Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Self-exclusion

Self-exclusion is a voluntary in which individuals experiencing or at risk of formally request prohibition from entering venues, participating in online betting, or accessing related services for a predetermined duration or permanently, aiming to interrupt compulsive behaviors and promote behavioral control. Implemented through regulatory frameworks, casino policies, and multi-operator schemes—such as the UK's service or state-specific lists in the United States—self-exclusion typically involves registrants providing identification for enforcement via database checks at entry points or during account logins, with periods ranging from six months to lifetime bans. Empirical studies indicate moderate effectiveness in curbing participation, with self-excluders reporting reduced frequency, expenditure, and reliance on formal compared to non-excluders, though short-term exclusions (under one year) show limited long-term impact relative to extended or indefinite ones. Despite its role as a harm-minimization tool, self-exclusion faces challenges including low utilization rates (typically 5-11% among at-risk gamblers), frequent breaches—up to 49% of participants engaging in prohibited gambling—and vulnerabilities to circumvention through unregulated platforms, proxy accounts, or jurisdictional gaps, underscoring limitations in enforcement and the need for complementary interventions like therapy. Academic analyses highlight that while it aids initial abstinence for many, systemic factors such as inadequate monitoring and variable operator compliance contribute to inconsistent outcomes, prompting calls for enhanced multi-jurisdictional coordination and integration with cognitive-behavioral support.

Definition and Principles

Core Concept and Rationale

Self-exclusion constitutes a device whereby individuals with difficulties formally request exclusion from specific venues, operators, or activities for a defined duration, typically ranging from months to years or indefinitely. This process involves signing an agreement that legally or contractually prohibits entry or access, with enforcement mechanisms such as identification checks or database cross-referencing to prevent breaches. Originating as a harm minimization , it empowers users to preemptively restrict their own participation when internal self-regulation proves insufficient against compulsive urges. The rationale underpinning self-exclusion derives from the empirical observation that frequently entails impaired impulse control, where individuals persist in betting despite accruing financial, relational, and psychological damages. Participants commonly cite motivations such as regaining personal agency over gambling behaviors, seeking external intervention amid escalating losses, or reaching a crisis point of severe distress, including or relational breakdowns. This approach aligns with principles of precommitment, wherein foreseeable future weaknesses prompt current binding constraints to avert , akin to Ulysses' stratagem against sirens in Homer's . Regulatory bodies and operators implement it as a tool to fulfill duty-of-care obligations, though its voluntary nature underscores individual accountability rather than imposed . Empirical evidence supports self-exclusion's efficacy in curtailing participation during active bans, with longitudinal studies documenting statistically significant declines in frequency of play, monetary expenditure, and self-reported problem severity among excluders compared to non-excluders. For example, a randomized of voluntary self-exclusion programs found participants gambled less overall and expended less on bets post-enrollment, alongside reduced reliance on formal services. However, outcomes vary by individual factors like ban duration and enforcement rigor, with relapse risks post-expiry indicating it functions best as a temporary scaffold rather than a permanent cure; population-level remains modest due to non-participation rates exceeding 90% among at-risk groups. These findings derive from peer-reviewed analyses prioritizing self-reported and administrative data, though self-selection biases—wherein only motivated individuals enroll—may inflate apparent benefits.

Psychological Foundations

Self-exclusion in emerges from the recognition that individuals with gambling disorder often exhibit impaired executive functioning, including heightened and diminished capacity for self-regulation, leading to repeated engagement despite adverse consequences. This voluntary mechanism functions as an external constraint to circumvent internal failures in , particularly when acute urges or cognitive distortions—such as the or chasing losses—override rational restraint. Empirical studies indicate that 73-95% of self-excluders meet criteria for pathological , underscoring its targeted application to those aware of their vulnerability to . At its core, self-exclusion embodies a precommitment strategy, wherein individuals prospectively bind themselves to avoid temptation, anticipating future lapses in akin to historical analogies of self-binding against anticipated weakness. Psychologically, it addresses behavioral pathways in models, such as those outlined by Blaszczynski and Nower (2002), by removing access to environmental cues that reinforce habitual through intermittent schedules. By enforcing a period of , it facilitates disruption of automatic response patterns, potentially restoring perceived control and reducing urges, as evidenced in longitudinal assessments where participants reported halved expenditures and lower severity scores post-enrollment. Motivational drivers typically involve crises precipitating , including financial depletion, relational breakdowns, or emotional distress, often prompted by external influences like or counselors. Qualitative accounts reveal themes of through regained , though breaches—occurring in up to 70% of cases—highlight persistent psychological tensions, such as over lapses or underestimation of intensity. This reflects underlying dynamics where initial problem acknowledgment falters without sustained support, emphasizing self-exclusion's role as a harm minimization tool rather than a standalone cure, with efficacy enhanced when paired with cognitive-behavioral interventions targeting and biased beliefs.

Historical Development

Origins in Land-Based Gambling

The voluntary self-exclusion program for land-based originated in the United States, specifically in , where the Missouri Gaming Commission established the state's List—also known as the Missouri Voluntary Exclusion Program (MVEP)—in 1996. This initiative was prompted by a citizen's direct request to be barred from excursion gambling boats (riverboat casinos) due to his compulsive , marking the first formalized statewide mechanism allowing individuals to voluntarily prohibit themselves from entering licensed gaming venues. Initially designed as a lifetime ban with no option for reversal, the program required participants to submit identification and a notarized application, after which casinos were obligated to deny entry, withhold winnings, and report violations, thereby shifting responsibility from the gambler to the operator for enforcement. Missouri's model emphasized precommitment as a harm-reduction tool, rooted in the recognition that problem gamblers often lack sufficient during active episodes, necessitating external barriers to access. By November 1996, the program was operational across 's 13 licensed excursion boats, which had been legalized under the 1993 Missouri Gaming Act to boost riverfront economies while incorporating safeguards against gambling-related harms. data from the program's early years indicate modest initial uptake, with hundreds of individuals joining by , primarily motivated by financial losses and family disruptions rather than clinical diagnoses. Enforcement relied on physical checks at entrances, with penalties for venues failing to comply, underscoring a regulatory to operator over voluntary alone. This pioneering effort set a for other jurisdictions, influencing subsequent programs in states like and by the early 2000s, where similar statewide lists were adopted for land-based casinos. Unlike informal "trespass" requests previously handled by venues, Missouri's centralized list standardized self-exclusion, compiling participant details into a shared database accessible to all operators to prevent circumvention across sites. Early evaluations highlighted limitations, such as incomplete deterrence—studies of Missouri enrollees from 1996 to 2004 found that about 50% who attempted to re-enter succeeded initially due to lapses in staff vigilance—yet affirmed its role in reducing overall frequency for compliant participants. The program's evolution, including later amendments allowing petition for removal after five years (effective 2012), reflected ongoing refinements based on empirical feedback rather than ideological shifts.

Evolution to Online and Multi-Operator Systems

As expanded rapidly in the late 1990s and early , self-exclusion mechanisms evolved from physical venue bans to equivalents, where individuals could request closures or activity blocks directly with individual operators. These early online implementations relied on operator-specific tools, such as self-barring from a single or , but proved limited due to the ease of registering with alternative platforms, often across jurisdictions. The fragmentation of the online market—characterized by hundreds of operators—highlighted the inadequacy of single-operator exclusions, prompting the development of multi-operator systems to enable broader, centralized bans. In the , GAMSTOP emerged as a landmark initiative, launching on April 30, 2018, as the first national, free service allowing users to self-exclude from all licensed operators in through a single registration process. Previously known as the National Online Self-Exclusion Scheme (NOSES), it addressed prior gaps by mandating participation from regulated operators and using data-sharing protocols for enforcement, resulting in over 350,000 registrations by 2023. Similar multi-operator frameworks followed in other regulated markets to enhance efficacy. In , a nationwide system integrating land-based and online exclusions across multiple operators was implemented in 2019, allowing voluntary bans enforceable via a central registry shared with venues and digital providers. Belgium's scheme, operational for since around 2011 under its Gaming Act framework, expanded to cover all licensed operators and later incorporated retail venues by 2022, demonstrating an early regulatory push for cross-platform coverage. These systems typically employ technologies like integrations, identity verification, and periodic data synchronization to prevent circumvention, though challenges persist with unlicensed sites and cross-border access. By the mid-2020s, the model proliferated further, with the launching its first national voluntary self-exclusion program in 2024, initially in states like , , , and , enabling interstate exclusions via a unified platform to tackle the multi-jurisdictional nature of U.S. online betting. This progression reflects a causal shift driven by of single-exclusion inefficacy—such as high rates of venue-switching among problem gamblers—and regulatory demands for scalable , prioritizing centralized enforcement over fragmented voluntary measures.

Extension to Other Vices like Alcohol

The principle of self-exclusion, established in gambling regulation to enable individuals to voluntarily restrict their access to addictive activities, has been tentatively extended to alcohol consumption and purchase in select jurisdictions, primarily as local initiatives or legislative proposals rather than comprehensive national schemes. This adaptation draws on the same rationale of harm reduction for substance use disorders, where participants request bans from licensed premises or retailers to mitigate relapse risks, though enforcement remains decentralized and reliant on voluntary compliance by vendors. One early example is the "Count Me Out" program launched in , , on November 18, 2008, which permitted individuals to self-exclude from purchasing or consuming beer and spirits at participating off-licenses and pubs. The scheme integrated monitoring by health professionals, outreach workers, and to detect breaches via community reports, enabling early interventions to prevent associated harms such as family disruptions or escalation. Similar systems have been piloted elsewhere in the UK for alcohol alongside gambling, but they lack the mandatory multi-operator enforcement seen in gambling tools like GamStop, limiting their scope to cooperative local retailers. In the United States, legislative efforts have focused on state-controlled sales. For instance, House Bill 2811, introduced in 2022 by Representative Matthew Dowling, proposed a voluntary self-exclusion registry barring participants from purchasing at state-run Fine Wine & Good Spirits stores, motivated by personal recovery experiences and aimed at providing a structured barrier for those with . Earlier attempts, such as a 2009 proposal for a voluntary exclusion list, did not advance to enactment, highlighting challenges in scaling beyond due to 's widespread retail distribution. Digital platforms have also introduced opt-out features; implemented a voluntary exclusion from deliveries in November 2023, allowing users to block such orders marketplace-wide without affecting non-alcohol purchases. Unlike self-exclusion, alcohol extensions face inherent enforcement hurdles, as private retailers predominate and lack centralized for real-time verification, potentially undermining efficacy without broader mandates. No large-scale empirical studies assess long-term outcomes for alcohol-specific programs, though proponents argue they complement treatment by addressing access as a proximal cause of , analogous to venue bans. Adoption remains sporadic, reflecting alcohol's cultural entrenchment and regulatory fragmentation compared to 's more contained environments.

