Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

PJM Interconnection

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM) is an independent regional transmission organization (RTO) certified by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission that coordinates the movement of wholesale electricity and ensures the reliability of the high-voltage transmission grid serving all or parts of 13 states—Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia—and the District of Columbia.^[1]^[2]^[3] PJM operates competitive wholesale markets for energy, capacity, and ancillary services, while performing long-term regional transmission planning to support efficient grid expansion and integration of generation resources.^[4]^[5] The organization oversees more than 1,400 electric generators providing approximately 183,000 megawatts of capacity, connected via over 88,000 miles of transmission lines, delivering around 770 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity annually to more than 65 million consumers.^[5]^[6]^[7] As one of the largest RTOs in North America by population served and peak load—reaching 165,000 megawatts—PJM plays a pivotal role in balancing supply and demand, mitigating reliability risks during periods of rapid generation retirements and increasing electrification-driven demand growth.^[8]^[5]

History

Formation as a Power Pool (1927–1990s)

The Pennsylvania-New Jersey Interconnection, the precursor to PJM, originated on September 27, 1927, when three utilities—the Philadelphia Electric Company (PECO), Pennsylvania Power & Light Company (PPL), and Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G)—agreed to form the world's first power pool.^[9]^[10] These vertically integrated utilities, operating in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, interconnected their transmission systems to enable coordinated generation dispatch and reserve sharing, aiming to achieve economic efficiencies by utilizing the lowest-cost available units across the group while enhancing reliability through mutual support during demand peaks or outages.^[11] Early operations relied on voluntary bilateral agreements for cost-sharing, with manual coordination via telephone to schedule generation and maintain spinning reserves, allowing members to reduce individual reserve holdings by leveraging pooled capacity. In 1928, the pool integrated the newly completed Conowingo Dam hydroelectric plant on the Susquehanna River, owned by PECO, which provided approximately 252 megawatts of capacity and was shared among participants to bolster regional supply diversity and hydropower utilization without requiring redundant infrastructure from each utility.^[12]^[13]^[14] This integration exemplified the pool's focus on resource pooling for stability, as the dam's output helped offset variable demand and supported economic dispatch across interconnected lines. By the mid-20th century, the arrangement evolved through incremental membership growth and procedural refinements, including formalized manual dispatch protocols in control centers to optimize real-time unit commitments.^[11] In 1956, the addition of Maryland-based utilities prompted a rename to the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (PJM), expanding the footprint while preserving the voluntary, non-competitive framework centered on cost recovery via pro-rata allocations rather than market bidding.^[11] Further utilities joined in subsequent decades, such as in 1965, enabling broader reserve pooling that empirically demonstrated reliability benefits: coordinated operations lowered overall reserve requirements, minimized curtailments, and sustained uninterrupted service across the region through bilateral trust and shared incentives, absent any federal open-access requirements. Up to the 1990s, PJM's model prioritized deterministic planning and engineering coordination over economic competition, yielding stable performance metrics like reduced per-utility capacity margins due to collective risk distribution.

FERC Orders and Transition to RTO (1996–2001)

In response to concerns over transmission owners' potential to discriminate against non-affiliated generators, thereby perpetuating monopolistic control in wholesale electricity markets, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Order No. 888 on April 24, 1996. This order mandated that public utilities file open access transmission tariffs providing non-discriminatory access to their grids, aiming to foster competition by separating transmission services from generation ownership and requiring comparable treatment for third-party users versus the utilities' own resources.^[15]^[16] Concurrently, Order No. 889 established standards of conduct to prevent information advantages and required the implementation of an Open Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS) for real-time electronic posting of transmission availability and pricing data, addressing causal risks of undue preferences through enforced transparency.^[15] These reforms recognized that vertically integrated utilities' control over transmission bottlenecked competition, as owners could favor their own power plants in dispatch and access decisions, and sought to enable market-based generation entry by standardizing access rules. To comply with these mandates, the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) power pool restructured into an independent system operator (ISO) in 1997, transferring operational control of transmission facilities from member utilities to a neutral entity responsible for centralized dispatch and scheduling.^[2] FERC approved PJM's ISO proposal, which initially managed approximately 55 GW of generating capacity across the mid-Atlantic region, ensuring non-discriminatory access while utilities retained ownership.^[17] This transition causally mitigated discrimination risks by vesting dispatch authority in an independent operator unbound by ownership interests, allowing efficient real-time balancing of supply and demand across interconnected systems; empirical evidence from early operations showed reduced reliance on bilateral contracts and initial steps toward competitive bidding, though full market effects emerged later. FERC's December 1997 order further required PJM to implement market monitoring to detect and deter anticompetitive behavior, underscoring the agency's emphasis on oversight to sustain open access benefits.^[17] Building on ISO foundations, FERC's Order No. 2000, issued December 20, 1999, outlined minimum characteristics for Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) to enhance regional planning and eliminate remaining seams between control areas, including independent governance, broad scope over transmission assets, and authority to plan and ensure expansion.^[18] PJM achieved RTO designation in 2001, granting it expanded control over transmission planning and congestion management independent of individual owners, which addressed causal inefficiencies in fragmented planning that had previously hindered optimal grid utilization and reliability under monopoly-like structures.^[2]^[19] This evolution from ISO to RTO empirically supported greater competition by enabling proactive regional upgrades, reducing barriers to new entry, and aligning incentives toward least-cost reliability, though FERC's voluntary approach relied on utilities' participation to avoid overreach into state-sited generation.^[20]

Expansions and Deregulation Era (2002–2003)

In April 2002, PJM Interconnection expanded its operational footprint by integrating the Allegheny Power System (APS), creating a "PJM West" region that incorporated transmission assets across parts of Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Maryland, Virginia, and Ohio.^[21] This addition increased PJM's peak load responsibility from approximately 58,000 MW to over 75,000 MW, reflecting the absorption of APS's service territory and enabling broader market participation amid state-driven deregulation efforts.^[22] The move was facilitated by Allegheny's decision to join PJM rather than form a separate transmission organization, aligning with Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) incentives for regional coordination to enhance competition and efficiency.^[23] This expansion coincided with the maturation of retail choice programs in Pennsylvania and adjacent states, where deregulation laws—such as Pennsylvania's Electricity Choice Act of 1996—had unbundled generation from transmission, spurring entry by independent power producers and competitive suppliers.^[22] By early 2002, these policies had attracted new generation capacity, including natural gas-fired plants, to serve growing demand in PJM's expanded zone, with Pennsylvania alone seeing over 300,000 customers supplied by alternative providers.^[24] Integration into PJM's framework allowed these entrants to access a larger, liquid wholesale market, reducing reliance on bilateral contracts and promoting price signals for efficient resource deployment.^[22] Preparations in 2002–2003 focused on transitioning Allegheny's operations from bilateral scheduling to PJM's centralized dispatch model, which utilized locational marginal pricing (LMP) for energy and ancillary services to optimize real-time grid flows.^[21] This shift, while advancing market liberalization, introduced initial challenges, including heightened transmission congestion in the western zone due to legacy infrastructure constraints and differing operational practices among legacy utilities.^[21] Such trade-offs highlighted the tensions between rapid deregulation-induced growth and the need for coordinated reliability measures, as evidenced by elevated reserve shortfalls during peak periods in the integrated region.^[21]

Northeast Blackout Response and Recovery (2003–2005)

The Northeast blackout of August 14, 2003, originated in the FirstEnergy Corporation's control area in northern Ohio, where overgrown trees contacted high-voltage transmission lines, triggering a sequence of line failures and generator trips that cascaded across the Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator (MISO) region and into parts of New York and Ontario.^[25] PJM Interconnection's grid, serving the Mid-Atlantic and parts of the Midwest, experienced minimal direct impact, with its systems remaining operational and avoiding widespread outages for approximately 60 million customers in its footprint.^[26] This resilience stemmed from PJM's distinct control area boundaries, which limited the blackout's propagation, as the initial disturbances occurred outside PJM's operational jurisdiction under MISO.^[25] PJM operators detected early indicators of voltage instability in interconnected neighboring systems around 2:00 p.m. EDT and promptly notified affected parties while initiating islanding procedures to disconnect transmission ties with the destabilizing areas.^[26] These actions, including real-time monitoring and selective generation redispatch, prevented the cascade from extending into PJM's network, though brief frequency and voltage excursions occurred during the temporary islanded state as load-generation imbalances were corrected.^[27] The U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force's investigation confirmed that root causes—such as a software bug disabling alarms at FirstEnergy's control center, inadequate situational awareness, and poor vegetation management—were confined to non-PJM entities, underscoring PJM's effective separation as a key factor in containing the event.^[25] In the immediate aftermath, PJM focused on post-disturbance assessments and coordination with federal agencies, contributing data to the Task Force without requiring extensive internal restoration due to sustained operations.^[26] The Task Force's April 2004 final report recommended enforceable reliability standards, prompting the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to direct the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to develop mandatory rules addressing vegetation management, operator training, and system protection.^[25] By 2005, PJM had integrated these reforms, enhancing vegetation clearance protocols to maintain at least 50% of the minimum approach distances under NERC's emerging FAC-003 standard and upgrading operator training programs with advanced simulation tools for blackout scenario response.^[26] The Energy Policy Act of 2005 further codified NERC standards as legally binding with civil penalties up to $1 million per day per violation, enabling PJM to strengthen inter-regional coordination mechanisms and real-time data sharing to mitigate future cross-boundary risks.^[28]

Further Expansions and Market Evolutions (2006–2015)

In 2007, PJM implemented the Reliability Pricing Model (RPM), a forward-looking capacity market mechanism intended to supplant the prior Installed Capacity (ICAP) system, which relied on shorter-term, seasonal obligations that provided inadequate incentives for long-term generation investment amid rising retirements and demand growth.^[29]^[30] The RPM established annual Base Residual Auctions procuring capacity three years in advance, incorporating locational value through deliverability requirements and a downward-sloping demand curve calibrated to price scarcity based on reliability targets, thereby aiming to elicit competitive supply responses without relying solely on energy market price spikes.^[31]^[32] The inaugural RPM auction ran from April 2 to April 6, 2007, clearing 160,945 megawatts of capacity for the June 1, 2007, to May 31, 2008, delivery year at an average price of $42.34 per megawatt-day, reflecting initial market clearing above ICAP levels and signaling improved resource adequacy.^[33] This transition addressed empirical shortfalls in the ICAP regime, where capacity prices had suppressed below cost-recovery thresholds, contributing to reserve margins approaching critical levels in the mid-2000s; post-RPM, auctions incorporated net cost-of-new-entry benchmarks and variable resource requirements to sustain investment.^[30]^[34] Through 2015, RPM auctions demonstrated competitive dynamics, with prices fluctuating in response to supply conditions—such as natural gas plant additions offsetting coal retirements—while procuring installed reserve margins consistently above FERC-approved targets, for example, 19.8% achieved versus a 15.7% requirement in the 2015/2016 auction planning for delivery years within the period.^[35]^[36] These outcomes empirically mitigated scarcity risks, as evidenced by no involuntary load shedding events and stabilized peak-period reliability, though critics noted that administrative price caps occasionally dampened full scarcity signals in locational delivery areas.^[37] Regional transmission expansions under PJM's Regional Transmission Expansion Plan supported these market evolutions by alleviating congestion, enabling over $4.7 billion in approved upgrades by 2012 to integrate remote resources into capacity commitments.^[38]

Recent Reforms and Challenges (2016–Present)

In 2022, PJM transitioned to a reformed interconnection process approved by FERC in December, shifting from serial "first-in, first-out" studies to a cycle-based cluster study approach to address a backlog exceeding 250 GW from over 2,700 proposed projects, largely renewables and storage. This reform incorporated readiness requirements, site control verification, and commercial viability milestones to filter speculative requests and minimize restudies, with the first new cycle commencing in July 2023. By August 2024, PJM advanced 204 projects totaling 72 GW—predominantly renewables—to the system impact study phase, while transition processing reduced the legacy queue to about 46 GW by September 2025, though full clearance extends into 2026.^[39]^[40]^[41] Capacity auctions reflected intensifying supply-demand imbalances from coal and gas retirements—totaling over 20 GW announced since 2016—coupled with load growth projections rising 1.4% annually, accelerated by data centers adding 5–10 GW in forecasts. The 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction cleared 135,684 MW region-wide at $269.92/MW-day on average, a near-tenfold jump from $28.92/MW-day in the prior auction, driven by reduced supply offers (down 6.6 GW net), heightened peak demand, and ELCC recalibrations lowering credits for wind and solar. Some zones like Baltimore Gas & Electric reached $466/MW-day, signaling localized shortages.^[42]^[43]^[44] Winter Storm Elliott in December 2022 exposed vulnerabilities, with a 29-degree temperature plunge triggering 70% of forced outages from gas-fired units despite prior advisories; PJM responded by mandating enhanced cold-weather checklists, achieving 90%+ compliance from generators and better performance in 2025's January storms via emergency protocols. Forward-looking FERC filings outlined 2026–2030 risks, including potential shortfalls from retirements outpacing additions by 10–20 GW amid 72% load growth to 2040, prompting the Reliability Resource Initiative to prioritize 11.7 GW of dispatchable resources like gas and batteries for fast-tracking.^[45]^[46]^[47]^[48]

