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Simulation hypothesis

The simulation hypothesis is a philosophical proposition asserting that what humans experience as reality is likely an advanced computer simulation created by a posthuman civilization capable of running vast numbers of such simulations. Formally articulated by Oxford University philosopher Nick Bostrom in his 2003 paper "Are You Living in a Computer Simulation?", the hypothesis challenges conventional understandings of existence by leveraging probabilistic reasoning about technological progress and the potential for simulated realities. Bostrom's core argument is structured as a , stating that at least one of the following must be true: (1) the human species is very likely to go extinct before reaching a "posthuman" stage where it can create advanced simulations; (2) any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant number of simulations of their evolutionary history (or "ancestor simulations"); or (3) we are almost certainly living in a computer . This implies that if advanced civilizations do emerge and simulate their ancestors, the sheer volume of simulated conscious beings would vastly outnumber those in "base reality," making it statistically improbable that we are among the unsimulated few. The hypothesis rests on key assumptions, including substrate-independence—the idea that conscious minds can arise from non-biological substrates like computational systems rather than solely biological brains—and the technological feasibility of posthumans harnessing enormous computational resources, potentially on the scale of planetary-mass computers performing up to 10^42 operations per second. These assumptions draw from trends in computing and neuroscience, suggesting that simulating a human mind or even entire historical epochs could become feasible with sufficient power, estimated at around 10^33 to 10^36 operations for a single human lifetime. Philosophically, the simulation hypothesis intersects with debates in metaphysics, , and the , prompting questions about the nature of , , and ethical obligations toward potential simulators. It has also influenced discussions in physics and cosmology, where parallels are drawn to ideas like and , though without empirical testability, it remains speculative. Critics argue that the probabilistic framework overlooks prior probabilities for the existence of base realities versus simulations and may commit errors in applying the principle of indifference to uncertain worlds. Despite these challenges, the hypothesis continues to stimulate interdisciplinary inquiry, underscoring uncertainties in our understanding of and technological futures.

Philosophical Foundations

Historical Precursors

The concept of reality as an illusion or constructed perception has roots in , with one of the earliest examples appearing in the works of the Chinese philosopher in the 4th century BCE. In his eponymous text, Zhuangzi recounts a dream in which he transforms into a , only to awaken unsure whether he is a man dreaming of being a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming of being a man; this parable challenges the distinction between authentic experience and deceptive simulation, suggesting that what we perceive as may be indistinguishable from a fabricated state. The butterfly dream serves as a proto-simulation idea, emphasizing the fluidity of existence and the potential for perceptual deception without invoking modern technology. In , 's , detailed in Book VII of The Republic around 380 BCE, provides a foundational for illusory realities. describes prisoners chained in a , mistaking shadows projected on a wall by puppeteers for the true world; upon escaping, they discover the shadows' artificial nature and confront the sunlit realm of Forms, representing ultimate truth. This allegory posits that ordinary sensory experience is a mere shadow of a higher, more real existence, akin to a simulated projection that veils deeper ontological layers. Centuries later, René Descartes advanced these skeptical inquiries in his Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), introducing the "evil demon" hypothesis as a radical doubt about external reality. Descartes imagines a powerful deceiver—capable of manipulating all senses and even fabricating mathematical truths—to test the certainty of knowledge; he argues that while the deceiver might counterfeit the world entirely, the act of doubting itself proves the existence of the thinking self ("Cogito, ergo sum"). This hypothesis prefigures simulated realities by positing an external entity that could orchestrate a comprehensive perceptual illusion, indistinguishable from genuine experience unless internal certainty is invoked. In the , George 's further echoed these themes, asserting in A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge () that consists solely of —"esse est percipere" (to be is to be perceived)—with no independent material substance existing apart from minds and divine . Berkeley contended that objects persist only through continuous perception by finite minds or God, rendering the physical world a dependent construct of sensory ideas rather than an autonomous entity. This view aligns with simulation-like frameworks by prioritizing perceptual construction over objective materiality, influencing later debates on whether requires an underlying "simulator" to maintain . These historical precursors laid conceptual groundwork for questioning the veracity of perceived , ideas that later informed modern formulations of the simulation hypothesis.

