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Cross-strait relations

Cross-strait relations denote the multifaceted interactions—political, economic, military, and cultural—between the People's Republic of China (PRC), which controls mainland China and asserts jurisdiction over all of China, and the Republic of China (ROC), the democratic government administering Taiwan and associated islands across the Taiwan Strait.^[1]^[2] The schism traces to the Chinese Civil War (1927–1949), when Communist victory led to the PRC's proclamation on the mainland in October 1949, forcing the defeated Nationalist forces under the ROC to retreat to Taiwan in December 1949, establishing a de facto division that has endured without resolution.^[1]^[3] Initially, both regimes claimed legitimacy as the sole government of a singular China, but interpretations diverged: the PRC upholds a "One China principle" deeming Taiwan an inseparable province subject to reunification by force if necessary, whereas the ROC, through constitutional provisions and evolving policy, prioritizes parity, reciprocity, and de facto sovereignty over Taiwan amid rejection of Beijing's unification formulas like "one country, two systems."^[4]^[5]^[6] Economic ties have deepened interdependence, facilitating substantial trade and investment flows despite political estrangement and the absence of formal diplomatic recognition.^[1]^[7] Military frictions define the relationship's volatility, highlighted by crises such as the 1954–1955 and 1958 bombardments of ROC-held offshore islands and the 1995–1996 missile tests, which prompted U.S. carrier deployments and underscored deterrence dynamics involving American commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act.^[8]^[9] PRC gray-zone coercion, including frequent air and naval incursions, contrasts with Taiwan's defensive posture and international partnerships, raising global stakes for stability given the strait’s strategic sea lanes and semiconductor supply chains.^[1]^[10]

Background

Political entities and governance systems

The Republic of China (ROC), founded on January 1, 1912, after the Xinhai Revolution overthrew the Qing dynasty, operates as a representative democratic republic governing the Taiwan Area, which encompasses Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu islands.^[11]^[12] This multi-party system features a president elected by direct popular vote every four years, alongside a unicameral Legislative Yuan chosen through proportional representation and single-member districts.^[13] Since the inaugural direct presidential election in 1996, the ROC has experienced multiple peaceful transfers of power between major parties, including the Kuomintang (KMT) and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), consolidating its democratic institutions amid robust civil society participation and judicial independence.^[14]^[15] In opposition, the People's Republic of China (PRC), established on October 1, 1949, by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) following its victory in the Chinese Civil War, functions as a unitary Marxist-Leninist one-party state with absolute CCP dominance over all branches of government.^[16]^[17] The CCP, numbering over 99 million members, centralizes power through its Politburo Standing Committee and General Secretary, who concurrently holds the presidency and military commission chairmanship, ensuring party control supersedes state institutions.^[18] Unlike the ROC, the PRC conducts no competitive national elections, with local congresses serving as rubber-stamp bodies under CCP vetting, lacking mechanisms for genuine opposition or accountability to derive a democratic mandate.^[19] Cross-strait relations hinge on this structural divergence: the ROC's de facto sovereignty manifests in self-governance via electoral legitimacy and adherence to constitutional rule of law, while the PRC pursues irredentist unification under its authority, promoting models like "one country, two systems" that Taiwan authorities reject outright.^[20] Taiwanese officials, across parties, cite the PRC's imposition of Hong Kong's 2020 National Security Law—which curtailed dissent and eroded promised autonomies post-2019 protests—as empirical proof that such frameworks cannot preserve democratic freedoms.^[21]^[1] This rejection, polling near 90% public disapproval in Taiwan, underscores the causal incompatibility between the ROC's empirically verified democratic resilience and the PRC's authoritarian centralism.^[21]

Sovereignty claims and legal frameworks

The Republic of China (ROC) Constitution, promulgated in 1947 and amended subsequently, defines the ROC's sovereign territory as encompassing mainland China, Taiwan, Penghu, and associated islands, asserting jurisdiction over the entire historical domain of China.^[22] Following the ROC government's retreat to Taiwan in December 1949 amid the Chinese Civil War, however, it has maintained effective control exclusively over Taiwan proper and smaller offshore islands like Kinmen and Matsu, administering a population of over 23 million through uninterrupted governance, including regular democratic elections since the 1990s.^[23] This de facto authority, sustained for more than 75 years without PRC interference, aligns with international law principles emphasizing effective control as a core indicator of sovereignty, rather than mere historical assertions.^[24] The ROC traces its legal claim to Taiwan to Allied wartime agreements, notably the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, in which the United States, United Kingdom, and ROC stipulated that Taiwan—then under Japanese rule—would be "restored" to the ROC alongside other territories, a provision reaffirmed in the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945, which called for implementation of Cairo's terms post-Japan's surrender.^[25]^[26] These documents, however, constitute non-binding political declarations of intent rather than treaties conferring sovereignty, and Japan’s 1951 Treaty of San Francisco—formalizing its renunciation of Taiwan—did not explicitly designate a recipient, leaving the island's status undetermined.^[27] Under first-principles evaluation, such ambiguities prioritize Taiwan's sustained self-rule over retroactive interpretations favoring either claimant. In contrast, the People's Republic of China (PRC), proclaimed on October 1, 1949, claims Taiwan as its 23rd province based on purported succession to all Chinese territory, rejecting the ROC's legitimacy and framing any distinct Taiwanese governance as illegitimate separatism.^[28] To codify this stance, the PRC National People's Congress passed the Anti-Secession Law on March 14, 2005, which declares Taiwan an inseparable part of China and authorizes the state to "employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures" if Taiwan formally secedes, if "major incidents" leading to secession occur, or if peaceful reunification becomes impossible.^[29] The law explicitly deems Taiwan's independent referenda or identity assertions as "splittism," prioritizing PRC territorial integrity over Taiwan's empirical autonomy.^[30] United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI), adopted on October 25, 1971, recognized the PRC as the "only legitimate representative of China" and expelled ROC delegates from the UN and its bodies, but the text addresses representation exclusively and contains no provisions on Taiwan's sovereignty or territorial disposition.^[31] This ambiguity underscores that international consensus on "China" does not equate to PRC dominion over Taiwan, particularly given the island's distinct demographic self-determination—evident in its 23 million inhabitants' unchallenged internal governance—and the causal reality that PRC claims rest on zero effective control since inception.^[32] Legal scholars note that Taiwan's status thus hinges on de facto statehood criteria, including defined territory, permanent population, government, and capacity for international relations, rather than unilateral assertions lacking enforcement.^[33]

Historical Development

Pre-1949 origins and civil war

The Xinhai Revolution, erupting on October 10, 1911, with uprisings in Wuchang and spreading to other cities, overthrew the Qing dynasty, which had ruled since 1644, amid widespread discontent over foreign encroachments, internal rebellions, and failed reforms.^[34] The revolutionaries declared the founding of the Republic of China on January 1, 1912, ending over two millennia of imperial rule and establishing a provisional government under Sun Yat-sen, though power quickly shifted to military leader Yuan Shikai.^[35] Yuan's death in 1916 plunged the republic into the Warlord Era, characterized by fragmented control among regional militarists who divided China into competing fiefdoms, exacerbating economic instability and hindering national unification.^[36] The Kuomintang (KMT), founded in 1912 by Sun Yat-sen as a nationalist party advocating republicanism and anti-imperialism, sought to consolidate power amid this chaos. After Sun's death in 1925, Chiang Kai-shek led the Northern Expedition from 1926 to 1928, a military campaign by the National Revolutionary Army that defeated major warlord alliances and nominally unified China under KMT control by June 1928, establishing Nanjing as the capital.^[37] This unification, however, remained incomplete, as peripheral warlords retained de facto autonomy, and the KMT prioritized urban industrialization and centralized authority over rural reforms.^[38] Ideological tensions emerged with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), founded in July 1921 in Shanghai as a Marxist study group influenced by the Soviet Union, which initially allied with the KMT in the First United Front (1924–1927) but advocated class struggle and proletarian revolution against the KMT's nationalist framework.^[16] The CCP, purged by Chiang in the 1927 Shanghai Massacre, survived through rural insurgency, establishing base areas like Jiangxi Soviet where it implemented land redistribution to mobilize peasants against landlord exploitation, contrasting the KMT's urban focus and alliances with elites. The 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria and full-scale Second Sino-Japanese War from July 1937 prompted the Second United Front, a nominal KMT-CCP alliance against Japan, formalized after the Xi'an Incident in December 1936, during which CCP forces expanded in northern rural regions while KMT bore the brunt of conventional warfare.^[39] This cooperation fractured post-1945 Japanese surrender, as mutual distrust and competing claims to authority reignited hostilities; a U.S.-brokered truce in January 1946 collapsed amid skirmishes.^[40] The Chinese Civil War (1946–1949) saw the CCP leverage peasant support through aggressive land reforms that redistributed property from gentry to tenants, eroding KMT legitimacy in rural areas where over 80% of the population resided, while KMT forces suffered from hyperinflation—reaching 2,178% annually by 1948—endemic corruption, and low morale that led to desertions and intelligence failures.^[16] CCP guerrilla tactics and People's Liberation Army offensives, such as the Liaoshen and Huaihai campaigns in 1948, captured key cities and KMT arsenies, culminating in the capture of Nanjing on April 23, 1949. Chiang Kai-shek and remaining Republic of China (ROC) forces retreated to Taiwan in December 1949, relocating the capital to Taipei on December 8 amid naval evacuations of over 2 million soldiers, officials, and civilians.^[41] This divide entrenched the KMT-CCP rivalry, rooted in irreconcilable visions of governance—authoritarian nationalism versus communist collectivism—setting the stage for cross-strait separation.^[11]

1949–1979: Military confrontation and global realignments

Following the retreat of the Republic of China (ROC) government to Taiwan in December 1949 after defeats in the Chinese Civil War, the People's Republic of China (PRC) consolidated control over the mainland and prepared amphibious invasion plans against Taiwan, amassing over 100,000 troops and naval assets in Fujian province by mid-1950.^[41]^[42] These plans were disrupted by the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, which diverted PRC resources northward, with Mao Zedong committing up to 1.35 million troops to Korea by late 1950.^[43] On June 27, 1950, U.S. President Harry Truman ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait to neutralize it, preventing both PRC attacks on Taiwan and ROC counteroffensives against the mainland, thereby establishing a de facto military stalemate.^[44] This intervention, sustained through U.S. arms supplies and the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, maintained rough military parity in the strait, with ROC forces holding advantages in naval and air capabilities bolstered by American support, countering narratives of PRC inevitability through empirical deterrence rather than mainland demographic superiority alone.^[45] The period saw direct military confrontations over ROC-held offshore islands, notably Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu, which both sides viewed as gateways to Taiwan proper. In the First Taiwan Strait Crisis (September 1954–May 1955), PRC forces initiated artillery barrages on Kinmen and seized the Yijiangshan Islands, prompting U.S. deployment of carrier groups and congressional authorization for presidential use of force to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores, though not explicitly the outlying islands; the crisis subsided after tacit U.S. nuclear signaling and a PRC ceasefire.^[45] The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis erupted on August 23, 1958, with PRC shelling of Kinmen exceeding 400,000 rounds in initial days, aiming to interdict ROC resupply and test U.S. resolve; U.S. resupply airlifts succeeded, and PRC bombardment tapered by October amid Soviet hesitancy on nuclear escalation, preserving ROC control without full-scale invasion.^[45]^[8] Throughout, neither regime recognized the other's legitimacy, with the ROC asserting sole sovereignty over all China under its "Free China" constitutional framework and the PRC denouncing it as a U.S. puppet, fostering a tense equilibrium reliant on offshore island defenses.^[46] Global realignments eroded ROC diplomatic standing despite persistent military claims. The ROC retained its United Nations seat as representative of China until October 25, 1971, when UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 expelled it in favor of the PRC by a 76–35 vote, reflecting shifting Cold War alliances toward Beijing.^[47] U.S. President Richard Nixon's visit to China from February 21–28, 1972, culminated in the Shanghai Communiqué, acknowledging the PRC's position that Taiwan was part of China while affirming U.S. withdrawal intentions, signaling a pivot from containment.^[48] This culminated in U.S. derecognition of the ROC on January 1, 1979, establishing full relations with the PRC, though the concurrent Taiwan Relations Act mandated continued arms sales to Taiwan for self-defense, underscoring causal U.S. strategic hedging amid superpower détente.^[49]^[50]