Operational Mechanisms

Process of Enrolling in Self-Exclusion

The process of enrolling in self-exclusion typically requires individuals to submit a voluntary application to a operator, regulatory authority, or multi-operator scheme, affirming their intent to abstain from activities due to recognized . This application often includes selecting an exclusion duration and undergoing identity verification to prevent fraudulent enrollments or circumvention. Enrollment methods vary by and platform type, encompassing online registration, in-person submissions at licensed facilities, or remote appointments via phone or video. Upon approval, operators are obligated to close accounts, return deposited funds, cease marketing, and enforce the ban, though individuals bear responsibility for compliance. For online and national schemes, such as the UK's GamStop, enrollment begins with accessing the service's website to initiate registration, where participants select from fixed periods like 6 months, 1 year, or up to 5 years (with or without auto-renewal), followed by identity confirmation to apply the ban across all Great Britain-licensed online operators. In contrast, land-based or state-specific programs, like Pennsylvania's overseen by the , allow online submission through the regulatory portal, in-person appointments at board offices or casinos (scheduled via phone at 717-346-8300 or email), or equivalent verification processes, covering casinos, internet gaming, video terminals, and fantasy sports with options of 1-year or 5-year bans for physical venues. Verification universally demands government-issued photo ID (e.g., or ) and often a signature or photograph to match against entry attempts, ensuring enforceability. In U.S. states like , the process integrates support services: individuals contact the Gaming Commission via phone (1-800-426-1234), online chat, or schedule in-person/remote sessions at info centers or via video, providing ID, signing the exclusion agreement, and having a photo taken, with durations of 1, 3, 5 years, or lifetime (latter requiring prior shorter-term completion). Multi-operator or statewide lists distribute the enrollee's details to participating venues and platforms, triggering automatic enforcement, though exclusions may not extend to lotteries or non-participating tribal casinos. Once enrolled, revocation is restricted—often impossible before the chosen period ends—and may necessitate a formal reinstatement process, such as counseling verification, to underscore the commitment's gravity. These mechanisms prioritize while balancing prevention of abuse, with regulators mandating operator adherence under penalty of fines.

Types and Durations of Bans

Self-exclusion bans in gambling are generally classified as temporary or permanent, with temporary bans further subdivided by fixed durations to accommodate varying levels of problem severity and individual needs. Temporary bans enforce a voluntary prohibition from gambling activities for a predetermined period, after which individuals may petition for reinstatement, often subject to counseling or verification requirements. Permanent bans, by contrast, impose an indefinite exclusion without automatic expiration, intended for those seeking lifelong abstinence. These categorizations apply across venue-specific, operator-specific, and multi-jurisdictional programs, though enforcement rigor differs. Common temporary durations include short-term options for immediate cooling-off, such as 24-72 hours, 30 days, 90 days, or 3-6 months, which are prevalent in online platforms and some U.S. states to address episodic urges without long-term commitment. Medium-term bans of one year provide a standard entry point in many programs, balancing intervention with reversibility. Longer temporary periods, like five years or more, cater to chronic issues and are non-revocable until expiry in jurisdictions like the and several U.S. states. For example, the 's GAMSTOP service mandates minimums of six months, one year, or five years for exclusion. In the United States, state-specific variations reflect regulatory diversity: offers one-year or five-year bans for casino self-exclusion; requires minimums of one or five years; permits one, five, or ten years with renewal options; and cardrooms include 30 days, 90 days, one year, or lifetime. Lifetime bans, available in over half of U.S. states, prohibit re-entry indefinitely and often extend to both land-based and online gambling where linked. Worldwide, durations align with these patterns but adapt locally; for instance, some international venues feature 180-day or multi-year options, with renewals possible post-expiry to extend coverage. Programs may incorporate flexible mechanisms, such as auto-renewal for indefinite extension or tiered types combining durations with behavioral commitments, though empirical data indicates shorter bans correlate with higher revocation rates compared to longer or permanent ones. Selection of type and duration typically occurs during enrollment, with no universal standardization due to jurisdictional autonomy.

Enforcement and Technology Used

Enforcement of self-exclusion in land-based venues primarily relies on centralized databases combined with biometric technologies such as facial recognition to identify and intercept enrolled individuals. In jurisdictions like , , facial recognition systems scan entrants at entrances and areas in real-time, cross-referencing against self-exclusion registries to alert security personnel and prevent access. Similarly, in , , a government-mandated program deploys automated facial recognition integrated with venue surveillance cameras to enforce bans, with pilots demonstrating detection rates exceeding manual checks since implementation in the early . These systems store biometric templates from enrollment photos, enabling proactive denial of entry without relying solely on self-reporting or visual identification by staff. For online and multi-operator self-exclusion schemes, enforcement centers on mandatory participation by licensed operators through shared digital registries and API integrations that verify user status at account creation, login, or transaction points. In the United Kingdom, GamStop operates as a national database where self-excluded individuals are flagged across all UK Gambling Commission-licensed online platforms; operators must query the system to block access, with non-compliance risking regulatory penalties. This involves automated checks against personal details like name, date of birth, and email, supplemented by device fingerprinting to detect circumvention attempts such as new account registrations. Centralized systems in other regions, such as Sweden's Spelpaus, extend this model by requiring a single enrollment to propagate exclusions across operators via interoperable tech protocols, though effectiveness depends on jurisdictional enforcement of operator adherence. Technological challenges include evasion tactics like proxy accounts or VPNs in online environments, prompting enhancements such as behavioral analytics and enhanced identity (e.g., eIDAS-compliant checks in ). In land-based settings, facial accuracy has improved with algorithms achieving over 99% match rates in controlled tests, but false positives necessitate human oversight to balance with concerns. Overall, these tools shift from passive bans to active, data-driven prevention, though empirical data indicates variable compliance rates influenced by regulatory stringency.

Applications in Gambling

Venue-Specific Programs

Venue-specific self-exclusion programs enable individuals to voluntarily ban themselves from a single gambling establishment, such as an individual , rather than across multiple venues or jurisdictions. These initiatives are typically managed independently by each operator, requiring participants to submit an application, provide identification, and sign a binding agreement that prohibits entry, wagering, and collection of winnings at that venue. In jurisdictions without centralized registries, such as , casinos establish their own protocols, often including in-person enrollment and staff training to identify excluded persons via photos or lists. Durations for these bans vary by venue but commonly include options of one year, five years, or lifetime exclusion, with no automatic reversal; participants must petition for removal after the minimum period, demonstrating changed circumstances. Enforcement relies on manual checks at entry points, where security personnel verify IDs against internal databases, deny access to enrollees, and may confiscate winnings if occurs undetected. Some programs extend to halting and credit privileges from the venue. While these programs provide a targeted barrier for venue-loyal problem gamblers, their scope is inherently limited, as individuals can simply patronize nearby alternatives, reducing overall harm mitigation. Empirical reviews indicate low utilization rates among those with disorders, with many potential participants unaware of or deterred from the process due to or procedural hurdles. In non-tribal U.S. , adoption remains venue-driven, contrasting with tribal facilities that may or customize independently. Data from such programs show partial success in curbing access to the specific but highlight the need for integration with broader interventions to address to other outlets.

National and Multi-Operator Schemes (e.g., )

National and multi-operator self-exclusion schemes centralize the registration process, enabling a single enrollment to enforce bans across all participating operators within a , thereby addressing the risk of users circumventing restrictions by switching platforms. These programs typically cover operators licensed by national regulators and rely on shared databases or for real-time verification of exclusions. Participation is often mandatory for licensed entities, ensuring comprehensive coverage and reducing administrative burdens on individuals compared to operator-specific exclusions. In the , GamStop exemplifies such a scheme, launched on April 30, 2018, as a free, industry-wide service for self-exclusion. Users register via the GamStop website or app, selecting exclusion durations of 6 months, 1 year, or 5 years (with indefinite options unavailable), after which operators must deny access, terminate accounts, and suppress marketing. By September 2024, over 500,000 individuals had registered, with April 2024 marking a peak of 8,686 new enrollments. The UK mandated participation for all remote operators licensed in effective March 31, 2020, covering approximately 80-90% of the online market at inception, though non-UK licensed sites remain outside its scope. Enforcement involves operators querying the central register during account creation or login attempts, with non-compliance risking regulatory penalties. The also operates (Self Enrolment National Self-Exclusion), a national scheme for land-based casinos, allowing self-exclusion from all participating venues via a centralized form, effective since its establishment under oversight. Internationally, analogous programs include Sweden's Spelpaus, implemented on January 1, 2019, following the re-regulation of its gambling market, which enforces self-exclusion across all licensed online operators for durations up to lifetime bans via a national registry managed by Spelinspektionen. Australia's BetStop, rolled out in August 2023, provides a federal multi-operator tool for online and casino exclusions, requiring licensed wagering providers to honor registrations for 3 months to 4 years. These schemes generally integrate age verification and protocols compliant with privacy laws like GDPR, though challenges persist with operators and cross-border access.

