Bolshevik struggle rather than reliance on Western parliamentary aid, aiming to paralyze Soviet control and foster broader anti-communist alliances such as the . In a May 20, 1950, interview, he highlighted UPA successes like the 1945 battle, where insurgents broke an encirclement by three Soviet divisions, and noted Soviet estimates of UPA strength reaching 200,000 fighters in 1944–1945, though actual numbers were likely lower amid fragmentation into autonomous groups by 1945–1948. These operations inflicted significant casualties on Soviet troops and administrators, contributing to prolonged instability in despite overwhelming Soviet resources. To counter persistent threats, Bandera employed rigorous security protocols, including frequent relocation of residences across and use of false identities such as "Stefan Popel," posing as a in . Associates dedicated to his protection monitored potential infiltrators and thwarted multiple Soviet assassination plots, as detailed in their postwar memoirs, including a 1944 NKGB plan in involving a 5–7 agent team funded with 30,000 Reichsmarks and a 1953 operation deploying 10 agents under codenames like "Fomin." Soviet intelligence pressured his relatives for collaboration and tracked his movements, but U.S. Army refusal to honor requests shielded him until his 1959 killing by agent Bohdan Stashynskyi using a spray device. These measures reflected the high-stakes environment of exile leadership, where OUN-B maintained operational secrecy amid infiltration risks from Soviet agents posing as nationalists.

Assassination

KGB Operation and Immediate Aftermath

On 15 October 1959, Stepan Bandera was assassinated at the entrance to his home at Kreittmayrstraße 7 in , , by Bohdan Stashinsky, a Ukrainian-born operative assigned to the agency's assassination unit. Stashinsky had been recruited by the in 1952 and tasked with eliminating anti-Soviet Ukrainian émigré leaders, having previously killed Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) figure in 1957 using a prototype spray device to refine the method. The operation against Bandera, authorized at the level of the Soviet , involved months of on his routines and the development of a double-barreled spray gun loaded with liquid hydrogen , which vaporized into a lethal gas upon release. As Bandera returned from purchasing groceries around 1:00 p.m., Stashinsky approached disguised as a stranger, feigned confusion to get close, and simultaneously triggered both barrels of the device into Bandera's face from a distance of about one meter, causing rapid poisoning without external wounds or noise. Bandera collapsed immediately; his wife Yaroslava discovered him minutes later and summoned medical help, but he was pronounced dead at the scene, with initial examinations attributing the death to a heart attack or . Soviet authorities denied involvement, portraying the death as natural, while Western intelligence, including the CIA, suspected poisoning by an insider but lacked evidence until Stashinsky's defection in August 1961. In the Ukrainian diaspora, Bandera's killing galvanized mourning and resolve against Soviet oppression; his funeral procession in Munich drew thousands of attendees, including OUN supporters, who carried his coffin through the streets while singing the Ukrainian national anthem, before burial at Nordfriedhof cemetery. West German officials condemned the act as an infringement on sovereignty, prompting heightened security for émigré leaders, though Bandera's nationalist affiliations limited broader international outrage. Stashinsky evaded immediate capture, continuing KGB duties until his own crisis of conscience led to confession, confirming the operation's mechanics in a 1962 trial where he received an eight-year sentence, later reduced.

Personal Life

Family and Relationships

Stepan Bandera was the third of eight children born to Andriy Bandera (1882–1941), a Ukrainian Greek Catholic priest and civic activist involved in cooperative movements among local farmers, and Myroslava Głodzińska, daughter of a local priest. His father was arrested by Soviet NKVD forces on May 22, 1941, alongside two of Bandera's sisters; Andriy was sentenced to death and executed by shooting on July 10, 1941, in a Kyiv prison, explicitly as punishment for his son's nationalist activities. Bandera's siblings suffered severe repression during and its aftermath. His brothers Oleksandr and Vasyl were arrested by German authorities, transferred to , and killed there—Oleksandr in 1942 and Vasyl reportedly murdered by Polish inmates in 1943. His sisters and Marta-Maria were deported by the to Siberian gulags in 1941 following their father's arrest; both survived and were released in 1960 but barred from returning to . Bandera married Yaroslava Oparivska (1917–1977), whom he met through Ukrainian nationalist circles, sometime before his wartime internment; the couple had three children—daughters Natalia (born 1941) and Anna-Lesya (born 1947), and son Andriy (born 1946). The family relocated with him to post-war exile in , residing in , where Yaroslava managed household security amid constant threats; after Bandera's in 1959, she raised the children in to evade Soviet agents. The children later emigrated, with Andriy settling in , where his son Stephen Bandera has publicly discussed the family's nationalist legacy and wartime associations.

Ideology

Foundations of Integral Nationalism

Integral Ukrainian nationalism, as foundational to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Stepan Bandera's leadership of its revolutionary wing, originated in the writings of Dmytro Dontsov during the interwar period, particularly through his 1926 manifesto Nationalism and subsequent essays promoting "active nationalism." Dontsov, drawing from Nietzschean vitalism, Sorelian myth-making, and observations of Italian Fascism, rejected liberal rationalism and Marxist materialism in favor of a doctrine prioritizing the nation's organic unity and heroic struggle for survival amid Polish, Soviet, and Romanian occupations of Ukrainian territories post-1918. This framework positioned the Ukrainian nation not as a cultural or civic entity but as a mystical, amoral collective demanding total subordination, where compromise with imperial powers equated to national suicide. Central tenets included the supremacy of national will over ethical or humanitarian constraints, encapsulated in Dontsov's call for "spiritual mobilization" through an elite vanguard unbound by democratic norms or class solidarity. The OUN, founded on February 3, 1929, in by , explicitly adopted these principles in its statutes and the "Decalogue of the Ukrainian Nationalist," which mandated absolute loyalty to the nation, unrelenting struggle against enemies (defined as occupiers and their collaborators), and secrecy in operations to achieve an independent . thus framed independence as requiring revolutionary violence, including against Polish officials—such as the 1934 assassination of Interior Minister , planned under Bandera's early involvement—to shatter passivity and forge national consciousness. Bandera, who joined the OUN in 1929 at age 20 and led its militant by 1931, internalized these foundations as operational imperatives rather than abstract theory, viewing the doctrine's and rejection of as essential for countering the demographic and repressive disadvantages faced by in interwar , where they comprised about 15% of the population but endured land reforms favoring Poles and cultural policies. The ideology's totalitarian orientation—emphasizing "one nation, one state, one "—anticipated a single-party post-independence, with no tolerance for internal dissent or minority autonomies that could dilute ethnic Ukrainian dominance. While Dontsov influenced without formal OUN membership, Bandera's faction (OUN-B, post-1940 split) preserved the doctrine's radicalism against the more conciliatory OUN-M, prioritizing clandestine networks and over negotiated alliances. This adherence manifested in the OUN's 1941 , invoking integral nationalist imperatives for total war against Soviet and Nazi forces alike until Ukrainian sovereignty was secured. Critics, including Polish and Soviet-era analyses, highlight the doctrine's alignment with fascist organizational models like the , though its adaptive emphasis on anti-imperial guerrilla tactics distinguished it from expansionist variants.

