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2019 Pulwama attack

The 2019 Pulwama attack was a fidayeen suicide car bombing conducted on 14 February 2019 by the Pakistan-based terrorist organization Jaish-e-Mohammed against a convoy of Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel on the Jammu-Srinagar National Highway near Lethpora in Pulwama district, Jammu and Kashmir, India.^[1]^[2] The assailant, a local Kashmiri recruit named Adil Ahmad Dar, rammed an explosives-laden vehicle into one of the buses, killing 40 CRPF jawans and injuring dozens more in an assault that underscored the Islamist insurgency's tactics of targeting security forces to disrupt Indian administration in the region.^[2]^[3] Jaish-e-Mohammed, founded by Masood Azhar and operating primarily from Pakistan, claimed responsibility for the bombing shortly after, aligning with its pattern of cross-border operations aimed at fomenting separatism in Kashmir through violence against Indian personnel.^[1] The group's involvement was substantiated by India's National Investigation Agency through forensic analysis, including DNA matching and tracing of explosives procurement funded to the tune of over 5 lakh rupees, revealing logistical support from JeM handlers across the border.^[3] Despite Pakistan's denials of state complicity, the attack's execution relied on safe havens and resources in Pakistani territory, as documented in India's dossier presented to Islamabad and international partners.^[4] The incident triggered widespread condemnation in India, mourning processions, and heightened security measures, while prompting the Indian government's Balakot airstrike on 26 February targeting a JeM training facility in Pakistan, marking a shift toward preemptive action against terror infrastructure.^[1] It exacerbated India-Pakistan tensions, leading to aerial skirmishes and diplomatic fallout, including India's suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty and expulsion of Pakistani diplomats, amid accusations from Pakistan of Indian false-flag operations—claims contradicted by JeM's self-avowed role and evidentiary trails from official probes.^[1]^[4] The attack's legacy includes accelerated counter-terrorism efforts, such as the abrogation of Article 370 later that year, aimed at addressing root causes of radicalization and infiltration in the Kashmir valley.^[5]

Historical Context

Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir

The insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir began to escalate in the late 1980s, triggered by widespread perceptions of electoral fraud in the 1987 state assembly elections, which prompted local youth to join separatist outfits like the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) for armed struggle aimed at independence. This initial indigenous phase rapidly evolved due to external intervention, as Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence directed support toward Islamist groups, supplanting secular nationalists with factions like Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) and enabling the infiltration of foreign militants trained in Afghan jihad camps and Pakistani facilities.^[6] Pakistani logistical, financial, and doctrinal aid sustained the conflict, with at least 91 insurgent training camps operating in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir by the early 2000s, many active since the 1990s.^[6] Violence peaked in the 1990s, marked by intensified attacks on security forces, abductions, and civilian targeting, culminating in annual fatalities exceeding 2,900 in 1996—comprising 1,339 civilians, 370 security personnel, and 1,210 terrorists—per data aggregated from Indian police records by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP).^[7] Between 1988 and 2000, terrorist incidents totaled 43,956, claiming 26,226 lives, with civilians accounting for about 40% (10,310 deaths), reflecting patterns of indiscriminate bombings, ambushes on convoys, and kidnappings to coerce support or extract ransoms.^[8] Notable escalations included the forced exodus of over 100,000 Kashmiri Pandits from the Valley starting in early 1990, driven by targeted killings of around 219 Pandits by 1998 and mosque announcements threatening non-Muslims, amid a broader surge in Islamist radicalization.^[9] Local radicalization accelerated as Pakistan-backed groups like HM, initially comprising Kashmiri recruits seeking merger with Pakistan, and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which drew foreign fighters but also indoctrinated Valley youth through madrasas and propaganda, drawing thousands into militancy.^[6] HM's recruitment focused on local grievances amplified by jihadist ideology, while LeT's operations, supported by Pakistani charities like Jamaat-ud-Dawa, integrated Kashmiri locals into broader transnational networks, with biographical analyses of over 900 deceased LeT militants revealing a mix of Pakistani and regional recruits sustaining asymmetric warfare against Indian forces.^[10] This hybrid of indigenous participation and foreign influx, causally linked to sustained Pakistani state sponsorship rather than purely endogenous factors, entrenched the insurgency's lethality through the decade.^[6]

Pakistan-Sponsored Militant Groups

The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan's premier military intelligence agency, has historically channeled resources from the Afghan jihad era—where it coordinated U.S.-backed mujahideen fighters against Soviet forces from 1979 to 1989—toward sustaining insurgency in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir.^[6] Following the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989, surplus arms, trained operatives, and ideological networks from Afghan battlefields were redirected across the border, enabling the infiltration of battle-hardened militants into Kashmir by the early 1990s; this shift was facilitated by ISI safe havens in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).^[11] Such repurposing created a pipeline for foreign fighters, including Arab and Central Asian veterans, who numbered in the thousands and contributed to the escalation of attacks starting in 1989–1990, with over 3,000 militants reportedly crossing into Kashmir annually at peak infiltration periods.^[6] ISI support encompasses training camps, financial aid, arms supplies, and doctrinal guidance, with verifiable operations traced to at least 91 documented facilities in PoK and Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) as of the early 2000s.^[6] U.S. assessments, including State Department reports, have identified Pakistan as a persistent safe haven for terrorist networks targeting India, where groups receive sanctuary despite official bans, enabling recruitment and planning from Pakistani soil.^[12] A Brookings Institution analysis attributes this to Pakistan's military doctrine of using proxies for "strategic depth" against India, involving indirect control through funding and logistics while maintaining operational deniability via non-state actors.^[13] Pakistan's deniability tactics include public disavowals of involvement, even as evidence from captured militants' confessions—such as admissions of ISI-directed training in Muridke and Bahawalpur camps—and intercepted communications reveal handler directives from across the Line of Control.^[14] This pattern mirrors earlier cross-border operations, like the 2008 Mumbai attacks by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), where 10 gunmen trained in Pakistan executed a coordinated assault killing 166, with ISI-linked elements providing initial support and safe houses, underscoring continuity in state-tolerated infrastructure for extraterritorial strikes.^[15]^[16] Despite post-9/11 pressures, including U.S. intelligence acknowledgments of dual ISI policies (cracking down on anti-Pakistan groups while shielding anti-India ones), core networks persist, as evidenced by ongoing FATF scrutiny of Pakistan's terror financing lapses since 2018.^[13]^[12]

Jaish-e-Mohammed's Formation and Operations

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) was established in January 2000 by Maulana Masood Azhar in Bahawalpur, Pakistan, following his release on December 31, 1999, as part of the hostage exchange during the hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight IC-814 by militants linked to his former group, Harkat-ul-Ansar (later renamed Harkat-ul-Mujahideen).^[17]^[18] Azhar, who had been imprisoned in India since his 1994 arrest for promoting militancy in Kashmir, used the platform to recruit from existing jihadist networks, drawing initial funding and operatives from Pakistani sources sympathetic to the Kashmir cause.^[17] The group's ideology is grounded in Deobandi Sunni extremism, emphasizing armed jihad to expel Indian forces from Jammu and Kashmir and ultimately establish Islamic governance there under Pakistani influence or caliphate rule.^[19] Azhar's writings and speeches, including fatwas declaring war on India as a religious duty, frame the conflict as a defensive jihad against perceived Hindu aggression, with propaganda videos glorifying martyrdom and targeting non-Muslims.^[20] This doctrinal stance aligns with broader South Asian jihadi movements that blend local separatism with global Islamist goals, rejecting negotiations in favor of fidayeen (suicide squad) tactics.^[21] JeM conducted numerous high-profile attacks prior to 2019, specializing in fidayeen assaults and suicide bombings against Indian military and civilian targets. On December 13, 2001, JeM militants stormed the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, killing nine people including security personnel, in an operation that nearly escalated to full-scale war between India and Pakistan.^[22] The group claimed responsibility for the January 2016 Pathankot airbase attack, where fidayeen operatives killed seven security personnel, and has been attributed by Indian investigations to the September 2016 Uri army camp assault that claimed 19 soldiers' lives, though JeM's direct role in the latter remains disputed amid claims of collaboration with other groups.^[23] Overall, JeM has been linked to over 20 major incidents in Kashmir and beyond, often using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and trained infiltrators.^[24] Indian intelligence agencies have consistently alleged operational and logistical support for JeM from Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), citing confessions from captured militants, training camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, and financial trails uncovered in raids.^[24] Evidence includes ISI-issued arms recovered from JeM operatives and intercepted communications referencing handler directives, as detailed in Indian dossiers submitted to the United Nations.^[1] Pakistan has rejected these accusations, maintaining that JeM operates independently and that Azhar resides freely despite a 2002 government ban on the group, a denial critiqued by observers for inconsistencies with documented safe havens in Punjab province.^[25]

