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Luis Arce


Luis Alberto Arce Catacora (born 28 September 1963) is a Bolivian and who served as the 67th of the Plurinational of from 8 2020 to 8 2025. A graduate of the Higher University of San Andrés with a master's degree in economics from the University of Warwick, Arce built his career at the Central Bank of Bolivia before entering government service.
As Minister of Economy and Public Finances under President Evo Morales, Arce held the position from 2006 to 2017 and briefly from January to November 2019, during which Bolivia experienced robust growth fueled by high commodity prices and nationalizations in key sectors. Selected as the Movement for Socialism (MAS) candidate following the 2019 political crisis that ousted Morales amid fraud allegations in that year's election, Arce won the presidency in 2020 with 55% of the vote, restoring MAS to power after an interim administration. His presidency focused on industrializing Bolivia's natural resources and social programs but faced challenges including internal MAS factionalism with Morales, fuel and foreign exchange shortages, and a failed military mobilization in 2024 that Arce described as a coup attempt. Arce opted not to seek re-election in 2025, after which MAS lost the presidency to a center-right candidate, marking the end of two decades of socialist governance.

Early life and education

Family background and upbringing

Luis Arce Catacora was born on September 28, 1963, in La Paz, Bolivia. He grew up in the capital city during a period of political instability in the country, including multiple military coups and transitions to democracy in the late 1970s and 1980s. Arce was raised in a middle-class family, with both parents employed as public school teachers, which provided a stable environment emphasizing education. This background influenced his early exposure to intellectual pursuits, though specific details on family dynamics or siblings remain limited in public records.

Academic and early professional career

Arce completed his in La Paz in 1980 before pursuing higher studies in and . He graduated as from the Institute of Banking in La Paz in 1984. Subsequently, he obtained a in from the Higher University of San Andrés (UMSA) in La Paz. In 1997, Arce earned a in from the in the . Arce commenced his in 1987 at the of (Banco Central de Bolivia, BCB), where he remained until January 2006, advancing through various roles in economic analysis and policy. His early work at the BCB focused on monetary policy and financial stability amid Bolivia's economic challenges in the late 1980s and 1990s, including hyperinflation recovery and structural reforms.

Pre-presidential political roles

Minister of Economy and Public Finance

Luis Arce served as Minister of and under President from to , with a brief return in . In this , he implemented policies centered on over resources to fund programs and . A cornerstone of Arce's tenure was the nationalization of Bolivia's hydrocarbons sector announced on May 1, 2006, which raised royalties and taxes on foreign companies from 18% to 82% in major fields, channeling increased revenues to the state-owned YPFB. This policy, executed amid a global commodity boom, boosted hydrocarbon sector income from approximately $173 million in 2005 to over $1.8 billion by 2008, enabling fiscal expansion. However, it deterred private investment in exploration, contributing to stagnant production levels in subsequent years. Under Arce's fiscal , Bolivia experienced robust averaging around 5% annually from 2006 to 2014, driven by exports and resource rents, which funded poverty alleviation and . rates fell by 42% and extreme poverty by 60% between 2006 and 2019, attributed to redistributive spending on subsidies, bonuses, and . International reserves accumulated to a peak of nearly $15 billion by 2014, reflecting prudent savings from windfall revenues. As commodity prices declined after 2014, vulnerabilities in the model surfaced, with reserves halving to $6 billion by 2019 amid persistent public spending and widening fiscal deficits. Arce's approach emphasized import substitution and state-led industrialization, investing over $8.5 billion in hydrocarbon processing by 2015, but these efforts yielded limited diversification from extractive dependency. Critics, including investors and economists, argued that the heavy reliance on non-renewable rents without structural reforms sowed seeds for later economic strains, though supporters credit Arce with stabilizing finances during the boom.

Economic policies and outcomes under Morales

Luis Arce served as Bolivia's Minister of Economy and Public Finance from May 2006 to July 2017, during which he architected the core elements of President Evo Morales' state-led economic model. Appointed shortly after Morales' inauguration, Arce oversaw the nationalization of the hydrocarbon sector via Supreme Decree 28701 on May 1, 2006, which compelled foreign oil companies to renegotiate contracts with Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB), raising the state's share of production revenues from approximately 18% to up to 82% in direct control operations. This policy capitalized on surging global commodity prices, particularly for natural gas, tripling hydrocarbon exports from $780 million in 2005 to $2.5 billion by 2008 and building central bank international reserves to a peak of $15.5 billion by 2014. Under Arce's stewardship, public investment surged from 8% of GDP in 2005 to over 20% by , funding projects, subsidies, and conditional transfers such as the Juancito for and the Renta Dignidad . These measures, financed by rents, contributed to robust macroeconomic amid the supercycle: real GDP grew at an of 4.8% from to , outpacing the Latin regional . metrics improved markedly, with the falling from 60.6% in to 36.4% by per , and declining by over 60% through redistribution and gains in extractive sectors. However, the model's heavy reliance on non-renewable hydrocarbon exports—accounting for up to 30% of GDP and 60% of exports by 2014—exposed vulnerabilities to price volatility and production stagnation. Arce's administration maintained fixed exchange rates and import subsidies, which preserved purchasing power initially but sowed fiscal imbalances; public spending outpaced revenues post-2014 as gas output plateaued due to limited reinvestment in exploration amid state dominance. Fiscal deficits emerged around 7% of GDP by 2017, financed by drawing down reserves, while private sector investment contracted under regulatory pressures and nationalizations in mining and other industries. Critics, including economists from the IMF, argue this extractivist approach hindered diversification, fostering "Dutch disease" effects that appreciated the real exchange rate and undermined manufacturing competitiveness. Arce defended the framework as a "new economic model" prioritizing sovereignty over foreign capital, though its sustainability waned with the commodity downturn.

