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Derussification

Derussification encompasses systematic efforts by post-Soviet states to diminish Russian cultural, linguistic, and historical dominance imposed through centuries of imperial and Soviet Russification, involving measures such as renaming toponyms, promoting national languages in education and public life, and dismantling monuments associated with Russian figures or narratives.^[1]^[2] These initiatives gained momentum after the USSR's 1991 dissolution, as newly independent nations sought to reclaim indigenous identities amid legacies of forced assimilation, but accelerated sharply in Ukraine and the Baltic states following Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea and full-scale 2022 invasion, framing derussification as decolonization from Moscow's hybrid threats.^[3]^[4] In Ukraine, derussification has manifested in decommunization laws extended to excise Russian imperial symbols, including the 2022-2023 removal of over 1,000 monuments to figures like Alexander Pushkin and the rebranding of thousands of streets from Russified names, prioritizing Ukrainian historical narratives to counter perceived cultural imperialism.^[2]^[5] Language policies have shifted education toward Ukrainian exclusivity, reducing Russian-medium instruction from widespread use to marginal, as part of bolstering national resilience against informational and existential threats.^[6] Similarly, Baltic states like Latvia and Estonia have enforced state language requirements for citizenship and public administration since the 1990s, with post-2022 escalations in de-Sovietization targeting Russian Orthodox sites and media, aiming to integrate ethnic Russian minorities while mitigating irredentist risks from Moscow.^[7]^[8] While proponents view derussification as essential restorative justice—reversing demographic engineering and cultural erasure documented in Soviet archives—these policies have sparked debates over minority rights, with critics alleging ethnic discrimination despite empirical correlations between Russian cultural hegemony and heightened vulnerability to geopolitical aggression.^[1]^[9] Academic analyses, often drawing from primary policy texts rather than partisan reporting, underscore its causal role in fostering sovereign identity, though implementation varies by context, from Tatarstan's subtler linguistic purification to broader Central Asian shifts away from Cyrillic scripts.^[10]

Conceptual Foundations

Definition and Historical Origins

Derussification denotes a set of deliberate policies and processes in post-imperial or post-Soviet states aimed at reversing prior Russian linguistic, cultural, and administrative impositions by prioritizing indigenous languages, restoring native toponyms, and curtailing the symbolic dominance of Russian elements, such as through restrictions on Russian-language media or shifts away from Cyrillic script variants aligned with Russian norms.^[11] These efforts emerged as restorative countermeasures to historical Russification, which systematically promoted Russian as the lingua franca, resettled ethnic Russians in non-Russian regions, and marginalized local elites to consolidate imperial control.^[12] Unlike punitive ethnic cleansing, derussification's causal roots lie in the empirical backlash against coercive assimilation, where suppressed vernaculars and traditions fostered resilient national identities.^[13] The conceptual origins of derussification trace to 19th-century nationalist awakenings within the Russian Empire, provoked by intensifying Russification under Tsars Nicholas I and Alexander III. In Poland, following the failed November Uprising of 1830–1831, Russian authorities closed Polish universities, replaced Latin script with Cyrillic in official documents, and mandated Russian in secondary education, displacing an estimated 80% of Polish-language instruction by the 1860s; this suppression of the Polish elite—through land confiscations affecting over 1,600 estates post-1863 January Uprising—spurred underground cultural resistance and demands for linguistic revival.^[14] Similarly, in Ukraine (then termed "Little Russia"), the Valuev Circular of 18 July 1863, issued by Interior Minister Pyotr Valuev, banned Ukrainian-language publications in education, religion, and scholarship (except belles-lettres), declaring no distinct "Little Russian" dialect suitable for serious works, which halted over a dozen planned Ukrainian textbooks and journals, thereby galvanizing the Hromada societies for clandestine promotion of Ukrainian orthography and folklore.^[15]^[16] In Finland, annexed as an autonomous grand duchy in 1809, early Russification was limited but escalated in the 1880s with Finnish-language restrictions in bureaucracy and military conscription in Russian units, prompting the Fennoman movement—led by figures like Johan Vilhelm Snellman—to advocate Finnish as the administrative language by 1863, reversing Swedish dominance while preempting full Russian overlay through petitions that secured bilingual reforms. These precedents established derussification's framework: not as novel decolonization, but as causal restitution for Russification's documented scope, including the settlement of over 100,000 Russian colonists in Ukrainian gubernias by 1897 and the suppression of non-Orthodox clergy, which eroded local governance and literacy in native tongues.^[12]^[17]

Russification as Precursor Policy

Russification in the Russian Empire constituted a systematic policy of cultural and linguistic assimilation aimed at integrating non-Russian populations into a centralized imperial framework, primarily through the promotion of the Russian language as the dominant medium of administration, education, and public life. Key mechanisms included mandating Russian in official correspondence and schools, restricting publications in local languages, and appointing ethnic Russians to key bureaucratic positions in peripheral regions.^[18]^[19] This approach extended to demographic engineering, encouraging the migration of Russian settlers to non-Russian areas to alter ethnic compositions and bolster loyalty to the tsarist regime.^[20] In Ukraine, for instance, tsarist policies facilitated an influx of Russian migrants to industrializing eastern regions, contributing to a notable increase in Russian-language usage by the late 19th century, as evidenced by patterns of settlement documented in imperial records.^[21] Administrative centralization further manifested in the curtailment of regional autonomies, exemplified by the February Manifesto of 1899, which Tsar Nicholas II issued to override Finland's semi-autonomous status within the empire, subjecting Finnish legislation to imperial veto and integrating the Grand Duchy's military under Russian command.^[22] This decree marked an intensification of coercive measures, including the imposition of Russian as the language of governance and conscription, which eroded prior Finnish administrative independence and provoked widespread passive resistance.^[23] In Ukraine, similar tactics involved periodic bans on Ukrainian-language printing and theater, enforced through censorship that targeted expressions of distinct national identity, prioritizing state unity over the preservation of organic linguistic diversity.^[24] The effects of these policies included measurable erosion of local cultural institutions and literacy in native tongues, as Russian-medium education supplanted vernacular schooling in regions like Finland, where pre-Russification native literacy rates had been comparatively high due to earlier Protestant reforms.^[19] Empirical data from tsarist-era reports reveal suppressed uprisings tied to linguistic grievances, such as the 1905 formation of Ukrainian cultural societies like Prosvita, which faced immediate official scrutiny and closures despite temporary liberalization amid revolutionary unrest.^[24] Far from a voluntary "civilizing mission," Russification relied on coercive enforcement, as archival evidence of censored publications and enforced migrations underscores a deliberate strategy of assimilation that fostered resentment by subordinating peripheral identities to imperial imperatives, often at the expense of long-term social cohesion.^[17]^[19]

