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Joint List

The Joint List (Hebrew: הרשימה המשותפת, Arabic: القائمة المشتركة) was an electoral alliance of four predominantly Arab political parties in Israel—Hadash, Balad, Ta'al, and the United Arab List—formed ahead of the 2015 Knesset elections to unite fragmented Arab representation and overcome the 3.25% electoral threshold raised by legislation in 2014.^[1]^[2] Led primarily by Ayman Odeh of Hadash, the alliance spanned communist, nationalist, and Islamist ideologies, focusing on issues such as opposition to discrimination against Arab Israelis, advocacy for Palestinian rights, and resistance to Israeli settlement policies.^[3]^[4] The Joint List achieved its electoral peak in the March 2020 Knesset election, securing 15 seats and galvanizing record Arab voter turnout amid Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's public efforts to delegitimize it as a threat to Israel's security.^[4]^[5] This representation marked the largest Arab bloc in the Knesset since the early 1990s, enabling vocal opposition to Netanyahu's governments and highlighting internal Arab political mobilization.^[6] However, ideological tensions, particularly between secular nationalists like Balad and Islamists in Ra'am, led to fractures; Ra'am departed in 2021 to join an anti-Netanyahu coalition, and Balad split ahead of the 2022 election, reducing the alliance's seats and effectively dissolving it.^[7]^[5] Controversies surrounding the Joint List included accusations from Israeli right-wing figures that its member parties, especially Balad, harbored anti-Zionist views incompatible with Israel's character as a Jewish state, with some MKs facing legal scrutiny for alleged support of banned organizations.^[4] Despite these challenges, the alliance's formation demonstrated the potential for unified Arab political influence, though its collapse underscored persistent divisions; as of 2025, discussions persist among parties to revive a similar bloc for future elections.^[8]^[9]

Historical Background

Pre-2015 Fragmentation of Arab Parties

Prior to the formation of broader alliances, Arab-Israeli political representation in the Knesset relied on a patchwork of ideologically distinct parties, including the communist-led Hadash, the secular-nationalist Balad, the Islamist United Arab List (Ra'am), and the Arab-nationalist Ta'al, which often ran independently or in limited pairings such as Hadash-Ta'al or Ra'am with smaller factions.^[10]^[11] These divisions stemmed from deep ideological rifts—Hadash emphasized class-based solidarity and Jewish-Arab cooperation, Balad prioritized Palestinian national identity and opposition to Zionism, Ra'am focused on Islamic values and southern Bedouin concerns, and Ta'al advanced pragmatic Arab nationalism—preventing unified electoral strategies despite shared grievances over discrimination and marginalization.^[12]^[13] This fragmentation exacerbated electoral inefficiencies, particularly after the electoral threshold rose from 1% to 2% in 2003, requiring parties to secure at least 2% of the national vote (roughly 67,000 votes based on typical turnout) to enter the Knesset. In the 2009 elections, Arab lists collectively garnered about 7.5% of votes but split them across Hadash (3 seats), Balad (3 seats), and United Arab List-Ta'al (4 seats), with Balad's share hovering near the threshold at approximately 2.3%, risking disqualification and wasted votes if turnout dipped further.^[14]^[15] Similarly, in 2013, the parties maintained separate or paired slates—Hadash-Ta'al (3 seats with 3.0% of votes), Balad (3 seats with 2.0%), and Ra'am (4 seats with 2.0%)—yielding 10 seats total despite Arab Israelis comprising around 20% of the population, as vote dispersion diluted bargaining power and amplified vulnerability to minor shifts in participation.^[16]^[13] The impending hike to a 3.25% threshold in 2014, enacted via amendment in March of that year, intensified these pressures, as individual lists would likely fall short without consolidation, potentially slashing Arab representation by half or more.^[17]^[18] Compounding these structural issues, fragmentation fostered voter disillusionment, manifesting in persistently low turnout rates among Arab Israelis—around 50% in 2009, well below the national 65% average—which analysts linked directly to perceptions of futile representation, as divided parties struggled to influence legislation or coalitions despite highlighting issues like land expropriations and underfunding in Arab communities.^[15]^[19] By 2013, turnout edged up to 56%, defying predictions of further decline, yet remained subdued due to ongoing internal rivalries and a sense that splintered efforts yielded negligible policy gains, such as persistent gaps in education and infrastructure funding.^[20]^[21] This empirical pattern of abstention, evidenced by surveys showing widespread apathy toward "ineffective" politics, underscored how ideological silos not only wasted potential seats but eroded the collective Arab voice in Israel's parliamentary democracy.^[12]^[15]

Formation in 2015

The electoral threshold for parties to enter the Knesset was raised from 2% to 3.25% in March 2014 through legislation supported by the governing coalition, posing a severe risk to the viability of smaller Arab parties that had previously secured representation individually.^[17]^[22] This change prompted pragmatic discussions among Arab-majority parties to consolidate their votes and avoid fragmentation that could result in wasted ballots and diminished parliamentary presence.^[23]^[24] In December 2014, amid anticipation of early elections called after the dissolution of the 19th Knesset, Hadash, Balad, the United Arab List (Ra'am), and Ta'al announced their intention to run as a unified slate called the Joint List (HaReshima HaMeshutefet), despite encompassing ideologically disparate factions including communists, secular nationalists, Islamists, and Arab nationalists.^[24]^[25] Ayman Odeh, the newly elected chairman of Hadash, was chosen to lead the list, emphasizing unity to counter marginalization and boost participation among Arab citizens.^[24]^[26] The formal launch occurred on February 14, 2015, solidifying the technical alliance focused on electoral survival rather than resolving underlying tensions.^[27] The Joint List conducted mobilization campaigns targeting low historical turnout in Arab communities, framing the election as a critical opportunity for collective voice.^[28] In the March 17, 2015, Knesset elections, the alliance secured 13 seats—making it the third-largest bloc—and achieved the highest Arab voter turnout since 1999 at approximately 51.3%, reflecting successful efforts to reverse apathy amid perceived discrimination.^[29]^[11]

Evolution from 2015 to 2021

The Joint List maintained its alliance through multiple elections from 2015 to 2019, navigating ideological frictions among its communist, nationalist, and Islamist components while prioritizing electoral unity to counter low Arab voter turnout and fragmentation. Internal strains emerged over differing views on engagement with Jewish-led parties, with secular factions like Hadash and Balad favoring staunch opposition to Zionism, contrasted by Ra'am's occasional pragmatic overtures. External pressures intensified under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's governments, which sought to delegitimize the list by associating it with terrorism and pushing legislation to bar Arab parties perceived as anti-Zionist, yet these tactics often reinforced the alliance's cohesion among supporters.^[1] In the March 2020 election, the list expanded to 15 Knesset seats—its peak—driven by heightened Arab turnout, which rose to approximately 44% from 49% in April 2019, amid Netanyahu's inflammatory campaign ads labeling Joint List voters as supporters of "ISIS," inadvertently galvanizing participation despite the alliance's boycott of security-related votes, including abstentions on military funding and operations. This growth amplified its parliamentary voice but exposed operational limits, as coordinated stances on domestic issues like crime in Arab communities clashed with rejectionist principles, leading to infrequent cross-aisle collaborations. Ayman Odeh, the list's leader, leveraged the momentum to critique government neglect of Arab socioeconomic needs, yet the alliance's principled abstentions from defense debates underscored its marginalization in core state functions.^[30]^[4]^[31] By early 2021, fissures deepened as Ra'am, under Mansour Abbas, broke from the list to run separately, prioritizing tangible gains for Arab citizens—such as infrastructure investments—over ideological purity, culminating in its support for the Bennett-Lapid coalition in June 2021 and exposing the pragmatic-rejectionist divide that had simmered since 2015. Odeh positioned the remnant alliance (now Hadash-Ta'al-Balad) as a bulwark against Netanyahu, recommending Yair Lapid as prime minister during mandate consultations but rejecting government participation to preserve its oppositional identity. Legislative efforts yielded limited successes, including advocacy for incremental budget boosts to Arab local authorities for education and welfare, though systemic underfunding persisted, reflecting the list's adaptation to perpetual opposition amid internal debates over boycotting versus selective engagement.^[32]^[33]