Online vs. Land-Based Differences

Self-exclusion programs in often operate through multi-operator schemes, such as Sweden's Spelpaus or the UK's GamStop, enabling individuals to register once and be barred from multiple licensed platforms simultaneously. In contrast, land-based self-exclusion is typically venue-specific or limited to regional networks, requiring gamblers to approach individual casinos or betting shops for bans, which demands physical presence and limits coverage to local establishments. This structural difference facilitates broader, more immediate exclusion online but restricts land-based programs to fewer sites unless integrated into national systems like Switzerland's multi-venue approach. Enforcement mechanisms diverge significantly due to the mediums involved. Land-based venues rely on physical identification checks, such as photo ID verification upon entry, which European programs like those at employ to detect and deny excluded individuals, reducing undetected breaches compared to self-reported data. Online enforcement depends on digital tools like (KYC) protocols, IP tracking, and account matching, yet these are vulnerable to circumvention through virtual private networks (VPNs), anonymous accounts, or unlicensed offshore operators, leading to higher breach frequencies. For instance, in a 2023 Swedish survey, 82% of self-exclusion breaches occurred via online casinos, versus only 24% at land-based restaurant casinos. Effectiveness metrics reveal short-term reductions in activity for both formats, with studies indicating halved expenditure or lowered problem severity post-exclusion, though long-term outcomes weaken, particularly where spontaneous enrollment may reflect rather than sustained commitment. Breach rates stand at 38-49% across programs, but self-excluders, often younger and preferring chance-based games, report during bans at rates up to 52% for activities, exceeding land-based incidents due to accessibility and reduced . Utilization remains low in both—around 7% of gamblers and 0.6-7% of problem gamblers overall—highlighting barriers like deficits and , yet schemes' ease may boost uptake among at-risk demographics.

Applications Beyond Gambling

Self-Exclusion for Alcohol and Liquor

Self-exclusion programs for and permit individuals to voluntarily prohibit themselves from purchasing or being served alcoholic beverages at designated venues or retailers, aiming to curb excessive consumption and support recovery from alcohol use disorder. Unlike centralized gambling exclusion schemes, alcohol self-exclusion remains largely underdeveloped and fragmented, often limited to state-run liquor monopolies or individual businesses due to the decentralized nature of alcohol sales across private retailers, bars, and supermarkets. In Pennsylvania, House Bill 2811, introduced in 2021, proposed a statewide self-exclusion list managed by the , allowing individuals to ban themselves from purchases at state-operated Fine Wine and Good Spirits stores for a minimum of five years, renewable thereafter, with requirements including photo ID and personal details for verification. The bill, motivated by personal experiences with -related incidents such as DUIs, sought to provide a structured tool for self-imposed restrictions but was introduced and died in the 2021-2022 legislative session without enactment. Similar proposals have surfaced in discussions around monopolies in , but no nationwide implementations exist, as state entities like Sweden's focus on purchase limits and age verification rather than personalized bans. Limited voluntary programs operate at the retailer level; for instance, Australia's Beer Cartel, an online vendor, enables customers to request permanent exclusion from future orders, with staff trained to block sales upon identification. Individual bars or liquor stores may honor informal self-bans requested by patrons, but these lack , enforcement mechanisms, or technological integration seen in venues, such as shared databases or facial recognition. Enforcement challenges stem from alcohol's ubiquity: in jurisdictions without monopolies, exclusions cannot feasibly cover all outlets, enabling circumvention through unlicensed sales, home , or cross-border purchases. No peer-reviewed studies specifically evaluate self-exclusion's impact on consumption or relapse rates, though proponents argue it could mirror self-exclusion's short-term reductions in access, where up to 85% of participants report decreased activity, albeit with high breach risks absent complementary . Broader harm reduction relies instead on pricing, availability controls, and treatment, highlighting self-exclusion's niche role in this domain.

Emerging Uses in Other Addictive Behaviors

In response to rising concerns over , several U.S. states have explored adapting self-exclusion mechanisms traditionally used in to restrict access to dispensaries. In , a introduced on October 3, 2024 (A4914), proposes a voluntary self-exclusion program allowing individuals to bar themselves from entering licensed cannabis dispensaries or purchasing products, aiming to aid those at risk of by prohibiting sales to listed persons for a specified duration. The program mirrors self-exclusion by maintaining a centralized list shared among retailers, with enrollment requiring in-person or online verification and no ability to reverse during the exclusion period, though details on enforcement technology remain under debate. Proponents argue this tool addresses addiction's behavioral parallels to , where immediate exacerbates compulsive use, supported by evidence that self-binding strategies reduce impulsive consumption in substance disorders. However, as of late 2024, the initiative faces scrutiny over potential circumvention via unlicensed markets and limited empirical data on long-term efficacy outside contexts, with no peer-reviewed studies yet evaluating cannabis-specific outcomes. Similar proposals have surfaced in other legalized markets, such as Michigan's exclusion options for marijuana participation, though these focus more on than . Beyond substances, preliminary discussions have emerged for self-exclusion in digital behavioral addictions like excessive or use, but formal implementations lag, with platforms offering only temporary blocks rather than binding, multi-provider exclusions akin to GamStop. Conceptual extensions to use propose voluntary bans from retailers to curb , drawing on self-exclusion's success in limiting access-driven , yet no widespread programs exist as of 2025. These adaptations highlight self-exclusion's potential as a harm-reduction strategy for non-gambling addictions, contingent on robust enforcement and integration with therapy to mitigate root causes like .

Empirical Effectiveness

Key Studies and Data on Reduction in Gambling

A systematic review of voluntary self-exclusion (VSE) programs indicated that participants reported significant reductions in gambling frequency during the exclusion period, alongside improvements in financial management and psychological distress. For instance, in a study of casino self-excluders, those enrolled in VSE reduced their days gambled per month from an average of 12.5 to 2.3 over six months, with corresponding drops in gambling expenditure. Similarly, longitudinal data from multi-venue exclusion programs showed that 70% of self-excluders achieved abstinence or substantial harm reduction in gambling severity scores on the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI) at follow-up assessments one year post-enrollment. Empirical evaluations of online self-exclusion schemes, such as Sweden's Spelpaus national program implemented in 2019, demonstrated that registered users experienced a 40-60% decline in average monthly sessions and net losses in the initial exclusion phase, based on operator transaction logs analyzed from 2020-2022. A comparative analysis of short-term (under 6 months) versus long-term VSE found that longer exclusions correlated with greater sustained reductions, with long-term participants showing 65% lower relapse rates and persistent decreases in PGSI scores (from severe to low-risk categories) compared to 35% for short-term groups. These outcomes were attributed to enforced barriers preventing access, though effectiveness diminished without concurrent behavioral interventions. Cross-sectional data from treatment-seeking gamblers revealed that self-exclusion adopters had 50% lower weekly expenditures post-implementation than non-excluders, with qualitative reports confirming perceived gains. However, a synthesis of 15 studies noted that while immediate reductions averaged 55% in days, only 40% maintained these gains beyond 12 months, highlighting variability tied to exclusion duration and individual motivation. In controlled trials integrating VSE with , participants reduced symptoms by 45% at six-month follow-up, outperforming VSE alone by enforcing compliance through incentives.

Relapse Rates and Long-Term Outcomes

Studies indicate that relapse rates following self-exclusion from are substantial, with breaching occurring in 49% of self-excluders in a nationwide survey, often via unregistered websites or alternative gambling forms. Similarly, in a study of 114 self-excluders, 59% (67 individuals) reported gambling despite exclusion, primarily through non-regulated online platforms. A German analysis found non-compliance rates exceeding two-thirds among participants, highlighting enforcement challenges in multi-operator schemes. Long-term outcomes vary by exclusion duration and integration with . Short-term voluntary self-exclusions (e.g., under 12 months) show limited sustained impact, with approximately 75% of participants resuming post-exclusion, whereas long-term exclusions (e.g., indefinite or multi-year) correlate with non-return rates above 99% during the active period. A 12-month follow-up of voluntary self-excluders reported reduced frequency, expenditure, and perceived need for , with 71% retention in . Systematic reviews of land-based programs document pathological prevalence dropping from 61-95% pre-exclusion to 13-26% post-exclusion, though these gains often erode without ongoing support. Self-excluders seeking clinical exhibit lower rates compared to non-excluders, with one finding improved response and reduced dropout risks among those who self-excluded prior to . Longitudinal evaluations reveal diminished negative impacts on daily activities, life, work, and mood persisting up to several years, alongside improvements evident within four weeks. However, standalone self-exclusion underperforms in preventing access via loopholes, underscoring the need for complementary behavioral to address underlying and .

Moderating Factors like Treatment Integration

The effectiveness of self-exclusion in mitigating gambling harm is significantly moderated by its integration with formal modalities, such as cognitive-behavioral therapy or counseling, which address underlying psychological drivers rather than relying solely on access barriers. Standalone self-exclusion provides a temporary deterrent but often fails to prevent upon expiration or circumvention, as it does not alter cognitive distortions or impulse control deficits inherent in disorder. When paired with , however, self-exclusion reinforces commitment to , enhances adherence, and yields measurable improvements in long-term outcomes. A 2023 of 145 patients seeking specialized for gambling disorder in found that those who had self-excluded prior to therapy initiation exhibited lower rates during and post- compared to non-self-excluders. Specifically, self-excluded participants demonstrated reduced symptom severity, better psychopathological profiles (e.g., lower and anxiety scores), and rates as low as 20-30% versus higher figures in the control group, attributing these differences to the proactive behavioral signal of self-exclusion fostering . This integration appears causal, as self-exclusion acts as an initial harm-reduction step that bridges individuals to professional , with empirical data indicating sustained rates up to 50% higher when follows exclusion. Other moderating factors akin to treatment integration include exclusion duration and motivational context. Longer self-exclusion periods (e.g., 2-5 years) correlate with non-return rates exceeding 99% in voluntary programs, outperforming short-term exclusions where approaches 75% post-lapse, underscoring the need for extended barriers alongside therapeutic to disrupt habitual patterns. Individual factors, such as baseline disorder severity and co-occurring issues, further moderate efficacy; severe cases benefit most from combined approaches, as isolated self-exclusion yields only partial reductions in frequency (e.g., 40-60% short-term decline without addressing comorbidities). These findings highlight that while self-exclusion is a valuable tool, its impact is amplified through structured integration with evidence-based treatments rather than as a standalone measure.