2020 presidential election

Campaign platform and intra-MAS dynamics

Arce's campaign platform for the , , centered on economic from the following the , promising to revive the state-directed model of the governments through and industrialization of resources such as , , and minerals. He outlined 256 specific proposals, with a primary emphasis on generating , stabilizing finances, and sustaining initiatives like the Renta Dignidad and Juancito educational , while critiquing the interim government's neoliberal adjustments as detrimental to . The also committed to reinforcing the plurinational framework enshrined in the constitution, advancing indigenous autonomy, and repositioning Bolivia's foreign policy toward integration with like-minded Latin American states while resisting external pressures on resource exploitation. Intra-party dynamics within MAS during the campaign reflected efforts to consolidate unity amid the leadership vacuum caused by Evo Morales' exile in Mexico and Argentina since November 2019. In December 2019, MAS convened to select its ticket, ultimately endorsing Arce—a former economy minister credited with Bolivia's commodity-boom-era fiscal surpluses—as the presidential candidate alongside David Choquehuanca, a former foreign minister representing indigenous and diplomatic continuity, following Morales' explicit backing from abroad. This pairing bridged tensions between the party's cocalero social base, loyal to Morales' agrarian , and urban-professional sectors favoring Arce's technocratic expertise to address post-crisis and shortages, averting deeper factionalism that could have benefited opposition coalitions like Comunidad Ciudadana. The strategy positioned Arce as a pragmatic successor capable of restoring the "Process of Change" without Morales' polarizing presence, contributing to MAS securing 55.1% of the valid votes in the first round.

Election victory and transition period

The Bolivian general occurred on , , with preliminary quick counts on night indicating that Luis Arce of the Movimiento al Socialismo () had secured approximately % of the presidential vote, surpassing the % needed to avoid a runoff against centrist rival . results released by the Plurinational Electoral on confirmed Arce's with 55.10% of the vote, while received 28.83%, marking a decisive win for and restoring the party's control after the 2019 political crisis that led to Evo Morales' resignation and exile. also gained a supermajority in both chambers of the Plurinational Legislative Assembly, with 75 of 130 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 21 of 36 in the Senate. Carlos Mesa conceded defeat on October 19, acknowledging the results from exit polls and quick counts, which helped de-escalate potential post-election tensions amid lingering suspicions from the annulled 2019 vote. The interim government under President Jeanine Áñez, which had overseen the election after assuming in November 2019, accepted the outcome, paving the way for a transition despite ideological divides and Áñez's earlier withdrawal from the presidential race to consolidate opposition votes. Arce and running mate David Choquehuanca emphasized continuity with Morales-era policies while promising democratic renewal and economic recovery from the COVID-19 downturn during the interim . The transition from October 18 to inauguration lasted three weeks, during which Arce's team prepared policy blueprints focused on reactivating the economy through state intervention and reversing privatization trends under the Áñez administration. Tensions arose over the interim government's handling of Morales' return from exile and potential legal actions against MAS figures, but no major violence erupted, contrasting with 2019 unrest. Arce was inaugurated as president on November 8, 2020, in La Paz, receiving the symbols of office from the Legislative Assembly in a ceremony attended by regional leaders, formally ending the interim regime and initiating MAS's return to executive power.

Presidency (2020–2025)

Inauguration and initial agenda

Luis Arce Catacora was inaugurated as President of Bolivia on November 8, 2020, in La Paz, restoring the rule of the socialist Movement for Socialism (MAS) party one year after the ouster of Evo Morales. The ceremony occurred in the Plurinational Legislative Assembly amid the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, with attendance limited but including thousands of MAS-aligned peasants, union delegates, and indigenous groups gathered outside. Foreign dignitaries from nations including Argentina, Paraguay, Colombia, and Spain were present, alongside representatives from Cuba and Venezuela. Vice President David Choquehuanca, an indigenous Aymara leader, was sworn in concurrently, completing the MAS ticket's transition to power. In his inaugural , Arce declared the end of "" imposed during the interim Jeanine and affirmed that had "reclaimed ," vowing intolerance for coups or dictatorships in the . He assumed the with a on overcoming the pandemic's and economic impacts, reactivating , and generating to address the crises inherited from 2019's political turmoil and 2020's lockdowns. Arce emphasized unity across Bolivia's diverse social sectors, pledging to combat corruption, strengthen public institutions, and advance science and technology for national development. Arce's initial agenda prioritized economic recovery through reactivation of the "process of change" from the Morales era, including industrialization of natural resources like lithium and hydrocarbons to boost exports and state revenues. He committed to reviving dismantled social programs aimed at poverty reduction and indigenous inclusion, while promising to serve only one term to avoid personalistic rule. Foreign policy efforts focused on rekindling ties with leftist allies, such as re-establishing diplomatic and economic relations with Venezuela and Iran shortly after taking office. Domestically, early actions included facilitating the return of exiled MAS leaders and addressing immediate health needs amid Bolivia's high COVID-19 mortality rates, though implementation faced challenges from fiscal constraints and internal party tensions.

Domestic policy

Arce's a of the for () emphasizing state-led , , and , but encountered persistent challenges including declining , foreign shortages, and fiscal rigidities. slowed from 6% in 2021 to levels below 2% by 2024 amid falling prices, drought-induced agricultural shortfalls, and failure to diversify exports beyond hydrocarbons and minerals. The maintained heavy subsidies on and , which strained finances without corresponding gains, leading to a severe dollar scarcity by 2023 that hampered imports and fueled black-market currency trading. Arce attributed the crisis to external factors like global demand shifts and inherited mismanagement from prior MAS terms, yet refused subsidy cuts or liberalization measures ahead of the 2025 elections, contributing to his approval ratings dropping to around 20%. In resource management, Arce prioritized and industrialization of reserves, declaring it a strategic sector in 2021 with aims to capture 40% of supply by 2030 through state-owned pilots. Despite announcements of partnerships, including secretive 2023 agreements for pilot in the , progress stalled due to technical hurdles, environmental concerns, and insufficient foreign investment under restrictive state control terms, yielding no significant production increases by 2025. This approach echoed hydrocarbon but failed to generate anticipated revenues, exacerbating fiscal deficits without alleviating Bolivia's dependence on raw mineral exports. Social programs under Arce expanded conditional transfers and subsidies inherited from Morales-era initiatives like the Juancito and Renta Dignidad bonuses, with fiscal allocations reaching 5.2% of GDP in 2020 for and alleviation. declined modestly from 13.7% in 2020 to 11.1% in 2021, attributed to recovery spending and remittances, though overall metrics stagnated amid and rises by 2023. These efforts prioritized and rural communities but faced for inefficiency and , with limited impact on structural inequalities as public debt servicing consumed growing budget shares. Judicial reforms promised by Arce aimed to address institutional weaknesses, including proposals for judge elections and tenure security to curb corruption, but implementation deepened politicization. The administration leveraged a MAS-dominated legislature and judiciary to pursue cases against opposition figures and rival MAS faction leaders like Evo Morales, including disqualification attempts in 2023-2024, eroding judicial independence and public trust, which polls showed at historic lows. This control facilitated executive overreach but intensified intra-party schisms, hindering broader rule-of-law advancements. On security and , Arce's policies emphasized and anti-corruption drives, yet homicide rates rose amid urban violence, with emerging as a transit hub due to porous borders and . cultivation expanded to 31,000 hectares in , a 4% increase from , under expanded legal quotas defended by Arce as cultural patrimony rather than a drug precursor. The government challenged UN coca bans and promoted industrial uses, but cocaine production estimates reached record highs, with scandals implicating even former anti-narcotics officials in labs. Seizures increased modestly, but enforcement weaknesses persisted, linking domestic policy to broader regional trafficking dynamics.

