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Joseph Wu

Jaushieh Joseph Wu (born October 31, 1954) is a Taiwanese political scientist and serving as Secretary-General of the of the Republic of China () since May 2024. He previously held the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs from February 2018 to May 2024, marking the longest tenure in that office since Taiwan's transition to democracy in the late 1980s. Wu earned a in political science from in 1989, following degrees from and the University of Missouri-St. Louis. His career includes academic research at , roles within the , and high-level government positions such as Chairman of the (2016–2017), Secretary-General to the President (2017–2018), and Representative of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (2007–2008), Taiwan's . As Foreign Minister, Wu advanced Taiwan's diplomatic resilience against the People's Republic of China's systematic efforts to isolate the island through diplomatic poaching, military intimidation, and economic pressure, while bolstering alliances with democratic nations, particularly the , and advocating for Taiwan's inclusion in international bodies like the . His tenure emphasized transparent communication via and to highlight threats from Beijing's expansionist policies, contributing to increased global awareness of Taiwan's strategic importance in countering authoritarian influence. In his current role, Wu continues to coordinate responses to cross-strait tensions, including warnings about China's ambitions for a Beijing-dominated international order. Wu's advocacy for Taiwan's distinct sovereignty has elicited sharp rebukes from the , which labels him a proponent of , though his positions align with Taiwan's constitutional framework and public support for maintaining the against forcible unification. Recent espionage cases involving subordinates have drawn scrutiny to security protocols under his oversight, though courts have not implicated Wu directly in the incidents.

Early life and education

Family and upbringing

Joseph Wu was born on October 31, 1954, in , . Public information regarding his parents, siblings, or specific family professions remains limited, with no verifiable details on ancestral origins or household dynamics emerging from official records or interviews. His formative years unfolded amid Taiwan's prolonged regime, imposed by the government in May 1949 after retreating from and not lifted until July 1987; this era featured authoritarian governance, suppression of dissent, and a curriculum steeped in anti-communist propaganda to foster loyalty to the Republic of China. Such conditions shaped the socio-political environment of Wu's upbringing in central , though personal anecdotes tying family life directly to these policies are absent from available sources.

Academic training

Joseph Wu obtained a degree in from in . He pursued graduate studies in the United States, earning a degree in from the University of Missouri-St. Louis. Wu completed his Doctor of Philosophy in political science at The Ohio State University in 1989. His dissertation, titled Toward Another Miracle? Impetuses and Obstacles in Taiwan's Democratization, analyzed the political, social, and institutional factors driving and hindering Taiwan's transition from authoritarian rule to democracy during the late 1980s, a period marked by lifting martial law and expanding electoral participation. This work drew on comparative politics frameworks and empirical data from Taiwan's evolving institutions, laying groundwork for Wu's later expertise in cross-strait dynamics and international relations.

Academic and early professional career

Scholarly positions

Following his doctoral studies, Joseph Wu returned to and assumed scholarly roles at the Institute of International Relations (IIR) at (NCCU) in , where he served as a for over a decade, commencing in the early after prior government service. In this capacity, he instructed courses on , with a specialization in U.S. toward and regional security issues, drawing on empirical assessments of strategic balances rather than normative frameworks. Wu's academic contributions at NCCU emphasized rigorous analysis of Taiwan's political transitions and interstate dynamics in East Asia, informed by data on institutional reforms and military equilibria. His contract with the institution extended until at least 2008, when it lapsed amid his diplomatic appointments, underscoring his dual-track expertise bridging academia and policy. Complementing his NCCU affiliation, Wu held a visiting fellowship at the Brookings Institution's Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, a U.S.-based think tank, which facilitated engagements with policymakers on trans-Pacific security matters. This role, grounded in Brookings' nonpartisan research tradition, allowed him to contribute to discussions on regional power shifts through evidence-based briefings and seminars.

