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Jui

is a Deobandi Sunni Islamist in , representing clerical interests and advocating the enforcement of law as the basis for governance.
Rooted in the conservative Deobandi tradition, the party emerged in the as a pro- faction favoring and has since positioned itself as a defender of Islamic orthodoxy against secular influences, achieving notable electoral success such as forming part of the coalition that governed in 2002-2007.
Under the long-term leadership of Maulana Fazlur Rehman, JUI-F has navigated alliances with both civilian governments and military establishments while maintaining influence in madrassa networks and Pashtun regions, though it faces criticism for ideological overlaps with militancy, including historical support for and reluctance to unequivocally denounce extremist groups.
In the 2024 general elections, it garnered 2.16 million votes, comprising 3.7% of the national share and ranking as the fifth-largest party by vote, underscoring its enduring grassroots appeal amid 's volatile political landscape.

History

Founding and Early Development

The (JUI) emerged in October 1945 as a splinter group from the , founded by Deobandi scholars led by who favored the All-India Muslim League's campaign for a separate . This divergence stemmed from irreconcilable positions on partition: while , established in 1919, opposed the division of India and maintained ties with the , JUI aligned with Muhammad Ali Jinnah's vision of a Muslim-majority state governed by Islamic principles. In the lead-up to the 1946 provincial elections, JUI clerics conducted extensive outreach in mosques and madrasas across Muslim-majority regions, urging voters to back the Muslim League to secure Pakistan's formation, which proved instrumental in consolidating religious support for the demand. Following independence in , the organization relocated its base to , particularly in the northwest, where it prioritized advocating for an Islamic amid debates over the new republic's . , appointed as a key religious advisor, issued fatwas endorsing the of 1949, which affirmed sovereignty's ultimate source as , though JUI's influence remained limited by the dominance of secular bureaucrats and military figures. Usmani's death in December 1949 marked an early transition, with subsequent leaders focusing on expanding Deobandi seminaries to foster grassroots clerical networks while pressing for Sharia-based legal reforms in the constitutional assemblies. Despite these efforts, JUI encountered resistance from Pakistan's ruling , functioning more as a religio-political pressure group than a mass party, with minimal electoral success until the late . Its early emphasis on ulema oversight of laid foundational tensions with modernist state policies, prioritizing scriptural fidelity over compromise.

Splits and Factionalization

The (JUI) experienced an initial schism in 1969, when a more leftist-oriented faction led by Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi broke away, reflecting ideological differences over political strategy amid opposition to Ayub Khan's regime; this group later merged with the in 1977. The party's leadership under Mufti Mahmud, who had reorganized JUI in the 1960s as a platform against secular , maintained a unified Deobandi core focused on enforcing and opposing Western-influenced governance. The most significant factionalization occurred following Mufti Mahmud's death on October 23, 1980, splitting JUI into Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazl) (JUI-F), led by his son Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman, and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Sami) (JUI-S), headed by Maulana . The divide stemmed from disagreements over engagement with General Zia-ul-Haq's military regime: JUI-F favored pragmatic political participation, including selective support for Zia's Islamization policies to advance electoral influence, while JUI-S prioritized uncompromising opposition, viewing Zia's rule as insufficiently Islamic and aligning more closely with madrasa-based militancy against Soviet influence in . This rift was exacerbated by JUI's brief involvement in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) against Zia, with JUI-F leaders in pushing for continued anti-regime activism, whereas JUI-S emphasized ideological purity over coalition politics. JUI-F emerged as the dominant faction, consolidating power through alliances like the (MMA) in 2002, which amplified its parliamentary presence before internal MMA disputes led to JUI-S's exit in 2003 over policy divergences on governance and foreign relations. JUI-S, rooted in Sami-ul-Haq's , focused on clerical training and support, maintaining limited electoral footprint but significant influence in Pashtun tribal areas. Smaller offshoots, such as JUI-Pakistan (JUI-P) under Maulana , splintered from JUI-F in December 2020 amid accusations of leadership centralization and electoral opportunism, further fragmenting the party's grassroots base in . Efforts at reunification have periodically surfaced, including a 2016 merger between JUI-F and the minor JUI-Nazriati faction, driven by shared Deobandi priorities but undermined by persistent leadership rivalries. These divisions have weakened JUI's cohesion, with factions competing for networks and voter loyalty, often prioritizing regional strongholds—JUI-F in southern and , JUI-S in northwestern seminaries—over national unity, as evidenced by their separate stances on post-2001 militancy and constitutional reforms.