Dissolution and Splits After 2021

In early 2021, ahead of the March 23 legislative elections, the United Arab List (Ra'am) withdrew from the Joint List alliance, opting to run independently under leader Mansour Abbas in a strategic bid to pursue pragmatic cooperation with Israeli governments for community benefits, such as infrastructure funding in Arab towns.^[34] This departure reflected deep ideological rifts, with Ra'am's Islamist pragmatism clashing against the alliance's dominant anti-Zionist and non-cooperation stance toward Jewish-majority parties, particularly those on the right.^[35] Ra'am secured 4 seats in the election, enabling it to join the Bennett-Lapid coalition in June 2021 as the first Arab party to participate formally in an Israeli government, prioritizing domestic gains over unified opposition to the state.^[36] The alliance of Hadash, Balad, and Ta'al, rebranded as the Joint List for the 2021 vote, won 6 seats but faced mounting internal strains over willingness to engage with non-right-wing coalitions.^[37] These tensions culminated in September 2022, when Balad split from Hadash-Ta'al just weeks before the November 1 elections, primarily over Balad's insistence on an ironclad pledge to boycott any government including right-wing parties, which Hadash-Ta'al viewed as overly rigid and detrimental to electoral viability.^[38]^[7] The breakup stemmed from irreconcilable views: Balad's pan-Arab nationalist ideology rejected compromise with Israel's political center, while Hadash's communist framework allowed tactical flexibility against perceived greater threats like Netanyahu's bloc.^[1] The November 2022 elections exposed the costs of fragmentation, with Hadash-Ta'al gaining 5 seats and Ra'am also securing 5, for a total of 10 Arab-held seats—down from 13 across parties in 2021—amid Balad's failure to surpass the 3.25% electoral threshold, netting zero seats.^[37]^[39] This decline evidenced voter disillusionment, as Arab turnout fell to approximately 44-45%, reflecting frustration with divided leadership and perceived inefficacy in addressing issues like crime and economic marginalization in Arab communities.^[40]^[41] Opportunistic maneuvers, such as Ra'am's coalition play for targeted funding, further eroded trust, prioritizing short-term sectoral gains over collective bargaining power and amplifying the alliance's causal breakdown into ideologically siloed entities with diminished sway in Knesset dynamics.^[42]^[43]

Ideology and Positions

Unifying Principles and Tensions

The Joint List coalesced around the shared objective of consolidating Arab voter support to exceed Israel's 3.25% electoral threshold, thereby securing greater parliamentary influence and advancing the socioeconomic and civil rights of the country's Arab minority amid longstanding grievances over discrimination and underrepresentation.^[11] This electoral pragmatism masked profound ideological divergences among its components: Hadash's Marxist-inspired secularism and binationalism clashed with Balad's vehement anti-Zionism and ethnonationalist separatism, Ra'am's conservative Islamism emphasizing Sharia-influenced social policies, and Ta'al's pan-Arab nationalism focused on cultural preservation.^[44]^[29] A pivotal tension arose from the alliance's predominant refusal to affirm Israel's identity as the nation-state of the Jewish people, with leaders from Balad, Hadash, and Ta'al routinely qualifying their Knesset oaths or explicitly rejecting such recognition, framing it as incompatible with equal citizenship for Arabs.^[45]^[46] Ra'am's conditional pragmatism offered limited bridging, but the stance underscored irreconcilable views on state legitimacy, prioritizing Palestinian national aspirations over accommodative Zionism.^[47] To mitigate fractures, the factions negotiated rotational mechanisms for list leadership and reserved Knesset seats, such as Ayman Odeh's (Hadash) initial helm in 2015 followed by planned shifts, yet these pacts faltered under pressure—exemplified by a 2017 crisis over unimplemented seat rotations that nearly derailed unity and eroded voter confidence.^[48] Such arrangements highlighted the superficiality of consensus, as empirical intra-alliance conflicts persisted despite electoral gains, ultimately contributing to partial dissolutions by 2021.^[11]

Positions on Israel-Palestine Conflict

The Joint List alliance has articulated positions centered on terminating Israel's military presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, viewing the occupation as the root cause of ongoing violence and instability in the region. Leaders such as Ayman Odeh, head of the Hadash party within the alliance, have publicly endorsed a two-state solution as a pathway to resolution, emphasizing Palestinian statehood alongside territorial concessions by Israel based on 1967 borders. This stance, however, is complicated by inconsistent condemnation of Palestinian militant actions; for instance, Odeh has questioned the attribution of terrorism amid Gaza conflicts, redirecting focus toward Israeli operations without explicit denouncement of groups like Hamas responsible for initiating rocket barrages.^[49]^[50] A core tension arises from Balad's ideological commitment to redefining Israel as a "state of all its citizens," a binational framework that prioritizes civic equality over Jewish national self-determination and effectively undermines Israel's foundational identity as the nation-state of the Jewish people. Balad's platform advocates for this model explicitly, including support for a full Palestinian right of return to areas within Israel's pre-1967 borders, which would alter the country's demographic balance and sovereignty. This position has prompted legal challenges, with election committees citing it as evidence of rejecting Israel's Jewish character, though Israel's Supreme Court has ruled that mere advocacy for such a state does not inherently disqualify participation in democratic processes.^[51]^[52]^[53] In practice, Joint List members have frequently opposed Israeli security responses to threats from Gaza, including criticism of military operations targeting Hamas infrastructure following escalations like the 2021 conflict, where alliance MKs prioritized demands for immediate ceasefires and releases of Palestinian prisoners held for attacks on Israeli civilians. Odeh has praised elements of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement for exerting international pressure on Israel regarding settlement expansion and occupation policies, though he has distanced the alliance from broader boycotts encompassing Israel proper. These stances reflect a pattern of elevating Palestinian national aspirations, including endorsements of unilateral recognitions of Palestinian statehood, over affirmations of Israeli security imperatives rooted in defensive necessities against empirically documented terrorism.^[49]^[54]

Domestic Policy Stances

The Joint List has consistently advocated for expanded public investment in Arab-majority localities to address socioeconomic disparities, including demands for higher budgets to improve infrastructure, education, and welfare services in these communities, which often lag behind Jewish-majority areas in per capita funding and development.^[55] Party leaders, such as Ayman Odeh, have emphasized the need for equitable resource allocation to combat poverty rates exceeding 40% in Arab households compared to under 15% in Jewish ones, framing such investments as essential for integration without assimilation.^[56] However, critics within and outside the alliance note that persistent governance challenges in Arab municipalities, including corruption and inefficient administration, have hindered effective use of allocated funds, contributing to unaddressed needs despite increased state outlays.^[57] On public safety, the Joint List has prioritized tackling elevated crime rates in Arab communities, where organized crime and clan-based violence accounted for over 70% of Israel's homicides in recent years, with 98 Arab deaths in the first nine months of 2021 alone.^[58] ^[59] Figures like Mansour Abbas have called for bolstered police presence, dedicated anti-crime units, and socioeconomic programs to dismantle criminal networks, attributing the crisis partly to state neglect in enforcement and prevention.^[60] Yet, empirical data reveal that cultural factors, such as family feuds and resistance to centralized authority, exacerbate the issue beyond funding shortfalls, with low conviction rates linked to witness intimidation and parallel justice systems in some areas.^[57] The alliance vehemently opposed the 2018 Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, which Joint List chairman Ayman Odeh described as enshrining "Jewish supremacy" by downgrading Arabic from an official language to one with "special status" and prioritizing Jewish settlement.^[61] In 2020, Joint List members joined Meretz in unsuccessful Knesset bids to repeal the law, arguing it institutionalized inequality for the 21% Arab population.^[62] Proponents of the law counter that it codifies Israel's raison d'être without altering individual rights, and Joint List rhetoric overlooks Arab citizens' equal legal protections under existing basic laws.^[63] Regarding government initiatives like the 2016-2021 five-year plan under Resolution 922, which allocated approximately 15 billion shekels (about $4.5 billion) for Arab sector development in education, transport, and housing, the Joint List initially welcomed it but criticized implementation rates hovering below 60% for many projects due to bureaucratic delays and local mismanagement.^[55] ^[64] Party MKs highlighted that core gaps in employment and infrastructure persisted, with only partial closure in educational attainment despite the infusion.^[65] Ideologically, the Joint List's emphasis on ethnic-specific remedies for socioeconomic woes has strained relations with Jewish-left parties like Meretz, which prioritize class-based universalism over targeted ethnic framing, leading to debates where Joint List advocates view disparities primarily through a lens of systemic discrimination rather than shared economic pressures affecting working-class Israelis across groups.^[66] This divergence surfaced in coalition negotiations and policy advocacy, with Joint List pushing identity-focused budgets that some Jewish-left allies saw as divisive, though both sides collaborated on broader equality bills.^[67]

