Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Plurinational Legislative Assembly

The Plurinational Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional) is the bicameral legislative organ of the , comprising the with 36 members—four elected from each of the nine departments—and the with 130 members apportioned by population through a mixed system of single-member districts and . Established by the 2009 Political Constitution of the State, which restructured 's governance to emphasize its plurinational character and indigenous representation, the Assembly replaced the prior unicameral National Congress and began operations following elections in December 2009. The Assembly's primary functions include enacting and sanctioning laws, approving the national budget and international treaties, authorizing public debt, and conducting oversight of the executive and other state organs through investigations and fiscalization mechanisms. Presided over by the Vice President of , it convenes annually starting August 6, with members serving five-year terms and mandated in candidate lists to promote equal participation. While designed to embody and intercultural pluralism, the Assembly has been characterized by dominant influence from the Movement for Socialism party in its early decades, reflecting the political shifts initiated under President . Its sessions occur in a dedicated building in , underscoring the legislative branch's central role in 's framework.

History

Establishment and 2009 Constitutional Reforms

The Plurinational Legislative Assembly was established by the Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, approved via national referendum on January 25, 2009, with 61 percent voter approval, and promulgated on February 7, 2009. This replaced the prior National Congress, renaming and restructuring the legislature to emphasize Bolivia's plurinational composition, incorporating recognition of indigenous nations, rural native peoples, and intercultural parity within a unitary state framework. The reforms stemmed from the Constituent Assembly elected in August 2006, which drafted the text by late 2007; the draft faced opposition-led modifications in the National Congress before referendum submission. Under the previous structure, the National Congress comprised a 130-member elected via proportional and single-member districts, and a 27-member with three seats per (two for the departmental and one for the first minority). The 2009 retained 130 deputies but reconfigured their election into 70 uninominal districts, 53 plurinominal seats allocated proportionally per , and seven special seats via direct in designated circumscriptions to rectify longstanding underrepresentation of native groups. The expanded to 36 members, with four per elected through a mixed system prioritizing territorial plurality, including provisions to ensure minority and voices. These changes aimed to foster participatory, representative, and communitarian , granting the assembly authority over , oversight, and while subordinating it to constitutional supremacy and plurinational principles. The inaugural assembly convened in January 2010 following general elections on December 6, 2009, which applied the new electoral framework under the reformed constitution.

Transitional and Early Assemblies (2009–2015)

The 2009 , approved by on January 25, 2009, with 61.43% support, established the Plurinational Legislative Assembly as the successor to the bicameral National Congress, comprising a 130-member and a 36-member Chamber of Senators to enhance representation of and plurinational character. The was promulgated on February 7, 2009, by President , who declared a "Plurinational State" emphasizing communal and alongside representative elements. In the interim, the outgoing National Congress—elected under the 1967 with 130 deputies and 27 senators—continued functioning in a transitional role to bridge the gap until new elections could populate the restructured body, handling routine legislative matters amid ongoing political tensions from the process. General elections on December 6, 2009, determined the composition of the inaugural assembly, with ' Movement for Socialism () securing a : 88 seats in the (67.7%) and 25 seats in the Chamber of Senators (69.4%), enabling powers without opposition veto. This dominance reflected 's alignment with the constitution's plurinational framework, including reserved seats for indigenous candidates, though critics noted the results stemmed from ' 64% presidential victory amid low opposition turnout and regional divisions. The assembly was formally installed on August 6, 2010—Bolivia's Independence Day—with selecting its leadership, including Senate President Gabriela Montaño and Deputies President Héctor Arce, marking the operational shift to the new structure headquartered in . From 2010 to 2015, the assembly prioritized enacting five foundational laws mandated by the constitution within 180 days of to operationalize the : the Framework Law of Autonomies and (Law 031, July 19, 2010), regulating departmental and autonomies; the Electoral Regime Law (Law 026, June 30, 2010), enforcing in candidate lists (alternating men and women); and others addressing judicial restructuring and frameworks. These measures centralized executive control under while nominally via autonomies, though implementation faced delays and disputes, such as departmental referendums boycotted by opposition strongholds like . The period saw over 100 laws passed, focusing on resource and social programs, but also controversies including suppression of dissent, as evidenced by assembly approvals of regulations criticized for curbing freedoms. By 2014 elections, retained its majority, transitioning to the next in 2015, with the early term solidifying executive-legislative alignment under .

Assemblies Under MAS Dominance (2015–2025)

The third Plurinational Legislative Assembly (2015–2020), elected in the October 12, 2014, general elections, featured overwhelming dominance by the (), which secured 88 of 130 seats in the (67.7 percent) and 25 of 36 seats in the . This two-thirds in both chambers allowed MAS to enact legislation advancing resource , expansion, and state-led economic policies without significant opposition vetoes. Key measures included the September 2018 Law of Political Organizations (Law 026), which imposed intraparty primaries for candidate selection but drew opposition claims of entrenching MAS control over electoral processes by raising barriers for smaller parties. The assembly's tenure was marked by efforts to extend President ' rule, including tacit support for the 2017 Constitutional Tribunal ruling interpreting indefinite reelection as a human right, overriding the 2016 where 51.3 percent of voters rejected further terms for . Controversies included procedural maneuvers, such as passing promotion regulations in 2019 by exploiting opposition absences to achieve , and broader criticisms of democratic erosion through MAS influence over judicial and electoral bodies, enabling suppression of dissenting media and . Opposition lawmakers faced expulsions and harassment, contributing to a legislative environment where MAS priorities—such as sector reforms and spending laws—prevailed amid reports of limited debate on fiscal sustainability. The 2019 electoral crisis, involving fraud allegations and Morales' resignation, led to an interim administration under Jeanine Áñez, which convened the assembly minimally before new elections. The fourth assembly (2020–2025), elected on October 18, 2020, retained MAS majority with 75 of 130 Deputies seats (57.7 percent) and 20 of 36 Senate seats, though short of a supermajority. Under President Luis Arce, MAS initially unified to reverse Áñez-era policies, passing emergency economic laws and reasserting state control over lithium and gas resources amid post-pandemic recovery. However, from mid-2023, escalating rivalry between Arce's faction and Morales loyalists fractured the party, paralyzing assembly functions through boycotts, quorum denials, and mutual accusations of treason. This infighting stalled key legislation, including budget approvals and judicial reforms, exacerbating fuel shortages and inflation as blockades by Morales supporters disrupted supply chains in 2024. Physical clashes between factions, including a July 2024 brawl in , underscored the breakdown, with ' camp controlling grassroots bases while Arce held formal party structures. The assembly's inability to resolve internal disputes weakened MAS governance, culminating in the party's electoral defeat in the August 17, 2025, general elections, where opposition coalitions captured a legislative , ending two decades of MAS .

Structure and Composition

Chamber of Deputies

The (Cámara de Diputados) serves as the of Bolivia's Plurinational Legislative Assembly, established under the 2009 Constitution to represent through . It comprises 130 deputies, with 70 elected via vote in single-member districts apportioned across Bolivia's departments and 60 allocated proportionally from closed party lists within each of the nine departments, ensuring a mixed-member system that balances local and departmental representation. Deputies serve five-year terms concurrent with presidential elections, requiring candidates to be Bolivian citizens over 25 years of age, literate, and resident in their constituency or department as applicable. This structure aims to incorporate Bolivia's plurinational diversity, with uninominal seats focusing on geographic and plurinominal seats distributing based on vote shares exceeding thresholds set by electoral , typically favoring larger parties while allowing smaller ones limited access. communities may secure special circumscriptions if population thresholds are met, though these have not significantly altered the standard 130-seat total in recent assemblies. The chamber organizes into a , vice-presidencies, and commissions for specialized review, elected internally at the session's outset to manage proceedings and legislative workflow. In the 2020-2025 legislative period, the held a of approximately 88 seats, enabling dominance over legislative agendas. However, the August 17, 2025, general elections marked a dramatic reconfiguration, with the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) capturing 49 seats, the LIBRE alliance securing 39, smaller parties like taking additional shares, and MAS relegated to just one seat amid widespread voter rejection of its prolonged rule. This outcome, certified by the Plurinational Electoral Organ, reflects heightened fragmentation and opposition control, potentially complicating executive-legislative relations under incoming President Rodrigo Paz Pereira.