Prelude to the Attack

Intelligence Inputs and Warnings

In the weeks preceding the February 14, 2019, attack, Indian intelligence agencies disseminated multiple inputs warning of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) plans for fidayeen-style assaults on security force convoys in south Kashmir, including areas along the Jammu-Srinagar national highway such as Pulwama and Awantipora.^[26]^[27] These alerts, shared via the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) platform of the Intelligence Bureau with entities including the Director General of Police (DGP) Jammu and Kashmir, Inspector General of Police (IGP) Kashmir, and Additional Director General (ADG) Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), highlighted JeM's "Qisas mission" to retaliate for recent militant killings, drawing on patterns from prior JeM operations in Pulwama and Sopore.^[26] Specific inputs included a January 2 alert on the "Qisas mission" targeting south Kashmir following the January 1 killing of JeM commander Sameer Ahmad Mir, amplified on January 3 with references to historical JeM attacks in the region.^[26]^[27] On January 7, reports noted a foreign terrorist training local youths in Shopian to fabricate and deploy improvised explosive devices (IEDs), signaling heightened local radicalization risks.^[26] Further details emerged on January 18 regarding approximately 20 local militants alongside foreign mercenaries in Awantipora, Pulwama, preparing a major operation; January 24 identified JeM operative Mudasir Khan plotting a fidayeen strike in Awantipora with two to three foreign terrorists; and January 25 pinpointed Khan's group in Midoora and Lam Tral villages, eyeing Awantipora or Pampore as targets.^[26]^[27] Later warnings intensified focus on explosive threats: a February 9 input flagged a JeM retaliation for the hanging of Afzal Guru, while February 12 referenced a social media handle signaling IED blasts along security routes, and February 13 cautioned broadly of IED attacks on force movements across Jammu and Kashmir.^[26] These reports underscored vulnerabilities inherent to large convoys on the Jammu-Srinagar highway, a corridor prone to ambushes due to its terrain and civilian traffic integration, though specific pre-2019 ambush data on road-opening parties was not detailed in the inputs.^[27] The convergence of local recruitment, foreign guidance in IED handling, and targeted reconnaissance in Pulwama vicinity pointed to escalating JeM capabilities for vehicle-borne or pedestrian-borne assaults.^[26]

CRPF Convoy Vulnerabilities

The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) conducted routine large-scale troop rotations along the Jammu-Srinagar National Highway following Republic Day on January 26, with heightened personnel movements in early February to reinforce deployments in Kashmir amid ongoing insurgency threats. These rotations often involved convoys exceeding 2,000 personnel to efficiently transport battalions between Jammu bases and Srinagar, as airlifting large numbers was logistically constrained by limited helicopter assets and weather conditions in the region. On February 14, 2019, the targeted convoy carried over 2,500 CRPF personnel in 78 vehicles, stretching several kilometers and creating a predictable, high-value target on a fixed route.^[28]^[29]^[30] The highway's south Kashmir segment, passing through Pulwama district, amplified operational risks due to its terrain—narrow, winding roads flanked by orchards and villages that provided concealment for militants staging ambushes. This area had a documented pattern of attacks on security convoys, including grenade lobbing and IED placements, as militants exploited local knowledge of convoy timings and civilian traffic integration. The allowance of civilian vehicles alongside military convoys further compromised security, enabling potential infiltration by hostile elements without dedicated route clearance.^[29]^[31]^[32] CRPF faced systemic resource limitations, including insufficient mine-resistant vehicles suited for IED threats, relying instead on standard buses and trucks with limited underbody armor that proved inadequate against high-explosive VBIEDs. Pre-attack audits and post-incident probes highlighted that convoy lengths over 2 kilometers hindered rapid dispersal or evasion, while the absence of integrated anti-IED escorts or electronic jammers left formations exposed to asymmetric tactics honed by groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed. These gaps stemmed from stretched logistics in sustaining over 60,000 paramilitary troops in Kashmir, prioritizing volume over hardened transport amid budget constraints.^[33]^[32]^[34]

The Attack

Planning and Execution

The 2019 Pulwama attack was executed as a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) suicide bombing targeting a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) convoy traveling along National Highway 44 (NH44), the Jammu-Srinagar highway, near Lethpora in Pulwama district on 14 February 2019.^[35] The perpetrator, Adil Ahmad Dar, a 22-year-old local from Kakapora village in Pulwama, drove a modified Mahindra Scorpio SUV directly into one of the convoy's buses at approximately 3:10 p.m. local time, detonating the payload upon impact.^[36] This timing exploited the convoy's vulnerability during a routine road opening patrol (ROP) movement, when over 2,500 CRPF personnel in about 78 vehicles were bunched together on a narrow, two-lane stretch of the highway prone to traffic bottlenecks.^[37] Forensic analysis of the blast site revealed the use of an estimated 300-350 kilograms of high explosives, primarily military-grade RDX (cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine) mixed with ammonium nitrate and other local fertilizers to amplify the yield, forming a potent IED capable of creating a crater over 20 feet wide.^[38] ^[39] The RDX component, not locally producible in such quantities, was smuggled across the Line of Control from Pakistan in small tranches over months, concealed in everyday items like gas cylinders, coal bags, and carried by couriers including women and children to evade detection.^[39] ^[40] Assembly occurred in concealed locations in Pulwama's villages, with the device wired to a detonator triggered by the impact or remote if needed, as evidenced by residue traces and shrapnel patterns consistent with shaped-charge enhancements for armor-piercing effects.^[41] Dar's preparation included reconnaissance of convoy routes, filmed in a pre-attack video where he pledged commitment and detailed his intent, indicating prior surveillance of CRPF movement patterns along NH44.^[42] The operation's tactical design prioritized the convoy's predictable daily transit during peak hours, leveraging the highway's chokepoints and limited escape routes for security forces, a method refined from earlier IED tactics in the region but escalated in scale for this VBIED.^[43]

Casualties and Immediate Impact

The suicide bombing killed 40 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel, the deadliest single assault on Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir since 2000.^[35]^[44] The perpetrator, a Jaish-e-Mohammed suicide bomber, also perished upon detonation of the vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (IED).^[42] The IED, containing approximately 80 kg of high-grade RDX explosives, was driven into a bus within a convoy of 78 vehicles transporting over 2,500 CRPF personnel along the Jammu-Srinagar National Highway near Lethpora.^[45]^[28] The resulting blast pulverized the targeted bus, inflicted structural damage on adjacent vehicles through shrapnel and shockwave effects, and littered the site with debris across a wide radius, briefly halting highway traffic for rescue operations.^[46]^[29] Local security units and medical teams responded immediately, ferrying the severely wounded to nearby facilities while recovering fragmented remains amid chaotic scenes described by bystanders as a thunderous detonation producing a towering fireball and acrid smoke.^[37] A handful of personnel escaped with injuries from peripheral blast effects, underscoring the attack's concentrated lethality on the primary impact zone.^[44]

Claim of Responsibility and Attribution

Jaish-e-Mohammed's Involvement

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) publicly claimed responsibility for the 14 February 2019 Pulwama attack shortly after its execution, releasing a video that identified the suicide bomber as Adil Ahmad Dar, a 20-year-old local resident from Gundibagh village in Pulwama district's Tral area.^[47] The video depicted Dar driving the explosive-laden vehicle toward the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) convoy, aligning with JeM's pattern of using propaganda footage to glorify operations and recruit followers.^[48] JeM chief Masood Azhar, the group's founder and a UN-designated terrorist, endorsed the attack in subsequent statements, framing it as retaliation against Indian forces in Kashmir.^[49] Dar, previously employed at a local sawmill and a school dropout after Class 12, had become radicalized following alleged encounters with security forces and joined JeM approximately one year prior to the attack, around early 2018.^[50] His recruitment reflected JeM's increasing reliance on local Kashmiri youth for high-impact operations, shifting from predominantly Pakistani operatives to homegrown militants amid intensified counterinsurgency pressures.^[51] Family accounts indicated Dar's path involved exposure to militant ideology after reported beatings by troops, leading to his disappearance and training with JeM handlers.^[52] The attack's suicide bombing modality was consistent with JeM's established fidayeen tactics, which emphasize explosive-laden vehicle ramming or individual assaults to maximize casualties against security targets, as seen in prior operations like the 2001 Indian Parliament attack.^[53] JeM had previously attempted suicide missions in Kashmir, including training local recruits for such roles, though Pulwama marked a rare successful large-scale fidayeen strike by a solo local operative.^[51] This admission via video and Azhar's praise served as JeM's initial attribution, distinguishing it from denials by Pakistani officials who questioned the group's operational capacity without external support.^[49]