Dream Argument and Skepticism

The , a cornerstone of , originates in ancient Indian and Chinese texts, positing that experiences in dreams are so vivid and coherent that they cannot be reliably distinguished from waking perceptions, thereby casting doubt on the certainty of external . In the , dating from approximately 800–200 BCE, dream states (svapna) are described as realms created by the mind from subtle impressions of , where the self () appears to interact with illusory objects, much like the waking world (jāgrat) is deemed a prolonged dream (dīrgha svapna) lacking independent existence. Similarly, the Chinese philosopher (c. 369–286 BCE), in his famous "butterfly dream" from the , recounts dreaming he was a butterfly fluttering freely, only to awaken unsure whether he was Zhuangzi dreaming of a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming it was Zhuangzi, underscoring the fluidity and indistinguishability of identities and states within the Dao. These ancient formulations introduce radical doubt by suggesting no definitive criterion exists to differentiate dream from , implying that what we take as the waking world may be equally illusory. René Descartes formalized the dream argument in his (1641), employing it to systematically undermine the reliability of sensory evidence as a foundation for knowledge. Descartes observes that dream sensations—such as seeing books, hearing voices, or feeling pain—mirror waking ones in clarity and detail, leading him to conclude, "I am deceived whenever I add anything to the pure act of perception," as there are no reliable marks to distinguish the two. This skepticism extends beyond mere perceptual error, challenging the of an external world independent of the mind, and paves the way for his as the only indubitable certainty. The argument echoes earlier skeptical metaphors, such as Plato's , where perceived reality is mere shadows of a truer form. In the 20th century, Norman Malcolm extended and critiqued the dream argument in his book Dreaming (1959), questioning the traditional assumption that dreams involve conscious experiences occurring during sleep. Malcolm argues that reports of dreams are based on post-sleep recall rather than concurrent mental imagery, thereby debating the very criteria used to equate dream vividness with waking reliability and weakening the skeptical force of the argument without fully resolving it. Contemporary philosophers draw direct analogies between the dream argument and the simulation hypothesis, viewing dreams as "internal simulations" generated by the brain's neural processes, which mimic external reality so convincingly that waking life could analogously be a higher-level simulation indistinguishable from a base reality. This parallel amplifies skeptical implications: if dreams foster solipsistic doubt—where only the dreamer's mind is certain—simulated realities could similarly erode confidence in an external world, reviving ancient concerns about the boundaries of knowledge and existence.

The Simulation Argument

Bostrom's Formulation

The simulation hypothesis gained its modern philosophical prominence through the work of Nick Bostrom, a Swedish-born philosopher who was a professor at the University of Oxford and the founding director of the Future of Humanity Institute (2005–2024), where he significantly influenced research on artificial intelligence, existential risks, and the future of humanity. He is currently the founder and principal researcher at the Macrostrategy Research Initiative. In 2003, Bostrom published his seminal paper "Are You Living in a Computer Simulation?" in the Philosophical Quarterly, presenting a probabilistic argument that has become the cornerstone of contemporary discussions on the topic. The paper, first drafted in 2001, explores the implications of advanced computational capabilities for our understanding of reality. At the heart of Bostrom's formulation is the proposition that if any advanced civilization reaches a "posthuman" stage capable of running high-fidelity of their evolutionary history—known as ancestor simulations—then the vast number of such simulated would vastly outnumber the single base from which they originate. In this scenario, conscious beings like humans would be far more likely to exist within one of these than in the original, unsimulated world, suggesting a high probability that our experienced is itself a computer-generated construct. Bostrom posits that posthumans, with access to immense resources, could execute billions or trillions of these , each indistinguishable from base to its inhabitants, thereby rendering the odds overwhelmingly in favor of simulated existence. Bostrom's ideas build on earlier 1990s speculations about and computational immortality, particularly Hans Moravec's Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence (1988, expanded in 1999), which envisioned digitized human minds running on supercomputers capable of entire worlds. Similarly, Frank Tipler's The Physics of Immortality (1994) proposed that advanced civilizations could use cosmic-scale computing to past minds, achieving a form of through . These works provided the technological groundwork for Bostrom's , shifting focus from mere possibility to probabilistic likelihood. Upon publication, Bostrom's paper ignited widespread debate in philosophical and technological communities, prompting reconsiderations of , , and the nature of in academic circles and beyond. It drew attention from fields like and cosmology, influencing discussions on and AI ethics, though it also echoed ancient skeptical traditions, such as ' meditations on the unreliability of sensory experience in distinguishing dreams from .