Research focus on international relations

Wu's scholarly work centered on the interplay between Taiwan's domestic political transformations and its external security environment, particularly emphasizing how influenced cross-strait dynamics and deterrence strategies. In his 1996 article "Democratization and Uncertainty: Taiwan's Political Development in a New Era," he examined the uncertainties arising from Taiwan's , arguing that while it fostered internal , it complicated relations with the (PRC) by amplifying debates over sovereignty and unification, thereby necessitating robust deterrence to preserve independence. This analysis drew on empirical observations of Taiwan's electoral reforms and policy shifts post-1987 martial law lifting, critiquing assumptions of inevitable PRC-Taiwan convergence by highlighting causal links between and heightened PRC coercion risks. A core theme in Wu's research was the U.S. role in balancing cross-strait power asymmetries, as detailed in his chapter "The United States as a Balancer in , 2000–2008," where he assessed U.S. arms transfers and diplomatic engagements as key stabilizers against PRC expansionist pressures. Using data on U.S. implementations, including notifications of defensive weaponry sales totaling over $10 billion in that period, Wu contended that such support underpinned Taiwan's defensive posture without provoking escalation, privileging verifiable alliance metrics over rhetorical commitments to the "" principle. He challenged normalized narratives of PRC-Taiwan unification as historically predetermined, instead applying to demonstrate how U.S.-facilitated deterrence preserved the amid China's military modernization. Wu also contributed to broader discussions on 's rising power and its implications for regional security, editing volumes such as China Rising: Implications of Economic and Military Development (circa early 2000s), which compiled analyses of PRC capabilities and urged to prioritize asymmetric defenses like tactics against superior conventional forces. His co-authorship in Challenges of the Century (2001) extended this to globalization's effects on , positing that interconnected economic ties did not mitigate PRC coercive intents but rather amplified the need for Taiwan-centric deterrence frameworks grounded in empirical threat assessments. These works underscored a defensive realist orientation, focusing on preservation through verifiable metrics like alliance reliability and capability gaps, rather than optimistic diplomatic equilibria.

Governmental and diplomatic roles

Service in presidential offices

Wu entered government service during President Chen Shui-bian's administration, serving as vice secretary-general of the by at least 2004, where he addressed policy and cross-strait issues in public briefings ahead of referendums. In this capacity, he contributed to intelligence-related policy coordination amid heightened tensions with following Chen's election victory. From 2004 to 2007, Wu chaired the , directing Taiwan's official stance on and evaluating (PRC) countermeasures to Taiwanese electoral outcomes, such as diplomatic isolation efforts post-2004 presidential election. His tenure emphasized empirical tracking of PRC economic and political pressures, informing Taiwan's maintenance of the without formal independence declarations. Under President , Wu assumed the role of secretary-general of the in 2017, overseeing interagency analysis of PRC military maneuvers, including data on (PLA) drills proximate to following the 2016 elections. This position involved synthesizing intelligence reports on incursions to bolster deterrence recommendations, prioritizing asymmetric defense capabilities against observed PLA patterns. Concurrently, from May 2017 to February 2018, he served as secretary-general to the presidential office, facilitating executive coordination on security threats.

Tenure as foreign minister

Jaushieh Joseph Wu was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan) on February 26, 2018, by President , succeeding David Lee. His tenure lasted until May 2024, marking the longest continuous service in the role since Taiwan's in the late . During this period, Wu oversaw Taiwan's diplomatic efforts amid intensifying pressure from the , which sought to isolate internationally. Wu's ministry confronted the defection of several diplomatic allies to China, including El Salvador in August 2018, Solomon Islands in September 2019, and Kiribati in the same month, reducing Taiwan's formal partners from 17 to 15 within months. Further losses followed, such as in December 2018 and in March 2023, with Taiwan employing financial aid and infrastructure projects—often termed "dollar diplomacy" by critics—to retain remaining ties, though these efforts yielded mixed results against Beijing's competing offers. To counter economic reliance on China, Wu advanced the (NSP), initiated in 2016 but expanded under his leadership to foster ties with 18 countries in , , and . NSP achievements included a 73.3% surge in Taiwanese investment to nations, reaching US$4.2 billion in 2016 and sustaining growth into subsequent years, alongside increased bilateral trade volumes that helped diversify exports away from . For instance, Taiwan-India trade expanded through memoranda on industrial collaboration, aligning with NSP goals for . Wu elevated Taiwan's global profile through addresses at international venues, such as the and forums, where he advocated for Taiwan's inclusion in democratic dialogues and emphasized its dominance—producing over 60% of the world's chips—as vital to stability amid geopolitical tensions. These efforts coincided with virtual engagements, including inputs to discussions in 2021 on and , underscoring 's strategic value despite exclusion from formal multilateral bodies.