Role in Afghan Jihad and Zia-ul-Haq Era

The (JUI) initially viewed General Muhammad 's 1977 takeover with reservations, rooted in its opposition to overriding Islamic governance principles, but pragmatic alignment emerged as Zia pursued Islamization policies and rallied support against the Soviet invasion of on December 24, 1979. The party's Deobandi clerical base provided religious legitimacy to Zia's framing of the conflict as a global against atheistic , issuing fatwas that mobilized Pakistani and Afghan ulema to endorse armed resistance. By the early 1980s, JUI's network, concentrated in border regions like , played a pivotal role in recruiting, indoctrinating, and training fighters among , with institutions under Deobandi-affiliated bodies like Wafaq-ul-Madaris al-Arabia expanding rapidly under state patronage and foreign funding from and the U.S.-backed . These seminaries, numbering in the thousands by the mid-1980s, emphasized anti-Soviet rhetoric alongside traditional , producing cadres who joined Deobandi-leaning factions such as those led by , facilitated through coordination with Pakistan's (ISI). JUI leaders, including those in the emerging pro-Zia faction, leveraged this involvement to secure political concessions, including reserved seats and funding, enhancing the party's influence amid the refugee influx of over 3 million by 1982. The 1980 split within JUI crystallized ideological divides over Zia's regime: the JUI-Fazl (JUI-F) , under Maulana Mufti Mahmud's successors and later Maulana Fazlur Rehman, embraced deeper cooperation, prioritizing support and implementation over anti-martial law purism, while JUI-Sami (JUI-S) maintained opposition. This pro-Zia alignment positioned JUI-F as a key ideological partner in channeling resources to , with party-affiliated ulema preaching in refugee camps and mosques to sustain volunteer flows estimated at tens of thousands of joining the fight by 1988. Such engagement not only bolstered Zia's domestic legitimacy amid international alliances but also entrenched Deobandi networks that later influenced post-Soviet dynamics, though it drew criticism for blurring clerical roles with state-backed militancy.

Post-9/11 Engagements and Political Alliances

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazl) (JUI-F) leaders, including chief Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman, expressed public support for the Afghan Taliban regime and opposition to potential U.S. military action, leading to Fazl-ur-Rehman's brief house arrest by Pakistani authorities in October 2001. In response to Pakistan's alignment with the U.S.-led War on Terror under President Pervez Musharraf, JUI-F joined the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), a coalition of six Islamist parties formed in June 2001, to channel anti-American sentiment and contest the October 2002 general elections. The MMA, dominated by JUI-F in Pashtun areas, secured a surprise victory in the 2002 elections, winning 45 seats nationwide and forming a provincial government in the (NWFP, now ), where JUI-F's became chief minister. During its 2002–2007 tenure, the MMA government opposed military operations against militants, passed resolutions condemning U.S. policies, enacted the Shariat Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 2003 to enforce Islamic law in Malakand, and introduced the Hisba Bill in 2005 (later struck down by courts) to create morality police, reflecting resistance to federal counterterrorism efforts. Governance emphasized Islamization but faced criticism for inefficiency, corruption, and uneven development, such as prioritizing native districts for funding. JUI-F maintained ideological affinity with the Taliban, with many Taliban leaders having studied in its Deobandi madrasas, such as , and resisted madrassah reforms aimed at curriculum modernization and registration to curb militancy links, viewing them as threats to its religious and political autonomy. Fazl-ur-Rehman advocated negotiations with the , hosted their delegations, and in 2021 hailed their Afghan takeover as a victory against foreign intervention, urging international recognition despite Pakistan's official reservations. This stance contributed to tensions with the Pakistani military, which distinguished between "good" (Afghan-focused) and "bad" (anti-Pakistan) , while JUI-F's network was accused of providing sanctuary to militants, though the party denied direct operational involvement. After the MMA's 2008 electoral decline amid voter backlash against its governance and Musharraf's ouster, JUI-F pragmatically shifted alliances, joining the (PPP)-led federal coalition and securing cabinet positions to bolster its influence. In 2013, it forged electoral pacts with the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) in key areas, supporting the PML-N government post-election for provincial coalitions in and . From 2018 to 2022, JUI-F led the (PDM) opposition alliance against 's PTI government, organizing protests and tabling a successful no-confidence motion in April 2022 that removed Khan. In the February 2024 elections, JUI-F contested largely independently without a grand alliance, securing about 2.16 million votes but criticizing results as rigged, while navigating post-poll dynamics amid PTI's exclusion. These alliances underscore JUI-F's adaptability, balancing Islamist principles with power-sharing to sustain relevance despite fluctuating electoral fortunes.