Views on Ukrainian Statehood and Authoritarianism

Bandera prioritized the establishment of an independent, ethnically homogeneous as the overriding goal of the nationalist movement, viewing it as essential for national survival and expansion amid threats from , the , and other powers. This vision, rooted in , subordinated tactical alliances—including temporary cooperation with —to the pursuit of sovereignty over Ukrainian ethnic territories. On June 30, 1941, following the German invasion of the , the OUN-B faction under Bandera's direction proclaimed the Act of Restoration of the in , led by , which asserted Ukraine's independence while pledging alliance with the states. Influenced by Dmytro Dontsov's doctrine of "active nationalism," Bandera's ideology framed the state as an instrument of the nation's collective will, emphasizing struggle, fanaticism, and amorality in state-building to overcome historical subjugation. Dontsov's writings, which glorified the will to power and imperial expansion as national virtues, shaped OUN thought until at least 1943, portraying the state not as a democratic entity but as a vehicle for ethnic dominance and revolutionary mobilization. Bandera, as a proponent of this framework, rejected liberal individualism, advocating a system where national imperatives superseded personal freedoms to forge unity against existential threats. The OUN-B's organizational structure under embodied authoritarian principles, adopting the "leader principle" (fuehrerprinzip) from its 1929 statutes, which vested supreme, unquestioned authority in the providnyk—initially , then Bandera after the 1940 split. Members swore oaths of absolute obedience, enabling centralized command in clandestine operations, including assassinations and uprisings deemed necessary for statehood. This reflected integral nationalism's disdain for parliamentary , favoring a as a transitional mechanism to consolidate power, as articulated by OUN theorist Mykola Stsiborsky in his 1935 concept, which proposed a national leader directing a single-party state toward ethnic purity and syndicalist economics. While the broader OUN ideologically moderated in 1943 at its Third Extraordinary Congress—rejecting in favor of post-liberation democratic aspirations—Bandera's leadership in exile from maintained the faction's rigid discipline and anti-Soviet militancy, prioritizing operational security over internal . Critics, including some Ukrainian historians, attribute this to the exigencies of rather than inherent , though the pre-war and wartime emphasis on elite and as tools for national rebirth underscored an illiberal core.

Ethnic Policies and Relations

Stance Toward Poles

Stepan Bandera, as a prominent leader within the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), adopted a staunchly adversarial position toward , rooted in the perception of interwar as an imperial occupier that systematically suppressed Ukrainian national identity and territorial claims in and . Under his direction as head of the OUN's executive in from , the group escalated , against Polish property, and targeted assassinations to undermine Polish authority, framing these actions as defensive responses to Warsaw's repressive measures, including policies and the pacification campaign that involved demolishing Ukrainian institutions. A pivotal manifestation of this hostility occurred on June 15, 1934, when OUN operatives under Bandera's organizational oversight assassinated Interior Minister in . Pieracki had advocated for camps to contain militants and intensified efforts, which Bandera and his faction viewed as existential threats to self-determination. Bandera was arrested two days prior on unrelated suspicions but convicted in the ensuing trial for masterminding the plot, receiving a death sentence commuted to ; he defiantly justified the killing during proceedings as a necessary strike against domination. Bandera's integral nationalist ideology, which emphasized ethnic purity and exclusive Ukrainian control over historic ethnographic territories, extended this antagonism into and beyond, influencing OUN-B policies that rejected coexistence with populations in contested borderlands. Although imprisoned by authorities from July 1941 to September 1944, Bandera's faction proclaimed Ukrainian statehood on June 30, 1941, in , implicitly claiming regions under prior administration and directing local units to neutralize perceived threats. This worldview underpinned the Ukrainian Insurgent Army's (UPA)—formed by OUN-B cadres—systematic campaigns, notably the 1943 Volhynia massacres, where up to 100,000 civilians were killed through village raids, torture, and expulsion to consolidate Ukrainian demographic dominance; these operations aligned with Bandera's pre-war advocacy for revolutionary violence to "purify" national spaces from alien elements. In after , maintained OUN-B leadership without moderating his anti- rhetoric, prioritizing armed struggle for a unitary over reconciliation, even as Polish forces retaliated with their own clearances of Ukrainian villages, killing tens of thousands. This unyielding stance reflected a causal of national survival over minority accommodations, viewing Polish presence as an enduring obstacle to amid shared histories of mutual atrocities.

Stance Toward Jews

Stepan Bandera, as leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists' Bandera faction (OUN-B), oversaw an rooted in integral that prioritized ethnic homogeneity and viewed non-Ukrainians, including , with suspicion if perceived as aligned with Soviet or interests. OUN-B in the late 1930s and early 1940s often associated with "Judeo-Bolshevism," portraying them as complicit in Soviet oppression of , a exacerbated by the Soviet occupation of in 1939, which reinforced perceptions of Jewish dominance in Bolshevik structures. However, this rhetoric was pragmatic and secondary to anti-Soviet and anti- aims, lacking the biological central to Nazi ; Bandera's writings and directives emphasized Ukrainian over explicit anti-Jewish measures. During the German invasion of the in June 1941, OUN-B units, acting under Bandera's overall leadership, participated in anti-Jewish pogroms in western cities, including , where Ukrainian nationalists joined German forces and local crowds in killing an estimated 4,000–6,000 between and July 2. These events, occurring in at least 26 Galician and Volhynian locales, were encouraged by German propaganda to deflect blame for killings onto , but OUN-B militants actively engaged, driven by revenge for Soviet repressions and nationalist fervor. Bandera, present in for the OUN-B's declaration of independence, did not personally direct the violence, and no direct orders from him authorizing pogroms have been documented; his arrest by the Germans on July 5, 1941, and subsequent imprisonment in until September 1944 limited his operational control thereafter. No primary sources record Bandera expressing personal antisemitic views through quotes or endorsements of Jewish extermination; historical analyses note the absence of evidence that he supported or condemned the killings of , with his focus remaining on Ukrainian sovereignty amid alliances of convenience with . Critics, including and Russian narratives, attribute to Bandera for OUN-B's actions, while Ukrainian defenders argue the pogroms were localized excesses not reflective of core policy, pointing to later OUN-B shifts away from collaboration after Bandera's arrest. Post-war, from exile, Bandera led anti-Soviet efforts through the , which included non-Ukrainian elements, but maintained ethnic Ukrainian primacy without renewed anti-Jewish campaigns. The (UPA), evolving from OUN-B structures during Bandera's captivity, conducted some anti-Jewish actions in 1943–1944 against perceived , but these were marginal compared to anti- operations and not verifiably ordered by Bandera.