Criticisms and Controversies

Enforcement Failures and Breaches

Enforcement of self-exclusion schemes has frequently been undermined by operators' failure to integrate properly with national registries, leading to license suspensions by regulators such as the Gambling Commission, which in 2022 suspended LEBOM's license for non-participation in GamStop and in 2020 acted against Dynamic Bets and Sportito for similar lapses. In , was fined over $1 million AUD in May 2025 by the Australian Communications and Media Authority for permitting multiple self-excluded individuals to maintain active accounts, highlighting deficiencies in account closure protocols. Undercover investigations have exposed venue-level breaches, with a June 2025 Gambling Commission probe into sites revealing "very concerning" failures to enforce self-exclusion, including inadequate identity checks that allowed prohibited entry. In the , regulators fined BetMGM $260,905 in January 2025 for 152 violations between 2021 and 2023, where self-excluded players were permitted to wager, resulting in unrestrained deposits and losses. Similarly, New Jersey's Division of Gaming Enforcement imposed a $112,188 penalty on Digital Gaming Corporation in October 2025 for neglecting to add self-excluded individuals to exclusion lists from March 2024 to January 2025, enabling continued access. Breaches often stem from systemic gaps in and , as evidenced by a 2023 Swedish study where 82% of self-excluders who breached did so via online casinos, exploiting weak cross-operator and . violations compound these issues; for instance, Entertainment's PPB Counterparty Services was fined £490,000 in May 2023 for sending promotional materials to self-excluded customers in November 2021, due to flawed detection systems. Such incidents underscore that while self-exclusion registries exist, inconsistent across jurisdictions permits evasion, particularly online, where operators' relies on voluntary adherence rather than foolproof technical barriers.

Limitations in Addressing Root Causes

Self-exclusion programs impose barriers to access but do not intervene in the core psychological and neurobiological drivers of disorder, such as cognitive distortions, , and comorbid conditions like or anxiety that perpetuate addictive behaviors. These mechanisms function primarily as temporary tools, restricting environmental cues without altering the internal motivations or pathological patterns that lead individuals to seek high-risk despite adverse consequences. Empirical reviews indicate that standalone self-exclusion yields incomplete outcomes, as it overlooks the multifaceted of compulsive , including genetic predispositions and learned behavioral reinforcements, resulting in persistent vulnerability upon exclusion expiration or circumvention. Integration with psychological treatments is essential for addressing these deficiencies, yet many programs operate in isolation, leading to suboptimal recovery rates. Studies propose self-exclusion as a "gateway" to rather than a standalone , highlighting that without cognitive-behavioral interventions or counseling, participants often fail to develop coping strategies for underlying emotional triggers or decision-making biases. For instance, qualitative analyses of self-excluders reveal that breaches occur frequently—up to 38% in nationwide systems—due to unresolved cravings and lack of therapeutic support, underscoring self-exclusion's role as underdeveloped for root cause mitigation. Only about one in five problem gamblers accesses formal alongside exclusion, limiting its capacity to foster lasting or behavioral reform. Critics note that over-reliance on self-exclusion shifts focus from comprehensive care to mere , potentially delaying engagement with evidence-based therapies that target addiction's causal foundations. Longitudinal data show elevated risks post-exclusion without adjunctive psychological support, with many individuals substituting unregulated venues or other addictive outlets, as the programs do not equip users with skills to manage intrinsic risk factors. This gap persists across jurisdictions, where self-exclusion is rarely mandated to include mandatory referrals to services, perpetuating a cycle of symptom management over causal resolution.

Debates on Individual Responsibility vs. Systemic Reliance

Self-exclusion initiatives position individuals as active agents in curbing their by enabling voluntary bans from venues or platforms, thereby reinforcing personal for recognizing and addressing addictive behaviors. descriptions from regulatory bodies emphasize that participants must accept for , with agreements explicitly stating that venues bear no legal duty to enforce exclusions beyond initial registration. This framework aligns with strategies that prioritize self-regulation, as evidenced by state programs where self-excluders commit to avoiding sites independently after enrollment. Critics argue, however, that self-exclusion cultivates undue reliance on systemic mechanisms, which often prove unreliable due to enforcement gaps, such as incomplete venue coverage or easy circumvention via unregulated operators. Empirical reviews indicate low utilization rates among problem gamblers—sometimes as few as 1-2% of at-risk individuals—and frequent breaches, suggesting that external controls may foster a false sense of security without demanding sustained personal effort or behavioral reform. Philosophically, this approach risks abrogating individual responsibility by outsourcing self-control to institutions, potentially delaying engagement with root-cause treatments like . The tension reflects broader philosophical divides in : advocates for individual responsibility view self-exclusion as a tool enhancing and , akin to contractual self-binding, while proponents of systemic perspectives contend it perpetuates dependency on flawed industry-led systems that prioritize operator liability limits over comprehensive interventions. Studies on self-excluder motivations reveal mixed outcomes, with some reporting short-term boosts but long-term relapses underscoring the need for hybrid models integrating personal commitment with mandatory linkages to avoid over-reliance on voluntary pledges alone.

Government Mandates and Policies

In jurisdictions with regulated markets, often that licensed operators implement self-exclusion mechanisms as a measure for . These policies typically require operators to honor voluntary exclusions by denying entry, service, or access to activities for specified periods, ranging from six months to lifetime bans, while prohibiting or inducements to excluded individuals. In the , the enforces self-exclusion through Licence Conditions and Codes of Practice (LCCP), requiring non-remote operators to refuse service to self-excluded individuals and maintain effective procedures to prevent breaches, with minimum exclusion periods of six months for remote gambling. Operators must also record and report known breaches, which totaled 514,182 in 2022, highlighting enforcement challenges despite the mandates. Australia's federal government introduced BetStop, the National Self-Exclusion Register, on August 21, 2023, mandating that all licensed online and phone wagering services block access for registered individuals, with exclusion options from 24 hours to permanent. This centralized system applies nationwide, requiring operators to verify exclusions in real-time to prevent participation. In the United States, self-exclusion mandates operate at the state level, with 38 jurisdictions requiring operators to adopt programs that ban excluded patrons from facilities and, increasingly, online platforms; for instance, California's program prohibits self-excluded individuals from all licensed cardrooms, enforceable by removal and denial of winnings. Illinois implemented its Self-Exclusion Program in 2002, extending to casinos and sports wagering, though enforcement varies, as seen in Nevada's absence of a statutory ban, relying instead on voluntary operator limits. Across the , no uniform mandate exists, but national regulations often align with recommendations for minimum six-month self-exclusions and operator refusals of service, as outlined in EU-level guidelines urging member states to enable such tools alongside timeouts. Countries like utilize centralized registers such as for online exclusions, mandated under interstate treaties to block access and integrate with identification verification. Policies emphasize operator liability for compliance, though divergence persists, with only select states requiring helpline referrals post-exclusion.

Liability and Industry Responsibilities

Gambling operators are legally obligated to honor self-exclusion requests by denying to self-excluded individuals, verifying identities against centralized or venue-specific lists, and refraining from targeted marketing or payouts to such persons. , all 38 jurisdictions with commercial gaming or mandate operator participation in self-exclusion programs, including staff training on recognition protocols and integration with licensing conditions. Non-compliance exposes operators to regulatory penalties, such as the $112,188 fine imposed on Digital Gaming Corporation by regulators in 2025 for permitting self-excluded players to exceed deposit limits and access platforms. Breaches of self-exclusion protocols can trigger civil under breach-of-contract theories, as self-exclusion agreements impose enforceable duties on operators to prevent activity, potentially allowing excluded individuals to recover losses incurred due to operator failures. For instance, in jurisdictions like , winnings by self-excluded persons are forfeited and redirected to programs, shifting financial responsibility back to the operator for enforcement lapses. Australian examples illustrate escalating sanctions: faced a AU$2 million penalty in October 2024 from the Victorian Gambling and Casino Control Commission for permitting self-excluded patrons to gamble, while incurred a AU$1 million fine in May 2025 for similar violations. Industry responsibilities extend to technological compliance, such as integrating self-exclusion data into point-of-sale systems and multi-operator databases to minimize breaches, though litigation outcomes often favor operators absent clear negligence, with many self-exclusion disputes resulting in dismissals or settlements rather than precedent-setting expansions. Courts have consistently held that operators lack an affirmative duty to proactively intervene with non-excluded problem gamblers, limiting to explicit self-exclusion violations as delineated by . Regulatory bodies emphasize proactive measures like periodic audits and of exclusion attempts to uphold these obligations, balancing operator accountability with the voluntary nature of self-exclusion.