1979–1987: Internal reforms and policy pivots

Following the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) on January 1, 1979, the U.S. Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) on April 10, 1979, which authorized the provision of defensive arms to Taiwan and required the U.S. president to maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force or coercion that would jeopardize Taiwan's security.^[51]^[52] This legislation responded to the termination of formal U.S.-Republic of China (ROC) ties, aiming to preserve de facto relations through unofficial channels like the American Institute in Taiwan. Concurrently, the PRC issued its "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan" on the same day, January 1, 1979, advocating peaceful reunification, cessation of the Chinese Civil War, and an end to artillery shelling of Kinmen and Matsu islands, while calling for negotiations on unity under socialist principles.^[53] However, the message retained the PRC's longstanding position that force remained an option should peaceful efforts fail, signaling a rhetorical pivot from active confrontation without abandoning unification by compulsion.^[54] The U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué of January 1, 1979, acknowledged the PRC's view of a single China without explicitly endorsing Taiwan's inclusion, while the August 17, 1982, Communiqué addressed ongoing tensions over U.S. arms sales, with the U.S. stating an intent to gradually reduce such transfers to zero upon signs of peaceful PRC progress toward Taiwan, though without enforceable timelines or PRC renunciation of force.^[55]^[56] These documents reflected mutual accommodations: the PRC tempered immediate military threats in line with its post-Mao shift away from exporting revolution, prioritizing internal stability, but preserved doctrinal flexibility for coercion.^[57] No direct cross-strait official contacts occurred during this period, with interactions limited to indirect proxies such as third-country intermediaries or unofficial business channels, foreshadowing later semi-official mechanisms.^[58] In the PRC, Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms, initiated at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in December 1978, emphasized pragmatic development over ideological orthodoxy, de-emphasizing global revolutionary export in favor of domestic modernization.^[57] Yet on Taiwan, Deng proposed "one country, two systems" as early as January 1979, envisioning Taiwan's retention of capitalist autonomy and military under PRC sovereignty, a formula reiterated in the early 1980s but rejected by the ROC as infringing sovereignty. This approach contrasted with rigid unification demands, though it did not preclude force, maintaining pressure amid Taiwan's isolation.^[57] On Taiwan, President Chiang Ching-kuo, succeeding his father in 1978, pursued incremental internal liberalization amid domestic pressures from intellectuals, the Tangwai (non-Kuomintang) movement, and generational shifts within the Kuomintang. Key steps included permitting limited opposition publications and electoral participation by the mid-1980s, culminating in tolerance of the Democratic Progressive Party's formation in September 1986 despite formal bans, and the lifting of martial law on July 15, 1987, after 38 years, which replaced it with the National Security Law.^[59] These reforms, driven by recognition of authoritarian unsustainability and economic success fostering demands for political openness, prioritized domestic stability over cross-strait engagement, enabling future policy flexibility without conceding to PRC overtures.^[60]

1987–2000: Democratization, dialogues, and early tensions

In 1987, President Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law in Taiwan, which had been in effect since 1949, enabling the legalization of opposition parties such as the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and greater press freedoms.^[61]^[62] This reform, enacted on July 15, marked the onset of Taiwan's democratization, allowing public discourse on identity and governance previously suppressed under Kuomintang (KMT) authoritarian rule.^[63] Following Chiang's death in January 1988, Vice President Lee Teng-hui, the first Taiwan-born leader, assumed the presidency and pursued policies of localization, or "Taiwanization," emphasizing Taiwanese cultural and historical distinctiveness over pan-Chinese narratives tied to the mainland.^[64]^[65] These shifts fostered growing public identification with Taiwan as a separate entity, evidenced by surveys showing a decline in self-identification as "Chinese" from over 70% in the early 1990s to around 50% by 2000, correlating with expanded democratic participation.^[66] The People's Republic of China (PRC) interpreted these developments as threats to its "one China" principle, prioritizing coercive responses over substantive negotiation despite occasional cross-strait dialogues. In 1992, representatives from Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and the PRC's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) held talks in Hong Kong, yielding the "1992 Consensus," an informal understanding that both sides affirm "one China" but hold differing interpretations of its meaning—Taiwan allowing flexibility for its de facto sovereignty, while the PRC insisted on eventual unification under its authority.^[67]^[68] This ambiguity facilitated the first high-level semi-official meeting, the Koo-Wang talks, held April 27–29, 1993, in Singapore between Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) Chairman Koo Chen-fu and ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan; the sessions addressed economic ties, postal agreements, and document authentication but deferred core political disputes, producing four joint protocols without resolving sovereignty issues.^[69]^[70] Tensions escalated when Lee Teng-hui visited Cornell University in June 1995, his alma mater, prompting the PRC to launch ballistic missile tests into waters near Taiwan—six in July–August 1995, followed by additional tests and live-fire exercises in March 1996—aimed at intimidating voters ahead of Taiwan's first direct presidential election on March 23, 1996.^[9]^[71] The United States responded by deploying two aircraft carrier battle groups, including the USS Independence, signaling deterrence without direct confrontation.^[9] Despite the coercion, Lee secured 54% of the vote in the election, with turnout at 76%, demonstrating the ineffectiveness of PRC military pressure in halting Taiwan's democratic consolidation or global engagements, as Lee's subsequent policies continued outreach to international forums.^[72]^[73] This period underscored the PRC's reliance on intimidation, which empirically failed to reverse Taiwan's identity-driven political evolution, while dialogues like Koo-Wang remained limited to functional issues amid unresolved sovereignty clashes.^[9]^[71] ![USS Independence during Taiwan Strait Crisis](./assets/USS_Independence_CV-62

2000–2008: Heightened political confrontations

The election of Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as president on March 18, 2000, marked the first transfer of power from the Kuomintang to an opposition party, with Chen securing 39.3 percent of the vote amid a fragmented field.^[74] The PRC responded by suspending cross-strait semi-official talks through the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), viewing the DPP's historical advocacy for Taiwan's distinct identity as a threat to unification under the "one China" principle.^[75] In his inaugural address, Chen pledged the "five no's"—no declaration of independence, no change to the national title of Republic of China, no inclusion of independence in the constitution, no promotion of independence via referenda, and no abolition of the National Unification Guidelines—but the PRC conditioned dialogue on the DPP explicitly renouncing Taiwan independence, leading to a diplomatic freeze that highlighted Beijing's unwillingness to engage non-unificationist administrations.^[76] Tensions escalated with Chen's December 31, 2002, year-end speech articulating a "one country on each side" framework, prompting the PRC to reiterate in official statements that it would not rule out non-peaceful means to prevent formal secession.^[77] This rhetoric culminated in the March 14, 2005, adoption of the Anti-Secession Law by the National People's Congress with unanimous support (2,896 votes in favor), which codified the PRC's authority to employ "non-peaceful means" against Taiwan independence activities, major secessionist incidents, or peaceful reunification becoming impossible, directly targeting perceived DPP provocations like Chen's push for a 2004 defensive referendum on China's missile deployments.^[78] The law's passage, amid Chen's re-election in March 2004, underscored Beijing's strategy of legalizing coercive threats to deter sovereignty assertions, rather than pursuing mutual accommodation. PRC efforts to isolate Taiwan diplomatically included blocking annual UN membership bids under names like "Taiwan" or "Republic of China (Taiwan)," with the General Committee rejecting Taiwan's 2007 proposal outright, citing UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 as affirming the one-China policy.^[79] Economically, Beijing attempted targeted coercion, such as pressuring mainland firms to shun pro-DPP Taiwanese businesses and imposing selective bans on agricultural imports, yet these measures failed to alter cross-strait dynamics, as bilateral trade volume expanded from approximately $32 billion in 2000 to over $130 billion by 2008, driven by Taiwan's manufacturing investments in China despite political frictions.^[80] U.S. arms sales notifications, including a $5 billion package in 2001 for Kidd-class destroyers and other systems, provoked PRC diplomatic protests and vows of retaliation, exacerbating trilateral tensions without yielding concessions from Washington or Taipei.^[81] Domestically, corruption allegations against Chen and his family, surfacing prominently from 2006 onward—involving embezzlement of special presidential funds and overseas money laundering—culminated in his post-term indictment in 2008 and life imprisonment conviction in 2009, severely undermining his administration's legitimacy and fueling opposition-led protests.^[82] However, these scandals did not prompt shifts in Taiwan's sovereignty posture, as Chen persisted with identity-affirming policies like educational reforms emphasizing Taiwanese history, further entrenching PRC perceptions of DPP rule as inherently separatist and justifying sustained coercive postures over eight years of minimal official engagement.^[83]

2008–2016: Economic rapprochement and cross-party divides

Upon taking office in May 2008 following the Kuomintang's (KMT) presidential victory, Ma Ying-jeou articulated a cross-strait policy centered on the "Three No's": no pursuit of unification with the People's Republic of China (PRC), no declaration of formal Taiwan independence, and no use of force in resolving disputes.^[84] ^[85] This framework aimed to foster economic and cultural exchanges while maintaining Taiwan's de facto autonomy, contrasting with the prior Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration's confrontational stance. Early initiatives included the inauguration of direct charter flights on July 4, 2008, ending a 59-year prohibition and facilitating weekend travel between major cities like Taipei and Shanghai.^[86] ^[87] Regular direct flights, sea transport, and postal links followed in December 2008, reducing transit times and costs for business and limited tourism.^[88] The cornerstone of rapprochement was the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), signed on June 29, 2010, and implemented in September, which reduced tariffs on select goods and services to institutionalize trade liberalization.^[89] Cross-strait trade volume expanded rapidly, reaching $124 billion in 2013—up from approximately $100 billion in 2008—and continuing to grow toward $170 billion by 2015, with Taiwan exporting electronics, machinery, and petrochemicals while importing raw materials from the PRC.^[90] Chinese tourist arrivals to Taiwan surged from 329,000 in 2008 to 1.6 million in 2010 and peaking at 4.2 million in 2015, injecting billions into Taiwan's service sector and offsetting declines in other international visitors.^[91] ^[92] These ties enhanced Taiwan's economic growth, with ECFA credited for averting marginalization in regional supply chains, yet they deepened structural dependencies, as the PRC became Taiwan's largest trading partner, accounting for over 40% of exports by volume.^[90] Partisan divides intensified over the policy's implications, with the KMT emphasizing mutual prosperity and stability under the "1992 Consensus"—a tacit agreement on "one China" with differing interpretations—while the DPP warned of asymmetric vulnerabilities and PRC leverage through economic inducements.^[93] Beijing's approach aligned with its united front strategy, promoting integration as a pathway to political unification by fostering interdependence that could erode Taiwan's distinct identity over time, though Ma's administration framed it as pragmatic diplomacy without conceding sovereignty.^[94] Tensions culminated in the Sunflower Movement from March 18 to April 10, 2014, when students and civic groups occupied Taiwan's legislature for 24 days, protesting the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) negotiated via semi-official channels.^[95] Critics argued the deal, intended to open 64 Taiwanese service sectors to PRC firms, was rushed without legislative review, risking job losses in vulnerable industries and enabling economic coercion to advance assimilation goals; the occupation halted ratification, galvanizing youth-led resistance to perceived over-reliance on China-centric growth.^[96] ^[97] The period's symbolic apex was the November 7, 2015, summit in Singapore between Ma and PRC President Xi Jinping—the first meeting of leaders from both sides since 1949—featuring an 80-second handshake and reaffirmation of the 1992 Consensus but yielding no substantive political agreements beyond a proposed communication hotline.^[98] ^[99] While hailed by proponents as stabilizing ties amid economic gains, the encounter underscored rapprochement's limits: Beijing insisted on unification preconditions, exposing how economic overtures masked enduring sovereignty disputes and cross-party rifts that prioritized Taiwan's democratic safeguards over deepening integration.^[100]^[94]

