Timor-Leste Defence Force
The FALINTIL-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL), the official military of Timor-Leste, originated as the FALINTIL guerrilla force founded in 1975 to resist Indonesian occupation following Portugal's withdrawal and evolved into a conventional defense force upon the country's independence in 2002, with a primary mandate to safeguard national sovereignty, secure maritime borders, and support disaster response operations.[1] Comprising roughly 2,000 active personnel organized into a land component with two light infantry battalions, a modest naval element equipped with coastal patrol vessels, and limited support units but no dedicated air force, the F-FDTL maintains a lightly armed posture suited to Timor-Leste's archipelagic terrain and emphasis on internal stability over power projection.[2][3] Established in February 2001 through the integration of former resistance fighters, the force has prioritized professionalization via international partnerships, particularly with Australia and Portugal, enabling deployments to United Nations peacekeeping missions while addressing historical challenges such as the 2006 internal crisis that prompted structural reforms to enhance discipline and civilian oversight.[4] Despite its small scale and reliance on foreign training, the F-FDTL symbolizes national resilience, drawing legitimacy from its roots in the independence struggle and contributing to regional security cooperation amid Timor-Leste's strategic position in Southeast Asia.[5]Historical Background
Pre-Independence Armed Resistance
The Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor Leste (Falintil), the armed wing of the Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (FRETILIN), was formed on August 20, 1975, initially to counter internal political rivals such as the União Democrática Timorense (UDT) amid the collapse of Portuguese colonial authority, and subsequently to mount resistance against the impending Indonesian invasion.[6] Following FRETILIN's declaration of independence on November 28, 1975, Indonesian forces launched Operation Seroja on December 7, 1975, rapidly overrunning urban centers and prompting Falintil to shift to protracted guerrilla operations in rural and mountainous terrain. At its outset, Falintil commanded an estimated force of approximately 20,000 combatants, including regulars with Portuguese training and irregular militias drawn from the local population.[7] This indigenous mobilization relied on asymmetric tactics, such as hit-and-run ambushes by small, mobile units without fixed bases, to harass superior Indonesian numbers and avoid decisive engagements.[8] Falintil's strategy emphasized integration with civilian networks for intelligence, logistics, and sanctuary, embedding fighters within communities to sustain operations despite Indonesian scorched-earth campaigns that displaced populations and induced famine. These tactics prolonged the conflict but incurred heavy attrition through combat, defections, and targeted killings, reducing Falintil's effective strength to around 200 fighters by 1999.[9] The occupation's brutality, evidenced by the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) estimate of approximately 102,000 Timorese deaths from direct violence, starvation, and disease between 1975 and 1999—representing up to 17% of the pre-invasion population—stemmed causally from Indonesian policies of mass relocation, crop destruction, and reprisal massacres that weaponized deprivation against resistance supporters.[10][11] Key commanders shaped Falintil's endurance: Xanana Gusmão assumed leadership in 1981, coordinating a unified clandestine front that combined armed action with diplomatic outreach to garner international scrutiny of Indonesian actions, until his capture in 1992. Taur Matan Ruak then took command, maintaining operational cohesion through the 1990s amid escalating militia violence. This leadership sustained the resistance's core objective of national liberation, preventing total subjugation and contributing to the 1999 referendum where 78.5% voted for independence, though at the cost of near annihilation of Falintil's field capacity.[1] The guerrilla phase underscored the causal limits of conventional force against a determined occupier, with survival hinging on dispersed, low-intensity persistence rather than territorial control.[8]Formation of the F-FDTL
The F-FDTL was formally established on 1 February 2001 via UNTAET Regulation No. 2001/1, which restructured the Falintil guerrilla force—comprising roughly 6,000 veterans cantoned since late 1999—into a conventional national defense force tasked primarily with military protection of East Timor's territory, population, and sovereignty.[12][13] This transition occurred under the supreme authority of the UN Transitional Administrator, who retained command oversight and appointed the initial Chief of Defence Force, with the structure including a regular force and reserves but no fixed personnel ceiling in the regulation itself.[12] Personnel selection emphasized integration of select ex-Falintil combatants to form a disciplined, apolitical unit, drawing approximately 1,500 members from thousands of applicants by prioritizing younger fighters with potential for conventional training while deliberately excluding many older veterans to avert factional risks, militia revival, or entrenched guerrilla mentalities that could undermine civil-military relations.