Appointment to National Security Council

Joseph Wu was appointed Secretary-General of Taiwan's (NSC) by President , with the transition announced in April 2024 and formalized upon Lai's on May 20, 2024. This shift from his prior role as foreign minister positioned Wu to coordinate whole-of-government responses to immediate security challenges, including (PRC) military drills launched hours after the , which framed as "punishment" for perceived separatist rhetoric. Wu's tenure has emphasized resilience against gray-zone coercion, particularly PRC Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) incursions, which surged post-inauguration to over 300 aircraft detections per month—more than double the prior average—and totaled over 4,000 from January to September 2025 alone. The NSC under Wu has directed enhanced monitoring, asymmetric defense enhancements, and public alerts, aligning with Lai's vision for a "whole-of-society" national cybersecurity strategy unveiled in 2025. In April 2025, Wu led a low-profile delegation to the via the established "special channel" for consultations with administration officials, focusing on accelerating arms deliveries such as advanced missiles and fighters, alongside deepened intelligence cooperation to counter PRC and hybrid threats. During a forum in on October 20, 2025, Wu highlighted PRC priorities skewed toward expansionism amid internal economic stagnation and leadership purges, rather than domestic reforms, while dismissing Beijing's sovereignty assertions over —rejected by 82.5 percent of respondents in an April 2025 government poll as incompatible with the island's independence.

Foreign policy and cross-strait positions

Advocacy for Taiwan's international space

As Taiwan's Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2018 to 2024, Joseph Wu prioritized expanding the island's international engagement through partnerships with democracies sharing values such as , , and , a strategy he described as "value-based diplomacy" to build resilience amid shrinking formal diplomatic ties. This approach sought to counter Taiwan's loss of formal allies—dropping from 22 in 2016 to 12 by 2024—by fostering unofficial economic and multilateral ties with over 60 countries maintaining representative offices in . Wu emphasized collaboration with "like-minded countries" in the and beyond to promote a free and open , as articulated in his 2020 call for among democracies. A key initiative under Wu's leadership was Taiwan's application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) on September 22, 2021, aiming to integrate Taiwan into high-standard regional trade frameworks despite opposition from . In November 2022, Wu reported no formal objections from CPTPP members to Taiwan's bid, attributing this to consultations highlighting Taiwan's economic contributions, including its role as a major exporter of semiconductors comprising 60% of global supply. By 2023, supporters like and the expressed willingness to consider Taiwan's accession, with Wu framing CPTPP entry as essential for diversification and reductions on like agricultural products and electronics. This effort built on bilateral free trade agreements with and since 2013, expanding Taiwan's trade network to cover 40% of its exports by volume. Wu also advanced economic pacts with , advocating a Taiwan-EU bilateral (BIA) during his 2021 European tour to facilitate reciprocal investments amid Taiwan's outbound semiconductor manufacturing commitments. In June 2023, he linked closer EU ties to Taiwan's investments, such as TSMC's €10 billion European fabs, urging to prioritize mutual over one-sided supply demands and noting stalled BIA negotiations as a missed opportunity for regulatory alignment in tech and green energy sectors. These overtures yielded EU parliamentary resolutions supporting Taiwan's WHO and ICAO participation, alongside screening dialogues that enhanced Taiwan's appeal as a stable partner. In U.S. relations, Wu oversaw the launch of the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade in June 2022, culminating in the first agreement on June 1, 2023, which addressed non-tariff barriers in customs procedures, sanitary standards, and , enabling streamlined trade worth $120 billion annually. The pact included commitments to digital trade facilitation and agricultural transparency, reducing approval times for imports by up to 30% in targeted sectors, and laid groundwork for phase-two talks on labor, environment, and supply chains, with Wu citing it as evidence of Taiwan's proactive agency in bilateral deals absent full . This initiative complemented tech cooperation, such as joint R&D under the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, bolstering Taiwan's export diversification to mitigate reliance on single markets. Wu's diplomacy underscored Taiwan's self-reliant posture, arguing that robust domestic defenses and economic contributions attract sustained support from allies, rather than concessions that signal weakness, as evidenced in his 2024 Foreign Affairs essay linking Ukraine aid to Taiwan's deterrence needs. These efforts elevated Taiwan's profile in forums like the G7's outreach, where Wu's advocacy secured mentions of stability in 2021-2023 communiqués, fostering a network of over 20 "Taiwan Plus" investment platforms with partners including and .

