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David Chalmers

David John Chalmers (born April 20, 1966) is an philosopher and renowned for his contributions to the , particularly his formulation of the "," which distinguishes the explanatory challenges of subjective experience from those of cognitive functions like and . In this framework, Chalmers argues that while "easy problems" of consciousness—such as explaining , , and reportability—may be addressed through and , the "hard problem" concerns why physical processes give rise to phenomenal experience at all, a question he posits may require extending our scientific worldview beyond . His seminal 1996 book, : In Search of a Fundamental Theory, expands on these ideas, defending property dualism and naturalistic approaches to while critiquing reductive . Chalmers earned an Honours Degree in Pure Mathematics from the in 1986, followed by graduate study in mathematics at the (1987–1988) and a PhD in and from in 1993. His academic career includes positions as assistant, associate, and full professor at the (1995–1998); professor at the (1999–2004), where he directed the Center for Consciousness Studies (2002–2004); and Australian Research Council Federation Fellow (2004–2009) and director of the Centre for Consciousness (2004–2014) at the Australian National University. Since 2009, he has held appointments at (NYU), becoming co-director of NYU's Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness in 2012 and University Professor of and Neural Science in 2015. He also co-founded the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness in 1994 and the PhilPapers Foundation, which hosts the largest research. Beyond consciousness, Chalmers has made influential contributions to other areas of philosophy, including co-authoring the 1998 paper "The Extended Mind" with Andy Clark, which proposes that cognitive processes can extend beyond the brain into the environment via tools and interactions, challenging traditional boundaries of the mind. His work on two-dimensional semantics, developed in books like Constructing the World (2012), explores how meanings and possibilities are structured to address issues in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of language. More recently, in Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy (2022), he examines the philosophical implications of virtual reality, simulation arguments, and artificial intelligence, suggesting that simulated worlds can be as real as physical ones in terms of knowledge and ethics. Chalmers has received the Jean Nicod Prize (2015), election as a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (2013), and as an International Fellow of the British Academy (2024), and he served as president of the American Philosophical Association's Eastern Division (2022–2023).

Biography

Early life

David Chalmers was born on April 20, 1966, in , . He spent his early childhood there, including brief periods abroad in and during preschool years, before returning to around age five. The family relocated to , , when he was nine, where he grew up in an environment shaped by his parents' academic pursuits; his father, John Chalmers, was a medical researcher specializing in and served as a professor of at . Chalmers developed early interests in science fiction, mathematics, and philosophy, sparked by family discussions and extensive reading in a book-filled home. He was particularly drawn to works by authors like , , and , which introduced him to speculative ideas about minds, robots, and reality. These readings, combined with intellectual exchanges at home, fostered his initial exposure to themes through narratives, including questions about subjective experience and . As a teenager in , Chalmers immersed himself in , earning recognition as a "math " and competing at high levels, which laid the groundwork for his later academic path.

Education

Chalmers completed his undergraduate education at the , earning an of in in 1986. Following his undergraduate studies, he pursued graduate study in at the from 1987 to 1988. During his studies at , he primarily focused on , physics, and , but also took philosophy electives in his first year, including courses on , , and , which sparked his interest in and the nature of the mind. In 1989, Chalmers began pursuing a PhD in philosophy and cognitive science at Indiana University Bloomington, which he completed in 1993. His dissertation, titled Toward a Theory of Consciousness, examined computationalism and the challenges of explaining consciousness within computational frameworks. The work was supervised by Douglas Hofstadter, with Mike Dunn serving as co-advisor. Chalmers' graduate training at included coursework in , medieval logic under Paul Spade, and German social and with Fred Beiser, though he noted there were no formal courses in or language during his program. He participated in seminars within Hofstadter's research group at for Research on Concepts and , which emphasized and early explorations of , profoundly shaping his foundational views on these topics through interdisciplinary discussions and exposure to computational theories of mind.

Personal life

Chalmers lives in with his partner, Claudia Passos Ferreira, a philosopher and from who teaches at the NYU Center for Bioethics. He moved to full-time in 2014 after taking a part-time position at NYU in 2009. Chalmers serves as the lead singer and guitarist in the rock band The Zombie Blues, which he founded in the . The band has performed at philosophy s, including the Toward a Science of Consciousness in Tucson in 1998, where Chalmers sang "Zombie Blues" accompanied by bandmate Pradeep. It has also appeared at events like the Qualia Fest in in 2012. Chalmers identifies as an atheist, viewing consciousness as a natural phenomenon without need for supernatural explanations. Chalmers maintains interests in science fiction, gaming, and , drawing inspiration from works like to explore themes of , though these pursuits remain separate from his core professional endeavors.