Economic management and crises

Arce assumed the presidency in November 2020 amid the and an contracting by approximately 8.7% that year, largely due to lockdowns and prior political following the 2019 . His initially prioritized fiscal stimulus, including transfers such as the "Bonus against " totaling 1,000 bolivianos per eligible to mitigate effects and domestic . rebounded to 6.1% in 2021, driven by commodity exports and pent-up , but this masked structural vulnerabilities like declining natural gas production, which had peaked under predecessor Evo Morales and fallen by over 50% from 2014 levels by 2023 due to exhausted fields and insufficient investment. Arce maintained Morales-era policies of a fixed exchange rate pegged at 6.96 bolivianos per U.S. dollar since 2011, heavy subsidies on imported fuel (costing up to 4% of GDP annually), and state dominance in hydrocarbons, rejecting devaluation or subsidy cuts to avoid social unrest. These choices preserved short-term stability but depleted foreign reserves from $6.9 billion in 2020 to under $2 billion by mid-2024, as gas export revenues—once covering 50% of dollar inflows—plummeted amid rising domestic consumption and import needs. Public debt rose to 95% of GDP by 2025, fueled by external borrowing and fiscal deficits averaging 7-8% of GDP, with the government resorting to gold sales and one-off measures to service obligations rather than structural reforms. By 2023, dollar scarcity triggered a parallel black market where the boliviano depreciated to over 12 per dollar, crippling imports and sparking shortages of fuel, wheat, and medicines; fuel lines emerged nationwide in late 2024, with subsidized diesel prices at $0.50 per liter failing to incentivize supply amid import costs tripling in dollars. Inflation, dormant at under 3% annually through 2022, accelerated to 1.6% GDP growth in 2024 amid 13.23% year-on-year inflation by February 2025, escalating to monthly peaks of 5.2% in June 2025—the highest in 38 years—and annual rates exceeding 24% by August, driven by imported cost pressures and supply disruptions rather than wage spirals. The administration's refusal to liberalize the exchange rate or seek IMF funding—citing ideological opposition to conditionalities—exacerbated the crisis, with Arce instead promoting cryptocurrency remittances and bilateral deals for fuel, though these yielded limited relief. Growth projections for 2025 hovered near zero, with risks of default absent $1.8 billion in new multilateral loans blocked by parliamentary opposition, underscoring the unsustainability of the model reliant on depleting non-renewable resources without diversification.

Resource nationalization and lithium development failures

Upon assuming office in November 2020, President Luis Arce reinforced Bolivia's by prioritizing over hydrocarbons and minerals, extending policies initiated under , including the 2006 of and gas that initially boosted revenues but later contributed to declining and fiscal strains. By 2024, Arce attributed dollar shortages and reduced hydrocarbon exports to inadequate of nationalized assets, with output falling from 18 billion cubic annually in 2014 to around 13 billion by 2023, forcing Bolivia to import fuel despite reserves. This approach emphasized over foreign , yet pragmatic with firms like Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) yielded due to regulatory uncertainties and low incentives for partners. Arce's administration placed particular emphasis on lithium development to diversify the economy, leveraging Bolivia's estimated 21 million metric tons of reserves in the Salar de Uyuni—about 20% of global totals—through the state-owned Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos (YLB). Initial efforts focused on lithium extraction (DLE) technology for pilot plants, but production remained negligible: output halted mid-2020 due to COVID-19 and resumed at low levels, yielding only 15 tons of lithium carbonate in 2021 from inefficient evaporation-based pilots inherited from Morales. Subsequent deals, including a 2023 $1 billion agreement with Chinese firms , BRUNP, and CMOC for two targeting 50,000 tons annually ( to 100,000 by 2028), and partnerships with Russia's , faced from unproven DLE scalability, high magnesium-to-lithium ratios complicating , opposition, and insufficient —estimated at $5 billion needed versus secured . By late 2025, commercial-scale output had not materialized, contrasting sharply with neighbors and , which produced over 100,000 tons combined in 2023 via private-led joint ventures, leaving Bolivia without significant lithium revenue to offset economic crises like fuel shortages and inflation. The state-centric model deterred broader foreign expertise and capital, perpetuating technical and governance hurdles that prioritized ideological control over pragmatic industrialization.

Social programs and poverty metrics

The Arce administration maintained and sought to expand Bolivia's existing social safety net programs, primarily inherited from the Evo Morales era, including conditional cash transfers like the Bono Juancito Pinto (providing approximately 200 bolivianos annually per schoolchild to promote attendance) and the Bono Juana Azurduy de Padilla (targeting maternal and child health services). The universal Renta Dignidad pension for those over 60 was sustained at around 350 bolivianos monthly, benefiting over 1 million elderly recipients as of 2021, with adjustments for inflation attempted amid fiscal strain. These initiatives, framed as pillars of the "Process of Change," prioritized redistribution through hydrocarbon revenues, though declining gas exports limited expansions; social spending represented about 10-12% of GDP annually during 2020-2023, but implementation faced delays due to dollar shortages and procurement irregularities. Poverty metrics under Arce reflected initial post-pandemic stabilization but subsequent stagnation amid economic contraction. Official data from Bolivia's National Institute of Statistics (INE) indicated a national poverty rate of 36% and extreme poverty at 11% in 2021, marginally improved from pandemic highs but unchanged from 2018 levels of around 37% and 15%, respectively. The World Bank corroborated the 2021 figures at 36.3% for moderate poverty, attributing short-term relief to resumed social transfers and partial economic rebound, though international extreme poverty ($2.15/day) hovered at 3.1%. By 2022, INE reported a slight uptick to 37.3% moderate poverty, linked to fuel shortages, 15-20% inflation on food staples, and reduced real wages, exacerbating rural-urban disparities where rural extreme poverty remained over 20%. Independent analyses, including from the BTI Transformation Index, highlighted that while programs mitigated sharper rises, underlying fiscal deficits and import dependencies undermined long-term efficacy, with Gini coefficient inequality steady at 40.9 in 2021 despite earlier MAS-era gains.