Ideology and Principles

Deobandi Theological Foundations

The theological foundations of (JUI) derive directly from the Deobandi school, a Sunni revivalist tradition emphasizing the preservation of orthodox Islamic scholarship against external influences. Established at in 1866 by scholars like Muhammad Qasim Nanautavi and , this movement prioritizes the Hanafi in (jurisprudence) and Maturidi kalam (theology) in aqeedah (creed), rejecting speculative rationalism while upholding (monotheism), adherence to the and , and the authority of classical mujtahids. JUI's ulema, trained in this system, view theology as inseparable from societal reform, mandating Sharia's supremacy over man-made laws through Hanafi-derived rulings on personal status, criminal penalties, and governance. A core principle is , the binding emulation of the four Sunni madhhabs—predominantly Hanafi for Deobandis—over unrestricted , which JUI leaders argue safeguards against interpretive errors and Western-inspired dilutions of . This manifests in opposition to reforms like uniform civil codes, insisting on punishments (e.g., for , for ) as divinely mandated, derived from Hanafi texts like . Maturidi aqeedah underpins this by affirming God's transcendence and human accountability via reason subordinate to revelation, countering Mu'tazili over-rationalism and allowing qualified defenses of alongside . Deobandi theology also incorporates a reformist approach to tasawwuf (), endorsing and Chishti orders for spiritual purification but condemning shrine-based practices as (innovation) or shirk (), such as intercessory appeals to saints over direct supplication to God. JUI madrasas propagate this via the dars-e-nizami curriculum, prioritizing collections (e.g., ) and commentaries, fostering a clerical committed to enforcing these norms politically. This framework rejects secular nationalism, positing Islam's comprehensiveness (kafah) as the sole basis for state legitimacy, with JUI's advocacy for Nizam-e-Mustafa (Prophetic order) reflecting Deobandi causal realism: as the immutable cause of societal order. Critics from rival schools, such as Barelvis, accuse Deobandis of anthropomorphic tendencies in or excessive literalism, but JUI maintains fidelity to Maturidi interpretive flexibility, as articulated in Nanautavi's , which reconciles scriptural attributes of with rational negation of resemblance. Empirical data from JUI-affiliated institutions, numbering over 10,000 Deobandi madrasas in by 2000, underscore this theology's institutionalization, producing graduates who integrate doctrinal purity with calls for Sharia's full implementation.

Core Political Positions

Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), particularly its dominant Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F), centers its political platform on Deobandi interpretations of , advocating for the comprehensive enforcement of law as the basis for governance in . The party seeks to align state institutions, including the , with Islamic principles, such as appointing judges versed in and ensuring legal reforms reflect Quranic injunctions. In 2025, JUI-F leaders demanded 's full implementation in the former (FATA) merged districts, arguing it would address local governance failures and promote Islamic justice. This stance stems from the party's foundational opposition to , viewing 's as requiring subordination to rather than Western-inspired reforms. On social issues, JUI-F promotes conservative policies rooted in Islamic norms, including gender roles defined by , with women entitled to inheritance and rights "per Islamic principles" while emphasizing family structures and moral . The party guarantees religious minorities civil protections and of worship but subordinates these to the Islamic framework of the state, rejecting secular pluralism in favor of "Wahadat-i-Millat" (unity of the nation under ). Education policy prioritizes Islamic curricula, free schooling up to secondary level, and integration of madrasas into the national system with 15% GDP allocation, aiming to instill Deobandi values alongside modern subjects. Anti-corruption measures include criminalizing graft and establishing autonomous bodies, framed as restoring Islamic ethical . Economically, JUI-F envisions an "Islamic " with interest-free banking, subsidies for small farmers via land distribution and loans, and incentives for remittances to reach $15 billion annually through formal channels. It pledges support for rural industries, allowances, and housing for laborers, while targeting a 15% tax-to-GDP ratio by curbing waste and smuggling—measures intended to redistribute resources equitably under Sharia-compliant , avoiding and promoting self-reliance over foreign aid dependency. In foreign policy, JUI-F prioritizes Pan-Islamist solidarity, friendly ties with Muslim neighbors, and resolution of disputes like through Islamic unity, while critiquing U.S. interventions. The party has historically supported Afghan reconciliation processes and maintains close ideological links to the , with leaders offering mediation in 2025 Pakistan-Afghanistan border tensions to prevent escalation and foster dialogue. It has expressed wariness toward anti- military actions, viewing them as counterproductive to regional stability, and welcomed Saudi-Pakistani defense pacts in 2025 as steps toward an "Islamic power bloc." Past positions included backing Most Favored Nation status for to benefit trade, though broader stances emphasize over alliances with non-Muslim powers conflicting with Islamic causes.