Organizational Structure and Governance

Membership and Stakeholder Engagement

PJM Interconnection functions as a non-stock, member-owned limited liability company, facilitating voluntary participation from diverse market participants through market-driven incentives rather than compulsory mandates. Membership comprises five categories: transmission owners responsible for maintaining high-voltage lines, generation owners operating power plants, electric distributors serving end-use customers, other suppliers including marketers and brokers, and end-use customers with significant load. These members must adhere to eligibility criteria, such as demonstrating financial responsibility and compliance with reliability standards, as detailed in PJM's operating agreement.^[49] This structure encourages engagement by aligning interests with competitive outcomes, where participants gain from efficient market signals like capacity auctions and locational marginal pricing.^[50] Stakeholder engagement occurs via a collaborative process involving over 20 committees, subcommittees, task forces, and working groups, where members propose, debate, and vote on revisions to rules, tariffs, and market designs. Voting allocates shares by sector—such as 25% each to Generation Owners, Transmission Owners, Electric Distributors, and Other Suppliers, with the remaining 10% to Independent Members—to prevent dominance by any group and promote consensus. Proposals advance through stages of issue identification, scoping, development, and voting, requiring simple majorities or supermajorities for approval before submission to the PJM Board and potential FERC filing; this bottom-up mechanism has historically integrated feedback from competitive entities, evidenced by over 1,000 stakeholder-initiated changes since the early 2000s.^[51]^[52] The independent Market Monitoring Unit (MMU), managed by Monitoring Analytics since 2007, oversees compliance and scrutinizes transactions for market power abuse or structural flaws that could undermine competition. The MMU conducts real-time monitoring, investigates referrals, and issues annual state-of-the-market reports analyzing bidding patterns, resource adequacy, and incentive alignment, recommending adjustments to preserve nondiscriminatory access and efficient pricing. For instance, MMU assessments have identified and mitigated issues like uplift payments that distort incentives, reinforcing reliance on voluntary, price-responsive participation over administrative allocations.^[53]^[54]

Regulatory Framework and FERC Oversight

PJM Interconnection operates as a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) under the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), which oversees its compliance with federal standards for non-discriminatory transmission access and competitive wholesale markets.^[29] Established through FERC Order No. 2000 in 1999, which encouraged the formation of RTOs to manage multi-state transmission systems, PJM's tariffs and market rules are subject to FERC approval under sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act, ensuring rates, terms, and conditions remain just and reasonable.^[3] The Energy Policy Act of 2005 further solidified FERC's authority by enhancing enforcement mechanisms for reliability and market integrity, including backstop siting authority for transmission lines, though PJM's core RTO status predates this legislation.^[55] A key aspect of FERC oversight involves approving mechanisms to prevent distortions in PJM's capacity auctions, such as the Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR), which sets a floor for resource bids to mitigate the impact of state subsidies that could suppress clearing prices and undermine competitive signals.^[56] In 2019, FERC directed PJM to expand the MOPR to apply to subsidized resources, including renewables, with limited exceptions, a decision upheld by the Third Circuit in 2023 as not arbitrary or capricious.^[57] This rule aims to preserve auction efficiency by countering out-of-market payments, though subsequent refinements like the 2021 Focused MOPR narrowed its scope to target buyer-side market power more precisely.^[58] Recent FERC orders have addressed resource accreditation and interconnection processes to enhance reliability amid changing generation mixes. In orders spanning 2021 to 2024, FERC reviewed PJM's Effective Load Carrying Capability (ELCC) methodology for accrediting variable resources, accepting revisions that adjust capacity values based on system-wide performance but drawing dissents from commissioners concerned that it may over-accredit intermittent sources or fail to fully capture portfolio reliability risks, potentially leading to inadequate pricing for dependable capacity.^[59] FERC Order No. 2023, issued in July 2023, mandated reforms to PJM's interconnection queue, including cluster studies, cost allocation for network upgrades, and consideration of grid-enhancing technologies to reduce delays and backlogs, with PJM's compliance filings approved in phases through 2025 despite ongoing debates over implementation timelines and their effects on timely resource additions.^[60]^[61] These interventions underscore FERC's mandate to enforce open access while grappling with tensions between state-driven resource policies and federal market principles, where subsidies or accreditation flaws can distort incentives for investment in reliable generation.^[62]

Internal Operations and Decision-Making Processes

PJM maintains a centralized System Operations Center in Audubon, Pennsylvania, which serves as the hub for real-time grid monitoring and control across its footprint. This facility integrates Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for telemetry data collection and state estimator software to model the transmission grid's current state, enabling operators to detect anomalies and assess system conditions continuously.^[63]^[64] Operational dispatch follows a hierarchical, algorithm-driven protocol that emphasizes reliability through security-constrained economic dispatch, where generation units are committed and redispatched based on empirical cost data, physical constraints, and contingency analyses rather than non-technical priorities. Automated tools within the Energy Management System (EMS) execute these decisions, prioritizing voltage stability, thermal limits, and frequency control to minimize outage risks.^[65]^[66] Strategic decisions on rules, procedures, and market-reliability interfaces are developed via a multi-tiered stakeholder process, with the Markets and Reliability Committee (MRC) playing a central role in reviewing subcommittee recommendations through structured voting and analysis. The MRC forwards endorsed proposals to the Members Committee for ratification, while the PJM Board of Managers holds final approval authority, including the ability to override non-consensus outcomes to safeguard against fragmented interests or regulatory capture. This framework ensures decisions are grounded in verifiable performance data and engineering assessments.^[67]^[68] Reliability outcomes reflect the efficacy of these processes, with PJM's EMS demonstrating availability exceeding 99% across operating hours, bolstered by redundant monitoring and real-time contingency event detection via SCADA alarming and state estimation.^[29]^[69]

Geographical Coverage

Service Territory and Load Zones

PJM Interconnection serves all or parts of 13 states—Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia—along with the District of Columbia, encompassing approximately 369,054 square miles and a population exceeding 67 million people.^[70] This footprint supports a peak demand of 165,563 MW and includes 182,036 MW of generation capacity as of 2024.^[70] The service territory spans diverse geographies, from densely populated urban centers in the Northeast to more rural areas in the Midwest and South, influencing electricity demand patterns and infrastructure needs.^[2] PJM divides its service territory into over 20 load zones, each corresponding to specific utility service areas or transmission owner regions, to facilitate locational marginal pricing (LMP).^[71] These zones account for variations in generation costs, transmission constraints, and local demand, resulting in price differences; for instance, zones in the urban Northeast, such as those in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, often experience higher LMPs due to congestion and limited supply relative to load, compared to less constrained Midwest zones like those in Indiana or Ohio.^[72] Zonal pricing reflects underlying geographical factors, including proximity to generation resources and transmission infrastructure density, enabling more efficient resource dispatch while signaling investment needs in bottleneck areas.^[73] Load zone configurations support PJM's market design by aggregating nodal prices into zonal averages for settlement and forecasting, with adjustments for internal constraints.^[74] As of recent data, key zones include AEP, BGE, and Dominion, among others, where historical LMP spreads have widened during peak periods due to fuel price disparities and retirements in coal-heavy regions versus gas-rich areas.^[75] This structure promotes causal realism in pricing by tying costs directly to locational realities rather than uniform regional averages.^[76]

Interconnections with Adjacent Grids

PJM Interconnection maintains physical and operational ties with adjacent regional transmission organizations, primarily the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) to the west and the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) to the north, facilitating power exchanges across seams to enhance reliability and manage parallel flows. These interconnections support bidirectional transfer capabilities, with PJM-MISO interfaces historically enabling approximately 9,000 to 10,000 MW of flow, as documented in interregional studies assessing limits under various conditions.^[77] Coordination protocols, including joint operating agreements, were formalized post-2003 Northeast blackout to mitigate risks of cascading failures across borders, emphasizing real-time data sharing and emergency assistance.^[78] The PJM-MISO Joint Operating Agreement, effective from December 31, 2003, outlines procedures for transmission service coordination, congestion management, and reliability assessments, directly addressing parallel flow issues that could otherwise propagate disturbances.^[78] During peak demand events, such as the 2022 heatwaves, these ties enabled successful imports into PJM, helping balance loads when internal generation faced stress, though exact volumes varied by hour and interface constraints.^[79] Similarly, PJM-NYISO coordination, governed by a separate agreement with defined interconnection facilities, includes joint operations drills to simulate cross-border scenarios, ensuring synchronized responses to anomalies like line outages.^[80] Differences in market rules present ongoing challenges to optimal interconnection utilization, particularly between PJM's mandatory forward capacity market under the Reliability Pricing Model and MISO's more voluntary, state-reliant resource adequacy approach, which can lead to misaligned incentives for cross-border capacity commitments.^[81] Recent joint studies, such as the 2024 PJM-MISO Interregional Transfer Capability Study, aim to identify targeted upgrades for incremental enhancements, potentially averting reliability gaps amid evolving generation mixes, but implementation hinges on aligning these divergent frameworks.^[82]

Grid Operations

Transmission System Management

PJM Interconnection oversees the operation and reliability of approximately 88,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines owned and maintained by its member transmission owners, ensuring coordinated dispatch and monitoring to prevent overloads and maintain grid stability across its footprint.^[7] These lines, typically operating at 100 kV or higher, facilitate the bulk transfer of electricity from generation sources to load-serving entities, with PJM using state estimation models and real-time telemetry data to detect and mitigate potential violations of thermal, voltage, or stability limits.^[83] Transmission expansions and upgrades are directed by PJM through targeted selections in its Regional Transmission Expansion Plan, prioritizing projects that deliver verifiable cost savings via congestion relief, such as reduced locational marginal price differentials in constrained areas.^[84] For instance, approved RTEP projects emphasize benefit-cost ratios exceeding 1.25:1, where benefits accrue from avoided production costs and enhanced market efficiency rather than speculative future needs.^[85] Efficiency enhancements include the adoption of dynamic line ratings (DLR), which leverage real-time measurements of ambient conditions like wind speed and conductor temperature to increase effective line capacity by up to 20-50% over conservative static ratings, thereby minimizing curtailments and LMP spreads during peak flows.^[86] PJM has integrated DLR systems proposed by transmission owners, such as those activated by PPL Electric Utilities in 2022, following stakeholder-approved procedures for validation and market impact assessment.^[87] High-voltage direct current (HVDC) technology is also utilized for select interconnections and long-haul segments, providing lower resistive losses and bidirectional control to optimize power flows between asynchronous grids.^[88] Black start protocols form a critical component of transmission restoration, with PJM designating and qualifying specific generation units capable of self-starting without external power, subjected to annual performance tests verifying cranking paths, synchronization times under 180 minutes, and load acceptance capabilities.^[89] These tests, conducted per PJM Manual requirements, ensure sequenced energization of transmission paths post-blackout, prioritizing minimal dependency on fuel availability and coordination with adjacent balancing authorities.^[90]

Generation Fleet and Resource Mix

The PJM Interconnection's generation fleet consists of approximately 199,000 MW of installed capacity as of December 2024, dominated by fossil fuels and nuclear power. Natural gas-fired units account for about 44% of the total, or roughly 88,700 MW, primarily combined-cycle and combustion turbine plants. Coal-fired steam units comprise 19.5%, equivalent to 38,800 MW, while nuclear power provides around 17% or 34,000 MW from baseload reactors. Renewables, including wind, solar, and hydro, constitute approximately 10%, with the remainder from oil and other minor sources.^[76]^[91] Since 2010, the resource mix has shifted markedly toward natural gas, driven by abundant shale gas supplies that lowered fuel costs and enabled efficient combined-cycle plants to outcompete older coal units. Coal capacity has declined by over 20 GW in PJM through retirements, with annual announcements peaking around 2015-2017 as uneconomic plants faced pressure from gas prices below $3 per MMBtu and environmental regulations. This transition replaced much of the retiring coal with gas-fired generation, increasing the gas share from under 30% in 2010 to over 40% by 2024, while nuclear capacity remained relatively stable despite some early retirement threats.^[92]^[93] Capacity factors underscore the differing reliability profiles of these resources, with nuclear units achieving averages exceeding 93% annually, reflecting their dispatchable baseload role with minimal downtime. Combined-cycle gas plants operate at around 50-60%, varying with demand and fuel economics, providing flexible peaking and intermediate support. In contrast, wind and solar resources exhibit effective capacity factors below 30%, limited by intermittency and weather dependence, contributing less to peak reliability despite installed growth.^[94]^[95]^[96] Fuel diversity in the fleet mitigates certain risks, such as nuclear's independence from fuel delivery pipelines, but the heavy reliance on natural gas—now the marginal resource for most hours—exposes the system to supply chain vulnerabilities, including pipeline constraints observed during winter events like 2014 and 2022. Coal's on-site fuel storage offers resilience against short-term disruptions, though its declining share reduces this buffer. Empirical data from past shortages highlight that gas dependencies can elevate reliability risks during coincident high demand and constrained deliveries, necessitating robust transmission and storage to maintain balance.^[97]^[98]

Real-Time Balancing and Ancillary Services

PJM maintains real-time supply-demand balance across its grid through security-constrained economic dispatch (SCED), a optimization algorithm that dispatches generation resources every five minutes to minimize total production costs while respecting transmission constraints, reliability margins, and physical limits of equipment.^[99] This process incorporates real-time telemetry data, load forecasts, and generator offers to compute locational marginal prices and binding instructions, ensuring instantaneous matching of supply to fluctuating demand and exports without relying on post-hoc subsidies for variable resources.^[100]^[101] Deviations from scheduled output are settled via real-time energy imbalance service at locational marginal prices, incentivizing accurate forecasting by market participants to minimize exposure to price volatility during mismatches.^[102] Ancillary services markets complement SCED by procuring specialized capacity for grid stability, including regulation for frequency control and reserves for contingency response.^[103] The regulation service market clears resources capable of automatic adjustments via automatic generation control signals to counteract second-by-second imbalances, with compensation based on performance metrics for response speed and accuracy; dispatchable gas turbines and battery storage systems dominate due to their rapid ramp rates, outpacing slower renewables in fulfilling these requirements.^[103]^[104] Synchronized reserve service requires online, spinning capacity deployable within 10 minutes to restore balance after generator outages or sudden load changes, while non-synchronized (supplemental) reserve allows offline units to start and synchronize within 30 minutes for longer-term support.^[103]^[102] These services are co-optimized with energy dispatch in the RT-SCED software, enabling simultaneous clearing to reflect true marginal costs of reliability without separate silos that could distort incentives.^[101]^[105] Empirical outcomes demonstrate effective balancing, with PJM's integrated forecasting and dispatch tools yielding high accuracy in load predictions—typically within 1-2% mean absolute percentage error during peak periods—thus limiting imbalance exposures and maintaining system frequency within North American Electric Reliability Corporation standards.^[102]^[106] This first-principles approach prioritizes dispatchable resources' inherent controllability for reserves, as intermittent sources' variability necessitates compensatory adjustments from flexible assets to avoid reliability risks.^[103]