Judiciary reforms and institutional control

Upon assuming office in November 2020, President Luis Arce pledged to reform Bolivia's judiciary, which had been criticized for politicization and inefficiency under prior MAS administrations, including temporary appointments and lack of independence. However, these efforts stalled amid internal MAS party divisions, with no substantive changes implemented to enhance judicial security or merit-based selection by 2024. Bolivia's judiciary operates under a 2009 constitutional framework unique globally, requiring popular election of high court judges every six years to ostensibly democratize the system, but resulting in heightened politicization as candidates are nominated by legislative assemblies dominated by MAS. Elections originally scheduled for December 2023 were postponed due to congressional impasse, driven by rivalry between Arce's faction and Evo Morales's supporters, allowing interim judges—many MAS-aligned—to remain in place and enabling executive influence over rulings, such as those targeting opposition figures or Morales himself. The contest for judicial control intensified as Arce and Morales vied to back rival candidates, transforming the process into a partisan struggle rather than a reform for impartiality, with Arce's allies accusing Morales of seeking to weaponize courts against the government while critics noted the system's inherent bias toward ruling party incumbents. Judicial elections proceeded on December 15, 2024, amid low voter turnout of approximately 23% and widespread apathy, yielding results that further entrenched MAS influence without addressing core independence issues. This outcome perpetuated perceptions of institutional capture, as the elected magistrates' loyalties aligned more with factional politics than legal merit, undermining rule-of-law metrics in international assessments.

Security, crime, and coca production

The Arce administration upheld Bolivia's "cato" system of social control for coca cultivation, permitting up to 22,000 hectares for traditional and legal uses while committing to voluntary eradication of excess crops to comply with international agreements. Despite these measures, independent monitoring by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) indicated persistent growth in illicit cultivation, with the total area under coca rising from 25,500 hectares in 2019 to 31,000 hectares in 2023, exceeding legal limits by approximately 40%. This expansion occurred primarily in the Yungas of La Paz and Tropics of Cochabamba regions, contributing to Bolivia's position as the third-largest coca producer globally and facilitating increased cocaine processing for export. On drug trafficking, the government intensified operations through the Special Force Against Drug Trafficking (FELCN), achieving record validations for the destruction of seized narcotics, including 84% of illegal drugs confiscated in 2021. However, emerged as a strategic for cocaine routes, with traffickers exploiting geographic advantages and reported institutional infiltration by criminal . High-profile cases, such as the 2024 approval for of former anti-narcotics René Sanabria to the on cocaine smuggling charges, underscored ongoing challenges within institutions. General crime trends under Arce showed relative compared to regional peers, with intentional rates fluctuating between and 4.4 per 100,000 inhabitants. Recorded homicides totaled 485 in 2022 and rose to 541 in 2023, before declining to 336 cases in 2024, yielding a rate of approximately per 100,000. Political and intra-party conflicts exacerbated urban , including incidents like the October 2024 confrontation between anti-narcotics patrols and supporters of former President Evo Morales. Overall, while anti-drug enforcement yielded operational successes, the failure to curb coca expansion and trafficking vulnerabilities highlighted limitations in addressing root causes tied to policy tolerance for excess cultivation.

Foreign policy

Arce's foreign policy pursued an anti-imperialist orientation rooted in the () tradition, prioritizing solidarity with leftist governments in while deepening economic ties with and to fund resource extraction and infrastructure projects. This approach aimed to diversify Bolivia's partnerships away from traditional dependencies, emphasizing multipolarity and against perceived U.S. hegemony. Upon assuming office in November 2020, Arce swiftly restored full diplomatic relations with Venezuela and Cuba, which had been downgraded or severed during the interim government of Jeanine Áñez following Evo Morales's 2019 resignation. He pledged to reintegrate Bolivia into the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), attending its XXI summit in Havana on May 27, 2022, alongside leaders from Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. Arce's government consistently defended Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro against U.S. sanctions and election disputes, with Maduro publicly thanking Arce in March 2025 for condemning U.S. immigration policies targeting Venezuelans. This alignment extended to rhetorical support for Cuba's sovereignty, highlighted in Arce's August 2025 acknowledgment of congratulations from both nations amid Bolivia's internal elections. Relations with the United States remained strained, marked by mutual accusations of interference and ideological divergence. Arce's administration inherited tensions from Morales's era, including the 2008 expulsion of the U.S. ambassador and DEA agents, and continued to criticize U.S. policies as interventionist. In his September 25, 2025, address to the UN General Assembly, Arce accused the U.S. of using the "war on drugs" as a pretext for meddling in Venezuela and labeled U.S. support for Israel as complicit in "genocide." Bilateral trade persisted at low levels, with U.S. concerns over Bolivia's human rights record, judicial independence, and cooperation on counternarcotics contributing to limited engagement. Arce advocated reducing dollar dependence through diversified trade, as stated in July 2023, amid Bolivia's foreign exchange shortages. Bolivia under Arce cultivated deepening economic dependencies on China and Russia, particularly for lithium and natural gas development, as Western firms withdrew due to nationalization risks and regulatory hurdles. Chinese state-owned enterprises secured lithium exploration contracts, with President Xi Jinping and Arce exchanging congratulations in July 2025 on 40 years of bilateral ties, praising mutual respect and Belt and Road alignment. China provided critical COVID-19 aid and infrastructure loans, though lithium projects advanced slowly due to congressional blocks and technical challenges. Similarly, Russia elevated ties to a strategic partnership by October 2024, supplying Sputnik V vaccines in 2020–2021 and exploring investments in hydrocarbons and uranium, with Arce inviting further Russian capital during meetings with Vladimir Putin in June 2024 and October 2024. These partnerships filled voids left by declining gas exports to Brazil and Argentina, but exposed Bolivia to geopolitical risks, including sanctioned entities and delayed returns on resource deals.