Evidence of Pakistani Support

The National Investigation Agency's (NIA) charge sheet in the Pulwama attack case identified Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) chief Maulana Masood Azhar and his brother Abdul Rauf Azhar, both based in Pakistan, as key conspirators who directed the operation at Pakistan's behest.^[54]^[55] Umar Farooq, a Pakistani national and senior JeM commander who served as the attack's operational handler, coordinated logistics and training from across the Line of Control (LoC), including smuggling approximately 105 kg of RDX explosives—35 kg each carried by three Pakistani operatives—over four months during favorable lunar phases to evade detection.^[54] Forensic analysis of the IED residue confirmed the use of military-grade RDX mixed with ammonium nitrate and nitro-glycerin, consistent with materiel sourced from Pakistani territory, as infiltration routes via Shakargarh corridor were used by the handlers, mirroring prior JeM operations.^[56]^[54] Intercepted communications from Farooq's recovered Samsung Galaxy Note smartphone revealed over 16 hours of voice notes and digital chats with Pakistan-based JeM leaders, including Ammar Alvi, approving the suicide bombing and receiving updates on preparations; photographs of assembled IEDs were transmitted to these handlers in early February 2019.^[54]^[57] These intercepts, corroborated by digital forensics, demonstrated real-time guidance from across the LoC, with Farooq directing local recruits like the suicide bomber Adil Ahmad Dar in weapon handling and target selection.^[54] The NIA traced Farooq's links to al-Qaeda training in Afghanistan's Sangin district in 2016, followed by JeM-specific indoctrination, underscoring cross-border operational support.^[58]^[54] JeM maintained training facilities in Balakot, Pakistan, which Indian intelligence identified as a hub for fidayeen (suicide squad) preparation linked to the Pulwama plot; satellite imagery and post-strike assessments by the Indian Air Force indicated these camps hosted 300-400 militants undergoing explosives and assault training prior to infiltration.^[54] Farooq's role in dispatching cadres from such facilities aligned with JeM's pattern of LoC crossings for high-impact strikes, with the charge sheet naming 19 accused, including multiple Pakistan-based figures, as evidence of state-tolerated terrorist infrastructure enabling the attack.^[55]^[54]

Investigation

National Investigation Agency Probe

The National Investigation Agency (NIA) assumed control of the Pulwama attack investigation shortly after the February 14, 2019, incident, re-registering the case under its jurisdiction on February 20, 2019, and naming Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) in the First Information Report (FIR) for orchestrating the suicide bombing.^[59] Initial raids commenced in late February 2019, targeting locations in Jammu and Kashmir linked to suspected overground workers (OGWs) who provided logistical support, such as transportation and shelter, to the militants involved in planning and execution.^[60] These operations uncovered preliminary leads on local facilitators, emphasizing the NIA's focus on tracing domestic networks aiding cross-border terrorism. Forensic breakthroughs included DNA profiling and explosive residue analysis from blast debris scattered across the site, which matched samples to the suicide bomber Adil Ahmad Dar and confirmed the use of ammonium nitrate-based improvised explosive devices (IEDs) exceeding 300 kilograms.^[61] Digital forensics played a pivotal role, with recovery of Dar's pre-attack video will from militant devices, in which he pledged allegiance to JeM and outlined his intent for the operation, alongside IED assembly instructions and training materials extracted from seized phones and laptops.^[36] Further analysis of a mobile phone belonging to JeM commander Umar Farooq, retrieved post-encounter, yielded selfies, videos, and encrypted chats documenting reconnaissance of CRPF routes, explosive procurement from Pakistan, and coordination with handlers across the border, establishing the conspiracy's timeline and JeM's operational chain.^[62]^[57] By August 25, 2020, the NIA compiled a 13,500-page chargesheet filed in a special court in Jammu, indicting 19 individuals—including JeM chief Masood Azhar and Pakistani operatives—for offenses under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and Explosive Substances Act, based primarily on this amalgam of digital, forensic, and documentary evidence.^[63]^[64] The document detailed the attack's preparation, including smuggling of RDX explosives and recruitment of local recruits, underscoring the evidentiary chain linking Indian OGWs to JeM's Pakistan-based infrastructure without reliance on intercepted communications alone.^[65]

Key Findings and Arrests in India

The National Investigation Agency's (NIA) investigation into the 2019 Pulwama attack uncovered a local support network in Jammu and Kashmir that provided logistics, shelter, and materials to Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) operatives, including overground workers who facilitated militant movements and procured explosive components domestically.^[64] Key findings highlighted the use of locally sourced chemicals and online purchases for improvised explosive devices (IEDs), with one accused procuring materials via e-commerce platforms to assemble bomb components.^[66] These revelations pointed to vulnerabilities in domestic supply chains exploited by militants, though primary explosives like RDX were traced to cross-border smuggling channels.^[67] By mid-2020, the NIA had arrested seven suspects in India, primarily from Jammu and Kashmir, dismantling elements of the local JeM facilitation ring.^[68] Notable arrests included a Kashmiri sawmill owner in July 2020, charged with harboring JeM terrorists and supplying them high-end mobile phones for communication; Mohd. Iqbal Rather, arrested earlier that month for aiding terrorist mobility; and Shakir Bashir Magrey, detained in February 2020 for logistical support to militants.^[68]^[69]^[70] Additional detentions in March 2020 involved a father-daughter duo in Jammu for harboring attackers and two others linked to explosive procurement.^[71]^[72] Operations yielded seizures of arms, ammunition, and communication devices, exposing hawala-linked funding routes used by JeM affiliates for operational costs, though specific monetary hauls in these arrests were tied to broader terror financing probes.^[73] In August 2020, the NIA filed a 13,500-page chargesheet in a special Jammu court against 19 accused, detailing their roles in conspiracy, execution, and support, with charges under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and Explosive Substances Act.^[74] As of February 2023, seven of the named individuals remained in custody, while eight had been killed in encounters.^[75] Court proceedings advanced slowly, with limited convictions among direct facilitators; separate cases saw convictions for peripheral support, such as a Bengaluru student sentenced to five years in 2022 for publicly endorsing the attack online.^[76] Six suspects, including key JeM handlers, remained at large as per the chargesheet.^[77]

Security and Intelligence Controversies

Debates on Lapses and Oversights

Former Jammu and Kashmir Governor Satyapal Malik alleged that the Pulwama attack stemmed from systemic security lapses, including inadequate intelligence handling and operational negligence, which he claimed were suppressed by directives from Prime Minister Narendra Modi and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval to avoid public disclosure.^[78] ^[79] Malik, who held office at the time, described these failures as encompassing incompetence in threat assessment and convoy protection, attributing the high casualties to preventable errors rather than isolated militant actions.^[80] Investigations highlighted eleven ignored intelligence inputs between December 2018 and February 2019, which specifically warned of a fidayeen suicide attack involving an explosive-laden vehicle targeting security force convoys in south Kashmir's Pulwama-Lethpora belt.^[26] These alerts, sourced from multiple agencies, detailed risks of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) but were not translated into heightened road sanitization or route alterations, raising questions about gaps between input receipt and actionable response.^[26] An internal Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) inquiry pinpointed the convoy's configuration as a critical vulnerability, noting that 2,500 personnel traveled in 78 vehicles over a 3-kilometer stretch without sufficient spacing or aerial overwatch, amplifying exposure to the suicide bomber's 300-350 kg RDX-laden assault.^[81] ^[32] This setup deviated from standard protocols for dispersing large movements, with debates focusing on why road transit was prioritized over airlifting despite prior requests for aircraft support, potentially due to logistical constraints in Jammu and Kashmir's terrain.^[82] In empirical contrast to preceding Kashmir incidents, such as the 2016 Uri attack where intelligence enabled rapid perimeter security despite infiltration, Pulwama exposed execution shortfalls amid a reported decline in overall terror strikes from 2014-2018 per Ministry of Home Affairs data (from 1,086 incidents in 2014 to 614 in 2018).^[83] Critics argued that while inputs existed—similar to those preempting smaller ambushes in prior years—causal breakdowns occurred in inter-agency coordination and IED countermeasures, including limited deployment of vehicle-borne detection systems along the Jammu-Srinagar highway.^[81] These lapses fueled discussions on whether resource shortages or procedural rigidity hindered adaptation to evolving VBIED tactics observed in earlier low-casualty events.^[84]