Relations with Other Minorities

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under Stepan Bandera's leadership (OUN-B) regarded ethnic Russians primarily through the lens of opposition to Soviet and Russian imperial domination, focusing armed actions against Soviet military and security forces rather than systematic ethnic targeting of civilians. The (UPA), formed by OUN-B in October 1942, prioritized anti-Soviet after the Red Army's reoccupation of beginning in 1943–1944, engaging in thousands of skirmishes with units and that included ethnic Russians but were framed as resistance to occupiers rather than minority . Documented UPA violence against Russian civilian settlements was limited and opportunistic, often tied to suspected collaboration with Soviets, contrasting with more deliberate campaigns against other groups; Soviet reports exaggerated such incidents for , claiming over 150,000 killed in anti-partisan operations, though these figures encompass broader casualties without ethnic specificity. Relations with Germans shifted rapidly from provisional cooperation to hostility after the OUN-B's declaration of Ukrainian independence in Lviv on June 30, 1941, which contravened Nazi plans for . Bandera was arrested by the on July 5, 1941, and held in until late 1944, alongside other OUN-B leaders, reflecting German distrust of autonomous . The subsequently launched sustained attacks on German garrisons and supply lines, recording 47 direct combats in October–November 1943 and over 125 clashes involving village self-defense units, establishing it as a significant anti-Nazi force by 1943–1944 despite earlier OUN-B auxiliary roles in Wehrmacht-aligned battalions like Nachtigall. OUN-B extended inclusive overtures to Carpatho-Ruthenians (also known as ), whom it ideologically assimilated into the broader Ukrainian ethnos, supporting the short-lived of Carpatho-Ukraine's defense against forces in March 1939. OUN activists, including from Galician branches under Bandera's influence, provided organizational and combat aid to local Ruthenian militias during the brief uprising, viewing as integral Ukrainian territory rather than a distinct minority domain. This stance contrasted with tensions toward minorities in the region, whom OUN opposed as annexers, though specific UPA actions against them post-1941 were subsumed under anti-Axis resistance. Limited evidence exists of OUN-B policies toward smaller groups like ethnic Czech or German colonists in , where sporadic UPA raids occurred amid broader anti-occupier operations but lacked the scale of documented Polish or Jewish targeting.

Controversies

Extent of Nazi Collaboration

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B), under Stepan Bandera's leadership, pursued a tactical alliance with in the lead-up to and initial phase of in June 1941, viewing the invasion as an opportunity to expel Soviet forces and establish Ukrainian independence. OUN-B members formed auxiliary units, such as the , which participated in combat alongside forces advancing into , with estimates of 250-800 OUN affiliates involved in these early efforts. This cooperation extended to local administration and policing roles in occupied territories, where some OUN elements assisted in anti-Jewish pogroms and executions during the summer of 1941, aligning temporarily with German anti-Soviet and anti-communist objectives. On June 30, 1941, in , OUN-B leader proclaimed the Act of Restoration of the on Bandera's behalf, anticipating German endorsement of Ukrainian sovereignty; however, Nazi authorities rejected this declaration, prioritizing their own imperial designs over puppet independence. Bandera was arrested by the on July 5, 1941, in , placed under "honorary arrest" initially, and later transferred to Sachsenhausen concentration camp's Zellenbau special block, where he remained imprisoned until September 1944. His deputy Stetsko was detained around the same time, and two of Bandera's brothers perished in Auschwitz, underscoring the abrupt termination of high-level collaboration. Post-arrest, OUN-B's rank-and-file continued limited operational ties with German forces in some capacities, such as formations involved in Holocaust-related actions, but the organization's leadership shifted toward opposition, culminating in the formation of the (UPA) in October 1942, which engaged in against both Nazi occupiers and by 1943. No primary evidence confirms direct meetings between Bandera and or senior Nazi ideologues, with interactions confined to mid-level contacts prior to the ; the alliance's brevity—spanning mere weeks before dissolution—reflected mutual exploitation rather than ideological convergence, as OUN-B's clashed with Nazi racial hierarchies excluding Slavic statehood.

Implication in Massacres and Ethnic Cleansing

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B), led by Stepan Bandera, and its armed wing, the (), have been implicated in systematic massacres targeting civilians in and during 1943–1944, resulting in an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 deaths, primarily women and children, through methods including shootings, burnings, and axe attacks. These actions aligned with OUN-B's goal of establishing a ethnically homogeneous by expelling or eliminating populations perceived as colonizers, as articulated in OUN directives emphasizing "struggle against occupiers." While Bandera was imprisoned by German authorities from July 1941 to October 1944 and thus not directly issuing field orders during the massacres' peak in July–August 1943, OUN-B's central leadership, including figures like Dmytro Klymchuk and , operated under Bandera's proclaimed authority, with the 's formation in October 1942 explicitly tied to his faction's ideology of radical separatism. OUN-B's ethnic cleansing campaign against Poles extended beyond Volhynia, encompassing over 1,000 documented attacks in by mid-1944, where units systematically destroyed Polish villages to prevent repopulation and secure territorial control amid retreating German and advancing Soviet forces. investigations and eyewitness accounts, corroborated by post-war trials, detail tactics such as herding civilians into churches before setting them ablaze, as in the Sahryń massacre on March 10, 1944, where approximately 600 Poles were killed. Bandera's pre-war writings and OUN-B congress resolutions from endorsed authoritarian that viewed interethnic coexistence as incompatible with Ukrainian sovereignty, providing ideological justification for such violence, though direct personal orders from him remain undocumented due to his incarceration. Critics, including historians, argue this implicates Bandera morally and organizationally, as OUN-B rejected ceasefires or negotiations with self-defense units, prolonging the bloodshed. Bandera's OUN-B also bears responsibility for participation in anti-Jewish pogroms in western Ukraine following the German invasion on June 22, 1941, including the Lviv pogroms of June 30–July 2, where OUN-B militants and local auxiliaries killed an estimated 5,000 Jews through beatings, shootings, and mutilations, often framing Jews as Bolshevik agents. OUN-B's provisional government declaration of Ukrainian independence on June 30, 1941, in Lviv, under Bandera's direction before his arrest, coincided with these outbursts, and faction members formed auxiliary police units that aided German Einsatzgruppen in rounding up and executing Jews, as in the early phases of the Babyn Yar massacre near Kyiv in September 1941. While Bandera himself issued no explicit anti-Jewish orders in surviving documents, OUN-B propaganda from 1940–1941 portrayed Jews as threats to Ukrainian purity, and the faction's collaboration with Nazis until the 1941 rift enabled local leaders like Yaroslav Stetsko to incite violence, with post-war UPA units continuing sporadic killings of Jewish survivors into 1944. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum records confirm OUN-B members' involvement in these atrocities, distinguishing them from mere opportunistic looting by emphasizing organized nationalist motives. These events reflect OUN-B's broader strategy of ethnic homogenization, which targeted not only Poles and but also and in isolated incidents, though Poles and suffered the highest casualties; for instance, UPA reports from 1943 internally justified "anti-Polish operations" as necessary for , mirroring Bandera's vision of a unitary nation excluding minorities. and scholarship, drawing from declassified Soviet and archives, attributes primary agency to OUN-B/UPA structures rather than unilateral German direction, countering narratives that downplay nationalist initiative in favor of wartime chaos. Bandera's post-release endorsement of UPA in 1944–1959 exile further linked him to the ongoing insurgency's repressive tactics, including reprisals against suspected collaborators.