Alignment with authoritarian regimes

Arce's administration has sustained Bolivia's participation in the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), a regional bloc founded by Venezuela and Cuba that includes Nicaragua, emphasizing anti-imperialist solidarity among left-wing governments. In May 2022, Arce attended the XXI ALBA Summit in Havana, where member states reaffirmed commitments to mutual economic cooperation and opposition to U.S. sanctions on Venezuela and Cuba. The Bolivian government under Arce has provided diplomatic backing to Venezuela's Nicolás Maduro regime, particularly amid contested elections. On July 29, 2024, Arce congratulated Maduro on his re-election victory, despite international concerns over electoral irregularities and opposition claims of fraud. This support aligns with broader Latin American leftist endorsements of Maduro, contrasting with condemnations from democratic governments in the region. Relations with Cuba have involved coordinated foreign policy stances, including joint denunciations of U.S. policies. In July 2025, Bolivian officials alongside Cuban counterparts criticized U.S. measures against Havana, reflecting ideological affinity and Cuba's historical influence on MAS party governance. Bolivia has hosted Cuban medical brigades and maintained educational exchanges, sustaining ties inherited from the Morales era. Arce has similarly aligned with Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega administration, participating in forums that bolster Ortega's international legitimacy despite domestic repression. Bolivian support for Ortega includes recognition of his electoral wins and shared participation in anti-Western alliances, contributing to a pattern of endorsing regional authoritarian continuity. Economic and diplomatic engagements with Russia and China have deepened, including lithium exploration agreements signed in 2023 with Rosatom and Chinese firms, prioritizing state-to-state deals over Western partnerships. These ties extend to military cooperation with Russia and infrastructure loans from China, fostering dependency on authoritarian creditors amid Bolivia's resource extraction strategies. Arce's pursuit of BRICS associate status in 2024 further signals strategic alignment with this Moscow-Beijing-led bloc.

Relations with Western countries

Arce's administration maintained strained relations with the United States, continuing a pattern of tensions established under his predecessor Evo Morales, characterized by mutual expulsions of diplomats and ideological clashes over Bolivian policies on resource sovereignty, coca production, and alignment with non-Western powers. The U.S. State Department criticized Arce's government in 2024 for anti-democratic actions and erosion of judicial independence, amid Bolivia's deepening economic crisis and internal political conflicts. In response, Arce frequently accused the U.S. of imperialism, including in a September 25, 2025, speech at the United Nations General Assembly where he charged the U.S. with practicing genocide and using the "war on drugs" as a pretext for intervention in Latin America, such as Venezuela. These exchanges contributed to frozen bilateral ties, with limited high-level engagement and U.S. concerns over Bolivia's cooperation on counternarcotics, as the country under Arce expanded legal coca cultivation while facing persistent illicit production estimates exceeding 30,000 hectares annually. Relations with the European Union were comparatively more diplomatic, though limited by Bolivia's pivot toward China and Russia for investment in lithium and energy sectors, which sidelined Western offers for resource partnerships. The EU congratulated Arce on his 2020 election victory, describing the process as peaceful and credible, and maintained channels for dialogue on trade and development aid, including a projected Forest Alliance in January 2025 focused on Amazon conservation. Bilateral ties with individual EU members, such as France, remained friendly, bolstered by a 2021 meeting between Arce and President Emmanuel Macron to discuss economic cooperation, though overall EU-Bolivia trade volumes stagnated at around €1.2 billion annually, with disputes over human rights and environmental standards in mining occasionally surfacing. Arce's government rejected Western criticisms of its institutional reforms as interference, prioritizing sovereignty in foreign policy formulations.

Trade dependencies on China and Russia

Bolivia's trade with China expanded under President Luis Arce, with bilateral volumes reaching $2.6 billion in 2023 and $2.73 billion in 2024, marking a 5.4% year-on-year increase in the latter. Exports from Bolivia to China totaled $328 million in 2023, mainly raw materials like minerals and agricultural products, while imports—dominated by machinery, electronics, vehicles, and consumer goods—far exceeded this figure, creating a persistent trade deficit that heightened reliance on Chinese financing and supply chains. In January 2025 alone, Bolivian exports to China surged to $118 million, surpassing historical monthly averages but still underscoring the asymmetry, as China became a primary market for Bolivian commodities amid declining traditional partners like Brazil and Argentina. This dependency extended to strategic sectors, particularly lithium development, where Arce's administration signed agreements with Chinese firms such as CBC Investments Limited—a subsidiary of battery producer CATL—for constructing production plants and industrializing Bolivia's reserves, estimated at 23 million tons. In June 2025, Bolivia secured a $1 billion deal with CBC to fund lithium projects, part of broader efforts to avert debt default amid $13.3 billion in external obligations, though critics noted the contracts' terms favored foreign control over Bolivia's resources. China's role as a creditor grew, providing loans for infrastructure like roads and hydropower, which Arce prioritized to address dollar shortages and fuel import needs, but these deepened exposure to Beijing's geopolitical influence without resolving underlying fiscal deficits exceeding 10% of GDP in 2023–2024. Relations with Russia under Arce emphasized energy and pharmaceutical imports, with key Russian exports including vaccines, medicines, antisera, and refined petroleum products to Bolivia. Trade discussions at forums like the 2025 BRICS summit focused on investment projects, including Russian assistance for Bolivian hydrocarbon purchases to ease fuel shortages. In 2024, Bolivia inked a lithium extraction deal with Russia's Uranium One Group, aiming to leverage Bolivian deposits for joint ventures, though implementation lagged amid technical and political hurdles. Bilateral ties elevated to a strategic partnership by 2025, with Arce inviting Russian investments in mining and energy to counter Western sanctions' indirect effects on Bolivia's economy, yet trade volumes remained modest compared to China, limited by Russia's focus on pharmaceuticals and fertilizers rather than large-scale imports of Bolivian gas or soy. These dependencies reflected Arce's pivot to non-Western partners amid economic isolation from traditional lenders, with China and Russia filling gaps in financing for lithium industrialization and import needs, but they exacerbated vulnerabilities: Bolivia's export reliance on primary goods yielded chronic deficits, while debt accumulation—without parliamentary approval for multilateral loans—risked default by mid-2025, as warned by Arce himself. Lithium contracts with both nations drew opposition for opaque terms and potential loss of sovereignty, with incoming administrations signaling intent to renegotiate or scrap them.