Relations with Israeli Governments

The Joint List has historically adopted a rejectionist posture toward Israeli governments, refusing to join coalitions led by Zionist parties on grounds of ideological incompatibility with Israel's foundational identity as a Jewish state and its policies toward Palestinians. This stance reflects the alliance's prioritization of Palestinian national claims, which its leaders contend cannot be reconciled with participation in governance structures perceived as perpetuating occupation and discrimination. As a result, the Joint List has remained in perpetual opposition, voting against state budgets and key security legislation while leveraging its Knesset seats primarily for critique rather than compromise.^[68]^[69] In post-election mandate consultations with the president, the Joint List has occasionally extended external support to non-right-wing figures, such as recommending Benny Gantz in March 2020 following the third election in under two years, though Gantz rejected any formal partnership to avoid alienating potential coalition allies. Such gestures underscore tactical pragmatism amid rejectionism but have not translated into governing roles for the alliance itself. Right-wing leaders, including Benjamin Netanyahu, have countered by framing the Joint List as an existential security risk, citing affiliations with groups endorsing boycott campaigns or armed resistance; this rhetoric facilitated disqualification bids, notably the 2019 Central Elections Committee bans on Balad and Ra'am slates for alleged support of terrorism, later reversed by the Supreme Court.^[4]^[70] A pragmatic outlier emerged in 2021 when Ra'am, previously aligned with the Joint List, ran independently and entered the Bennett-Lapid coalition on June 13—the first Arab Islamist party to hold ministerial positions since 1974—securing commitments for approximately 30 billion shekels ($9.2 billion) in five-year investments targeting Arab communities, including infrastructure upgrades, housing permits, and anti-crime initiatives that reduced violence rates in select areas by up to 47% in initial implementations. These outcomes demonstrated potential for issue-specific gains outside ideological purity but elicited sharp intra-Arab criticism for sidelining conflict-related demands, with Joint List chair Ayman Odeh decrying the focus on domestic pragmatism over "national" priorities. The arrangement's fragility was evident in Ra'am's withdrawal trigger during the coalition's June 2022 collapse, yielding no enduring political concessions and highlighting the tensions between short-term material benefits and long-term rejectionist isolation.^[71]^[72]^[73] This pattern of exclusion—both self-enforced and structurally reinforced—has confined the Joint List to marginal legislative impact, where sponsored private members' bills advance infrequently without cross-aisle buy-in, as opposition status curtails agenda influence in a system favoring coalition majorities. Empirical assessments of Knesset dynamics confirm that non-governing factions like the Joint List achieve enactment rates for initiatives below typical thresholds, often limited to symbolic resolutions or amendments rather than transformative policy.^[74]

Composition

Hadash

Hadash, formally the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, was founded in March 1977 as a leftist electoral alliance anchored by the Israeli Communist Party (Maki), which traces its origins to the pre-state Palestine Communist Party established in 1919.^[75]^[76] The formation followed the 1965 split in Maki between its original Jewish-dominated leadership and the Rakah faction, which was more oriented toward Arab voters and Soviet-aligned; Hadash reunited elements of both under a broader umbrella to contest the 1977 Knesset elections, emphasizing joint Jewish-Arab action against perceived Zionist dominance and economic inequality.^[77]^[78] Ideologically, Hadash prioritizes class-based solidarity over ethnic separatism, advocating binational equality within Israel's borders, withdrawal from occupied territories, and dismantling socioeconomic disparities rooted in capitalist structures.^[75] This framework, inherited from Maki's Marxist-Leninist tradition, positions the party as a proponent of universalist principles, including workers' rights and opposition to nationalism in favor of a shared civic identity, though it has consistently garnered support primarily from Arab communities in northern Israel and mixed cities like Haifa.^[79]^[80] In the Joint List alliance formed for the 2015 elections, Hadash functioned as the stabilizing communist core, leveraging its cross-ethnic composition—about 10-15% Jewish members historically—to temper the more identitarian stances of partners like Balad, thereby enabling electoral unity and higher Arab voter turnout without fully alienating potential Jewish leftists.^[77]^[80] Its moderation, manifested in pragmatic engagement with Israeli institutions and avoidance of outright rejectionism, contributed to the alliance's peak performance of 13 seats in 2020.^[79] Critics within Palestinian nationalist circles have accused Hadash of diluting authentic Palestinian resistance by prioritizing binational inclusivity, which they argue subordinates national self-determination to Israeli civic norms and class rhetoric, potentially "Israelizing" Arab political identity for marginal gains in Knesset influence.^[81] This tension reflects causal trade-offs in alliance-building: Hadash's broader appeal sustains coalition viability amid Israel's fragmented Arab party landscape, but at the expense of purist ideological commitments that prioritize ethnic solidarity over joint struggle.^[80]

Balad

Balad, formally known as the National Democratic Assembly, was established in 1995 by Azmi Bishara as an Arab nationalist party seeking to redefine Israel as a binational "state for all its citizens," rejecting its designation as a Jewish state in favor of equal national rights for Arab Israelis as a distinct minority group.^[82]^[51] The party's platform prioritizes cultural autonomy for Palestinian citizens of Israel, emphasizing their national identity and historical ties to the broader Arab and Palestinian worlds over integration into a Zionist framework.^[83]^[84] Bishara, Balad's founder and initial Knesset representative, exemplified the party's rejectionist orientation by fleeing Israel in 2007 while facing charges of aiding Hezbollah during the 2006 Lebanon War, actions interpreted as support for armed resistance against the state.^[84] Successor leaders, notably Haneen Zoabi, amplified these tensions through provocative rhetoric; Zoabi was suspended from Knesset activities multiple times, including a six-month ban in 2014 for statements denying Israeli culpability in the kidnapping and murder of three Jewish teenagers and labeling Israeli soldiers as "murderers."^[85]^[86] Balad's uncompromising nationalism has repeatedly triggered legal scrutiny, with Israeli authorities attempting to disqualify the party from elections on grounds of incitement to racism, support for terrorism, or negation of Israel's existence as a Jewish state—efforts that have included raids and fraud probes but often failed following Supreme Court interventions.^[87]^[88] In a notable 2021 case, Zoabi and 12 other Balad affiliates, including senior officials, were convicted by the Nazareth Magistrate's Court of fraud and forgery for inflating voter rolls through fabricated registrations during the 2019 elections.^[89] These incidents underscore Balad's pattern of operating at the fringes of Israeli political legitimacy, prioritizing ideological purity over pragmatic participation despite its niche appeal among hardline Arab nationalists.^[82]

United Arab List (Ra'am)

The United Arab List (Ra'am) serves as the political representative of the southern branch of Israel's Islamic Movement, a conservative Islamist organization that prioritizes religious observance, family values, and socioeconomic improvements in Arab communities over confrontational nationalism.^[35] Unlike the northern branch—banned in 2015 for alleged Hamas ties and known for anti-Zionist rhetoric—the southern faction has historically engaged Israel's parliamentary system to advance local priorities like combating crime, building infrastructure, and addressing illegal construction in Arab locales.^[90] This approach stems from a 1996 schism, where southern leaders rejected the northern emphasis on boycotting elections in favor of pragmatic participation to secure tangible gains for Muslim citizens.^[91] Under Mansour Abbas's leadership since 2016, Ra'am has embodied an Islamist pragmatism that sets it apart from the Joint List's more ideologically rigid partners, such as Balad's secular nationalists who often prioritize Palestinian statehood claims and reject cooperation with Jewish-led governments.^[92] Abbas, a dentist from a Bedouin background, steered the party toward emphasizing domestic Arab welfare—such as allocating budgets for unrecognized villages and mosques—over symbolic anti-Israel stances, fostering tensions with alliance radicals who viewed such flexibility as capitulation.^[93] Within Ra'am and the broader southern Islamic Movement, this stance sparked internal debates: traditionalists argued that joining "Zionist" coalitions risks diluting Islamic principles and legitimizing Jewish sovereignty, while pragmatists countered that abstention perpetuates Arab marginalization, citing historical precedents like the Movement's municipal election runs since the 1980s.^[69]^[94] Ra'am's divergence culminated in its 2021 departure from the Joint List, as Abbas rejected the alliance's insistence on foregrounding the Palestinian conflict, opting instead for independent candidacy to enable government involvement.^[69] This move enabled Ra'am's four seats to underpin the Bennett-Lapid coalition—the first such inclusion of an independent Arab Islamist party—yielding commitments for over 30 billion shekels ($9 billion) in Arab sector investments, including housing and violence prevention programs, though it drew accusations from Hamas and Joint List holdouts of betraying core resistance ideals.^[95]^[96] Ra'am's coalition tenure underscored its tactical focus on constituency benefits, contrasting the Joint List's opposition posture, but highlighted ongoing Islamist qualms about systemic engagement, with Abbas framing it as a means to "realize the interests of Palestinian Arab society inside [Israel]" without foreign interference.^[94]

Ta'al

Ta'al, formally the Arab Movement for Renewal, was founded by Ahmed Tibi in 1996 ahead of Israel's general election that year, initially running as the Arab Union before rebranding to emphasize secular Arab nationalist renewal and advocacy for Palestinian identity among Israeli Arabs. The party, which draws support primarily from Arab communities in central Israel, has historically maintained an anti-Zionist orientation, prioritizing collective Arab rights, cultural preservation, and opposition to policies perceived as discriminatory against Arab citizens. Its platform underscores pragmatic political engagement while rooted in nationalist principles, distinguishing it from more ideologically rigid partners in alliances.^[97]^[98]^[99] Prior to the formation of the Joint List in 2015, Ta'al achieved limited independent electoral success, often failing to cross the electoral threshold alone or securing only marginal representation through tactical mergers, such as with the United Arab List (Ra'am) in various cycles. This constrained footprint highlighted the party's dependence on broader coalitions to amplify its voice in the Knesset, where it typically contributed one seat via Tibi's leadership. Within the Joint List, Ta'al functioned as a stabilizing element, leveraging Tibi's rhetorical skill and cross-factional rapport to bridge divides between nationalist and pragmatic elements, particularly during rotation agreements for list leadership and committee roles.^[97]^[100]^[101] Ta'al's nationalist base coexists with instances of flexible positioning, as seen in its endorsement of coalition maneuvers that prioritized Arab socioeconomic gains over strict ideological isolation, though this drew internal scrutiny for diluting purist stances on the Israel-Palestine conflict. The party's smaller scale within the Joint List—contrasted with dominant factions like Hadash—positioned it as an alliance "glue," reliant on Tibi's charisma to sustain unity amid tensions over domestic versus conflict-focused priorities. This dynamic enabled Ta'al to influence Joint List platforms on issues like housing discrimination and minority representation, despite its modest seat count.^[98]^[102]^[97]