2016–present: Identity assertion, coercion, and military escalations

Following the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) victory in the January 2016 Taiwanese presidential election, with Tsai Ing-wen assuming office on May 20, Beijing suspended official cross-strait communication channels, including those between the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits and Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, citing Tsai's refusal to endorse the "1992 Consensus"—a framework implying "one China" with differing interpretations—as evidence of support for independence.^[1]^[101] In response, the People's Republic of China (PRC) imposed economic sanctions, such as halting group tourism from the mainland to Taiwan—previously over 4 million visitors annually—and restricting imports of Taiwanese goods like pineapples and wax apples, actions framed by Beijing as countermeasures to "separatist" activities but resulting in measurable losses for Taiwanese agriculture and tourism sectors.^[1]^[102] These measures coincided with intensified diplomatic isolation efforts, exemplified by Nauru's severance of ties with Taiwan on January 15, 2024, in favor of recognizing the PRC, reducing Taiwan's formal allies to 12.^[103]^[104] Tsai's successor, Lai Ching-te, took office on May 20, 2024, after winning the presidency in January with a platform emphasizing Taiwan's distinct identity and democratic sovereignty, prompting Beijing to launch "Joint Sword-2024A" exercises three days later, involving 111 People's Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft and 46 naval vessels encircling Taiwan and simulating blockades of key ports.^[105]^[106] The drills, which included live-fire components and integrated China Coast Guard vessels, marked an escalation in scale and proximity compared to prior operations, with PLA forces crossing the Taiwan Strait median line multiple times and approaching within 40 nautical miles of Taiwan's coast.^[107] Similar exercises followed, such as "Joint Sword-2024B" in October 2024 after Lai's National Day speech, and "Strait Thunder-2025A" in April 2025, incorporating rehearsal of precision strikes and anti-submarine warfare to assert dominance over the strait.^[108]^[109] Complementing these overt drills, the PRC has employed persistent gray-zone coercion through air incursions into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), with PLA aircraft detections rising from fewer than 400 annually pre-2016 to 1,737 in 2022 and exceeding 4,000 in the first nine months of 2025 alone, normalizing median-line crossings and straining Taiwan's air force response capacity.^[110]^[111] These tactics, often involving fighter jets and bombers without entering sovereign airspace, aim to erode Taiwan's deterrence posture without triggering full conflict, while Taiwan has countered with U.S. arms acquisitions continuing seamlessly under both Trump and Biden administrations, including over $18 billion in sales during Trump's term and subsequent packages like $387 million in November 2024 for radar systems.^[112]^[113] On October 25, 2025—marking the 80th anniversary of Taiwan's post-World War II return from Japanese rule—the PRC National People's Congress ratified October 25 as "Commemoration Day of Taiwan's Restoration," with official statements underscoring Taiwan's inseparability from China and reserving the right to use force against "separatists," as articulated by Wang Huning, reinforcing Beijing's unification narrative amid ongoing military posturing.^[114]^[115] This declaration, coupled with prior commemorations emphasizing over 35 million Chinese casualties in the war against Japan, frames Taiwan's governance as illegitimate occupation, justifying coercive measures irrespective of Taiwan's internal political choices.^[116]^[117]

Communication Channels

Semi-official institutions (SEF and ARATS)

The Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) was established on 9 March 1991 by the Taiwanese government to manage technical, business, and practical cross-strait matters, functioning as a semi-official proxy to facilitate dialogue without formal diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC).^[118] ^[119] The Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) was founded on 16 December 1991 by the PRC's Taiwan Affairs Office as its counterpart, similarly handling operational issues such as document authentication, repatriation of remains, and verification of legal certificates to enable limited cross-strait exchanges.^[120] ^[121] These institutions emerged from the "three links" (mail, transport, trade) discussions initiated in the late 1980s, serving as non-governmental facades for government-directed talks amid mutual non-recognition of sovereignty.^[119] SEF and ARATS negotiated key functional agreements, including the 1993 protocol on certificate verification, which streamlined authentication of documents like marriage registrations and business contracts across the strait, reducing bureaucratic hurdles for civil exchanges.^[121] They also addressed fisheries disputes through mechanisms for incident reporting, aftermath assistance, and maritime rescue coordination, handling cases of boat collisions or captures in contested waters without resolving underlying territorial claims.^[122] High-level meetings peaked during Taiwan's Ma Ying-jeou administration (2008–2016), with the last significant SEF-ARATS talks occurring in November 2015 between SEF Vice Chairman Shih Hui-fen and ARATS Executive Vice Chairman Zheng Lizhong, focusing on trade agreement implementation but yielding no new breakthroughs amid domestic opposition in Taiwan.^[123] Following the election of President Tsai Ing-wen on 20 January 2016 and her inauguration on 20 May 2016, the PRC suspended official SEF-ARATS communications on 25 June 2016, citing Tsai's inaugural address as insufficiently affirming the 1992 Consensus—a vague understanding from 1992 talks interpreted by Beijing as Taiwan's acceptance of "one China" under PRC terms.^[124] ^[125] This freeze halted structured dialogues, with no high-level meetings resuming by October 2025, as the PRC conditioned engagement on Taiwan's explicit endorsement of its political preconditions, effectively prioritizing ideological alignment over pragmatic issue resolution.^[122] ^[126] Despite the institutional standstill, ad hoc contacts persisted for urgent, non-political matters, such as verifying stranded individuals' documents during the COVID-19 pandemic or mediating fisheries incidents involving detained vessels, underscoring the channels' utility for low-stakes operational needs but their vulnerability to broader political tensions.^[122] SEF maintained its mandate for fisheries management, including assistance in cross-strait boat accidents and dispute notifications, though without formal ARATS reciprocity in high-level forums.^[122] The suspension highlights the PRC's strategic use of these mechanisms as leverage, linking routine cooperation to demands for Taiwan's deference on sovereignty, rather than treating them as insulated from geopolitical disputes.^[127]

Unofficial and backchannel mechanisms

Unofficial mechanisms in cross-strait relations encompass track-two diplomacy, involving non-governmental actors such as academics, think tanks, former officials, and business representatives, which have historically provided indirect avenues for dialogue when official channels falter. These forums, including cross-strait economic symposia and academic conferences, aim to build understanding but lack binding authority and have dwindled since 2016 amid Beijing's insistence on the "1992 Consensus" as a prerequisite for engagement.^[1] For instance, interactions through platforms like the Straits Forum, initially launched in 2010 to foster grassroots ties, have been leveraged more for Beijing's narrative promotion than mutual de-escalation, with participation from Taiwanese opposition figures but boycotts by ruling Democratic Progressive Party affiliates post-2016. Third-party involvement, particularly by the United States, has supplemented these channels as informal backdoors for messaging, with Washington relaying concerns between Taipei and Beijing to avert miscalculations, as seen in U.S. diplomatic interventions during heightened tensions. Japan has contributed through trilateral security dialogues with the U.S. and Taiwan, emphasizing regional stability over direct mediation, though these focus primarily on deterrence rather than reconciliation.^[128] ^[129] Empirical evidence of fragility emerged in the 2020s, when existing hotlines—including military and ministerial lines—remained dormant, failing to mitigate escalations like the People's Republic of China's (PRC) August 2022 military drills encircling Taiwan after U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit, which involved over 100 aircraft and 11 warships crossing the median line without prior de-escalatory contact.^[130] ^[1] Beijing has systematically utilized unofficial channels for intelligence gathering and influence operations, deploying united front networks to infiltrate Taiwanese business, academic, and political circles, often prioritizing subversion over crisis prevention. U.S. congressional reports detail how PRC intelligence agencies exploit these ties, recruiting agents and amplifying pro-unification narratives, with over 100 documented cases of espionage via business fronts between 2017 and 2023.^[131] ^[132] Cyber dimensions extend this coercion, with PRC-affiliated hackers conducting thousands of attacks annually on Taiwanese infrastructure and election systems, as reported by Taiwan's National Security Bureau, including disinformation floods during the 2024 presidential vote to erode trust in democratic institutions without triggering overt conflict.^[133] Such tactics reveal the mechanisms' asymmetric utility, enabling Beijing's gray-zone pressure while official suspensions heighten inadvertent escalation risks, as no empirical instances demonstrate sustained de-tensioning through these routes since the mid-2010s.^[134]

Economic Ties and Vulnerabilities

Trade dependencies and key industries

Cross-strait trade volume reached US$267.8 billion in 2023, with Taiwan's exports to the mainland comprising a significant portion dominated by high-technology products such as integrated circuits and electronic components.^[135] Taiwan's semiconductor industry, led by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), maintains a commanding position in global advanced chip production, accounting for over 60% of the foundry market share in 2024 and producing the majority of the world's most sophisticated nodes below 7 nanometers.^[136] This asymmetry underscores Taiwan's leverage, as the People's Republic of China (PRC) remains heavily reliant on Taiwanese chips for its technology sector, importing billions in semiconductors annually despite domestic efforts toward self-sufficiency that have yet to close the capability gap.^[137] Semiconductors represent approximately 12% of Taiwan's total exports and 8% of its GDP, with cross-strait channels forming a critical conduit, though PRC restrictions on advanced technology transfers limit reciprocal high-end flows.^[138] The PRC's share of Taiwan's exports, including Hong Kong, stood at 31.7% in 2024, down 12.2 percentage points from its 2020 peak, reflecting a structural decline driven by global supply chain shifts and reduced demand for intermediate goods amid PRC economic slowdowns.^[139] Taiwan's exports to the mainland fell 18.1% year-on-year in 2023, continuing a trend of decoupling in lower-value segments while high-tech exports persist due to the PRC's technological dependencies.^[140] This imbalance challenges narratives of symmetric interdependence, as the PRC has weaponized trade through targeted bans, such as the March 2021 suspension of Taiwanese pineapple imports—citing pest concerns rejected by Taiwanese authorities—resulting in the loss of a market that absorbed over 90% of Taiwan's pineapple output and exemplifying coercion rather than mutual economic gain.^[141] Such measures have prompted short-term disruptions but highlighted Taiwan's capacity to redirect agricultural exports, with empirical data showing limited long-term damage from isolated actions.^[142] Taiwan's cumulative approved investments in the PRC totaled US$206.37 billion across 45,523 cases as of 2023, concentrated in manufacturing and exposing assets to risks of expropriation or operational interference in a potential conflict scenario.^[143] These outflows, peaking earlier but declining sharply to 7.5% of Taiwan's total overseas investment in 2024, embed vulnerabilities in cross-strait economic ties, where PRC regulatory opacity and political leverage could enable asset freezes or seizures, amplifying Taiwan's exposure beyond trade flows.^[144] Key industries like electronics assembly in the PRC rely on Taiwanese capital and expertise, yet this integration facilitates PRC coercion tactics, as evidenced by periodic investment curbs and inspections that disrupt operations without equivalent reciprocity.^[145]

Investment patterns and supply chain risks

Taiwanese firms have directed substantial foreign direct investment (FDI) toward mainland China since the early 1990s, accumulating over US$200 billion cumulatively by the mid-2010s, with continued flows despite geopolitical tensions.^[146] This pattern reflects cost advantages in labor and scale, exemplified by Hon Hai Precision Industry (Foxconn), which operates massive facilities like the Zhengzhou "iPhone City" complex, employing hundreds of thousands and assembling a significant portion of global consumer electronics.^[147] Foxconn's 2024 announcement of a US$138 million headquarters investment in Zhengzhou underscores ongoing commitments, even as diversification pressures mount.^[147] Such investments create economic hooks that the People's Republic of China (PRC) leverages in its united front strategy to foster dependence and political influence, potentially constraining Taiwan's strategic autonomy during crises. In contrast, PRC outbound FDI to Taiwan remains severely restricted by Taiwanese regulations prioritizing national security, with approvals limited to non-sensitive sectors. In 2023, Taiwan approved just 30 cases of mainland Chinese investment totaling US$29.7 million, rising modestly to US$297 million across 36 cases in 2024—figures dwarfed by Taiwanese outflows and reflecting political scrutiny over technology transfer risks.^[148]^[149] These barriers stem from concerns that PRC capital could serve as a conduit for influence operations, aligning with causal patterns where economic inflows amplify coercion potential without reciprocal openness. Supply chain vulnerabilities amplify these investment asymmetries, particularly in critical materials and high-tech manufacturing. China controls approximately 70% of global rare earth mining and 90% of processing, creating chokepoints for Taiwan's electronics and defense industries reliant on these elements for magnets and alloys.^[150] Conversely, Taiwan dominates advanced semiconductor production, holding about 68% of global foundry capacity for nodes below 10nm as of 2023, with Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) underpinning over 90% of the world's most sophisticated chips.^[151] This concentration exposes global supply chains to cross-strait disruption risks, as a conflict could halt output, causing economic losses estimated in trillions.^[152] The US-China technology competition from 2022 onward has accelerated Taiwan's supply chain resilience efforts, prompting "friend-shoring" to allied nations. US export controls on advanced chips and equipment have driven Taiwanese firms, including TSMC, to expand fabs in the US (e.g., Arizona facilities) and Japan, reducing China exposure while mitigating coercion risks from over-reliance on PRC markets and inputs.^[153]^[154] These shifts, including subsidies under the US CHIPS Act, reflect empirical responses to PRC export restrictions and gray-zone tactics, though full decoupling remains impractical given entrenched interdependencies.^[155]