Internal party conflicts

The rivalry between President Luis Arce and former President Evo Morales fractured Bolivia's ruling Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party, escalating from policy disagreements into a contest for control of its structures and base. Initially, Arce, whom Morales endorsed as his successor in the 2020 elections, governed with Morales' influence intact, but tensions surfaced by mid-2021 over economic policies and Morales' push for an immediate return to power despite constitutional bans on his reelection. By early 2023, the dispute formalized with competing claims to the party's leadership: Arce's faction secured control of official MAS organs through judicial rulings and congresses in Cochabamba, while Morales rallied cocalero (coca growers') unions and rural militants, accusing Arce of neoliberal drift and authoritarian consolidation. The feud intensified in 2024 when Bolivia's Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal ruled Morales ineligible for the 2025 presidential race, citing term-limit precedents from his own era; Morales alleged judicial manipulation by Arce's allies, while Arce's camp emphasized legal consistency to prevent indefinite rule. Parallel MAS congresses proliferated, with Arce's group expelling Morales from the party in October 2023 and Morales denouncing Arce as a "traitor" who sidelined indigenous movements for technocratic governance. This schism eroded MAS cohesion, as Arce retained urban and institutional support but lost sway over Morales' loyalist networks in the Chapare region, leading to dual party apparatuses that paralyzed decision-making on legislation like budget approvals and electoral preparations. Resulting protests by Morales' supporters, beginning with road blockades on September 16, 2024, demanded his candidacy reinstatement and Arce's ouster, clashing with pro-government forces and police in incidents that killed at least four and injured dozens by December 2024. These actions, centered in Morales' strongholds, disrupted fuel and food supplies, exacerbating fuel shortages and inflation amid Bolivia's economic woes, while Arce responded with decrees criminalizing blockades and arrests of Morales-linked leaders. The paralysis extended into 2025, with factional violence undermining MAS's electoral machinery and governance, as evidenced by stalled congressional sessions and fragmented social movement alliances that once unified under Morales.

Feud with Evo Morales

The feud between Bolivian President Luis Arce and former President Evo Morales, once political allies within the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party, originated from tensions over party control and succession following Morales' 2019 resignation amid disputed elections and protests that resulted in 36 deaths. Arce, who served as Morales' finance minister, secured the presidency in 2020 as the MAS candidate backed by Morales from exile, positioning him as a proxy to restore MAS rule after the interim government. However, upon Morales' return to Bolivia after the election, disagreements intensified over influence within MAS, particularly regarding judicial reforms and the selection of candidates for the 2025 elections, with Morales seeking a fourth term despite constitutional term limits. The conflict escalated sharply in October 2023 when Morales' faction convened the 10th MAS congress in Lauca Ñ, Cochabamba, on October 5, declaring the "self-expulsion" of Arce and Vice President David Choquehuanca for failing to attend and expelling 20 Arce-aligned deputies. The congress ratified Morales as MAS president and its 2025 presidential candidate, prompting Arce's camp to challenge its legitimacy in the Constitutional Court, which suspended the gathering and later ruled in December 2023 that Morales was ineligible to run due to indefinite re-election bans. Morales dismissed the ruling as "fraudulent" and government-orchestrated, while Arce accused Morales' congressional allies of obstructing legislation in an "economic boycott" to undermine his administration. By 2024, the rivalry manifested in competing MAS congresses, such as Arce's attendance at a disputed gathering in El Alto on May 3, which a high court later recognized as legitimate in May, bolstering his faction's position. Supporters clashed violently, including rock-throwing and tear gas incidents during Morales' 190-kilometer march from Caracollo to La Paz in September 2024, injuring about 40 people, as Morales demanded his electoral eligibility to "save" the country from Arce. Morales' followers also blockaded roads for two weeks in February 2024, contributing to economic losses, while broader protests over fuel and dollar shortages in May and June 2024 highlighted how the schism stalled governance and deepened institutional divisions within MAS.

Resulting political paralysis and protests

The schism within the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) between factions loyal to President Luis Arce and former President Evo Morales generated legislative gridlock, as Morales-aligned lawmakers obstructed Arce's legislative agenda, including bills for external debt issuance and lithium project approvals essential for economic stabilization. This partisan obstruction, rooted in disputes over party control and 2025 election candidacies, stalled governance and prevented MAS from unifying for primary elections, deepening institutional paralysis amid Bolivia's fiscal crisis. By mid-2024, the impasse had eroded the party's cohesion, limiting its capacity to mobilize social bases and respond to national challenges. Morales' supporters escalated protests from late 2023, employing road blockades and marches to demand his eligibility for reelection—despite a 2023 constitutional court ruling against consecutive terms—and to denounce Arce's administration. A prominent action occurred on September 19, 2024, when clashes erupted during Morales' 190 km march from Caracollo to La Paz, injuring about 40 participants amid rock-throwing and tear gas deployment by counter-protesters. Further unrest included truckers' roadblocks and tire burnings in June 2024, alongside merchants' 100 km protest trek to La Paz on June 17 over currency shortages, which compounded fuel scarcity and forced multi-day queues at gas stations. These sustained demonstrations, lasting over two months by December 2024, disrupted supply chains and public order, with police interventions in areas like Mairana highlighting escalating violence. The protests amplified political instability, diverting resources from policy implementation and accelerating MAS's fragmentation, which by 2025 contributed to the party's electoral setbacks and diminished influence.