Leadership

Key Figures and Roles

Ayman Odeh, leader of the Hadash party, served as the inaugural chairman of the Joint List from its formation ahead of the March 2015 Knesset election until the alliance's fragmentation following the 2021 election.^[1] In this role, Odeh emerged as the primary public face of the alliance, advocating for Arab minority rights and opposing Israeli settlement policies in the West Bank, though the List's consistent opposition stance precluded substantive legislative achievements.^[9] His tenure coincided with the Joint List securing 13 seats in 2015, elevating Arab representation in the Knesset but yielding limited policy influence due to exclusion from coalition governments.^[29] Ahmad Tibi, head of the Ta'al party, functioned as a co-chair within the Joint List's rotating leadership structure and as deputy speaker of the Knesset from 2006 to 2019, extending into the alliance's active period.^[103] Tibi's media engagement and parliamentary maneuvers amplified the alliance's critiques of government actions toward Arab communities, including housing demolitions in unrecognized Bedouin villages, yet internal ideological tensions under his involvement highlighted the challenges of sustaining unity among diverse factions.^[101] Mansour Abbas, chairman of the United Arab List (Ra'am), participated as a key figure in the Joint List until its split in early 2021, when Ra'am opted to run independently to pursue pragmatic engagement with governing coalitions.^[38] Abbas's shift post-separation enabled Ra'am to secure four seats in the March 2021 election and join the Bennett-Lapid coalition, focusing on domestic Arab sector issues like infrastructure funding, contrasting the Joint List's broader oppositional posture under Odeh and Tibi that prioritized anti-Zionist rhetoric over coalition compromises.^[104] This divergence underscored Abbas's influence in demonstrating potential for policy gains outside the Joint List framework, though it contributed to the alliance's dissolution.^[7]

Internal Power Dynamics

The Joint List operated through formal power-sharing agreements among its factions, allocating Knesset seats and leadership positions proportionally based on electoral thresholds and prior negotiations, such as designating Ayman Odeh of Hadash as the alliance's head while reserving key list spots for Balad, Ra'am, and Ta'al representatives.^[1] These pacts included rotation mechanisms for committee roles and candidate placements to balance influence, but frequent renegotiations bred tensions, as seen in 2017 disputes over list composition where internal critics accused factions of prioritizing personal and financial gains over unity.^[48] Factional bargaining often faltered amid ideological rifts, notably Balad's rigid opposition to any coalition or support arrangements with Zionist-led governments, which functioned as an effective internal veto and clashed with Hadash's more flexible approach to tactical endorsements against Benjamin Netanyahu.^[4] This dynamic peaked in power-sharing breakdowns before the April 2019 election, when disagreements over candidate slots and factional sway prompted a split into the Hadash-Ta'al bloc and the Ra'am-Balad alliance, temporarily halving their combined representation potential before a pre-September reunion.^[4] Such conflicts, rooted in Balad's pan-Arab nationalism versus Ra'am's Islamist pragmatism and Hadash's leftist universalism, eroded cohesion by fostering mutual distrust and repeated brinkmanship over list primacy.^[9] Analyses tracing the alliance's 2022 fragmentation highlighted these pre-existing fault lines as causal, with unresolved veto dynamics preventing adaptive governance strategies.^[105]

Electoral Performance

2015 Election

The Joint List was established on January 22, 2015, as an electoral alliance comprising Hadash, Balad, Ta'al, and the United Arab List (Ra'am) to collectively surpass Israel's electoral threshold, which had been raised from 2% to 3.25% in 2014, threatening to exclude smaller Arab parties from the Knesset.^[106] This unity was a pragmatic response to prevent vote fragmentation among Arab voters, who had previously seen parties like Balad and Ra'am fail to meet lower thresholds in past elections. Led by Ayman Odeh of Hadash, the list campaigned on issues including opposition to the threshold hike, enhanced Arab representation, and resistance to perceived discriminatory policies.^[107] In the March 17, 2015, legislative elections, the Joint List received approximately 446,000 votes, securing 13 seats and 10.6% of the popular vote, making it the third-largest bloc in the 20th Knesset after Likud (30 seats) and the Zionist Union (24 seats).^[107] The alliance's formation spurred a surge in Arab voter turnout to 51.3%, the highest among Arab citizens since the 1999 elections, reversing a trend of declining participation from 49% in 2009 to 48.7% in 2013.^[12] On election day, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned supporters via social media that "Arab voters are heading to the polling stations in droves," attributing the mobilization partly to buses organized by left-wing groups and foreign funding, a statement that drew widespread criticism for stoking fears and potentially further galvanizing Arab participation.^[108]^[109] Post-election, President Reuven Rivlin included the Joint List in coalition consultations, meeting with Odeh on March 22, 2015, though the bloc's anti-Zionist stance precluded inclusion in Netanyahu's right-wing government.^[107] The Joint List assumed a role in the Knesset opposition, focusing on legislative scrutiny of policies affecting Arab communities, such as housing discrimination and underfunding of Arab localities, but encountered immediate challenges including internal ideological tensions between secular nationalists and Islamists, and marginalization in coalition-building due to Jewish parties' reluctance to partner with predominantly Arab lists.^[107] This debut marked a high-water mark for unified Arab political influence, yet highlighted barriers to broader impact within Israel's parliamentary system.

2020 Election

In the Israeli legislative election on 2 March 2020, the Joint List secured 15 seats with 577,355 votes, representing 12.61% of the total valid votes cast.^[110] This outcome marked the alliance's strongest performance to date, gaining two seats over its result in the September 2019 election and establishing it as the Knesset's third-largest faction behind Likud and Blue and White.^[30] The gains stemmed from a sharp rise in Arab voter participation, reaching 67% compared to 49% in the April 2019 vote, fueled by campaigns urging turnout to deny Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a governing majority amid his impending corruption trial.^[110] Post-election, Joint List leader Ayman Odeh endorsed Blue and White chairman Benny Gantz for prime minister, recommending him to President Reuven Rivlin and helping Gantz amass support from 61 Knesset members to receive the mandate to form a government.^[111]^[112] This recommendation deviated from the longstanding norm of Arab parties avoiding endorsements of Jewish-led governments, pursued as a tactical measure to oust Netanyahu.^[112] However, the Joint List remained outside any coalition, as Gantz opted for a national unity agreement with Netanyahu in May 2020, which excluded the Arab alliance and allocated it no ministerial roles.^[111]

2021 Election

The March 23, 2021, Israeli legislative election marked a significant downturn for the Joint List alliance, which competed without the United Arab List (Ra'am) after internal disagreements prompted the latter's independent candidacy. The alliance, comprising Hadash, Balad, and Ta'al, secured 364,393 votes, equating to 4.81% of the total valid votes and translating to six seats in the 24th Knesset—a sharp decline from the 15 seats won in the preceding March 2020 election.^[113] This result reflected broader challenges, including a drop in Arab voter turnout to approximately 45% from 49% in 2020, attributed to disillusionment with political representation and fragmented leadership.^[113]^[114] Ra'am's separate run, led by Mansour Abbas, proved successful, garnering 170,686 votes or 4.07% of the vote share for four seats, demonstrating the viability of a pragmatic Islamist approach focused on local issues like crime and infrastructure over ideological opposition to Zionist governance.^[115] The split stemmed from fundamental debates within the Joint List: Abbas advocated for conditional support to anti-Netanyahu coalitions in exchange for tangible benefits to Arab communities, contrasting with Ayman Odeh's stance prioritizing principled non-participation in Jewish-majority governments deemed discriminatory.^[116]^[115] These tensions highlighted deepening ideological rifts—between Ra'am's conservative pragmatism and the alliance's mix of communism, nationalism, and anti-Zionism—foreshadowing further fragmentation. Combined, the lists achieved only 10 seats, underscoring voter fatigue and the risks of disunity, as Arab representation fell short of potential despite comprising about 21% of Israel's electorate.^[113] Post-election, Ra'am's willingness to negotiate with diverse parties intensified scrutiny on the Joint List's rigid opposition strategy, setting the stage for subsequent divisions.^[117]