Market Mechanisms

Energy Markets: Day-Ahead and Real-Time

The PJM day-ahead energy market conducts a forward auction each day to schedule generation resources and clear bids for the majority of anticipated hourly load, typically covering around 95% of energy transactions based on forecasted demand. This process uses security-constrained economic dispatch to commit units and establish locational marginal prices (LMPs) for delivery the following day, integrating participant offers, virtual trading, and transmission limits. Deviations between scheduled and actual conditions are settled financially in the real-time market, which operates continuously to procure balancing energy.^[107]^[108] LMPs in both markets are calculated at individual nodes as the sum of the system energy component (marginal cost of generation), the congestion component (cost of transmission constraints), and the marginal loss component (cost of line losses). This nodal structure causally incorporates physical grid realities, enabling prices to reflect localized supply-demand imbalances and incentivizing efficient resource siting and operation without uniform regional pricing distortions. Real-time LMPs adjust every five minutes to actual conditions, settling imbalances from day-ahead commitments and promoting convergence between markets, with historical price convergence rates exceeding 90% in many periods.^[109]^[110]^[29] The Independent Market Monitor's 2024 State of the Market Report assessed PJM's energy markets as competitive, finding that prices aligned with verifiable supply costs and demand without systemic exercise of market power, based on econometric tests of offer behavior and residual supply indices. This competitiveness empirically minimizes uplift payments—supplemental adjustments for out-of-market dispatch—relative to pre-competitive eras, where cost-of-service regulation often required higher ex-post reconciliations; LMP-driven dispatch aligns revenues closer to marginal costs, reducing such distortions as evidenced by PJM's ongoing uplift mitigation efforts. The MMU, an independent entity with access to proprietary data, provides credible oversight, though its analyses prioritize rule-based mitigation over broader policy influences.^[111]^[112]^[113]

Capacity Markets: RPM Design and Auctions

The Reliability Pricing Model (RPM) secures capacity commitments through forward auctions conducted three years prior to the delivery year, with the Base Residual Auction (BRA) serving as the primary mechanism to meet the reliability requirement after accounting for bilateral contracts and self-supply.^[114] This design incentivizes resource owners to offer capacity based on expected revenues, using a downward-sloping demand curve that incorporates the net cost of new entry (net CONE) as a key parameter for offer caps and scarcity pricing thresholds.^[115] Net CONE, calculated periodically through stakeholder processes, reflects the annualized fixed costs of a reference combustion turbine minus energy and ancillary service revenues, ensuring prices signal efficient entry when supply tightens.^[116] Capacity Performance rules, implemented since the 2015/2016 delivery year, impose stringent penalties for non-delivery during scarcity conditions defined as Performance Assessment Intervals (PAIs), typically triggered by high system stress or emergency actions.^[117] Non-performing resources incur charges scaled to the shortage level, capped at 150% of their annual auction revenues, with a stop-loss provision limiting total penalties; this structure aligns incentives for availability, as demonstrated by reduced forced outages during PAIs compared to pre-reform periods.^[118] Auctions clear at prices determined by the intersection of supply offers and the locational demand curve, fostering scarcity pricing that has historically prompted new generation and demand response entry in response to tightening balances.^[119] Locational deliverability tests underpin RPM auctions by defining Locational Deliverability Areas (LDAs) for constrained sub-regions, where separate reliability requirements ensure transmission-limited capacity can reach load zones without violating stability limits.^[42] PJM models LDAs based on historical congestion, generator deliverability analyses, and probabilistic assessments, requiring must-offer resources to pass interconnection and stability criteria; this zonal approach cleared distinct prices in 80 LDAs during recent auctions, preventing over-reliance on remote resources.^[120] The 2025/2026 BRA, held July 17, 2024, procured capacity for the June 1, 2025, to May 31, 2026, delivery year amid rising peak demand projected at 165,492 MW—a 2.5% increase from prior forecasts driven by electrification and data center loads—clearing 166,152 MW against the reliability requirement, exceeding it by 660 MW with minimal uncleared capacity of 21 MW annually.^[42]^[121] Region-wide prices reached $270.48 per MW-day, approaching the net CONE-based cap and reflecting scarcity signals that reversed prior oversupply, with LDA-specific prices up to $444 per MW-day in constrained areas like eastern MAAC.^[122] This outcome underscores RPM's role in adequacy, as centralized procurement and penalties have maintained positive reliability margins, contrasting with bilateral markets where fragmented contracting elevates shortage risks due to coordination failures and unhedged exposures.^[123]^[124]

Financial Transmission Rights and Congestion Management

Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) in PJM serve as financial instruments that enable market participants to hedge against uncertainties in locational marginal prices (LMPs) arising from transmission congestion. Holders of an FTR receive a payout equal to the congestion component of the LMP difference between specified source and sink points, multiplied by the MW quantity of the right, during periods when real-time flows align with the FTR direction; this mechanism compensates for the financial exposure of generators to reduced revenues or loads to elevated costs due to binding constraints.^[125] PJM administers FTR auctions—conducted annually for the full planning period and monthly for residual opportunities—where participants submit bids to acquire these rights, with clearing prices determined through optimization that maximizes social welfare subject to transmission limits.^[126] Central to the auction process is the Simultaneous Feasibility Test (SFT), which verifies that the proposed set of FTRs remains within the physical capabilities of the transmission system under normal and contingency conditions by modeling power injections at sources and withdrawals at sinks.^[125] This test ensures deliverability without overloading lines, using a security-constrained economic dispatch model that incorporates historical peak and off-peak flowgates; infeasible proposals are scaled or rejected proportionally to maintain feasibility.^[127] Prior to FTR auctions, eligible participants receive Auction Revenue Rights (ARRs) based on historical usage or proportional allocation, granting them claims on auction proceeds without guaranteeing specific paths.^[126] Auction revenues are distributed first to ARR holders in proportion to their entitlements, with any surplus treated as excess congestion credits allocated to loads via LMP adjustments, embodying PJM's revenue neutrality principle where total FTR payouts aim to match collected congestion rents over time.^[128] This design theoretically recycles congestion revenues back to rights holders, funding system upgrades indirectly through avoided direct allocations, though shortfalls occur when auction revenues fall below real-time congestion collections—averaging $200-300 million annually in recent years due to factors like path-specific underbidding.^[129] Empirical analysis indicates FTRs effectively stabilize generator revenues by offsetting LMP volatility; for instance, over 1999-2019, monthly FTR auction prices for key paths averaged 137% of expected day-ahead congestion payouts, providing a premium hedge that mitigated revenue swings for generation owners holding FTRs from plant buses to load zones.^[130] Data from PJM's 2023-2024 auctions show FTR holdings correlated with reduced earnings volatility for hedged generators, as payouts during high-congestion events—such as those exceeding $1/MWh differences on constrained interfaces—counteracted dispatch-driven price suppressions, though speculative trading by non-physical participants has occasionally amplified auction volatility without undermining core hedging efficacy.^[127]^[131]

Planning and Resource Adequacy

Long-Term Transmission Planning (RTEP Process)

The Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (RTEP) constitutes PJM's structured methodology for assessing and addressing long-term transmission requirements, spanning a 15-year horizon to incorporate load growth projections, generation retirements, and evolving reliability standards. This process commences with comprehensive power flow and stability analyses to detect violations of North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) criteria and local planning standards, prioritizing upgrades that rectify identified deficiencies in a cost-minimal manner. Baseline projects, selected first, focus exclusively on essential reliability enhancements without deference to speculative future scenarios, such as unproven renewable expansions lacking demonstrated need.^[132]^[133] Subsequent phases evaluate supplemental and expansion proposals through production cost simulation models, which quantify benefits via avoided generation dispatch costs in constrained scenarios. Projects advance only if they achieve a benefit-to-cost ratio exceeding 1.25, derived from differential "with" and "without" case analyses that emphasize verifiable economic efficiencies over policy mandates. Stakeholder proposal windows permit nominations for congestion relief or voltage support, but these undergo identical scrutiny, ensuring selections derive from empirical grid data rather than advocacy-driven assumptions about intermittent resources.^[134]^[135] The 2023 RTEP report documented 48 approved baseline reliability projects, encompassing reconductoring, substation additions, and line rebuilds at an estimated $6.6 billion cost, targeted to mitigate thermal overloads and stability risks amid coal retirements and data center-driven demand surges. These initiatives, informed by synchronized load-growth forecasts and generator outage data, exemplify RTEP's adherence to causal grid physics over optimistic renewable integration projections, with cumulative investments across recent cycles surpassing $30 billion through 2033 to sustain N-1 contingency compliance. High-voltage direct current (HVDC) lines featured in select expansions where modeling confirmed superior long-term congestion relief relative to alternatives.^[136]^[137] RTEP's annual reporting and biennial deep-dive cycles facilitate iterative refinement, incorporating real-time operational feedback to validate model assumptions against actual system performance. This empirical orientation contrasts with approaches in other regions that embed renewables quotas prematurely, as PJM's threshold enforces that expansions yield tangible production savings exceeding investment outlays by at least 25%, thereby anchoring planning in observable market dynamics and reliability imperatives.^[138]^[139]

Interconnection Queue Reforms and Backlogs

Prior to the implementation of reforms, PJM operated under a serial first-come, first-served interconnection process that permitted projects to enter the queue with minimal upfront commitments, resulting in a backlog of over 2,700 projects totaling approximately 250 GW by mid-2022.^[140] This system encouraged speculative entries, as developers could secure queue positions at low cost and withdraw later without significant penalties, leading to frequent restudies and average delays of nearly five years from queue entry to commercial operation for projects that ultimately built. Such dynamics exacerbated economic inefficiencies, including distorted transmission planning from phantom capacity assumptions, escalated network upgrade costs socialized across ratepayers for unbuilt projects, and deferred entry of viable generation amid rising demand.^[141] In June 2022, PJM proposed a shift to a first-ready, first-served cluster methodology, grouping proposed projects for parallel feasibility, system impact, and facilities studies to accelerate processing while imposing readiness thresholds to deter speculation.^[140] Core elements include mandatory demonstration of site control over 100% of the project area, initial study deposits scaled by project size, and progressive readiness deposits reaching $4,000 per MW tied to commercial milestones such as power purchase agreements, financing evidence, and turbine orders.^[39] Withdrawal penalties escalate with queue progression, refundable only upon demonstrated progress, aiming to filter out non-viable proposals early and allocate upgrade costs more accurately within clusters.^[140] The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approved these reforms on November 29, 2022, mandating a transition period for the legacy queue starting July 2023, with full cycle implementation for new entries in 2026.^[140] In Transition Cycle 1, PJM advanced studies on queued projects, issuing facilities study reports and interconnection agreements enabling over 46 GW to proceed to construction by June 2025, while withdrawing or disqualifying non-ready entries that comprised much of the original 250 GW backlog.^[142] This pruning reduced speculative overhang, but cluster-based upgrade assignments have revealed higher-than-expected costs for surviving projects, averaging tens of thousands per MW due to shared reinforcements.^[143] Persistent backlogs, with about 63 GW remaining in transition processing as of mid-2025, continue to impose 4-5 year delays, amplifying economic drag through readiness clusters that lock in upgrade obligations for interdependent projects, some of which fail viability tests and leave stranded costs or suboptimal grid configurations.^[144] These delays hinder causal resource adequacy by postponing firm capacity additions, elevate developer risk premiums passed to consumers, and underscore how pre-reform lax entry barriers fostered over-queueing that reforms mitigate but do not fully resolve without further penalties on serial withdrawals.^[145]

Reliability Assessments and Forecasting Models

PJM Interconnection employs probabilistic reliability assessments centered on the Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE) metric, which quantifies the expected frequency of involuntary load shedding as no more than one event per ten years across its footprint. This approach contrasts with stricter deterministic standards, such as those mandating zero tolerance for certain contingencies under all conditions, by incorporating statistical variability in generator outages, load forecasts, and resource performance to derive Installed Reserve Margins (IRMs). Empirical validation of PJM's LOLE models demonstrates their effectiveness, as the region has maintained reserve margins that averted widespread shortages during extreme events, including the 2021-2022 winter storms that challenged multiple grids.^[146]^[147] To account for variable resources like wind and solar, PJM integrates Effective Load Carrying Capability (ELCC) values into its forecasting, simulating hourly output correlations with peak load conditions to accredit only the reliable contribution these assets provide during scarcity periods. ELCC ratings, updated annually via Monte Carlo-based simulations, have shown declining values for high-penetration renewables—e.g., solar ELCC at approximately 70% for low fleet sizes but dropping below 30% at higher penetrations—reflecting causal limitations from intermittency rather than over-optimistic assumptions. Complementing this, PJM conducts N-1-1 contingency analyses in long-term planning to evaluate sequential failures, such as a transmission line outage followed by a generator trip, ensuring stability limits are quantified beyond basic N-1 criteria used in real-time operations.^[148]^[149] In its 2024 assessments, PJM's models project resource adequacy through 2028 under baseline scenarios, with projected peak load growth of 32 GW by 2030 largely from data centers offset by capacity commitments, but signal elevated risks post-2030 due to accelerated coal and gas retirements outpacing interconnection queues. These forecasts rely on scenario testing that prioritizes empirical data over regulatory mandates for uniform resource mixes, highlighting vulnerabilities like unmitigated demand surges without corresponding dispatchable additions. Historically, PJM's probabilistic framework has outperformed more rigid deterministic approaches elsewhere, avoiding the cascading failures in ERCOT's 2021 Winter Storm Uri—where 33.8 GW of generation offline led to rolling blackouts—through preemptive reserve planning grounded in outage statistics rather than assumed perfect performance.^[150]^[151]^[152]