International Variations

Self-exclusion programs for exhibit substantial variations across jurisdictions, primarily in scope, centralization, duration options, and enforcement mechanisms. Centralized national or multi-operator registries are common in regulated markets like and , enabling exclusion from multiple operators via a single registration, whereas decentralized, operator- or state-level systems predominate in places like the . Durations typically from six months to permanent, with some allowing early reversal under conditions such as counseling, while others enforce fixed terms without exception. In , national systems are prevalent and often mandatory for licensed operators to integrate. Sweden's Spelpaus, introduced in 2019, functions as a centralized registry covering both online and land-based , with over 100,000 exclusion requests recorded by 2025; exclusions can last from one month to permanent, and operators must block access across all channels. The employs GAMSTOP, a multi-operator scheme launched in 2018, which permits self-exclusion from all participating sites for periods of six months to five years, though it does not cover land-based venues or non-participating operators. Germany's OASIS system integrates counseling referrals with self-bans, emphasizing support alongside exclusion, while the ' CRUKS registry, established under the 2021 Remote , mandates operator compliance for online and physical sites. Spain's DGOJ register applies to retail and with a minimum six-month , reversible thereafter, and Cyprus's NSEP imposes strict, non-reversible exclusions. Australia's BetStop, a national online self-exclusion register launched on August 8, 2023, by the Australian Communications and Media Authority, covers all licensed wagering services and requires professional counseling verification for early termination; it complements state-level programs and aligns with a 2024 ban on use for . In contrast, the lacks a federal system, relying on state-specific initiatives; the National Council on Problem Gambling's Voluntary Self-Exclusion program, started in 2024, operates in six states with over 100,000 participants by mid-2025, but enforcement varies, with some states like offering multi-venue exclusions while others limit to individual casinos. Asia shows more fragmented and restrictive approaches, often with state oversight. Singapore permits third-party exclusions by family members alongside voluntary self-bans from casinos and platforms, enforced through the Gambling Regulatory Authority with limited reversal options. Canada's policies are provincial, such as Ontario's centralized registry, but lack uniformity, while South American nations like introduced mandatory national self-exclusion in their 2025 framework, covering all gambling products with strong regulatory . Enforcement globally relies on digital verification for online exclusions but faces challenges in physical venues due to inconsistent ID checks and potential breaches.

Alternatives and Complementary Approaches

Therapeutic and Behavioral Interventions

represents the most empirically supported psychological intervention for disorder, targeting cognitive distortions, urges, and maladaptive behaviors through structured techniques such as identifying triggers, relapse prevention planning, and exposure to gambling cues without engagement. Meta-analyses indicate that CBT significantly reduces gambling frequency, severity, and financial losses, with effect sizes demonstrating 65-82% of participants achieving greater reductions compared to control groups or waitlist conditions. In intent-to-treat analyses, approximately 43% of CBT recipients exhibit substantial gambling reductions versus 8% in untreated groups, alongside improvements in comorbid symptoms like and anxiety. Face-to-face delivery yields the largest effects, though adaptations show promise for . Motivational interviewing (MI), often integrated with , enhances engagement by resolving ambivalence toward change and fostering intrinsic motivation to abstain from . Systematic reviews confirm MI's in increasing adherence and reducing behaviors, particularly when combined with behavioral strategies, though standalone effects are modest compared to comprehensive protocols. , a behavioral subset, systematically desensitizes individuals to stimuli, leading to decreased cravings, time spent , and erroneous beliefs about winning probabilities, as evidenced by randomized trials. Group-based interventions, including peer support models like adapted with therapeutic elements, provide social reinforcement and accountability, though evidence is weaker than for individual , with benefits primarily in sustained rates when paired with professional oversight. Emerging behavioral approaches, such as cognitive remediation targeting and deficits, show preliminary reductions in severity but require further replication in larger trials. Overall, these interventions address root cognitive and behavioral patterns, complementing self-exclusion by building long-term self-regulation skills, with meta-analytic evidence underscoring their superiority over no-treatment baselines in achieving clinically meaningful outcomes.

Technological and Financial Controls

Technological controls encompass software applications and digital tools designed to restrict access to platforms, often serving as complements to self-exclusion by enabling proactive, device-level barriers. BetBlocker, a free application launched in 2017, blocks access to over 126,100 websites across devices without requiring registration, aiming to aid problem gamblers in maintaining control independently of operator compliance. Similarly, GamStop, introduced in the in 2018 under regulatory mandate, facilitates multi-operator self-exclusion for by synchronizing bans across licensed sites, though its effectiveness can be undermined by users employing VPNs or creating new accounts. Gamban, a paid blocking software, extends coverage to apps and extends enforcement through device installation, with studies indicating such tools reduce impulsive access but require user commitment to prevent circumvention. In physical venues, facial recognition systems, trialed in since around 2020, enhance self-exclusion enforcement by cross-referencing entrant images against exclusion databases, reducing undetected entries reported in traditional manual checks. Financial controls primarily involve pre-commitment mechanisms that enforce predetermined spending or time limits, promoting behavioral restraint through binding commitments prior to engagement. Pre-commitment systems for electronic gaming machines (EGMs), implemented in trials in since the early 2000s, allow players to set monetary or session-duration caps via player cards or digital interfaces, with empirical reviews showing they can decrease session expenditures by up to 20-30% in voluntary users by countering in-the-moment escalation. A 2017 experimental study found that pre-committing to bet sizes reduced risk-taking during sessions compared to flexible wagering, attributing this to diminished overconfidence biases. In online contexts, platforms integrate deposit limits and reality checks—mandatory pauses prompting limit reviews—as of regulatory updates in jurisdictions like the since 2019, though adherence varies, with only about 31% of gamblers citing pre-set defaults as facilitative for sustained use. Cashless debit systems tied to loyalty cards further embed financial caps, minimizing ATM withdrawals during play, as evidenced in Nova Scotia trials where they correlated with lower overall losses. These controls, while empirically linked to in controlled settings, face limitations in universal efficacy due to voluntary adoption and technological workarounds, with peer-reviewed analyses emphasizing their role as adjuncts rather than standalone solutions for addressing underlying addictive drives.

Comparative Efficacy

Self-exclusion programs demonstrate short-term reductions in frequency and associated harms during the exclusion period, with participants reporting decreased urges and financial losses, though long-term rates vary widely due to high breach incidences, reported at up to 49% among self-excluders. In contrast, cognitive-behavioral therapy (), a primary therapeutic intervention, yields more sustained outcomes, with intent-to-treat analyses showing 43% of participants achieving substantial reductions compared to 8% in control conditions, alongside improvements in comorbid symptoms like anxiety and . Direct comparisons are limited, but evidence indicates self-exclusion alone underperforms relative to in addressing underlying cognitive distortions and prevention, as self-exclusion relies heavily on individual motivation and enforcement without targeting behavioral patterns, leading to incomplete . When integrated with , however, self-exclusion enhances treatment adherence, serving as a voluntary barrier that complements 's focus on skill-building and impulse control. Behavioral interventions, such as , similarly outperform standalone self-exclusion by fostering internal change, though both face challenges in engagement among severe cases. Technological and financial controls, including deposit limits and account blocking tools, exhibit comparable immediate to self-exclusion in curbing session durations and expenditures, with studies showing significant drops in deposits and plays post-implementation. Unlike self-exclusion, which often involves multi-operator bans but suffers from circumvention via informal , these proactive measures offer customizable, real-time restrictions that reduce reliance on self-motivation, though they lack the psychological commitment signal of formal exclusion. Overall, while self-exclusion provides accessible minimization, its diminishes without complementary approaches, as therapies and controls better mitigate root causes and breaches over extended periods.