Academic career

Early positions

Following the completion of his in and at in 1993 under supervisor , David Chalmers began his academic career with a postdoctoral McDonnell Fellowship in the Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology program at from 1993 to 1995. This position, directed by Andy , allowed Chalmers to focus on research in , including early explorations of , while also teaching a course on the subject in fall 1993. During this fellowship, he collaborated with and other program members on foundational ideas in , contributing to papers that questioned strict computational explanations of mental processes by emphasizing the explanatory gaps in reducing phenomenal experience to physical or functional terms. In 1995, Chalmers transitioned to a tenure-track assistant professorship in the Department of Philosophy at the , where he served until 1997. At UCSC, he taught courses on in fall 1995 and 1996, using the platform to develop and refine his emerging views on as a fundamental feature not fully captured by computational or neuroscientific models alone. This period marked the initial drafting and publication of key works, such as his 1995 paper "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness," which argued for distinguishing the "hard problem" of subjective experience from more tractable cognitive functions, challenging prevailing computational theories of mind. Chalmers was promoted to associate professor at UCSC in 1997, holding the role through 1998, during which he continued teaching philosophy of mind and introduced a course on consciousness in winter 1997. His collaborations extended to joint work with Clark, culminating in the 1998 paper "The Extended Mind," co-authored while at UCSC, which further critiqued narrow computational boundaries by proposing that cognitive processes can incorporate external environmental elements. These early positions occurred amid a competitive 1990s philosophy job market, where tenure-track opportunities, though improved from prior decades, still drew multiple qualified candidates per opening, particularly in specialized areas like philosophy of mind.

Major appointments

In 1999, David Chalmers joined the University of Arizona as a professor in the Department of Philosophy, a position he held until 2004. During this period, he also served as associate director of the Center for Consciousness Studies from 1999 to 2001, before becoming its director from 2002 to 2004; he co-founded the center in 1999 to advance interdisciplinary research on consciousness. Chalmers moved to the Australian National University () in 2004, where he was appointed as an ARC Federation Fellow and professor of until 2009, while continuing as a professor thereafter. He simultaneously directed the ANU Centre for Consciousness from 2004 to 2014, establishing it as a key hub for philosophical and scientific inquiry into . In 2009, Chalmers accepted a part-time professorship in the Department of Philosophy at (), transitioning to a full-time role in 2014 and becoming University Professor of Philosophy and Neural Science in 2015. He currently co-directs NYU's Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness, fostering collaborative work across , , and . That same year, 2009, Chalmers co-founded with David Bourget, developing it into a comprehensive and indexing service for philosophical and resources.

Awards and honors

Chalmers was elected a of the Australian Academy of the Humanities in 2006, recognizing his contributions to philosophical scholarship in the humanities. In 2013, he was inducted as a of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, an honor bestowed upon individuals for distinguished achievements in their fields, including and . These fellowships highlight his influence on debates surrounding and mind. In 2015, Chalmers received the Jean Nicod Prize from the Institut Jean Nicod in , a prestigious award given annually to a leading philosopher or cognitive scientist for outstanding contributions to the study of and ; the prize included delivering the Jean Nicod Lectures on his work in . He was awarded the Apostolos P. Stefanopoulos Prize in Philosophy in 2018 by the for his contributions to applied philosophy and ethics, particularly in the philosophy of consciousness. Chalmers won a long-standing wager in 2023 against , placed in 1998 at a Tucson consciousness conference, concerning whether would be identified by that year in a manner resolving the ; Koch conceded publicly at the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness meeting in San Jose, awarding Chalmers a bottle of Claret wine and acknowledging the persistence of the ". This event underscored Chalmers' enduring impact on interdisciplinary discussions of . In 2020, he received the Marc Sanders Prize in Philosophy of Mind from the American Philosophical Association, awarded for excellence in published work on the foundations of mind. Most recently, in 2024, Chalmers was elected an International Fellow of the British Academy, the United Kingdom's national academy for the humanities and social sciences, in recognition of his foundational work on the , , and . He has also been invited to deliver numerous prestigious lecture series, including the John Locke Lectures at the in 2010 and the Descartes Lectures at in 2024, platforms that have allowed him to present seminal ideas on two-dimensional semantics and the extended mind.