Post-2021 Fragmentation Effects

The fragmentation of the Joint List following the 2021 election resulted in its component parties contesting the November 1, 2022, Knesset election independently, yielding a combined total of 10 seats across Ra'am and Hadash-Ta'al, with Ra'am securing 5 seats on a platform emphasizing pragmatic governance and Hadash-Ta'al also obtaining 5.^[118] Balad, running separately with a more ideological focus, failed to cross the 3.25% electoral threshold, forfeiting representation despite garnering sufficient votes to highlight voter support that was ultimately wasted, thereby reducing overall Arab parliamentary presence compared to unified runs.^[119]^[120] This division reflected diverging voter priorities, with a portion shifting toward Ra'am's participation-oriented pragmatism—evident in its prior coalition involvement addressing Arab community infrastructure needs—while others adhered to boycott calls or hardline positions associated with Balad, contributing to lower aggregate turnout and efficacy among Arab voters estimated at around 44% in 2022.^[120] The separate slates fragmented the vote, preventing the consolidation of a larger bloc that had previously amplified influence, as unified lists in earlier elections like 2020 had achieved up to 15 seats.^[121] Long-term, the post-2021 splits eroded collective bargaining leverage, rendering the parties less pivotal in coalition formations and legislative negotiations; divided into smaller factions, they struggled to present a cohesive front for policy demands on issues like discrimination and underfunding in Arab localities, with analysts observing that fragmentation diluted their capacity to extract concessions from governing majorities.^[122] This diminished clout was compounded by wasted votes exceeding 50,000 for Balad alone, underscoring how internal divisions prioritized ideological purity over strategic unity, ultimately weakening advocacy for shared constituency interests in a polarized Knesset environment.^[119]

Controversies and Criticisms

Accusations of Anti-Zionism and Disloyalty

The Joint List, particularly its Balad component, has been accused by right-wing figures such as Avigdor Liberman of functioning as a political extension of Hamas, advancing terror through Knesset immunity while rejecting Israel's Zionist foundations.^[123] These claims stem from Balad's explicit platform opposing Israel as a Jewish state and evidence of members' actions perceived as endorsing armed struggle against Israeli security forces.^[82] In 2022, Israel's Central Elections Committee disqualified Balad from running independently due to allegations of terrorism support, including praise for attackers, though the Supreme Court overturned the ban on narrower grounds related to incitement.^[124] Prominent examples include refusals to affirm national symbols. During the April 30, 2019, Knesset swearing-in ceremony, all MKs from Hadash-Ta'al and Ra'am-Balad exited the plenum as "Hatikva" played, citing its lyrics' exclusivity to Jewish identity as incompatible with their stance.^[125] Joint List leader Ayman Odeh has similarly stood silently during renditions, framing it as protest against an anthem that marginalizes Arab citizens' hopes for equality.^[126] Accusations of disloyalty extend to unauthorized travel and engagements with adversarial entities. Former Balad MK Said Nafa began a one-year prison sentence on November 1, 2015, after conviction for entering Syria—an enemy state under Israeli law—where he met Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Secretary-General Ahmed Jibril without Interior Ministry approval.^[127] Further allegations involve direct solidarity with perpetrators of violence against Israelis. On February 8, 2016, the Knesset Ethics Committee suspended three Arab MKs, including Joint List affiliates, for weeks after they visited families of terrorists responsible for deadly stabbing attacks during the 2015-2016 wave, an act Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu condemned as legitimizing murder and prompted calls for their disqualification from office.^[128]^[129] Critics argue such conduct reflects a pattern of elevating Palestinian nationalist grievances over civic obligations to condemn attacks on Israeli civilians, as evidenced by repeated Knesset motions—such as the failed July 2025 expulsion attempt against Odeh for equating hostages with militants—to bar members perceived as terror apologists.^[130]^[131] This has fueled broader right-wing demands, including from Itamar Ben-Gvir, for expelling "disloyal" MKs who undermine state sovereignty.^[132]

Internal Ideological Conflicts

The Joint List alliance encompassed stark ideological divides between rejectionist factions, such as Balad, which emphasized uncompromising Palestinian nationalism and opposition to Israel's character as a Jewish state, and more pragmatic elements like Ra'am, which prioritized tangible socioeconomic gains for Arab citizens over ideological purity.^[11] Balad consistently vetoed any cooperation with Zionist-majority coalitions, viewing such moves as legitimizing an illegitimate entity and betraying core principles of resistance, as evidenced by its leaders' public refusals to pledge allegiance to Israel as a Jewish and democratic state during Knesset swearing-in ceremonies.^[1] In contrast, Ra'am's leader Mansour Abbas adopted a strategy of conditional engagement, arguing that abstaining from power perpetuated Arab marginalization, a position that clashed with Balad's absolutism and led to repeated internal standoffs over electoral pacts and legislative participation.^[34] These tensions culminated in the 2021 separation of Ra'am from the Joint List ahead of the March elections, driven by Abbas's intent to negotiate independently with Jewish parties for budget allocations targeting Arab communities' infrastructure and crime issues, rather than adhering to the alliance's blanket opposition to Netanyahu-era governments.^[34] Balad and allies like Hadash-Ta'al opposed this pragmatism, fearing it diluted the united front's leverage and risked co-optation, resulting in Ra'am running solo and securing four seats while enabling its support for the Bennett-Lapid coalition—a first for an Arab party in a governing majority.^[7] The rift deepened in 2022 when Balad split from Hadash-Ta'al over disputes regarding Knesset voting during the Lapid interim government; Balad boycotted key votes, including the 2023 budget, to protest perceived concessions, while Hadash-Ta'al favored selective engagement, fracturing the remaining alliance and preventing a unified slate.^[38] Such factional vetoes exacerbated instability, as Balad's rejectionism repeatedly blocked moderate coalition overtures, such as potential abstentions that could have amplified Arab influence without full participation, prioritizing symbolic purity over electoral viability.^[66] This infighting contributed to voter disillusionment, with Arab turnout dropping from 44.6% in 2020 to around 40% in subsequent cycles amid fragmentation, and polls indicating widespread frustration over parties' failure to deliver unified representation, leading to splinter voting and diminished overall Knesset seats—from 15 in 2020 to a fragmented total of 9 in 2022 excluding Balad's threshold failure.^[133]^[134] The causal root lay in irreconcilable visions: rejectionists' zero-sum antagonism toward the Israeli system versus pragmatists' incrementalism, rendering tactical unity fragile and prone to collapse under pressure for realpolitik decisions.^[81]

Legislative Participation and Effectiveness

The Joint List demonstrated limited legislative effectiveness during its tenure, particularly in passing bills and engaging in routine Knesset voting, despite holding significant seats as the primary representative of Arab citizens. In the 23rd Knesset (2020–2021), where it secured 15 seats, the alliance's MKs sponsored numerous private member bills focused on Arab community issues such as education funding and discrimination protections, but the vast majority failed to advance, reflecting both opposition status and frequent abstentions on non-Arab-specific matters like security and budget votes. This contrasted with higher output from Jewish opposition parties, which often saw more preliminary approvals for their proposals due to broader cross-aisle support, underscoring the Joint List's marginal impact on national legislation beyond advocacy.^[135] High abstention rates further hampered participation; Joint List MKs routinely absented themselves from votes on defense-related bills or those perceived as conflicting with Palestinian national aspirations, reducing their influence on policy formation. For instance, during debates on military operations or settlement expansions, multiple MKs from the list boycotted proceedings, prioritizing ideological consistency over procedural engagement—a pattern that limited their role in amending or blocking government initiatives compared to more consistently active Jewish counterparts.^[10] Ra'am's departure and entry into the Bennett-Lapid coalition in June 2021 marked a notable exception, yielding tangible outcomes through pragmatic negotiation rather than opposition posturing. With 4 seats, Ra'am secured commitments including a NIS 30 billion five-year plan (Government Resolution 550, approved November 2021) for Arab socio-economic development, encompassing crime-fighting measures like expanded police deployment and security cameras in Arab-majority towns to address escalating violence. This allocation, estimated at over NIS 10 billion initially for immediate anti-crime efforts, represented the largest such investment in Arab communities, demonstrating heightened effectiveness when prioritizing coalition leverage over abstention. However, such successes were atypical for the fragmented Joint List remnants, which reverted to lower productivity post-2021.^[136]^[137]^[138]