Diversification strategies and decoupling attempts

Taiwan's government initiated the New Southbound Policy (NSP) in 2016 to reduce economic dependence on the People's Republic of China (PRC) by fostering trade, investment, and people-to-people ties with 18 countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Australia, and New Zealand.^[156] The policy has yielded measurable gains, including a 29% year-over-year increase in bilateral trade with India from 2023 to 2024, pushing total trade volume above US$10 billion for the first time.^[157] Trade with ASEAN nations has also expanded, with Taiwanese investments and exports in sectors like semiconductors and manufacturing rising amid efforts to integrate Taiwan into regional supply chains.^[158] Private sector responses have accelerated under the "China Plus One" framework, where companies seek alternative production bases to mitigate PRC coercion and geopolitical risks. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), for instance, has committed over US$100 billion to new fabrication plants in the United States and Japan, including facilities in Arizona and Kumamoto, to diversify advanced chip production away from Taiwan and PRC-adjacent vulnerabilities.^[159]^[160] This aligns with broader trends, as 23% of surveyed foreign firms in Taiwan reported relocating operations from the PRC over the past five years, driven by supply chain resilience concerns.^[161] Government measures have supported these shifts through targeted incentives, such as the July 2025 cabinet-approved package aiming to attract NT$1.2 trillion in domestic investment and generate 80,000 jobs via tax breaks and subsidies for relocating high-tech and manufacturing facilities to Taiwan.^[162] In response to anticipated U.S. tariffs under the incoming Trump administration, Taiwanese authorities pledged assistance for firms moving production from the PRC, emphasizing derisking without full severance.^[163] Progress remains partial, however, as the PRC continues to dominate Taiwan's trade profile despite diversification rhetoric challenging narratives of inevitable economic integration. Exports to the mainland reached US$96.8 billion in 2024, comprising 20.4% of Taiwan's total, though the combined share with Hong Kong fell to a 23-year low of 31.7%, with the U.S. emerging as the top destination at 23.5%.^[164]^[165] Taiwanese firms predominantly pursue diversification over outright decoupling, retaining PRC operations for cost efficiencies while hedging risks through NSP-aligned expansions.^[166]

Military Dynamics

PRC capabilities buildup and gray-zone operations

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone rapid modernization since the early 2010s, with investments prioritizing capabilities for cross-strait power projection, including an expanding carrier fleet and advanced missile systems that exceed defensive requirements against regional threats. By 2025, the PLA Navy operates two conventionally powered aircraft carriers, Liaoning and Shandong, while the electromagnetic catapult-equipped Fujian completed sea trials and is slated for commissioning by late 2025, enabling sustained operations in the Taiwan Strait and beyond.^[167]^[168] Hypersonic weapons, such as the DF-17 glide vehicle and new anti-ship variants displayed in 2025 parades, provide maneuverable strike options against naval targets, enhancing the PLA's ability to contest sea control in contested areas like the Taiwan Strait.^[169] These developments, funded at levels supporting a battle force growth to 395 ships by 2025, indicate preparations for offensive scenarios rather than mere deterrence, as the scale targets Taiwan's geographic isolation.^[170] Gray-zone operations have intensified, involving persistent PLA Air Force incursions into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), exceeding 4,000 detections from January to September 2025 alone—more than double annual totals from prior years—and normalizing over 200 sorties monthly.^[111]^[171] China Coast Guard vessels have encroached on waters near outlying Taiwanese islands like Kinmen and Pratas, with patrols launched in May 2024 and February 2025 to assert de facto control without kinetic escalation.^[172] Cyber intrusions, primarily attributed to PRC state actors, doubled to an average of 2.4 million daily attacks on Taiwanese government systems in 2024, rising another 17% in 2025, often coinciding with political events to probe defenses and sow disruption.^[173]^[174] Large-scale drills have simulated blockade scenarios, such as the "Joint Sword-2024B" exercise in April 2025, which encircled Taiwan with joint army, navy, air, and rocket force units practicing port seizures and sea assaults.^[175] The "Strait Thunder-2025A" followed in early 2025, integrating coast guard assets under PLA command to rehearse comprehensive isolation tactics.^[109] These non-kinetic pressures erode Taiwan's operational freedom while avoiding thresholds for full conflict, aligning with PRC doctrine emphasizing "winning without fighting" through graduated coercion.^[176] Internal PLA purges underscore reliability challenges amid this buildup, with nine senior generals expelled in October 2025 for corruption, including key Rocket Force figures like Wang Houbin, amid broader shake-ups originating in 2023 graft probes.^[177]^[178] These dismissals, the largest since the Mao era, reveal systemic issues in command loyalty and equipment integrity—such as missile silo malfunctions tied to embezzlement—potentially undermining operational readiness for high-stakes contingencies despite outward force expansion.^[179]^[180]

Taiwan's asymmetric defense and fortifications

Taiwan's defense posture has increasingly emphasized asymmetric capabilities under the Overall Defense Concept (ODC), adopted in 2017, which prioritizes cost-effective, survivable systems to impose prohibitive costs on a numerically superior adversary during the initial phases of a conflict. This "porcupine strategy" leverages Taiwan's terrain, littoral waters, and technological edges through mobile anti-ship missiles, anti-tank weapons, unmanned systems, and enhanced reserves, rather than pursuing expensive symmetric platforms like additional fighter jets or large surface combatants.^[181]^[182]^[183] Key procurements include U.S.-supplied FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank guided missiles, integrated into infantry units for denying beachheads and urban advances, with deliveries commencing under Foreign Military Sales notifications dating back to 2019 and ongoing training exercises demonstrating their operationalization. Anti-ship capabilities are bolstered by AGM-84 Harpoon missiles, with the first batch of ground-launched systems expected to arrive by late 2025, enabling coastal batteries to target amphibious forces from dispersed positions.^[184]^[185] Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) form a cornerstone, with Taiwan unveiling indigenous models like the Teng Yun reconnaissance drone and Chien Hsiang loitering munition in August 2025, designed for rapid production and swarm tactics; the Ministry of National Defense plans to acquire nearly 50,000 UAVs over two years, treating them as expendable munitions akin to artillery shells.^[186]^[187] Sea drones, inspired by Ukraine's Black Sea operations, are under development for harbor denial and surveillance.^[188] Reserve forces have been expanded through structural reforms, including the extension of compulsory military service to one year starting in 2024 for men born after 2005, coupled with new training regimens emphasizing asymmetric skills like drone operation and missile defense; these measures aim to create a robust citizen-soldier base capable of rapid mobilization, with annual Han Kuang exercises incorporating reservists in scenarios simulating invasion repulsion.^[189] Fortifications on outlying islands such as Kinmen and Matsu, positioned mere kilometers from mainland China, include extensive Cold War-era tunnel networks, bunkers, and artillery emplacements, modernized with anti-landing mines, concrete barriers, and sensor arrays to channel attackers into kill zones; these static defenses complement mobile assets, with Kinmen's 10-kilometer proximity to Xiamen enabling preemptive fires but exposing positions to saturation strikes, prompting investments in hardened command posts and decoy systems.^[190]^[191] Defense budgets have risen accordingly, with allocations projected at 3.32% of GDP for 2026—up from prior years and surpassing 3% for the first time since 2009—funding indigenous production and backlog clearance, though U.S. delivery delays on items like Harpoons have persisted due to production constraints, with partial fulfillments in 2025 mitigating gaps and enhancing deterrence resilience.^[192]^[193]^[194]

Invasion risks, deterrence factors, and historical analogies

Chinese President Xi Jinping has directed the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to achieve readiness for a potential Taiwan invasion by 2027, aligning with milestones for military modernization and the centennial of the People's Liberation Army.^[195]^[196] However, U.S. Department of Defense assessments indicate that China lacks the current amphibious and logistical capabilities for a successful short, sharp invasion by that date, citing deficiencies in landing craft, sealift, and joint operations experience.^[197] Empirical data on domestic support further tempers invasion probabilities: a 2025 survey found 55% of mainland Chinese respondents opposed using force against Taiwan, reflecting awareness of economic and human costs despite state propaganda.^[198] In Taiwan, public resolve against unification remains strong, with over 80% rejecting Beijing's "one country, two systems" framework in a 2025 poll, bolstering societal deterrence through potential high resistance and irregular warfare.^[199] Key deterrence factors include U.S. strategic ambiguity, which maintains uncertainty about intervention without explicit commitments that could provoke preemption, while enabling arms sales and training to enhance Taiwan's defenses.^[200] Regional alliances amplify this: the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) coordinates U.S., Japanese, Indian, and Australian efforts to uphold maritime norms in the Indo-Pacific, indirectly signaling collective resistance to aggression; AUKUS advances nuclear-powered submarines for Australia, improving long-range deterrence against PLA naval expansion.^[201] Taiwan's geographic advantages—mountainous terrain, urban density, and the 100-180 km Taiwan Strait—exacerbate invasion challenges, requiring untested amphibious assaults vulnerable to anti-ship missiles and submarines, with simulations estimating PLA losses exceeding 10,000 in initial waves.^[202] Historical analogies underscore these risks without overstating immediacy. Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, anticipated as a quick victory, devolved into protracted attrition due to Ukrainian resolve, terrain exploitation, and Western resupply, costing Moscow over 600,000 casualties and stalling advances despite initial superiority—paralleling potential PLA overreach in a cross-strait amphibious operation, where rapid seizure of ports is essential but historically rare (e.g., no modern peer equivalent succeeded).^[203] Unlike Ukraine's land border, Taiwan's island status demands sealift dominance, amplifying vulnerabilities to interdiction, as evidenced by PLA exercises revealing coordination gaps.^[204] Global economic interdependence acts as mutual deterrence: a conflict disrupting Taiwan's semiconductor output (producing 90% of advanced chips) could slash world GDP by $10 trillion, or 10%, per Bloomberg Economics models, far exceeding Ukraine war impacts and imposing asymmetric pain on export-reliant China.^[205]^[206]

Geopolitical Context

US commitments and arms support

The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), enacted on April 10, 1979, established the legal framework for U.S. unofficial relations with Taiwan following the termination of formal diplomatic recognition and the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1979.^[207] The TRA mandates that the United States provide Taiwan with defensive arms and maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force or coercion that would jeopardize Taiwan's security, but it stops short of a formal defense commitment or treaty obligation to intervene militarily.^[208] This defensive orientation emphasizes arms sales over offensive capabilities or direct entanglement in Taiwan's conflicts.^[209] In 1982, amid negotiations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) over the August 17 Communiqué—which stated intent to gradually reduce U.S. arms sales to Taiwan—the Reagan administration issued the Six Assurances to Taiwan to clarify U.S. policy boundaries.^[56] These assurances, conveyed on July 14, 1982, included commitments not to set a date for ending arms sales, not to alter the TRA, not to mediate between Taiwan and the PRC, not to pressure Taiwan to enter negotiations, not to revise the U.S. position on Taiwan's sovereignty, and not to consult the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan.^[210] The Six Assurances reinforced the TRA's focus on Taiwan's self-defense without conceding to PRC demands for mediation or sales cessation.^[211] U.S. arms sales notifications to Taiwan exceeded $20 billion from 2020 to mid-2025, reflecting sustained implementation of the TRA amid rising PRC military pressure.^[212] The backlog of undelivered arms stood at approximately $21.5 billion as of June 2025, including systems like Harpoon missiles, HIMARS launchers, and F-16 upgrades approved during both Trump and Biden administrations.^[213] The Trump administration approved about $18.3 billion in sales over its full term, while the Biden administration continued notifications, such as $228 million for tactical datalink upgrades in September 2024, signaling policy continuity despite delivery delays criticized for undermining deterrence.^[214] ^[215] U.S. policy employs "strategic ambiguity," deliberately avoiding explicit commitments on whether it would defend Taiwan against invasion to deter both PRC aggression and Taiwanese moves toward formal independence.^[216] This approach, rooted in the TRA and subsequent communiqués, has preserved cross-strait peace for decades by creating uncertainty for Beijing about U.S. intervention costs.^[217] Critics, including some U.S. strategists, argue that PRC advances necessitate shifting to "strategic clarity" to bolster deterrence, though administrations under Biden and incoming Trump have reaffirmed ambiguity while enhancing arms support and regional posture.^[217] ^[218] Biden's administration reiterated non-support for Taiwan independence in statements following President Lai Ching-te's 2024 inauguration, aligning with TRA limits on offensive entanglements.^[219]