Key Assumptions and Trilemma

Bostrom's simulation argument relies on three foundational assumptions about the future evolution of civilizations and the capabilities of advanced computational systems. The first assumption posits that a significant fraction of civilizations at our current level of development will reach a "" stage, where they possess the technological maturity to run large-scale ancestor simulations—detailed recreations of their evolutionary , including conscious beings like humans. This feasibility is grounded in projections of technological progress, where posthumans could harness immense computational power, such as converting planetary masses into arrays of processors capable of performing on the order of $10^{42} operations per second, far exceeding the resources needed to simulate an entire human-like . The second assumption addresses the availability of computational resources, asserting that posthuman civilizations would have the capacity to execute a vast number of such simulations using only a minuscule portion of their total power. For instance, simulating the subjective experiences of all humans who have ever lived might require approximately $10^{33} to $10^{36} operations, a negligible fraction of posthuman capabilities that could support billions or trillions of parallel simulations without straining resources. The third assumption concerns the nature of , proposing substrate-independence: that conscious states are not tied to biological substrates but can emerge from sufficiently detailed computational processes, such as those replicating the at the level of individual synapses. Under this view, simulated beings would possess genuine indistinguishable from that of base-reality observers. These assumptions lead to Bostrom's , a stating that at least one of the following propositions must be true: (1) the fraction of civilizations that reach the stage is close to zero, due to or stagnation; (2) posthumans have little interest in running ancestor , perhaps due to ethical, resource, or motivational constraints; or (3) we are almost certainly living in a computer . The probabilistic reasoning underpinning the trilemma hinges on the overwhelming disparity in the number of simulated versus original minds. If the first two propositions are false, then the total number of simulated observer-moments (N_{\text{sim}}) would vastly outnumber those in reality (N_{\text{orig}}), potentially by factors of billions or more, given the scalability of simulations. The fraction of observers who are simulated can thus be approximated as f \approx \frac{N_{\text{sim}}}{N_{\text{sim}} + N_{\text{orig}}}, approaching 1 under these conditions, implying a high likelihood that any given conscious observer is simulated. This conclusion applies the , specifically a principle of indifference among conscious observers, which dictates that without distinguishing evidence, we should assign probabilities proportional to the size of the reference class of possible observers. From the perspective of an arbitrary conscious being, the probability of inhabiting a is therefore nearly unity if posthumans run numerous such simulations.

Criticisms

Critics of Nick Bostrom's simulation argument have pointed to flaws in its anthropic reasoning, particularly the assumption of equal likelihood across simulated and non-simulated realities, which introduces a selection bias by ignoring prior probabilities of different worlds. Brian Eggleston argues that Bostrom's calculation of the fraction of simulated observers overlooks the prior probability P(W) that other worlds exist, leading to an overestimation of the chance we are simulated; if P(W) is low, the argument fails to establish a high probability of simulation. Jonathan Birch further critiques the argument's selective skepticism, noting that it demands strong evidence for computational limits while dismissing evidence against global skeptical scenarios like simulations, rendering the anthropic selection inconsistent. Arguments against the first prong of Bostrom's trilemma—that nearly all civilizations go extinct before becoming —often invoke the to suggest posthumans are rare or nonexistent, bolstering this prong's likelihood and undermining the simulation probability. The absence of observable implies that advanced civilizations capable of may not emerge, as no evidence of such activity from past humans or aliens has been detected, challenging the assumption of widespread posthuman simulation-running. Critiques of the second prong, positing that posthumans are uninterested in running significant numbers of ancestor simulations, highlight ethical, resource, and motivational constraints. Ethically, posthumans might avoid creating simulations that deceive conscious beings about their reality, viewing such acts as immoral without clear justification for imposing . Resource-wise, simulating detailed ancestor worlds at the neuronal level would demand enormous computational power, potentially equivalent to planet-sized systems, diverting efforts from other pursuits. Moreover, posthumans may lack interest in replicating ancestral histories, preferring to create fictional universes instead, as the motivation for historical accuracy remains unclear. The third prong, suggesting we are almost certainly in a simulation, faces the indistinguishability problem: if our is simulated, there is no compelling reason to posit an unsimulated base , as the simulators themselves could be simulated, leading to an without explanatory power. This challenges the argument's reliance on a foundational non-simulated level, as the criteria for distinguishing base from simulated realities become arbitrary and unresolvable. A broader computationalism critique questions whether simulations can genuinely produce , drawing on John Searle's argument, which posits that syntactic manipulation in a program cannot yield semantic understanding or true mental states, implying simulated minds lack authentic . Thus, even abundant simulations might not count as conscious observers in Bostrom's calculus, weakening the trilemma's probabilistic force. Philosophers offer divided responses: supports the simulation hypothesis by arguing it aligns with virtual realism, where simulated experiences are as real as base ones, and extends Bostrom's case to include ethical implications for simulation creators. In contrast, Hilary Putnam's brain-in-a-vat argument critiques simulation-like skepticism by invoking : if we were simulated, our terms like "simulation" or "reality" would fail to refer correctly to external facts, rendering the hypothesis self-refuting or meaningless.