Government Response to Failure Claims

The Indian central government rejected assertions of intelligence failure preceding the Pulwama attack. On June 26, 2019, Minister of State for Home Affairs G. Kishan Reddy informed the Rajya Sabha that no such failure occurred, emphasizing ongoing coordination and real-time intelligence sharing among agencies, while attributing persistent terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir to cross-border sponsorship.^[85] In response to the attack's exposure of vulnerabilities in troop movements, security protocols were revised promptly. Convoys were limited to a maximum of 40 vehicles, down from larger formations of up to 78, with increased use of bulletproof vehicles resistant to low-intensity improvised explosive devices.^[86] Civilian vehicle movement on highways was restricted during convoy transits, road opening parties were strengthened for enhanced threat detection, and coordination between central intelligence, Jammu and Kashmir police, and the army was intensified.^[86] Additional measures included expanded airlift options for personnel via more frequent flights to Srinagar and upgraded camp perimeters with night vision devices and real-time intelligence feeds.^[86] Subsequent politicized allegations of systemic lapses, including those by former Jammu and Kashmir Governor Satya Pal Malik in 2023 claiming cover-ups and inadequate air transport for forces, were rebutted by Home Minister Amit Shah, who stated the government had "nothing that needs to be hidden" and welcomed scrutiny.^[79] The National Investigation Agency's probe, initiated on February 20, 2019, and culminating in a 13,800-page charge sheet filed on August 25, 2020—after 16 months of evidence collection including forensic traces of smuggled explosives, financial hawala trails, and communications linking perpetrators to Jaish-e-Mohammed leadership—demonstrated rigorous accountability, with 19 accused named, including key Pakistani operatives.^[87]^[54]

Indian Counteractions

Militant Eliminations Post-Attack

In the immediate aftermath of the 14 February 2019 Pulwama attack, Indian security forces intensified cordon-and-search operations targeting Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) hideouts in Jammu and Kashmir, leveraging specific intelligence to neutralize key operatives involved in planning and execution.^[88] On 18 February 2019, a joint team comprising the Indian Army's Rashtriya Rifles, Jammu and Kashmir Police's Special Operations Group, and Central Reserve Police Force personnel conducted a 12-hour encounter in the Pinglana forests of Pulwama district, resulting in the elimination of Abdul Rasheed Ghazi, alias Kamran, a Pakistani national and top JeM commander identified as the on-ground mastermind of the suicide bombing.^[89]^[90] Ghazi, an Afghan war veteran and close aide to JeM chief Masood Azhar, was killed alongside two local JeM militants, with security forces recovering AK-series rifles, grenades, and Pakistani-made explosives from the site, confirming their involvement in recent attacks.^[91]^[92] The operation was triggered by actionable human intelligence pinpointing the militants' location, enabling a swift raid that prevented their escape or regrouping.^[93] Indian Army's Chinar Corps commander Lieutenant General K.S. Dhillon stated that these actions had eliminated the entire JeM top leadership in the Kashmir Valley within 100 hours of the attack, disrupting the group's command structure and operational capabilities.^[88]^[93] This decapitation strike created a leadership vacuum for JeM in the region, contributing to a subsequent decline in local Kashmiri recruitment, as no viable successors emerged to sustain momentum, according to assessments by Indian military officials in early 2019.^[94] The group's reliance on foreign commanders like Ghazi had previously bolstered infiltration and training efforts, and their removal hampered immediate reconstitution efforts in south Kashmir hotspots.^[88]

Balakot Airstrike

In response to the Pulwama attack, the Indian Air Force conducted airstrikes on February 26, 2019, targeting a Jaish-e-Mohammed training facility in Balakot, located in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.^[95]^[96] The operation, codenamed Bandar, involved 12 Mirage 2000 fighter jets crossing the Line of Control and deploying five one-tonne precision-guided munitions, including Spice 2000 bombs, to strike the camp's structures.^[97]^[96] Indian officials stated that the site was selected due to intelligence indicating the gathering of 200 to 325 JeM militants there following the Pulwama incident, with the strikes aimed at disrupting planned terrorist activities.^[96] Indian government assessments claimed the strikes eliminated a very large number of terrorists, estimated at over 300, based on pre-strike intelligence on camp occupancy and post-strike evaluations of structural destruction and human losses.^[98]^[96] Supporting evidence included debris from Indian-made munitions recovered at the site, confirming the precision of the hits on multiple buildings used for training and habitation.^[96] Satellite imagery analyzed by Indian sources showed pre- and post-strike changes consistent with bomb impacts on the forested ridge-top complex, though exact casualty verification relied primarily on human intelligence rather than visual confirmation alone.^[99] The strategic rationale framed the action as a measured, non-escalatory retaliation under India's right to self-defense, targeting exclusively non-state militant infrastructure without engaging Pakistani military assets, in adherence to international norms against terrorism.^[100] This approach sought to deter future cross-border attacks by demonstrating capability to strike deep into Pakistan while avoiding broader conflict escalation.^[99]

India-Pakistan Military Standoff

On 27 February 2019, following India's Balakot airstrike, the Pakistani Air Force launched airstrikes targeting six locations in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, which Indian officials described as an attempt to strike military installations along the Line of Control (LoC).^[101] The Indian Air Force (IAF) responded defensively by scrambling jets to intercept the intruding Pakistani aircraft, leading to a brief but intense aerial dogfight over the LoC.^[101] During the engagement, India reported that IAF MiG-21 Bison pilots thwarted the incursion, with Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman credited with shooting down a Pakistani F-16 using an R-73 missile before his own aircraft was damaged by Pakistani fire and crashed in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.^[102] Pakistan acknowledged downing an Indian MiG-21 but denied losing any F-16s and claimed to have targeted only non-military sites in response to Balakot, while capturing Varthaman after he crossed into their territory post-ejection.^[101] India confirmed the loss of one aircraft and pilot capture but disputed Pakistan's claim of downing a second Indian jet.^[101] Varthaman's capture marked a rapid escalation, with Pakistan parading him in media appearances that India condemned as a violation of the Geneva Conventions.^[103] Held for roughly 48 hours, he was subjected to interrogation but reportedly maintained operational silence.^[103] On 28 February 2019, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan announced Varthaman's release as a "peace gesture" to de-escalate tensions between the nuclear-armed neighbors, a move influenced by international diplomatic pressure including from the United States via military channels.^[104] The handover occurred on 1 March 2019 at the Wagah-Attari border crossing, where Varthaman walked across to Indian custody amid crowds and military honors.^[103] ^[105] The pilot's repatriation, combined with direct communications via DGMO hotlines, contributed to restoring operational restraint along the LoC, halting the immediate cycle of cross-border firing that had intensified post-Balakot.^[104] Both militaries reported sporadic violations in the days following but avoided further large-scale aerial or ground engagements, with India's posture remaining focused on defensive deterrence rather than offensive expansion.^[106] This de-escalation dynamic underscored the role of tacit mutual restraint amid heightened risks, though ground-level ceasefire adherence remained fragile.^[106]