Early 20th Century Instances

Post-Russian Empire Collapse (1917–1920s)

The collapse of the Russian Empire following the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917 and the ensuing civil war (1917–1922) fragmented imperial control, enabling rapid assertions of independence in peripheral territories and initial reversals of Russification policies. Poland reestablished sovereignty on November 11, 1918, with recognition formalized in the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919; Estonia declared independence on February 24, 1918; Latvia on November 18, 1918; and Lithuania on February 16, 1918. These acts occurred amid wartime chaos, as Bolshevik forces initially lacked capacity to reimpose central authority, allowing local assemblies to prioritize national consolidation over continued Russian linguistic and administrative dominance.^[25] Newly independent governments pursued derussification through targeted measures, including the dismissal of Russian officials from bureaucracies and militaries, the restoration of Latin scripts in place of imposed Cyrillic elements, and the elevation of native languages in public spheres. In Poland, purges removed thousands of Russian administrators inherited from the Congress Kingdom era, while educational reforms shifted instruction to Polish; the Act of January 24, 1924, enshrined Polish as the official state language, mandating its use in legislation, courts, and schools to unify administration across diverse regions. Baltic states enacted analogous reforms: Estonia's 1920 constitution designated Estonian as the state language, requiring its primacy in government and education; Latvia and Lithuania followed suit by 1922, converting Russian-medium institutions to national languages where feasible, while permitting limited minority schooling under international treaty obligations. These steps reflected pragmatic imperatives of state-building in a post-imperial void, leveraging the empire's disintegration to reorient institutions toward ethnic majorities without wholesale ethnic expulsions. Empirical shifts were evident in administrative and educational domains, where Russian's role contracted sharply as national languages assumed default status; for instance, pre-independence Russian instruction, prevalent in urban schools under imperial rule, yielded to mandatory native-language curricula, confining Russian to private or minority contexts by the mid-1920s. Russian émigrés, numbering tens of thousands in Poland and the Baltics as refugees from Bolshevism, perceived these changes as an erosion of prior cultural hegemony, often attributing it to new regimes' instrumental nationalism rather than Bolshevik collapse alone—evidenced in émigré writings lamenting the "Polonization" of shared spaces and the marginalization of Russian Orthodox institutions. This derussification, enabled by geopolitical fragmentation rather than primordial animosities, laid foundational precedents for interwar national policies, though tempered by League of Nations minority protections that preserved some Russian-language rights.^[26]^[27]

Specific Cases: Kars and Harbin Russians

In the Kars region, annexed by Turkey following the Turkish-Armenian War and formalized by the Treaty of Kars in 1921, Turkish authorities implemented policies asserting sovereignty over former Russian imperial territories, leading to the displacement of remaining Russian settlers. During Russian administration from 1878 to 1918, Russian colonists formed a notable presence, but post-1920 military recapture by Turkish forces and subsequent border agreements with the Soviet Union prompted repatriation or emigration of ethnic Russians, reducing their demographic share to negligible levels by 1923.^[28]^[29] These efforts included renaming geographic sites associated with Russian rule and curtailing Orthodox Christian institutions, aligning with broader Turkification initiatives rather than a targeted anti-Russian campaign. Economic activities tied to Russian settler agriculture and trade diminished as local Muslim populations resettled, prioritizing Turkish national consolidation over multicultural remnants of imperial presence.^[28] The Harbin Russian community, centered around the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) established in 1898, experienced accelerated decline in the 1920s amid Chinese assertions of control. Following the 1920 replacement of Russian administrative roles in the CER zone by Chinese officials and the 1924 Sino-Soviet agreement for joint management, Russian influence waned, prompting emigration; the population, which exceeded 100,000 in the early 1920s, fell below 40,000 by the 1930s due to assimilation pressures and outbound migration.^[30]^[31] Russian merchants, reliant on extraterritorial privileges and railway commerce, faced severe economic disruptions as Chinese nationalization efforts eroded concessions, leading to business failures and further exodus. This process reflected Chinese sovereignty reclamation post-Russian Civil War instability, not ideological derussification, with remaining Russians adapting through cultural dilution or relocation to other diasporas.^[30]^[32]

Soviet-Era Dynamics

Russification Dominance and Exceptions

The Soviet policy of korenizatsiya, implemented in the 1920s to promote indigenization through local languages and ethnic elites in non-Russian republics, was systematically reversed under Joseph Stalin's regime by the late 1920s and early 1930s amid political purges and centralization efforts.^[33] This shift prioritized Russian as the lingua franca for administration, education, and industry, effectively establishing it as the elite language across the USSR and marginalizing vernaculars in favor of cultural homogenization.^[34] Empirical data from Soviet censuses illustrate this dominance: non-Russian bilingualism in Russian rose steadily due to mandatory schooling and urban migration, with reports indicating that by the late 1970s, the number of non-Russians claiming fluency in Russian as a second language had increased by 40% from 1970 levels, reflecting enforced integration over ethnic autonomy.^[35] By the 1989 census, approximately 80% of the Soviet population, predominantly non-Russians, reported speaking Russian, underscoring the net Russification despite nominal federal structures.^[36] Rare exceptions to this trajectory occurred in limited, short-lived reforms during the korenizatsiya era, such as Ukrainian orthographic standardization efforts in the mid-1920s, which aimed to unify and promote the language through academic discussions and publications like the 1928 orthography draft.^[37] These were abruptly scrapped in the 1930s, with the 1933 orthography imposing changes that aligned Ukrainian more closely with Russian phonetics and vocabulary, serving central control rather than preservation.^[38] Similar suppressions affected other groups; for instance, the Tatar language transitioned from a Latin script adopted in 1927 to Cyrillic in 1939 via decree, facilitating alignment with Russian orthographic norms and easing surveillance over printed materials.^[39] Causal factors driving Russification's prevalence included rapid industrialization and collectivization from the 1930s onward, which demanded a unified administrative language for worker mobility and Five-Year Plan execution, rendering local tongues inefficient for technical and inter-republic communication.^[40] While framed as pragmatic communism transcending ethnic favoritism, these policies empirically eroded vernacular usage—evidenced by declining native-language literacy rates in republics like Tatarstan post-script reforms—prioritizing Soviet unity over cultural pluralism.^[41] Pockets of resistance or reversal were confined to pre-purge phases, yielding to purges that eliminated indigenous cadres and reinforced Russian dominance by 1959, when non-Russian elites were disproportionately Russified in urban centers.^[42]