Chamber of Senators

The Chamber of Senators forms the upper house of Bolivia's bicameral Plurinational Legislative Assembly, established under the 2009 Constitution to represent the country's territorial departments and plurinational character. It consists of 36 senators, with four elected from each of the nine departments: La Paz, Oruro, Potosí, Cochabamba, Chuquisaca, Tarija, Santa Cruz, Beni, and Pando. Each department elects four titular senators and corresponding substitutes via closed-list proportional representation, ensuring multi-party distribution based on vote shares within the department. Senators serve five-year terms, renewable only once, aligning with general elections for the assembly. Candidates must be Bolivian citizens by birth, at least 30 years old, and literate, with no additional departmental residency requirement beyond general eligibility. The chamber's presidency is elected by absolute majority among senators at the start of each legislative period, with the eldest senator presiding temporarily until then; the president coordinates sessions, represents the chamber, and maintains order. Beyond shared legislative functions in , the holds exclusive attributions including approving international treaties, authorizing presidential absences exceeding 30 days or indefinite leaves, permitting troop deployments abroad, and judging—upon by the —high officials such as judges, prosecutors, and military leaders for offenses in office. It also accepts resignations from its members and the , and approves its internal regulations autonomously. The chamber operates through specialized commissions for policy areas like , , and , facilitating bill review and oversight. Sessions convene in , with requiring an absolute majority of members.

Electoral System and Representation

The electoral system for Bolivia's Plurinational Legislative Assembly combines majoritarian, proportional, and reserved representation elements to elect its bicameral structure, as established by the 2009 Constitution and Law 026 of the Electoral Regime. Elections occur every five years concurrently with presidential voting, using universal adult for citizens aged 18 and older, with enforced through fines for non-participation. The system emphasizes plurinational representation by incorporating special mechanisms for , alongside geographic and proportional allocations to balance urban, rural, and departmental interests. In the Chamber of Deputies, 130 members are elected as follows: 70 via plurality vote in single-member uninominal districts corresponding to electoral circumscriptions; 53 through closed-list (plurinominal seats) allocated departmentally using the ; and 7 reserved for representatives elected by plurality in dedicated rural native circumscriptions. This structure ensures direct local through uninominal seats, broader departmental , and affirmative for Bolivia's 36 recognized nations and peoples, who comprise a significant portion of the but face geographic and socioeconomic barriers to standard electoral competition. is mandated, with lists alternating male and female candidates and requiring at least 50% female overall.
Seat TypeNumberElection MethodPurpose/Allocation
Uninominal70 in single-member districtsLocal geographic
Plurinominal53 (D'Hondt)Departmental proportionality
Indigenous Special7 in circumscriptionsReserved for native groups
The Chamber of Senators comprises 36 members, with four elected per each of Bolivia's nine departments through a binary voting system: two seats allocated to the party or receiving the most votes (simple plurality) and two to the runner-up . This method provides guaranteed minority representation at the departmental level while favoring larger vote-getters, differing from pure proportional systems by limiting fragmentation. Like the Deputies, senatorial lists enforce alternation, promoting balanced representation across 's diverse departmental demographics, including highland, lowland, and Amazonian regions. Overall, the system's design reflects constitutional commitments to plurinationality by reserving seats and distributing others to avoid over-dominance by urban centers like and , though critics note that uninominal districts can amplify rural vote disparities and that circumscriptions sometimes suffer from low turnout or logistical challenges in remote areas. The Plurinational Electoral Organ (Órgano Electoral Plurinacional), an independent body, oversees ballot design, , and to maintain integrity.

Powers and Functions

Legislative Authority

The Plurinational Legislative Assembly exercises supreme legislative authority as the sole organ empowered to enact, interpret, modify, and repeal laws binding across Bolivia's territory, in accordance with the 2009 Constitution. This authority encompasses all matters not explicitly reserved to other state organs, including the formulation of the economic and social development plan, establishment of the and measures, and regulation of strategic sectors such as natural resources. Legislative initiatives may originate from assembly members, the executive branch, the , autonomous territorial entities, or citizen proposals backed by at least 0.3% of the national electorate or 2% of a department's voters, ensuring broad input while requiring absolute majority approval in both chambers for passage. Central to its authority is the approval of the General State Budget, which the must submit at least two months before the fiscal year's end; failure to approve within 60 days results in automatic enactment of the submitted version. The assembly also authorizes public indebtedness, requiring justification of repayment capacity and favorable terms, and approves the creation, modification, or elimination of national taxes, typically at initiative though members may compel bills if the delays. International treaties, including those on trade, security, and , must be ratified by the assembly following submission, with the Chamber of Senators holding specific roles in and diplomatic appointments. The bicameral structure delineates complementary roles: the initiates budget, tax, credit, and loan legislation, while the full assembly handles plenary decisions like overriding with a two-thirds or approving states of emergency. Laws take effect upon publication in the Official Gazette unless specified otherwise, with the afforded 10 days to bills, prompting potential revisions or rejection overrides. This framework underscores the assembly's role in balancing proposals with legislative scrutiny, though in practice, MAS party from 2009 to 2020 facilitated rapid passage of aligned reforms, such as resource nationalizations.

Oversight and Accountability Mechanisms

The Plurinational Legislative Assembly holds oversight authority over the executive branch through mechanisms including , , investigative commissions, and budgetary supervision, as enshrined in Articles 158 and 161 of the 2009 Constitution. These tools enable the Assembly to summon ministers and senior officials for questioning, conduct inquiries into executive actions, and monitor public institutions and enterprises with state participation. Interpellation allows any assembly member to question ministers individually or collectively on policy implementation, with either chamber initiating the process under general rules approved by the Assembly. If dissatisfaction persists, censure requires a two-thirds majority vote in the originating chamber, resulting in the minister's immediate replacement by the executive. This mechanism, regulated by laws such as Ley 1350 of September 16, 2020, and subsequent amendments, prohibits reappointment of censured ministers to the same role, though its application has been infrequent, with only one successful censure recorded between 2009 and 2023. Investigative powers permit the Assembly to form commissions for probing conduct, including direct inspections, hearings, and collection of citizen complaints, extending to oversight of execution and debt authorization under Articles 321–323. The must submit the General proposal at least two months before the fiscal year-end and annual administration reports, subjecting them to assembly scrutiny and approval within specified timelines. For higher accountability, the authorizes trials against the or for constitutional violations, involving procedures across both chambers and potentially the , while the accuses and the tries members of judicial bodies for misconduct. Recent legislative efforts, including projects approved in October 2025, aim to enhance these fiscalization procedures amid calls for greater activation in the post-2025 .