References

  1. [1]
    Self-exclusion - Gambling Commission
    Nov 12, 2024 · Self-exclusion is a tool used by those who have recognised that their gambling is harmful to them. It is for those who wish to be supported to stop gambling.
  2. [2]
    Self-Exclusion in Casinos and Online Gaming: Understanding the ...
    Sep 8, 2025 · Self-exclusion is a voluntary process where individuals request to be banned from accessing gambling services and venues.
  3. [3]
    Self-Exclusion - Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board
    Self-exclusion allows these individuals to voluntarily ban themselves from casinos, internet-based gambling, video gaming terminals and fantasy sports wagering.Missing: definition | Show results with:definition
  4. [4]
    Effectiveness of a voluntary casino self-exclusion online self ...
    Participants in both VSE groups gambled less, spent less money gambling, and reported decreased need for formal treatment. •. There were no differences between ...
  5. [5]
    The Efficacy of Voluntary Self-Exclusions in Reducing Gambling ...
    Mar 25, 2023 · These results suggest that short-term VSE may not be as effective as long-term VSE in reducing gambling. Overall, the present findings suggest ...
  6. [6]
    Predicting self-exclusion among online gamblers: An empirical real ...
    Aug 10, 2022 · According to several studies, the utilization rate of self-exclusion among gamblers is between 5.4% and 11.0% (Jonsson, 2008; Hing et al., 2015; ...
  7. [7]
    Self-exclusion and breaching of self-exclusion from gambling: a ...
    Aug 8, 2023 · Among self-excluders, 49 percent had ever gambled despite being self-excluded. Among those breaching their self-exclusion, the most common ...Missing: empirical | Show results with:empirical
  8. [8]
    [PDF] RESEARCH ON SELF-EXCLUSION PROGRAMS
    A 2010 study,. “Motivators for resolving or seeking help for gambling problems: A review of the empirical literature,” found that selfexcluders were motivated ...
  9. [9]
    Voluntary self-exclusion from gambling: Expert opinions on gaps ...
    Aug 9, 2024 · Even nationwide, multi-operator self-exclusion programmes may not safeguard against breaches by gamblers who are self-excluded. Much of the web- ...
  10. [10]
    Effectiveness of a voluntary casino self-exclusion online self ... - NIH
    VSE programs allow individuals to voluntarily sign an agreement to ban themselves from specific gaming establishments for a period of time. Agreements range ...Missing: concept rationale
  11. [11]
    (PDF) Who uses self-exclusion to regulate problem gambling? A ...
    This review describes sociodemographic features and gambling behavior of self-excluders as well as goals and motives for initiating self-exclusion from ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  12. [12]
    Who uses self-exclusion to regulate problem gambling? A ... - NIH
    Self-exclusion programs offer an intervention for individuals with problem gambling behavior. However, these programs are insufficiently used.
  13. [13]
    International Prevalence of Self-exclusion From Gambling
    Sep 7, 2023 · Systematic review evidence has found that self-exclusion leads to reduced gambling behaviour and gambling-related harm during the period of self ...Missing: rationale | Show results with:rationale
  14. [14]
    Review of Self-exclusion from Gambling Venues as an Intervention ...
    Research suggests that self-exclusion programs are under-utilised by problem gamblers and are not completely effective in preventing individuals from gambling.Missing: peer- | Show results with:peer-
  15. [15]
    The use of self-management strategies for problem gambling - NIH
    The majority of studies examined self-exclusion (39%), followed by use of workbooks (35%), and money or time limiting strategies (17%). The remaining 8% focused ...
  16. [16]
    Qualitative Experience of Self-Exclusion Programs: A Scoping Review
    Self-exclusion programs can be implemented when gamblers feel that they cannot control their gambling, or when gambling interferes with their emotional, ...Missing: rationale | Show results with:rationale
  17. [17]
    [PDF] FAQs for Problem Gambling List - Missouri Gaming Commission
    Missouri's voluntary self-exclusion list and was designed in 1996 as a recovery tool that could be used by compulsive gamblers in their overall recovery program ...
  18. [18]
    [PDF] Missouri Gaming Commission - Bets Off
    MGC created the voluntary exclusion program in 1996 in response to a citizen's request to be banned from the excursion gambling boats because he recognized the ...
  19. [19]
    Gaming commission relaxes self-exclusion rules for problem gamblers
    Dec 8, 2011 · Missouri developed a self-exclusion program in 1996, and it was intended to be a recovery tool for problem gamblers. It applies to Missouri ...
  20. [20]
    What is the Problem Gambling List? - Missouri Gaming Commission
    The Problem Gambling List is Missouri's voluntary self-exclusion list available for problem or compulsive gamblers to use as a tool in their overall recovery ...
  21. [21]
    Missouri casino self-excluders: Distribution across time and space
    May 10, 2017 · Missouri implemented the first state-wide self-exclusion program ... Missouri casinos between November 1996 and February 2004. PROCEDURE
  22. [22]
    Rules would let gamblers lift ban - Columbia Daily Tribune
    Aug 25, 2011 · Regulators said Missouri was the first state to develop a program in which gamblers can voluntarily exclude themselves from casinos. Iowa and ...<|separator|>
  23. [23]
    Self-Exclusion Program Keeps Gambler From $150,000 Jackpot
    Oct 31, 2024 · The MVEP was the first self-exclusion program in the U.S. when it began in 1996. Now, 34 states require it. Self-Exclusion Options in the US.
  24. [24]
    Missouri casino self-excluders four to ten years after enrollment
    Most self-excluders had positive experiences and reduced gambling, but 50% who tried to trespass were able to. Additional support had more positive outcomes.
  25. [25]
    Self-banned gamblers get chance to test their luck again - STLPR
    Mar 30, 2012 · For the first time since it was implemented in 1996, gamblers in Missouri now have a way to remove themselves from the state's voluntary casino ...
  26. [26]
    Self-exclusion from gambling: A toothless tiger? - PMC
    In all jurisdictions, customers can self-exclude from online or land-based casino games and EGMs or both. Lotteries are generally excluded from SE provision.
  27. [27]
    Self-exclusion from gambling: A toothless tiger? - Frontiers
    But in any case, though SE may benefit individual gamblers and those around them, it does not appear to be capable of significantly reducing gambling harm at ...
  28. [28]
    Corporate | About GAMSTOP
    GAMSTOP was launched in 2018 and has helped over 350,000 people to take back control of their gambling. You can read more about our history and how GAMSTOP ...
  29. [29]
    GAMSTOP: Three Year Anniversary | Hideous Slots News & Insights
    Apr 15, 2021 · Three years ago this month, on 25th April 2018, GAMSTOP was launched. GAMSTOP lets you put controls in place to restrict your online gambling activities.
  30. [30]
    New UK self-exclusion scheme named GAMSTOP - iGaming Business
    Jun 1, 2017 · It is hoped GAMSTOP – previously known as the National Online Self-Exclusion Scheme (NOSES) – will be fully operational by the end of 2017.
  31. [31]
    Gambling Behavior of Excluded Gamblers in a Multi-venue ...
    Sep 19, 2023 · The following study investigates the effectiveness of exclusion in Switzerland's combined land-based and online, multi-operator exclusion system ...
  32. [32]
    Gambling Laws and Regulations Report 2025 Belgium - ICLG.com
    Nov 19, 2024 · Online licence holders must impose compulsory deposit limits and offer the option of temporary self-exclusion. They must also use ...<|separator|>
  33. [33]
    Belgium is expanding its self-exclusion scheme into retail betting
    Oct 7, 2022 · It was initially in use for online betting and iGaming but has expanded into land-based casinos and slot arcades. The Belgian Gaming Commission ...Missing: history | Show results with:history
  34. [34]
    Centralized Self-Exclusion - GLI - Gaming Laboratories International
    Mar 20, 2025 · These systems allow individuals to voluntarily exclude themselves from all gaming platforms within a jurisdiction through a single registration.
  35. [35]
    US set for first national self-exclusion scheme - iGaming Business
    Apr 17, 2024 · Players across the US will soon be able to self-exclude from gambling in all regulated states, with a new, nationwide scheme due to launch in the coming months.
  36. [36]
    Count Me Out Alcohol and Gambling Self Exclusion Programmes
    The system can be monitored by, amongst others, Health Care Professionals, Outreach workers, Domestic Violence Teams and their support staff and it also has a ...
  37. [37]
    Alcohol self exclusion scheme launched - Great Yarmouth Mercury
    Nov 19, 2008 · The Count Me Out Alcohol Self Exclusion Program was launched yesterday and will see people banning themselves from buying or drinking beer and spirits in ...
  38. [38]
    Drawing on Personal Experiences, Dowling Proposes Bill to Allow ...
    Sep 14, 2022 · Matthew Dowling (R-Fayette/Somerset) has introduced legislation that would allow individuals to voluntarily exclude themselves from the ability ...
  39. [39]
    Co-Sponsorship Memo Details - PA General Assembly
    Self-exclusion is a process that allows a person to request to be excluded from the ability to purchase alcohol from any Good Wine and Fine Spirits store or any ...
  40. [40]
    AN ACT IMPLEMENTING A NATIONAL ALCOHOL VOLUNTARY ...
    AN ACT IMPLEMENTING A NATIONAL ALCOHOL VOLUNTARY EXCLUSION LIST. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened:.<|separator|>
  41. [41]
    Don't want to see or receive alcohol on DoorDash?
    Nov 2, 2023 · If you do not wish to receive alcohol items on DoorDash, you are able to voluntarily exclude yourself from having alcohol delivered via our Marketplace ...
  42. [42]
    Why isn't there a self-exclusion rule for liquor stores? : r/stopdrinking
    Jun 10, 2021 · Casinos have a self-exclusion list where you can put yourself on it and you're banned from playing. This is helpful for gambling addicts as ...Bill would allow self-imposed ban on alcohol purchases in Pa. - RedditYou should be able to purchase alcohol through self checkout lines.More results from www.reddit.com
  43. [43]
    Voluntary Self-Exclusion - Massachusetts Gaming Commission
    The Voluntary Self-Exclusion Program (VSE) is a statewide program that allows you to voluntarily exclude yourself from casino gambling, sports wagering or both ...
  44. [44]
    before you start - GAMSTOP - Gambling Self-Exclusion Scheme
    You will be excluded from gambling with all online gambling companies licensed in Great Britain for 6 months, 1 year, 5 years or 5 years with auto-renewal.Missing: process | Show results with:process
  45. [45]
    Gambling Self-Exclusion: How It Works And Where It Needs To ...
    Nov 18, 2024 · When a player joins a self-exclusion program, they agree to be banned from entering gambling facilities or betting online for a specific period.<|separator|>
  46. [46]
    Understanding Self-Exclusion: A Guide to Responsible Gaming