2024 military coup attempt

On June 26, 2024, units of the Bolivian military, including armored vehicles and approximately 200 soldiers, mobilized in La Paz and attempted to seize the presidential palace, known as the Casa Grande del Pueblo, in what President Luis Arce described as a coup d'état against his government. The operation was led by General Juan José Zúñiga, the army commander whom Arce had dismissed the previous day for insubordination related to threats against former President Evo Morales. Zúñiga positioned tanks to block access to Plaza Murillo and rammed the palace doors, while declaring on state television that the action aimed to "restore democracy" amid economic instability and political divisions within the ruling Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party. Arce, confronting Zúñiga directly inside the palace alongside loyal ministers, appointed General José Wilson Sánchez as the new army chief, who promptly ordered the troops to withdraw. The incursion lasted several hours before soldiers retreated without significant violence or casualties, leading to Zúñiga's arrest later that afternoon along with 16 other military personnel and civilians involved. Arce rallied supporters outside the palace, vowing to defend democracy and attributing the plot to unspecified internal and external forces seeking to exploit Bolivia's fuel shortages and foreign currency crisis. Zúñiga, prior to his detention, cited motivations including Bolivia's deteriorating economy—marked by dollar scarcity, rising inflation, and fuel rationing—as well as the need to free "political prisoners" and address MAS infighting, particularly the Arce-Morales rift over candidate selection for the 2025 elections. However, after his arrest, Zúñiga reversed course, alleging the event was a fabricated "self-coup" orchestrated by Arce to consolidate power and distract from governance failures, a claim echoed by Morales, opposition leaders, and initially by Argentine President Javier Milei before a partial reversal. Arce dismissed these accusations as "lies" with no evidentiary basis, emphasizing Zúñiga's independent actions and prior loyalty to the MAS government. In the aftermath, Bolivian authorities initiated judicial proceedings against Zúñiga and co-conspirators on charges of terrorism and sedition, with trials ongoing as of late 2024; Zúñiga faces up to 30 years in prison. The episode temporarily bolstered Arce's domestic support amid widespread pro-government mobilization, but it underscored Bolivia's institutional fragility, exacerbated by economic pressures and the MAS schism, without resolving underlying tensions. No conclusive evidence has emerged to substantiate staging claims, though skeptics point to the coup's swift collapse and Zúñiga's post-arrest statements as circumstantial indicators of orchestration, contrasting with Arce's narrative of genuine external threats.

2025 election withdrawal and term end

In May 2025, amid declining approval ratings and internal divisions within the Movement for Socialism (MAS) party, President Luis Arce announced his withdrawal from the August 17, 2025, presidential election, forgoing a bid for re-election despite constitutional eligibility for a second consecutive term. Arce cited the need to avoid splitting the leftist vote with his rival Evo Morales, who sought a return to power, and urged Morales to similarly step aside in favor of party unity; Morales rejected the proposal and proceeded with his candidacy. The decision followed polls showing Arce trailing significantly behind opposition figures, exacerbated by Bolivia's economic woes including fuel shortages, inflation exceeding 5% annually, and foreign reserve depletion. The MAS schism, rooted in a prolonged feud between Arce and Morales over party control and policy direction, fragmented the ruling bloc's support base, polling at under 20% combined in pre-election surveys. This paved the way for opposition gains in the August 17 first-round vote, where centrist Senator Rodrigo Paz Pereira of the Revolutionary Left Front secured first place with approximately 28% of the vote, followed by former President Jorge Quiroga at 24%, forcing a runoff on October 19. Neither Arce nor Morales endorsed a successor effectively, contributing to voter disillusionment amid protests and violence tied to the intra-party conflict, which claimed at least five lives in 2024-2025 clashes. Paz Pereira won the runoff decisively, marking the first non-MAS presidency since 2005 and ending nearly two decades of socialist governance. Arce's five-year term, inaugurated on November 8, 2020, concluded with the handover of power on November 8, 2025, in La Paz's Plaza Murillo, amid subdued ceremonies reflecting the outgoing administration's unpopularity—approval ratings hovered below 30% by late 2025 due to unaddressed structural reforms. The transition highlighted Bolivia's shift toward market-oriented policies, with the new government pledging dollarization and subsidy cuts to address a fiscal deficit surpassing 8% of GDP. Arce departed office without major legal impediments at the time, though lingering investigations into corruption allegations from his tenure persisted.

Post-presidency activities

Transition to new administration

Rodrigo Paz, a centrist senator and son of former president Jaime Paz Zamora, won Bolivia's presidential runoff election on October 19, 2025, with 54% of the vote against conservative rival Jorge "Tuto" Quiroga, marking the end of nearly 20 years of uninterrupted rule by the leftist Movement for Socialism (MAS) party under Evo Morales and Luis Arce. The first-round general election on August 17, 2025, had produced no outright winner, necessitating the runoff amid voter disillusionment with MAS's internal divisions and economic mismanagement, including fuel shortages, inflation exceeding 5% annually, and depleted foreign reserves. The presidential transition process commenced immediately after the election results were certified, with Arce's administration coordinating directly with Paz's incoming team to facilitate a orderly handover of power. Paz emphasized institutional continuity and economic stabilization in initial transition meetings, pledging to address Bolivia's fiscal deficits—estimated at 8.9% of GDP in 2025—through pro-market reforms while avoiding abrupt nationalizations. Unlike the contentious 2020 transition following Morales's exile, which involved interim governance under Jeanine Áñez amid protests and fraud allegations, the 2025 shift proceeded without reported violence or legal disputes, reflecting Arce's decision not to seek reelection amid approval ratings below 30% and party schisms with Morales. Paz's inauguration is set for November 8, 2025, at the Casa Grande del Pueblo in La Paz, succeeding Arce's five-year term that began on November 8, 2020. During the transition period, focus areas included briefing on lithium extraction contracts—Bolivia holds over 20% of global reserves but produced less than 0.1% commercially under Arce—and foreign debt obligations totaling $12 billion, primarily to China and Russia. Arce's outgoing cabinet committed to delivering comprehensive policy dossiers, though critics from MAS factions alleged delays in releasing full economic data to obscure inherited liabilities. Paz, in turn, signaled intentions to diversify trade away from over-reliance on Beijing and Moscow, which accounted for 40% of Bolivia's exports in 2024. Following the MAS party's defeat in the August 17, 2025, general elections and subsequent October 19 runoff, where center-right candidate Rodrigo Paz Pereira secured victory with promises of market-oriented reforms, Arce's influence as an outgoing president has waned significantly. The fracture between Arce's faction and Evo Morales' supporters, exacerbated by Arce's May 15, 2025, withdrawal from the presidential candidacy amid declining support and economic crises including fuel shortages and currency scarcity, contributed to the party's collapse and loss of legislative majorities. As Bolivia transitions to non-MAS governance for the first time since 2005, Arce retains nominal leadership over remnants of his MAS splinter group but lacks the institutional leverage to shape policy, with analysts noting the end of the MAS era's dominance in indigenous and leftist mobilization. Arce faces renewed legal scrutiny in the Fondo Indígena corruption scandal, involving alleged embezzlement of approximately $40 million from the Indigenous Development Fund between 2010 and 2015, during his tenure as Minister of Public Works. The case, originally investigated under the 2019-2020 interim government, was reactivated in October 2025 by former viceminister Rafael Quispe, who demanded Arce's summons as an implicated party for purported economic damage; however, the Public Ministry suspended his required declaration on October 22, 2025. Separately, on September 9, 2025, Arce became subject to a paternity lawsuit filed by a woman alleging he fathered her child in 2023 and denied responsibility, seeking child support and recognition. These proceedings occur against a backdrop of broader corruption probes in MAS-linked institutions, though no convictions against Arce have been secured as of October 2025.