Sino-Soviet Split and Limited Reversals

The Sino-Soviet split, escalating from ideological divergences in the late 1950s, culminated in the Soviet Union's abrupt withdrawal of approximately 1,390 technical advisors and termination of 600 aid contracts in July 1960, severing collaborative projects across Chinese industry and infrastructure.^[43] ^[44] This geopolitical rupture, driven by disputes over de-Stalinization, peaceful coexistence with the West, and leadership primacy within global communism, prompted China to curtail Soviet-influenced elements in border regions, including accelerated promotion of Mandarin instruction in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia to supplant Russian-language technical training.^[45] ^[46] Unlike ethnic decolonization efforts elsewhere, these measures prioritized ideological purification over cultural erasure, affecting an estimated several thousand Soviet expatriates and local Russian descendants—out of China's roughly 23,000 registered Russians per the 1953 census—but sparing broader Russophone communities from systematic expulsion or assimilation. Soviet analyses framed such actions as Chinese nationalist pretexts masking anti-communist tendencies, rather than genuine reversals of prior Russification.^[47] In the split's wake, particularly amid the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), isolated derussification manifested in vandalism and renaming of Soviet-constructed sites, such as factories and monuments symbolizing pre-split alliance, as reported in Soviet diplomatic dispatches decrying the destruction of collaborative legacies.^[47] These episodes, concentrated in urban and industrial hubs like Manchuria where Soviet aid had peaked in the 1950s, reflected Maoist campaigns against "revisionism" but lacked nationwide enforcement or permanence; data from the era indicate a temporary decline in Russian-language materials and personnel, with influence rebounding via indirect channels post-1969 border clashes.^[48] ^[49] Border skirmishes in Xinjiang, including gunfights at Tielieketi in August 1969, heightened scrutiny on Russian minorities there—descended from 19th- and early 20th-century migrations—but resulted in localized relocations rather than mass derussification, underscoring the conflict's interstate character over domestic ethnic policy.^[48] Pragmatic détente by the late 1980s, including normalized ties in 1989, limited any enduring reversals, as China retained Soviet-era technical blueprints and expertise without ideological concessions.^[50]

Post-Soviet Revival and Policies

Language and Script Reforms

Post-Soviet derussification initiatives have emphasized language reforms to reverse the Soviet-era elevation of Russian as the lingua franca, where proficiency reached 83.1% of the population in Kazakhstan by 1989.^[51] These efforts prioritize elevating titular state languages in public domains, countering Russian's role in urban communication and administration, which often exceeded 80% usage in multiethnic settings.^[52] Policies typically impose quotas rather than outright bans on Russian or minority languages, allowing limited accommodations for ethnic groups while mandating dominance of the state language; compliance varies, with enforcement through fines for media violations but uneven application in education and private spheres. Script reforms form a key component, symbolizing cultural dissociation from Cyrillic, introduced during Russification. Kazakhstan decreed a transition from Cyrillic to Latin script in 2017, targeting completion by 2025 but extended to 2031 amid implementation challenges like dual-script coexistence and public education campaigns.^[53] This aligns with broader decolonization goals, reducing orthographic ties to Russian while facilitating global integration.^[54] Turkmenistan, retaining Latin since 1993, pursued parallel lexical purification in the 1990s by promoting native Turkmen terms over Russian loanwords in official usage, consolidating the state language against residual Soviet influences.^[55] Legislative mandates enforce state language quotas in media and services, yielding measurable declines in Russian usage. Ukraine's 2019 Law on Ensuring the Functioning of Ukrainian as the State Language requires 90% Ukrainian content in national television and radio broadcasting, with 75% for general programs, aiming to reclaim public spheres from Russian dominance.^[56] In Kazakhstan, Russian proficiency has correspondingly dropped, with daily Kazakh speakers among ethnic Kazakhs rising to 63.4% by the 2021 census, reflecting policy-driven shifts from Soviet baselines.^[57] Minority provisions permit up to 10-25% non-state language content in regional media, balancing derussification with rights protections, though compliance monitoring reveals gaps in rural enforcement.^[58]