Renewable Energy Integration

Current Levels of Penetration and Empirical Outcomes

In 2024, solar generation accounted for just over 2 percent of PJM's total electricity production, reflecting rapid capacity additions of nearly 4,500 MW during the year but constrained by intermittency and daytime peaking.^[153]^[154] Wind generation, primarily onshore, contributed an estimated 6-8 percent of the energy mix, with limited offshore development keeping overall variable renewable penetration below 12 percent.^[76] These levels underscore that solar and wind remain minor contributors to PJM's annual generation of approximately 800 TWh, dominated by natural gas (over 40 percent) and nuclear (around 30 percent). PJM's Effective Load Carrying Capability (ELCC) methodology quantifies renewables' net reliability value, assigning capacity credits far below nameplate ratings to account for non-dispatchability and correlation with peak demand. For the 2024/2025 delivery year, onshore wind receives 21 percent ELCC, offshore wind 47 percent, fixed solar panels 33 percent, and tracking solar panels 50 percent.^[155] This results in effective contributions of less than half the installed capacity for most classes, highlighting diminished marginal reliability as penetration grows without corresponding firming resources. Empirical data reveal operational inefficiencies, including increased curtailments during oversupply events, such as midday solar peaks, though PJM-specific volumes remain low relative to higher-penetration regions (e.g., under 1 percent of potential output in recent years).^[105] Renewable variability correlates with elevated ancillary service demands, particularly for regulation, where studies indicate potential price increases of up to 36 percent under scenarios with greater variable renewable energy integration due to forecasting errors and ramping needs.^[156] No verifiable evidence supports systemic cost savings from state renewable mandates; instead, wholesale energy prices and capacity obligations have trended upward amid retirements and load growth, with renewables offsetting limited baseload displacement.^[76]

Technical Challenges: Intermittency and Capacity Credits

The intermittency of wind and solar generation in PJM introduces substantial variability in supply, requiring dispatchable resources like natural gas-fired plants to provide balancing services through frequent ramping to match fluctuating net load. This variability arises from weather-dependent output, leading to intra-hour changes that exceed those of traditional generators, with net-load ramping requirements intensifying as renewable penetration grows—particularly in scenarios with high solar during midday followed by evening declines. In PJM's transitioning grid, thermal resources, including gas peakers, fulfill a significant portion of these ramping needs, accounting for about 32% of system-wide requirements in modeled high-renewable futures, which can accelerate equipment cycling and maintenance demands on flexible units.^[157]^[158] PJM assesses the reliability value of intermittent resources via Effective Load Carrying Capability (ELCC), which simulates contributions to loss-of-load expectation during peaks and declines with rising penetration due to diminished diversification benefits from correlated generation patterns. For the 2026/27 delivery year, fixed-tilt solar ELCC is 8%, tracking solar 11%, onshore wind 41%, and offshore wind 69%, with marginal values for additional units lower than fleet averages as output correlations reduce incremental peak support. These figures reflect empirical modeling of historical weather data, showing solar's high initial credits at low penetration (often exceeding 50% in early assessments) eroding to under 20% amid PJM's growing ~10 GW solar fleet, limiting accredited capacity in auctions.^[159]^[160]^[161] From 2022 to 2024, wind and solar contributed less than 5% to PJM's summer peak loads, which reached 152,666 MW in July 2024, as renewable output aligns poorly with evening demand maxima when solar diminishes and wind remains inconsistent. This low empirical contribution during critical periods highlights intermittency's causal impact on resource adequacy, with ELCC capturing the need for overbuilding nameplate capacity to achieve equivalent firm reliability—often requiring 5-10 times more installed intermittent capacity than dispatchable alternatives for comparable peak value. Co-located storage partially addresses short-term variability but remains limited by PJM's ~5 GW installed battery capacity as of 2024, with hybrid ELCC classes still discounted due to finite discharge durations unable to fully offset multi-hour lulls.^[162]^[163]

Policy-Driven Distortions and Market Signal Conflicts

Federal subsidies, particularly the production and investment tax credits expanded under the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, enable intermittent renewable resources to submit zero or near-zero megawatt offers in PJM's capacity auctions by offsetting their fixed costs through non-market payments, thereby suppressing clearing prices and undermining price signals for investment in dispatchable generation.^[92] This distortion persisted prior to capacity market reforms, as subsidized resources cleared auctions without reflecting their limited contribution to reliability, contributing to chronic underinvestment in firm capacity amid rising retirements of natural gas and coal plants.^[164] PJM's February 2023 assessment highlighted how such policy incentives exacerbate risks by prioritizing subsidized additions over economically viable replacements, with historical interconnection completion rates for renewables as low as 5% delaying needed backups.^[92] State renewable portfolio standards (RPS) further conflict with market signals by mandating utilities to procure renewables regardless of cost-effectiveness, often resulting in uneconomic retirements of dispatchable resources like natural gas and nuclear to comply with quotas. In PJM, policy-driven retirements are projected to reach 25 gigawatts by 2030, comprising 18 gigawatts of gas and nuclear alongside 24 gigawatts of coal, outpacing reliable replacements and straining reserve margins to as low as 5%.^[92] These mandates override competitive dispatch economics, where retained nuclear or gas plants offer lower long-run marginal costs, forcing higher system expenses through forced integration of intermittent sources that require redundant firm capacity for reliability.^[164] PJM's Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR), upheld and refined by FERC orders including the December 2019 directive, seeks to counteract these distortions by requiring subsidized resources to offer above their net avoided costs, but exemptions and waivers for state RPS-compliant resources remain contentious, allowing continued suppression of capacity prices in affected local delivery areas.^[165] Debates over such waivers, as seen in Maryland's push for alignment with its 50% RPS by 2030, illustrate tensions where state interventions prioritize policy goals over market efficiency, potentially inflating costs by hundreds of millions annually through retained uneconomic fossil units or accelerated retirements.^[165] Empirically, full-cycle levelized costs of electricity for wind and solar in PJM double when accounting for integration expenses, including backups and transmission upgrades, rendering combined-cycle natural gas more competitive despite policy favoritism toward renewables.^[164] Forced renewable penetration elevates total system costs compared to retaining dispatchable nuclear or gas, as intermittency necessitates overbuilding capacity and infrastructure—evident in PJM's stalled queues where only 27% of queued projects from 2000-2016 entered service by 2021—while subsidies mask these inefficiencies and deter private investment in high-reliability alternatives.^[164]^[92]

Controversies and Criticisms

Capacity Market Design Flaws and ELCC Methodology

PJM's Reliability Pricing Model (RPM) capacity market procures forward capacity commitments through Base Residual Auctions (BRAs) to ensure resource adequacy, but design elements have drawn scrutiny for potentially distorting incentives and reliability signals. A key change occurred in 2021 when PJM proposed and FERC approved the shift to marginal Effective Load Carrying Capability (ELCC) accreditation, which evaluates a resource's capacity value based on its incremental contribution to reducing the expected frequency of loss-of-load events when added at the margin to the existing resource mix, rather than fixed or average historical performance.^[166] This probabilistic methodology, derived from historical load and generation data integrated into loss-of-load expectation (LOLE) models, assigns lower credits to intermittent resources like solar and wind as their fleet-wide penetration rises, reflecting correlated output patterns that diminish marginal reliability benefits during system stress periods.^[167] The marginal ELCC approach, first applied in the 2025/2026 BRA held in July 2024, reduced accredited capacity for many renewables and batteries compared to prior net CONE-based methods, contributing to a clearing price surge from $28.92 per MW-day in the prior auction to $269.92 per MW-day, procuring 134,311 MW against a reliability requirement of approximately 145,000 MW.^[168]^[43] The Independent Market Monitor (MMU), operated by Monitoring Analytics, critiqued this outcome as non-competitive, attributing elevated costs partly to ELCC-driven accreditation changes that exacerbated supply constraints and structural market power, estimating ELCC's role in adding $4.4 billion to total auction expenses.^[169]^[170] PJM countered that marginal ELCC better aligns payments with verifiable reliability contributions, an emerging standard across ISOs/RTOs that avoids overvaluing resources whose added output fails to proportionally reduce peak risks in high-renewable scenarios.^[171]^[172] Proponents of ELCC emphasize its empirical grounding in causal reliability modeling, where first-mover intermittent resources receive higher initial credits (e.g., solar ELCC around 20-40% nameplate early on, declining to under 10% at higher penetrations), incentivizing dispatchable capacity to fill gaps exposed by intermittency correlations rather than subsidizing overbuilds that do not enhance marginal system firmness.^[173] Critics, often renewable industry groups, contend it introduces undue volatility and penalizes "clean" technologies by understating their fleet-level benefits, potentially biasing auctions toward fossil retainers amid policy pushes for decarbonization, though such claims overlook ELCC's basis in observed data over optimistic assumptions of uncorrelated output.^[174]^[175] Post-ELCC auction results demonstrate price signals effectively averting adequacy shortfalls by drawing retained and new entry, with procured capacity meeting PJM's target despite retirements, underscoring the methodology's role in countering prior over-optimism on intermittent credits.^[43]^[171]

Reliability Risks from Retirements and Demand Growth

Between 2020 and 2025, PJM experienced substantial generator retirements, primarily of coal-fired plants, totaling over 20 GW of capacity exiting the system due to economic pressures and state-level decarbonization policies.^[92] These exits have accelerated, with PJM forecasting an additional 40 GW of existing generation—representing about 21% of its current 192 GW installed base—at risk of retirement by 2030, encompassing both economic retirements of aging thermal units and policy-driven closures of nuclear and coal facilities.^[44] Such losses diminish the pool of dispatchable, firm capacity essential for meeting peak demands, particularly during extreme weather, as replacements often involve intermittent renewables with lower effective capacity contributions. Compounding these retirements is rapid demand growth, projected to add 32 GW of peak load from 2024 to 2030, with approximately 30 GW attributable to data centers and electrification trends.^[151] This surge outpaces the development of new reliable supply, as evidenced by PJM's 2025 Long-Term Load Forecast, which highlights a supply-demand imbalance risk without accelerated firm resource additions.^[176] The causal dynamic—retiring baseload generators while inflexible loads like data centers ramp up—elevates blackout probabilities, especially in high-demand scenarios where variable renewables cannot fully substitute for lost thermal capacity. Winter operations amplify these vulnerabilities, with fuel insecurity affecting black start units critical for grid restart after outages; current PJM requirements mandate only a 16-hour runtime assurance for these resources, insufficient for prolonged cold snaps disrupting fuel deliveries.^[177] Historical events, such as Winter Storm Elliott in 2022, underscore this, where natural gas units accounted for 70% of forced outages due to supply constraints.^[178] FERC proceedings in 2025 revealed divisions on capacity pricing adequacy, with Commissioner Chang dissenting against PJM's Reliability Resource Initiative for inadequately addressing 2026-2030 gaps through market signals alone, arguing it fails to incentivize sufficient new entry amid retirements.^[179] Similarly, Chairman Christie's dissent criticized proposals shifting reliability risks from generators to consumers via adjusted effective load-carrying capacity (ELCC) penalties, favoring undistorted market pricing to retain and attract resources.^[180] PJM and industry stakeholders emphasize that enhanced capacity market pricing, as seen in the 2025 auction clearing at the $329.17/MW-day cap—a 22% increase—provides necessary signals for investment in firm capacity over regulatory mandates.^[181]^[182] In contrast, some environmental advocates and analysts downplay short-term gaps by advocating unproven scaling of energy storage, projecting PJM requires 16 GW by 2032 and up to 43 GW by 2045 to offset risks, though empirical deployment lags and storage's limited duration fails to replicate thermal plants' multi-day firm output.^[183] This perspective overlooks causal dependencies on fuel-secure, weather-resilient generation for reliability, prioritizing accelerated retirements without equivalent replacements.^[184]