Key Legislative Periods and Outcomes

2010–2015 Period

The first Plurinational Legislative Assembly convened following the December 6, 2009 general elections, under the framework of the newly promulgated 2009 Constitution. The secured a , holding 89 of 130 seats in the and 26 of 36 seats in the Chamber of Senators, enabling near-unilateral control over legislative proceedings. This composition reflected MAS's 64% presidential vote share for , with opposition parties fragmented among alliances like Plan Patriótica 2025 and , securing the remaining seats. During this period, the assembly prioritized enacting laws to operationalize the plurinational state's principles, including resource sovereignty and . Key legislation included Law 031, the Framework Law of and "Andrés Ibáñez," approved on July 19, 2010, which outlined procedures for departmental, municipal, and autonomies but was contested by eastern opposition-led departments for reinforcing oversight rather than genuine . Law 045, the and All Forms of Law, passed on October 8, 2010, criminalized discriminatory acts with penalties up to five years imprisonment, yet drew criticism for ambiguous provisions that enabled prosecutions against political adversaries, including media figures and opponents, often without safeguards. Law 071, the Law of the Rights of , enacted December 21, 2010, granted legal to natural ecosystems and prohibited exploitation harming their "regeneration," aligning with cosmovisions but facing challenges amid ongoing extractive activities. Further reforms addressed electoral and judicial structures. In 2010, the assembly approved a gender parity law mandating equal male-female representation on party lists, boosting women's legislative participation to over 50% by subsequent elections. Judicial restructuring via Law 025 in June 2010 established indigenous jurisdiction alongside ordinary courts, though integration proved contentious due to jurisdictional overlaps and limited resources. In 2012, following protests over the Isiboro-Sécure (TIPNIS) highway project, the assembly passed Law 180, declaring TIPNIS a protected area while permitting controlled development, highlighting tensions between environmental protections and infrastructure priorities. By 2013, it endorsed a referendum on presidential reelection limits, approved by 61% of voters on February 25, 2014, extending Morales's eligibility despite opposition claims of executive overreach. The period's outcomes facilitated MAS-driven policies on nationalizations and poverty alleviation, with legislative approval for hydrocarbon revenue redistribution funding social programs that reduced extreme poverty from 38% in 2005 to 17% by 2015. However, opposition and human rights observers documented limited debate due to the supermajority, with laws like the anti-racism statute retroactively applied in over 300 cases by 2015, often targeting dissenters and contributing to self-censorship in media. Assembly actions also included impeachments of judicial magistrates under a 2010 anticorruption law, criticized for politicizing the and enabling MAS influence over appointments. Overall, while advancing constitutional reforms, the assembly's dominance underscored challenges in balancing plurinational ideals with centralized governance, as evidenced by stalled autonomy statutes in opposition regions.

2015–2020 Period

The third Plurinational Legislative Assembly, resulting from the 2014 general elections, operated from January 2015 until its dissolution amid the 2019 political crisis, with the Movement for Socialism (MAS) maintaining dominant control in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Chamber of Senators. This supermajority enabled swift passage of executive-aligned legislation but drew criticism for minimal oversight of the Morales administration, as opposition parties held fewer than 20% of seats collectively. Legislative activity emphasized and identity-based reforms, including the passage of a bill permitting individuals to update markers on identification documents without prior judicial approval or medical procedures, reflecting MAS priorities on cultural despite limited debate on long-term institutional impacts. In September 2019, the assembly approved a measure prohibiting , setting the minimum age at 18 for both sexes, which aligned with human rights standards but occurred against a backdrop of uneven in rural communities. Annual budget laws, such as the 2019 General State Budget approved in December 2018, sustained programs funded by hydrocarbon revenues, though declining commodity prices from 2015 onward strained fiscal without diversification reforms. Overall output remained modest, with fewer than 650 norms promulgated across the prior decade's comparable period, indicating legislative inertia amid executive dominance. The assembly's role in circumventing the 2016 constitutional referendum—which rejected indefinite re-election by 51.3%—sparked significant controversy, as MAS-aligned institutions, including the legislature's influence over judicial appointments, facilitated the Constitutional Tribunal's 2017 ruling interpreting term limits as contrary to international pacts, thereby enabling President ' 2019 candidacy. This maneuver exemplified broader patterns of institutional capture, with documenting executive interference in judicial processes that undermined opposition accountability. Tensions peaked during the October 2019 dispute, marked by fraud allegations and nationwide protests; the MAS-majority assembly initially boycotted sessions, impeding constitutional and contributing to ' on November 10, 2019, before approving a new s law on November 23 excluding him as a . These events highlighted the assembly's alignment with MAS leadership over pluralistic checks, exacerbating polarization and eroding public trust in legislative independence.

2020–2025 Period

The 2020–2025 legislative period commenced after general elections held on , 2020, in which the obtained a in the 130-seat and the 36-seat , enabling it to control legislative proceedings without opposition vetoes but falling short of the two-thirds required for constitutional amendments or overriding presidential vetoes. This outcome followed the 2019 and interim government, with MAS candidate elected president alongside the legislative results, restoring the party's dominance after a brief interruption. Despite the majority, the Assembly experienced substantial gridlock stemming from intra-party fractures within , particularly between factions loyal to President Arce and exiled former President , who vied for influence over candidate nominations and policy direction ahead of the 2025 elections. These divisions manifested in procedural disputes, delayed calls, and stalled debates on economic stabilization measures amid rising and fuel shortages, as Morales-aligned lawmakers obstructed Arce's initiatives to consolidate executive authority. The lack of cohesion prevented passage of comprehensive fiscal reforms, exacerbating Bolivia's foreign reserve depletion and import dependencies, with legislative output limited to targeted approvals such as infrastructure loans and military promotions rather than broad structural changes. A pivotal event occurred on June 26, 2023, when army chief General Juan José Zúñiga staged an attempted coup, marching on government buildings in ; the Assembly responded with a unified resolution condemning the action and affirming civilian control, though underlying MAS tensions persisted in subsequent investigations that yielded limited accountability. Later legislative actions included approving Law 1636 in 2025 to criminalize online child exploitation and grooming, and a ban on that month, reflecting incremental social policy advances amid broader paralysis. The period concluded with the Assembly's term ending before the August 17, 2025, general elections, in which MAS's vote share plummeted due to economic discontent and internal schisms, allowing opposition parties to capture a of seats and signaling the of the party's legislative after nearly two decades. This outcome underscored causal links between sustained intra-party conflict and diminished efficacy, as evidenced by unaddressed macroeconomic vulnerabilities.

2025–Present Period

The general elections of August 17, 2025, marked the beginning of the 2025–2030 legislative term for the Plurinational Legislative Assembly, electing 130 deputies and 36 senators amid Bolivia's deepening economic crisis, including fuel shortages, dollar scarcity, and inflation exceeding 10%. The vote reflected widespread disillusionment with the , which had controlled the assembly since 2009 but suffered from internal schisms between factions loyal to former President and incumbent President , resulting in no unified presidential candidacy and diminished legislative seats. The Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC) emerged with the largest bloc, securing a across both chambers—approximately 70 seats in total—establishing a working majority but falling short of the two-thirds threshold (111 seats) required for constitutional amendments or overriding vetoes, thus necessitating coalitions with parties like and Unidad Nacional. Five parties gained representation, ending MAS dominance and introducing greater fragmentation compared to prior periods. Elected PDC legislators initiated meetings in late October 2025 to select assembly leadership ahead of the November inauguration, aligning with incoming President Rodrigo Paz's centrist platform. Paz's presidential runoff victory on October 19, , over (with 52% to 48% of the vote), positioned the PDC-led assembly to back market-oriented reforms, including incentives, foreign , and renewed U.S. ties, as a response to the empirical failures of state-controlled that precipitated . Early indications suggest the assembly will prioritize emergency economic , such as restructuring and export promotion, though dynamics may temper radical changes. As of October 27, , the assembly had not yet convened, but the electoral shift underscores a causal break from plurinational socialist policies toward pragmatic stabilization measures.

Achievements and Reforms

Poverty Reduction and Social Legislation

The Plurinational Legislative Assembly, operating under majorities from 2010 onward, facilitated through legislation and budgetary approvals that expanded programs, funded primarily by revenues from nationalized exports. These initiatives built on earlier executive actions but received legislative reinforcement, including annual allocations in the Presupuesto General del Estado that prioritized social spending, rising from 10% of GDP in 2005 to over 15% by 2015. Such measures complemented , which doubled GDP between 2006 and 2019 and drove the primary decline in rates, from 60.6% moderate poverty in 2005 to 36.4% in 2017. A cornerstone program, the Renta Dignidad, provides universal monthly pensions to Bolivians aged 60 and older, enacted via Law Nº 3791 on November 28, 2007, with the Assembly approving subsequent enhancements, such as Law Nº 953 on May 26, 2017, which increased payments by 50 Bolivianos to reach approximately 1.5 million beneficiaries. Empirical evaluations attribute these transfers to lifting thousands out of , with national-level impacts including higher consumption among eligible households and a reduction in incidence by up to 9.6 percentage points when combined with other bonos. The Bono Juancito Pinto, offering 200 Bolivianos annually to primary students for attendance and vaccination compliance, received ongoing legislative support through decrees like DS Nº 5031 (September 27, 2023) and Assembly-backed funding mechanisms, contributing to decreased school dropout rates by several percentage points and improved retention in vulnerable rural areas. Likewise, the Bono Juana Azurduy de Padilla targets maternal and child health, with transfers linked to and vaccinations, helping reduce from 54 per 1,000 live births in 2005 to 23 in 2019. Counterfactual analyses estimate that without these bonos, poverty would have been 5-10 percentage points higher, though their effectiveness relied on commodity-fueled fiscal surpluses rather than structural reforms.