Roles of other nations and multilateral frameworks

Japan has deepened non-military security cooperation with Taiwan, including joint maritime exercises and intelligence sharing, viewing Taiwan's stability as integral to its own defense amid Chinese assertiveness in the region.^[220] In April 2025, amendments to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty extended to space domains, indirectly bolstering regional deterrence relevant to the Taiwan Strait.^[221] Australia maintains growing diplomatic and intelligence ties with Taiwan, emphasizing the island's role in Indo-Pacific stability, though formal defense pacts remain absent due to China's diplomatic pressure.^[222]^[223] The European Union has expanded investment ties with Taiwan following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, with bilateral trade reaching $77 billion in 2023 and Taiwan launching 22 new EU investment projects worth over $4.9 billion in 2023, marking a 750% increase from 2022.^[224]^[225] EU parliamentary resolutions in 2023 urged alignment on sanctions against Russia and affirmed Taiwan's democratic resilience as a counter to authoritarian expansionism.^[226] These developments reflect heightened EU interest in Taiwan's semiconductor supply chains for strategic autonomy, despite Beijing's opposition. In multilateral forums, Taiwan faces exclusion from UN-affiliated bodies, having lost World Health Organization observer status in 2017 and been barred from International Civil Aviation Organization assemblies since 2013, complicating global aviation safety coordination for its busy flight information region.^[227]^[228] As of October 2025, Taiwan retains formal diplomatic relations with 12 countries, primarily in Latin America and the Pacific, which advocated for its interests during the UN General Debate.^[229]^[230] G7 communiqués have repeatedly underscored peace across the Taiwan Strait as essential to global security, with the March 2025 foreign ministers' statement omitting prior "one China" references and expressing concern over Chinese military drills.^[231]^[232] Taiwan's 2021 application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership remains stalled as of November 2024, alongside China's bid, with members like Australia continuing to support Taipei's accession on merits despite Beijing's blocking efforts.^[233]^[234] India, through the Quad framework, hedges against Chinese dominance by prioritizing maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, maintaining strategic ambiguity on Taiwan while benefiting from stable strait shipping lanes.^[235]^[236]

Global economic and strategic implications

A conflict in the Taiwan Strait would disrupt approximately 20 percent of global maritime trade, valued at over $2.45 trillion annually as of 2022, primarily affecting container shipping routes between Northeast Asia and the rest of the world.^[237] ^[238] Such disruptions could lead to severe supply chain bottlenecks, with estimates indicating a potential 10.2 percent decline in global GDP, exceeding impacts from the 2008 financial crisis or COVID-19 pandemic.^[239] Taiwan's dominance in semiconductor production amplifies these risks, as it manufactures over 90 percent of the world's advanced chips through firms like TSMC, which held 70.2 percent of the global pure-play foundry market in Q2 2025.^[240] ^[241] A blockade or invasion could trigger shortages halting production in industries from automobiles to defense systems, with Bloomberg Economics projecting a $10 trillion hit to the world economy and a 40 percent contraction in Taiwan's GDP.^[205] Strategically, Taiwan's position in the first island chain serves as a barrier constraining People's Republic of China (PRC) naval access to the Pacific, with control enabling dominance over the South China Sea and threats to allies like Japan and the Philippines.^[242] ^[243] A PRC seizure would undermine U.S. deterrence credibility, potentially reshaping Indo-Pacific alliances and facilitating expanded PRC influence in contested maritime domains.^[244] Recent surveys reflect preferences for maintaining the status quo amid decoupling efforts, with 51 percent of Americans in late 2024 favoring encouragement of Taiwan's current posture, while Taiwanese majorities support policies preserving de facto independence.^[245] ^[246] These dynamics underscore pressures to diversify supply chains without altering the cross-strait balance.

Public Opinion and Domestic Factors

Taiwanese preferences on status quo, independence, unification

Public opinion surveys in Taiwan consistently indicate strong support for maintaining the status quo in cross-strait relations, with limited enthusiasm for unification and growing identification with a distinct Taiwanese identity. According to a February 2025 poll by the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF), 51.8% of respondents identified independence as their ideal political future, 24.2% favored the status quo, and only 13.3% supported unification with China.^[247] In scenarios where the status quo becomes unsustainable, 61.3% preferred moving toward independence, compared to 18.6% for unification.^[247] These figures reflect a trend of hardening preferences against unification, countering narratives of its inevitability, as support for independence has risen from prior years, including a 4.6 percentage point increase from May 2024.^[247] Polls from National Chengchi University (NCCU) similarly show sustained preference for the status quo, encompassing options like indefinite maintenance or eventual determination, totaling around 80-90% in recent years, with immediate unification below 10% and independence options (immediate or eventual) at 25-35%.^[248] A July 2025 TPOF survey found 77.4% of respondents identifying solely as Taiwanese, with Chinese identification minimal at under 7%. This shift toward exclusive Taiwanese identity has been pronounced among younger generations, where over 90% in recent surveys self-identify as Taiwanese only, diverging from older cohorts influenced by historical mainland ties.^[249] Such trends undermine assumptions of cultural affinity driving unification, as empirical data reveal identity consolidation amid decades of democratic governance and separation. Rejection of Beijing's "one country, two systems" framework exceeds 80%, with an April 2025 Mainland Affairs Council poll showing 84.4% opposition, consistent with prior surveys post-Hong Kong's 2019-2020 protests, which amplified fears of eroded autonomy.^[199]^[250] Those events correlated with a near-doubling of formal independence support in some polls, from under 20% pre-2019 to over 32% by 2021, bolstering Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) victories in 2020 and 2024 elections.^[251] Electoral outcomes, including DPP presidential wins in 2016, 2020, and 2024 under Tsai Ing-wen and Lai Ching-te, align with anti-coercion sentiments, as voters prioritize sovereignty preservation over accommodation.^[252] PRC military drills and gray-zone coercion have further solidified resolve, with polls indicating over two-thirds of Taiwanese willing to defend against invasion, and such actions often backfiring by elevating support for self-reliance rather than submission.^[253] TPOF data attributes recent preference shifts partly to external pressures, including post-inauguration drills in 2024, which reinforced perceptions of unification as untenable without force.^[247] These dynamics, grounded in longitudinal polling from reputable Taiwanese institutions, demonstrate preferences rooted in empirical experiences of PRC governance contrasts, rather than abstract inevitability.

Mainland Chinese views on reunification methods

Mainland Chinese public opinion strongly favors eventual reunification with Taiwan, with surveys consistently showing support levels exceeding 70% for unification in principle, though preferences for methods emphasize peaceful approaches over coercion. A 2023 survey by the Global Times, a state-affiliated outlet, indicated that 71% of respondents supported unification by any means necessary, but subsequent polling revealed a divergence in acceptable methods, with economic integration and diplomatic persuasion favored over military action. This reflects a broad nationalist consensus on territorial integrity, rooted in historical narratives of national rejuvenation promoted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), yet tempered by pragmatic concerns over costs. Despite official rhetoric that does not renounce the use of force, a majority of mainland Chinese oppose military unification under any circumstances. A 2024 survey conducted by the Carter Center in collaboration with Emory University, polling nearly 2,500 respondents, found that 55% rejected the use of force entirely to achieve reunification, highlighting limits to CCP propaganda's influence on public tolerance for conflict.^[255] ^[256] Respondents expressed skepticism about Taiwan's willingness to reunify peacefully, with over 60% doubting voluntary integration without incentives, yet prioritizing stable cross-strait economic ties amid domestic growth priorities. State media, such as People's Daily, routinely frames Taiwan as a "renegade province" inseparable from the motherland, reinforcing irredentist views, but empirical data underscores a gap between elite signaling and mass aversion to war's disruptions.^[257] Among younger mainland Chinese, nationalism coexists with economic pragmatism, fostering support for unification but resistance to forceful methods that could jeopardize prosperity. A 2025 analysis of youth attitudes noted that while "Generation N" exhibits heightened patriotism—driven by state education and online discourse—strategic rationalism prevails, with many viewing military escalation as incompatible with personal aspirations for stability and global integration.^[258] Post-2019 Hong Kong developments have further eroded enthusiasm for the "one country, two systems" model as a blueprint for Taiwan, as mainland observers witnessed protests and crackdowns erode perceived autonomy, leading to broader wariness of coercive unification templates despite official endorsements.^[1] This nuance reveals propaganda's incomplete sway, as public preferences align more with diplomatic and economic leverage than confrontation.^[259]

Influences of propaganda, identity, and generational shifts

In Taiwan, the prevalence of free and competitive media allows for open democratic discourse that has cultivated a distinct Taiwanese identity, with empirical surveys indicating that a majority of respondents self-identify primarily as Taiwanese rather than Chinese, a trend reinforced by exposure to diverse viewpoints unfiltered by state control.^[249] This contrasts sharply with the People's Republic of China (PRC), where the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintains strict control over information flows, deploying state-directed propaganda to promote narratives of inevitable reunification while suppressing dissenting perspectives on Taiwan's status.^[260] The CCP's united front strategy extends to cognitive operations targeting Taiwan, including recruitment of online influencers to produce content that portrays PRC governance favorably and downplays military threats, aiming to subtly erode resistance to unification without overt coercion.^[261] Generational differences in Taiwan amplify this identity divergence, as older cohorts, shaped by historical ties to the mainland during the Republic of China era, exhibit greater receptivity to unification rhetoric compared to younger generations, who, immersed in democratic norms and repeated PRC military posturing, overwhelmingly prioritize sovereignty and the status quo.^[262] On the mainland, state propaganda instills strong nationalist sentiments among post-1990s youth, fostering hawkish views on Taiwan as a core interest, yet surveys reveal widespread wariness toward the costs of force, with a majority opposing military unification in favor of prioritizing domestic economic stability.^[255] ^[263] This pragmatic restraint stems from lived experiences of prosperity under controlled narratives, though CCP efforts to link Taiwan policy to personal advancement sustain underlying support for non-violent pressure tactics. PRC military drills around Taiwan, often framed propagandistically as responses to perceived provocations, have empirically strengthened Taiwanese societal cohesion and skepticism toward unification, as the CCP has adjusted tactics upon recognizing that high-profile exercises inadvertently bolster pro-independence resolve rather than intimidation.^[264] In turn, PRC influence operations via platforms like TikTok exploit algorithmic amplification to seed doubts about U.S. reliability and align Taiwan's youth with pro-reunification sentiments, though such campaigns face limits due to Taiwan's media literacy and generational aversion to authoritarian models.^[265] These dynamics underscore how propaganda's causal impact on identity is mediated by institutional freedoms, with Taiwan's open environment enabling resilience against external narratives, while mainland controls yield nationalism tempered by self-interest.^[266]