Organizational Framework

Leadership and Key Figures

The leadership of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), particularly its dominant Fazl-ur-Rehman faction (JUI-F), has historically centered on Deobandi scholars from the Mahmud family, emphasizing clerical authority over the party's political and religious direction. Mufti Mahmud (1919–1980), a prominent Islamic scholar and politician, assumed leadership of the JUI in 1962 following the death of Maulana Ahmad Ali Lahori and guided the party through opposition to military regimes, including serving briefly as Chief Minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 1972. His tenure solidified the party's anti-establishment stance, as evidenced by his resignation from the chief ministership in protest against federal encroachments in 1973. Upon Mufti Mahmud's death in October 1980, his son, Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman (born June 19, 1953), emerged as the party's leader, initially as acting president and later as the elected ameer of JUI-F, a position he has held continuously since the mid-1980s amid factional splits. Under Fazl-ur-Rehman's stewardship, the JUI-F has navigated alliances with both civilian governments and military influences, leveraging its network for mobilization while maintaining opposition roles, such as leading protests against perceived electoral rigging in and mediating in Pak-Afghan border tensions as recently as October 2025. Key figures beyond the central leadership include Maulana , a senior JUI-F parliamentarian and former leader who has influenced the party's legislative agenda on religious matters, and , a longtime assembly member who served as provincial from 2002 to 2007 under a MMA . These individuals, often drawn from the party's clerical cadre, operate within a (council) system that advises the ameer but defers to his strategic decisions in electoral and politics. Factional rivals, such as Maulana of the splinter JUI-S until his death in 2018, have occasionally challenged JUI-F dominance but represent minority strands rooted in differing alliances during the Afghan era.

Madrasa Network and Grassroots Structure

The Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazl (JUI-F) derives much of its organizational resilience from an extensive Deobandi network, which serves as the primary conduit for clerical recruitment and ideological propagation. These seminaries, coordinated through federations like Wafaq-ul-Madaris al-Arabia, encompassed approximately 9,500 registered institutions as of the mid-2000s, representing the dominant share of Pakistan's religious schools and producing graduates who fill key roles across the party's hierarchy. JUI-F-affiliated , often numbering in the thousands and operated by party members, function as ideological training grounds, embedding Deobandi orthodoxy while fostering loyalty to the party's political objectives. At the grassroots level, this network underpins JUI-F's decentralized structure, with local acting as mobilization hubs in rural and tribal areas of , , and southern . District and provincial committees are overwhelmingly composed of ulema and madrasa alumni, who leverage seminary communities for voter outreach, protest coordination—such as the 2019 Azadi March—and enforcement of . This cleric-dominated framework ensures rapid activation but prioritizes religious authority over broader societal representation, enabling the party to sustain influence in Pashtun belts despite electoral fluctuations. The system's integration into JUI-F's operations is reinforced by the party's strategic resistance to regulatory reforms, which could impose curriculum oversight or financial transparency and erode clerical control. JUI-F has historically aligned with federations to block federal registration drives, as during the 2002-2008 MMA era when provincial governments under its influence curtailed reform implementation. In December 2024, negotiations with the federal government yielded amendments to the Registration Act, transferring oversight from education to industries ministries, thereby safeguarding the network's operational independence and its role as a bulwark for party survival.

Electoral Performance

National Assembly and Senate Results

In the 2008 Pakistani general elections held on February 18, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (F) (JUI-F) secured 8 seats in the National Assembly. The party's performance reflected its influence in conservative rural constituencies, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then North-West Frontier Province) and Balochistan, where Deobandi networks provided grassroots mobilization. In the 2013 general elections on May 11, JUI-F won 15 of the 272 general seats, consolidating its position as a key regional player amid alliances with Pakistan Peoples Party elements in Balochistan. This result, yielding a total of around 24 seats including reserved quotas for women and non-Muslims, enabled JUI-F to influence provincial governance and opposition dynamics. The 2018 general elections on saw JUI-F's representation drop to 6 general seats, focused in its core areas despite national challenges from Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf's surge. In the February 8, 2024, elections, JUI-F won 4 seats, positioning it as the largest Islamist party in the house but highlighting broader electoral contraction outside Pashtun belts. These outcomes underscore JUI-F's reliance on clerical endorsements and madrasa-affiliated voter bases, with vote shares typically under 5% nationally but higher locally. Senate representation for JUI-F stems from indirect elections by provincial assemblies and the , favoring parties with sustained provincial strength. From 2008 to 2013, JUI-F held 7 seats, leveraging and assemblies. In the April 2024 partial polls (37 seats contested), JUI-F retained influence through coalition negotiations, maintaining a foothold amid in due to assembly disputes. Following the July 21, 2025, elections in (11 seats), JUI-F secured 2 seats—one general and one technocrat—bringing its total to 7 senators as of late July 2025. This enduring presence, often 5-8 seats per cycle, amplifies JUI-F's legislative voice on religious legislation despite limited direct popular mandate.