Cultural De-Symbolization Efforts

Cultural de-symbolization efforts within derussification policies target the physical remnants of Russian imperial and Soviet influence, including monuments to figures like Vladimir Lenin and Alexander Pushkin, as well as toponyms evoking those eras. These actions, enacted post-independence in various former Soviet republics, seek to dismantle symbols perceived as markers of historical subjugation, often through legislative mandates that prioritize national narratives over retained Soviet heritage. While proponents frame such measures as restorative of indigenous identity, critics contend they risk oversimplifying complex historical integrations, potentially erasing contributions from Russian cultural figures predating Bolshevik impositions.^[59] In Ukraine, the 2015 decommunization laws catalyzed extensive renamings, affecting over 51,000 streets, squares, and other toponymic objects by 2016, in addition to 987 cities and villages that reverted to pre-Soviet designations or adopted new ones.^[59] This process extended to monument removals, with all 1,320 Lenin statues across the country dismantled by 2017, many toppled spontaneously after the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution in what became known as "Leninfall."^[60] Public opinion on these removals varied regionally, with stronger backing in central and western Ukraine—around 42% support for demolitions in Kyiv and Poltava oblasts—contrasting with lower approval in eastern areas like Kharkiv at 11%.^[61] Derussification expanded these efforts to non-Soviet Russian symbols, particularly after 2022, leading to the dismantling of over 30 Pushkin monuments viewed as emblems of imperial cultural dominance despite the poet's pre-Soviet literary stature.^[62] In the Baltic states, similar post-1991 initiatives replaced numerous Soviet-era street names and removed monuments, legislatively enforcing the excision of occupational legacies from public spaces by the early 2000s, though precise tallies remain less documented than Ukraine's decommunization.^[63] These symbolic purges, while empirically tied to bolstering national cohesion, have sparked debates over historical accuracy, as some targeted icons reflect intertwined cultural histories rather than unilateral imposition.^[64]

Media and Education Shifts

In Ukraine, a 2017 law on television and radio broadcasting mandated quotas for Ukrainian-language content, initially requiring 75% of programming on national channels to be in Ukrainian and rising to 90% for certain broadcasters by 2020.^[65] ^[66] These quotas aimed to reduce reliance on imported Russian content, with enforcement monitored by the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting, resulting in most regional channels exceeding 90% Ukrainian airtime by 2023.^[56] Education reforms in the Baltic states have emphasized state-language proficiency, with Latvia's 2004 education law amendment requiring at least 60% of secondary school instruction in Latvian, including for minority-language schools, to align curricula with national standards.^[67] Similar policies in Estonia and Lithuania tie citizenship naturalization to passing state-language exams at B1 level or higher, with data showing improved proficiency rates among non-citizen residents from 40% in the 1990s to over 70% by 2020, though implementation faced protests from Russian-speaking communities.^[68] ^[69] Following Russia's 2022 invasion, Ukraine prohibited imports of books printed in Russia and Belarus, alongside banning distribution of certain Russian-authored works, which impacted tens of thousands of titles previously available and prompted the removal of 19 million Russian- and Soviet-era books from public libraries by early 2023.^[70] ^[71] Enforcement efficacy is evident in surveys showing Russian media consumption dropping to 12% among Ukrainians in 2022, compared to 20-30% in prior years, with further declines linked to wartime restrictions and shifts toward domestic sources.^[72] ^[73] These policies have boosted Ukrainian-language instruction in schools, with a 2020 mandate requiring 80% of secondary education in Ukrainian, leading to near-universal adoption and surveys indicating 85% proficiency among students by 2023, up from 60% a decade earlier.^[74] Advocates claim such shifts strengthen national cohesion by unifying linguistic practices, as evidenced by increased state-language media dominance correlating with higher self-reported cultural alignment in polls.^[75] Critics, however, argue they risk creating information silos, limiting exposure to Russian-language perspectives and potentially exacerbating echo chambers, with some studies noting reduced cross-cultural media access post-reforms.^[72]

Regional Implementations

Ukraine

Derussification in Ukraine accelerated following the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution, which triggered the "Leninfall" campaign where over 550 monuments to Vladimir Lenin were toppled by activists and local authorities in the ensuing months.^[76] This grassroots action, concentrated in western and central regions, symbolized rejection of Soviet legacy amid Russian annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in Donbas.^[64] By 2017, decommunization laws enacted in 2015 had led to the removal of all 1,320 Lenin statues nationwide, alongside bans on communist symbols and required renaming of thousands of streets bearing Soviet names.^[77] The 2019 Law "On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language," passed on April 25, mandated Ukrainian as the sole language in public administration, education, media, and services, with phased implementation to prioritize it over Russian in official spheres.^[78] This built on earlier restrictions but faced criticism from Russian-speaking communities and international observers for potentially marginalizing minorities, though proponents argued it countered historical Russification and promoted linguistic sovereignty.^[79] Following Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, derussification intensified: parliament approved bans on importing and distributing books by Russian authors post-1991 (unless they condemned the war) and prohibited public performance or media broadcast of music by such artists, effective June 2022.^[71] ^[80] Urban derussification expanded post-2022, with over 7,800 toponyms renamed in 83 cities by May 2024, targeting Russian imperial, Soviet, or neutral terms lacking Ukrainian ties, often replacing them with local historical figures.^[81] In Kyiv alone, 517 urbanonyms (17% of total) changed from 2014 to early 2023, reflecting broader efforts to excise Moscow-linked nomenclature.^[5] Language surveys indicate shifts: while the 2001 census recorded 29.6% native Russian speakers versus 67.5% Ukrainian, post-2014 polls and usage data show rising Ukrainian proficiency and preference, particularly in education and media, correlating with policy enforcement.^[82] Proponents credit these measures with fostering national cohesion, evidenced by widespread wartime unity transcending linguistic divides, as Russian-speaking Ukrainians increasingly embraced Ukrainian identity markers.^[83] Critics, including pre-war analyses, contend they alienated Russian-majority areas like Donbas—where 2001 data showed up to 75% Russian speakers in Donetsk Oblast—exacerbating separatist sentiments and contributing to 2014 conflict escalation by signaling cultural exclusion.^[84] Such policies, while empirically linked to reduced Russian cultural dominance, highlight tensions between identity consolidation and regional pluralism in a multi-ethnic state.^[85]