External Influences and Security Concerns

Ahmad Tibi, leader of the Ta'al party within the Joint List, served as a close political advisor to Yasser Arafat from 1993 to 1999, facilitating contacts between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the Oslo peace process era.^[139] Tibi has described his relationship with Arafat as one of trust, stating in 1996 that his political actions in the Knesset aligned with Arafat's directives.^[140] These ties have fueled allegations that the Palestinian Authority (PA), under Arafat's leadership, provided financial support to Arab-Israeli parties, including those later comprising the Joint List; a former Arafat economic advisor claimed in 2012 that the PA distributed funds to such groups to influence Israeli Arab politics, though no convictions or official Israeli investigations confirmed direct transfers to the alliance itself.^[141] Security concerns intensified due to perceived sympathies among Joint List factions toward Palestinian militant groups. The Balad party, a core Joint List member, faced repeated accusations from Israeli officials of functioning as an extension of Hamas; in 2014, Avigdor Liberman labeled Balad a "wing of Hamas" for actions like MKs visiting Gaza amid conflicts and praising armed resistance.^[123] Israeli intelligence has monitored Joint List leaders for contacts with PA and Hamas officials, viewing such interactions as potential security risks amid ongoing hostilities.^[142] Following the Hamas-led attacks on October 7, 2023, which killed approximately 1,200 Israelis and took over 250 hostages, Joint List leaders issued condemnations that critics on the Israeli right deemed ambiguous or insufficiently unequivocal. Ayman Odeh, Hadash leader and former Joint List head, described the events as a "horrific massacre" but framed them within the broader context of occupation and mutual bloodshed, emphasizing Palestinian suffering in Gaza.^[143] Similarly, Tibi condemned the violence but focused subsequent statements on Israeli military responses, leading to accusations of moral equivocation; some Joint List-affiliated figures attended Knesset screenings of October 7 attack footage in November 2023, yet others abstained, heightening perceptions of divided loyalties.^[144] These issues prompted intensified right-wing efforts to disqualify Joint List components under Israel's Basic Law: The Knesset, which bars parties supporting "armed struggle by an enemy state or a terrorist organization against the State of Israel."^[145] In multiple election cycles, including 2015 and 2020, petitions targeted Balad and allied lists for alleged terror endorsement, with the Central Elections Committee occasionally upholding disqualifications before Supreme Court reversals; post-2023, proposals expanded criteria to include support for "individual terrorists," aiming to bar figures seen as PA/Hamas sympathizers.^[146] Despite these pushes, the Joint List and its successors have not been fully banned, though fragmentation post-2021 weakened their cohesion amid heightened scrutiny.^[147]

Impact and Legacy

Achievements in Representation

The Joint List's formation ahead of the 2015 Knesset elections united Hadash, Balad, Ta'al, and the United Arab List, securing 13 seats and surpassing the fragmented 11 seats won by separate Arab parties in 2013.^[148] This consolidation responded to the 2014 electoral threshold increase to 3.25%, averting wasted votes and potential underrepresentation for smaller Arab factions.^[149] In the March 2020 elections, the alliance reached its zenith with 15 seats, the highest ever for an Arab-majority list and positioning it as the Knesset’s third-largest bloc.^[150] This outcome reflected heightened mobilization, with Arab voter turnout rising to approximately 59% from lower figures in prior fragmented cycles like April 2019's 49%.^[12]^[113] The expanded parliamentary presence elevated visibility for Arab Israeli issues, including socioeconomic disparities and community infrastructure, through opposition advocacy and plenary speeches by leaders like Ayman Odeh.^[150] This pressured coalition governments for minor concessions, such as increased budget allocations for Arab localities in response to representational demands, though causal links remain debated amid broader political dynamics.^[113] These gains temporarily challenged perceptions of Arab political exclusion, demonstrating electoral viability and forcing inclusion of minority perspectives in national discourse, albeit as an outlier before post-2021 fragmentation eroded seats to six for the core alliance remnant.^[150]

Failures and Shortcomings

Despite securing 13 seats in the March 2020 Knesset elections and campaigning on improved services for Arab communities, the Joint List failed to mitigate surging violent crime in the Arab sector, where homicides reached 220 in 2024 compared to 109 in 2022, with Arabs comprising 73% of murder victims despite representing 21% of Israel's population.^[151]^[152] This escalation continued into 2025, with 149 Arab Israelis killed in violent incidents by August, a 13% increase over the prior year, prompting protests that accused Arab representatives, including Joint List members, of inadequate action.^[153] Voters expressed disillusionment, attributing roughly half the blame for persistent neglect to Arab parties' inability to deliver tangible reductions in crime or societal fissures.^[154]^[155] Educational disparities in the Arab sector similarly persisted under Joint List representation, with OECD assessments in 2019 revealing the widest global gap in reading, math, and science scores between Hebrew- and Arabic-speaking students, reflecting chronic underinvestment and poor outcomes despite electoral pledges for reform.^[156] Arab pupils' academic achievements lagged behind Jewish peers in key metrics, with limited progress in closing gaps during the alliance's peak influence from 2015 to 2021, as broader implementation of sector-specific plans stalled amid political gridlock.^[157] The alliance's opposition status hindered leverage to enforce five-year development initiatives, resulting in low execution rates for infrastructure and services in Arab towns.^[44] The Joint List's ideological commitment to non-recognition of Israel as a Jewish state fostered rigidity that precluded pragmatic alliances with centrist or right-leaning Jewish parties, confining its influence to vocal opposition rather than coalition participation.^[105] This rejectionist posture, prioritizing symbolic anti-Zionist stances over cross-aisle deals, correlated with electoral isolation, as evidenced by the alliance's fragmentation post-2021 when pragmatic elements like Ra'am pursued independent coalitions, leaving the core Joint List marginalized and unable to translate seats into policy gains.^[158] Such insularity perpetuated a cycle of unmet commitments, as the absence of broader partnerships reduced bargaining power to address causal drivers of sector woes, including weak local governance and enforcement gaps.^[159]

Recent Developments Toward Reunion (2022-2025)

In the November 1, 2022, Knesset elections, the remnants of the Joint List fragmented further, with Hadash and Ta'al running jointly and securing 5 seats (4.3% of the vote), while Balad campaigned separately but failed to surpass the 3.25% electoral threshold, receiving only 2.9% and no representation.^[160]^[161] Ra'am, which had already split in 2021 to join a governing coalition, maintained its independent path and also won 5 seats, highlighting the ideological and strategic divides that prevented broader unity amid declining Arab voter turnout of around 44%.^[120] This marginalization of Balad underscored the risks of disunity, as fragmented slates risked wasting votes and reducing overall Arab influence in the Knesset.^[8] Following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks and the ensuing war, Arab parties faced heightened scrutiny and internal pressures, yet initial unity efforts stalled due to differing stances on the conflict and governance participation.^[162] By mid-2025, amid Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's coalition stability despite opposition challenges, calls for reunification intensified to consolidate Arab representation and potentially block right-wing dominance in anticipated 2026 elections.^[163] Polls indicated over 70% support among Arab citizens for party unity, viewing it as essential for boosting turnout and addressing socioeconomic gaps exacerbated by the war.^[162] In June 2025, Hadash leader Ayman Odeh publicly advocated reviving a unified slate, emphasizing majority Arab public demand for a single list to maximize seats.^[164] Negotiations advanced in July and August, with leaders of Hadash, Ta'al, Balad, and Ra'am agreeing on August 11 to continue talks toward reestablishing the Joint List, though disputes persisted over leadership and platform—Hadash proposed Yousef Jabarin as head, gaining tentative support from Ra'am and Ta'al despite Ra'am's pragmatic history clashing with Balad's nationalism.^[165]^[8] By September 1, Hadash officials reported progress, projecting a potential return to 10-15 seats if unified, but Ra'am's conditional willingness highlighted ongoing tensions over coalition participation and anti-normalization rhetoric.^[160] As of October 2025, formal merger remained elusive, with talks focused on reconciling ideological rifts to counter Netanyahu's government.^[166]