Provincial and Local Successes

In the 2024 provincial elections for , (JUI-F) secured direct wins in several constituencies, particularly in southern districts such as , , and , leveraging its Deobandi clerical networks and opposition to the ruling (PTI). Following the of Pakistan's (ECP) allocation of reserved seats for women and minorities in July and October 2025, JUI-F emerged as the largest party in the 145-seat assembly with 18 members, surpassing PTI-backed independents and positioning itself as the primary opposition force. This development stemmed from ECP rulings on , which awarded JUI-F additional seats based on its vote share of over 1 million in the province. In Balochistan's 65-seat provincial assembly, JUI-F consistently holds a bloc of 12 to 14 seats post-2024 elections, forming a key opposition contingent with influence in Pashtun-majority areas like , , and Musakhel. The party won 10 general seats outright in February 2024, drawing support from madrasa-affiliated voters and tribal leaders opposed to secular governance, though it has occasionally joined coalitions, such as supporting the (PPP)-led government in exchange for policy concessions on religious matters. This provincial foothold has enabled JUI-F to block legislation on reforms and advocate for Sharia-aligned policies within the assembly. At the local level, JUI-F demonstrated strength in the 2021–22 local government elections, capturing the mayor's office in —defeating PTI candidates in a major upset—and winning chairmanships in and multiple councils across 17 districts. The party secured 16 chairmen positions and led in overall council seats, particularly in rural and tribal areas, where its grassroots structure mobilized voters disillusioned with provincial governance. In , JUI-F contributed to victories in local by-elections on January 26, 2025, winning several union council seats alongside allies like and the National Party, reinforcing its presence in district-level bodies. These local triumphs underscore JUI-F's reliance on clerical influence rather than broad urban appeal, sustaining its provincial relevance amid national electoral challenges.

Alliances, Coalitions, and Rivalries

Historical Partnerships

The (JUI) engaged in its earliest notable post-independence political partnerships through coalitions with regional nationalist groups following the 1970 general elections, where it secured significant representation in the (now ) and . In these provinces, JUI formed governments in alliance with the (NAP), a left-leaning Pashtun and Baloch nationalist outfit led by . Mufti Mahmud, JUI's leader at the time, assumed the position of of the in May 1972, heading a coalition cabinet that emphasized Islamic principles alongside regional autonomy demands until its dismissal by Prime Minister in 1973 amid escalating tensions over governance and separatism accusations. A parallel JUI-NAP coalition operated in under until 1973. These arrangements highlighted JUI's pragmatic willingness to partner with non-Islamist entities to consolidate Deobandi clerical influence in peripheral regions, though they unraveled due to ideological clashes and federal intervention. By 1977, JUI shifted to broader opposition alliances against Bhutto's (PPP), joining the (PNA), a nine-party coalition encompassing conservative, Islamist, and centrist factions united against perceived electoral rigging and secular policies. The PNA, which included the (PML), (JI), (JUP), and others, boycotted parts of the March 1977 polls and launched mass protests demanding fresh elections and Nizam-e-Mustafa (rule by Islamic injunctions), drawing millions and paralyzing urban centers until General Zia-ul-Haq's July 1977 coup dissolved the . JUI's participation lent religious credibility to the movement, with its ulema mobilizing mosques and madrasas, though internal divisions emerged post-coup as some leaders reconciled with Zia's regime while others critiqued its authoritarianism. Under Zia's Islamization drive from 1977 to 1988, JUI provided tacit and overt support, partnering informally with the military establishment to endorse , laws, and Sharia courts, which aligned with Deobandi . This alignment facilitated JUI's expansion of networks funded partly through state channels, positioning it as a beneficiary of Zia's anti-secular pivot, though it avoided full subsumption into state-controlled structures like the Majlis-e-Shura advisory council. The party's 1980 schism into JUI-Fazl (JUI-F, led by Maulana Fazlur Rehman, favoring political engagement) and JUI-Sami (JUI-S, led by Maulana Samiul Haq, emphasizing autonomy) influenced subsequent partnerships, with JUI-F pursuing electoral coalitions. In the late 1980s and , JUI-F forged alliances with right-wing parties like the PML-Nawaz (PML-N) and , contesting seats in and through seat adjustments and joint campaigns to counter PPP dominance, as seen in the and elections amid transitions to civilian rule. These pacts emphasized and Islamic platforms, yielding provincial gains for JUI-F, such as ministries in PML-N cabinets. Uniquely among Islamist parties, JUI-F also built cross-ideological ties with secular-leaning groups like the PPP and Awami National Party (ANP), exemplified by provincial coalitions in the and early 2000s, driven by shared regional interests in rather than doctrinal convergence. Such flexibility stemmed from JUI's madrasa-based grassroots strength, enabling opportunistic balancing against military or dominant civilian foes, though it drew criticism for diluting ideological purity.