Authoritarian Extremism and Domestic Repression

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), particularly its Bandera faction (OUN-B), promoted an authoritarian model for a future Ukrainian state centered on a one-party dictatorship under OUN control, rejecting multiparty democracy and political pluralism as incompatible with national unity during wartime exigencies. Bandera, as providnyk (supreme leader), embodied the Führerprinzip, where absolute loyalty to the leader and organization superseded individual rights, with the state's military and political apparatus designed to enforce integral nationalism through centralized command. This structure extended to plans for suppressing internal dissent, as articulated in OUN-B documents envisioning a "political and military dictatorship of the OUN" to eliminate ideological rivals and consolidate power post-independence. Internally, OUN-B enforced discipline via its Sluzhba Bezpeky (SB), a security apparatus that functioned as both counterintelligence against external foes and internal police, purging members suspected of treason, infiltration, or deviation from Bandera's line through interrogations, imprisonment, and executions. The SB's operations, intensified amid wartime pressures from Nazi and Soviet forces, created a paranoid environment where hundreds of OUN affiliates faced liquidation for alleged collaboration, with estimates from declassified records indicating dozens to low hundreds executed in 1943–1944 alone across western Ukraine. This repression extended to rival Ukrainian nationalists, such as OUN-M adherents, through violent clashes and assassinations, as Bandera's faction sought to monopolize the independence movement and prevent fragmentation. Domestically, OUN-B and its armed wing, the (UPA), targeted communists, socialists, and Soviet sympathizers as existential threats, viewing them as agents of "Muscovite imperialism" that undermined ethnic homogeneity. In controlled territories, particularly and from 1943 onward, UPA units conducted sweeps against pro-Soviet villagers and activists, executing individuals affiliated with the or Red partisans, often in for but also preemptively to deter . These actions, documented in partisan warfare logs, resulted in the deaths of leftists numbering in the low thousands amid broader anti-partisan campaigns, prioritizing nationalist purity over inclusive governance. Bandera's ideology framed such measures as necessary for , equating domestic left-wing elements with foreign occupation and justifying their elimination to forge a unitary .

Legacy

Heroic Commemoration in Ukraine

Stepan Bandera is commemorated in as a key figure in the fight for national independence against , Soviet, and Nazi occupations. On January 22, 2010, President posthumously awarded him the title of for his leadership in the Organization of Nationalists (OUN), symbolizing resistance to foreign domination, though the award was annulled by a Lviv district court on April 12, 2011, citing Bandera's lack of citizenship at the time of his death. Dozens of monuments and memorials to Bandera have been erected across , particularly in , , , and oblasts, with notable examples including a large in unveiled in 2009 and another in dedicated in 2001. Streets and squares bear his name, such as Stepan Bandera Street in renamed in 1992 following Ukraine's independence, and in , where Moscow Avenue was redesignated as Bandera Avenue on July 7, 2016, under laws enacted in 2015 to remove Soviet-era toponyms, despite subsequent legal challenges including a 2021 court ruling attempting to reverse it. Public commemorations include annual torchlight marches on January 1, Bandera's birthday, organized by nationalist groups in and other cities, attracting hundreds to thousands of participants waving red-and-black OUN flags and chanting slogans affirming his role as a freedom fighter; for instance, a 2022 march drew several hundred amid wartime solidarity. issued a honoring Bandera on January 1, 2009, marking the centennial of his birth, with a print run of 180,000 copies at a face value of 1 hryvnia. These acts of veneration intensified after the 2014 Revolution and amid the , positioning Bandera as a against in Ukrainian nationalist narratives, with his image appearing in protests and military units adopting OUN symbols for morale. Commemorative coins have also been minted, such as a 20-hryvnia in 2019 by the depicting Bandera in Cossack attire.

Criticisms and Rejections Abroad

In Poland, Stepan Bandera is broadly regarded as a figure responsible for the ethnic cleansing of Poles during World War II, particularly through the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which his Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B) faction led and which carried out the Volhynia massacres from 1943 to 1945, killing an estimated 100,000 Polish civilians, predominantly women and children. Polish government officials, including prime ministers, have repeatedly condemned Ukrainian efforts to glorify Bandera, viewing such actions as incompatible with historical reconciliation between the two nations. In December 2024, Poland's opposition Law and Justice party proposed legislation to ban the glorification of Bandera within Polish borders, equating it to prohibitions on praising Adolf Hitler and citing the need to prevent Ukrainian nationalists from erecting monuments or promoting his ideology on Polish soil. Tensions escalated in July 2022 when Poland's foreign ministry protested statements by Ukraine's ambassador to Germany, Andriy Melnyk, who denied Bandera's responsibility for mass murders of Poles, prompting diplomatic interventions to reaffirm the documented scale of UPA atrocities. Jewish organizations and Israeli officials have similarly rejected Bandera's veneration, citing the OUN-B's initial collaboration with in 1941, including participation in anti-Jewish pogroms, and its documented anti-Semitic rhetoric under his leadership. In December 2018, Israel's ambassador to , Joel Lion, publicly condemned the regional council's declaration of 2019 as the "Year of Stepan ," describing it as shocking given Bandera's association with Nazi-aligned forces that facilitated the murder of Jews during . The expressed deep concern over the decision, labeling Bandera a Nazi collaborator whose honoring undermined efforts to combat distortion. diplomatic responses, such as a January 2020 rebuke to deeming protests against Bandera commemorations "counterproductive," highlighted friction, as Israeli critiques emphasized empirical evidence of OUN-B involvement in pogroms like those in in June 1941, where thousands of were killed with nationalist complicity. Broader European skepticism persists, with Bandera's image as an ultranationalist who sought alliance with —proclaiming Ukrainian independence in on June 30, 1941, under German auspices before his arrest—fueling rejections in discourse on historical memory. In , analysts have described Bandera as a barrier to Ukraine's integration due to his legacy of Nazi collaboration and , arguing it complicates Warsaw-Kyiv relations amid shared membership goals. German media and officials, while distinguishing Bandera from direct , have critiqued his glorification as emblematic of unresolved fascist tendencies in , especially after controversies like Melnyk's 2022 defense of Bandera, which drew ire from both and authorities for minimizing OUN-B's role in wartime massacres. These international positions prioritize documented alliances and atrocities over Bandera's later anti-Soviet resistance, reflecting a abroad that his authoritarian methods and ethnic policies disqualify him from unqualified heroic status.

Influence on Modern Geopolitics and Identity

Stepan Bandera's legacy has profoundly shaped Ukrainian national identity, particularly in the context of asserting independence from Russian cultural and political dominance. Following the 2014 Revolution, which ousted pro-Russian President , Bandera emerged as a rallying symbol for anti-Russian sentiment, with chants of "Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the heroes!"—slogans associated with the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN)—becoming widespread during protests. This period saw accelerated de-communization, including the erection of over 100 monuments to Bandera and related figures by 2016, often replacing Soviet-era Lenin statues, and the renaming of key streets, such as Kyiv's Moscow Avenue to Stepan Bandera Avenue on November 18, 2015. The 2022 Russian full-scale invasion further amplified Bandera's role in forging a unified identity centered on defiance against . Russian President cited "" as a on February 24, 2022, explicitly invoking Bandera and OUN-UPA () history to frame Ukraine's government and military as fascist successors, a narrative echoed in portraying forces as "Banderites." In response, society has increasingly embraced Bandera as an of to Soviet repression, with public approval ratings rising from around 22% in 2012 to over 80% in by 2021, reflecting a broader consolidation of national sentiment amid existential threats. Geopolitically, Bandera's symbolism exacerbates tensions in , serving as a for alignments between Ukraine's Western-oriented and Russia's revanchist worldview. and have criticized Ukraine's veneration of Bandera due to his faction's documented involvement in anti-Polish and anti-Jewish violence during , with Polish President condemning Bandera glorification in 2018 as incompatible with values. Yet, in Ukraine, this has reinforced a narrative of over historical reckoning, influencing and debates on integrating a whose draws from . Russia's exploitation of Bandera in —through campaigns labeling the Battalion and other units as neo-Banderists—has, paradoxically, bolstered his domestic heroism, framing geopolitical survival as a continuation of his anti-Soviet .