Interconnection Delays and Economic Inefficiencies

PJM's interconnection queue has historically suffered from severe backlogs, with average processing times for projects reaching commercial operation exceeding five years by 2022, compared to around four years for those built between 2018 and 2022.^[185]^[186] These delays stem primarily from incentives favoring speculative project submissions, as developers faced minimal early-stage financial commitments, leading to queues ballooning beyond 2,000 GW in capacity requests by the late 2010s, far outpacing feasible grid additions.^[41] High withdrawal rates—often exceeding 80% overall and 45% for projects entering since 2020—exacerbated the issue, as abandoned proposals triggered costly re-studies for remaining projects, imposing sunk costs estimated in the billions for interconnection analyses funded by ratepayers.^[187]^[188] Reforms implemented in 2022, shifting to a cycle-based process with milestone payments and deposits (ranging from 10% to 100% of costs), have reduced the transition queue to approximately 63 GW by mid-2025, with projected processing times dropping to one to two years for future cycles.^[189]^[144]^[190] Despite progress, residual backlogs persist, as evidenced by PJM's pause on new applications until 2025, highlighting ongoing incentive misalignments where low-barrier entry continues to encourage low-viability submissions over genuine, financeable projects.^[191] Prior to the backlog era around 2015, queues were smaller and processing more efficient, with fewer re-studies needed due to lower speculation in competitive market conditions that rewarded viable entrants.^[192]^[193] These delays impose economic inefficiencies by postponing new capacity additions, constraining supply and contributing to elevated wholesale prices; for instance, PJM's 2025/2026 capacity auction saw costs rise from $14.7 billion to $16.1 billion, partly due to unmet demand from stalled projects amid surging load growth.^[194]^[195] Developers contend that protracted queues deter investment and inflate development risks, potentially slowing grid modernization,^[196] while ratepayer advocates emphasize the burden of funding speculative studies—totaling hundreds of millions annually—that yield few operational assets, diverting resources from reliable infrastructure.^[197]^[187] This dynamic underscores a causal link between weak entry disincentives and systemic drags on market efficiency, where delayed competition sustains higher near-term costs rather than infrastructure deficits alone.^[198]

Performance Metrics and Impact

Reliability Record and Outage Statistics

PJM Interconnection has upheld a robust reliability record for its bulk electric system, avoiding major blackouts in its core operations since the August 14, 2003, Northeast blackout, during which PJM operators detected voltage instability early, notified adjacent systems, and limited impacts within their footprint to approximately 4,000 MW of load loss while facilitating rapid restoration.^[26]^[199] Subsequent years have seen no comparable system-wide failures attributable to PJM-managed transmission, reflecting effective operational protocols and infrastructure investments that prioritize stability over its 13-state and D.C. footprint.^[200] In response to extreme weather, PJM demonstrated resilience during Winter Storm Elliott from December 23–25, 2022, when arctic conditions drove record winter peak demands; the grid operator dispatched reserves to meet loads without load shedding, rolling blackouts, or uncontrolled separations, maintaining uninterrupted service to customers despite widespread generator outages, particularly from natural gas units comprising 70% of forced derates.^[45]^[46] This performance contrasted with vulnerabilities observed in other regions, such as ERCOT's 2021 winter crisis, highlighting PJM's forecasting accuracy, reserve management, and lack of reliance on emergency measures that could propagate outages.^[201] NERC audits and performance evaluations consistently validate PJM's compliance with reliability standards, including sustained achievement of 100% or better on the Control Performance Standard (CPS1) across calendar years, ensuring frequency regulation and interchange scheduling meet mandatory thresholds without penalties.^[29] Transmission outage data further indicate limited disruptions, with equipment failures yielding short effective durations—often under an hour on average for reported events—and low overall frequency relative to system scale, as tracked in quarterly market analyses.^[202] These metrics position PJM favorably against peer RTOs, where analogous standards compliance and outage rarity underscore the stabilizing influence of competitive resource procurement and real-time dispatch.

Economic Efficiency: Prices, Competition, and Consumer Costs

PJM's energy markets employ locational marginal pricing (LMP), which dispatches resources based on real-time supply, demand, and transmission constraints to minimize costs and promote efficiency. In 2024, the real-time load-weighted average LMP was $33.74 per MWh, an 8.5% increase from $31.08 per MWh in 2023, driven by higher load and generation costs but remaining indicative of competitive outcomes without evidence of market power abuse. The Independent Market Monitor for PJM confirmed that energy market results were competitive throughout 2024, reflecting effective price signals that encourage efficient resource use and entry by low-cost generators.^[203]^[204]^[54] The capacity market auctions procure committed resources for peak periods, with clearing prices serving as incentives for new investment amid retirements and rising demand. The 2025/2026 base residual auction cleared at $269.92 per MW-day region-wide (except higher in constrained zones), procuring 139,943 MW of unforced capacity while total costs rose to $14.7 billion from $2.2 billion the prior year due to tighter supply balances. The 2026/2027 auction reached the FERC-approved cap of $329.17 per MW-day across all zones, securing 134,311 MW and signaling urgent needs that have prompted commitments for new entry, including over 2 GW of renewables since the prior auction and potential for 7 GW of battery storage. These elevated prices counter claims of profiteering by demonstrating competition's downward pressure on energy costs and upward signals for capacity, as affirmed by the Market Monitor's finding of no structural market power in the broader wholesale framework.^[198]^[43]^[195]^[205] Competitive markets in PJM have yielded measurable consumer benefits, with operations and planning delivering annual savings of $3.2 to $4 billion compared to non-competitive alternatives, through efficient procurement, reduced duplication, and optimized resource dispatch serving 65 million customers. Studies of competitive versus regulated structures highlight PJM's wholesale prices as among the lowest, 41.7% below non-competitive benchmarks as of 2020, underscoring how deregulation fosters cost discipline without compromising efficiency. Capacity price spikes, while increasing short-term procurement costs, function as essential market signals to avert shortages, with historical data showing they elicit supply responses that stabilize long-term prices and costs for end-users.^[206]^[207]^[208]

Achievements in Grid Stability and Market Innovation

PJM Interconnection introduced locational marginal pricing (LMP) on April 1, 1998, pioneering a market-based mechanism that calculates energy prices based on generation costs, transmission constraints, and losses at specific grid locations, which has since become the standard in U.S. wholesale electricity markets and enhanced economic efficiency by incentivizing generation siting and reducing congestion costs.^[109]^[209] This innovation allowed PJM to integrate diverse resources more effectively, supporting grid stability through precise dispatch signals that minimize operational inefficiencies compared to uniform pricing systems.^[210] In parallel, PJM developed one of the earliest and largest demand response (DR) programs, integrating flexible capacity from participants who curtail usage during peak periods, with resources totaling approximately 8 GW as of 2025, providing a cost-effective alternative to new generation for reliability.^[211] This DR integration, formalized through capacity market participation, has enabled PJM to manage load variability without excessive reliance on rigid supply-side additions, demonstrating empirical success in maintaining balance during high-demand events.^[212] Following the 2003 Northeast blackout, PJM accelerated deployment of synchrophasor technology, deploying phasor measurement units (PMUs) to provide real-time, high-resolution grid visibility—sampling data up to 30-120 times per second—enabling operators to detect oscillations, voltage instabilities, and disturbances faster than traditional SCADA systems.^[213]^[26] This post-event innovation has supported proactive stability measures, such as improved wide-area monitoring, which correlates with shorter disturbance response times and fewer cascading failures in subsequent analyses of system events.^[214] Overall, these competitive market designs have facilitated PJM's expansion to serve growing loads affordably, with markets procuring diverse resources at efficient costs that outperform non-competitive alternatives in reserve provision and innovation incentives.^[215]