Cultural and Humanitarian Interactions

Exchanges in education, tourism, and media

Tourism between mainland China and Taiwan peaked prior to 2016, with over 4 million mainland visitors annually in 2015, representing a significant portion of Taiwan's inbound tourism and serving as a channel for informal cross-strait interactions.^[267] These exchanges were formalized under agreements allowing group and individual travel, but numbers declined sharply after political tensions escalated under Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party administration in 2016, dropping to 3.61 million in 2016.^[268] Suspensions intensified during the COVID-19 pandemic, with group tours halted entirely; limited resumptions for residents of select Chinese provinces like Fujian and Shanghai occurred in early 2025, but large-scale access remains blocked by Beijing, which has conditioned approvals on political concessions.^[269] ^[270] Taiwan authorities have expressed willingness to expand tourism for economic and people-to-people benefits, yet view PRC restrictions as leverage for unification propaganda rather than genuine mutual exchange.^[271] Educational exchanges remain constrained, with mainland Chinese student enrollment in Taiwan limited to fewer than 40,000 cumulatively since programs began in the 2010s, amid tightened PRC controls and Taiwanese security reviews.^[272] Beijing has ignored Taiwanese requests to resume broader student flows as of 2025, imposing de facto bans tied to political disputes, while Taiwan prohibits exchanges with PRC military-linked institutions to mitigate infiltration risks.^[273] ^[274] Proponents argue such interactions preserve shared linguistic and cultural heritage, fostering mutual understanding, but critics highlight espionage threats and ideological assimilation efforts, where PRC participants are often vetted for loyalty to Beijing's narrative on reunification.^[275] Taiwanese policies prioritize vetted, short-term programs over open enrollment to balance these risks against potential soft power gains.^[276] Media interactions underscore stark contrasts between Taiwan's pluralistic press and the PRC's state-controlled outlets, with limited formal exchanges exploited by Beijing for influence operations rather than reciprocal dialogue. PRC entities like CGTN have sought to embed propaganda in Taiwanese discourse, promoting narratives of inevitable unification while comprising up to 44% of their output on political models.^[277] Taiwan has countered through expulsions of PRC-linked media in 2025 and regulations against foreign funding to curb self-censorship and infiltration, revealing Beijing's tactics of intimidation and sponsored content over genuine exchange.^[278] ^[279] These efforts prioritize assimilation—portraying Taiwan as an inseparable province—over mutual benefit, prompting Taiwanese vigilance against erosion of independent journalism.^[280]

Humanitarian aid and crisis responses

In response to the COVID-19 outbreak originating in Wuhan in late 2019, Taiwan implemented stringent border controls, including an early flight ban from China, achieving one of the lowest infection rates globally with under 500 cases by mid-2020.^[281] Cross-strait humanitarian exchanges remained minimal, as Taiwan prioritized domestic stockpiling and international donations of over 50 million masks to allies, while rejecting PRC-procured vaccines like Sinovac due to efficacy doubts and perceived political leverage attempts.^[282] The PRC, conversely, pursued vaccine diplomacy globally but faced Taiwan's insistence on self-reliant procurement and transparent trials, avoiding dependency amid heightened geopolitical strains. Natural disasters have prompted sporadic reciprocal gestures, though often overshadowed by mutual distrust. Taiwan dispatched a medical team to assist PRC recovery efforts following a 2010 Qinghai earthquake, exemplifying pragmatic aid without preconditions.^[283] In contrast, after Taiwan's 7.2-magnitude Hualien earthquake on April 3, 2024, which killed 18 and injured over 1,100, the PRC offered relief supplies and expertise, but Taiwan declined, citing historical patterns where such aid served propaganda or intelligence-gathering aims rather than pure humanitarianism.^[284]^[285] This rejection aligns with Taiwan's preference for domestic and allied support, as evidenced by rapid mobilization of over 2,000 rescuers and international donations exceeding NT$1 billion within days. Frontline crises in the Taiwan Strait, particularly around Kinmen islands mere kilometers from the PRC coast, frequently involve fisheries-related rescues amid territorial disputes. In March 2024, Taiwan coast guard vessels joined PRC forces at Beijing's request to search for two missing crew from a capsized Chinese fishing boat near Kinmen, recovering one body and underscoring occasional operational coordination despite tensions.^[286]^[287] Yet, risks persist: on February 14, 2024, two Chinese fishermen drowned after their vessel capsized during a high-speed evasion of Taiwan coast guard patrol in restricted waters off Kinmen, with the other two crew rescued but sparking PRC accusations of aggression and subsequent increased patrols.^[288]^[289] Such incidents, occurring in waters claimed by both sides, highlight the humanitarian toll of unresolved maritime boundaries, where over 100 PRC fishing incursions near Kinmen were reported in early 2024 alone. Taiwan's robust humanitarian capacity—evidenced by billions in global medical aid donations—contrasts with its exclusion from forums like the WHO, where PRC influence has barred participation since 2017 despite Taiwan's proven outbreak surveillance and assistance to over 20 nations during COVID-19.^[290]^[291] This isolation limits cross-strait crisis coordination, as Taiwan relies on bilateral channels rather than multilateral mechanisms politicized by Beijing, fostering a pattern where Taiwan extends aid outward while guarding against inbound offers laced with unification rhetoric.

Contrasts in values, human rights, and civil liberties

Taiwan receives a rating of "Free" in the Freedom in the World 2025 report by Freedom House, scoring 94 out of 100 and ranking second in Asia behind Japan, reflecting strong protections for political rights and civil liberties including multiparty elections, independent judiciary, and freedom of expression.^[292] In contrast, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is rated "Not Free" with a score of 9 out of 100, due to systematic suppression of dissent, absence of electoral competition, and pervasive state control over media and civil society.^[293] These disparities underscore fundamental differences in governance, with Taiwan's democratic institutions enabling robust civic participation while the PRC's authoritarian system prioritizes regime stability over individual rights. On press freedom, Taiwan ranked 24th globally in the 2025 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders (RSF), the highest in Asia, benefiting from a pluralistic media environment despite occasional pressures from disinformation campaigns.^[294] China, however, ranks near the bottom at 179th out of 180 countries, characterized by state censorship, imprisonment of journalists, and the Great Firewall restricting information flow.^[295] Taiwan's legal framework supports journalistic independence, whereas the PRC enforces ideological conformity through entities like the Cyberspace Administration, limiting reporting on sensitive topics such as human rights abuses. Civil liberties diverge sharply in areas like LGBTQ rights: Taiwan became the first Asian jurisdiction to legalize same-sex marriage on May 24, 2019, granting equal marital benefits and adoption rights to same-sex couples under amendments to the Civil Code.^[296] The PRC lacks such protections, with no national recognition of same-sex unions and ongoing crackdowns, including the 2023 closure of the Beijing LGBT Center and 2025 arrests of individuals for producing gay-themed literature deemed subversive.^[297] These policies reflect Taiwan's emphasis on personal autonomy versus the PRC's surveillance apparatus, which monitors and suppresses nonconforming expressions through social credit systems and mass digital oversight. Asymmetric defection patterns highlight the appeal of Taiwan's system: defections from Taiwan to the PRC are exceedingly rare, with Taiwan's military recording only about 20 cases between 1949 and 1989, often met with severe penalties upon attempted return.^[298] In the opposite direction, over 119 Chinese nationals have attempted illegal entry into Taiwan in the past decade, including by speedboat, motivated by desires for greater freedoms, though formal defection policies remain limited.^[299] This one-way flow empirically demonstrates the relative attractiveness of Taiwan's liberties. Public opinion in Taiwan reinforces these contrasts, with a Mainland Affairs Council poll in August 2025 showing 86 percent support for maintaining the cross-strait status quo, explicitly tied to preserving democratic values and human rights amid fears of PRC-style erosion seen in Hong Kong's post-2020 national security law implementation and the Uyghur internment camps in Xinjiang, where over one million have been detained since 2017.^[300] Taiwanese leaders have rejected the "one country, two systems" model proposed by Beijing, citing Hong Kong's declining autonomy as a cautionary precedent against unification.^[301] Such views prioritize empirical safeguards for freedoms over ideological unification narratives.