Kazakhstan

In Kazakhstan, derussification has proceeded gradually and pragmatically since independence in 1991, emphasizing the promotion of Kazakh language and cultural identity alongside economic diversification, rather than outright cultural erasure. This approach contrasts with more confrontational policies in neighboring states, retaining Russian as a functional inter-ethnic communication tool in business, education, and administration to facilitate multi-ethnic cohesion and trade ties with Russia.^[86]^[87] The ethnic Russian share of the population fell from 37.8% in the 1989 Soviet census to around 18% by the 2021 national census, driven chiefly by post-independence emigration to Russia amid economic uncertainty, alongside demographic factors like lower Russian fertility rates and higher mortality.^[88]^[89] This decline reflects voluntary outflows rather than forced displacement, aligning with Kazakhstan's resource-driven nationalism that prioritizes Kazakh empowerment without alienating skilled Russian-speaking professionals in key sectors like energy.^[90] A cornerstone policy has been the shift from Cyrillic to Latin script for the Kazakh language, decreed by President Nursultan Nazarbayev in October 2017 with an initial target completion by 2025, later extended to a phased rollout concluding in 2031 under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.^[91] The reform's primary drivers include enhancing digital accessibility—given the dominance of Latin-based keyboards and software globally—and boosting economic integration with Latin-script nations like Turkey and the West, rather than explicit anti-Russian sentiment.^[92]^[93] Cyrillic's Soviet-era imposition in 1940 is acknowledged as a historical imposition, but the transition prioritizes practical gains in information technology and trade efficiency over symbolic decolonization.^[94] Media policies have also advanced derussification selectively, with Kazakhstan blocking Russian state-affiliated platforms in 2023, including Sputnik24 in November for licensing violations and Tsargrad in August for extremist content, alongside reductions in broadcasts of Channel One derivatives to cap foreign programming at 50% of airtime.^[95]^[96] These measures, intensified post-Nazarbayev's 2019 resignation amid Tokayev's consolidation of power, aim to curb perceived propaganda influence from Moscow while preserving Russian-language content from non-state sources. Rooted in causal factors like resource sovereignty—Kazakhstan's vast oil and uranium reserves necessitate asserting national control over narratives and partnerships—these steps balance ethnic Kazakh ascendancy with pragmatic avoidance of economic isolation from Russia.^[97]^[98]

Baltic States

Following the restoration of independence in 1991, Estonia and Latvia implemented citizenship laws granting automatic status primarily to pre-1940 citizens and their descendants, leaving a significant portion of Soviet-era ethnic Russian residents—comprising about 25% of the population in each country—as non-citizens required to naturalize through language proficiency and civic knowledge tests aligned with EU integration standards.^[99]^[100] In contrast, Lithuania adopted a more inclusive approach, extending citizenship to nearly all permanent residents regardless of arrival date, resulting in a smaller ethnic Russian minority of around 5% facing fewer formal barriers but still subject to Lithuanian-language mandates in public administration and education.^[101] These policies aimed to reverse Soviet Russification by prioritizing state languages for societal cohesion and national security, particularly amid concerns over Russian-speaking communities' potential loyalty to Moscow, though critics argued they imposed discriminatory integration pressures on minorities.^[7]^[8] In Latvia, derussification intensified through education reforms, with a 2022 law mandating a full transition to Latvian as the language of instruction in all schools by September 2025, building on earlier shifts that reduced minority-language programs from up to 40% in 2004 to minimal supplementary use.^[102]^[103] This contributed to a halving of Russian-language school enrollment since 1991, alongside the phasing out of Russian as a second foreign language starting in primary grades from 2026/2027, reflecting EU-aligned efforts to bolster national identity amid demographic declines in ethnic Russian populations from 34% in 1989 to 23% by 2023.^[104]^[105] Non-citizens, predominantly ethnic Russians, fell to about 9% of the population by 2023 due to residency-based naturalization requirements, including Latvian language exams, though naturalization rates remain low at under 1% annually in the Baltics.^[106]^[105] Estonia enforced similar language thresholds for citizenship, requiring B1-level proficiency in Estonian alongside constitutional exams, which non-citizens—largely Russian-speakers—must pass for full rights, with exemptions only for those educated in Estonian.^[107] These measures, upheld as proportionate for state integrity, have driven integration but sparked debates over exclusion, as ethnic Russians (25% of the population) navigate pressures including restricted property ownership near borders for non-citizens.^[108]^[7] Controversies arose over alleged discrimination, with European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) cases like Valiullina and Others v. Latvia (2023) examining reforms increasing Latvian instruction proportions; the Court ruled no violation of anti-discrimination norms under Article 14 combined with Protocol 1 Article 2, affirming states' latitude in promoting official languages for education without infringing minority rights unduly.^[109] Similar ECtHR scrutiny in Latvia's pre-school shifts found no breach, prioritizing societal integration over exclusive mother-tongue access.^[110] In Lithuania, with its smaller minority, policies emphasize Lithuanian in public sectors but permit Russian in private communication, avoiding the stricter citizenship hurdles of its neighbors while monitoring integration amid post-2022 influxes of Russian exiles.^[111]^[112] Overall, these EU-vetted frameworks reflect security imperatives against hybrid threats, fostering state-language dominance while non-citizen statuses in Estonia and Latvia—down from 32% and 27% in the 1990s—signal gradual assimilation, though persistent low naturalization underscores cultural frictions.^[100]^[99]

Turkmenistan and Central Asia

In Turkmenistan, derussification efforts intensified immediately after independence in 1991 under President Saparmurat Niyazov, who pursued aggressive Turkmenization policies to prioritize the national language and culture amid the country's declared policy of permanent neutrality and isolationism. The government mandated a transition from the Cyrillic to a Latin-based script in 1993, aiming to sever orthographic ties to Russian and revive pre-Soviet linguistic forms. Russian ceased to be an official language, and by the late 1990s, most Russian-language media outlets were banned, including newspapers before 2000 and reductions in state television and radio broadcasts to minimal hours daily. These measures, enforced without public consultation in an authoritarian context, contributed to a sharp decline in Russian proficiency; the ethnic Russian population fell from around 7% in 1989 to 1.62% by the 2022 census, with overall Russian speakers estimated at under 20% by 2020 due to emigration incentives favoring Turkmen surnames for social mobility and limited educational access.^[113]^[114]^[115]^[116] Across Central Asia, similar elite-driven derussification accelerated post-2022 amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine, with Turkmenistan's neighbors like Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan implementing targeted reductions in Russian's institutional role while maintaining pragmatic economic ties. In Uzbekistan, the number of Russian-language schools dropped from 700 to 119 between the early 2000s and 2011, reflecting a broader policy shift toward Uzbek-medium instruction, though full implementation lagged due to bilingual legacies. Kyrgyzstan, facing domestic pressures, removed Soviet-era symbols such as Lenin statues in 2025 and promoted traditional Kyrgyz surnames over Russified ones via parliamentary legislation, signaling cultural distancing without widespread societal debate. Regional Russian proficiency has declined significantly since 2000, with non-speakers exceeding 50% in several countries by the late 2010s, driven by demographic shifts, reduced media exposure, and state preferences for national or English languages over Russian as a lingua franca.^[117]^[118]^[119]^[120] These processes in Turkmenistan and adjacent states contrast with more contested implementations elsewhere, characterized by top-down directives from authoritarian elites emphasizing national sovereignty and isolation from Russian influence, often bypassing public input or democratic deliberation. Turkmenistan's extreme variant, including media blackouts and script reforms, exemplifies how derussification serves isolationist goals, reducing Russian's practical utility to below 5% functional proficiency among youth by the 2010s in elite-monitored environments. Neighboring efforts post-2022, while less hermetic, prioritize administrative de-emphasis—such as curricular cuts in Kyrgyzstan—over mass mobilization, yielding gradual erosion of Russian dominance without provoking overt backlash.^[121]^[122]