Indigenous and Plurinational Representation Efforts

The 2009 Bolivian Constitution, which redefined the state as plurinational, mandates political participation and representation for nations and peoples, recognizing 36 such groups and integrating their rights into the legislative framework. This includes provisions for direct electoral mechanisms to address historical underrepresentation, with the Plurinational Legislative Assembly designed to embody intercultural parity between state and indigenous jurisdictions. The structure prioritizes empirical inclusion through reserved seats and circumscriptions, drawing from the constitution's emphasis on indigenous while maintaining control. In the 130-seat , seven special seats are reserved exclusively for representatives, apportioned to non-contiguous rural circumscriptions in seven of 's nine s and elected by self-identified voters using a first-past-the-post system. These seats, established via the electoral law, represent approximately 5.4% of the chamber and target dispersed communities to enable direct voicing of territorial and cultural concerns, separate from standard uninominal (70 seats) and plurinominal (53 seats) districts. The Senate's seats, allocated proportionally by without quotas, rely on party lists that have included candidates, though without dedicated safeguards. Implementation has yielded mixed outcomes, with indigenous deputies elected in every cycle since 2010, including four indigenous women in the 2020–2025 term representing special circumscriptions. However, these representatives often align with the ruling (MAS) party, subordinating community-specific interests to national party priorities, as evidenced by legislative support for extractive projects in indigenous territories despite constitutional consultation requirements. Plurinational efforts extend to procedural accommodations, such as multilingual proceedings and integration of indigenous justice norms into oversight functions, but critics, including some indigenous leaders, argue these mechanisms dilute autonomous by centralizing authority under state institutions. Despite comprising 41% of the population per the 2012 , indigenous influence remains constrained by MAS dominance, with reserved seats providing tokenistic rather than transformative representation in practice.

Controversies and Criticisms

Centralization vs. Plurinational Ideals

The 2009 defines the state as plurinational, mandating autonomies—including originary peasant autonomies (AIOCs), departmental, and municipal forms—to devolve authority from the central government and affirm the of nations alongside other territorial units. These provisions aimed to address historical centralism by enabling local governance over resources, justice, and administration, with the Plurinational Legislative Assembly tasked with enacting enabling laws. Yet, under the dominant (MAS) party, the assembly approved the Framework Law of Autonomies and (Law No. 031) on July 19, 2010, which established procedural hurdles such as requiring two consecutive referendums with absolute majorities and central executive approval, thereby constraining rather than facilitating . Implementation has remained limited, with only three AIOCs fully establishing and five others gaining status via judicial declaration of constitutionality by 2023, far short of the dozens petitioned; the first, Charagua Iyambae, was approved in 2016 but operates with restricted competencies due to withheld transfers of authority in fiscal and extractive matters. Academic analyses attribute this to deliberate recentralization strategies by the MAS-led assembly and executive, which prioritized national unity and resource control over autonomist ideals, as evidenced by stalled departmental autonomy bids in opposition strongholds like and . Centralization manifests acutely in natural resource governance, where assembly-passed legislation vests ownership and exploitation rights in state entities like Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB), enabling executive-led that overrides indigenous territorial claims and consultation requirements under Convention 169, ratified by in 1991. Conflicts, such as the 2011–2012 protests against the Isla del Sol–Beni highway through the Isiboro-Sécure Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS), highlight how legislative deference to central priorities undermined plurinational reciprocity, prompting indigenous federations like the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Eastern Bolivia (CIDOB) to accuse the of co-opting autonomist rhetoric for statist consolidation. Scholars contend that these patterns reveal plurinationalism's contradictions: while the assembly's supermajorities (exceeding two-thirds from 2009 to 2019) enabled reforms reducing through centralized redistribution, they simultaneously eroded decentralizing mechanisms, rendering autonomies symbolic amid economic dependence on hydrocarbons and minerals, which accounted for 72% of exports in 2022. This has fueled critiques from indigenous leaders and analysts that the legislative framework sustains a unitary core disguised as , prioritizing hegemony over genuine causal empowerment of subnational entities.

Role in Political Crises and Authoritarianism

The Plurinational Legislative Assembly, under prolonged dominance by the from 2009 to 2025, has been critiqued for facilitating by repurposing legislative functions to skew electoral, , and judicial arenas in favor of the . This included the of MAS-aligned judges to the Plurinational Constitutional in 2011 and 2017, where party loyalists secured overwhelming majorities—such as 95% of seats in 2011—enabling rulings that extended executive tenure and weakened opposition challenges. Such actions, as analyzed in studies of democratic backsliding, undermined and allowed the executive to prosecute political adversaries under laws like the 2010 anti-racism and discrimination statute, which was weaponized against over 100 journalists and activists between 2013 and 2019. In the 2019 political crisis triggered by results on , the MAS-majority obstructed constitutional succession after Evo resigned on November 10. MAS legislators boycotted sessions, preventing and delaying invocation of Article 165, which mandates succession to the president; this paralysis persisted until President Mónica Copa canceled a planned rejection of Morales' resignation on , enabling opposition Senator Jeanine Áñez to assume interim presidency amid ongoing protests that claimed 36 lives. The episode exemplified how partisan control of the prolonged institutional vacuums, fostering violence and interim governance instability until the 2020 elections. Post-2020, under President , intra-MAS factionalism—intensified by the 2023 rift with —rendered the Assembly gridlocked, failing to achieve for critical sessions in 2024 and exacerbating economic and political crises, including fuel shortages and a failed June 2024 military mobilization perceived as a coup attempt. This dysfunction, rooted in the Assembly's historical role as an executive appendage rather than a counterbalance, contributed to MAS's electoral collapse in the August 17, 2025, vote, where the party garnered under 4% nationally, paving the way for center-right control and potential institutional reforms. Critics, including analyses from , attribute such patterns to systemic one-party dominance that prioritized loyalty over pluralism, eroding legislative oversight.

Corruption and Economic Policy Failures

The Plurinational Legislative Assembly has been implicated in multiple scandals, with members accused of , fund diversion, and ethical breaches that have eroded institutional credibility. In July 2024, the president of the faced allegations of involvement in a coimas (kickbacks) scheme, prompting denunciations that highlighted systemic vulnerabilities within the assembly's leadership. By February 2022, the assembly's Ethics Commission had processed 33 cases against deputies, including two against José Carlos Gutiérrez of the bloc, though enforcement remained inconsistent amid political divisions. In July 2025, Senator Aquilardo Caricari Cala was linked to another probe, underscoring ongoing issues with oversight and impunity in legislative ranks. Corruption extended to mismanagement of public funds approved by the assembly, including a 2015 where millions of dollars allocated for development projects were diverted, implicating MAS-affiliated entities under legislative purview. The assembly's mixed commissions have investigated irregular resource handling, such as during transitional periods, but critics argue MAS dominance hindered thorough probes into state company audits, as seen in October 2025 maneuvers to delay appointments that could expose long-term graft. On , the MAS-controlled assembly endorsed and expansive subsidies that fueled initial growth but sowed seeds of unsustainability. Hydrocarbons nationalization laws reinforced post-2009 extracted state control over gas exports, generating revenues during the commodity boom, yet failed to diversify the , leaving vulnerable to price drops after 2014. Persistent subsidies, untouched since a 2010 policy reversal amid protests, drained fiscal resources, costing billions annually and contributing to chronic deficits financed by . These policies precipitated a reserves : net international reserves peaked at approximately $15 billion in 2014 but plummeted to $2.4 billion by April 2025 and $2.9 billion by August 2025, equivalent to under three months of imports, amid dollar shortages and black-market exchange rates double the official peg. The assembly's approval of high-deficit budgets under Presidents and Arce exacerbated balance-of-payments pressures, prioritizing short-term social spending over structural reforms, resulting in spikes, import restrictions, and stalled investment by 2025. Critics, including economic analysts, attribute this to causal overreliance on without productivity gains, contrasting initial reductions with governance failures that fragmented MAS cohesion and public support.