References

  1. [1]
    Stepan Bandera - leader of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists
    Apr 23, 2021 · He pushed the activity of the OUN towards individual terror against the representatives of Polish authorities and against Ukrainians who were ...
  2. [2]
    Bandera, Stepan - Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine
    Revolutionary, politician, and ideologue of the Ukrainian nationalist movement. Born into a clerical family, Bandera took an active part in community affairs.
  3. [3]
    Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist
    The monograph also charts the creation and growth of the Bandera cult before the Second World War, its vivid revivals during the Cold War among the Ukrainian ...
  4. [4]
    Ukraine's Memory Wars | Cato Institute
    Mar 25, 2022 · They point out that Bandera, the head of the political wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), was arrested by the Nazis in ...
  5. [5]
    Operation ANYFACE: How the US Army Shielded a Ukrainian ...
    Apr 18, 2022 · Protected by the US Army's refusal to honor a Soviet extradition request, Stepan Bandera plotted for Ukrainian independence for nearly 15 years after the end ...Missing: biography - - | Show results with:biography - -
  6. [6]
    Ukraine's problematic nationalist heroes - New Statesman
    Jan 5, 2023 · Although Bandera himself was imprisoned in Germany for much of the war, his followers founded the paramilitary Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), ...
  7. [7]
    Who was Stepan Bandera, Ukraine's controversial nationalist figure?
    Jun 27, 2022 · Revered by many as a national hero who fought Soviet domination, and as a fascist responsible for killing tens of thousands by others, ...
  8. [8]
    How a KGB Assassin Used the Death of His Child to Defect - Politico
    Jan 5, 2017 · How a KGB Assassin Used the Death of His Child to Defect. Bogdan ... assassinated Stepan Bandera. The visit solidified his story ...<|separator|>
  9. [9]
    Stepan Bandera: Hero or Nazi collaborator? – DW – 05/22/2022
    May 22, 2022 · The Mariupol fighters revere him, Russian soldiers hunt his supporters. The myth surrounding Ukrainian nationalist Stepan Bandera is at the ...
  10. [10]
    Andriy Bandera. A Father Punished for His Son
    Sep 4, 2024 · After graduation, he married Myroslava Hlodzinska, who came from an ancient Galician family of clergymen. In 1906, he was ordained a priest by ...
  11. [11]
    Stepan Andreevich “"Stetsko"” Bandera (1909-1959) - Find a Grave ...
    His father, Andriy Bandera, was a Ukrainian Greek Catholic priest, while his mother, Myroslava Bandera (née Głodzińska), also came from a clerical ...
  12. [12]
    Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe's biography of Stepan Bandera - WSWS
    Oct 4, 2022 · Stepan Bandera's father Andriy, a Greek Catholic priest, served with the army of Petliura in 1918. Veterans of this army would go on to form ...
  13. [13]
    Stepan Bandera Facts for Kids
    Oct 17, 2025 · Early Life and School​​ His father, Andriy Bandera, was a priest. His mother was Myroslava Głodzińska. Stepan had seven brothers and sisters. He ...Missing: background siblings
  14. [14]
    Stepan Bandera: The Resurrection of a Ukrainian National Hero - jstor
    This article discusses the reinterpretations of the career of Ukrainian nationalist leader Stepan Bandera and his place in contemporary Ukraine by examining ...
  15. [15]
    Stepan Bandera Biography - The Famous People
    Jul 30, 2024 · The following year, he joined the agronomy course in Lviv Polytechnic but eventually had to leave without a degree due to political unrest in ...
  16. [16]
    Biography of Stepan Bandera - Майдан Моніторинг
    Mar 9, 2010 · In 1919 Stepan Bandera began his secondary school studies at the Ukrainian- language Himnaziya in the city of Stryi, where his grandfather lived ...
  17. [17]
    Osyp Tiushka. 40 Years With Stepan Bandera
    Oct 14, 2024 · Before the outbreak of World War II, he moved to Berlin and lived there with S. Bandera in the Ukrainian House. Soon he took up the post of ...
  18. [18]
    The History of Fascism in Ukraine Part I: The Origins of the OUN ...
    Nov 7, 2022 · In the Spring of 1929, Bandera joined the OUN. He was a talented organizer and rose quickly through the ranks. By 1930 Stepan Bandera was in ...
  19. [19]
    Stepan Bandera's nationalist legacy - May. 06, 2010 | KyivPost
    May 6, 2010 · Andriy J. Semotiuk writes: Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists fought to end foreign rule… - May. 06, 2010. By Andriy J. Semotiuk.
  20. [20]
    Stepan Bandera, the Ukrainian anti-hero glorified following the ...
    Jan 12, 2023 · The Ukrainian ultranationalist who allied with Nazi Germany during WWII has experienced a resurgence in popularity because of his struggle ...<|separator|>
  21. [21]
    Chapter 3. The OUN, 1929-43 - OpenEdition Books
    The author also maintains that Bandera fled from Polish confinement during the relocation of prisoners in September 1939. Other sources state that he was ...Missing: involvement | Show results with:involvement<|separator|>
  22. [22]
    Ukrainian Nazism today: origin and ideological and political typology
    Dec 11, 2023 · The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was founded in 1929 and initially existed as a single organization. After the murder of its ...
  23. [23]
    Bandera, Ukraine & the Holocaust Part II: 1939-1943
    Jan 22, 2015 · Released from his incarceration in Brest (now a part of Belarus), Bandera returned to a UON in ideological turmoil, eventually splitting into ...
  24. [24]
    [PDF] Ilb.ort on the assassination oi ainister Pieracki - CIA
    Indictment:Ordered the assassination of Pieracki;selected the assassin with defendant PidhajnyIsupplied defendant Eebed with funds to be used for the.Missing: Stepan | Show results with:Stepan
  25. [25]
    Bandera, Ukraine & the Holocaust Part I: 1909-1936 | All About History
    Jan 15, 2015 · On 15 June 1934, Polish Minister of the Interior Bronisław Pieracki was assassinated by the UON in retaliation for the government's repressive ' ...
  26. [26]
    [PDF] _i• , - CIA
    most, closely knit, and militant emigre organizations in West Germany. ... As a footnote to the life and activities of Stefan Bandera it might. bementioned ...
  27. [27]
    Did the Polish Minister of the Interior have to be killed? | 8 | The a
    The assassination of Bronisław Pieracki, Polish Minister of the Interior ... Stepan Bandera and other OUN members involved in terrorist activities ...
  28. [28]
    UKRAINIAN KILLERS GUILTY IN WARSAW; Three Sentenced to ...
    ... assassination of Interior Minister Bronislaw Pieracki in June, 1934. Under the recent general amnesty the sentences were commuted to life imprisonment. The ...Missing: Stepan | Show results with:Stepan
  29. [29]
    [PDF] BANDERA, STEFAN_0085.pdf - CIA
    At his trial in 1935, he was sentenced to death and the sentence commuted to life in prison. He was committed to Holy Cross jail in Warsaw and remained there.