Views on China's threats and status quo

Joseph Wu has consistently rejected the "one China" framework and the , arguing that Taiwan has never accepted the former and viewing the latter as an outdated construct that fails to reflect current realities across the . In alignment with Lai Ching-te's administration, Wu supports maintaining the through a framework emphasizing non-subordination to , avoidance of provocation, robust deterrence, and principled cross-strait dialogue, which he sees as essential to preserving peace without conceding . Wu has highlighted China's use of gray-zone tactics, including frequent People's Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force incursions into Taiwan's air defense identification zone (ADIZ), as direct evidence of coercive pressure eroding the status quo. For instance, he has pointed to over 750 PLA aircraft sorties near Taiwan in late 2021 alone, with cumulative incursions exceeding thousands annually thereafter, including 2,301 sorties from January to October 2024— a 64% increase from prior comparable periods— as deliberate intimidation rather than routine exercises. He argues these actions, coupled with Beijing's military buildup and political rhetoric, reveal preparations for potential invasion rather than genuine pursuit of peaceful unification, countering narratives that normalize China's claims of restraint. While asserting that war with is avoidable through strengthened deterrence, Wu emphasizes that must enhance its defenses to counter 's aggression without initiating conflict, rejecting unification overtures that ignore empirical patterns of coercion. and 's (KMT) opposition have criticized Wu's positions as escalatory, with the former labeling Democratic Progressive Party policies as provocative "two-state theory" and the latter faulting similar approaches under prior administrations for heightening tensions. However, polls indicate broad Taiwanese support for Wu's stance on preserving independence, with a February 2025 Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation survey showing a majority favoring as the ideal future while prioritizing maintenance to avert immediate risks.

Engagements with allies like the and

Taiwan intensified security ties with the under Joseph Wu's leadership as foreign minister from 2018 onward, emphasizing acquisitions and strategic dialogues to counterbalance Chinese pressure. In February 2022, Wu keynoted a event alongside former U.S. Secretary of Defense , advocating for sustained U.S. sales and training exchanges as critical deterrents against . These discussions preceded U.S. approvals of multiple packages, contributing to notifications of over $28 billion in sales to from 2015 to mid-2025, including systems in 2020 and ongoing deliveries of defensive weaponry during Wu's tenure. As Secretary-General from May 2024, Wu oversaw bilateral mechanisms addressing U.S. semiconductor export controls, navigating restrictions imposed since 2022 to limit China's access to advanced while safeguarding Taiwan's role in global supply chains. High-level talks in 2025 focused on cooperative production expansions, such as TSMC's U.S. investments, amid U.S. pressures for diversified to mitigate risks from Beijing's influence. With , Wu facilitated post-2022 enhancements in defense collaboration, building on Tokyo's strategic pivot toward 's stability following Abe's advocacy. and held their first joint maritime drill on July 18, , simulating search-and-rescue scenarios in the waters between Yonaguni Island and to improve coordination without formal alliances. These efforts aligned with broader frameworks, including 's participation in U.S.-led exercises like Valiant Shield, which indirectly bolstered regional deterrence applicable to contingencies. Such partnerships yielded measurable economic shifts, with Taiwan's export reliance on China dropping from 43.9% in 2020 to 31.7% in 2024, driven by expanded trade in high-tech goods with the U.S. and amid deliberate diversification policies. This reduction, tracked via official customs data, reflected strengthened integrations that diminished vulnerability to .