Infrastructure and Operations

Legislative Buildings and Facilities

The Plurinational Legislative Assembly of Bolivia convenes primarily in its new headquarters located in , the seat of government, at the intersection of Calle Comercio and Colón. This modern facility replaced the historic Palacio Legislativo on Plaza Murillo, which had served as the legislative seat for over a century. Construction of the new building began in 2015 and spans 41,000 square meters, incorporating advanced technology to support legislative functions. President inaugurated the structure on August 2, 2021, emphasizing its role in modernizing parliamentary operations without tolerance for treasonous activities. Situated near Plaza Murillo, the building houses both the Chamber of Senators and the , facilitating unified sessions and committee work. The facility supports key legislative events, including the swearing-in of elected officials, as demonstrated in October 2025 when it hosted ceremonies for incoming leaders. While the new edifice centralizes operations in , ancillary administrative functions may utilize proximate government structures, though primary deliberations occur within this dedicated legislative complex.

References

  1. [1]
  2. [2]
    Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional - Camara de Senadores
    ¿Qué es la Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional? Es uno de los cuatro Órganos del Estado, donde se reúnen Los representantes de los nueve departamentos y es ...
  3. [3]
    Cámara de Diputados: Inicio
    La Paz – Bolivia. Nuevo Edificio de la Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional. Calle Comercio esquina Colón. Área Legislativa. Diputados. Proyectos de Ley en ...Proyectos de Ley en TratamientoSesionesComisiones y ComitésVisitas a la Asamblea ...REGLAMENTO GENERAL DE ...
  4. [4]
    BOLIVIA (Cámara de Diputados), ELECTIONS IN 2009
    On 25 January 2009, Bolivians voted in a referendum on the new Constitution, which they approved by 61 per cent of the votes. The Constitution grants greater ...<|separator|>
  5. [5]
    [PDF] Bolivia: Constitución Política del Estado de 2009, 7 de febrero de 2009
    Feb 7, 2009 · Page 1. Contenido. Bolivia: Constitución Política del Estado de 2009 ... Asamblea Legislativa. Plurinacional. Capítulo Segundo - Procedimiento ...
  6. [6]
    Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2009 - Constitute Project
    The Pluri-National Legislative Assembly is composed of two chambers, the Chamber of Deputies (Camara de Diputados) and the Chamber of Senators (Camara de ...
  7. [7]
    Constitutional history of Bolivia | ConstitutionNet
    Legislative power is vested in a two tier chamber and judicial power rests with a Supreme Court of Justice and other lower courts.
  8. [8]
    Press Conference by Bolivia on New Constitution
    Jan 27, 2009 · Bolivians had endorsed a new Constitution that gave greater voice to long-marginalized indigenous groups and “expanded, extended and deepened” democracy to ...
  9. [9]
    [PDF] Bolivia's New Constitution: Towards Participatory Democracy and ...
    12 Moreover, the new constitution establishes that members of the judicial branch, after pre-selection by the legislative branch, will be elected by the ...
  10. [10]
    [PDF] Bolivia - Amnesty International
    Additional information. The Plurinational Legislative Assembly established under the 2009 Constitution started work in January 2010. Its priority tasks ...
  11. [11]
    Bolivia (08/01/11) - State.gov
    Aug 1, 2011 · A new constitution was promulgated February 7, 2009, replacing Bolivia's 1967 constitution. The 2009 constitution provides for legislative, ...
  12. [12]
    Freedom in the World 2009 - Bolivia | Refworld
    Jul 16, 2009 · The National Congress consists of a 130-member Chamber of Deputies and a 27-member Senate, which would increase to 36 seats under the new ...
  13. [13]
    BOLIVIA (PLURINATIONAL STATE OF) (Cámara de Diputados), Full ...
    It took 88 seats in the 130-member Chamber of Deputies and 25 in the 36-member Senate. The Democratic Unity coalition (UD) - comprising the Social Democratic ...
  14. [14]
    BOLIVIA - LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN - SNG-WOFI
    The highest electoral authority is the seven-member Supreme Electoral Tribunal, elected by the Plurinational Legislative Assembly. Bolivia is a unitary country ...
  15. [15]
    Decentralisation or Recentralisation in Bolivia? Autonomous ...
    Aug 31, 2022 · On 19 July 2010, Law No. 030 Marco de Autonomías y Descentralización “Andrés Ibáñez” (LMAD) was enacted to regulate the state's autonomy regime ...
  16. [16]
    Freedom in the World 2016 - Bolivia | Refworld
    Jun 29, 2016 · In September 2015, the Plurinational Legislative Assembly voted to amend the constitution in order to allow presidents to run for three ...
  17. [17]
    Election results | Bolivia (Plurinational State of) | IPU Parline
    Oct 12, 2014 · Data on parliamentary elections, including the background, candidates, voter turnout, results and the formation of the new legislature. By ...Missing: composition | Show results with:composition
  18. [18]
    Bolivian Legislative Election - Chamber of Senators, 2014 - PoliGlobe
    The 2014 election in Bolivia elected the President as well as all members of the legislature. The election ended with the victory for Movement for Socialism ...<|separator|>
  19. [19]
    [PDF] BOLIVIA 2019 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT - State Department
    In September 2018 the Legislative Assembly passed the Law of. Political Organizations with provisions that included implementation of the primaries for the ...
  20. [20]
    Bolivia: Freedom in the World 2019 Country Report
    A 2017 ruling by the Constitutional Tribunal cleared the way for President Evo Morales, head of the ruling Movement toward Socialism (MAS) to run for a fourth ...Missing: composition | Show results with:composition
  21. [21]
    The Case of Bolivia: When Democratic Backsliding Delivers to the ...
    Nov 6, 2022 · Over the last two decades, Bolivian democracy has been routinely attacked and undermined by its leftist government.<|control11|><|separator|>
  22. [22]
    Bolivia: Freedom in the World 2020 Country Report
    In September 2018, the MAS-dominated ALP passed the Political Organizations Law, which contains a provision requiring intraparty primaries; opposition leaders ...
  23. [23]
    Bolivia Chamber of Deputies October 2020 | Election results
    Oct 18, 2020 · Data on parliamentary elections, including the background, candidates, voter turnout, results and the formation of the new legislature. By ...
  24. [24]
    Counting the Costs of Bolivia's High-level Schism
    Dec 6, 2024 · Conflict between MAS factions has paralysed the government and discredited the authorities, while recurrent protests and blockades have ...
  25. [25]
    Bolivia: Key Points about the Failed Military Coup and its Aftermath
    Jul 30, 2024 · This dispute has paralyzed the Legislative Assembly ... Far from coming to a truce in the MAS space, the internal struggle will only intensify.<|control11|><|separator|>
  26. [26]
    Bitter political fight in Bolivia is paralyzing the government as unrest ...
    Protesters streamed into Bolivia's capital, throats hoarse from chanting and feet blistered from a week of walking ...Missing: Plurinational Assembly dominance internal
  27. [27]
    Protests Have Paralyzed Bolivia for Months. Here's Why.
    Dec 15, 2024 · Protests in Bolivia triggered by a feud between the president and a political rival have caused turmoil. One fallout: fuel shortages that have left drivers ...Missing: assembly 2023-2025
  28. [28]
    Rival Bolivian party factions in street brawl - BBC
    Jul 11, 2024 · Followers of President Luis Arce and former president Evo Morales faced off in La Paz.Missing: Plurinational Assembly internal conflicts
  29. [29]
    Why Bolivia's MAS Collapsed | Journal of Democracy