  30. [30]
    HI-30 JUNE 1941 - ucrdc.org
    After the German invasion of the USSR on 22 June 1941 OUN-B hoped to force the German government to accede to the formation of an independent Ukrainian state.
  31. [31]
    Russia's 'denazification' lie and the whitewash of Roman Shukhevych
    Nov 22, 2022 · At the outset of Operation Barbarossa in the summer of 1941, Roman Shukhevych commanded the Nachtigall Battalion, a volunteer unit operating ...
  32. [32]
    [PDF] “Glory to the Heroes!” The Commemoration of the OUN and UPA in ...
    nationalist leader Stepan Bandera, Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist – Fascism, Genocide, and Cult.
  33. [33]
    [PDF] Ukrainian Nationalism, the OUN and the UPA - Slow Memory
    Nationalist movements, including the Organisation of. Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), fought for the creation of an independent. Ukrainian state. The OUN was ...
  34. [34]
    Canadian imperialism's fascist friends—Part 3: The role of the OUN ...
    May 21, 2022 · The Nachtigall Battalion and OUN (B) auxiliary groups participated in two murderous sprees in Lviv in 1941, from June 30 to July 3, and ...
  35. [35]
  36. [36]
    June 30, 1941 in the History of Ukraine and in Yaroslav Stetsko's ...
    Jun 29, 2021 · “In 1941, Stetsko arrived in the German-occupied city of Lviv, - the paper reads, - where on behalf of the “leadership” of the OUN he formed the ...
  37. [37]
    OUN: the beginning and the end of independence | Lviv Interactive
    By the will of the Ukrainian people, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under the direction of Stepan Bandera proclaims the formation of the Ukrainian ...
  38. [38]
    [PDF] of the Proclamation of the Restoration of the Independence of ...
    Stepan. Bandera and Yaroslav Stetzko were imprisoned in a Nazi concentration camp until the end of the war. This proclamation of Ukrainian's independence began ...
  39. [39]
    The Unknown Plan for Assassination of Stepan Bandera
    Oct 14, 2022 · Researchers of the life of Stepan Bandera often mention seven (some – even ten) attempted assassinations - from the late 1940s to 1959. This was ...
  40. [40]
    Stepan Bandera, Yaroslav Stetsko - League of Ukrainian Canadians
    On June 30, 1941, the Nachtigall Battalion reached Lviv, and OUN leaders headed by Yaroslav Stetsko declared the restoration of Ukrainian statehood and formed a ...Missing: proclamation | Show results with:proclamation
  41. [41]
    Stepan Bandera - Russia's Periphery
    Bandera's branch (OUN-B) favored action towards immediate independence, and formed a “militant fascist organization” (Breitman, 74). With the 1941 Nazi ...
  42. [42]
    [PDF] BANDERA, STEFAN_0016.pdf - CIA
    OUN membership in exile how Stepan Bandera "disobeyed" the Orders'of. • the "homeland" and attempted "to create a diversion within the OUN ranks." The series ...<|separator|>
  43. [43]
    Ukrainian Insurgent Army. From an Interview with Stepan Bandera
    Sep 14, 2022 · In particular, a lot of interesting information about the activities of UPA is contained in head of the OUN(b) Provid Stepan Bandera's interview ...
  44. [44]
    [PDF] The Insurgent Movement in Ukraine During 1940s-1950s - DTIC
    Jun 8, 2012 · The OUN became the pillar for forming the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). The Ukrainian insurgency resisted the occupational regimes for about ...
  45. [45]
    The 13th Department: The KGB's Top-Secret Assassination Unit
    ... KGB's Top-Secret Assassination Unit. Stepan Bandera. Stepan Bandera. In a second, equally shocking murder, Stashinsky said he used a similar type of spray gun ...
  46. [46]
    The Man with the Poison Gun: Q&A with Serhii Plokhii
    Feb 7, 2017 · So, assassination, targeted killing... something that is not completely unfamiliar to us today; it's happening again all over the world. Back ...
  47. [47]
    planned and executed murders - of ukrainian political leaders
    Jul 1, 2021 · Stashynsky said clearly that the order for the killing of Bandera came from the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the government. He ...Missing: Bogdan Stashinsky aftermath
  48. [48]
    How a MERCILESS KGB hitman lost everything over a woman
    Oct 20, 2021 · After Stashynsky had successfully tested a poison mist gun, which left no sign of forced death on his first victim Lev Rebet, his handlers ...
  49. [49]
    The Assassination of Stepan Bandera - Christopher Othen
    Aug 21, 2016 · This gas gun was two tubes of liquid cyanide with a plunger for each barrel. Stashynsky squirted both barrels into Bandera's face and carried ...
  50. [50]
    "By now, there was no way back for me": the strange story of Bogdan ...
    Jan 19, 2017 · The story of Stashinsky's career as a triggerman for the KGB plays out against the backdrop of the fight for Ukrainian independence after the Second World War.
  51. [51]
    Stepan Bandera's death — how the nationalist died 65 years ago
    Oct 15, 2024 · Historical videos show that at the end of the funeral procession, everyone sang the Ukrainian anthem. As we mentioned earlier, according to ...Missing: immediate reactions
  52. [52]
    The funeral for OUN-B leader Stepan Bandera in West Germany ...
    Mar 1, 2025 · We only know that it was a KGB assassination because the assassin fled to the West a few years later and confessed.Stepan Bandera was heroically assassinated by the KGB on this day ...On 15 October 1959, KGB agent Bogdan Stashinsky assassinated ...More results from www.reddit.com
  53. [53]
    The Unmasking of a KGB Assassin: The Defection of Bogdan ...
    Feb 7, 2025 · Stashinsky was convicted of murder but received a relatively lenient sentence of eight years in prison, which was later reduced to six years due ...
  54. [54]
    Biography of Stepan Bandera (english)
    Mar 13, 2010 · Bandera's father was a Ukrainian Catholic priest and civic activist. He supported the co-operative movement among small farmers, educational ...
  55. [55]
    Yaroslava Vasylivna Bandera (Oparivska) (1917 - 1977) - Geni
    May 22, 2025 · Stepan Bandera. husband · Natalia Kucan. daughter · Andriy Bandera. son · Anna Lesia Bandera. daughter · Vasyl Oparivskyi. father · Julia Oparivska.
  56. [56]
    [PDF] Stepan Bandera: The Resurrection of a Ukrainian National Hero
    where among other things he found time to get married to Yaroslava Oparivska. ... Rakhmannyi regards the date of 30 June 1941 as the most significant in ...
  57. [57]
    The grandson of Ukrainian strongman Stepan Bandera reckons with ...
    Aug 21, 2019 · Born in Winnipeg in 1970, Steve Bandera grew up in a Ukrainian nationalist milieu in Toronto, attending a Ukrainian school, participating in ...Missing: childhood siblings
  58. [58]
    THE BIRTH OF UKRAINIAN “ACTIVE NATIONALISM”: DMYTRO ...
    Oct 10, 2014 · During the 1920s, Ukrainian publicist Dmytro Dontsov (1883–1973) created “active nationalism,” a political doctrine that later became the ...