Contemporary Oppositions

In the aftermath of the February 2024 general elections, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (F) (JUI-F) emerged as a principal opponent to the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)-led coalition government, rejecting overtures to join the federal cabinet despite PML-N's post-poll outreach to Maulana Fazlur Rehman. The party cited widespread electoral irregularities, including delayed results and alleged manipulations favoring establishment-backed candidates, as grounds for its non-participation, opting instead to enter parliament with explicit reservations. JUI-F's antagonism toward the ruling coalition intensified through public criticisms and threats of mobilization; in June 2025, Fazlur Rehman warned the government that his party could orchestrate a takeover of within a week if provoked, echoing pre-election patterns of leveraging street power against perceived illegitimate regimes. This stance aligns with JUI-F's provincial strongholds, where it became the largest opposition bloc in the Assembly with 18 seats by July 2025, challenging PML-N and allied forces on and issues. Relations with (PTI), another major opposition entity, remain fraught despite exploratory talks for a grand anti-government ; as of 2025, JUI-F demanded seat adjustments and guarantees from PTI in before committing, stemming from historical clashes like the 2019 Azadi orchestrated by JUI-F against PTI's Imran Khan-led administration. Such hesitancy has hindered unified opposition efforts, with JUI-F prioritizing autonomy over subordination to PTI's populist platform. Pragmatic negotiations with the PML-N-PPP government on specific legislation, such as the proposed 26th package in October 2024, reveal tactical flexibility, yet JUI-F has disavowed rumors of blanket support, expressing skepticism over intra-coalition frictions as recently as October 2025. This pattern positions JUI-F as a pivotal, independent critic, exploiting governmental vulnerabilities while avoiding full alignment with secular-leaning rivals or military-influenced coalitions.

Controversies and Debates

Alleged Links to Militant Groups

The (JUI), particularly its Fazl (JUI-F) faction, has faced allegations of ideological and indirect support for the through its extensive network of Deobandi madrasas, which have historically served as grounds for fighters. Reports indicate that , JUI-affiliated seminaries permitted leaders to recruit Afghan and i students, contributing to the group's regrouping in . Similarly, with JUI-F backing, the accessed Deobandi madrasas for and reorganization during its resurgence. These institutions, emphasizing a strict Deobandi aligned with ideology, have been criticized for fostering rather than formal education, though JUI leaders maintain they promote religious scholarship. JUI-F chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman has been accused of sympathizing with the Taliban, including public endorsements following their 2021 takeover of Afghanistan. In August 2021, Rehman congratulated Taliban leader Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada on the victory and praised the group's reconciliation policy, viewing it as a restoration of Islamic governance. The party expressed optimism for a stable Afghanistan under Taliban rule, aligning with its opposition to Western-backed secular reforms. In 2017, Rehman invited Pakistani Taliban militants to join JUI-F, framing it as an offer for political integration amid ongoing violence. Such statements have fueled claims of tacit support, despite JUI-F's denials of operational ties to militancy. Related allegations extend to JUI's resistance against reforms aimed at curbing curricula, with JUI-F blocking government efforts to mandate secular subjects and registration, potentially sustaining environments conducive to . In , Rehman's visit to to meet officials, including the deputy prime minister, was portrayed by him as congratulating their resistance against U.S.-led forces, further highlighting perceived affinities. Critics, including Pakistani analysts, argue these links exacerbate cross-border militancy, though of direct funding or command structures remains limited to ideological overlap and alumni networks. JUI-F has countered that such accusations stem from political rivalries and misrepresent its advocacy for Pashtun and Islamic interests.

Resistance to Educational and Social Reforms

Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazl (JUI-F) has mounted significant opposition to state-led efforts to reform Pakistan's system, particularly those mandating the inclusion of modern subjects such as , , and English alongside religious curricula. Party leaders, including chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman, have framed such reforms as threats to Islamic education's , arguing they impose secular influences under the guise of oversight by the Ministry of Education. In September 2014, JUI-F organized protest rallies in districts like and against proposed national curriculum revisions, which activists claimed diluted core Islamic content in favor of Western-oriented material. This resistance intensified in late 2024 amid debates over the , where JUI-F demanded seminaries register under the Ministry of Industries instead of Education to evade requirements for curriculum standardization and financial transparency linked to counter-terrorism financing. The party threatened street protests and issued ultimatums to the government, accusing bureaucratic delays of undermining religious institutions' credibility. By October 2024, JUI-F secured a political deal exempting thousands of unregistered from mandatory compliance, effectively stalling broader reforms aimed at integrating over 30,000 seminaries enrolling approximately 2.5 million students. On social reforms, JUI-F has similarly resisted measures expanding women's roles beyond traditional boundaries defined by interpretations, viewing them as imports of liberal ideologies that erode family structures. Affiliated clerics, such as those from JUI-F, publicly denounced the 2020 , criticizing slogans like "Mera Jism Meri Marzi" as promoting moral decay and female autonomy incompatible with Islamic modesty requirements. In June 2025, the party opposed a federal bill setting a minimum age of 18, with leaders contending it violated religious freedoms by overriding scriptural allowances for earlier unions under . While JUI-F's 2024 election manifesto pledged "equal education" and safety measures for women, these commitments emphasize protection within segregated, faith-based frameworks rather than endorsing unrestricted or reforms.