    Evo Morales's Movement Toward Socialism transformed Bolivian politics. But after almost two decades in power, the party is unraveling.Missing: Plurinational Assembly 2020-2025 conflicts
  30. [30]
  31. [31]
    Bolivia (Estado Plurinacional de) 2009 Constitución - Constitute
    Las Cámaras se reunirán en Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional para ejercer las siguientes funciones, además de las señaladas en la Constitución: Inaugurar y ...
  32. [32]
    Bolivia (Plurinational State of) | Electoral system
    Chamber of Deputies · Basic information · Elections · Election results · Electoral system · Historical data on women · Parliamentary mandate · Law-making, oversight ...
  33. [33]
    Bolivia (Plurinational State of) | Chamber of Deputies - IPU Parline
    Basic information: Elections, Parliamentary mandate, Law-making, oversight, budget, Working methods, Administration, Specialized bodies, Data on women, Data on ...
  34. [34]
    [PDF] Ley Nº 026 del Régimen Electoral
    Jun 30, 2010 · (DEMOCRACIA INTERCULTURAL). La democracia intercultural del. Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia se sustenta en el ejercicio complementario y en ...
  35. [35]
    [PDF] REGLAMENTO GENERAL DE LA CÁMARA DE DIPUTADOS
    La Cámara de Diputados ejerce en lo que le corresponde, la soberanía y la representación popular, así como las funciones legislativas de fiscalización, de.
  36. [36]
    Election results | Bolivia (Plurinational State of) | IPU Parline
    Aug 17, 2025 · Data on parliamentary elections, including the background, candidates, voter turnout, results and the formation of the new legislature. By ...
  37. [37]
    El MAS se desploma en el Parlamento de Bolivia - Infobae
    Aug 18, 2025 · Tras casi 20 años de hegemonía política, el Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) enfrenta su peor resultado electoral.<|separator|>
  38. [38]
    Bolivia: Government - globalEDGE
    Constitution: Adopted: 2009; Defines Bolivia as a unitary plurinational, and secular state. ... Legislative. The national congress is the main legislative ...
  39. [39]
    Bolivia: Sistemas Electorales / Electoral Systems
    Sistema Electoral Electoral System ; Election System. A minimum of 40% of the valid votes with a minimum margin of 10% with respect to the second place candidate ...
  40. [40]
    Bolivia (Plurinational State of) | Chamber of Senators - IPU Parline
    Data on the age of parliamentarians is collected at the start of the legislature, following the most recent elections. This data is not updated during the ...Missing: size pre-
  41. [41]
    Bolivian Chamber of Senators 2025 General - IFES Election Guide
    Assembly: bicameral Plurinational Legislative Assembly (Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional), with a 130-seat Chamber of Deputies (Cámara de Diputados) and a 36 ...
  42. [42]
    BOLIVIA (PLURINATIONAL STATE OF) (Cámara de Senadores ...
    PRESIDENCY OF THE PARLIAMENTARY CHAMBER ; Voting system, - formal vote by secret ballot ; Procedures / results, - the eldest Senator presides over the Senate ...
  43. [43]
    Atribuciones del Senado
    BOLIVIA Artículo 66.- Son atribuciones de esta Cámara: Responsabilidad de acusación en juicio político;. Rehabilitar como bolivianos, o como ciudadanos, ...
  44. [44]
    Bolivia (Plurinational State of) | Chamber of Senators | Oversight
    Oversight. Oversight tools. Parliament/Chamber has the power to summon members of the government. Yes. Sources: General Rules of the Senate.Missing: functions | Show results with:functions
  45. [45]
    Bolivia (Plurinational State of) | Electoral system
    Rules concerning the right to vote and to stand for election, and details of the electoral system for directly-elected chambers. Eligibility and voting. Minimum ...
  46. [46]
    Bolivia: Freedom in the World 2017 Country Report
    In 2015, the Plurinational Legislative Assembly voted to amend the constitution in order to allow presidents to run for three consecutive terms instead of two. ...
  47. [47]
    Representation of indigenous peoples in times of progressive ...
    Oct 30, 2020 · In 2009, Bolivia introduced a new mechanism for direct representation to counteract this systematic representation gap, securing 7 of 130 seats ...
  48. [48]
    Bolivia (Plurinational State of) | Chamber of Deputies | IPU Parline
    Data on the age of parliamentarians is collected at the start of the legislature, following the most recent elections. This data is not updated during the ...
  49. [49]
    Election Brief: Bolivia 2025 General Elections - All Tech Is Human
    Jun 11, 2025 · The Plurinational Electoral Organ (OEP) operates under Law 026 (Ley del Régimen Electoral) with constitutional-level independence. Key ...
  50. [50]
  51. [51]
  52. [52]
  53. [53]
  54. [54]
  55. [55]
  56. [56]
  57. [57]
  58. [58]
  59. [59]
    Bolivia (Plurinational State of) | Chamber of Deputies | Oversight
    Oversight · Parliament is automatically dissolved when a motion of no confidence is adopted · There is a procedure for parliament to dismiss or impeach the ...Missing: accountability mechanisms
  60. [60]
    [PDF] asamblea legislativa plurinacional cámara de diputados
    Jan 24, 2025 · La interpelación podrá ser promovida por cualquiera de las. Cámaras. La censura implicará la destitución de la Ministra o del Ministro. El ...
  61. [61]
    Senado aprueba ley para restablecer las atribuciones de ...
    Oct 15, 2025 · La Constitución otorga al Legislativo la potestad de interpelar a los ministros de Estado, y establece que una censura aprobada por dos tercios ...
  62. [62]
    Senado aprueba proyecto de ley que impide que un ministro ...
    Jul 9, 2025 · La norma modifica la ley 1350, del 16 de septiembre del 2020, que trata justamente la regulación a los efectos de la censura determinada en el ...
  63. [63]
    la fiscalización: el límite de la asamblea plurinacional
    Control del poder ejecutivo: La fiscalización legislativa permite que el poder legislativo supervise y controle las acciones del poder ejecutivo, asegurando ...
  64. [64]
    BOLIVIA (Cámara de Senadores), ELECTIONS IN 2009 - IPU Parline
    Parliament name (generic / translated), Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional / Plurinational Legislative Assembly. Structure of parliament, Bicameral.
  65. [65]
    General Elections in Bolivia, December 2009 (ARI)
    Dec 18, 2009 · The Bolivian general elections were held in December 2009 in very special circumstances and conditions: they were the first elections under ...
  66. [66]
    The Bolivian Legal System - GlobaLex
    Decree No. 48 dated March 18, 2009, established that the name “Plurinational State of Bolivia” must be used in all public and private acts, as well as ...
  67. [67]
    World Report 2015: Bolivia | Human Rights Watch
    In July 2014, the Plurinational Assembly had initiated an impeachment process, targeting three Constitutional Court magistrates under a 2010 law that allows the ...Missing: controversies 1st Legislative
  68. [68]
    Bolivia Law: Rights of Mother Earth 2010 - Eco Jurisprudence Monitor
    ... Law of the Rights of Mother Earth, and President Evo Morales approved the law in 2010. The law recognizes Mother Earth as a living being with rights and as ...Missing: Major Asamblea 2010-2015
  69. [69]
    BOLIVIA (PLURINATIONAL STATE OF) (Cámara de Senadores ...
    It took 88 seats in the 130-member Chamber of Deputies and 25 in the 36-member Senate. The Democratic Unity coalition (UD) - comprising the Social Democratic ...
  70. [70]
    Bolivia Legislative Assembly approves constitutional change to ...
    Sep 28, 2015 · In March 2009 Morales began redistributing land [JURIST report] to indigenous farmers under power given to him by the country's new constitution ...
  71. [71]
    (PDF) Ethnic rights and the dilemma of extractive development in ...
    May 6, 2016 · PDF | The Bolivian constitution of 2009 has been classified as one of the most progressive in the world regarding indigenous rights.