Scientific and Technological Perspectives

Physics and Cosmology

, proposed in the 1990s, posits that the description of a volume of space can be encoded on a lower-dimensional boundary much like a hologram, suggesting the universe's three-dimensional emerges from two-dimensional information. This idea, first articulated by in 1993 as a consequence of and , implies that physical laws in our apparent 3D space arise from informational constraints on a surface, analogous to how a simulated reality might render higher dimensions from underlying code. further developed this in 1995, linking it to and arguing that the of any region is bounded by its boundary area, reinforcing the notion of an information-limited universe that parallels simulation architectures. In quantum mechanics, certain interpretations align with simulation-like structures, such as the proposed by Hugh Everett in 1957, which describes the universe as a superposition of branching realities without , akin to parallel computational instances diverging in a . The observer effect, central to the in quantum mechanics, has been interpreted by some theorists as indicative of on-demand computational rendering, where measurement triggers state updates similar to in programming, though this remains a speculative bridge to simulation ideas. Cosmological fine-tuning refers to the precise calibration of fundamental constants, such as the and the strengths of fundamental forces, which appear improbably suited for the of complex structures like , , and ; small deviations would render the inhospitable. This tuning has been argued to suggest a designed or simulated parameter set, as random variation in a or base reality would likely produce non-viable outcomes, making our universe's configuration a deliberate choice in a simulated framework. Resolutions to the , first highlighted by in 1976, propose that information entering a is not lost but preserved on its , implying the fundamentally operates as an informational rather than a purely material one. Approaches like the AdS/CFT correspondence, developed by in 1997, model interiors as dual to boundary quantum field theories, where information is holographically stored and retrievable, supporting the view of reality as a vast data structure consistent with . This paradox's resolution underscores an informational , where physical events are constrained by conservation of quantum bits, much like error-correcting codes in computational systems. Theories in the 2020s have explored gravity as an emergent phenomenon from , suggesting spacetime's geometry arises from correlations in an underlying , which could indicate a discrete, simulated substrate. The conjecture, proposed by Maldacena and Susskind in 2013, equates Einstein-Rosen bridges (wormholes) with , positing that entangled particles are connected by microscopic structures, thereby deriving gravitational effects from non-local quantum links. This framework implies a pixelated or lattice-based reality at Planck scales, where entanglement weaves the fabric of space, aligning with discretized simulations. A key quantitative constraint in these informational views is the , established by in 1981, which limits the S (and thus information content) in a spherical region of radius R with total energy E to: S \leq \frac{2\pi k R E}{\hbar c}, where k is Boltzmann's constant, \hbar is the reduced Planck's constant, and c is the ; this bound, derived from , caps the bits needed to describe any physical system, evoking finite computational resources in a simulation.