Moldova

In Moldova, derussification policies gained momentum after the July 2021 snap parliamentary elections, in which the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), led by President Maia Sandu, won 63 of 101 seats, enabling a pivot toward EU integration and reduced Russian cultural dominance. A pivotal measure was the March 16, 2023, parliamentary law mandating replacement of "Moldovan language" with "Romanian" in all legislation and the constitution, reflecting empirical linguistic continuity with Romania while rejecting Soviet-constructed distinctions.^[123] Complementary actions included post-2022 restrictions on Russian-state-funded media outlets to curb informational influence, alongside demands for withdrawal of the approximately 1,500 Russian troops stationed in breakaway Transnistria since the 1992 ceasefire.^[124]^[125] These initiatives encounter resistance in ethnically and linguistically diverse peripheries, particularly Transnistria—a self-proclaimed republic controlling about 12% of Moldova's territory, where Russian military presence enforces de facto separation and sustains Moscow-aligned governance.^[126] The Gagauz autonomous region, home to a Turkic minority with historical Soviet Russification, opposes central derussification, as evidenced by its retention of Russian-language education and media, alongside vocal resistance to EU-oriented reforms from pro-Russian local leaders.^[127] Russian speakers comprise roughly 14.5% of Moldova's population per the 2014 census, with ethnic Russians at 4.1%, fostering identity divisions where self-identification as "Moldovan" correlates with stronger Russian cultural affinities, while "Romanian" aligns with Western orientation.^[128] Geopolitically, Moldova navigates tensions between Romanian linguistic-cultural realignment and Russian separatism, exacerbated by Gazprom's historical control over 100% of gas imports until diversification efforts post-2022, which Moscow has weaponized through supply manipulations to bolster Transnistrian leverage.^[129] President Sandu has conditioned Transnistria resolution on full Russian troop evacuation, underscoring causal links between military presence and stalled reintegration, though persistent energy dependencies and regional autonomies limit derussification's scope.^[125]

Controversies and Evaluations

Purported Achievements: National Identity Restoration

Proponents of derussification measures claim they have bolstered national identities through enhanced use of indigenous languages, with empirical surveys in Ukraine documenting a rise in Ukrainian workplace usage from 41.9% in 2012 to 67.7% by December 2022.^[130] In Kyiv specifically, the share of residents identifying Ukrainian as their native language increased from 57% in 2012 to 86% in recent years, reflecting broader shifts in daily communication patterns amid policy-driven promotion.^[131] These changes are attributed to legislative quotas and educational mandates prioritizing native tongues, though surveys also note persistent bilingualism in Russian-speaking regions.^[132] Script reforms are similarly cited as tools for cultural reconnection, as in Kazakhstan's 2017-initiated transition from Cyrillic to Latin alphabet, intended to symbolize independence from Soviet linguistic legacies and foster ethnic identification among Kazakh speakers.^[133] While direct polling on national pride post-reform remains sparse, advocates link such changes to heightened self-perception as a distinct nation, with the process projected for completion by 2031.^[134] Claims of improved social cohesion extend to reduced affinity for Soviet-era symbols, evidenced in the Baltic states by generational declines in nostalgia—sharpening after external events like Russia's 2014 actions—and paralleling economic expansions that positioned the region with Eastern Europe's highest economic freedom indices by 2021.^[135]^[136]^[137] Lower penetration of Russian-language media is argued to enable organic identity formation, potentially aligning with global linguistic diversity indicators, though UNESCO data primarily highlights risks to minority tongues rather than direct gains from dominance reduction.^[138] Overall, these purported outcomes hinge on correlations rather than isolated causation, with identity metrics varying by demographic and context.

Criticisms: Erasure of Shared Heritage and Discrimination

Critics of derussification contend that measures such as the removal of monuments to Alexander Pushkin and bans on Russian-language literature erase elements of shared cultural heritage appreciated by bilingual populations across former Soviet states. In Ukraine, laws enacted in 2022 prohibiting the import of most Russian books and restricting Russian music in public spaces have been described as radical, potentially alienating Russian-speaking citizens who view works by Pushkin and Leo Tolstoy as canonical literature transcending national boundaries.^[139] These policies risk confirming narratives of cultural suppression, thereby providing material that bolsters external propaganda claims of minority erasure.^[140] In the Baltic states, derussification has manifested in stringent language proficiency requirements for citizenship and public sector employment, contributing to the marginalization of Russian-speaking minorities comprising 20-25% of populations in Latvia and Estonia as of the 1990s. Prior to reforms in the 2010s, non-citizen status affected hundreds of thousands, denying them voting rights and full political participation, which human rights observers have cited as discriminatory barriers exacerbating socioeconomic disparities.^[141]^[100] Such disenfranchisement has fostered resentment among ethnic Russians, who report feelings of exclusion from national identity frameworks.^[142] Empirical indicators of polarization include economic strains in Ukraine's publishing sector, where post-2014 restrictions on Russian imports spurred a shift to Ukrainian editions but initially disrupted supply chains and inflated translation costs, reducing affordability for consumers reliant on Russian-language materials.^[143] In regions with high Russian-speaker concentrations, like Crimea before 2014, perceptions of linguistic imposition correlated with elevated separatist sentiments, as reflected in the disputed referendum's reported 83% turnout and overwhelming pro-Russian vote on March 16, 2014.^[140] These dynamics underscore how aggressive cultural purges can intensify internal divisions rather than foster cohesion.