Personal life

Family and relationships

Arce was born on September 28, 1963, in La Paz, Bolivia, to Carlos Arce Gonzales and Olga Catacora, both public school teachers who raised him in a middle-class household. He was previously married to Jéssica Mosqueira, with whom he has three children: Luis Marcelo Arce Mosqueira, Rafael Ernesto Arce Mosqueira, and Camila Daniela Arce Mosqueira. Arce's eldest son, Luis Marcelo, was detained by Bolivian police on October 16, 2025, following a complaint of gender-based violence filed by his former partner. His son Rafael Ernesto, aged 25 as of 2025, acquired a large rural property known as "Adán y Eva" for approximately USD 3.3 million in 2023, raising questions about the funding sources amid Bolivia's economic constraints. Arce is currently married to economist Lourdes Brígida Durán Romero, who has served as Bolivia's First Lady since his inauguration on November 8, 2020; no children have been reported from this marriage. In September 2025, Arce faced a paternity lawsuit alleging he fathered an additional child outside his recognized family, though details remain contested and unresolved as of his term's end.

Health and public image

Arce was diagnosed with renal cell carcinoma in June 2017 while serving as Minister of Economy, prompting his resignation to undergo treatment in Brazil, where he received surgery and subsequent care that led to remission by 2019. He returned to public life thereafter, and in December 2020, following his presidential inauguration, a routine checkup in Brazil confirmed the cancer remained in remission with no recurrence detected. Rumors of acute health episodes, such as a claimed preinfarction in July 2024, were publicly denied by government officials, who affirmed his good health. In August 2025, Arce planned a medical control visit to Brazil, which allies described as precautionary, though former President Evo Morales dismissed it as a pretext amid political tensions. Publicly, Arce initially benefited from his reputation as a pragmatic economist instrumental in Bolivia's commodity-driven growth during the 2006–2019 Morales era, which reduced poverty and expanded social programs through state-led resource nationalization. However, his image deteriorated amid escalating economic challenges, including fuel and foreign exchange shortages, high inflation, and slowed GDP growth post-2020, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and global commodity price fluctuations. Approval ratings plummeted, reaching just 9% by late 2024 according to the Latinobarómetro survey, reflecting widespread dissatisfaction with governance amid internal Movement for Socialism (MAS) divisions and perceived policy failures. This unpopularity contributed to his May 2025 decision to withdraw from the presidential race, citing slumping polls and a desire to avoid further left-wing fragmentation. Arce's portrayal in Bolivian media and opposition circles often highlights his technocratic style as a contrast to Morales' indigenous populism, yet critics attribute his declining stature to over-reliance on ideological continuity without adapting to fiscal constraints.

Electoral history

[Electoral history - no content]

Publications

Authored books

Luis Arce Catacora authored El modelo económico social comunitario productivo boliviano, published in 2015 by Soipa in La Paz, Bolivia. The 425-page volume details the foundational principles of the economic framework implemented by Bolivia's Movement for Socialism (MAS) administration since 2006, emphasizing state-led resource management, social equity, and community productive initiatives as alternatives to prior neoliberal policies. In 2023, Arce published Un modelo económico justo y exitoso: La economía boliviana, 2006-2019 through Fondo de Cultura Económica. This work provides a comparative analysis of Bolivia's economic policies from the 1985 neoliberal shock therapy era through the MAS period, arguing that the post-2006 model achieved sustained growth, poverty reduction, and fiscal stability via resource nationalization and public investment, while critiquing predecessor approaches for exacerbating inequality and external dependence. Arce presented the book at the La Paz International Book Fair on August 12, 2023, highlighting empirical data on GDP expansion and social indicators under the model he helped design as minister of economy.

Key articles and economic writings

Arce's economic writings primarily focus on macroeconomic policy, monetary issues, and the theoretical underpinnings of Bolivia's post-neoliberal development model, often drawing from Post-Keynesian frameworks and emphasizing state intervention in demand management. His contributions appear in specialized Bolivian economic journals and research series affiliated with public institutions, reflecting his roles in central banking and public finance. A notable early article, "Incertidumbre y dolarización en Bolivia," published in 2001 in the Revista de Análisis of the Central Bank of Bolivia (Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 31–56), analyzes the risks of economic uncertainty under dollarization, advocating for policy measures to mitigate volatility in a partially dollarized economy. In 2015, Arce co-authored "Mathematic formalization of the economic social communitarian productive model" with David Quiroz Sillo for the Bolivian Economic Research Papers (Vol. 1, No. 1), offering a formal mathematical representation of Bolivia's Economic Social Communitarian Productive Model (MESCP) introduced in 2006, which integrates social, communal, and productive elements to prioritize domestic resource mobilization over external dependency. The paper formalizes key variables such as investment, consumption, and state-led redistribution to demonstrate potential for endogenous growth. Another significant piece, co-authored with Quiroz Sillo and José Alberto Villegas Gómez in the 2016 Bolivian Economic Research Papers (Vol. 1, No. 2), titled "Can aggregate demand policies bring about economic growth in the long run? A Post Keynesian view for Bolivia," contends that sustained expansion requires active fiscal and monetary stimuli to boost effective demand, critiquing supply-side constraints and applying Kaleckian models calibrated to Bolivian data for empirical validation. These works underscore Arce's advocacy for heterodox policies prioritizing public investment and income distribution to achieve long-term stability.

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