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Israel's Jewish Nation-State Law - Adalah
Dec 20, 2020 · In 2018, the Israeli parliament approved the Jewish Nation-State Basic Law that enshrines Jewish supremacy over Palestinian citizens.
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Analysis of the implementation of the five-year plan for the economic ...
Mar 6, 2024 · The 5-year plan based on Government Resolution 922 was implemented in 2016–2021, and markedly advanced the economic development in Arab society.
[65]
Historic Economic Development Plan for Arab Sector: Overview and ...
Jan 13, 2016 · Voicing criticism of the Plan, Joint Arab List MKs pointed out that the Plan was not integrated into the National Budget Bill, and did not ...
[66]
The Joint List is dead. Who will lead the fight for Palestinian citizens?
Nov 7, 2022 · The fragmentation of Arab parties in Israel exemplifies the lack of a political compass to confront a far-right government and broken ...
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evidence from Palestinian Arabs in Israel | Acta Politica
May 8, 2024 · This paper examines how the voter turnout of members of minorities and their political party preferences in national elections respond to ...
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Why can't the Joint List join the government? | The Jerusalem Post
Aug 25, 2019 · If non-Zionist, nondemocratic haredi parties can sit in a coalition, why can't Arab politicians?
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Ra'am Joins the Government Coalition: Paving a Path to Jewish ...
Jun 17, 2021 · Beyond the change of power, Israel's 36th government marks a historic precedent, when for the first time an Arab party joined the coalition.
[70]
Israel's electoral committee bans Arab candidates, allows extreme ...
Mar 7, 2019 · A decision by Israel's electoral committee to ban two Arab parties and a candidate from a third Arab-led slate from running in elections,
[71]
History made as Arab Israeli Ra'am party joins Bennett-Lapid coalition
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Arab leader's gamble to play kingmaker in Israel is paying off - NPR
Jan 17, 2022 · Mansour Abbas broke a longstanding taboo when he led his Arab party into Israel's governing coalition last year. The bold move appears to be paying dividends.
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Joint List's Odeh rips Ra'am for focus on internal affairs and 'nothing ...
Oct 10, 2021 · ... Joint List's refusal to cooperate with successive coalitions has rendered it irrelevant. Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, left, and Ra'am ...
[74]
Reevaluating the policy success of private members bills
Jun 7, 2023 · We show exploratory evidence that the success rate of PMBs is much higher than commonly perceived and that PMBs influence the government agenda.
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Israel Political Parties: Hadash - Jewish Virtual Library
Israel's major Arab political parties Balad, Ra'am, and Ta'al signed an ... For the 2022 election, Hadash and Balad decided to run together. After some ...Missing: separate | Show results with:separate
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Maki - The Israel Democracy Institute
Founded in 1948. The roots of Maki (HaMiflaga HaKomunistit HaYisraelit – the Israeli Communist Party), as a mixed Jewish-Arab party, are to be found in the ...<|separator|>
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Hadash | ECFR - European Council on Foreign Relations
Balad. About Balad · Sami Abu Shehadeh. Islamic Movement (Northern Branch) ... Hadash was part of the Joint List since its founding in 2015; although it ...
[78]
Hadash – Democratic Front for Peace and Equality - חד"ש
Hadash was established by the Israeli Communist Party (Maki), which was represented in the first Knesset, became one of the most influential political movements ...
[79]
Hadash - The Israel Democracy Institute
One of the veteran political parties in Israel, Hadash has run in every Knesset elections since 1977. Established before the elections for the Ninth Knesset.
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A century after its founding, the Israeli Communist Party is at a ...
Jul 28, 2023 · For 100 years, Maki has been the leading force for Jewish-Palestinian equality in Israeli politics, yet it has failed to unite Arab and ...
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What do indigenous parties want? The case of Palestinian citizens ...
What explains the persistent fragmentation within the Palestinian-Arab party system in Israel, even under circumstances that ostensibly encourage unity?Missing: evolution | Show results with:evolution
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A brief history of Balad scandals | The Jerusalem Post
Sep 22, 2016 · The party, whose name is an acronym for “National Democratic Alliance,” was founded in 1995 by Azmi Bishara, who entered the Knesset alone after ...
[83]
Balad | ECFR - European Council on Foreign Relations
Balad's Knesset members, particularly former MKs Azmi Bishara and Haneen Zoabi, were the subjects of fierce political attacks by Jewish Israeli politicians, ...
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A brief history of Balad, the renegade Joint List faction that passed ...
Sep 24, 2019 · It specifically calls on Israel to guarantee that Arab Israelis can manage their own educational and cultural affairs; it also urges the Jewish ...Missing: conflict | Show results with:conflict<|separator|>
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On the Punishment of MK Hanin Zoabi by the Knesset Ethics ...
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Balad party appeals its election disqualification to the High Court
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[88]
Israel's top court unanimously overturns ban on Arab party from ...
Jun 10, 2022 · Anachnu claimed that Balad/Tajammu' rejects Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, and instead supports “a state of all its citizens”. In ...
[89]
Former MK Hanin Zoabi, 12 others convicted in Balad party fraud ...
Oct 4, 2021 · Former Knesset member Hanin Zoabi and 12 others tied to the Balad party, including senior officials, were convicted Monday at the Nazareth Magistrate's Court.
[90]
Israel's Islamic party (Ra'am): Pragmatism and Islamism according to ...
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The United Arab List (RAAM): Conservative Revolution in Israeli ...
Mar 18, 2021 · The United Arab List (RAAM) represents the southern faction of the Islamic Movement and has been widely discussed in Israeli political, public, and media ...Missing: Ra' am<|separator|>
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What's driving Mansour Abbas and Ra'am's strategy?
May 5, 2022 · The United Arab List (Ra'am) political party and its chairperson, Knesset Member Mansour Abbas, have come under fire recently from Hamas ...
[93]
How Islamist Ra'am broke Arab politics and may win the keys to the ...
Mar 25, 2021 · Ra'am shares many legislative priorities with the Joint List, the amalgamation of Arab parties of which it used to be a part: Passing and ...
[94]
Ra'am and the Israeli Islamic Movement's Interaction with Hamas ...
Hamas Leader Calls on Ra'am Leader to Leave the Israeli Government Coalition · Ra'am Responds: We Are Determined to Realize the Interests of Palestinian Arab ...
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The first Arab party in a ruling Israeli coalition | Reichman University
One cannot overstate the importance of The United Arab List's (RA`AM) integration into the new governing coalition in Israel. It is a historical turning ...
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Israeli Islamist party linked to Turkish Hamas front group - JNS.org
Feb 27, 2024 · Israel's Ra'am Party (United Arab List) has close ties to a Turkey-based association linked to the Hamas terrorist group, according to an investigation.
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Ta'al - The Israel Democracy Institute
In that election, the party ran under its original name, Ha-Ichud HaAravi ("Arab Union"), and did not succeed in passing the electoral threshold. The party ...
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Ta'al | ECFR - European Council on Foreign Relations
The Arab Movement for Change (also known as Ta'al or Taghyir) is a secular Arab party led by Ahmed Tibi, a prominent and long-time Arab lawmaker.
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The Israeli Ta'al political party, short for Tnu'a Arabit LeHithadshut (Arabic Renewal Movement), is a political party in Israel primarily representing the ...
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Israel Political Parties: Arab Movement for Renewal (Ta'al)
Ta'al (transliterated Hebrew acronym for “Arab Movement for Renewal”) is an Israeli political party largely supported by Israeli Arabs.Missing: ideology | Show results with:ideology
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Is Ahmad Tibi the most powerful man in Israel's Knesset?
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[102]
Joint List MK Ahmad Tibi: 'There's only so much political flexibility ...
Dec 6, 2020 · Knesset member Ahmad Tibi will mark his 21st year in the Israeli parliament this year, making him the Knesset's most seasoned Arab member.<|separator|>
[103]
The Joint List is the real opposition to Israel's right-wing governments
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Israel Elections: Joint Arab List breaks up, leaving Mansour Abbas out
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Ideology Killed the Joint List - Opinion - Haaretz.com
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Diverse Israeli Arab Political Factions Join Forces to Keep Place in ...
Jan 23, 2015 · Facing an electoral threshold that threatens to bar small parties from Parliament, the factions are forming a single ticket for the March ...<|control11|><|separator|>
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Israel's Joint List faces challenging road ahead | News | Al Jazeera
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Binyamin Netanyahu: 'Arab voters are heading to the polling stations ...
Mar 17, 2015 · Israel prime minister releases a video on election day urging supporters to vote as Joint List party prompts high Israeli Arab turnout at polls.
[109]
Netanyahu apologises to Israeli-Arabs over election remarks - BBC
Mar 23, 2015 · Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu says sorry for warning that "the Arabs are voting in droves" during the election campaign.
[110]
Final results show Likud with 36 seats, Netanyahu bloc short of ...
Mar 5, 2020 · The full results, published by the committee after delays in checking a number of polling stations and ballot boxes, also confirmed, however, ...
[111]
Israel's president to ask Netanyahu rival Benny Gantz to form ...
Mar 15, 2020 · Opposition leader Benny Gantz will be asked to form a new government, Israel's president said on Sunday, boosting his chances of ousting ...<|separator|>
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Benny Gantz, With Thin Majority, Wins Chance to Form Israeli ...
Mar 15, 2020 · Benny Gantz, the centrist former army chief battling to depose Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, on Sunday won the endorsements of a narrow majority ...
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The Arab Vote in the Elections for the 24th Knesset (March 2021)
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[114]
The 2021 Israeli Elections: An Earthquake in Palestinian Arab Society
Following the dramatic decline in voter turnout in Arab localities and the poor performance of the Joint List, calls for a reevaluation in general are ...