Pakistani Reactions

Official Denials and Counter-Narratives

Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued statements denying any state involvement in the February 14, 2019, Pulwama attack, attributing the incident instead to India's internal security failures and rejecting Indian accusations of cross-border terrorism support.^[107] Pakistani officials, including then-Prime Minister Imran Khan, countered by implying the attack served Indian domestic political interests, particularly electoral gains for the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party amid upcoming national polls.^[108] Even after Jaish-e-Mohammed released a video on February 15, 2019, explicitly claiming responsibility for the suicide bombing that killed 40 Indian Central Reserve Police Force personnel, Pakistani spokespersons distanced the government from the group, insisting JeM acted autonomously without official backing or safe havens in Pakistan.^[109] This position persisted despite JeM's status as a UN-designated terrorist entity with known leadership and operations historically traced to Pakistani soil, including the group's founding by Masood Azhar, released in a 1999 prisoner exchange.^[110] In response to India's Balakot airstrike on February 26, 2019, targeting an alleged JeM training facility, Pakistan's military and government denied the site's militant use, asserting strikes hit a benign forested area or seminary with only trees damaged and no terrorist casualties.^[111] These claims were amplified through state media and official briefings, framing the Indian action as aggressive fabrication to escalate tensions.^[112] Such narratives conflicted with JeM's subsequent admissions of losses at the site, including statements from Azhar's relatives confirming militant deaths, and independent analyses of pre- and post-strike satellite imagery showing thermal signatures and debris patterns indicative of a populated camp rather than vacant woodland.^[110]

Arrests and Releases of Suspects

In response to international pressure following India's Balakot airstrike on March 4, 2019, Pakistan's Interior Ministry announced the preventive detention of 44 individuals affiliated with banned militant groups on March 5, 2019, including Masood Azhar's brother Abdul Rauf Azhar and son Hammad Azhar, who were named in India's dossier on the Pulwama perpetrators.^[113]^[114] These detentions were to last at least 14 days, with potential prosecution contingent on evidence, but reflected a broader operation targeting multiple groups rather than a focused dismantling of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM).^[113] No formal charges resulted from these arrests, aligning with Pakistan's historical pattern of brief, symbolic detentions of JeM figures that end without accountability once diplomatic tensions subside.^[115] Masood Azhar himself evaded arrest despite his UN Security Council designation as a global terrorist on May 1, 2019, a status requiring member states to freeze assets and impose travel bans, yet Pakistan declined to prosecute him or disrupt JeM's core leadership.^[116]^[18] JeM rapidly reconstituted its network post-crackdown, reopening facilities like seminaries previously sealed and resuming propaganda and recruitment, indicative of state tolerance that allows the group to regenerate after superficial interventions.^[115] Such cycles of token enforcement have repeatedly enabled JeM's persistence, as seen in prior instances following the 2001 Indian Parliament attack and 2016 Pathankot assault, where arrests yielded to releases without structural reforms.^[115]^[18]

Domestic Repercussions

Backlash Against Separatists and Kashmiris

Following the 14 February 2019 suicide bombing that killed 40 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel, public outrage in mainland India manifested in protests and incidents of violence targeting Kashmiri traders, students, and workers, driven by perceptions of widespread sympathy for militants amid a history of stone-pelting and civilian facilitation of attacks in the Valley. In cities such as Lucknow, Dehradun, and Vadodara, mobs assaulted Kashmiri vendors and students, with videos emerging of beatings and expulsions from hostels and markets, as crowds chanted slogans linking the community to the perpetrators. These reactions stemmed from documented patterns of local civilian involvement in militancy, including over 1,000 stone-pelting incidents in 2018 alone that often shielded terrorists during operations.^[117] Economic boycotts amplified the backlash, with calls to shun Kashmiri products like shawls and dry fruits gaining traction; Meghalaya Governor Tathagata Roy publicly urged a nationwide boycott of "everything Kashmiri" on social media, citing the attack's perpetrators as products of separatist ideology. Traders' associations in states like Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat enforced informal bans, leading to shuttered Kashmiri shops and reduced livelihoods, as buyers associated the Valley's economy with funding terror networks through hawala and overt support. This civilian-led pressure highlighted causal links between endemic militancy tolerance—evidenced by families harboring militants—and national security costs, prompting self-reflection among some Kashmiri diaspora.^[118]^[119] In parallel, the Indian government intensified crackdowns on separatist financing, launching Income Tax raids on leaders like Nayeem Khan of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and freezing assets tied to groups such as Hizbul Mujahideen. Authorities arrested nearly 150 separatists across Jammu and Kashmir in the immediate aftermath, targeting networks accused of channeling funds from Pakistan-based handlers to sustain militancy, including payments to stone-pelters. These measures, rooted in evidence of hawala transactions exceeding ₹80 crore annually to insurgents, disrupted operational support structures.^[120]^[121] The combined public and official backlash correlated with an empirical erosion in overt civilian terror support; stone-pelting incidents, a proxy for militant sympathy, peaked at over 1,300 cases in 2019 but plunged 88% by 2021 amid heightened awareness of repercussions, with local recruitment for groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed waning as communities distanced from proxy warfare. This shift reflected causal deterrence from demonstrated national intolerance for facilitation, reducing the ecosystem that enabled attacks like Pulwama.^[122]^[123]^[124]

Enhanced Security Measures in Kashmir

In the aftermath of the Pulwama attack on February 14, 2019, Indian security forces escalated operations in Jammu and Kashmir, including intensified cordon-and-search activities and heightened vigilance along infiltration routes to disrupt militant networks.^[124] This was complemented by the deployment of additional Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel, with convoy escorts reinforced using armored vehicles and route randomization to prevent similar ambushes.^[125] A pivotal policy shift occurred on August 5, 2019, when the Indian government revoked Article 370, stripping Jammu and Kashmir of its special autonomous status and reorganizing it into two union territories under direct central control.^[126] This measure, enacted amid a security lockdown involving over 50,000 additional troops and a near-total communications blackout, aimed to dismantle separatist structures enabling militancy by enabling streamlined governance and intelligence-sharing.^[124] Post-revocation, security protocols incorporated advanced surveillance technologies, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for real-time monitoring of militant hideouts and border areas, which improved detection of cross-border movements.^[127] These enhancements yielded measurable reductions in militant activity, with terrorist-initiated incidents falling from 614 in 2018 to 124 in the first seven months of 2020—a 70% decline attributed to proactive operations and curtailed logistical support for insurgents.^[124] By November 2023, such incidents had further decreased to 83, alongside a 66% overall drop in terror-related events since the abrogation.^[125]^[128] Security forces neutralized numerous high-value targets through precision encounters, eliminating key commanders affiliated with groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba, which degraded command structures and recruitment pipelines.^[127] This operational tempo, sustained by human intelligence fused with drone-derived data, correlated with fewer successful attacks, though challenges persisted in remote terrains.^[129]

International Responses

Condemnations and Support for India

The United Nations Security Council issued a press statement on 21 February 2019 condemning the Pulwama suicide bombing as a "heinous and cowardly" act that killed 40 Indian Central Reserve Police Force personnel, explicitly attributing responsibility to the Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed militant group and urging all countries to cooperate in holding perpetrators accountable.^[130]^[131] The United States government issued a strong condemnation of the attack shortly after it occurred on 14 February 2019, with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo affirming U.S. solidarity with India and calling on Pakistan to "end support for terrorist groups like JeM" that threaten regional stability, while emphasizing the need for Pakistan to take "immediate action" against cross-border terrorism.^[132] Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu echoed this support, stating on 15 February 2019 that "Israel stands with the people of India... following this heinous terror strike" and offering unconditional assistance to India in combating terrorism, including defense technologies tailored against such threats.^[133]^[134] Several other nations, including France, the United Kingdom, and Australia, publicly affirmed India's position as the victim of state-sponsored terrorism originating from Pakistan, with French President Emmanuel Macron describing the attack as "unacceptable" and pledging cooperation in investigations, while Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison highlighted JeM's role and urged Pakistan to dismantle terror safe havens.^[132] These responses collectively reinforced India's claims by designating JeM as a terrorist entity—already proscribed by the UN—and pressing Pakistan to act against its leadership and infrastructure, though enforcement varied due to geopolitical constraints.^[132]