[13] The initial recruit cohort, numbering around 600, underwent basic training starting in late March 2001 at facilities like Metinaro, led by instructors from Australia, Portugal, and Malaysia, who imparted infantry tactics, discipline, and logistics suited to a light force.[13] The founding doctrine prioritized light infantry battalions for territorial defense, reflecting geographic realities of Timor-Leste's mountainous interior and maritime borders, as well as fiscal prudence in a resource-scarce state wary of Indonesian revanchism following the 1999 referendum violence and occupation withdrawal.[12][13] Heavy equipment or expeditionary capabilities were forgoing in favor of mobile, low-maintenance units capable of deterring cross-border incursions, with the regulation prohibiting routine internal policing to preserve police primacy amid post-referendum instability, though limited support roles in emergencies or disasters were permitted.[12] Initial materiel support came via donations, including small arms like M16 rifles, basic vehicles, and two Portuguese Albatross-class patrol boats transferred in 2001 for nascent naval tasks, underscoring the force's dependence on bilateral aid from former colonial power Portugal and key partners like Australia to bootstrap operations without domestic production capacity.[13][14] This modest scale—capped effectively at 1,500–2,000 through UNTAET planning—aligned with first-principles constraints of a nascent economy unable to sustain larger commitments, yet it constrained surge capacity for hybrid threats blending external aggression and domestic unrest.[13] Early operational testing included provisional internal security patrols in districts like Ermera under UNMISET coordination from 2002, where F-FDTL units patrolled borders and supported stability amid lingering militia threats, marking a cautious expansion beyond pure external focus while honing interoperability with international forces.[15]The 2006 Crisis and Internal Divisions
In January 2006, approximately 594 soldiers from the Timor-Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL), primarily from western districts, submitted a petition to President Xanana Gusmão alleging discrimination in promotions and welfare, rooted in regional divisions between eastern and western recruits; these petitioners, often former Falintil guerrillas from the west who felt marginalized by an eastern-dominated officer corps, were dismissed on 1 March 2006 by F-FDTL Chief of Defence Force Brigadier-General Taur Matan Ruak for insubordination.[16][17] The dismissals, representing about one-third of the F-FDTL's personnel, triggered protests in Dili starting 24 April, escalating into widespread riots, desertions, and clashes between petitioners, loyalist F-FDTL units, police, and civilian militias, resulting in at least 38 deaths, over 100 injuries, and the displacement of around 150,000 people by mid-2006.[18][19] The crisis exposed deep internal divisions within the F-FDTL, including recruitment biases that favored easterners—many tied to Fretilin networks—over western veterans who had borne heavier resistance burdens against Indonesian occupation but were underrepresented in command roles due to post-independence integration policies prioritizing political loyalty over merit.[17][20] Leadership failures compounded these tensions, as Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri's Fretilin-led government was criticized for politicizing the security sector, arming civilian loyalists, and sidelining non-Fretilin figures, which reports attribute to exacerbating resentments rather than addressing substantive discrimination claims empirically evidenced by uneven regional representation in the force.[17][21] Pro-F-FDTL perspectives defended the dismissals as essential for maintaining discipline against a mutiny that threatened institutional cohesion, while critics, including petitioner leaders like Alfredo Reinado, highlighted excessive force by loyalist units and alleged government orchestration of violence to consolidate power.[16][17] Causal analysis from contemporaneous inquiries points to the exclusion of western veterans during F-FDTL formation as a key grievance, fostering factionalism that Alkatiri's autocratic governance—favoring Fretilin allies and ignoring institutional frailties—amplified into near-civil war, with militia resurgence exploiting the vacuum.[17][20] An Australian-led multinational force, deployed on 25 May 2006 alongside Portuguese, New Zealand, and Malaysian contingents, intervened to secure Dili and restore order, suspending the national police and enabling Alkatiri's resignation on 26 June amid accusations of arming hit squads against opponents.[16][18] This episode underscored the F-FDTL's vulnerability to ethnic-regional fissures and politicization, with International Crisis Group assessments noting that while discrimination claims held partial validity, the government's failure to integrate diverse resistance legacies precipitated the collapse.[17]Post-Crisis Reforms and Stabilization