Geopolitical Ramifications and Russian Responses

Russia has portrayed derussification policies, particularly in Ukraine and the Baltic states, as discriminatory acts amounting to cultural genocide against ethnic Russians, framing them as justification for protective measures including the 2022 invasion under the banner of "denazification" and demilitarization.^[144] In a February 21, 2022, address, President Vladimir Putin cited Ukrainian language laws and decommunization efforts as evidence of ethnic discrimination, arguing they suppress Russian speakers and erase shared historical ties, thereby necessitating Russian intervention to safeguard the "Russian world."^[145] This rhetoric extends to accusations of hybrid warfare orchestrated by the West, with derussification depicted as a tool to sever post-Soviet cultural bonds and provoke interstate conflict.^[146] In response, Russia has employed diplomatic isolation, propaganda campaigns, and support for pro-Russian minorities, though direct sanctions targeting derussification are embedded within broader punitive measures against Ukraine and its allies rather than isolated policies. Russian officials, including former President Dmitry Medvedev, have threatened retaliation against perceived de-Russification in neighboring states, linking it to escalated tensions.^[147] Economically, Russia has imposed counter-sanctions on Western nations supporting Ukrainian sovereignty efforts, indirectly pressuring derussification by disrupting trade and energy flows, while maintaining leverage through gas transit dependencies in Ukraine and Moldova.^[148] These actions underscore a realist calculus: derussification weakens Russia's soft power in its near abroad, prompting hybrid countermeasures to preserve influence without full-scale commitments everywhere. Geopolitically, derussification has accelerated post-Soviet states' alignment with NATO and the EU, heightening frontier tensions but also exposing limits to Russian dominance, as seen in the Baltic states' post-2022 purge of Russian cultural symbols amid reduced economic dependence on Moscow.^[8] Western powers, including the EU, have endorsed these shifts as affirmations of sovereignty and decolonization, providing financial aid and integration incentives, though institutions like the Venice Commission have critiqued specific language restrictions for potential minority rights violations, balancing support with rule-of-law standards.^[149] In Central Asia, the dynamic is more pragmatic; while trade with Russia surged initially post-2022 due to sanctions evasion routes, countries like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have diversified toward China and the EU, with non-oil exports to the latter rising 20-30% annually by 2024, reflecting a causal pivot from over-reliance on Russian markets amid war-induced volatility.^[150]^[151] This process reveals non-zero-sum elements, as enduring economic interdependencies—such as Central Asian labor migration to Russia, peaking at over 150,000 net entries in September 2022—and shared WWII victory narratives complicate outright erasure, fostering selective retention of heritage amid power realignments rather than total rupture.^[152] Russian responses thus prioritize narrative control and selective alliances, acknowledging that derussification erodes ideological hegemony but cannot fully dissolve material ties forged over decades.^[153]

Recent Developments (2014–Present)

Euromaidan and Post-Annexation Acceleration

The Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity, which led to the ouster of President Viktor Yanukovych on February 22, 2014, catalyzed decommunization initiatives to dismantle Soviet-era symbols and nomenclature. On April 9, 2015, Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada passed four laws collectively known as the decommunization package, signed into effect by President Petro Poroshenko on May 15, 2015; these prohibited the promotion of communist and National Socialist regimes, recognized certain historical figures as independence fighters, and required local authorities to rename thousands of streets, villages, and cities associated with Soviet history while removing related monuments.^[60] ^[154] By early 2016, parliament had approved the renaming of 175 settlements, contributing to over 51,000 toponymic changes and the dismantling of approximately 2,389 monuments nationwide by 2020.^[155] ^[59] ^[156] Russia's annexation of Crimea, formalized on March 18, 2014, and the outbreak of conflict in Donbas intensified these efforts, positioning derussification as a defensive strategy against Moscow's cultural and informational subversion amid hybrid warfare.^[157] Post-Euromaidan authorities viewed Soviet remnants as vectors for Russian influence, prompting accelerated purges of communist iconography that had lingered since independence, with grassroots "Leninfall" actions evolving into state-mandated reforms.^[64] In the media domain, Ukraine enacted quotas on March 17, 2017, mandating at least 75 percent Ukrainian-language content on national television and radio broadcasts, alongside bans on dozens of Russian state-affiliated channels and websites imposed via presidential decree in May 2017.^[65] ^[158] ^[159] These measures, enforced by the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting, restricted access to 77 Russian TV channels by 2018 and substantially curtailed Russian-origin programming, fostering greater domestic content production despite criticisms of limiting information diversity.^[160] ^[161] Such policies bolstered Ukrainian identity formation in the revolution's aftermath but highlighted internal fissures, as surveys in Donbas revealed roughly one-third of residents endorsing pro-Russian separatism or closer Moscow ties in 2014, underscoring enduring regional sympathies that derussification measures risked alienating rather than unifying.^[162] Polling data indicated persistent divides, with pro-Ukrainian orientations strengthening over time yet coexisting with significant pro-Russian sentiment through the pre-2022 period, complicating national cohesion efforts.^[85]