Controversies and criticisms

Diplomatic ally losses and policy effectiveness

During Joseph Wu's tenure as Taiwan's foreign minister from February 2018 to December 2023, the country lost at least six formal diplomatic allies to the (PRC), continuing a trend that saw Taiwan's recognitions dwindle from 22 in 2016 to 12 by 2024. These switches included the in June 2018, in December 2018, and in September 2019, in December 2021, and in March 2023. followed in January 2024 shortly after Wu's transition to the , amid PRC offers of economic aid that Taiwan's smaller development assistance packages could not match. Wu's administration defended these losses by emphasizing reallocations from diplomatic expenditures toward targeted Pacific aid programs, such as infrastructure projects in remaining allies like and , yet empirical outcomes showed persistent erosion, particularly in where four switches occurred despite increased Taiwanese investments. To offset formal recognitions, Wu oversaw expansions in Taiwan's "non-diplomatic" international presence, establishing or upgrading over a dozen representative offices in locations including in August 2020, in 2021, and in 2020, contributing to a network exceeding 60 such entities worldwide by 2023. These efforts aimed to sustain substantive ties through trade, cultural exchanges, and unofficial security dialogues, with proponents arguing they provided more resilient platforms than fragile formal alliances vulnerable to PRC "." However, (KMT) lawmakers, representing a right-leaning perspective skeptical of over-reliance on informal networks at the expense of cross-strait stability, criticized Wu's approach as fiscally wasteful, pointing to billions of new Taiwan dollars in to switch-prone allies that yielded no retention benefits and risked provoking Beijing's retaliatory measures. Assessments of policy effectiveness remain mixed, with data indicating no direct causal connection between Taiwan's ally losses and escalated PRC military aggression, such as increased air incursions, which predated and persisted independently of diplomatic shifts. Nonetheless, the pattern underscores limitations in countering China's economically coercive inducements—often involving billions in loans and infrastructure pledges—against Taiwan's constrained budget and global isolation, prompting questions about the long-term viability of prioritizing informal ties over pragmatic engagement strategies favored by KMT critics.

Espionage allegations involving associates

In May 2025, the (DPP) expelled five members accused of spying for the (PRC), including Ho Jen-chieh, a former aide to Joseph Wu during his tenure as foreign minister from 2018 to 2024. The expulsions followed investigations revealing alleged leaks of sensitive information, such as details on Taiwan's diplomatic strategies and internal party discussions, to PRC handlers via encrypted communications. On September 25, 2025, the District Court convicted four former DPP staffers of , sentencing Ho Jen-chieh to eight years and two months in prison for transmitting classified foreign ministry documents to between 2020 and 2023. The other defendants included Huang Chu-jung (10 years), Chiu Shih-yuan (six years and two months), and Wu Shang-yu (four years), who had collectively leaked over 100 documents related to and cross-strait policy. Ho had denied the charges initially but was found to have used a PRC-developed encrypted app for contact with operatives. DPP officials attributed the incidents to sophisticated PRC infiltration efforts, citing the involvement of professional intelligence networks targeting high-level aides. Opposition parties, including the , criticized the DPP's internal security protocols as inadequate, pointing to repeated breaches under Wu's leadership of the foreign ministry and subsequent role, though no charges were filed against Wu himself. These cases underscored vulnerabilities in Taiwan's political apparatus amid heightened PRC activities, with Taiwan's National Security Bureau reporting 64 espionage prosecutions in 2024 alone.