References

[1]
[PDF] PJM – At a Glance
PJM Interconnection coordinates the movement of electricity in all or parts of 13 states and the District of Columbia. Our job is to ensure there is enough ...
[2]
PJM | Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
The PJM Interconnection operates a competitive wholesale electricity market and manages the reliability of its transmission grid.
[3]
An Introductory Guide for Participation in PJM Processes
Apr 11, 2025 · PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM) operates the electric transmission system or “grid” for all or part of 13 states and the District of Columbia.
[4]
PJM - Who We Are
- **Description**: PJM Interconnection is a regional transmission organization (RTO) coordinating wholesale electricity movement.
[5]
[PDF] PJM OVERVIEW
PJM Interconnection is the regional grid operator, whose primary focus is to maintain electric reliability for over 65 million consumers.
[6]
[PDF] PJM: Maintaining Resource Adequacy During a Period of Transition
Jan 28, 2025 · Megawatts of generating capacity. 183,254. Miles of transmission lines. 88,185. Gigawatt hours of annual energy. 770. Generation sources. 1,419.Missing: facts | Show results with:facts
[7]
[PDF] Power in Balance - PJM Interconnection
Jan 29, 2025 · PJM operates more than 88,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines across its territory. These lines move electricity from the generating ...Missing: key | Show results with:key
[8]
[PDF] Overview of PJM and Recent FERC Orders
Jul 16, 2024 · Key Statistics. Member companies. 1,090. Millions of people served. 65+. Peak load in megawatts. 165,563. Megawatts of generating capacity.Missing: facts | Show results with:facts
[9]
PJM Marks 94 Years of Keeping the Lights On
Sep 27, 2021 · On Sept. 27, 1927, they established the first continuous power pool in the United States. The utilities had found in exploring such a ...Missing: history | Show results with:history<|separator|>
[10]
PJM Interconnection, Officials Mark Historic Day for Power Pool
Sep 29, 2017 · “In September 1927, PECO, PPL and PSE&G collaborated to bring to life an ingenious idea – a power pool,” said PJM CEO and President Andrew L. ...Missing: formation | Show results with:formation
[11]
What's Past Is Prologue at Annual Meeting General Session
May 16, 2017 · PJM began in 1927, a seminal year in American history – the ... The formation of the power pool was reported in a front page article ...
[12]
Why the Grid Is Lagging Behind Demand | The Breakthrough Institute
Oct 1, 2025 · ... (PJM) coming together as an early model in 1927 to build the Conowingo Dam and share its 200 MW of capacity. These power pools formed a kind ...
[13]
Conowingo Hydroelectric Generating Station - Constellation Energy
Constructed in 1928, the Conowingo Dam originally produced 252 megawatts (MW) of power, becoming the second-largest hydroelectric project in the United States ...Missing: PJM Interconnection integration
[14]
PJM History | PJM Interconnection - LinkedIn
Feb 29, 2024 · ... Conowingo Dam goes into service on Susquehanna River in northern Maryland, where its hydroelectric turbines still generate electricity for PJM ...
[15]
Major Orders & Regulations | Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Order Granting PJM Market Monitor Complaints and Orders Additional Briefing News Release ... Order 888-A in Regard To Promoting Wholesale Competition ...<|separator|>
[16]
Order No. 888 - Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Aug 5, 2020 · Order No. 888 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities.
[17]
[PDF] Order Requiring PJM ISO to Establish Market Monitoring Function
Nov 25, 1997 · The PJM. Interconnection was established as the PJM Interconnection. Association as of July 1, 1993, and was converted into a limited liability ...
[18]
[PDF] Order No. 2000, RTO Final Rule Part 1 of 4, December 20, 1999
See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory. Transmission Services by Public Utilities and Recovery of Stranded Costs by ...
[19]
[PDF] united states of america - PJM Interconnection
Jun 21, 2022 · FERC, 272 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“FERC Order No. 2000”). 4 PJM received RTO designation by FERC in 2001. See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. ...
[20]
[PDF] Docket No. RM99-2-000 - Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
We also establish an "open architecture" policy regarding RTOs, whereby all RTO proposals must allow the RTO and its members the flexibility to improve ...
[21]
[PDF] State of the Market - Monitoring Analytics
Mar 5, 2003 · On April 1, 2002, the PJM Region expanded with the addition of the Allegheny Power System (APS) under a set of agreements known as “PJM-West.
[22]
[PDF] Electric Power Outlook For Pennsylvania 2002 – 2007
Oct 18, 2002 · In April 2002, Allegheny Power joined PJM Interconnection, LLC (PJM) through the creation of PJM West. As a PJM member, Allegheny Power is ...
[23]
[PDF] Transmission Business Update - Carnegie Mellon University
Apr 11, 2002 · Why Did Allegheny Choose to Join PJM? • Circa 1996. – Allegheny, Along with First Energy and Virginia Power Formed the Original Alliance TRANSCO.
[24]
The Ultimate Guide to Pennsylvania Electricity Deregulation
The following year, in 2002, the Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate noted that energy suppliers were providing service to approximately 300,000 customers.Missing: PJM | Show results with:PJM
[25]
[PDF] Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States ...
Dec 24, 2003 · The report makes clear that this blackout could have been prevented and that immediate actions must be taken in both the United States and ...
[26]
Fifteen years since Northeast Blackout, reliability remains top PJM ...
Aug 14, 2018 · As events unfolded the afternoon of Aug. 14, 2003, PJM operators saw signs of voltage instability and notified our neighboring systems, where ...
[27]
[PDF] Blackout August 14, 2003 Final Report - NYISO
The U.S. Canada Power System Outage Task. Force (the International Task Force) concern- ing the August 14, 2003 Blackout undertook a comprehensive, eight-month ...
[28]
[PDF] FERC Staff Issues Electric Reliability Primer
After the 2003 blackout, NERC's role and responsi- bilities changed. Congress added section 215 to the. FPA in 2005, which authorized the development of.
[29]
[PDF] PJM Interconnection (PJM) - Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Five-year-out planning enables PJM to assess and recommend transmission upgrades to meet forecasted near-term load growth and to ensure the safe and reliable ...
[30]
[PDF] PJM Reliability Pricing Model – A Summary and Dynamic Analysis
Subject to FERC approval, RPM is scheduled to replace the current capacity market effective June 2007. This paper summarizes the key features of the RPM ...Missing: launch | Show results with:launch
[31]
[PDF] Review of PJM's Reliability Pricing Model (RPM) - The Brattle Group
The initial auctions procuring forward capacity resources for particular delivery years are referred to as Base Residual Auctions or BRAs, in reference to ...Missing: launch | Show results with:launch
[32]
[PDF] Capacity Markets in PJM
The RPM design included a sloped demand curve with defined inflection points, a three year forward procure- ment, a locational market definition, and market ...
[33]
[PDF] NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE - PJM Interconnection
Apr 16, 2007 · PJM's first RPM auction began on April 2 and closed on April 6. It was for delivery of capacity during the 2007/2008 planning year (June 1, 2007 ...Missing: launch | Show results with:launch
[34]
Reviewing Progress in PJM's Capacity Market Structure via the New ...
The Reliability Pricing Model introduces significant changes to the capacity market structure of PJM. The main feature of the RPM design is a downward-sloping ...Missing: launch | Show results with:launch
[35]
[PDF] 2014/2015 RPM Base Residual Auction Results
May 13, 2011 · The Reserve Margin presented in Table 1 represents the percentage of installed capacity cleared in excess of the RTO load (including load served ...Missing: outcomes | Show results with:outcomes
[36]
PJM Capacity Auction Results Improve Reliability at Competitive ...
Aug 28, 2015 · In the auction, PJM procured total resources for a reliability reserve margin of 19.8 percent compared to a target of 15.7 percent. As in prior ...Missing: 2006-2015 | Show results with:2006-2015
[37]
[PDF] 2015 State of the Market Report for PJM - Monitoring Analytics
Feb 9, 2016 · The results of the energy market, the results of the capacity market and the results of the regulation market were competitive in 2015. The ...
[38]
PJM approves nearly $1 bln in U.S. power transmission upgrades
Dec 6, 2012 · PJM OKs $4.7 bln in transmission upgrades in 2012. Dec 6 (Reuters) - The operator of the U.S. Mid-Atlantic and Midwest power grid approved ...
[39]
FERC Approves PJM Interconnection Process Reforms to Address ...
Dec 21, 2022 · PJM will process the queue backlog using the Transition Period Rules prior to the date that the reformed interconnection procedures (“New Rules”) ...
[40]
PJM Reaches Next Interconnection Milestone
Aug 6, 2024 · PJM has cleared 204 generation projects to the second phase of its new interconnection process, designed to study 72,000 MW of mostly renewable ...
[41]
PJM Completes Interconnection Reform Transition Cycle 1 Studies
Sep 22, 2025 · The interconnection transition queue has been reduced to about 46 GW of projects, all of which will be processed by the end of 2026 in ...Missing: cluster | Show results with:cluster
[42]
[PDF] 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction Report
Jul 30, 2024 · This document provides information for PJM stakeholders regarding the results of the 2025/2026 Reliability Pricing. Model (RPM) Base Residual ...
[43]
PJM Auction Procures 134311 MW of Generation Resources
Jul 22, 2025 · This price compares with $269.92/MW-day for the 2025/2026 auction for the RTO, except for the BGE and Dominion zones, which cleared at $466.35/ ...Missing: $269/ | Show results with:$269/
[44]
PJM Details Resource Retirements, Replacements and Risks
Feb 24, 2023 · In addition to the retirements, PJM's long-term load forecast shows demand growth of 1.4% per year for the PJM footprint over the next 10 years.Missing: challenges | Show results with:challenges
[45]
PJM Releases Winter Storm Elliott Report
Jul 17, 2023 · PJM has released its Winter Storm Elliott Event Analysis and Recommendation Report, which reviews the circumstances leading up to the December 2022 storm.
[46]
https://www.pjm.com/-/media/DotCom/library/reports-notices/special-reports/2023/20230717-winter-storm-elliott-event-analysis-and-recommendation-report.pdf
[47]
PJM's Reliability Resource Initiative Adds 11.7 GW To Queue
Jun 2, 2025 · PJM selected 51 projects that will add a total of 11.7 GW of new energy capacity to the regional grid. These projects will move forward as part of Transition ...
[48]
Blaming data centers for PJM supply challenges misses the bigger ...
Sep 10, 2025 · Blaming data centers for PJM supply challenges misses the bigger picture. Reliability will not be secured by focusing on a single industry. PJM ...
[49]
[PDF] PJM Manual 33:
Jul 28, 2021 · Welcome to the PJM Manual for Administrative Services for the PJM Interconnection. Operating Agreement. In this introduction, you will find ...
[50]
[PDF] Membership in PJM
Members take part in PJM's stakeholder process, which provides a forum for those with a stake in the wholesale electric industry to discuss and work through ...Missing: structure | Show results with:structure
[51]
[PDF] PJM Manual 34:
Jul 27, 2022 · 5.7 Stakeholder Group Structure Diagram ... Stakeholders – PJM Members, OPSI and its members, state consumer advocates who.
[52]
[PDF] Committees and Groups Develop Solutions in Stakeholder Process
Jan 7, 2025 · PJM members and stakeholders form committees and groups in a collaborative stakeholder process. The stakeholder process examines issues and ...
[53]
Our Role as PJM Market Monitor - Monitoring Analytics
Monitoring Analytics, as PJM's independent monitor, promotes a competitive market, monitors compliance, identifies flaws, and analyzes market structure and ...
[54]
[PDF] 2024 State of the Market Report for PJM Volume 1: Introduction
Mar 13, 2025 · market incentives to load based on the marginal cost of additional consumption. The objective of efficient short run price signals is to ...
[55]
Wholesale Competition in Regions With Organized Electric Markets
Jul 2, 2007 · As the third major federal law enacted in the last 30 years to embrace wholesale competition, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) ...
[56]
Federal appeals court upholds FERC action on PJM capacity market ...
Dec 4, 2023 · In 2019, FERC approved a proposal to expand the MOPR to include resources that received state subsidies, such as renewable energy facilities and ...
[57]
Third Circuit Upholds FERC's Approval of PJM's Focused MOPR
Dec 11, 2023 · The Third Circuit upheld PJM's Focused MOPR, which mitigates buyer-side market power, and found FERC's approval was not arbitrary or capricious.<|separator|>
[58]
PJM's 'Focused' Minimum Offer Price Rule Takes Effect by Operation ...
Oct 1, 2021 · The MOPR sets a floor price for bids into the capacity market to avoid market distortion by preventing resources from bidding artificially low ...
[59]
Commissioner Christie's Concurrence to PJM's Capacity Market ...
Jan 30, 2024 · PJM's ELCC approach fails to determine the reliability of the actual portfolio of resources that clear in the auction, meaning that PJM's ...
[60]
FERC orders changes to PJM's grid interconnection process, plus 3 ...
Jul 25, 2025 · Required changes include cost allocation for network upgrades, consideration of grid-enhancing technologies and energy storage modeling.
[61]
Explainer on the Interconnection Final Rule
Jan 23, 2025 · Cluster studies are now the required interconnection study method, and all transmission providers will need to eliminate the serial study ...
[62]
PJM MRC/MC Briefs: Aug. 20, 2025 - RTO Insider
Aug 25, 2025 · The changes would establish a “bright-line” test where a POI of 69 kV or higher would fall under FERC jurisdiction, while lower-voltage ...
[63]
[PDF] PJM Manual 01:
The PJM Manual for Control Center and Data Exchange Requirements is one of a series of manuals within the Transmission Owners manuals. This manual focuses ...
[64]
New PJM state estimator provides the big picture of the transmission ...
Dec 17, 2003 · The huge program, called a “state estimator,” models the electric transmission grid from Minnesota to the Atlantic Ocean and from Tennessee and ...Missing: Audubon SCADA<|separator|>
[65]
[PDF] “Perfect Dispatch” – as the Measure of PJM Real Time Grid ...
Abstract—This paper discusses a novel approach for analysis of large scale real time grid operation performance. The PJM. Interconnection energy market is ...
[66]
[PDF] PJM Manual 38:
Jan 23, 2025 · Transmission Operations Section 3.9 stability procedure. • Resolve thermal overloads, voltage, SOL, and/or IROL exceedances with non-cost.
[67]
[PDF] PJM Manual 34:
Mar 19, 2025 · Exhibit 1: PJM Stakeholder Process Structure. Specifically, the Members Committee and the Markets and Reliability Committee are identified as ...
[68]
[PDF] Stakeholder Process Uses Structured Problem Solving
PJM's structured process uses defined scope, robust discussion, consensus building, and voting, with defined issue scope and key activities.
[69]
[PDF] Attachment A: PJM Reliability Plan 22 - NERC
3.10 Contingency Events are monitored by state estimator, RTCA, SCADA Alarming, and transmission displays. Local control centers report Contingency Events on ...Missing: Audubon | Show results with:Audubon
[70]
Welcome - PJM Annual Report 2024
PJM serves 13+ DC states with 182,036 MW generation capacity, 165,563 MW peak demand, 369,054 square miles of territory, and 67+ million population.
[71]
[PDF] Appendix A PJM Geography - Monitoring Analytics
Feb 9, 2016 · In 2017, the PJM footprint included 20 control zones located in Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland,. Michigan, New Jersey, North ...
[72]
PJM Maps
Jun 4, 2025 · Locational Marginal Pricing - This map shows the locational marginal price or LMP for each transmission zone in the region PJM serves.
[73]
[PDF] Locational Marginal Pricing and its System Energy Component ...