Diplomatic Pressures on Pakistan

In the immediate aftermath of the Pulwama attack on February 14, 2019, India imposed stringent bilateral diplomatic measures against Pakistan, revoking its Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status and applying a 200% customs duty on all imports from Pakistan, which halted nearly all bilateral trade valued at approximately $488 million annually prior to the escalation.^[135] India further downgraded diplomatic relations by expelling several Pakistani diplomats and demanding a reduction in Pakistan's high commission staff in New Delhi by half, signaling a deliberate effort to limit official engagements. These actions were framed by Indian officials as responses to Pakistan's alleged support for Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), the group that claimed responsibility for the attack, aiming to economically pressure Islamabad into curbing cross-border terrorism.^[136] Internationally, the attack intensified efforts to isolate Pakistan in counter-terrorism frameworks, culminating in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 1267 Committee's designation of JeM leader Masood Azhar as a global terrorist on May 1, 2019, following a joint push by the United States, United Kingdom, and France. This listing, which imposed an assets freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo on Azhar, overcame years of Chinese technical holds and was explicitly linked to JeM's role in Pulwama, with the resolution noting the group's attacks on India.^[137] The U.S. State Department highlighted JeM's prior designations and urged Pakistan to prosecute Azhar and dismantle associated networks, underscoring Pakistan's failure to act despite repeated international calls.^[138] The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) amplified pressures by condemning the Pulwama attack in a February 22, 2019, statement, explicitly calling on Pakistan to ensure that terrorist groups like JeM could not operate from or use its territory for fundraising or planning. Already on the FATF grey list since June 2018 for deficiencies in combating terror financing, Pakistan faced heightened scrutiny and was prevented from exiting the list at the March 2019 plenary, with India presenting evidence of JeM's financial links to the attack. This prolonged grey-listing restricted Pakistan's access to international financing, serving as a causal deterrent against state tolerance of militant groups, though Pakistan's partial compliance measures were later credited for its eventual removal in 2022.^[139]^[140]

Legacy and Ongoing Implications

Persistence of JeM Leadership

Despite targeted Indian airstrikes in Operation Sindoor on May 7, 2025, which killed at least 10 family members of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) chief Masood Azhar, including relatives and aides at the group's Bahawalpur headquarters in Pakistan, Azhar himself survived and maintained operational control over the organization.^[141]^[142] Azhar publicly acknowledged the losses in a statement, expressing regret but reaffirming JeM's commitment to jihadist activities against India.^[143] Pakistani authorities denied significant damage or JeM involvement, but admissions from JeM commanders confirmed the strikes disrupted family networks without eliminating the core leadership structure.^[144] JeM's resilience under Azhar's direction persisted into late 2025, with the group conducting recruitment drives, such as one launched hours before an India-Pakistan cricket match on September 14, 2025, in Dubai, targeting potential militants for cross-border operations.^[145] A senior JeM commander explicitly linked Azhar to ongoing plots, including past attacks in Delhi and Mumbai, and vowed continued assaults despite the setbacks from Operation Sindoor.^[146] Indian intelligence assessments, corroborated by JeM's own statements, indicated sustained training and planning activities from safe havens in Pakistan, underscoring Azhar's ability to regenerate capabilities post-strikes.^[141] International efforts to dismantle JeM leadership have faltered, as Azhar remains at large in Pakistan despite his UN designation as a global terrorist since 2019 and inclusion on India's most-wanted list.^[147] Pakistan's refusal to extradite or prosecute Azhar, coupled with minimal enforcement of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) gray-list pressures, has allowed JeM to evade comprehensive disruption, with no verified arrests of top figures following the 2025 strikes.^[148] This impunity highlights gaps in multilateral sanctions, where verbal condemnations from entities like the UN Security Council have not translated into actionable constraints on Pakistan-based operations.^[149]

Effects on India-Pakistan Relations and Counter-Terrorism

The Balakot airstrikes of February 26, 2019, conducted by the Indian Air Force in retaliation for the Pulwama attack, marked a pivotal doctrinal shift in India's approach to cross-border terrorism, extending operations from Line of Control skirmishes to deep strikes inside Pakistani territory targeting Jaish-e-Mohammed infrastructure.^[150] This evolution built on the 2016 surgical strikes but normalized pre-emptive aerial actions against non-state actors backed by Pakistan, signaling that terrorist safe havens would face direct military costs regardless of location.^[151] Pakistan's subsequent airstrikes on February 27, 2019, and the aerial dogfight—resulting in the downing of an Indian MiG-21 and capture of pilot Abhinandan Varthaman, released on March 1—escalated tensions but concluded without broader war, reinforcing a pattern of calibrated brinkmanship.^[152] Post-crisis, India-Pakistan relations entered a phase of enforced deterrence, with the demonstrated credibility of Indian retaliation deterring large-scale infiltrations and attacks akin to Pulwama until 2025 escalations, such as the Pahalgam incident.^[95] This period saw Pakistan adopt tactical restraints along the Line of Control, partly due to the raised threshold for sponsoring high-profile operations, as Balakot inflicted reputational and operational damage on groups like JeM without provoking nuclear thresholds.^[153] India's multidimensional deterrence posture—combining intelligence-driven strikes, diplomatic isolation, and economic measures—evolved to impose asymmetric costs on Pakistan's proxy warfare, reducing the frequency of major cross-border incidents while sustaining low-level ceasefire violations.^[154] In counter-terrorism terms, the events entrenched surgical strikes as a core element of India's proactive strategy, shifting from reactive defense to offensive disruption of terror networks, with Balakot validating air-delivered precision over ground raids for deeper penetration.^[155] This adaptation pressured Pakistan to publicly crack down on JeM affiliates, though persistent leadership survival indicated incomplete dismantlement.^[156] Globally, the crisis heightened recognition of Pakistan's complicity in harboring UN-designated terrorists, prompting renewed calls from entities like the FATF for verifiable action against state-linked groups, thereby complicating Pakistan's international standing on counter-terrorism compliance.^[12] Such dynamics underscored causal links between territorial disputes and sponsored militancy, influencing third-party assessments toward viewing restraint as untenable without addressing root enablers in Pakistan.^[157]