Domestic political opposition

Kuomintang (KMT) lawmakers have repeatedly criticized Joseph Wu for Taiwan's diminishing formal diplomatic allies, attributing losses to policy shortcomings rather than exclusively to Chinese interference. In December 2021, following Nicaragua's switch to recognizing the , KMT legislator I-hsin demanded Wu's resignation, accusing him of incompetence in maintaining relations and escalating with extreme rhetoric calling for atonement through self-sacrifice. Similar rebukes followed earlier defections, such as those of and the in 2019, where KMT figures faulted the DPP's approach for alienating small nations through insufficient economic incentives compared to Beijing's offers. Legislative interrogations have amplified these tensions, with KMT members portraying Wu's defenses as evasive or confrontational. During a 2023 session, when pressed on ongoing ally erosion—Taiwan having lost 10 partners since —Wu's responses were decried as arrogant, intensifying claims that he prioritizes ideological posturing over pragmatic statecraft. KMT critics argue such rhetoric, by rejecting frameworks like the , forecloses dialogue channels, stalling any revival of cross-strait stability and heightening escalation risks without yielding verifiable deterrence enhancements, as Chinese military incursions have surged without offsetting formal alliances for . Public opinion reflects this partisan rift, with surveys showing KMT supporters disproportionately favoring engagement-oriented policies toward , including acceptance of the as a dialogue basis, while DPP backers endorse Wu's firmer line. Despite these domestic attacks, KMT opposition often aligns with broader pro-unification leanings, contrasting DPP emphasis on preservation amid empirical evidence of Beijing's coercive tactics.

Honors, awards, and legacy

Official recognitions

In recognition of his diplomatic efforts, Joseph Wu received the Order of Brilliant Star with Special Grand Cordon from President on May 14, 2024, honoring his leadership as foreign minister amid Taiwan's international challenges. On October 28, 2021, Wu was awarded the Czech Senate President's Silver Medal for contributions to bilateral ties, reflecting strengthened Taiwan-Czech relations in the face of Chinese diplomatic pressure. Earlier in his career, Wu earned the Second Order of the Brilliant Star on May 19, 2004, for service as deputy secretary-general of the Presidential Office.

Impact on Taiwan's security posture

Wu's tenure as foreign minister from May 2018 coincided with Taiwan's push for defense budget expansions, rising from about 2.4% of GDP in 2018 to over 3% by 2025, including a record NT$606.8 billion (approximately ) allocation for 2025 that incorporated expenditures for the first time. These hikes, totaling billions in additional funding over the period, supported priorities such as anti-drone systems, jammers, and kinetic interceptors, alongside reserve force enhancements and guidelines updated in response to threats. Wu's advocacy integrated these domestic reforms with diplomatic efforts to position within security architectures, emphasizing its role in countering regional coercion through partnerships that amplified deterrence without formal alliances. Despite these advances, Taiwan's security posture faced persistent erosion in formal diplomatic recognition, with losses of allies including El Salvador in August 2018, the Solomon Islands and Kiribati in September 2019, Nicaragua in December 2021, and Honduras in March 2023, reducing Taiwan's partners from 17 to 12 by mid-decade and limiting multilateral leverage. China's escalated gray-zone operations—encompassing over 80 documented tactics like undersea cable sabotage, maritime militia incursions, and drone swarms—exposed unresolved vulnerabilities, as Taiwan's responses, including strengthened patrols and identification-shoot protocols, struggled to fully deter incremental pressure without risking escalation. These dynamics underscored partial successes in capability buildup but highlighted dependencies on asymmetric shifts amid Beijing's sustained coercion, prioritizing empirical metrics like incursion frequency over declarative gains. Official Chinese statements framed Wu's initiatives as emblematic of "separatist" provocations doomed to fail, with Taiwan's labeling leaders like Wu and President as irreconcilable advocates whose policies invited unification by force if necessary, while rejecting offers. In Taiwan, public polls reflected credit for preservation, with surveys showing 85% favoring indefinite maintenance despite Xi Jinping's repeated unification imperatives—such as his 2022 congress report and 2023 calls for "peaceful" absorption—amid low approval (under 10%) for unification scenarios, attributing to diplomatic firmness under Wu amid heightened threats. This bipolar assessment—achievements in hardening defenses against invasion risks, tempered by gray-zone and alliance shrinkage—marks Wu's legacy as bolstering without resolving core asymmetries in a deterrence .