Positions on Blasphemy, Minorities, and Women's Rights

Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazl (JUI-F) has consistently opposed amendments to Pakistan's laws, which impose severe penalties including death for offenses against . In 2018, JUI-F secretary general Senator Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Haideri declared the party would block any changes, viewing them as threats to religious sanctity. Similarly, in 2017, the party warned of nationwide agitation against federal government efforts to review the laws, emphasizing their unalterable nature to safeguard Islamic honor. JUI-F leaders, including Maulana Fazlur Rehman, have advocated retaining the death penalty for convictions, aligning with demands for stricter implementation post-2021 . These stances reflect the party's Deobandi ideology, prioritizing protection of prophetic reverence over concerns about misuse against individuals. On religious minorities, JUI-F and policies emphasize Islamic supremacy, often marginalizing non-Sunni groups. The party has targeted Ahmadis, declaring them non-Muslims and supporting constitutional , as evidenced by anti-Ahmadi in rallies. During 2019 protests, Maulana Fazlur Rehman incorporated anti-minority narratives, alleging conspiracies by and to undermine , which fueled sectarian tensions. While Rehman stated in 2018 that minorities deserve equal rights under an MMA coalition manifesto, party actions contradict this, including defense of laws disproportionately enforced against , , and Ahmadis—over 1,500 cases since 1987, per data. JUI-F's network promotes curricula viewing minorities as deviations from , contributing to societal exclusion without formal advocacy for protections like separate electorates reform. Regarding , JUI-F adheres to conservative interpretations, resisting reforms perceived as Western imports. The party opposed the 2016 Punjab Protection of Women Against Violence Act, arguing it promoted immorality and undermined family structures, echoing critiques influenced by JUI clerics. In June 2025, Maulana Fazlur Rehman rejected the Islamabad Capital Territory Child Protection Bill, deeming it incompatible with Islamic norms on guardianship and marriage age. JUI-F has criticized women's rights marches as obscene, with leaders accusing activists of vulgarity and cultural erosion. Its 2024 pledged women's safety and education access but within segregated, Sharia-compliant frameworks, opposing co-education and liberal laws; historically, the party backed Zia-ul-Haq's Hudood Ordinances, which impose evidentiary burdens disadvantaging women in and cases. These positions prioritize patriarchal Islamic over initiatives.

Impact and Legacy

Contributions to Islamic Education and Resistance to Secularism

Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) has played a pivotal role in advancing Deobandi-oriented Islamic education in Pakistan through its deep ties to madrasa networks, particularly following the partition when affiliated Deobandi scholars established seminaries to sustain traditional Sunni scholarship. These institutions emphasize Quranic exegesis, , , and , offering tuition-free instruction to underserved rural and urban populations where state schooling often falls short. JUI's involvement extends to oversight bodies like Rabita al-Madaris Islamia, directly linked to the party, which coordinates Deobandi curricula and teacher training across provinces. In 2021, JUI-F leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman assumed the role of patron-in-chief of Wifaq ul Madaris al-Arabia, the dominant Deobandi federation supervising thousands of seminaries and certifying qualifications equivalent to university degrees in religious studies. This affiliation has enabled JUI to influence pedagogical standards, resisting dilution of core Islamic content while expanding enrollment; by the early 2000s, Deobandi madrasas under such umbrellas educated over 1.5 million students annually, focusing on clerical training and community moral guidance. The party's efforts have preserved interpretive traditions against erosion from modernization, producing generations of ulama who staff mosques, courts, and political platforms. JUI's commitment to Islamic primacy manifests in staunch opposition to secular encroachments on education, framing state-driven reforms as threats to Sharia sovereignty. In October 2024, JUI-F negotiated a government concession exempting its madrasas from mandatory registration under the Societies Registration Act, averting what the party deemed intrusive oversight akin to secular control. Similarly, in December 2024, JUI-F rejected a draft bill imposing regulatory frameworks on religious schools, insisting that such measures prioritize foreign-influenced secularism over autonomous Islamic pedagogy. Historically, JUI resisted General Pervez Musharraf's reforms mandating secular subjects like and English in madrasas, alongside registration, viewing them as dilution of religious focus; protests led by JUI in 2004 decried textbook revisions removing references as anti-Islamic . The party has also critiqued broader initiatives, such as the Single National Curriculum proposed in 2020, for insufficiently embedding principles and favoring uniform secular standards over sectarian Islamic variances. Through parliamentary leverage and street mobilizations, JUI has compelled concessions, ensuring madrasas retain curricular independence while advocating Islamization of public schools to counter perceived secular drift.