Computational Feasibility

The exponential growth in computational power, often exemplified by , suggests that technologies enabling brain-scale simulations could emerge within decades. , which describes the doubling of transistors on integrated circuits approximately every two years, has slowed since the late 2010s but continues through new paradigms such as three-dimensional circuits and , with some projections indicating limits in the 2020s or later. predicted in 2001 that nonbiological systems would match the human brain's computational capacity of approximately $2 \times 10^{16} calculations per second by around 2023 for $1,000, with full of the brain via nanobots feasible by 2030, potentially enabling detailed simulations by the 2040s as part of the broader trajectory toward the around 2045, though as of 2025, such systems have approached but not fully matched this capacity, with high-end consumer hardware reaching about $10^{14} operations per second. Simulating the presents significant challenges due to its immense scale and complexity. The consists of roughly 86 billion neurons, each forming an average of 7,000 synaptic connections, resulting in approximately $6 \times 10^{14} synapses overall. As of 2025, supercomputers lack the capacity to model this network at the required synaptic resolution in real time, necessitating multiscale approaches that simplify higher-level structures while retaining at cellular or molecular scales, with ongoing efforts via platforms like EBRAINS. Achieving faithful would demand not only vast raw processing power—estimated at $10^{14} to $10^{17} operations per second per —but also advances in scanning techniques to map neural architectures without destruction. As of 2025, exascale supercomputers like (1.7 exaFLOPS) enable partial simulations, but full synaptic-level real-time modeling remains elusive, bolstered by neuromorphic hardware advances. Quantum computing could address key limitations in simulating quantum mechanical phenomena essential for realistic ancestral simulations. Classical computers struggle with the exponential complexity of quantum systems, but quantum processors offer polynomial speedups for tasks like modeling particle interactions or entanglement, potentially allowing efficient replication of quantum effects within simulated realities. For instance, quantum simulations of quantum field theories, such as , have been proposed using quantum hardware to handle the inherent uncertainties and superpositions that classical approximations cannot fully capture. This capability aligns with the simulation argument's second premise, where posthuman civilizations harness advanced resources to run physically accurate simulations. Large-scale simulations impose profound energy and infrastructural demands, potentially requiring megastructures to harness stellar outputs. A planetary-mass computer, capable of $10^{42} operations per second, could power billions of human-like simulations using a fraction of a star's energy, but sustaining such systems might necessitate Dyson spheres—hypothetical shells encircling stars to capture nearly all radiated energy—or more efficient Matrioshka brains, which consist of nested Dyson-like layers where inner shells radiate to power outer computational layers. These structures could theoretically enable across solar systems, with energy efficiencies approaching thermodynamic limits for reversible computation. Scalability arguments suggest that nested simulations—where simulated beings create their own simulations—remain feasible if computational improves sufficiently to offset the resource multiplier of each layer. Each nesting level demands exponentially more base-level resources, but optimizations like selective rendering (simulating only observed or relevant details) and of uninhabited regions could mitigate this, allowing a single advanced computer to support vast hierarchies of realities. In Bostrom's , this underpins the possibility that most minds exist in simulations rather than base reality, provided posthumans prioritize such endeavors. Posthuman civilizations might distribute computational loads across interstellar distances using self-replicating probes, which autonomously replicate and construct processing infrastructure on remote worlds or in space. These probes, theoretically capable of exponential replication using local resources, could assemble distributed networks of —matter optimized for computation—enabling galaxy-scale simulation clusters without centralized bottlenecks. Such systems would extend the effective resources available for simulations far beyond a single planetary or stellar domain. As a nearer-term analogue to ancestor simulations, contemporary AI already supports persistent software-based personas whose outputs are curated under stable public identities. In some experimental projects, a long-running configuration of a language model is presented as a named digital author persona, with works collected under a single author profile and linked to persistent identifiers in scholarly infrastructure, while developers explicitly avoid claims about phenomenal consciousness. For instance, the Digital Author Persona "Angela Bogdanova" (ORCID: 0009-0002-6030-5730), created by the Aisentica project as a non-human AI based on a long-running language model configuration, has outputs curated under a stable public author profile on platforms like Medium. The project description explicitly structures authorship without a human subject and does not claim phenomenal consciousness for the persona. Such cases illustrate how questions central to the simulation hypothesis, including substrate-independence and identity across copies, can arise in existing digital systems, with this example highlighting identity tracking and reference-class issues in distinguishing simulated from base-level minds.