  72. [72]
    Freedom in the World 2015 - Bolivia | Refworld
    Apr 7, 2015 · Anticorruption legislation enacted in 2010 has been criticized for permitting retroactive enforcement.Missing: 1st | Show results with:1st
  73. [73]
    Justice as a Weapon: Political Persecution in Bolivia | HRW
    Sep 11, 2020 · Political interference in the justice system is a longstanding problem in Bolivia. Former president Evo Morales repeatedly rejected judicial independence.Missing: 1st | Show results with:1st
  74. [74]
    Bolivia after the 2020 General Elections
    Nov 23, 2020 · The Movement towards Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo or MAS) was returned to power and obtained an absolute majority in the parliament after a one-year ...
  75. [75]
    World Report 2020: Bolivia | Human Rights Watch
    In 2018, the Legislative Assembly approved a government-sponsored amnesty law for former presidents Jorge Quiroga and Carlos Mesa. They had been charged with “ ...Missing: 2015-2020 | Show results with:2015-2020
  76. [76]
    Bolivia | The Global State of Democracy - International IDEA
    On 17 September, the Legislative Assembly passed a bill banning child marriage, which was promulgated later that month. The bill abolished ...
  77. [77]
    Bolivia: Ley del Presupuesto General del Estado Gestión 2019, 20 ...
    Dec 20, 2018 · Capítulo PRIMERO Disposiciones generales. Artículo 1°.- (Objeto) La presente Ley tiene por objeto aprobar el Presupuesto General del Estado ...
  78. [78]
    Apenas 293 leyes aprobadas y publicadas desde el 2020 en la ...
    Sep 28, 2025 · Se aprobaron apenas 293 leyes entre 2020 y septiembre de 2025; entre 2010 y 2015 se promulgaron 653 normas y en la legislatura siguiente (2015- ...Missing: 2015-2019 | Show results with:2015-2019<|separator|>
  79. [79]
    Bolivian referendum goes against Evo Morales as voters reject ...
    Feb 22, 2016 · Figures show president will not be able to continue his unbroken run in power after constitutional amendment is defeated at ballot box by ...
  80. [80]
    Bolivia's Congress passes law for new elections without Morales
    Nov 24, 2019 · Bolivia's Congress approved a bill Saturday that opens the door to new elections without ex-president Evo Morales, as the caretaker ...Missing: 2016-2019 | Show results with:2016-2019<|control11|><|separator|>
  81. [81]
    Restoring Democracy: Lessons from Bolivia since the 2019 ...
    Dec 18, 2024 · Bolivia's 2019 “coupvolution” was the product of years of democratic backsliding, worsening political polarization, and anti-populist backlash.<|control11|><|separator|>
  82. [82]
    Election results | Bolivia (Plurinational State of) | IPU Parline
    Oct 18, 2020 · The Movement for Socialism (MAS-IPSP), led by exiled former President Evo Morales (see note), won a majority in both the 130 member Chamber of Deputies and the ...
  83. [83]
    [PDF] Analyzing Bolivia's 2020 General Elections - Final Report
    Both the Bolivian Constitution (Constitución Política del Estado – CPE) and the laws framing the elections enable the holding of democratic elections generally ...
  84. [84]
    [PDF] BOLIVIA 2020 - European Parliament
    Oct 18, 2020 · and the Legislative Assembly used this list to appoint the remaining six members. ... Plurinational State of Bolivia, the Legislative.<|separator|>
  85. [85]
    Bolivia braces for tense elections as ruling party implodes - ACLED
    The dispute between Evo Morales and current President Luis Arce has triggered deadly violence in defense of Morales' cause, which signals the power of his ...
  86. [86]
    Can Bolivia Avoid Renewed Election Violence in 2025?
    Jun 5, 2024 · When leftist candidate Luis Arce won Bolivia's 2020 elections, many hoped that the country could finally enter a period of stabilization and ...
  87. [87]
    In Bolivia, an “Intense” Battle Between Arce and Morales
    May 30, 2024 · The struggle between President Arce and Evo Morales for control of the MAS party is consuming national politics and jeopardizing the economy.Missing: Plurinational internal
  88. [88]
    Why Bolivia's MAS Collapsed - Project MUSE
    Sep 30, 2025 · Internal rivalries between Evo Morales and President Luis Arce fragmented the party, undermined governance, and eroded ties with social ...
  89. [89]
    President Arce enacted the law approving the loan for ... - FONPLATA
    Mar 27, 2024 · President Luis Arce enacted the law approving the loan for the improvement and enlargement of the Senkata-La Apacheta section.Missing: passed | Show results with:passed
  90. [90]
    Bolivia: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report
    Bolivia is a democracy where credible elections have been held regularly. While mass protests and violence erupted after the disputed 2019 elections, ...Missing: passed | Show results with:passed
  91. [91]
    Bolivia: Arce signs bill protecting children from online abuse into law
    Sep 11, 2025 · Known as Law 1636, the legislation introduces new criminal offenses to address online crimes like grooming and the distribution of child sexual ...
  92. [92]
    Three Things to Know About Bolivia's 2025 First-Round Election ...
    Aug 19, 2025 · The outcome of Bolivia's first-round presidential vote spelled a major upset in the country's political panorama.
  93. [93]
    Bolivia election: voters bring two decades of leftist politics to an end
    Aug 19, 2025 · Centre-right Rodrigo Paz Pereira and rightwing Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga, who briefly led the country in 2001, will now compete for the presidency in ...Missing: majority | Show results with:majority
  94. [94]
    From crisis to stability: what next for Bolivia's economy?
    Oct 16, 2025 · The 2025 Bolivian national elections, held on 17 August, knocked the incumbent Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party off the perch it had ...
  95. [95]
  96. [96]
  97. [97]
  98. [98]
    Elecciones Generales 2025: Cinco organizaciones políticas tendrán ...
    Aug 27, 2025 · ... Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional para el siguiente periodo constitucional. Las organizaciones políticas que cuentan con mayor ...
  99. [99]
  100. [100]
  101. [101]
  102. [102]
  103. [103]
    The Economic Challenges Facing Bolivia's Next Government
    Jan 6, 2020 · As important, the percentage of people living in poverty declined from 59.6% in 2005 to 36.4% in 2017, and inequality measured by the Gini ...
  104. [104]
    [PDF] THE PLURINATIONAL STATE OF BOLIVIA
    Poverty reduction gains accomplished between 2005 and. 2014, the period of the highest strides in poverty reduction, were to a very large extent due to ...
  105. [105]
    Bolivia: Ley de la Renta Universal de Vejez (Renta Dignidad), 28 de ...
    Nov 28, 2007 · Complementa el Decreto Supremo N° 29400 de 29 de diciembre de 2007 (Reglamento de la Ley N° 3791 de 28 noviembre de 2007), de la Renta Universal ...Missing: aprobación | Show results with:aprobación
  106. [106]
    Renta Dignidad sube en Bs 50 y llega a 1.5 millones de personas
    May 27, 2017 · El presidente Evo Morales promulgó ayer la Ley 953 que incrementa en 50 bolivianos la Renta Dignidad para las personas mayores de 60 años, ...
  107. [107]
    [PDF] EL EFECTO DE LA REDISTRIBUCIÓN DEL INGRESO SOBRE LA ...
    Los resultados sugieren que la implementación de estos programas redujo la incidencia de la pobreza moderada en Bolivia en 8,2pp y la pobreza extrema en 9,6pp ...
  108. [108]
    [PDF] Efecto de la Renta Dignidad en el nivel de pobreza, ingreso y ...
    A nivel país, en general, el impacto de la Renta Dignidad en el grupo elegible representa un incremento en el consumo per cápita. El impacto en pobreza ...
  109. [109]
    Bolivia: Decreto Supremo Nº 5031, 27 de septiembre de 2023
    Sep 27, 2023 · El monto del Bono «Juancito Pinto» entregado a cada estudiante beneficiario tendrá un valor de Bs200.- (DOSCIENTOS 00/100 BOLIVIANOS). Son ...