  59. [59]
    (PDF) Dmytro Dontsovs Ideology of Integral Nat - Academia.edu
    Current nationalist organizations like Svoboda highlight intensity, exceptionality, and globalism as core tenets of Dontsov's integral nationalism while ...
  60. [60]
    8 Things To Know About the Ukrainian National Movement
    Mar 29, 2024 · "Integral" nationalism developed by Dmytro Dontsov meant that all spheres of public life should be imbued with nationalism. Dontsov did not ...
  61. [61]
    Far-right Radicalism in Ukraine in Past and Present | Rabotyazhev
    Ideological foundation of the OUN was the concept of integral nationalism elaborated by Dmytro Dontsov. The OUN proclaimed the creation of Ukrainian sovereign ...
  62. [62]
    Fascism or ustashism? Ukrainian integral nationalism of the 1920s ...
    OUN was indeed a typical fascist organization as shown by many of its features: its leader principle (Führerprinzip), its aspiration to ban all other political ...
  63. [63]
    Ethnocratic Concepts. Ukrainian Statehood in the 20th Century
    This movement adopted as its ideology the "integral" or "active" nationalism created by Dmytro Dontsov. 2. The Main Ideas of Dmytro Dontsov's Active Nationalism.
  64. [64]
    Was Bandera's ideology fascist and totalitarian? – Likbez
    Ukrainian integral nationalism of the 1920s-1930s comprised a number of variants: Dmytro Dontsov's “active (“effective”) nationalism,” the OUN's ...
  65. [65]
    Polish-Ukrainian friendship masks a bitter, bloody history - AP News
    Apr 5, 2023 · Efforts by Bandera-led forces to carve out an independent territory for Ukraine led them to perpetrate atrocities against Poles, Jews and ...
  66. [66]
    WW2 massacre of Poles by Ukrainians must be called genocide ...
    Jul 7, 2023 · The atrocities, known as the Volhynia massacres and in which up to 100,000 Polish civilians were murdered, are regarded in Poland as a genocide.Missing: quotes | Show results with:quotes
  67. [67]
    Chapter 6. The Ukrainian-Polish Conflict - OpenEdition Books
    IntroductionOf all the volatile issues emanating from Ukraine's participation in the Second World War, perhaps the most debated has been UPA's conflict with ...
  68. [68]
    Why Are Jews So Afraid of Stepan Bandera? - Tablet Magazine
    Mar 7, 2014 · So while Bandera and his men were responsible for killing Jews, their ideology wasn't fundamentally anti-Semitic; rather, it was pro-Ukrainian, ...Missing: express | Show results with:express
  69. [69]
    [PDF] THE HOLOCAUST IN UKRAINE
    groups during the occupation of Ukraine—OUN (consisting of two branches: OUN-. Melnyk and the more radical OUN-Bandera) and UPA (created at the end 1942).
  70. [70]
    Holocaust Amnesia: The Ukrainian Diaspora and the Genocide of ...
    Soviet prisons following the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Many of them were instead murdered by the NKVD during the days that followed. According to.
  71. [71]
    Chapter 5. UPA's Conflict with the Red Army and Soviet Security ...
    ... OUN, which was prepared to cooperate with the German occupiers long after the Bandera wing turned hostile.37 Its members have not been found guilty of war ...Missing: relations | Show results with:relations
  72. [72]
    True Story of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) as Recorded in ...
    Apr 22, 2023 · The main goal of the UPA movement was the restoration of Ukraine's independence, and an armed struggle was chosen as the means for achieving that goal.<|control11|><|separator|>
  73. [73]
    10 myths about the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA): who and why ...
    May 10, 2017 · In October-November 1943, the UPA-ONS conducted 47 fights against German occupiers, and the UPA village self-defense clashed with them 125 times ...
  74. [74]
    OUN-UPA
    The moderate members remained loyal to Andriy Melnyk, while the radical supported Stepan Bandera. ... Carpatho-Ukraine offered the first armed resistance ...
  75. [75]
    Wartime Occupation and Peacetime Alien Rule
    The Rada's inability to deliver the promised grain frustrated the occupiers, who looked the other way as a conservative, landowning, former general, Pavlo ...
  76. [76]
    Ukrainian Nationalism, Activities Sponsored by Nazi Germany
    Ukrainian National lists in Western Ukraine viewed the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union as a liberation, and welcomed the creation of a 'free' Ukraine within ...
  77. [77]
    Roman Shukhevych, Stepan Bandera, Nachtigall and Roland
    Members of the OUN(b) were rounded up and Bandera was arrested in Krakow on July 5, 1941 and Stetsko in Lviv on July 12. Both refused to retract the ...
  78. [78]
    [PDF] Cold War Allies: The Origins of CIA's Relationship with Ukrainian ...
    Even though OUN's enthusiasm diminished after the Nazis failed to support Ukrainian statehood, many Ukrainians continued to fight alongside the Germans until ...
  79. [79]
    Ethnic Cleansing, Genocide or Ukrainian-Polish Conflict? The Mass ...
    Apr 25, 2018 · In contrast, in Poland, the mass murder of Poles in Volhynia is often characterized as genocide. A research question is whether this was a ...<|separator|>
  80. [80]
    [PDF] Connections Between the Holocaust and the Genocide of
    Key Words: Holocaust, Genocide, Massacre of Poles in Volhynia and Galicia, Organization of. Ukrainian Nationalists, World War II in Ukraine. Between the years ...
  81. [81]
    Ethnic Cleansing, Genocide or Ukrainian-Polish War in Volhynia?
    the “Euromaidan” in Ukraine in 2014. The Polish Senate and Sejm in 2013 declared the massacre of Poles in Volhynia as ethnic. cleansing with features of ...
  82. [82]
    The Genocide on Poles Conducted by the OUN-B and UPA - History
    Contrary to the truth, they suggest that the Volhynian massacres were not the first, but the second stage of a bloody Polish-Ukrainian conflict. According to ...
  83. [83]
    Ukrainian 'Working through the Past' in the Context of the Polish ...
    May 18, 2020 · The Ukrainian historiography, apart from sparse exceptions, avoids the term 'massacre' and 'genocide' in reference to the events in Volhynia, ...
  84. [84]
    The Polish-Ukrainian Battle for the Past
    Dec 15, 2017 · A dispute about the different interpretations of their common past is poisoning relations between Poland and Ukraine in ways that benefit ...
  85. [85]
    The Collaboration of Ukrainian Nationalists with Nazi Germany
    The anti-Jewish massacres in Lviv in June/July 1941 did not occurby chance, but were the fruits of infamous abetment, and Bandera's OUN-B hadaccounted for a ...
  86. [86]
    A Slaughter of Jews in Ukraine - Tablet Magazine
    Jul 5, 2023 · On June 30, 1941, Czeslawa Budynska, her sister, and a neighbor girl were put to cleaning up battle sites in the city.
  87. [87]
    The Romani Genocide in Volhynia, 1941–1944 in - Brill
    Oct 18, 2024 · Still, the cases of massacres of Roma during this time are unknown. In early 1942, approximately a similar number of Jews were still alive in ...