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Feb 28, 2020 · The NIA on Friday arrested an operative of terror group Jaish-e-Mohammed for his alleged involvement in the Pulwama terror attack last year, ...Missing: findings | Show results with:findings
[74]
NIA charges JeM chief, 18 others for Pulwama attack - Times of India
Aug 26, 2020 · ... Pulwama terror attack case, has named 19 accused including Jaish-e-Muhammed. ... many terror attacks across India. The NIA chargesheet said ...
[75]
8 Of 19 Involved In Pulwama Attack Killed, 7 Arrested - NDTV
Feb 14, 2023 · On the fourth anniversary of the Pulwama terror attack, Additional Director General of Police (ADGP) Kashmir Zone, Vijay Kumar today said of ...
[76]
Bengaluru engineering student convicted for supporting terrorist ...
Oct 31, 2022 · The special NIA court convicted an engineering student for supporting the Pulwama terrorist attack, sentencing him to five years of ...
[77]
2019 Pulwama attack | Six terrorists on the run, says NIA - The Hindu
Aug 27, 2020 · Six terrorists involved in the 2019 Pulwama terror attack who are on the run, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) said in a charge-sheet filed in a Jammu ...
[78]
'PM Modi, NSA Doval silenced me on security lapses leading to ...
Apr 16, 2023 · Satya Pal Malik, the former Governor of Jammu and Kashmir, revealed that the Pulwama terror attack was a result of systemic failure, involving gross security ...
[79]
India home minister challenges account of 2019 deadly attack on ...
Apr 23, 2023 · Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's government has nothing to hide concerning a deadly attack on a military convoy in Kashmir in 2019, ...
[80]
'PM Told Me to Keep Quiet' After Pulwama: What Satya Pal Malik ...
Apr 16, 2023 · Malik, who was governor during the Pulwama terrorist attack of February 2019 ... KT: Well this is a terrible intelligence failure as well?
[81]
Long convoy, intel failure: Multiple lapses led to Pulwama terror ...
Sep 4, 2019 · An internal inquiry conducted by CRPF has revealed that multiple intelligence lapses led to the heavy casualties in the Pulwama terror attack.
[82]
2019 Pulwama attack: 'Why were CRPF personnel denied aircraft ...
Apr 15, 2023 · “After a period of over four years, where has the inquiry in the Pulwama terror attack reached? Where, when, how and who will fix the ...
[83]
Pulwama terror strike: The surprising Intelligence failure
Mar 25, 2019 · The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) data revels that the terror attack in the country saw a major decline since the Narendra Modi government ...
[84]
Pulwama attack: Intelligence failure… we are at fault also, admits ...
Feb 15, 2019 · Jammu and Kashmir Governor Satya Pal Malik has said that Thursday's Pulwama attack was partly the result of an intelligence failure.
[85]
Pulwama terror attack: No intelligence failure, says government
Jun 26, 2019 · Responding to a question “whether the reasons of Pulwama terror attack was failure of intelligence”, Minister of State for Home G. Kishan ...Missing: denial | Show results with:denial
[86]
2 years after Pulwama terror attack, safer convoy movements now
Feb 14, 2021 · A major decision taken after the Pulwama attack was to restrict the movement of civilian vehicles on the highway when the convoys of security forces are on the ...
[87]
[PDF] lok sabha unstarred question no. 2014 to be answered on the 03rd ...
INVESTIGATION INTO PULWAMA TERROR ATTACK. 2014. SHRI MANISH TEWARI: Will ... (a) to (g):. National Investigation Agency (NIA) registered a case on. 20.02 ...
[88]
Pulwama attack: Have eliminated top leadership of JeM in the Valley ...
Feb 19, 2019 · Lt Gen Dhillion of the Indian Army also said that Pakistan Army's involvement in the Pulwama attack has been proved.
[89]
Pulwama attack mastermind Abdul Rasheed Ghazi killed by security ...
Feb 18, 2019 · India News: In a big breakthrough, security forces gunned down top Jaish-e-Mohammed commander Abdul Rasheed Ghazi alias Kamran, ...
[90]
Pulwama encounter: CRPF convoy attack mastermind Ghazi ...
Feb 18, 2019 · Kamran alias Ghazi Rasheed was the mastermind of the Pulwama terror attack which took place on February 14. He was cornered by security forces along with two ...Missing: Mohammed | Show results with:Mohammed<|separator|>
[91]
Pulwama attack mastermind Abdul Rasheed Ghazi killed by security ...
Feb 18, 2019 · Security forces on Monday gunned down top Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) commander Abdul Rasheed Ghazi alias Kamran, in a 12-hour-long encounter with multiple JeM ...
[92]
Third Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorist killed in Pulwama encounter
Feb 18, 2019 · Earlier in the day, the security forces killed Pulwama terror attack mastermind Abdul Rasheed Ghazi alias Kamran and a local Jaish terrorist ...
[93]
Eliminated Jaish leadership that planned Pulwama attack within 100 ...
Feb 18, 2019 · Lt Gen KS Dhillon said that the car bombing of the CRPF convoy had been controlled from across the border by Pakistan's spy agency.
[94]
No one ready to take over JeM leadership in Kashmir: Army
Apr 24, 2019 · Calling it a healthy sign, the Indian Army on Wednesday said that there had been a decline in the recruitment of local Kashmiri people in ...
[95]
Three Years After Balakot: Reckoning with Two Claims of Victory
Feb 28, 2022 · In response to the attack, on February 26, the Indian Air Force (IAF) struck a JeM terrorist camp at Balakot, located in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ...
[96]
India bombs Jaish camp in Pakistan's Balakot - The Hindu
Feb 26, 2019 · 12 IAF Mirage-2000 fighter jets unleash five one-tonne payloads; 200-325 militants had moved there from LoC sites after Pulwama attack.
[97]
'Operation Bandar' was IAF's code name for Balakot airstrike
Jun 21, 2019 · Add ANI As A Trusted Source For Reliable Information. ani ... 'Operation Bandar' was IAF's code name for Balakot airstrike. By Ajit ...
[98]
India claims 'large number' of JeM militants killed in Pakistan airstrike
Feb 26, 2019 · An Indian airstrike on a militant camp in killed "a very large number" of JeM fighters preparing to attack India, a foreign ministry ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[99]
From Kargil to Balakot: The continuing challenges to India's modern ...
May 22, 2023 · The 26th of February 2019 marked the first time the Indian Air Force had conducted airstrikes in Pakistan since 1971. In 1994, Elliot A Cohen ...
[100]
The Balakot Crisis Revisited: A Chinese Perspective - Stimson Center
Feb 28, 2022 · On February 26, 2019, India launched a brief but decisive airstrike on an alleged Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) training camp in Balakot, a town in Pakistan's Khyber ...Missing: details | Show results with:details
[101]
Pakistan shoots down two Indian fighter jets: Military - Al Jazeera
Pakistan shot down two Indian air force fighter jets and launched air strikes at six targets in Indian-administered Kashmir, its military says.Missing: standoff aerial
[102]
Pakistan released IAF pilot Wg. Cdr. Abhinandan after India's attack ...
Oct 29, 2020 · Before his jet was hit, Wing Commander Varthaman downed an F-16 fighter of Pakistan. He was released on the night of March 1 . In a speech in ...
[103]
Abhinandan: Captured Indian pilot handed back by Pakistan - BBC
Mar 1, 2019 · Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman was handed over to Indian officials on Friday at the only legal border crossing with Pakistan. Minutes ...
[104]
US played key role in release of Wing Commander Abhinandan ...
Mar 12, 2019 · The United States weighed in on the Pakistan Army through high-level military channels to release Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman within hours of his ...
[105]
Pakistan hands over captured pilot Abhinandan Varthaman to India
Mar 1, 2019 · His release came two days after he was captured following a rare aerial engagement between the nuclear-armed rivals over the disputed region of ...Missing: date | Show results with:date
[106]
India-Pakistan tensions: All the latest updates | News - Al Jazeera
Mar 10, 2019 · Crackdown on outlawed groups by Pakistan not enough, says India as ties between nuclear-armed neighbours remain tense.
[107]
Rejection of Indian Prime Minister's remarks insinuating Pakistan's ...
Oct 31, 2020 · Pakistan firmly believes that the biggest beneficiary of the February 2019 Pulwama attack was the BJP government, as it resulted in BJP's ...Missing: denial | Show results with:denial<|separator|>
[108]
Latest revelations further expose India and vindicate Pakistan
The latest revelations further confirm what Pakistan has consistently pointed out: The BJP government stages “false flag” operations; maligns Pakistan with ...
[109]
Official Spokesperson's response on Pakistan Foreign Secretary's ...
Feb 15, 2019 · The Official Spokesperson said, "JeM has claimed responsibility for the attack. The organization and its leadership are located in Pakistan.Missing: findings | Show results with:findings
[110]
Pakistan, and not just its 'non-state actors', are responsible for ...
Mar 5, 2019 · Backdoor Became Bigger. The Indian Air Force (IAF) attack on JeM terror camps in Balakot, not far from where Osama bin Laden hid out in ...
[111]
So far apart - India and Pakistan engage in war of claim, counter-claim
Mar 4, 2019 · An air strike by Indian warplanes inside Pakistan last week, and a subsequent retaliatory attack by the Pakistani air force, ...
[112]
Pakistan vows retaliation after India's airstrikes – DW – 02/26/2019
Feb 26, 2019 · Following the air strikes, speaking at an election rally in the northern state of Rajasthan, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said, "The ...
[113]
Pakistan arrests scores in fresh crackdown on armed groups | News