Influence on Pakistani Politics and Afghan Relations

The Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazl (JUI-F) has exerted significant influence in Pakistani politics as a pragmatic Islamist party, often acting as a in governments due to its strong base in and provinces. In the post-2008 democratic era, JUI-F joined the Peoples Party-led , securing three federal ministries and leveraging its participation to advance conservative religious agendas while navigating alliances with secular parties. The party played a pivotal role in the 2022 opposition alliance against , contributing to the no-confidence motion submitted on March 8, 2022, which culminated in Khan's ouster on April 10, 2022, after 174 votes against him in the . Subsequently, JUI-F integrated into the ensuing , though it later distanced itself amid disputes over election rigging claims following the February 8, 2024, polls, which it rejected as manipulated by influence. This pattern underscores JUI-F's strategy of balancing ideological rigidity with opportunistic , sustaining its relevance despite limited national vote shares, often around 4-5% in general elections. JUI-F's influence extends to Afghan relations through deep ideological and clerical ties rooted in Deobandi networks, with the party historically supporting during the Soviet invasion and fostering sympathy for the regime even after Pakistan's official alignment against them. Many leaders emerged from madrassas affiliated with JUI-F's clerical base, enabling the party to maintain informal channels of influence across the . In January , JUI-F chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman met senior officials in to mediate strained Pakistan-Afghanistan ties amid cross-border militancy, aiming to stabilize relations post- takeover on , 2021. This engagement reflects JUI-F's prioritization of Islamist solidarity, which Fazlur Rehman cited as a factor in his party's poor performance, arguing it alienated Pakistani voters wary of instability spillover. Such relations have drawn for potentially undermining Pakistan's security by bolstering groups like the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, though JUI-F frames its role as promoting regional Islamic governance over secular interventions.

Criticisms from Secular and International Perspectives

Secular critics in , including liberal intellectuals and organizations, have accused (JUI-F) of fostering through its control over madrassas, which often resist curriculum reforms aimed at incorporating secular subjects like and . In 2022, JUI-F leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman mobilized opposition against government efforts to regulate madrassas under the Single National Curriculum, arguing that such measures infringe on religious autonomy and threaten Deobandi educational traditions, a stance viewed by reformers as perpetuating isolation from modern and enabling ideologies. This resistance is criticized for prioritizing clerical influence over national development, with reports linking unregistered JUI-affiliated madrassas to recruitment for groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). On , JUI-F has drawn sharp rebuke from Pakistani feminists and secular activists for opposing initiatives like the , an annual demonstration for held on , with party officials in 2022 threatening to halt it using "batons" and decrying its slogans as promoting "obscenity" under the guise of rights advocacy. The party has also contested provincial women protection bills, such as Punjab's 2016 legislation against , with Fazlur Rehman labeling it un-Islamic and incompatible with , prompting accusations of entrenching patriarchal norms that limit female participation in public life—JUI-F lacked a formal until 2004 despite constitutional quotas for female legislators. In a 2016 incident, a JUI-F senator verbally assaulted a female guest on during discussions of honor killings, which claim dozens of women's lives annually, further fueling claims of the party's disdain for gender reforms. Internationally, human rights organizations and Western governments have condemned JUI-F's historical role in supporting the , including Fazlur Rehman's assistance in its 1990s formation alongside Pakistan's , which facilitated the group's rise and imposition of restrictive interpretations that curtailed women's education and minority protections in . Following the 's 2021 resurgence, JUI-F's public endorsements elicited criticism from entities like for bolstering a accused of systemic abuses, including bans on female secondary schooling and executions under blasphemy provisions akin to those JUI-F champions in . U.S. Department reports highlight JUI-F's advocacy for stringent blasphemy laws, which have led to over 40 cases against minorities in single months, as exacerbating and endangering groups like and Ahmadis, with the party's Deobandi sectarian leanings implicated in anti-Shia violence in . These positions are seen as undermining 's commitments under international covenants like the Universal Declaration of , prioritizing theocratic governance over pluralistic standards.

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