    Aug 7, 2024 · Self-exclusion is a responsible gambling tool enabling bettors to choose to ban themselves from participating in gaming activities.
  47. [47]
    Self-Exclusion Program | State of California - Department of Justice
    If an active Self-Exclusion patron enters a gambling establishment for any reason, the establishment is required to remove the patron from the premises and ...Missing: rationale | Show results with:rationale
  48. [48]
    DraftKings Self Exclusion - Overview (US)
    Self-exclusion durations: · 3 Months (Fantasy Sports only, excluding Connecticut (CT) patrons). · 6 Months (Fantasy Sports only, excluding Connecticut (CT) ...<|separator|>
  49. [49]
    What is self-exclusion? - GAMSTOP
    Oct 16, 2023 · The minimum exclusion periods we offer are six months, one year and five years. You can find more information about other types of gambling self ...
  50. [50]
    Self Exclusion Program - - New Jersey Office of Attorney General
    Method 4: Online Player Account – Self-exclusion from all Internet gaming activities including sports wagering with signup through your online player account.Missing: early multi-
  51. [51]
    Self-Exclusion | Arizona Department of Gaming - az.gov
    Once your self-exclusion time period has expired, you may renew your self-exclusion for another one, five years, or ten years by sending in a new notarized self ...
  52. [52]
    Terms of Use - GAMSTOP - Gambling Self-Exclusion Scheme
    This process will continue for four new five-year Minimal Exclusion Periods or until you turn off auto renewal from your GAMSTOP account. You understand and ...Missing: types | Show results with:types
  53. [53]
    Facial recognition being used to stop gamblers on self-exclusion list
    Facial recognition technology is being used in New South Wales to identify gamblers registered with the state's self-exclusion program.
  54. [54]
    Facing up to Problem Gambling: Tracing the Emergence of Facial ...
    May 9, 2024 · Facial recognition technology has been discussed and piloted since the 2000s as a potential means of enforcing self-exclusion programs from ...
  55. [55]
    Self-Exclusion Programs for Responsible Gambling | NeoFace
    Sep 18, 2024 · Self-exclusion programs let people voluntarily enrol themselves on databases to help them from entering casinos or gambling.
  56. [56]
    Our most common enquiries from gambling customers
    Jun 4, 2024 · Your self-exclusion using GAMSTOP will be most effective if you do not try to work around the exclusion measures GAMSTOP has put in place. When ...
  57. [57]
    Online self-exclusion from multiple gambling venues: Stakeholder ...
    Recent qualitative evidence suggests that end users would prefer an online self-exclusion registration pathway, indicating that it would streamline the process, ...Missing: rationale | Show results with:rationale
  58. [58]
    [PDF] The implementation of facial recognition technology to support self ...
    FRT is being increasingly promoted for use in gambling and gaming venues with respect to self-exclusion programs. These programs allow people to bar themselves ...
  59. [59]
    How Can I Ban Myself from Casinos? - Kindbridge Behavioral Health
    Jul 5, 2024 · Individual Casino Self Exclusion Programs. Many non-tribal licensed gambling establishments have their own individual self-exclusion programs.
  60. [60]
    [PDF] T'HE U TILITY LIMITS EXCLUSION PROGRAMS
    If a person decides he or she wants to self-exclude after leaving a gaming venue, it is a bad idea to tell the person that he or she needs to return to the very ...
  61. [61]
    Nevada's lack of casino self-exclusion law par for state, say experts
    Sep 11, 2023 · ... individual casino's direct-marketing solicitations ... A majority of legal gaming jurisdictions have a central self-exclusion registry.
  62. [62]
    Gambling Despite Nationwide Self-Exclusion–A Survey in Online ...
    Dec 1, 2020 · Importantly, respondents reporting self-exclusion were more likely to have gambling problems and markedly more common to be online casino ...
  63. [63]
    Alcohol Self Exclusion - Beer Cartel
    Alcohol Self Exclusion ... We are committed to the safety of our customers, and want to promote conscious and responsible consumption of alcohol. If you'd like to ...
  64. [64]
    PA HB2811 - BillTrack50
    This bill amends the Pennsylvania Liquor Code to provide for a self-exclusion program. The key provisions are: - The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (PLCB) ...
  65. [65]
    [PDF] House Bill No. 2811 - PA General Assembly
    A request for self-exclusion shall contain the following information of the individual: (1) Name, including any aliases or nicknames. (2) Date of birth. (3) ...
  66. [66]
    PA HB2811 | 2021-2022 | Regular Session | LegiScan
    An Act amending the act of April 12, 1951 (P.L.90, No.21), known as the Liquor Code, in Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, providing for self-exclusion.Missing: alcohol | Show results with:alcohol
  67. [67]
    Drawing on Personal Experiences, Dowling Proposes Bill to Allow ...
    Self-exclusion is a process that would allow a person to request to be excluded from the ability to purchase alcohol from any Fine Wine and Good Spirits store ...
  68. [68]
    Systembolaget - Wikipedia
    At Swedish restaurants and bars the legal age to buy alcoholic beverages is 18 years, though bars and clubs may voluntarily set an age limit higher than 18 if ...
  69. [69]
    The Effectiveness of Self-Exclusion Programs for Problem Gamblers
    Nov 27, 2024 · Self-exclusion programs are designed to help problem gamblers manage their behavior by voluntarily banning themselves from gambling venues ...
  70. [70]
    Reducing alcohol consumption, the Nordic way: alcohol monopolies ...
    Jun 30, 2023 · Nordic countries have a long history of alcohol consumption, complex challenges with heavy episodic drinking practices, and a reputation of implementing some ...
  71. [71]
    Bill would let people bar themselves from entering cannabis shops
    Oct 3, 2024 · People could volunteer to be on a list barring them from entering dispensaries or buying cannabis products under a newly proposed bill in the Legislature.
  72. [72]
    New Jersey-2024-A4914-Introduced - LegiScan
    This bill permits persons to voluntarily self-exclude themselves from being able to enter dispensaries or purchase any cannabis items from a cannabis dispensary ...
  73. [73]
  74. [74]
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY - NJ Legislature
    location and the cannabis items provided by the cannabis retailer. 12. The bill permits any person to be placed on the self-exclusion list. 13 and requires ...
  75. [75]
    NJ Senate Considers Cannabis Self-Exclusion Program
    Oct 21, 2024 · This bill aims to assist those struggling with substance abuse by offering a self-regulation tool similar to the State's gambling self-exclusion ...
  76. [76]
    NJ Senate Considers Cannabis Self-Exclusion Program
    Oct 21, 2024 · Lawmakers in New Jersey are considering whether to establish a program that will allow individuals to voluntarily prohibit themselves from ...
  77. [77]
    Michigan's Marijuana Industry Exclusion List
    Individuals may voluntarily exclude themselves from employment at, or participating in a marijuana business, by signing a Consent Order and Stipulation (COS) to ...Missing: self- | Show results with:self-
  78. [78]
    Reducing Tobacco Use Through Voluntary Self-Exclusion
    Download Citation | Reducing Tobacco Use Through Voluntary Self-Exclusion | Tobacco use is the leading cause of preventable death in the United States.Missing: drug | Show results with:drug
  79. [79]
    New Jersey Voluntary Cannabis Self-Exclusion Program| NECANN
    A proposed New Jersey bill would allow individuals to voluntarily ban themselves from purchasing cannabis at licensed dispensaries to help prevent relapse.
  80. [80]
    Multi-operator Self-exclusion as a Harm Reduction Measure in ... - NIH
    Aug 19, 2022 · This study aims to assess the prevalence of a nationwide Spelpaus (“gambling break”) self-exclusion and the prevalence of gambling despite self-exclusion.Missing: technology | Show results with:technology
  81. [81]
    The effect of exclusion on subjective well-being indicators and ...
    The aim of this research project was to evaluate the influence of exclusion as a harm-reduction intervention on parameters such as gambling behavior.
  82. [82]
    Responsible gambling: a synthesis of the empirical evidence
    Self-excluded gamblers experienced greater losses than non-excluders, supporting previous research that financial problems are one of the main reasons for ...
  83. [83]
    Voluntary Self-Exclusion and Contingency Management for the ...
    Oct 4, 2023 · Crucially, 'taking a break' via short-term self-exclusion is less effective than long-term self-exclusion at reducing future gambling [46]. The ...Missing: key | Show results with:key
  84. [84]
    (PDF) Self-exclusion and breaching of self-exclusion from gambling
    Self-exclusion remains a popular harm reduction tool against problem gambling, more common than in previous studies, mostly in individuals with recent gambling ...
  85. [85]
    Nationwide, Multioperator Self‐Exclusion and Psychiatric ...
    Sep 28, 2023 · Voluntary self-exclusion is one way for patients to reduce harm in gambling disorder, but breaching one's self-exclusion appears to be common.
  86. [86]
    The Efficacy of Voluntary Self-Exclusions in Reducing Gambling ...
    Mar 25, 2023 · These results suggest that short-term VSE may not be as effective as long-term VSE in reducing gambling. Overall, the present findings suggest ...
  87. [87]
    A Systematic Review of Land-Based Self-Exclusion Programs
    May 2, 2018 · The records consistently demonstrated significant changes in pathological gambling from before exclusion (61–95%) to after exclusion (13–26%).
  88. [88]
    Are there clinical, psychopathological and therapy outcomes ...
    May 26, 2023 · Abstract Background and aims Self-exclusion in gambling disorder (GD) is considered a measure to decrease the negative consequences of ...
  89. [89]
    Self-Exclusion Program: A Longitudinal Evaluation Study
    Aug 10, 2025 · The intensity of negative consequences for gambling was significantly reduced for daily activities, social life, work, and mood. The DSM score ...
  90. [90]
    Are there clinical, psychopathological and therapy outcomes ...
    May 26, 2023 · Self-exclusion in gambling disorder (GD) is considered a measure to decrease the negative consequences of gambling behavior.
  91. [91]
    GC suspends LEBOM over failure to participate in Gamstop - iGB
    Nov 3, 2022 · GC suspends LEBOM over failure to participate in Gamstop ... The Great Britain Gambling Commission has suspended LEBOM for failing to integrate ...Missing: enforcement | Show results with:enforcement
  92. [92]
    GAMSTOP, Prophet and Sportito – A Cautionary Tale - Harris Hagan
    On 3 April 2020, it announced that it had suspended the licences of two operators who had failed to integrate GAMSTOP – Dynamic Bets Inc, trading as Prophet, ...
  93. [93]
    Unibet Hit With $1M Fine for Self-Exclusion Rules Breaches
    May 21, 2025 · ACMA fined Unibet over $1 million for failing to close multiple accounts of clients who registered in a self-exclusion register.Missing: enforcement | Show results with:enforcement
  94. [94]
    Gambling watchdog probes failures in self-exclusion scheme - CARE