Impact of 2022 Russian Invasion

The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, triggered an immediate escalation in derussification policies within Ukraine, framed by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as an organic response to Russian aggression that would diminish Moscow's cultural influence.^[163] In June 2022, Ukraine's parliament enacted laws banning the public performance or broadcasting of music by post-Soviet-era Russian artists and restricting the import and distribution of books from Russia and Belarus, with one individual permitted to import at most 10 such books without authorization.^[80] ^[71] Public libraries removed millions of Russian-language volumes, including Soviet-era texts, with parliament reporting approximately 19 million books written off by February 2023.^[164] In Odesa, a city with significant Russian cultural heritage, libraries accelerated the removal of works by authors like Pushkin, Dostoyevsky, and Tolstoy from shelves, part of broader efforts to excise Russian influence amid wartime hostilities.^[165] ^[166] Monument removals surged, with local authorities in Kyiv alone planning to dismantle around 60 Soviet-associated statues and rename dozens of streets in April 2022, contributing to nationwide efforts that eliminated thousands of plaques, statues, and toponyms linked to Russian imperial and Soviet figures by late 2023.^[167] ^[168] Beyond Ukraine, the invasion and Russia's September 2022 partial mobilization prompted derussification accelerations in Central Asia, where fears of conscripting ethnic kin working in Russia spurred national identity reforms. Kazakhstan expedited its long-planned shift from Cyrillic to Latin script for the Kazakh language, with the war intensifying discussions on linguistic independence and reducing Russian cultural dominance.^[169] ^[170] These measures, while bolstering Ukrainian resolve against invasion, drew criticism for fostering internal polarization, particularly in Russian-speaking areas like Odesa, where de-Russification campaigns engendered fear among locals and deepened social divides, as noted in analyses of cultural cancellations by late 2024.^[171] The policies coincided with heightened emigration from Ukraine's eastern and southern regions, where ethnic Russians comprised a notable minority, amid the broader demographic disruptions of war through 2025.^[172]

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Dec 22, 2024 · The aim of the study is to determine whether the new president has intensified the process of the derussification of the republic. It was ...
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The aim of the study is to determine whether the new president has intensified the process of the derussification of the republic. It was possible to find the ...
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[PDF] The Russian Diaspora in the Baltic States: - LSE
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Latvian government backs move away from Russian in schools
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Latvia: UN experts concerned about severe curtailment of minority ...
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[PDF] Education in Latvia (EN) - OECD
Student enrolment in tertiary education (1990/91-2014/15) . . . . . . 254 ... close to 22 000 children, about 23%, were enrolled in Russian language.
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Baltic states have EU's lowest naturalisation rates
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Population of Latvia declined by 11 thousand in 2023
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Official language and level examinations | Haridus
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ECtHR: no discrimination in Latvian pre-school language reform
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Increased use of Latvian in education does not infringe ethnic ...
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Turkic States Revive Latin-Based Alphabet to Preserve Linguistic ...
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Though Fading In Turkmenistan, The Russian Language Is Still In ...
Feb 25, 2024 · Turkmenistan's government failed to explain the situation and no official order was made on the end of Russian-language education in the country ...Missing: loanwords reform
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Russian and Turkic languages in Central Asia (Chapter 15)
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Feb 13, 2025 · In Kyrgyzstan, where many still use Russian-style last names, parliament has adopted a bill that promotes traditional Kyrgyz surnames.
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Snap parliamentary elections were held in Moldova on 11 July 2021. Following the resignation of Ion Chicu, the position of Prime Minister became vacant, ...
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PRESIDENT MAIA SANDU STATED THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ...
President Maia Sandu stated that the withdrawal of the Russian army is a mandatory condition for resolving the Transnistrian conflict.
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Explained: Russian Troops, Pro-Russian Forces in Moldovan ...
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How an autonomous region in Moldova has retained its Soviet-era ...
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Russians and Russian-speakers in Moldova - Minority Rights Group
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Many Russian speakers in Ukraine have switched language
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(PDF) Language situation in Kyiv at the beginning of the 21st century
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research on language practices and attitudes in wartime Ukraine
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The Latinization of Kazakhstan: Language, Modernization and ...
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Kazakhstan Presents New Latin Alphabet, Plans Gradual Transition ...
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Latvia's Changing Political Parties and Efforts to Combat Soviet ...
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which of all the post-Soviet nations left that period of history behind most decisively — there is a clear generation gap ...
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Address by the President of the Russian Federation
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The Slavic Battle of the Books - Persuasion
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Dmitry Medvedev said de-Russification would cost Poland dearly
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Central Asia's Shifting Regional Dynamics | DGAP
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[PDF] How War in Ukraine Has Shaped Migration Flows in Central Asia
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Central Asia and Russia's invasion of Ukraine: drifting away from ...
Sep 13, 2025 · In this article, we examine the reaction of Central Asian (CA) states toward Russia since the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2022.
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Ukraine's Decommunization Laws: Legislating the Past?
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Ukraine's Decommunization Gets Boost As 175 Towns, Villages ...
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De-Russification Of Ukraine: Russian aggression became the major ...
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Ukraine: Revoke Ban on Dozens of Russian Web Companies
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Yet only about one-third of the population living in Donbas supported pro-Russian separatism there in 2014. ... The polls also show that a very small ...
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Invasion will only backfire and cause 'de-Russification' of Ukraine ...
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Fact Check: Has Ukraine Banned 19 Million Russian Books From its ...
Feb 7, 2023 · Ukraine's parliament said 19 million books have been "written off" including Soviet-era texts.
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War in Ukraine: 'De-Russification' on the rise in Odesa - France 24
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No more Pushkin, Dostoyevsky, or Tolstoy: Ukrainian libraries clean ...
Mar 10, 2024 · Russian authors have disappeared from the shelves of most Ukrainian libraries since the 2022 invasion. Librarians are not taking these decisions lightly.
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Friends no longer, Ukraine removes Russian statues and street names
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Mar 2, 2023 · A full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine only fuels the desire of many of them to abandon the “Russian” letters and return to their roots.
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Cancel culture in Ukraine - The Economist
Dec 19, 2024 · The result of this de-Russification is fear and polarisation. What was marginal is becoming mainstream. On the boulevard, people look away ...Missing: polarization | Show results with:polarization
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How Many Ukrainians Will Remain In Their Country After The War?
Mar 17, 2025 · Ukraine's post-Soviet population has dropped by about 45% -- from 52 million to 29 million on territory that Kyiv controls.Missing: ethnic | Show results with:ethnic