  110. [110]
    El impacto del Bono Juancito Pinto - SciELO Bolivia
    Los resultados sugieren que el BJP ha tenido un impacto positivo en la reducción de la inasistencia escolar en el ciclo primario, ha colaborado en la reducción ...
  111. [111]
    Bolivia con y sin bonos sociales: una comparación contrafáctica
    Mar 23, 2019 · Cuando los bonos están activos, el 31,9% de la población se ubica por debajo de la línea de pobreza, y cuando los bonos se han inactivado este ...
  112. [112]
    3 Bolivia: Advancing Indigenous Governance as a Distinct Order of ...
    It explores such democratic and Indigenous governance innovations as the creation of special reserved seats in the new Plurinational Legislative Assembly for ...
  113. [113]
    Bolivia: Freedom in the World 2024 Country Report
    Bolivia is a democracy where credible elections have been held regularly. While mass protests and violence erupted after the disputed 2019 elections.
  114. [114]
    The new Bolivian electoral law to guarantee indigenous ... - Nationalia
    Apr 14, 2009 · The electoral law will allow Evo Morales reelection, and also establishes that indigenous peoples -a majority in the country- will be reserved ...
  115. [115]
    This is what leadership looks like: Meet Cecilia Moyoviri Moye, an ...
    Mar 10, 2021 · As a result, four indigenous women now serve in the Plurinational Legislative Assembly as representatives of the special peasant indigenous ...
  116. [116]
    The Question of Plurinationalism in Bolivia - Columbia Blogs
    Jun 5, 2022 · Opponents, including some indigenous leaders, disagree, arguing that plurinationalism dilutes sovereign aims and maintains the unjust status quo.
  117. [117]
    The Indigenous World 2022: Bolivia - IWGIA
    Apr 1, 2022 · There are 36 recognized peoples in Bolivia. With the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples and a new Constitution, Bolivia ...
  118. [118]
    [PDF] New Institutions of Indigenous Self-Governance in Bolivia
    Jul 3, 2015 · The article analyzes Bolivia's indigenous autonomy framework, focusing on the first five statutes, and the tensions between autonomy and self- ...
  119. [119]
    Bolivia - IWGIA - International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs
    Three of them have already established their self-government, and another five have achieved their autonomous status through a declaration of constitutionality.
  120. [120]
    12 The Thaki (Path) of Indigenous Autonomies in Bolivia
    The path to formalizing Indigenous autonomy in Bolivia under the country's new Plurinational State framework is marked by legal obstacles and ongoing ...
  121. [121]
    Indigenous Autonomy and the Contradictions of Plurinationalism in ...
    Our central argument is that the real exercise of plurinationalism in Bolivia is heavily restricted by the country's economic dependence on the extraction ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  122. [122]
    4 Indigenous Autonomy in Bolivia: From Great Expectations to ...
    A few months after the promulgation of the 2009 Constitution, the MAS government introduced the secondary laws and supreme decrees to put in place the new legal ...
  123. [123]
    Competitive Authoritarianism in Morales's Bolivia
    In line with what is observed in competitive authoritarian regimes, the post-2009 legislature during the MAS's reign was repurposed to dispense authoritarian ...
  124. [124]
    Democratic Erosion in Bolivia
    Feb 27, 2024 · It is very clear that Morales and the MAS party undermined Bolivia's democratic institutions in an effort to consolidate power. These are key ...
  125. [125]
    The regional factor in the Bolivian political crisis - Latinoamérica 21
    May 29, 2024 · President Arce, faced with his weakness in the Plurinational Legislative Assembly, has decided to entrench himself in the judiciary and, from ...
  126. [126]
    How towering dominance of Bolivia's socialist party came tumbling ...
    Aug 20, 2025 · In strongholds such as El Alto, support for the Mas party that once made Evo Morales Bolivia's first Indigenous president has ebbed away ...
  127. [127]
    Bolivia: Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report
    The Plurinational Legislative Assembly (ALP) consists of a 130-member Chamber of Deputies and a 36-member Senate. Legislative terms are five years. Due to ...
  128. [128]
    Dañan imagen de Asamblea con escándalos y corrupción - El Diario
    Jul 29, 2024 · Los recientes escándalos y hechos de corrupción en instancias de la Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional (ALP) han ensombrecido la imagen y ...
  129. [129]
    DE 33 CASOS QUE ATENDIÓ LA COMISIÓN DE ÉTICA, DOS ...
    Feb 4, 2022 · Dirección. La Paz – Bolivia. Nuevo Edificio de la Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional. Calle Comercio esquina Colón. Área Legislativa. Diputados.
  130. [130]
    #RS_Informa Aquilardo Caricari Cala //Un escándalo más de ...
    Jul 22, 2025 · ... Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional, es urgente que la ALP conforme una comisión de investigación, no hay confianza en el Ministerio Público ...
  131. [131]
    From Hope to Disillusionment: Bolivia After 20 Years of MAS - NACLA
    Sep 3, 2025 · Social movement leaders were absorbed into the government, their loyalty ensured through perks such as union headquarters funded by the ...Missing: legislation | Show results with:legislation
  132. [132]
  133. [133]
    Comisión Mixta:Gobierno trabó investigaciones para ocultar casos ...
    Sep 16, 2020 · La Paz. La Comisión Especial Mixta de Investigación, de la Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional (ALP), sobre el manejo irregular de las ...Missing: escándalos | Show results with:escándalos<|separator|>
  134. [134]
    MAS maneuver in the Plurinational Legislative Assembly seeks to ...
    Oct 16, 2025 · “A Comptroller appointed by this Legislative Assembly will prevent any audits of corruption cases in state-owned companies such as YPFB ...
  135. [135]
    Research Update: Bolivia Long-Term Ratings Lowere - S&P Global
    Jun 25, 2025 · Balance-of-payments pressures have driven usable reserves to historically low levels, reaching US$2.4 billion in April 2025 (US$165 million in ...
  136. [136]
    To Escape Economic Crisis, Bolivia Has a Painful Road Ahead
    Jul 24, 2025 · By 2014, Bolivia had accumulated nearly $14 billion in foreign reserves, largely thanks to gas exports. However, the country failed to ...
  137. [137]
    [PDF] BOLIVIA MPO - The World Bank
    Net international reserves stood at USD 2.9 billion in Au- gust 2025 (equivalent to 2.9 months of imports), slightly above the 22 tons of gold level mandated ...
  138. [138]
    Bolivia: 2025 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report
    Jun 2, 2025 · Large fiscal deficits, mostly financed by the central bank, in a fixed exchange rate regime have led to the depletion of international reserves, ...
  139. [139]
    Visitas a la Asamblea Legislativa - Cámara de Diputados
    Dirección. La Paz – Bolivia. Nuevo Edificio de la Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional. Calle Comercio esquina Colón. Área Legislativa. Diputados. Proyectos de ...Missing: sede | Show results with:sede
  140. [140]
    Luis Arce inaugura sede del Legislativo donde no habrá
    Aug 2, 2021 · La Asamblea Legislativa boliviana cambiará de espacio de trabajo tras más de un centenar de años en el que se utilizó el Palacio Legislativo ...
  141. [141]
    Bolivia inaugura nueva sede parlamentaria – DW – 02/08/2021
    Aug 2, 2021 · El edificio, que ocupa una superficie de 41.000 metros cuadrados y empezó a construirse en 2015, pretende albergar un Legislativo "más ...
  142. [142]
    El Estado de Bolivia inaugura una nueva sede para el Poder ...
    Aug 3, 2021 · La sede del Legislativo se encuentra en las inmediaciones de la plaza Murillo (La Paz), cuenta con tecnología de punta y está edificada sobre ...
  143. [143]