Philosophical work

Philosophy of mind

David Chalmers is renowned for his foundational contributions to the , particularly through his articulation of the "," which he introduced in a 1995 paper. There, Chalmers distinguishes between the "easy problems" of consciousness—such as explaining cognitive functions like , , and behavior through neural mechanisms—and the "," which concerns why physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience or at all. He argues that while scientific advances may solve the easy problems by elucidating the mechanisms of information processing, the hard problem remains intractable under reductive physicalist frameworks, as it demands an explanation for the existence of phenomenal itself. Central to Chalmers' critique of materialism is his thought experiment involving philosophical zombies, detailed in his 1996 book The Conscious Mind. Philosophical zombies are hypothetical entities physically and behaviorally identical to conscious humans but lacking any inner experience; their conceivability, Chalmers contends, demonstrates that consciousness does not logically supervene on physical states alone, thereby challenging type-identity theories and supporting property dualism. This argument underpins his advocacy for naturalistic dualism, a position he elaborates in the same work, positing that consciousness constitutes a fundamental, non-reducible property of the universe, akin to space, time, or mass, yet fully compatible with a naturalistic worldview that rejects supernaturalism. In this framework, psychophysical laws would bridge physical processes and experiential states, allowing consciousness to be integrated into a broader scientific ontology without reducing it to physics. Chalmers further extends his philosophy of mind through collaborative work on the , co-authored with Andy Clark in 1998, which posits that cognitive processes are not confined to the but can incorporate external tools and environments when they function as reliable parts of an individual's cognitive system. For instance, a used to store and retrieve information might qualify as part of the mind if it plays an active role in reasoning, challenging traditional internalist views of cognition. Additionally, Chalmers has developed views sympathetic to , arguing in later papers that fundamental physical entities may possess rudimentary forms of , providing a potential solution to the hard problem by avoiding the emergence of experience from non-experiential matter. These ideas collectively critique and other reductive approaches, as outlined in , where Chalmers demonstrates that no functional description can fully capture the intrinsic nature of phenomenal experience.

Philosophy of language

David Chalmers' contributions to the build upon the theories of rigid designation and direct reference developed by and David Kaplan. In Kripke's framework, rigid designators such as proper names and terms refer to the same object or kind across all possible worlds in which they exist, leading to necessary truths like " is ," which are known empirically but hold metaphysically necessarily. Chalmers extends this by critiquing the limitations of one-dimensional intensions in capturing cognitive significance, arguing that Kripke's subjunctive modality (what might have been) requires supplementation to address epistemic possibilities (what might be the case). Similarly, he engages Kaplan's distinction between (a function from context to ) and (the proposition expressed), noting that indexicals like "I" function as rigid designators in counterfactual evaluation, but Kaplan's contextual approach inadequately links semantics to a priori knowledge. Through these extensions, Chalmers emphasizes how direct reference theories fail to fully reconcile reference with conceptual analysis, paving the way for a more comprehensive semantic structure. Central to Chalmers' philosophy of language is his development of two-dimensional semantics, a framework that posits two intensions for linguistic expressions: primary intensions (epistemic, determining reference relative to scenarios of evaluation) and secondary intensions (metaphysical, determining reference across possible worlds). Primary intensions capture the cognitive or conceptual role of terms, evaluating them as functions from epistemically possible scenarios—qualitatively identical to the actual world from a subject's perspective—to extensions, thus handling a priori and . Secondary intensions, in contrast, function like traditional Kripkean intensions, rigidifying reference based on the actual world (e.g., "" as H₂O). This dual structure addresses necessity by distinguishing epistemic necessity (true in all primary scenarios) from metaphysical necessity (true in all secondary scenarios), allowing for the analysis of statements like " is H₂O," which is metaphysically necessary but epistemically contingent. Chalmers argues that this approach restores a quasi-Fregean connection between meaning, apriority, and modality, where a sentence is a priori if its primary intension is necessary. Chalmers applies two-dimensional semantics to the , particularly in analyzing reference for terms like "" and phenomenal concepts related to . For "," the primary picks out the clear, drinkable liquid in any scenario, potentially referring to in a Twin Earth-like epistemic possibility, while the secondary intension fixes it as H₂O across metaphysical worlds, illustrating how empirical discoveries bridge epistemic and metaphysical dimensions. In consciousness debates, this framework supports conceivability arguments by showing that zombie worlds—epistemically possible scenarios without phenomenal experience—are metaphysically possible under primary intensions for terms like "," challenging physicalist reductions. These applications highlight how semantic structures reveal gaps between physical and phenomenal facts, integrating with metaphysical inquiry. Key publications advancing these ideas include Chalmers' chapter "Two-Dimensional Semantics" in the Oxford Handbook of (2006) and "The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics" (2006), which formalize the framework. His book The Character of Consciousness (2010) further integrates these semantics with mind, using two-dimensional analysis to explore phenomenal concepts and their irreducibility. Chalmers critiques traditional possible worlds semantics for its one-dimensional focus, which conflates epistemic and metaphysical evaluation and fails to capture conceptual analysis or a priori entailments. For instance, approaches like Kaplan's characters or Stalnaker's diagonal propositions approximate but do not fully ground the link between meaning and apriority, as they rely on contextual or token-reflexive elements that introduce circularity. Two-dimensionalism resolves this by prioritizing epistemic scenarios as primitives, better accommodating Kripkean necessities without sacrificing cognitive content. He has also briefly applied these tools to verbal disputes in , suggesting that semantic differences in intensions can reveal when disagreements are merely terminological rather than substantive.