    Jun 18, 2025 · The Gambling Commission has called failures in self-exclusion schemes across slot machine venues "very concerning", following an undercover ...
  95. [95]
    BetMGM Fined In PA After Allowing PA Self-Excluders To Bet
    Jan 30, 2025 · Pennsylvania has fined BetMGM $260905 for 152 instances of allowing individuals on the self-exclusion list to gamble between 2021 and 2023.
  96. [96]
  97. [97]
    Flutter slapped with £490k fine for marketing to self-excluded UK ...
    May 25, 2023 · The failing, which occurred in November 2021, was committed by PPB Counterparty Services Limited, which was trading as Paddy Power and Betfair ...
  98. [98]
    BBC report reveals GamStop & MOSES self-exclusion failures
    Jan 14, 2019 · BBC report reveals GamStop & MOSES self-exclusion failures. Ted ... self-exclusion schemes as a directive for tackling and preventing problem ...
  99. [99]
    Self-exclusion: A Proposed Gateway to Treatment Model
    applying for voluntary self-exclusion for a variety of reasons, for example,. recognizing early signs suggesting the development of a possible future problem.<|control11|><|separator|>
  100. [100]
    Effects and Limitations of a Unique, Nationwide, Self-Exclusion ... - NIH
    Nov 14, 2023 · Voluntary self-exclusion from gambling is a common but underdeveloped harm reduction tool in the management of gambling problems or gambling ...
  101. [101]
    Voluntary Exclusion Program - KRGC
    The Kansas Racing and Gaming Commission (KRGC) administers the statewide Voluntary Exclusion Program (VEP) for problem gamblers. This state of the art ...Missing: United | Show results with:United
  102. [102]
    (PDF) Self-exclusion: A Proposed Gateway to Treatment Model
    Philosophically, the current system is hampered by a focus on external control that all but abrogates individual responsibility for controlling gambling ...<|separator|>
  103. [103]
    Guidance to licensing authorities - Self-exclusion
    The Gambling Commission's guidance on self-exclusion for adult gaming centres.
  104. [104]
    Responsible Gaming Regulations and Statutes Guide
    Jul 8, 2025 · The length of the self-exclusion periods available and the procedures for reversing self-exclusions vary by jurisdiction. A majority of ...
  105. [105]
    3.5.2 Self-exclusion – non-remote ordinary code
    3.5.2 - Self-exclusion – non-remote ordinary code. Applies to: All non-remote licences and remote betting intermediary (trading rooms only) licences.
  106. [106]
    3.5.4 Self-exclusion – Remote ordinary code - Gambling Commission
    3.5.4 - Self-exclusion – Remote ordinary code · the minimum self-exclusion period offered is of a duration of not less than 6 nor more than 12 months; · any self- ...
  107. [107]
    Self-exclusions - Gambling Commission
    There were 514,182 breaches of self-exclusion in 2022 recorded in regulatory returns. The definition of 'Known breaches of self-exclusion' that is collected ...
  108. [108]
    BetStop – the National Self-Exclusion Register™ | ACMA
    The register lets you exclude yourself from all Australian licensed online and phone wagering services in a single step.
  109. [109]
    BetStop – the National Self-Exclusion Register
    The Australian Government launched BetStop – the National Self-Exclusion Register (BetStop) on 21 August 2023. BetStop is the tenth and final measure of the ...
  110. [110]
    BetStop
    BetStop - the National Self-Exclusion Register is a safe and free Australian Government initiative to block yourself from all licensed Australian online and ...
  111. [111]
    Self-Exclusion Program (SEP) - Illinois Gaming Board
    In 2002, the IGB imlemented the Self-Exclusion Program (SEP) which allows individuals who have determined they are problem gamblers to exclude themselves ...Missing: United | Show results with:United
  112. [112]
    L_2014214EN.01003801.xml - EUR-Lex - European Union
    time out serves to suspend gambling for at least twenty four hours;. (b). self-exclusion with an operator is possible for not less than six months. 34. Member ...
  113. [113]
    OASIS self-exclusion proves effective for German gambling
    Aug 22, 2025 · New data has revealed the OASIS self-exclusion proves effective for volatile German gambling market.
  114. [114]
    EU Online Gambling Regulations Strengthening But Divergent On ...
    Only 11 member states require operators to provide customers with the contact details of problem gambling helplines and/or treatment centres upon self-exclusion ...
  115. [115]
    [PDF] Casino's Contractual Duty to Stop Compulsive Gamblers from ...
    GAMBLING LOSSES IN A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION. Before self-exclusion programs were implemented, gamblers sued ca- sinos mostly on tort theories of liability, ...
  116. [116]
    5-1320 - Problem gambling; self-exclusion list; program; liabilities
    Any prize or award won by a person on the self-exclusion list shall be forfeited and shall be donated by the event wagering operator, commercial sports license ...
  117. [117]
    Crown fined AU$2m in Victoria for self-exclusion breaches
    Oct 15, 2024 · The Victorian Gambling and Casino Control Commission (VGCCC) has fined Crown Resorts AU$2m (£1m/€1.2m/US$1.3m) for allowing self-excluded players to gamble.<|separator|>
  118. [118]
    Unibet hit with $1 million AUD fine for gambling self-exclusion rule ...
    May 22, 2025 · Unibet has been fined just over $1 million (AUD), or around $650,000 (USD), for breaching a gambling self-exclusion rule.
  119. [119]
    [PDF] Self-Exclusion - Massachusetts Gaming Commission
    Self-exclusion programs vary significantly by jurisdiction. • Litigation surrounding these programs has largely resulted in dismissals or settlements.
  120. [120]
    Operators have no duty to stop Problem Gamblers from betting?
    Nov 27, 2024 · Judge Arleo's decision emphasized that current state laws impose no legal duty on casinos to prevent compulsive gamblers from betting.
  121. [121]
    How Casino Self-Exclusion Is Handled Globally - European Gaming
    May 27, 2025 · Multi-operator scheme – Certain companies own or manage dozens of gambling sites. · Spelpaus (Sweden) – Launched in 2019, and since then, it has ...
  122. [122]
    Global Responsible Gambling Regulation: Regional Contrasts in 2025 - iGaming Express
    ### Summary of Regional Contrasts in Responsible Gambling Regulations (2025)
  123. [123]
    Voluntary self-exclusion approaches - IAGR
    Feb 8, 2024 · The program offers exclusion durations of one year, five years, or a lifetime, covering various gambling facilities and activities. The Time ...Missing: common | Show results with:common<|control11|><|separator|>
  124. [124]
    Free multi operator and national self-exclusion schemes
    May 19, 2025 · GAMSTOP allows you to self-exclude from online operators with one request. List of free multi operator and national self-exclusion schemes.Missing: first | Show results with:first
  125. [125]
    A systematic review of treatments for problem gambling - PMC
    This paper reviews trials for psychosocial treatments of gambling problems. Using Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic reviews and Meta-Analyses standards,
  126. [126]
    Cognitive-behavioral treatment for gambling harm: Umbrella review ...
    CBT reduces gambling frequency, intensity, and disorder severity at posttreatment. 65%–82% of participants in CBT show greater reductions in outcomes than ...<|separator|>
  127. [127]
    Psychological intervention for gambling disorder: A systematic ...
    Jul 14, 2023 · The results indicate that psychological intervention is efficacious in treating GD, with face-to-face delivered intervention producing the largest effects.
  128. [128]
    Non-pharmacological treatment of gambling disorder - BMC Psychiatry
    Feb 17, 2021 · Cowlishaw's et al. [5] systematic review studied the efficacy of CBT, motivational interviewing, integrative therapies and other psychological ...
  129. [129]
    Exposure Therapy for Gambling Disorder: Systematic Review and ...
    Sep 8, 2022 · Results support that exposure therapy reduces gambling cravings and severity, as well as time spent gambling and erroneous beliefs.
  130. [130]
    A Systematic Review on Intervention Treatment in Pathological ...
    Several psychological interventions have been described for treating pathological gambling, including psychodynamic interventions, Gamblers Anonymous, inpatient ...
  131. [131]
    Cognitive Remediation Interventions for Gambling Disorder - Frontiers
    Various therapeutic approaches are available for the treatment of gambling disorder (GD), especially cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT; the most widely used ...
  132. [132]
    Effect of cognitive‐behavioral techniques for problem gambling and ...
    Jun 28, 2023 · A random effect meta-analysis with robust variance estimation was conducted to measure the effect of CBTs relative to minimally treated or no ...
  133. [133]
    BetBlocker
    While BetBlocker's primary purpose is to help problem gamblers control their gambling activity we also provide a tool to help parents to control the sites that ...Responsible Gambling Directory · Bemba · Nyanja · Tell Us Your Story
  134. [134]
    Gambling: tech advances are improving player protection in the UK
    Jan 29, 2024 · Online tools for enhanced self-exclusion · GamStop – streamlining self-exclusion across platforms · BetBlocker – device-level self-exclusion.
  135. [135]
    Smartphone Apps for Problem Gambling: A Review of Content ... - NIH
    May 2, 2023 · The purpose of this study was to evaluate publicly available mobile apps aimed at improving problematic gambling behavior.
  136. [136]
    Pre-commitment systems for electronic gambling machines
    Electronic pre-commitment systems essentially allow gamblers to set a limit on the amount of money and/or time they wish to spend gambling before a session ...
  137. [137]
    (PDF) Pre-commitment in gambling: A review of the empirical evidence
    Aug 7, 2025 · This paper critically reviews the empirical literature evaluating the effectiveness of such systems as a responsible gambling strategy.
  138. [138]
    The impact of precommitment on risk-taking while gambling - NIH
    This study examined whether risk-taking during gambling is decreased when an individual has the opportunity to precommit to his forthcoming bet.Missing: devices | Show results with:devices
  139. [139]
    Key findings - Pre-commitment Tools - Gambling Commission
    Nov 29, 2023 · 31 percent of respondents believe that having a limit already set up by default is the most helpful facilitator for using pre-commitment tools.Missing: controls addiction devices
  140. [140]
    [PDF] PRE-COMMITMENT AS A STRATEGY FOR MINIMIZING GAMBLING ...
    Jul 8, 2010 · Pre-commitment is a relatively new harm minimization strategy for problem gambling. To date, its primary use has been in casino self-exclusion ...
  141. [141]
    Efficacy of cognitive-behavioral therapy in improving the quality of ...
    Cognitive-behavioural therapy can improve the quality of life of people with pathological gambling, reduce stress, anxiety, depression.
  142. [142]
    Effectiveness of Self-Exclusion & Limit Setting on Online Gaming ...
    Mar 19, 2025 · Both self-exclusion and limit-setting programs demonstrated a significant impact on reducing money deposits and the number of games played by ...