  88. [88]
    How Ukraine's History Impacts its War with Russia
    Jul 18, 2024 · The fact that Bandera, a Nazi collaborator, has become widely popular has played a role in validating this for Russians and their propaganda, ...
  89. [89]
  90. [90]
  91. [91]
    [PDF] The Fascist Kernel of Ukrainian Genocidal Nationalism
    Until 1945 the OUN had three leaders: Ievhen Konovalets', Andrii Mel'nyk, and Stepan Bandera. All of them claimed to be the leaders of all Ukrainian people and ...<|separator|>
  92. [92]
    The Soviet/Russian War against the Ukrainian Nationalist Movement ...
    OUN(B)'s ruthless internal Security Service. Hunted and hounded on all sides and surrounded by genuine agents provocateurs, the SB was prone to ...
  93. [93]
    [PDF] TO CATCH A NAZI - CIA
    Obscured is the more complex story of OUN collaboration with. Nazi war crimes, and the OUN's own fas- cist and racist ideology. Goutstand. 25X1. 25X1. Sanitized ...
  94. [94]
    [PDF] TO CATCH A NAZI - CIA
    All that can be seen in these accounts is a fiery commitment to an in- dependent Ukrainian state and the re- pulting conflicts with both German and. Soviet ...Missing: internal executions
  95. [95]
    Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists - Wikipedia
    The older, more moderate members supported Andriy Melnyk's OUN-M, while the younger and more radical members supported Stepan Bandera's OUN-B. On 30 June 1941 ...Ukrainian Military Organization · Proclamation of a Ukrainian state · Dmytro Dontsov
  96. [96]
  97. [97]
    [PDF] Battle for the People: Ideological Conflict between Soviet Partisans ...
    Nazis upon invasion in 1941, due to internal struggles the organization split into two competing camps, the OUN-M under Andrii Melnyk and the OUN-B under Stepan.Missing: opponents | Show results with:opponents
  98. [98]
    Historian Timothy Snyder whitewashes the crimes of the Ukrainian ...
    May 26, 2022 · Bandera aimed to make of Ukraine a one-party fascist dictatorship without national minorities. During World War II, his followers killed many ...
  99. [99]
    Hero Or Villain? Historical Ukrainian Figure Symbolizes Today's Feud
    May 20, 2014 · So Bandera's group did pledge allegiance to Hitler's Nazi Germany. Bandera said he wanted ideological and ethnic purity for Ukraine. The Germans ...
  100. [100]
    Ukraine and its national heroes: time for changes?
    Feb 9, 2020 · In January 2010, during the last days of his presidency, Viktor Yushchenko had declared Bandera a “Hero of Ukraine,” a move that provoked ...<|separator|>
  101. [101]
    Out: Moscow Avenue, In: Bandera Avenue - Jul. 14, 2016 | KyivPost
    Jul 14, 2016 · The Kyiv City Council renamed Moscow Avenue in Kyiv after the iconic nationalist leader Stepan Bandera on July 7.
  102. [102]
    Kyiv Renames 'Moscow Avenue' After Contentious Nationalist Hero
    Jul 7, 2016 · The street will be named after Stepan Bandera, a Ukrainian nationalist resistance leader who fought both Soviet and Nazi forces during World War II.Missing: history | Show results with:history
  103. [103]
    Hundreds Of Ukrainians March To Honor Controversial Nationalist ...
    Jan 1, 2022 · Hundreds of Ukrainians held a torchlight march in the capital, Kyiv, to mark the birthday of the controversial nationalist leader Stepan Bandera.Missing: commemoration streets stamps
  104. [104]
    Stepan Bandera postage stamp. Price, buy, description | PostStampUA
    The size of the stamp is 30 * 33 mm. Postage stamps were printed in 4*4 sheets of 16 pieces per letter. The face value of the stamp is UAH 1. Circulation - ...Missing: monuments streets marches<|separator|>
  105. [105]
    Polish presidential candidate clashes with Ukrainian mayor over ...
    Feb 26, 2025 · Bandera's followers were responsible for the Volhynia massacres of 1943-45, during which around 100,000 ethnic Polish civilians – mostly women ...
  106. [106]
    Law banning glorification of Ukrainian nationalist Bandera proposed ...
    Dec 4, 2024 · The law would place Banderism alongside Nazism, fascism and communism, propagation of which is already punishable under Poland's criminal code by up to three ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  107. [107]
    Poland intervenes after Ukrainian ambassador denies wartime ...
    Jul 1, 2022 · Poland's foreign ministry has intervened after Ukraine's ambassador to Germany denied that Ukrainian nationalist leader Stepan Bandera was responsible for the ...Missing: rejected | Show results with:rejected
  108. [108]
    Israeli ambassador 'shocked' at Ukraine's honoring of Nazi ...
    Dec 15, 2018 · Ambassador Joel Lion condemned the Lviv region's decision to name 2019 the year of Stepan Bandera in a statement he published Tuesday.
  109. [109]
    World Jewish Congress troubled by honoring of Nazi collaborator in ...
    Dec 18, 2018 · The World Jewish Congress is troubled by reports that the Lviv Oblast in Ukraine has declared 2019 to be the Year of Stepan Bandera.Missing: criticism | Show results with:criticism
  110. [110]
    Ukraine tells Israel not to criticize veneration for Nazi collaborators
    Jan 12, 2020 · Diplomat says Israeli protests about events honoring Stepan Bandera and others are 'counterproductive,' after ambassador condemned Kiev in open ...
  111. [111]
    Ukraine's Berlin envoy draws Israeli, Polish ire with views on WW2 ...
    Jul 1, 2022 · But an interview with journalist blogger Tilo Jung published on Thursday in which he said Bandera was not a "mass murderer of Poles and Jews" ...
  112. [112]
    Bandera mythologies and their traps for Ukraine - openDemocracy
    Jun 22, 2016 · The mythologising of Stepan Bandera · Decommunisation and ideological diversity · Ignoring ideological apathy · What about democratic alternatives?
  113. [113]
    Ukrainian government spends millions on monuments and streets to ...
    Mar 8, 2023 · What was formerly “Moscow Avenue” in Kiev was renamed to the Avenue of Stepan Bandera—another Ukrainian Nazi collaborator, and leader of the ...
  114. [114]
    Looking for Stepan Bandera: The Myth of Ukrainian Nationalism and ...
    Sep 1, 2022 · Abstract. The so-called 'denazification' of Ukraine and the need to free the country from the radical nationalists was used by the Russian ...Missing: biography - - | Show results with:biography - -
  115. [115]
    New Ukraine: a breakthrough at great cost
    Feb 22, 2023 · The best example of this is the Ukrainian nationalist leader Stepan Bandera, who functions almost exclusively as a personification of steadfast ...
  116. [116]
    A Controversial Figure: Stepan Bandera - Hungarian Conservative
    Nov 11, 2022 · As a radical and active Ukrainian nationalist, Stepan Bandera was heavily involved in the assassination of the Polish minister of interior.Missing: participation youth
  117. [117]
    Russian propaganda's neo-Nazi myth - Forum for Ukrainian Studies
    Jul 9, 2022 · Without a doubt, the personality of Stepan Bandera is complex, which makes him an easy target for Russian propaganda.