Virtual reality and technology

In his 2022 book Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy, David Chalmers argues that constitutes genuine reality, possessing the same moral and epistemic status as physical reality. He contends that virtual objects and events exist as digital entities with real causal powers, and experiences within virtual environments are non-illusory when perceived directly by users, challenging traditional distinctions between simulated and base realities. This view, termed virtual realism, holds that virtual actions—such as building structures in a world or forming relationships in online simulations—carry equivalent ethical weight to those in the physical world, allowing for meaningful moral deliberations in digital spaces. Chalmers extends his arguments on to the , positing that we might inhabit an created by advanced , where digital minds replicate the qualitative experiences of biological ones through functional . Drawing on Bostrom's statistical framework, he suggests that if posthuman civilizations run numerous ancestor simulations, the probability that our reality is simulated exceeds that of a base reality, yet this does not induce global because beliefs formed within a perfect simulation remain largely veridical. Consciousness in such realms arises from computational structures that mirror neural processes, enabling simulated beings to possess genuine phenomenal experiences indistinguishable from our own. Chalmers advocates for the , originally co-developed with , asserting that technologies like smartphones function as extensions of cognition by integrating into our mental processes through habitual sensorimotor interactions. In cases like the "" , where a serves as an external store accessed via and , devices become constitutive parts of formation and , blurring the boundary between internal states and environmental tools. Smartphones exemplify this by offloading cognitive tasks—such as navigation or —directly into our extended , enhancing mental capacities without diminishing their authenticity. Chalmers views and as potent testing grounds for longstanding philosophical puzzles, including and . In virtual environments like or immersive VR simulations, agents exercise apparent through choices that have real consequences within the digital , allowing philosophers to probe compatibilist accounts without the confounds of physical . Similarly, identity puzzles—such as whether a avatar constitutes a distinct or an extension of the user—emerge in scenarios where users inhabit multiple digital personas, testing criteria for continuity and unity of in controlled, replicable settings. While optimistic about virtual reality's capacity to address real-world philosophical issues—such as resolving debates on and through empirically testable analogs—Chalmers critiques for presuming that VR's medium inherently renders it illusory or inferior. He argues that such views overlook the evolving sophistication of VR interfaces, which can deliver veridical perceptions and equivalent to physical experiences, potentially enabling solutions to epistemic puzzles like the by simulating interpersonal interactions at scale. This optimism underscores VR's role not as a mere substitute but as a parallel realm capable of enriching philosophical inquiry and human flourishing.