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[122]
Straits Exchange Foundation Introduction
The SEF is currently the sole organization established and operating under Article 4 of the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and ...Missing: date | Show results with:date
[123]
2015
The meeting was convened by SEF Vice Chairman Shih Hui-fen and ARATS Executive Vice Chairman Zheng Lizhong. The chief negotiators for the two sides were Taiwan ...Missing: Ku | Show results with:Ku
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Jun 26, 2016 · Beijing announces that it suspended cross-strait communications when Tsai Ing-wen assumed office.
[125]
China Suspends Diplomatic Contact With Taiwan
Jun 25, 2016 · Mainland diplomats said Saturday that they had suspended contact with their Taiwanese counterparts because the island's new leader would not endorse the idea ...
[126]
[PDF] Beijing's Policy Towards President Tsai Ying-wen and the Future of ...
As soon as President Tsai Ing-wen completed her inaugural address on May 20, 2016, ... “ARATS Chairman: My Fax Machine Always On Despite Suspended SEF-ARATS.
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[PDF] SECTION 3: TAIWAN
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Nov 27, 2023 · Our bipartisan memo on united front work will help the American people recognize and resist the CCP's malign influence.
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[PDF] Chinese Communist Party Covert Operations Against Taiwan
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[133]
Election Interference and Information Manipulation
Jun 6, 2024 · The PRC's efforts to influence Taiwan's January election employed techniques that combined military, economic, and diplomatic action with information ...
[134]
Paths to Crisis and Conflict Over Taiwan - Quincy Institute
Jan 11, 2024 · Taiwan is the most likely flashpoint for a US–China conflict, unmatched in its combustible mix of conflicting interests, high stakes, and eroding trust and ...
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Jan 17, 2024 · The trade volume between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan reached $267.8 billion in 2023, remaining at a high level, a mainland spokesperson ...
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Jan 15, 2025 · In 2024, it recorded a market share of 64.7 percent in the global semiconductor foundry market. That figure is positioned to grow to 66 in 2025.
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Aug 19, 2024 · China seeks to achieve self-sufficiency in all facets of the semiconductor industry, simultaneously reducing its reliance on foreign competitors ...
[138]
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May 29, 2025 · The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is today responsible for 8% of the island's overall economic output and 12% of its exports.
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[PDF] Statistical Bulletin
Jan 16, 2025 · In 2024, Taiwan's exports to Mainland China and Hong Kong accounted for 31.7%, down 12.2 percentage points from the historical high in 2020.
[140]
Taiwan's Surprising Drop in Trade Dependence on Mainland China
Mar 8, 2024 · Taiwan's exports to China thus shrunk by 1.6 percent in 2022. The figure plummeted again in 2023, this time declining by 18.1 percent year-on- ...
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Mar 31, 2021 · On February 26, 2021, the Chinese government announced that it would suspend imports of pineapples from Taiwan beginning March 1, 2021.
[142]
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Jan 9, 2024 · From pineapples to petrochemicals, Beijing uses trade to influence opinion, but analysts say it has little impact.
[143]
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CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS · Strengthened national defense; · Improved economic security; · Stable and principled cross-strait leadership; · Values-based diplomacy.
[144]
Taiwan's exports tilt toward US as China ratio drops to 24-year low
Jun 10, 2025 · The share of investment in China as a proportion of Taiwan's total overseas investment peaked at 83.8% in 2010, but plunged to just 7.5% by 2024 ...
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[146]
Taiwan FDI Statistics Summary Analysis (December 2024)
Jan 15, 2025 · With regard to inward investment from Mainland China, 36 cases were approved with an amount of US$297,223,000 from January to December 2024.
[147]
Foxconn to invest $138 million for new business headquarters in ...
Jul 24, 2024 · Foxconn to invest $138 million for new business headquarters in China ... Foxconn, formally called Hon Hai Precision Industry Co Ltd (2317 ...
[148]
Taiwan FDI Statistics Summary Analysis (December 2023)
Jan 15, 2024 · With regard to inward investment from Mainland China, 30 cases were approved with an amount of US$29,691,000 from January to December 2023.
[149]
Taiwan FDI Statistics Summary Analysis (December 2024)
Jan 15, 2025 · With regard to inward investment from Mainland China, 36 cases were approved with an amount of US$297,223,000 from January to December 2024.
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[151]
Advanced Semiconductor Market Share by Country (2023-2027F)
Mar 11, 2024 · Taiwan holds 68% of advanced foundry capacity, though this is expected to fall to 60% by 2027 as the U.S. expands its domestic capacity.
[152]
[PDF] US Exposure to Taiwanese Semiconductor Industry
Nov 21, 2023 · While Taiwan accounts for 18 percent of global semiconductor manufacturing capacity,4 the world almost completely relies on the economy for the ...
[153]
Better Ahead Than Red: US-Taiwan Cooperation for Non-PRC Tech ...
Sep 17, 2025 · To effectively progress toward non-Red supply chains, several macro- and micro-level policies enhancing US-Taiwan technology cooperation are ...
[154]
The Expansion of Taiwanese Firms and the US-China Trade War
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[155]
U.S.-China Trade Tensions and Taiwan's Semiconductor Nexus
May 4, 2025 · This report examines recent developments in U.S.-China and U.S.-Taiwan trade and tariff dynamics as of 2025, and analyzes their impact on the ...
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Taiwan's Approach to Materialize the Indo-Pacific Strategies
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[157]
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Jun 18, 2025 · Current cooperation between India and Taiwan has increased the growth rate in total trade by 29 percent between 2023 and 2024. As of May 1 ...
[158]
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Sep 30, 2024 · Trade between Taiwan and India exceeded US$ 10 billion in 2023-24, reflecting deeper economic ties, and Taiwanese companies increasingly ...
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Mar 4, 2025 · TSMC's $100 billion will significantly boost America's semiconductor manufacturing industry but how it will shape US-Taiwan relations is an open question.<|separator|>
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TSMC's Record Investment in US, Japan: A China Decoupling ...
Jan 15, 2025 · TSMC's strategic shift into the U.S. and Japan can be seen as a response to the growing tensions between the U.S. and China, as well as the U.S. ...
[161]
[PDF] Business Climate Survey - AmCham Taiwan
Jan 20, 2025 · Companies are diversifying their supply chains, with 23% of respondents reporting business relocation efforts from China in the past five ...
[162]
Cabinet approves new incentives to attract investment in Taiwan
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[163]
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[164]
Taiwan's Top Trading Partners 2024 - World's Top Exports
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[165]
Taiwan reports 2nd highest foreign trade in 2024
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[166]
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Oct 4, 2025 · China has three aircraft carriers. The first two, the Liaoning and Shandong, are operational, but the newest one, Fujian, is completing sea ...Missing: PLA | Show results with:PLA
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Oct 10, 2025 · China's ongoing shipbuilding and force modernization programs expect to grow the PLA Navy to 395 ships by 2025, and 435 ships by 2030.<|separator|>
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China Taiwan Weekly Update, February 7, 2025 | Critical Threats
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Apr 2, 2025 · China launched a large-scale, one-day military drill Monday that simulated a blockade of Taiwan. The exercise, code-named "Joint Sword - 2024B ...
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Oct 17, 2025 · The removal of the nine generals is the most prominent case to date linked to the PLA's broader personnel management problems. The nine appear ...
[180]
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[181]
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May 17, 2023 · While past arguments for a “porcupine strategy” for Taiwan's defense were not without merit, the concept is ultimately insufficient.
[182]
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Dec 7, 2021 · Taiwan should adopt a strategy that includes a large number of small things in order to leverage Taiwan's geographic and technological advantages.
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Sep 9, 2025 · Work will be performed in Poway, and is expected to be completed May 5, 2025. This contract involves Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan and is the ...
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Aug 14, 2025 · Both systems are designed for asymmetric warfare, with an emphasis on rapid assembly, mass production, cost-effectiveness and operational ...
[187]
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Aug 19, 2025 · Taiwan is moving to buy nearly 50,000 drones over the next two years as it seeks to bolster its asymmetric combat capabilities against ...<|control11|><|separator|>
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Jun 13, 2025 · Taiwan is learning lessons on how it could use sea drones as an effective and low-cost way to fend off any possible Chinese invasion.
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Aug 21, 2025 · Taiwan's defense spending will reach 3.32 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) next year, Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰) said Thursday, ...
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The backlog's total value remains $21.5 billion, with deliveries of $4.4 billion—split roughly evenly between Abrams tanks and ground-launched Harpoon anti-ship ...
[194]
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[195]
China, Taiwan, and the PLA's 2027 milestones | Lowy Institute
Feb 12, 2025 · For Xi, 2027 will also mark the 21st Party Congress, when he probably will secure his unprecedented fourth term as leader of the party, military ...
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The Three Pillars Underpinning the 2027 Centennial Military ...
Sep 25, 2025 · CCP statements stress that achieving the 2027 Goal will strengthen the PRC's ability to safeguard its sovereignty and national security, though ...
[197]
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Dec 19, 2024 · Rattner said Xi Jinping's goal of having his military ready to carry out a “short, sharp invasion” of Taiwan by 2027 “is not possible right now.”
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55% of Chinese People Do Not Support Using Force Against Taiwan
May 1, 2025 · Analysis: China Growing Ferry Fleet for Potential Taiwan Invasion ... Government Poll Reveals Taiwanese Public's Views on Cross-Strait Issues.
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Mar 7, 2024 · Since the 1990s, US policy toward Taiwan has been characterized as one of strategic ambiguity, as both sides have not reached a consensus on how ...
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The US, China and a Strategy of 'Deterrence through Denial'
Our AUKUS partnership with the US and the UK to buy and build nuclear powered, conventionally armed attack class submarines;; Our Quad strategic partnership ...
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Sep 26, 2025 · Chinese President Xi Jinping has directed the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready to militarily seize Taiwan by 2027. A large-scale ...Missing: goal | Show results with:goal
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The war in Ukraine is influencing how Taiwanese think about conflict
Mar 13, 2025 · Russia's invasion of Ukraine may not be directly comparable to any actions China might take against Taiwan, but over the past three years ...
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China And Taiwan Explain Key Differences Between Cross-Strait ...
Russia's invasion of Ukraine sparked widespread concern that China could similarly invade Taiwan, although not everyone agrees with this analogy. The ...
[205]
Xi, Biden and the $10 Trillion Cost of War Over Taiwan
dwarfing the blow from the war in Ukraine, ...
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The Global Economic Disruptions from a Taiwan Conflict
Dec 14, 2022 · ... economic impact would come from disruptions to semiconductor ... Other studies have attempted to estimate the economic costs of a war with China.
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Aug 18, 2025 · 6(a)). In their 1978 negotiations, the U.S. and PRC governments agreed to set aside the contentious issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.<|separator|>
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Aug 12, 2025 · Simultaneously, China does not perceive the shift in arms sales as any less offensive, and Taiwan will see negative impacts on its ability to ...
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Jun 15, 2023 · Those statements later came to be known as the Six Assurances. Lilley first delivered them to President Chiang on July 14, 1982. Taiwan's ...
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Feb 18, 2025 · Six Assurances communicated to Taiwan's government in 1982. This report seeks to inform Congress about the Six Assurances.
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Taiwan Arms Sales Backlog, March 2025 Update: New SIPRI Data ...
The backlog of US arms sales announced but not delivered to Taiwan did not change in March 2025. As shown in Figure 1, the backlog remains $21.54 billion.Missing: total | Show results with:total
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The backlog remains valued at $21.54 billion, with just shy of $4.5 billion of this figure covering deliveries that have begun but are not finished.
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Sep 17, 2024 · On September 16 (US EST), the United States government announced that it had notified Congress of the US$228 million sale to Taiwan for the ...
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Jun 24, 2024 · The United States' policy of “strategic ambiguity” has helped prevent conflict in the Taiwan Strait for decades by creating dual deterrence.
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The United States should no longer maintain a policy of strategic ambiguity on the China-Taiwan problem. Defending Taiwan is clearly in the U.S. interest.
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May 7, 2025 · That policy is quite simple: the US government will not commit to a specific action in response to a PRC action on Taiwan.
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Jan 13, 2024 · Biden's words reinforced the administration's position to Taiwan's new president Lai Ching-te, who has faced strong opposition from Beijing.
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Dec 10, 2024 · Japan-Taiwan defense cooperation took a turn towards increased collaboration on 25 September 2024, when the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense ...
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May 23, 2024 · Taiwan recognises there are limits on defence cooperation with Australia; it welcomes growing intelligence and diplomatic cooperation.
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Jul 22, 2025 · Amid shifting power dynamics, Taiwan's role as a pragmatic and principled partner deserves renewed attention in Australia's regional outlook.
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Mar 19, 2025 · Despite the lack of a deal, Taiwan's economic relationship with the EU remains strong. Per 2023 statistics, bilateral trade reached $77 billion, ...
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President Lai attends 2024 EU Investment Forum-News releases ...
Nov 18, 2024 · Last year, Taiwan initiated 22 new investment projects in the EU, totaling over US$4.9 billion – an impressive growth of 750 percent from 2022. ...<|separator|>
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Aug 2, 2024 · Salutes the agreed intention to cooperate to align the EU's and Taiwan's sanctions against Russia and Taiwan's commitment to stand with Ukraine ...
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Sep 22, 2023 · Taiwan's exclusion from ICAO, the UN's body for principles and techniques of air navigation, has similar implications for global flight safety.
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Aug 21, 2025 · Regrettably, Taiwan is barred from the 42nd Session of the ICAO Assembly, as its exclusion poses risks to international aviation. standards.
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Oct 3, 2025 · High level officials from Taiwan's diplomatic allies - Paraguay, the Marshall Islands, Kingdom of Eswatini, Palau, Saint Vincent and the ...
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Taiwan has 12 diplomatic partners left. Who'll drop it next?
Jun 12, 2025 · Guatemala and Paraguay—two of Taiwan's key Latin American diplomatic partners—are showing signs of strain. Guatemala's new president, Bernardo ...
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Tough G7 statement drops 'one China' reference from Taiwan ...
Mar 14, 2025 · G7 foreign ministers took a tough stance on China on Friday, stepping up language on Taiwan and omitting some conciliatory references from past statements.
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Mar 14, 2025 · G7 members emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. They encouraged the peaceful resolution of ...