Mar 5, 2019 · Ministry of Interior says 44 members of banned organisations arrested, including relatives of JeM chief Masood Azhar ... Pulwama attack. In recent ...
[114]
Masood Azhar: Pakistan arrests 44 members of banned outfits ...
Mar 5, 2019 · JeM chief Masood Azhar's son, brother among 44 taken into preventive detention in Pakistan ... attack on an army school in Peshawar in 2014 that ...
[115]
None
### Summary of Pakistan's Arrests, Releases, Performative Justice, and JeM Reconstitution Post-Pulwama
[116]
Masood Azhar, Man Behind Parliament Attack, Pulwama, Blacklisted ...
May 1, 2019 · In a big diplomatic win for India, Pakistan-based Jaish-e Mohammed chief Masood Azhar was designated a "global terrorist" by the United ...
[117]
https://www.indianexpress.com/article/india/pulwama-attack-kashmiri-traders-west-bengal-5597431/
[118]
Boycott everything Kashmiri, tweets Tathagata Roy - The Hindu
Feb 20, 2019 · Meghalaya Governor draws flak from several sections for controversial posts following Pulwama attack.
[119]
Governor Tathagata Roy tweets 'boycott Kashmiri', draws flak
Feb 19, 2019 · ... attacks following the terror attack on a CRPF convoy in south Kashmir's Pulwama that killed 40 jawans. “An appeal from a retired colonel of ...
[120]
Pulwama attack aftermath: I-T dept raids houses of separatist leader ...
Feb 27, 2019 · The government has launched a massive crackdown on separatists in the wake of the Pulwama terror attack that killed 40 CRPF jawans on February ...
[121]
India police arrest Kashmir separatists amid rising tensions | News
Feb 23, 2019 · Nearly 150 separatists arrested in a crackdown that follows the worst suicide attack in the disputed region last week.
[122]
MHA data: 88% dip in J&K stone-pelting compared to 2019
Aug 4, 2021 · ... militant groups. Stone-pelting incidents in Jammu and Kashmir have seen a massive drop since 2019 amid heavy presence of armed forces, Covid ...
[123]
2019 recorded most number of stone throwing incidents in Jammu ...
Jan 5, 2020 · MHA response to an RTI application includes data on terrorist violence, ceasefire violations, and number of militants killed.
[124]
Pakistan's Role in Kashmir's Terrorism Challenge Post-2019
Sep 3, 2025 · The Pahalgam terror attack of 22 April 2025 raised the spectre of cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir yet again.
[125]
Decline in Terror Incidents in Jammu and Kashmir - PIB
Dec 19, 2023 · ... terror incidents in UT of Jammu and Kashmir. Details are as under: Description. 2018. 2023 (upto 30th November). Terrorist Initiated Incidents.
[126]
Kashmir: The effects of revoking Article 370 - Commons Library
Aug 8, 2019 · In February 2019, more than 40 Indian soldiers were killed in an attack in Pulwama. On 5 August 2019, the Indian Government suddenly ...<|separator|>
[127]
Militant Violence in Jammu and Kashmir Post-Abrogation of Article 370
Sep 1, 2025 · The Pahalgam massacre has not only reignited national outrage in India against Islamist terrorism but also underscored the enduring threat of ...
[128]
Effects after the Abrogation of Article 370 on Militancy in Jammu and ...
Apr 24, 2025 · The Union Home Minister Amit Shah's statement is “ 66 percent decline in terrorist incidents in Jammu and Kashmir after the abrogation of ...
[129]
Security agencies maintain upper hand over militants in Kashmir ...
Dec 29, 2024 · Security forces in Kashmir had more success against militants compared to Jammu, where militancy escalated significantly this year.
[130]
Security Council Press Statement on Suicide Bombing in Jammu ...
Feb 21, 2019 · The following Security Council press statement was issued today by Council President Anatolio Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea):
[131]
UNSC Statement Condemning Pulwama Names Jaish, China ...
Feb 21, 2019 · China, which has developed strong strategic ties with Pakistan, has been repeatedly blocking a statement on the Pulwama terror attack by the ...
[132]
48 countries condemn Pulwama attack, extend support to India
Feb 16, 2019 · Chinese MFA spokesperson said, "China notes reports on the suicide terrorist attacks and deeply shocked by the attack. We express deep ...
[133]
Israel offers unconditional help to India to defend itself, especially ...
Feb 19, 2019 · After the Pulwama attack, Malka had also tweeted that "Israel strongly condemns the terror attack in #Pulwama and stands by our Indian ...
[134]
Pulwama attack: Israel stands with India, Benjamin Netanyahu ...
Feb 15, 2019 · Israel stands with the people of India with the security forces and with the prime minister following this heinous terror strike.Missing: support 2019<|control11|><|separator|>
[135]
India-Pakistan Trade Tensions - Shankar IAS Parliament
In February 2019, in the wake of the Pulwama attack, India decided to withdraw the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to Pakistan. ... In April 2019, India ...
[136]
Pulwama attack: Pakistan warns India against military action - BBC
Feb 19, 2019 · Pakistan has warned it will retaliate if India takes military action against it after a militant attack on Indian forces in ...
[137]
United Nations 1267 Sanctions Committee Designation of Masood ...
May 1, 2019 · JEM was designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) in 2001 and has ...
[138]
UN puts Pakistani armed group chief Masood Azhar on 'terror' list
May 1, 2019 · The United Nations added Masood Azhar, leader of a Pakistan-based armed group, to its list of “global terrorists” on Wednesday after China lifted its ...
[139]
Current Efforts by the FATF to Monitor and Take Action against ...
Feb 22, 2019 · ... attack last week that killed at least 40 Indian security forces in Pulwama in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. From this and other recent attacks ...
[140]
Pulwama attack: Pakistan to stay on FATF 'grey list' for terror financing
Feb 22, 2019 · This, after India made a strong push to ensure that Islamabad is not taken off the list, in the light of the Pulwama terror attack. Pakistan has ...
[141]
Masood Azhar's family 'torn into pieces' in India's Operation Sindoor ...
Sep 17, 2025 · Masood Azhar family news: JeM commander admits Indian missile strikes killed Masood Azhar's family, vows to continue jihad in neighbouring ...
[142]
Masood Azhar's family 'torn into pieces' by India: Jaish admits Op ...
Sep 16, 2025 · Terror outfit Jaish-e-Mohammad has, for the first time, admitted that family members of its chief, Masood Azhar, were killed during India's ...
[143]
Rajdeep Sardesai on X: "Big: JAISH TERROR CHIEF MAULANA ...
May 7, 2025 · Big: JAISH TERROR CHIEF MAULANA MASOOD AZHAR ISSUES STATEMENT; ADMITS THAT 10 OF HIS FAMILY MEMBERS HAVE BEEN KILLED IN THE MIDNIGHT STRIKES ...<|separator|>
[144]
Militant group chief says relatives killed in India strike - BBC
May 7, 2025 · The Pakistan-based leader of a militant group has said 10 of his relatives have been killed in a missile strike by India.
[145]
jaish e mohammed recruitment drive india pakistan cricket match ...
Sep 20, 2025 · Seven hours before the India-Pakistan Asia Cup cricket match in Dubai on September 14, banned terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed held a ...
[146]
Masood Azhar behind terror attacks in Delhi, Mumbai: Jaish leader's ...
Sep 17, 2025 · A senior Jaish-e-Mohammed commander has directly implicated Masood Azhar in planning attacks in Delhi and Mumbai, challenging Pakistan's ...
[147]
[PDF] Sl. No. Name of the Terrorist 1. Maulana Masood Azhar @ Maulana ...
Maulana Masood Azhar @ Maulana Mohammad Masood Azhar Alvi @ Vali. Adam Issa. 2. Hafiz Muhammad Saeed @ Hafiz Mohammad Sahib @ Hafiz Mohaddad.
[148]
India claims Jaish-e-Mohammad leader killed during airstrikes in ...
May 8, 2025 · ... Masood Azhar, was killed during India's retaliatory airstrikes on Pakistan on May 7 ... Press Releases · Media Calls · National Security ...
[149]
Foreign Terrorist Organizations - United States Department of State
FTO designations play a critical role in our fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring ...
[150]
Climbing the Escalation Ladder: India and the Balakot Crisis
Oct 2, 2019 · Founded in 2000, Jaish is responsible for some of the deadliest terrorist attacks in Kashmir and elsewhere in India, including attacks on ...
[151]
Balakot airstrikes was a message that cross-border terrorism will not ...
Feb 28, 2020 · The surgical strike of 2016 and Balakot airstrikes of 2019 were not just military strikes but a strong message to the adversary that terror ...
[152]
The India-Pakistan Pulwama-Balakot Crisis Six Years On - BASIC
Mar 12, 2025 · Six years ago this month, India and Pakistan were emerging out of a deep crisis that reached its most dangerous point on 27 February 2019 ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[153]
A Smoldering Volcano: Pakistan and Terrorism after Balakot
Mar 14, 2019 · ... India—until Balakot—from undertaking any direct attacks ... As a result, when the Pulwama attack occurred, Khan quickly realized that Pakistan ...
[154]
India's Evolved Convoluted Deterrence
Jun 2, 2025 · India has adopted a multidimensional approach to deterrence, anchored by resolute and punitive strikes designed to raise the costs of aggression for the ...Missing: statistics | Show results with:statistics
[155]
Understanding India's 'Surgical Strike' Special Operations and ...
Jul 7, 2022 · Plausibly, nuclear weapons have induced strategic restrain and caution in India-Pakistan relations. However, nuclear weapons could not affect ...
[156]
https://www.orfonline.org/research/pakistan-s-information-warfare-strategic-implications-and-india-s-response
[157]
Pulwama Terror Attack: India's Response Escalates - AIIA
Feb 27, 2019 · The attack is the deadliest since the conflict began in the region in 1989. The Pakistan-based terrorist organisation, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) ...