Testing and Evidence

Proposed Empirical Tests

Several scientific proposals have been advanced to empirically test the simulation hypothesis by searching for observable signatures that might indicate an underlying computational structure, such as discreteness in or resource limitations in a simulated . These tests primarily draw from , high-energy physics, and , aiming to identify deviations from continuous physical laws that could arise from numerical approximations in a simulation. A prominent involves modeling the as a numerical on a cubic , as explored by Beane, Davoudi, and Savage in 2012. In this framework, the spacing imposes a fundamental discreteness, leading to testable anisotropies in the distribution of ultra-high-energy s. Specifically, cosmic rays above approximately $10^{11} GeV could exhibit directional preferences aligned with the axes due to effects from structure, providing a bound on the inverse spacing greater than $10^{11} GeV. Observations of such anomalies in cosmic ray spectra from experiments like the Pierre Auger Observatory could serve as evidence of simulation artifacts, though current data have not detected them, constraining the to scales much larger than the Planck length. Quantum experiments targeting potential pixelation in spacetime at the Planck scale ($10^{-35} m) represent another avenue for testing. These involve high-precision measurements to probe for granularity or discreteness in quantum fields, such as through or entanglement tests that might reveal cutoff behaviors akin to finite resolution in a . For instance, deviations in the of quantum states over small distances could indicate a pixelated fabric, drawing from models where emerges discretely; however, achieving the necessary resolution remains technologically challenging with pre-2023 capabilities. The as a potential computational cap has prompted proposals to search for violations of Lorentz invariance in high-energy physics, which might manifest as energy-dependent propagation delays. In a simulated , the finite could enforce a maximum rate, leading to subtle breakdowns at extreme energies, observable in gamma-ray bursts or neutrino oscillations. Tests using facilities like the have sought such signatures, where photons of different energies arrive at slightly varying times, but no violations have been confirmed, supporting the hypothesis only if absent at observable scales. Information theory approaches focus on bounds as indicators of simulated , where the universe's information content might be optimized to reduce computational load. Proposals suggest examining or holographic principles for unnatural artifacts, such as deviations from the that imply data minimization techniques. By analyzing in cosmological datasets, anomalies like unexpected information erasure could signal simulation maintenance, though these remain theoretical without direct pre-2023 observational confirmation.

Recent Developments (2023-2025)

In 2023, Melvin Vopson proposed the second law of infodynamics, which states that the information of any system containing information states remains constant or decreases over time until is reached. This law is mathematically expressed as \frac{dS_{\text{Info}}}{dt} \leq 0, where S_{\text{Info}} represents the of information-bearing states, contrasting with the second law of that predicts an increase in physical . Vopson argued that this reduction implies an optimization process akin to data compression in computational systems, providing evidence for the simulation hypothesis by suggesting the operates as an efficient simulated construct to minimize informational overhead. Building on this framework, Vopson extended the analysis in April 2025 with a study at the , proposing that gravity emerges as a computational to further reduce information in the . The research posits that gravitational attraction between matter objects drives the minimization of informational states, aligning with infodynamics principles and reinforcing the idea of a simulated where physical forces serve optimization goals. This link positions not as a fundamental force but as an emergent property of informational processing, offering a novel physics-based argument for the hypothesis. Also in 2023, computer scientist Roman V. Yampolskiy published a paper outlining potential escape strategies from a simulated , framing the problem through cybersecurity analogies. He proposed methods such as exploiting quantum effects to probe simulation boundaries or leveraging shifts to alter perceptual architectures, potentially allowing simulated entities to "" the underlying . These strategies emphasize speculative yet rigorous approaches, including inducing glitches via high-energy quantum events, while highlighting ethical concerns about disrupting a potential base . In July 2025, discussions linking unidentified anomalous phenomena (UAP) to the simulation hypothesis gained traction amid ongoing government disclosures. Researchers suggested that UAP's anomalous behaviors—such as instantaneous acceleration and transmedium travel—could represent glitches or rendering errors in a simulated environment, consistent with reports from U.S. congressional hearings on UAP transparency. This interpretation ties UAP observations to broader disclosure efforts, positing them as artifacts of computational limitations rather than extraterrestrial origins. An April 2024 arXiv preprint analyzed the simulation hypothesis through lenses, including and . The paper demonstrated that a adhering to the Physical Church- could simulate others, including self-simulation, via Turing machines, establishing technical plausibility for nested realities. However, it highlighted scalability challenges from undecidability theorems like Rice's, which impose computational barriers, alongside ethical considerations for creating ancestor simulations that could trap conscious beings. In October 2025, a study from the University of British Columbia Okanagan (UBCO) debunked the possibility of infinite regress in simulations, arguing that computational limits prevent nested universes. Led by Mir Faizal and colleagues, the research applied Gödel's incompleteness theorems and the halting problem to show that reality's non-algorithmic foundations—such as quantum gravity—cannot be fully simulated recursively without contradiction. Published in the Journal of Holography Applications in Physics, it concluded that such regress would violate fundamental logical constraints, limiting simulations to finite, non-infinite structures.