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Taiwan and China's applications to the CPTPP both put on hold
Nov 28, 2024 · RTI | 28 November 2024. Taiwan and China's applications to the CPTPP both put on hold. At the annual meeting of the Comprehensive and ...
[234]
MOFA response to Australian government's clarification that its ...
The government of Australia has since clarified with Taiwan that its stance on Taiwan's accession to the CPTPP has not changed and that it continues to welcome ...
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India's Taiwanese Security Policy: A Priority for Regional Security in ...
Oct 2, 2024 · ... India has a vested interest in ensuring the continuation of the free flow of shipping through the South China Sea and along the Taiwan Strait.
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Can the Quad Hold the Line on Taiwan? - The Diplomat
Jul 16, 2025 · India, the only member of the Quad that is not a U.S. ally, continues to maintain deliberate silence on Taiwan, consistent with its ...
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Crossroads of Commerce: How the Taiwan Strait Propels the Global ...
Aug 22, 2024 · Nearly 27 percent of Australia's exports passed through the Taiwan Strait in 2022, totaling almost $109 billion. Commodities such as iron ore, ...
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The Taiwan Strait: crucial waterway and military flashpoint - France 24
Apr 1, 2025 · Around $2.45 trillion of goods -- more than a fifth of global maritime trade -- transited the strait in 2022, according to the Center for ...
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[PDF] The cost of conflict | Economic implications of a Taiwan military crisis ...
Mar 1, 2024 · Impact projections range between a 10.2 percent fall in global GDP (twice the impact of the 2008 Financial Crisis or the COVID-19 pandemic) ...
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Nov 11, 2024 · Neely analyzes the economic impact of a hypothetical 2026 Chinese invasion of Taiwan (a bad beat for the Winter Games and World Cup) that ...
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TSMC's global market share hits new high of 70.2% in Q2
Sep 6, 2025 · (TSMC) saw its share of the global pure-play wafer foundry market rise to a record 70.2 percent in the second quarter of this year, driven by ...<|control11|><|separator|>
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Chinese Views of Taiwan's Geostrategic Value | SPF China Observer
Dec 4, 2023 · Taiwan sits astride critical sea lines of communication that facilitate global maritime commerce. The Taiwan Strait connects the East and South ...
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China and Taiwan: A really simple guide - BBC
Jan 7, 2024 · Taiwan sits in the so-called "first island chain", which includes a list of US-friendly territories that are crucial to Washington's foreign ...
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So What? Reassessing the Military Implications of Chinese Control ...
Jun 20, 2025 · A China-controlled Taiwan provides China with the ability to saturate more of the Philippine Sea with short-range munitions rather than with ...<|separator|>
[245]
Americans and Taiwanese Favor the Status Quo
Dec 2, 2024 · In the event of an invasion, Taiwan's public expects—and the American public supports—a range of US policies designed to aid Taiwan in a crisis.
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MAC poll shows widespread support for government cross-strait policy
Jun 2, 2025 · A majority of people in Taiwan support President Lai Ching-te's cross strait policies and national security reforms to safeguard the country's sovereignty.
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[PDF] Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation
Feb 14, 2025 · In other words, the majority of Taiwanese people clearly prefer Taiwan independence as the most desirable political future, while maintaining ...
[248]
Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland(1994/12 ...
For data collection methodology, please see here. When quoted, please state clearly in writing: [sources: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University]
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In Taiwan, most identify as Taiwanese, few as primarily Chinese
Jan 16, 2024 · The election follows a recent Pew Research Center survey that examined how people in Taiwan feel about their own identity, as well as how they ...
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Apr 26, 2025 · More than eight out of 10 Taiwanese reject Beijing's “one country, two systems” framework for cross-strait relations, according to a survey released by the ...
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Nov 26, 2021 · Since the Hong Kong protests broke out in 2019, more than 32% of respondents in Taiwan preferred a move toward formal “independence” – twice as ...Missing: public | Show results with:public
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Jan 23, 2020 · China's hard-line approach to Taiwan and the social unrest in Hong Kong are the two main factors that led to her landslide victory in the 2020 election.
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Sep 5, 2025 · Surveys consistently find that over two-thirds of Taiwanese are willing to fight and defend their country if China invades. Support for ...
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China is subtly increasing military pressure on Taiwan. Here's how
Dec 18, 2023 · So far, the gray-zone tactics seem to be having the opposite effect in Taiwan. A poll conducted by the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation ...
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Most mainland Chinese citizens oppose use of force to unify with ...
May 1, 2025 · More than half of mainland Chinese citizens oppose the use of force to unify with Taiwan under any circumstances, according to a survey released on Wednesday.
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Most Chinese oppose force to unify Taiwan: survey - Taipei Times
May 2, 2025 · US PUBLICATION: The results indicated a change in attitude after a 2023 survey showed 55 percent supported full-scale war to achieve ...
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China's Taiwan Dilemma: How Public Opinion Is Shifting Strategy ...
Aug 19, 2025 · The data from the most recent wave of the survey in 2025 explores three distinct resolution strategies: (1) military intervention, (2) direct ...
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5 Striking Truths About China's Youth and Taiwan Unification Policy
May 23, 2025 · The younger generation's nationalism is rational and strategic, prioritizing economic stability while supporting state sovereignty. Rising ...
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“Generation N”: The Impact of China's Youth Nationalism | Asia Society
Mar 13, 2023 · The South China Morning Post referred to Chinese youth as “Generation N,” arguing that “nationalism has been on the rise, encouraged by the Communist Party.Missing: unification pragmatism
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https://thediplomat.com/2025/10/when-chinese-propaganda-goes-viral-in-taiwan/
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Recruitment of Online Influencers Reveals a New Tactic of China's ...
Jan 8, 2025 · The CCP is enticing Taiwanese influencers to create pro-China content aimed at whitewashing its authoritarian governance and aggression toward Taiwan.
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How Taiwanese identity has evolved on the island in recent ... - NPR
Jan 8, 2024 · CHANG: NPR's Emily Feng covers China and Taiwan from her base here in Taipei. FENG: But to be clear, my parents emigrated to the U.S. from China ...
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For many Chinese, there are 'more important things' than Taiwan ...
Mar 15, 2024 · Beijing has not ruled out using force to annex Taiwan, but there is little appetite for war among Chinese people.
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Silent Exercises, Escalating Tactics: How the CCP's Evolving ...
Jun 4, 2025 · Once the CCP realized that their military exercises might boost Taiwanese public support for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民進黨), the ...
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Assessing China's Cognitive Warfare against Taiwan on TikTok
Oct 8, 2025 · First, IORG's research showed that 41.5% of TikTok users in Taiwan believed that being pro-United States would lead to war between Taiwan and ...
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The Challenges Taiwan Faces in Cognitive Warfare and Its Impact ...
Apr 21, 2025 · Both the CCP and the DPP actively shape narratives to influence public opinion, reflecting the broader contest over Taiwan's political future.
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Chinese Group Tourism to Taiwan Not Likely to Resume Anytime ...
Jun 16, 2024 · At its peak in 2015, Taiwan saw visits by 4.2 million Chinese tourists. It was not expected by Taiwanese authorities that Chinese group ...Missing: pre- | Show results with:pre-<|separator|>
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Chinese visitors to Taiwan down 800000 in 2016
Jan 11, 2017 · The number of Chinese visitors to Taiwan totaled 3.61 million in 2016, a drop of nearly 800000 from the previous year based on an initial ...Missing: peak numbers pre-
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With Resumption of Limited Group Tours, Lai Administration ...
Jan 18, 2025 · China will soon allow group tours to Taiwan to resume for residents of Fujian and Shanghai. It is to be seen if the Chinese government further relaxes tourist ...<|separator|>
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The CCP Should Stop Blocking Mainland Chinese Students and ...
The CCP Should Stop Blocking Mainland Chinese Students and Tourists from Visiting Taiwan to Ensure Healthy and Orderly Cross-Strait Exchanges. Date：2025-09-19.
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Chinese tourists are still welcome, council says - Taipei Times
Dec 18, 2024 · The government's position of welcoming Chinese tourists remains unchanged, the Mainland Affairs Council said yesterday.
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[PDF] suspension or fadeout? student exchanges from china to taiwan
Several interviewees also stated that the tightened control of cross- strait academic exchange is used as a tool of extorting political pressure on Taiwan, and.
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China ignoring Taiwan's requests to discuss student exchanges: MAC
Feb 21, 2025 · Since 2004, about 20,000 agreements have been signed between cross-strait educational institutions, and educational exchanges have gradually ...<|separator|>
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Taiwan steps up research security as risk from China rises
Mar 12, 2025 · Taiwan's MoE announced a ban on all academic activities and exchanges with seven military-linked Chinese universities known as the “Seven Sons of National ...
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Magnanimity Works: Why Education Diplomacy, Not Coercion, Is ...
Oct 14, 2025 · The key concern is security. The public in Taiwan perceives a persistent risk of CCP infiltration, and recent issues with IDs and travel ...
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Bridges, Not Barriers: People-to-People Exchanges as Taiwan's ...
Aug 27, 2025 · At the same time, they encourage non-military exchanges that may stabilise cross-strait relations in ways deterrence alone cannot achieve.
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Chinese state media persuades a global audience that the “China ...
Jul 20, 2024 · Overall, messages promoting the Chinese model account for an estimated 44% of the content on CGTN (around 26% of the political model plus around ...
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Expulsion of PRC Media Outlet Reveals Scale of Taiwan's ...
Jan 27, 2025 · The presence of PRC media organizations in Taiwan highlights the complex interplay between press freedom, foreign influence, and national security.
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Assessing Taiwan's Media Landscape and PRC Influence, Part One
Jul 12, 2023 · In addition to self-censorship, Taiwan's media landscape is littered with under-the-table deals that allow for direct PRC narrative control.
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Beijing's Global Media Influence Report 2022 - Freedom House
The CCP and its proxies engage in an array of media influence tactics, including propaganda, disinformation campaigns, censorship and intimidation, control over ...
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Taiwan's Response to COVID-19 and the WHO | Think Global Health
May 15, 2020 · Taiwan has done a remarkable job curbing coronavirus spread, with fewer than five hundred reported cases as of May 15, and no new cases since May 8.
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Coronavirus Crisis Offers Taiwan a Chance to Push Back Against ...
Apr 23, 2020 · Taiwan is competing with China on pandemic aid diplomacy in defiance of Beijing's efforts to isolate the self-ruled democratic island that it claims as its own.
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China has announced 100 million yuan in emergency - Facebook
Mar 29, 2025 · taiwan sends humantarian aide to recent earthquake in China Taipei - Taiwan sent a medical team to China's Qinghai province on Sunday to ...
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Taiwan Earthquake: Why Taiwan Doesn't Want China's Help | TIME
Apr 4, 2024 · It's not real kindness,” one expert tells TIME of China's offer to assist Taiwan with recovery from a massive, deadly earthquake.
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RFI: Taiwan Rejects China's Relief Aid After Earthquake - Chinascope
Apr 8, 2024 · Analysts explained that Beijing's aid always comes with conditions attached and is not a true gesture of goodwill. Some suggested that, instead ...
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Taiwan joins China rescue mission after boat capsizes near Kinmen
Mar 14, 2024 · Taiwan and China are conducting a joint rescue mission to find two missing crew members after a fishing vessel capsized near Taiwan's Kinmen islands.
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Taiwan, China launch rescue bid after boat capsizes near sensitive ...
Mar 14, 2024 · Taiwan dispatched coast guard boats on Thursday to join a rescue mission at China's request after a fishing vessel capsized near the ...
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Two Chinese fishermen drown during pursuit by Taiwan coast guard
Two Chinese fishermen have drowned during a pursuit by Taiwan's coast guard who accused them of entering prohibited waters off the coast of Taiwan's Kinmen ...
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Taiwan: Two Chinese fishermen die after sea chase with coastguard
Feb 14, 2024 · Two Chinese fishermen have drowned while being chased by the Taiwanese coastguard off Taiwan's northernmost Kinmen archipelago.
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Health Care for All Humanity? The Case of the ... - Taiwan Insight
Jul 29, 2019 · Taiwan has invested more than $6 billion in medical and humanitarian aid throughout the world and has made significant contributions in tackling ...
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Taiwan's humanitarian aid/disaster relief: Wither or prosper?
Taiwan's humanitarian assistance mainly consisted of emergency relief in the aftermath of natural disasters, reconstruction work and grassroots medical ...
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Taiwan: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report
Women won 41.6 percent of the legislature's seats in 2024. The DPP's Huang Jie, who was elected to the Legislative Yuan in the 2024 elections, became its first ...Missing: rating | Show results with:rating
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China: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report
9 100 Not Free. A country or territory's Freedom in the World status depends on its aggregate Political Rights score, on a scale of 0–40, and its aggregate ...2024 · Hong Kong · Tibet
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Taiwan - RSF
Taiwan, officially the Republic of China, is a liberal democracy and the world's 21st largest economy that generally respects the principles of media freedom.
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Index - RSF
RSF's World Press Freedom Index aims to compare the level of press freedom enjoyed by journalists and media in 180 countries and territories.Taiwan · World Press Freedom Index · 2024 World Press Freedom... · China
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Taiwan becomes first in Asia to legalize same-sex marriage
May 17, 2019 · The law is due to take effect on 24 May 2019. Under the new law, same-sex couples are granted the same right to legally marry as opposite-sex ...Missing: date | Show results with:date
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Chinese Communist Party continues crackdown on LGBTQ+ people
Jan 28, 2024 · ... rights of sexual minorities in China, compared with just a few years ago. ... A month after that crackdown, authorities in the central Chinese ...
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Taiwan says soldier who went missing has been found in China - CNN
Mar 13, 2023 · In 2002, Taiwan's then-minister of defense said the Taiwanese military saw 20 cases of defections to China between 1949 and 1989. Defectors from ...
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Taiwan's Coast Guard Under Fire After Chinese National Rides a ...
Jun 17, 2024 · In the past 10 years, 119 Chinese nationals have sought to enter Taiwan illegally. Military defections have been rare since the Cold War. ...
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MAC poll shows strong support for government cross-strait policy
Aug 22, 2025 · More than 86 percent support government policy on maintaining the status quo, with 83 percent emphasizing that the future of Taiwan should be ...
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Taiwan rejects Hong Kong model for Chinese unity - DW
Jan 1, 2020 · Taiwan's president has rejected a Chinese offer of a Hong Kong like model for unity with China. She said democracy and authoritarianism cannot co-exist in the ...