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Towards Jewish-Arab Normalization in Israel
Mar 17, 2021 · Israeli Arabs Want a More Pragmatic Politics while Jewish Parties Court the Arab Vote.<|separator|>
[116]
Why the Joint List Split Ahead of the March 2021 Knesset Elections
Apr 27, 2021 · The Palestinian Forum for Israeli Studies (MADAR) is an independent research center specialising in Israeli affairs, based in Ramallah, ...Missing: internal debates
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Israel: Political Developments and Data in 2021 - GANEL
Nov 3, 2022 · The year 2021 can be described in Israeli politics as one of change. After 12 consecutive years in power as Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu left office.<|separator|>
[118]
Ra'am, Balad and Hadash-Ta'al waiting to learn Israeli election fate
Nov 2, 2022 · Two Arab parties - the United Arab List (Ra'am) and Hadash-Ta'al – won 9-10 seats. A third Arab party, Balad, did not cross the electoral threshold.<|separator|>
[119]
The 2022 Elections: Results Analysis - The Israel Democracy Institute
Nov 7, 2022 · ... Balad did not pass the electoral threshold, some 300,000 votes were squandered. ... Meretz' failure to reach the threshold turned its surplus vote ...
[120]
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Nov 20, 2022 · A majority of the Arab public voted in the recent Knesset elections. An analysis of the voting patterns in the sector provides an interesting picture.
[121]
Summary of the 25th Knesset election results in Arab society
Dec 7, 2022 · The current issue of Bayan is being published about one month after the 25th Knesset elections which were held on November 1st, 2022. In his ...
[122]
As Joint List Splits, Arab Voters Have More Choices, Less Power
The big Israeli election news is the forming of new factions: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu brokering a deal with a far-right ...
[123]
Liberman calls Arab Balad party 'a wing of Hamas'
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[124]
Israel: Balad banned from election run, Ra'am qualifies - i24 News
Sep 30, 2022 · Israel: Balad banned from election run, Ra'am qualifies. Ra'am allowed to run despite filed allegations that it 'supports terrorism'.
[125]
Arab MKs walk out on anthem during Knesset swearing-in ceremony
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[126]
Rivlin: Arab citizens shouldn't be forced to sing national anthem
May 22, 2015 · Joint (Arab) List leader Ayman Odeh later said: “I chose to stay in the plenary and to just stand silently. It was my protest against an anthem ...Missing: refuse | Show results with:refuse
[127]
Former MK starts prison sentence for Syria visit | The Times of Israel
Nov 1, 2015 · Said Nafa met with Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine secretary during unlawful trip to enemy state.
[128]
3 Arab-Israeli MKs suspended for meeting with terrorists' families
Feb 8, 2016 · ... terror attacks. The Knesset Ethics Committee approved the ... terrorists should “not serve in the Israeli Knesset.” Two members of the ...
[129]
Netanyahu orders legal action against Balad MKs
Feb 7, 2016 · Prime Minister asks Attorney General to examine what legal action can be taken against Arab MKs who met terrorists' families.<|separator|>
[130]
Motion to expel Arab party head Odeh from Knesset fails
Jul 15, 2025 · “He's not a terror supporter, he's a terrorist,” he yelled immediately ahead of the vote. His rhetoric was taken up by other coalition figures, ...
[131]
Ayman Odeh's Failed Impeachment Is a “Win-Win” for the Right
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[132]
Ben Gvir says he'd seek to expel Arabs who attack IDF soldiers ...
Aug 16, 2022 · ... anti-Zionist Neturei Karta haredi extremists. Ben Gvir says he'd seek to expel Arabs who attack IDF soldiers, 'disloyal' MKs. Far-right MK ...
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Divided and dismissed despite historic gains, Arab parties now ...
Jan 14, 2021 · The March 2020 elections gave Arab Israelis an unprecedented 15 Knesset seats, the highest showing for their community in Israeli political ...
[134]
Ideology isn't a Dirty Word - The Israel Democracy Institute
Sep 19, 2022 · The disintegration of the Joint List is arousing diametrically opposite reactions from the two big blocs of the Israeli political spectrum.
[135]
Israel's Last Knesset Had Record-breaking Number of Bills Passed
Apr 29, 2019 · Figures Also Reveal a Major Surge in MKs Filing Private-member Bills on Marginal Issues, Although Only About Four Percent of Those Proposed ...
[136]
[PDF] NIS 30 Billion for Socio-Economic Development of Arab Society
Government Resolution 550 (Takadum):. NIS 30 Billion for Socio-Economic Development of Arab Society. November 2021. On November 4th the Government of Israel ...
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Israel continues working on Arab sector plan worth NIS 30 billion
Jun 11, 2022 · Housing projects in Arab cities were allocated a NIS 500 million budget and an extra NIS 47 million are set to go to various economic projects ...
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Israeli Police to Boost Number of Security Cameras in Two Mixed ...
Oct 25, 2021 · Israel Approves a $780-million Plan to Fight Crime in Arab Communities, as Well as an Economic Plan to Reduce Inequality Between Jews and ...Missing: am | Show results with:am
[139]
Ahmad Tibi | ECFR
Dr Ahmad Tibi was born in 1958 and has been a member of the Israeli Knesset since 1999. He is the chairman of the Ta'al party which he co-founded in 1996 ...
[140]
Arab MK: I Miss Arafat So Much! - Israel National News
Aug 5, 2015 · In November of 1996, Tibi said about Arafat: “All of my moves are made in according to his directions. I believe he places trust in me, and I ...
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Ex-Arafat adviser: PA funded Arab Israeli parties | The Jerusalem Post
May 17, 2012 · “When Mahmoud Abbas returned to the Palestinian territories [after the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993], I gave him $25,000 at the ...
[142]
Liberman: Balad party supports Hamas, has no place in Knesset ...
Aug 18, 2014 · “Balad, the party founded by [former MK] Azmi Bishara, who was charged with espionage and fled Israel, clearly proves again to those who doubted ...
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The position of Arab Israelis on the events of October 7, 2023
Oct 6, 2024 · Ayman Odeh and Ahmad Tibi also express a similar stance. They represent the Joint List (Al-Qa'imah Al-Mushtarakah), which received most of ...
[144]
'We can never forgive': Knesset hosts second screening of October 7 ...
Nov 15, 2023 · Among those who attended the screening on Wednesday were MKs Ayman Odeh and Ahmad Tibi from Hadash-Ta'al. None of the party's MKs attended ...
[145]
Disqualification of Knesset Lists and Candidates: Q&A
Sep 19, 2022 · Disqualifying candidates and lists for the Knesset violates one of the most fundamental democratic rights, the right to vote and to be elected.
[146]
The Israeli right is planning to ban Palestinian parties. Here's how
Mar 23, 2023 · Between the 2019 and 2022 elections, Balad representatives did not submit an additional proposed law calling for a “state of all its citizens.” ...
[147]
New Bill Proposed Expands the Criteria for Disqualification of ...
Nov 28, 2024 · It should be noted that we are not speaking of someone convicted of supporting terrorism; rather, the Central Elections Committee would be able ...
[148]
Knesset (March 2015) | Election results | Israel - IPU Parline
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud party remained the largest force, winning 30 seats in the 120-member Knesset. The Zionist Union - established in ...
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The Joint List: The Achievement and the Price
May 31, 2020 · In current issue of Bayan, Dr. Rana Zaher analyzes the achievements of the Joint List in 23rd Knesset elections and the challenges that lie ...Missing: controversies | Show results with:controversies
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Homicides in Arab Society Continue to Climb - מרכז טאוב
Feb 10, 2025 · The number of homicides in the Arab population stood at 220 in 2024, compared to only 109 in 2022. Among Jews, the numbers were 58 and 39, respectively.
[152]
Three out of four murder victims in Israel are Arab, police data reveals
Aug 26, 2024 · Despite making up 21% of Israel's population, the Arab public has made up 73% of murder victims in recent years.
[153]
As violent crime soars, Arabs see jobs, training as key to getting ...
Aug 4, 2025 · Since the start of 2025, a total of 149 Arab Israelis have lost their lives in violent criminal incidents, a 13 percent jump over the number ...Missing: statistics | Show results with:statistics
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Disenchanted Arab Voters May Play Major Role in Shaping Israeli ...
Oct 30, 2022 · “Well, no doubt we have to blame them [the Arab parties and politicians]; they are part of the failure. Yes, I blame them, 50% of the blame is ...
[155]
Arab Israelis declare general strike to protest surge in violent crime
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[156]
OECD finds record educational gulf between Hebrew, Arabic ...
Dec 3, 2019 · Survey of 79 countries shows Israel has worst socioeconomic gap; education minister sets up working group after dire scores in Arab sector ...
[157]
The Academic Achievements of Arab Israeli Pupils | מרכז טאוב
What are the differences between the educational achievements of Arab Israeli and Jewish students in Israel? Many educational research studies have explored ...Missing: Joint List
[158]
Why the splitting of the Joint List is so important to Netanyahu - opinion
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Why Israel's Arabs Are Its Biggest Threat - Middle East Forum
... Joint List). In the March 2020 elections they scored ... 25, 2021; Caroline Glick, “Ra'am's success is Israel's failure,” Israel Hayom (Tel Aviv), Nov.
[160]
Hadash-MK says Joint List revival moving forward
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Hadash-Ta'al - The Israel Democracy Institute
Towards the 2019 elections internal conflicts disbanded The Joint List. Just before the deadline for submitting the lists, Hadash (headed by Ayman Odeh) and Ta' ...
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As anti-Palestinian Sentiment Grows, Can Israel's Arab Parties Join ...
Jul 24, 2025 · Abu Shehadeh said a new Joint List would have to have clear working procedures and an agenda agreed upon by all four parties, to prevent the ...Missing: positions | Show results with:positions
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Arab leaders explore Joint List reunion to 'block Netanyahu ...
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Ahead of the 2026 elections, Ayman Odeh is pushing to reunite ...
Jun 24, 2025 · Odeh is working to reestablish the so-called Joint List, a unified slate of Arab parties with sharply varying views and a track record of energizing Arab ...
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Leaders of Arab parties agree to keep talks going on Joint List ...
Aug 11, 2025 · Following a meeting in Nazareth to discuss reviving a united bloc ahead of the next elections, the leaders of Israel's four Arab parties ...
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Israel's opposition is plotting a return to power. But it remains its own ...
Sep 15, 2025 · ... Ayman Odeh, leader of the Arab-Jewish socialist party Hadash, from the Knesset. When it came time for the vote, which failed, Lapid gave his ...