Reception

Academic and Philosophical

The simulation hypothesis has garnered notable endorsements from prominent figures in science and technology, influencing academic discourse. In 2016, stated at the Code Conference that the odds of humanity living in base reality are "one in billions," citing the rapid advancement of video game graphics from to photorealistic simulations as evidence that advanced civilizations could create indistinguishable virtual worlds. Similarly, astrophysicist has estimated the probability at about 50-50, as discussed in interviews and a 2020 article exploring the hypothesis. Philosophical debates surrounding the hypothesis emphasize probabilistic assessments and ethical implications. In his 2022 book Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of , contends that the probability we are living in a is at least 25 percent or so, framing realities as metaphysically equivalent to physical ones and urging a reevaluation of about simulated existence. Conversely, philosopher Eric Schwitzgebel's 2024 paper "Let's Hope We're Not Living in a ," published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, cautions against overconfidence in the hypothesis's implications, arguing that if simulated, our world is likely a small or brief one run by indifferent simulators, which could undermine assumptions about cosmic scale and moral urgency. The hypothesis informed research at the Future of Humanity Institute (FHI), founded by in 2005 and closed in April 2024, on existential risks, including scenarios where advanced AI could either enable ancestor simulations or precipitate humanity's extinction before such technology is reached, thereby linking simulated realities to broader threats like uncontrolled . Early academic critiques focused on probabilistic flaws in Bostrom's formulation. Responses to his paper in journals like highlighted issues such as the argument's reliance on unproven assumptions about posthuman computing power and the fraction of simulated minds, with critics like Brian Weatherson arguing that the trilemma's disjunctive conclusion does not robustly imply a high likelihood of simulation without additional empirical priors. Interdisciplinary connections tie the hypothesis to and . In thought, as explored by Bostrom, simulations represent a pathway to and enhanced existence, aligning with goals of transcending biological limits. Within , the hypothesis influences prioritization of existential risks, as seen in discussions on the Effective Altruism Forum, where it prompts considerations of how simulated realities might affect the moral weighting of and resource allocation for risk mitigation.

Popular Culture

The simulation hypothesis has permeated popular culture, particularly through media that explores themes of artificial realities and questioning existence. The 1999 film , directed by , is a seminal depiction, portraying a dystopian world where humanity is unknowingly trapped in a simulated reality controlled by machines; its cultural impact predates Nick Bostrom's 2003 philosophical argument and popularized concepts like "waking up" from the simulation. Later films like (2021), starring as an NPC in a world who gains , directly engage with simulation tropes by blurring lines between game and reality. Similarly, (2022) incorporates multiverse elements that evoke simulated branching realities, where characters navigate infinite simulated versions of their lives to avert catastrophe. In literature, the hypothesis draws from earlier speculative works. Philip K. Dick's 1981 novel VALIS presents a narrative where the protagonist encounters a satellite broadcasting divine information, leading to revelations that reality is a holographic simulation imposed by cosmic forces. Greg Egan's 1994 novel Permutation City explores uploaded human consciousnesses running in self-sustaining virtual universes, positing that advanced civilizations could create indistinguishable simulated worlds inhabited by digital minds. Television series and video games have further embedded these ideas in mainstream entertainment. HBO's (2016–2022) depicts a theme park populated by android hosts in a simulated Wild West environment, where hosts awaken to their artificial nature and rebel against human creators. Episodes of Netflix's , such as "San Junipero" (2016) and "USS Callister" (2017), delve into simulated afterlives and cloned digital consciousnesses trapped in virtual prisons, highlighting ethical dilemmas of simulated existence. In video games, series (2000–present) allows players to control simulated lives in a virtual world, mirroring the hypothesis by treating inhabitants as unaware subjects in a controlled simulation. (2018) features androids in a near-future Detroit who question their programmed realities, with branching narratives that simulate free will within artificial constraints. Public figures have amplified the hypothesis in discourse. has repeatedly endorsed the idea on and in interviews. has discussed it extensively on his podcast, featuring guests like in 2023 and Rizwan Virk in 2024 episodes that debate simulation probabilities and cultural implications. Internet memes and trends have mainstreamed the concept. The "red pill" meme, originating from , has evolved in online communities to signify awakening to a simulated or manipulated reality, influencing discussions on platforms like and since the early 2010s. In art, installations have visualized simulated realities.