Therefore, the total LMP of a given Pnode, for the events on March 17, 2021, may be greater than or less than the system energy component LMP of $3,664.51/MWh ...
[74]
[PDF] PJM Manual 11:
Feb 22, 2024 · Locational Marginal Prices in the pricing run. 2.1.4 Day-ahead ... • The LMP calculation determines the full marginal cost of serving an increment ...<|separator|>
[75]
PJM: Day-Ahead Price For Zones - LCG Consulting :: EnergyOnline
Date, total_lmp, node_name. 10/8/2025 9:00:00 PM, 29.88418, AECO ZONE. 10/8/2025 9:00:00 PM, 39.22623, AEP ZONE. 10/8/2025 9:00:00 PM, 40.59090, APS ZONE.
[76]
[PDF] 2024 State of the Market Report for PJM - Monitoring Analytics
Dec 31, 2024 · As of December 31, 2024, PJM had a total installed capacity of 198,841.1 MW, of which 38,776.4 MW. (19.5 percent) are coal fired steam units ...
[77]
[PDF] Interregional Transfer Capability Study (ITCS) - NERC
The current transfer capability calculation was performed using relevant Eastern Interconnection and Western ... PJM -> MISO. 9,146 MW. 10,771 MW. Interface E1007 ...
[78]
[PDF] Joint Operating Agreement Between the Midcontinent Independent ...
Jun 25, 2025 · the state estimator automatically via SCADA systems such as NERC's ISN link. Using an on-line state estimator model to calculate “Market ...
[79]
Early Season Heat Stressed The Eastern Interconnection
Jun 27, 2025 · SPP, Manitoba (MHEB), and Ontario also supported MISO, particularly when imports from PJM dried up during the RTO's own peak conditions.
[80]
PJM, NYISO Enhance Coordination With First Joint Operations Drill
Jun 10, 2025 · NYISO runs along PJM's northeastern border and shares tie lines with PJM in northeastern Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Ensuring that power flows ...
[81]
[PDF] Differences in Demand Response Markets - Great Plains Institute
PJM uses a forward capacity market with payments encouraging DR investment, while MISO's resource adequacy is state-based, with most DR for emergencies.
[82]
PJM, MISO to study transmission upgrades to bolster interregional ...
May 10, 2024 · A study conducted by Grid Strategies found that increased transfer capacity between MISO and PJM could save more than $15 billion by 2035, in ...
[83]
[PDF] Dynamic Line Ratings (DLRs) – Frequently Asked Questions
Apr 28, 2021 · Q1 What are dynamic line ratings? A1 Dynamic line ratings (DLRs) are an advanced grid technology that utilize real-time measurement data.
[84]
PJM Board Approves New Transmission Projects To Support Grid ...
Feb 26, 2025 · The PJM Board of Managers has authorized additions and changes to the Regional Transmission Expansion Plan to help ensure the most efficient, economical and ...
[85]
PJM Publishes Report Highlighting 2024 Planning Efforts
Apr 18, 2025 · PJM's Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (RTEP) process identifies transmission system additions and improvements needed for reliable grid ...
[86]
Dynamic Line Rating Activated by PPL Electric Utilities
Oct 24, 2022 · PPL Electric Utilities has said it expects the activation of dynamic line rating (DLR) technology to expand capacity and promote market efficiency.
[87]
PJM Facilitating Dynamic Line Rating Implementation
Mar 7, 2022 · PJM and its stakeholders are working to finalize the systems and procedures necessary to permit the acceptance of dynamic line rating systems.
[88]
[PDF] High Voltage Direct Current - PJM Interconnection
Jan 6, 2025 · HVDC technology can also be used to interconnect two AC systems or electric grids that operate at different frequencies. AC vs. DC. Transmission ...
[89]
[PDF] Black Start Service Helps Re-Energize the Grid - PJM Interconnection
Jan 29, 2025 · A unit designated under the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff as a black start unit must annually pass a series of performance tests to verify.Missing: protocols | Show results with:protocols
[90]
[PDF] PJM Manual 36:
Jun 15, 2025 · PJM Manual 36 covers system restoration, disturbance conditions, communications, reserves during restoration, and generation.
[91]
[PDF] PJM Introduction - gpaee
Feb 20, 2025 · Miles of transmission lines. 88,185. Terawatt hours of annual ... New Generation Interconnection Requests Submitted to PJM www.pjm.com ...
[92]
[PDF] Energy Transition in PJM: Resource Retirements, Replacements ...
Feb 24, 2023 · For the first time in recent history, PJM could face decreasing reserve margins, as shown in Table 1, should these trends – high load growth, ...Missing: 2000-2015 | Show results with:2000-2015<|separator|>
[93]
[PDF] How the Premature Retirement of Coal-Fired Power Plants Affects ...
Nov 6, 2017 · More than 250 coal-fired power plants in the United States have been retired since. 2010, taking more than 34,000 megawatts. (34 gigawatts) of ...
[94]
[PDF] Capacity Market - 2023 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM
Jan 1, 2024 · For a capacity mix of eight fuel types, the maximum achievable index is 0.875. For all FDI calculations prior to June 1, 2023, the fuel type ...
[95]
Independent Monitor's View of PJM Markets
Monitoring of wholesale power markets is required by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)—by Order No. 2000 of 1999—as one of several key functions ...
[96]
Newer-technology natural gas-fired generators are utilized ... - EIA
Apr 15, 2021 · The utilization rate, called capacity factor, of natural gas-fired combined-cycle (NGCC) units built from 2010 to 2020 in PJM was 71%, which was higher than ...
[97]
[PDF] FUEL SECURITY ANALYSIS: - PJM Interconnection
Dec 17, 2018 · Both escalated retirements portfolios included a significant amount of additional coal and nuclear retirements. To accommodate such a large.<|control11|><|separator|>
[98]
PJM has been dispatching coal-fired generators less than ... - EIA
Jun 17, 2024 · In 2023, the use of coal-fired generation in PJM dropped to 34% of capacity. In 2023, coal-fired generation contributed 14% of PJM's generation, while it made ...
[99]
[PDF] Security Constrained Economic Dispatch (SCED) Overview - AESO
SCED is a mathematical model for the most economic generation dispatch, considering system constraints, to serve forecasted load and meet system reserve ...
[100]
Understanding the Difference Between Scheduling and Dispatching ...
Jan 10, 2025 · In real-time, PJM continuously monitors grid conditions and issues dispatch instructions to generators every five minutes. These instructions ...
[101]
[PDF] Energy and Ancillary Service Co-Optimization Formulation
Jun 1, 2022 · This document is about Energy and Ancillary Service Co-Optimization Formulation, including the Security Constraint Economic Dispatch (SCED) ...
[102]
[PDF] 2024 State of the Market Report for PJM - Monitoring Analytics
Dec 1, 2024 · PJM provides regulation, energy imbalance, synchronized reserve, and supplemental reserve services through market mechanisms.
[103]
[PDF] Ancillary Services
Jan 29, 2025 · PJM operates several markets for ancillary services – regulation, synchronized reserve and non-synchronized reserve. These markets compensate ...
[104]
PJM: How do Regulation payments work? - Research - Modo Energy
Aug 15, 2025 · Over 80% of revenue earned by batteries in PJM today comes from Regulation. But payment isn't as simple as market price x MW cleared.
[105]
[PDF] Renewable Dispatch in Market Clearing Engines
Oct 7, 2024 · PJM's real-time security constrained economic dispatch tool (RTSCED) co-optimizes energy and reserves, maintains power balance, controls ...
[106]
How Load Forecasting Supports ERCOT, PJM, NYISO, ISONE, and ...
Mar 4, 2025 · Accurate demand predictions are essential for managing congestion and maximizing profitability. Key Challenges:
[107]
[PDF] Understanding the Differences Among PJM's Markets
Mar 10, 2025 · As the market operator, PJM's role is to balance the needs of buyers, sellers and other market participants while monitoring market.
[108]
Electricity Markets – 101 - National Governors Association
Day ahead market – this market represents around 95 percent of energy transactions and based on forecasted load for the next day and typically occurs the ...
[109]
[PDF] LMP Supports Competitive Wholesale Power Markets
Jan 29, 2025 · Locational Marginal Pricing, or LMP, reflects the price of electricity and the cost of congestion and losses at points across the grid.
[110]
Locational Marginal Price (LMP) Components
Dec 8, 2023 · Locational Marginal Prices (LMP) are made up of 3 independent components: System Energy Price · Congestion Price Will be zero if there are no ...
[111]
[PDF] 2024 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM
Sep 30, 2024 · Energy transactions analyzed in this report include those in the PJM Day-Ahead and Real-Time. Energy Markets. These markets provide key ...
[112]
[PDF] 2024 State of the Market Report for PJM - Monitoring Analytics
Mar 13, 2025 · “Our analysis concludes that the results of the PJM Energy Market were competitive in 2024,”. Bowring said. “Our analysis concludes that the ...
[113]
[PDF] Approaches to Reduce Energy Uplift and PJM Experiences
Jun 23, 2015 · Uplift payments ensure resources retain the incentive following RTO/ISO dispatch instructions, i.e., do not operate at a loss. • Uplift payments ...Missing: empirical benefits<|control11|><|separator|>
[114]
[PDF] Capacity Exchange User Guide - PJM Interconnection
Oct 15, 2024 · Market Participants use PJM's Capacity. Exchange to submit capacity offers for generation, demand resources, energy efficiency resources, and ...
[115]
[PDF] Fifth Review of PJM's Variable Resource Requirement Curve
Apr 22, 2022 · Demand Curve Design Objectives. PJM's capacity market, called the Reliability Pricing Model (RPM), ensures long-term grid reliability by ...
[116]
[PDF] Market Design Project Road Map - PJM Interconnection
Aug 8, 2025 · FERC Order 841 addresses the participation of electric storage resources in the capacity, energy and ancillary services markets operated by ISO ...
[117]
Understanding PJM's Capacity Market Penalty Structure & How It ...
Feb 6, 2025 · By holding participants accountable for their commitments, PJM creates a system that rewards reliability and penalizes failure.
[118]
[PDF] PJM's Capacity Performance Mechanism
Mar 4, 2025 · Stop-Loss Provision: Limits a resource's maximum annual penalty. Initially 1.5 × Net CONE; now 1.5 × Auction Revenues. Performance incentives ...
[119]
[PDF] PJM Capacity Market: Promoting Future Reliability
Jan 29, 2025 · Since 2007, PJM's evolving capacity market has used the power of markets to commit enough resources to meet future reliability targets. The ...Missing: launch | Show results with:launch
[120]
[PDF] 2024 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM
Sep 27, 2024 · 80 Locational Deliverability Areas are shown in maps in the 2021 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM, Volume II, Section 5, “Capacity.
[121]
[PDF] 2025/2026 Base Residual Auction Results
Aug 21, 2024 · 2025/2026 cleared 660 MWs above Reliability Requirement with only 21 MWs of annual uncleared capacity. Supply demand balance has tightened ...
[122]
PJM 2025/26 BRA Results | Enel North America
Aug 16, 2024 · In this auction, pricing across most of PJM 'cleared' at $269.92 per MW-day, which translates to $98,520.80 per MW-year. 'Clearing' in this ...Missing: $269/ | Show results with:$269/
[123]
[PDF] A Comparison of PJM's RPM with Alternative Energy and Capacity ...
... Markets. In energy-only markets, resources obtain revenues solely through markets for energy and ancillary services without additional payments for capacity.
[124]
Breakable: Can Capacity Markets Survive an Era of Sustained, High ...
Aug 25, 2025 · However, bilateral contracts can also result in opaque and inefficient markets that still result in elevated costs across the entire supply ...
[125]
[PDF] PJM Manual 06:
This manual focuses on how Auction Revenue Rights (ARRs) are acquired, how Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) are traded, in the FTR auctions or the.Missing: management | Show results with:management
[126]
[PDF] Financial Transmission Rights Market Review
FTRs purchased in the auctions can be sold bilaterally to another PJM member through the FTR center system. While there are rules for indemnification of any ...
[127]
[PDF] 2024 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January through ...
... FTR auction revenue. FTR Auction revenue results from the market prices paid by willing FTR buyers, should be paid to ARR holders, and should not be ...Missing: neutrality proceeds
[128]
[PDF] PJM Manual 28:
• Provides Energy Imbalance Service under Schedule 4 of the PJM Tariff. Energy Storage. Resource Model Participants or Open-Loop Hybrid Resources shall be ...
[129]
[PDF] 2024 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM
Effective June 1, 2003, PJM replaced the direct allocation of FTRs to load with an allocation of Auction Revenue Rights. (ARRs). Under the ARR design, the load ...Missing: neutrality proceeds
[130]
[PDF] The Role of FTR's as Congestion Hedges and FTR Auction Values
Jan 30, 2020 · The monthly auction price of a PJM western hub to PECO FTR averaged 137% of the day-ahead market target payout over the period May 1999 through ...
[131]
The Role of Auction Revenue Rights in Markets for Financial ...
Aug 15, 2019 · FTRs are financial derivatives sold in periodic auctions. Revenues from the sale of these derivatives are passed through to electricity ...Missing: neutrality proceeds<|separator|>
[132]
[PDF] RTEP: Planning for Long-Term Transmission Needs
The 15-year planning horizon allows PJM to evaluate the need for larger transmission projects long before construction. Transmission projects that emerge from ...
[133]
[PDF] PJM Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (RTEP) Process
Dec 6, 2024 · ‒ 178 of the proposed 230 Solutions completed all necessary reviews and the projects will be integrated into the 2025 Regional Transmission ...
[134]
[PDF] Market Efficiency Process Scope and Input Assumptions
If the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds a threshold of at least 1.25:1, then the project can be recommended for inclusion in the PJM RTEP. The annual cost of the ...
[135]
[PDF] PJM Manual 14B:
PJM dispatch considerations that have resulted in or are expected to result in operational performance issues which hinder the ability of PJM Capacity ...
[136]
[PDF] 2023-rtep-report.pdf - PJM Interconnection
Mar 7, 2024 · The PJM Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (RTEP) Report is published annually to convey planning study results throughout the year and to.
[137]
PJM Publishes Annual Planning Report for 2023
Mar 7, 2024 · The PJM Board approved 48 new baseline projects during 2023 to ensure that fundamental system reliability criteria across the grid are met.
[138]
PJM Publishes Updated Brochure Explaining PJM's RTEP Process
Jun 5, 2024 · PJM has published a refreshed brochure that explains PJM's Regional Transmission Expansion Plan (RTEP) process and PJM's efforts to meet future grid needs.
[139]
E-11 | ER25-612-000 - Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Apr 17, 2025 · based Enhancement or Expansion must meet a benefit-to-cost ratio threshold of at least 1.25:1 to be included in the RTEP recommended to the PJM ...
[140]
FERC Approves Interconnection Process Reform Plan
Nov 30, 2022 · The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on Tuesday approved PJM's June 14, 2022, interconnection reform filing that proposed to implement a more efficient and ...Missing: pre- 2500
[141]
[PDF] Outlook for Pending Generation in the PJM Interconnection Queue
are well documented, with the average project now taking approximately five years to get through ... But Interconnection queue delays blunt the ability of PJM.
[142]
PJM Generation Interconnection Reforms Continue To Produce ...
Jun 4, 2025 · More than 46,000 MW of projects now have interconnection agreements through PJM's study process and are free to build, about 18,000 MW of that ...
[143]
The ISO interconnection game - Wood Mackenzie
Sep 17, 2025 · However, with a build up of speculative projects over time - many of which will not materialise - delays to queue processing are inevitable.
[144]
[PDF] Generation Interconnection
Since 2023, PJM has processed almost 140 GW of generation interconnection projects. The interconnection transition queue has been reduced to ~63 GW of projects ...
[145]
Commissioner Phillips and Commissioner Rosner Concurrence ...
Feb 10, 2025 · Multiple factors are driving PJM's reliability challenges, including slow entry of new resources, extraordinary load growth expectations, and ...Missing: 2026-2030 | Show results with:2026-2030<|separator|>