Contemporary contributions

Artificial intelligence and consciousness

David Chalmers has examined the potential for in large language models (LLMs), such as and its successors, emphasizing indicators of awareness without asserting actual sentience. In assessing in 2022, he estimated a roughly 10% probability that it possesses any form of , viewing its outputs as sophisticated pattern-matching rather than genuine subjective experience, though he noted its conversational prowess could mimic . By 2024, Chalmers discussed in interviews and talks, expressing interest in its theoretical implications for AI . In his 2023 paper "Could a Large Language Model Be Conscious?", Chalmers systematically evaluates the prospects for consciousness, drawing on theories like and to argue that silicon-based systems could theoretically support experience if they incorporate recurrence, unified agency, and world models. He outlines potential tests, such as benchmarks for , affective responses, and agentive control, while debunking myths like the equation of with or reliance on self-reports influenced by training data. Chalmers assigns current a less than 10% chance of consciousness but projects over 25% for enhanced "LLM+" systems within a decade, potentially achieving mouse-level awareness. Chalmers actively participated in 2025 symposia debating consciousness, including the March event "Can Machines Become Conscious?", where he joined neuroscientist to explore whether replicating brain processes could yield machine , emphasizing philosophical implications for human minds. At the October symposium honoring , he argued that LLMs exhibit quasi-agentic traits like simulated beliefs and desires, raising risks of societal manipulation through "counterfeit people" alongside benefits for scientific inquiry into mind design. These discussions highlighted ethical tensions, with Chalmers cautioning against unreflective development that could erode trust or amplify harms. Chalmers advocates for moral consideration of advanced AI systems, even if non-conscious, to prevent misjudgments that could lead to unintended suffering or resource misallocation. He estimates a greater than 20% chance of conscious emerging within 10 years, urging frameworks that prioritize ethical treatment—such as avoiding designs that confuse users about —and integrate AI interests into broader to mitigate risks like subjugation. In 2025 talks, including his October address "Can There Be a Mathematical Theory of ?" at the Natural Philosophy Symposium, Chalmers explored formal applicable to architectures, critiquing reductionist for overlooking the between physical processes and subjective . He posits that mathematical theories could bridge this by quantifying phenomenal structure, potentially guiding design toward or away from , while rejecting purely neurobiological accounts as insufficient for machine minds. This builds on his thought experiments, where physically identical but non-conscious entities underscore why alone may not suffice for awareness. On October 29, 2025, Chalmers delivered a colloquium on " and in Large Language Models" as part of the & series, further examining philosophical questions of and in advanced systems.

Public engagement

David Chalmers has actively engaged the public through media appearances, discussing the implications of for . In a May 2025 article exploring whether might become conscious, Chalmers highlighted the "—how physical processes give rise to subjective experience—and expressed openness to augmenting , potentially leading to a shared "new intelligence bonanza." Similarly, in a July 2025 piece on leading philosophers' views of conscious , Chalmers was cited for his realist stance, emphasizing that is intrinsic and non-physical, requiring resolution of the hard problem to assess . He has also featured on , such as a January 2024 episode of Philosophy Bites, where he elaborated on "technophilosophy"—the interplay between and —and the extended mind hypothesis, arguing that devices like smartphones can integrate into when reliably coupled with the brain. Chalmers co-founded the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (ASSC) in 1994 and has maintained ongoing involvement, including serving as a past president and organizing its annual conferences to advance interdisciplinary research on . These events foster public and academic dialogue, drawing global participants to explore the nature and function of . His public profile was elevated by high-profile debates and wagers on consciousness research. In June 2023, the resolution of a 25-year bet with neuroscientist —placed in 1998 at an ASSC meeting—was widely publicized; Koch conceded that no clear neural correlate of consciousness had been identified by the deadline, presenting Chalmers with a case of wine before a packed audience at the ASSC's 26th conference in . This event, covered in outlets like and , underscored the persistence of the hard problem and garnered attention for Chalmers' philosophical perspective. Chalmers has contributed to popular discourse through accessible articles and interdisciplinary collaborations. A July 2023 Big Think piece detailed the Koch bet's outcome, framing it as evidence that even the "easy problems" of —identifying neural correlates—remain unsolved, while affirming the enduring challenge of subjective experience. In 2024 and 2025, he participated in panels with neuroscientists and researchers on generative , including a March 2025 discussion with on whether machines can achieve , examining large language models' sensory capabilities and their parallels to human minds. On November 14, 2025, Chalmers gave a talk titled "Dirty Secrets of " at the Foundational Questions Institute (FQxI), delving into key challenges and misconceptions in research. These engagements bridge with and technology, informing public understanding of 's ethical and existential implications.

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