Publications and public commentary

Key academic articles

Joseph Wu's early scholarly contributions centered on Taiwan's democratization and its implications for cross-strait stability, often incorporating empirical data on political transitions and U.S. strategic involvement. In "Democratization and " (1996), published in Security Dialogue, Wu analyzes how Taiwan's shift from authoritarian rule to multiparty in the and early generated policy unpredictability, potentially inviting Chinese coercion while complicating U.S. deterrence efforts in the ; he draws on case studies of Taiwan's legislative reforms and economic interdependencies to argue that requires robust external balancing to mitigate authoritarian exploitation. Complementing this, Wu co-authored "Party Identification in a : The Case of " in the Journal of Electoral Studies (1996), utilizing NCCU survey data from the mid-1990s to quantify voter attachments amid Taiwan's third-party emergence, revealing a decline in dominance from over 60% in 1992 to fragmented alignments by 1995, which he interprets as evidence of eroding legacy authoritarian structures without fully resolving identity-based divisions. These peer-reviewed works, grounded in quantitative metrics and historical empirics from Taiwan's reform era, underscore Wu's emphasis on causal links between domestic political liberalization and regional security risks, predating his entry into government advisory roles.

Op-eds and interviews on Taiwan's

In a 2023 interview with The Wire China, Joseph Wu outlined Taiwan's strategy to expand ties with like-minded democratic partners, emphasizing efforts to counteract the People's Republic of 's (PRC) diplomatic isolation tactics, which have reduced Taiwan's formal allies from 23 in 2016 to 12 by 2023. He argued that such outreach preserves Taiwan's by fostering alternative networks, rejecting PRC claims that Taiwan's international participation equates to . Addressing PRC assertiveness, Wu stated in October 2025, as head of Taiwan's , that prioritizes territorial over domestic economic recovery, despite China's GDP growth slowing to around 4.7% in 2024 amid structural challenges like a property crisis and exceeding 15%. He contrasted this with China's , which rose 7.2% to approximately $247 billion in 2025—outpacing official GDP and exceeding SIPRI estimates of actual spending at 1.7% of GDP in 2023—indicating a causal preference for coercion over reform. Wu maintained that Taiwan's asymmetric defense investments, supported by U.S. arms sales totaling $19 billion since 2017, deter aggression without provoking it, grounded in the empirical reality that PRC military exercises have escalated post-2016 despite Taiwan's non-declaration of . Wu has consistently highlighted Taiwanese public sentiment in interviews, asserting that polls show over 80% favor maintaining the —neither formal nor unification—favoring pragmatic cross-strait ties over confrontation, which undercuts media portrayals of inevitable war as deterministic rather than contingent on PRC choices. This stance aligns with data from Taiwan's indicating stable moderate preferences since the , driven by economic incentives and deterrence credibility rather than ideological fervor. Critics, including some PRC-aligned analysts and business lobbies, have labeled Wu's rhetoric hawkish for allegedly minimizing economic interdependencies, such as Taiwan's exports to and comprising 31.7% of total exports in 2024 (down from 42% in 2020 but still exposing vulnerabilities to ). These views contend that emphasizing risks trade disruptions, citing instances like 2022 export controls on semiconductors, though Wu counters that diversification to and the U.S.—now 23.4% of exports—mitigates such risks without conceding to unification demands. Empirical data supports partial feasibility, as Taiwan's overall surplus hit $80.5 billion in 2024, but interdependence persists as a restraint on .