[146]
[PDF] PJM Manual 18:
Jul 23, 2025 · ... ICAP Shortfall for such unit will be separated into a Daily ICAP Shortfall for RPM Resource Commitments and Daily ICAP Shortfall for FRR.
[147]
[PDF] 2021 State of the Market Report for PJM - Monitoring Analytics
Oct 3, 2022 · The results of PJM markets were reliable in 2021. The results of the energy market were competitive in 2021. The results of the 2021/2022 and ...
[148]
[PDF] Effective Load Carrying Capability Measures Capacity Contribution ...
Jan 28, 2025 · The ELCC method enables PJM to measure how much capacity may be provided by resources while ensuring there is enough generation to serve the ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[149]
[PDF] ELCC Class Ratings for the 2026/2027 Base Residual Auction
Therefore, no ELCC Class Rating will be determined for the Gas Combined Cycle Dual Fuel Class for the 2026/2027 Delivery Year and units in the Gas. Combined ...
[150]
[PDF] Reliability Resource Initiative MRC Update - PJM Interconnection
Nov 7, 2024 · If these trends continue, our models show increased risk of having insufficient resources later in this decade to maintain the reliable electric ...
[151]
PJM Kicks Off Initiative To Balance Reliability With Large Load Growth
Sep 17, 2025 · PJM and stakeholders began an accelerated process Monday to find consensus on how to integrate large load customers rapidly and reliably ...
[152]
Taming the Wild West: ERCOT market changes improve reliability
Apr 17, 2024 · ➤ Heading into 2021, the expected winter peak demand in ERCOT was 57.6 GW, with a 24.9 GW projected buffer. When 33.8 GW went offline during ...
[153]
Solar power's lost opportunity in PJM - E&E News by POLITICO
May 7, 2025 · Solar power production is up dramatically in PJM, but it is still a bit player as the Eastern grid operator works to meet rising electricity demand.
[154]
[PDF] PJM Response to the 2024 State of the Market Report
Aug 11, 2025 · PJM Performance Compliance provides monthly updates to the Operating Committee on these metrics, tracking progress against the established ...
[155]
[PDF] ELCC Class Ratings for 2024/2025
PJM performs an ELCC analysis for each individual unit in this class. The value shown in the table is a representative value provided for informational.
[156]
Prices in Frequency Regulation Markets: Impacts of Natural Gas ...
Through a case study of the PJM Interconnection, we find that doubling the natural gas price increases the average annual regulation price by 36%, while ...
[157]
[PDF] Energy Transition in PJM: Flexibility for the Future
Jun 24, 2024 · The region's generation fleet is undergoing a historic transformation to more renewable energy sources and storage from a system based on ...
[158]
[PDF] Energy Transition in PJM:
May 17, 2022 · The simulation results indicate that storage had a profound impact in the ancillary services market, providing up to 80% of synchronous reserves ...
[159]
[PDF] 2026/27 BRA IRM, FPR, and ELCC Class Ratings Shift Towards ...
Mar 13, 2025 · ELCC Class. Class Rating. Onshore Wind. 41%. Offshore Wind. 69%. Fixed-Tilt Solar. 8%. Tracking Solar. 11%. Intermittent Landfill Gas.
[160]
[PDF] Effective Load Carrying Capability (ELCC) - PJM
Feb 24, 2020 · wind and solar penetration levels. – Solar ELCC range from 0% (Dec, Jan) to 45% (Jun). – Wind ELCC range from 8% (Oct, Nov) to 48% (Jun). Page ...
[161]
[PDF] Average and Marginal Capacity Credit Values of Renewable Energy ...
Calculations of ELCC for VRE and storage has been extensively researched, in both proposed mathematical methods to estimate ELCC [21–28], as well as ...
[162]
2024 in Review: PJM Operations Maintained Reliability
Jan 2, 2025 · Different physical attributes of mostly intermittent resources include limited dispatchability and contribution to voltage support, load ...
[163]
[PDF] Outlook for Energy Storage in PJM | The Brattle Group
Oct 9, 2025 · Storage delivers outsized resource-adequacy value during extreme peak hours and complements limited new gas builds and intermittent renewables.
[164]
Understanding the Costs of Integrating Energy Resources in PJM
Feb 2, 2024 · This new analysis looks at full-cycle costs by going beyond base unit costs to incorporate the costs of maintaining backup sources, building new transmission, ...
[165]
[PDF] Alternative Resource Adequacy Structures for Maryland
Over the past few years, a conflict has developed between states' clean energy objectives and Minimum. Offer Price Rule (MOPR) provision within PJM's ...
[166]
[PDF] PJM's Electric Capacity Market: Background and Current Issues
Aug 22, 2024 · Most resources in PJM have a lower capacity value under the marginal ELCC accreditation compared to the method used in previous. PJM capacity ...
[167]
[PDF] PJM Manual 21A:
“ELCC Resource” shall mean a Generation Capacity Resource that is a Variable Resource, a. Limited Duration Resource, or a Combination Resource. “Variable ...Missing: adoption credits<|separator|>
[168]
[PDF] Analysis of the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual Auction- Part A
Sep 20, 2024 · The MMU analyzed the impact of these changes on the auction results for the 2025/2026 RPM Base Residual. Auction. PJM calculated the reserve ...<|separator|>
[169]
PJM market design flaws add billions to latest capacity auction costs
Sep 24, 2024 · A switch in how PJM measures power plant availability, one of several market issues flagged by Monitoring Analytics, increased capacity costs by $4.4 billion.Missing: RPM | Show results with:RPM
[170]
[PDF] 2025 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM
Aug 14, 2025 · “Our analysis concludes that the results of the capacity market auction for the 2025/2026 Delivery Year were not competitive.” Energy prices ...
[171]
[PDF] PJM Response to Independent Market Monitor Report on 2025/2026 ...
Oct 11, 2024 · The IMM's report shares analysis of sensitivities to the 2025/2026 PJM Reliability Pricing Model (RPM, or “capacity market”) Base Residual ...
[172]
PJM Responds to IMM Report on Capacity Auction Results
Oct 11, 2024 · The move to marginal ELCC accreditation is becoming an industry standard approach that aligns capacity valuation with marginal reliability ...Missing: methodology | Show results with:methodology
[173]
[PDF] Sixth Review of PJM's Variable Resource Requirement Curve
Apr 9, 2025 · PJM's capacity market, the Reliability Pricing Model (RPM), aims to support long-term grid reliability by procuring the required volume of ...
[174]
PJM's ELCC Modeling Minimizes Renewable Energy's Contributions
Mar 11, 2025 · PJM recently released its new Effective Load Carrying Capacity or ELCC Asset Ratings for the 2026-2027 delivery year.Missing: capability | Show results with:capability<|separator|>
[175]
[PDF] Comments of the Independent Market Monitor for PJM
Jan 23, 2025 · ELCC Values for Thermal Generators Do Not Appropriately Account for Winter Capability and Should be Revised. The Market Monitor recommends that ...
[176]
2025 Long-Term Load Forecast Report Predicts Significant Increase ...
Jan 30, 2025 · Between 2024 and 2026, PJM expects to process approximately 170,000 MW worth of generation projects, mostly renewables and storage. PJM planners ...Missing: GW | Show results with:GW
[177]
[PDF] Problem Statement Fuel Requirements for Black Start Resources
Currently, there is no fuel assurance requirement for black start resources, except for a 16-hour run time. PJM questions if this is sufficient for all fuel ...
[178]
Winter Storm Elliott Report Highlights the Risk of Natural Gas Failures
Jul 20, 2023 · PJM's report on Winter Storm Elliott found that gas generators were responsible for 70 percent of forced outages during December 2022.
[179]
Commissioner Chang's Dissent on PJM's RRI, ER25-712
Feb 11, 2025 · This proceeding concerns PJM's diagnosis of looming reliability challenges in the 2026-2030 timeframe and its proposed solution to address those challenges.
[180]
Chairman Christie's Dissent in PJM ELCC Penalty Filing, ER25-2002
Jun 17, 2025 · In short, PJM's proposal undermines market incentives and imposes reliability risk on consumers. I would reject this proposal as unjust and ...
[181]
[PDF] PJM Auction Procures 134311 MW of Generation Resources
Jul 22, 2025 · PJM's auction secured 134,311 MW of unforced capacity generation (UCAP) at a price of $329.17/MW-day, with a total of 146,244 MW available.Missing: $269/ | Show results with:$269/
[182]
PJM capacity prices set another record with 22% jump - Utility Dive
Jul 23, 2025 · Gas-fired generation accounted for 45% of the cleared capacity, followed by nuclear at 21%, coal at 22%, hydroelectric at 4%, wind at 3% and ...
[183]
PJM Interconnection needs 43 GW of energy storage by 2045
Oct 14, 2025 · The PJM Interconnection needs 16 GW of energy storage by 2032, 23 GW by 2040 and 43 GW by 2045 to meet resource adequacy needs and state clean ...
[184]
[PDF] Ensuring Reliability: A Case Study of the PJM Power Grid
The expected load losses are 1,247 MW in. SWMAAC and 1,055 MW in DEOK respectively, and a total of 3,066 MW for the PJM system. The resource shortfall in the ...Missing: SERVM | Show results with:SERVM<|separator|>
[185]
US grid interconnection backlog jumps 40%, with wait times ...
Apr 11, 2023 · Interconnection wait times averaged five years in 2022, up a year from the average of four years for projects built between 2018 and 2022.
[186]
[PDF] Queued Up: 2024 Edition - Energy Markets & Policy
(2) Percentages only include projects requesting interconnection from 2000-2018. (3) Includes data from 7 ISOs and 30 non-ISO balancing areas which provide ...
[187]
[PDF] Tackling the PJM Electricity Cost Crisis - Synapse Energy
Apr 15, 2025 · driven, projected load growth. From 2025 to 2040, PJM's annual load is projected to increase by 605. TWh, representing a 72 percent increase ...
[188]
[PDF] Queued Up: Status and Drivers of Generator Interconnection Backlogs
The typical project built in 2022 took 5 years from the interconnection request to commercial operations1, compared to 3 years in 2015 and <2 years in 2008. ...<|separator|>
[189]
New Fact Sheet Highlights Interconnection Process Reform Progress
Jul 21, 2025 · PJM has processed tens of thousands of megawatts in generation resources for interconnection as part of its transition to an improved interconnection process.
[190]
Clogged Interconnection Queues are Hindering Renewables ...
Oct 3, 2024 · The interconnection queue reform process will help clear the backlog of requests and get generation online more quickly, PJM officials said.
[191]
PJM Announces Application Deadline for First Cycle of New ...
Aug 22, 2025 · The application deadline for Cycle No. 1 of PJM's reformed interconnection process will be April 27, 2026, PJM announced Friday.Missing: 56GW | Show results with:56GW
[192]
Scores for Interconnection Times Highlight the Need for Reform in PJM
Apr 1, 2024 · PJM has the longest interconnection timelines, with the study process at a full stop, and a 5% completion rate for renewable projects. PJM's ...
[193]
Outlook for Pending Generation in the PJM Interconnection Queue
May 8, 2024 · The country's largest grid operator, PJM Interconnection (PJM), has experienced the most severe delays and backlog in new generation.
[194]
Capacity auction predicts higher energy bills; Youngkin, governors ...
Jul 24, 2025 · On Tuesday, PJM announced its capacity prices increased from $14.7 billion last year to $16.1 billion at this year's auction, costs that ...
[195]
PJM's Latest Power Auction Should Be on Your Radar. Here's Why.
Jul 29, 2025 · These high prices are driven by a surge in demand from data centers and PJM's failure to process its severe backlog of new, cost-effective ...
[196]
The country's biggest energy market struggles to… - Canary Media
Jul 28, 2025 · ... PJM's grid has also increased enormously in the past four years. The AI bubble has driven up PJM's projected load growth by 5.5 GW from last ...Missing: 2016- | Show results with:2016-
[197]
[PDF] Penny-wise and pound foolish - PJM capacity auction and ...
parallel processing, including management of PJM's backlog through Transition Cycles 1 and 2, and the ... that approximately 68.6 GW of accredited capacity is ...<|separator|>
[198]
[PDF] Drivers of PJM's Capacity Market Price Surge and its Impacts on ...
May 21, 2025 · PJM Interconnection (PJM) is the regional transmission organization (RTO) that coordinates the movement of wholesale electricity across the ...
[199]
[PDF] Blackout of 2003 - Power System Engineering Research Center
Blackout Statistics. • Area of 50 million people in eight states and two provinces. • Approximately 61,800 Megawatts (MW) of load. • PJM Interconnection – 4,000 ...
[200]
[PDF] Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States ...
Aug 14, 2003 · The report states the August 14, 2003 blackout could have been prevented, and that the task force investigated the causes and recommended ...
[201]
PJM Met Demand Through December 2022 Event, but Extreme Cold ...
Jul 18, 2023 · The PJM Interconnection was able to maintain system reliability and serve customers throughout the extreme weather that affected the regional transmission ...
[202]
[PDF] 2024 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM
Jun 1, 2024 · Table 12-69 Transmission equipment outages by effective duration: June. 2022 through March 2024. 2022/2023 (12 months). 2023/2024 (10 months).
[203]
[PDF] 2024 Annual State of the Market Report for PJM - Monitoring Analytics
Mar 13, 2025 · Status: Partially adopted December 17, 2024.) • The MMU recommends that PJM remove the 30 percent increase to the synchronized reserve.
[204]
MARKET MONITOR FINDS PJM WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY ...
Mar 13, 2025 · PJM Interconnection's wholesale electric energy market produced competitive results during 2024, according to the 2024 State of the Market Report for PJM.
[205]
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/climate-first-bank-energy-storage-virginia-pjm/803584/
[206]
[PDF] PJM Value Proposition
These audits review PJM's compliance with Critical. Infrastructure Protection standards, operations and planning standards. The approximate cost for PJM to ...
[207]
Energy Cost Savings - EPSA - Electric Power Supply Association
$$3.2-$4 billion: Annual savings enjoyed by consumers in the PJM Interconnection footprint, which serves 65 million customers in 13 states and the District of ...
[208]
NEW STUDY: Competitive Markets Reduce Electricity Costs ...
Prices in PJM were 41.7 percent lower as of 2020 and at $21.40/MWh were the lowest prices of the competitive markets examined. Prices in the New England ISO ...
[209]
[PDF] PJM Interconnection State of the Market Report - Monitoring Analytics
Jun 1, 2000 · LOCATIONAL MARGINAL PRICES Locational Marginal Pricing was implemented in the PJM control area on April 1, 1998. Upon FERC approval of a ...Missing: pioneered | Show results with:pioneered
[210]
Locational marginal pricing: Meaning, Criticisms & Real-World Uses
Oct 12, 2025 · ... 1998, pioneering a new way to accurately reflect the real-time cost of generating and delivering electricity,. Following PJM's success ...
[211]
FERC Approves Expanded Role for Demand Response To Enhance ...
May 7, 2025 · PJM has about 8 GW of DR resources and set a new winter peak load in February at about 154 GW. By 2030, PJM forecasts its peak load will reach ...Missing: integrated | Show results with:integrated
[212]
[PDF] Demand Response Strategy
Jun 28, 2017 · While DR resources are a significant part of the PJM wholesale markets, those markets have evolved, grid operational needs have changed, the ...Missing: achievements | Show results with:achievements
[213]
[PDF] Synchrophasor Technology Improves Grid Visibility
Synchrophasor technology can provide system operators with a clearer state of grid conditions at all times, enabling them to detect and prevent problems.
[214]
[PDF] PJM Case Studies of System Events Using Synchrophasor Data
In this paper, we have described the process that was developed at PJM for detecting grid disturbances that trigger post-event analysis using phasor data, as ...Missing: restoration | Show results with:restoration
[215]
The value of markets | PJM Inside Lines
May 22, 2018 · Thanks to the markets, PJM's grid enjoys reserve margins ... markets that have achieved stability, efficiency, innovation and investment.Missing: achievements | Show results with:achievements