Following the 2006 crisis, which saw the dismissal of approximately 594 petitioners from the F-FDTL amid allegations of regional discrimination and led to widespread unrest, recovery efforts emphasized security sector reform (SSR) coordinated by the government with UN and Australian support. Reintegration of the dismissed petitioners into civilian life proceeded without major incidents by 2009, with programs focusing on vocational training and community resettlement rather than military reinstatement to avoid exacerbating internal divisions.[22] The UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) facilitated administrative reforms, including asset management and procurement improvements within the Ministry of Defence and Security, while stressing the need to delineate roles between the F-FDTL and the National Police of East Timor (PNTL) to prevent future overlaps in internal security duties.[22] Under the continued leadership of Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak, who had commanded the F-FDTL since its 2001 inception and navigated the crisis without dismissal, reforms pivoted toward long-term professionalization via the Force 2020 strategic plan introduced in 2006. This blueprint aimed to build a sustainable force of around 3,000 personnel by incorporating obligatory national service, enhancing border and maritime capabilities, and prioritizing self-reliance to mitigate dependency on international donors amid emerging fatigue from prolonged assistance. Ruak's tenure emphasized discipline and apolitical conduct, drawing on his Falintil guerrilla experience to foster unity, though underlying east-west factionalism persisted as a challenge to cohesion.[23] In 2009, the F-FDTL undertook its first post-crisis recruitment drive, targeting disciplined entrants to rebuild capacity while integrating naval and air elements more formally into operations despite their earlier establishment. Australian Defence Cooperation Program advisors and UN military liaison officers provided targeted training on leadership, logistics, and human rights to address discipline gaps exposed in 2006, with workshops held as late as October 2009 to mentor officers.[24] These efforts supported initial naval patrols and border deployments in districts like Bobonaro and Covalima, marking steps toward operational self-sufficiency.[25] By 2011, these reforms had stabilized the force sufficiently for it to support internal security alongside the PNTL, including joint planning for the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections, which proceeded peacefully without major incidents.[26] A smooth transition to new F-FDTL leadership that year signaled institutional maturity.[27] However, progress drew criticism for its slowness, with observers noting inadequate vetting processes—unlike those applied to the PNTL—and lingering factional influences that hindered full professionalization.[28] Despite these shortcomings, the emphasis on endogenous capacity via Force 2020 laid groundwork for reduced reliance on external stabilization forces.[29]Organizational Structure and Command
Leadership and Chain of Command
![Photograph of Brigadier General Filomeno da Paixao de Jesus, former Deputy Chief of Defense Force][float-right] The Timor-Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL) operates under a centralized chain of command led by the Chief of the General Staff, who holds operational authority over the army, naval, and air components. The President of Timor-Leste serves as the supreme commander, ensuring civilian oversight as stipulated in the constitution, while the Prime Minister, concurrently holding the defence portfolio, directs policy and strategic decisions through the Ministry of Defence.[30] This structure, formalized in national defence legislation enacted on April 21, 2010, mandates that the Chief propose rules of engagement for approval, subordinating military actions to governmental authority. Lieutenant General Domingos Raúl, commonly known as Falur Rate Laek, has served as Chief of the General Staff since succeeding Major General Lere Anan Timur, with his leadership affirmed in joint exercises and international engagements as recently as September 2025.[31][32] The Vice Chief and departmental heads report directly to the Chief, facilitating joint operations through coordinated headquarters functions, though empirical assessments indicate effectiveness primarily in small-scale border and maritime patrols rather than large-scale conflicts.[33] In internal security crises, constitutional provisions allow the F-FDTL to support the National Police under the Prime Minister's direction, as dual-hatting arrangements have been invoked to maintain order without full militarization. Civilian control has empirically prevented coups in Timor-Leste's post-independence era, leveraging the F-FDTL's origins in guerrilla resistance to foster loyalty to democratic institutions over personalist rule. However, this oversight carries risks of political interference, as evidenced by the Prime Minister's involvement in promotion ceremonies and the 2006 crisis, where dismissals of personnel amid ethnic and regional grievances escalated into broader instability, highlighting tensions between merit-based advancement and governmental influence.[34] Such dynamics underscore the causal trade-offs in small, nascent militaries, where tight civilian integration deters internal threats but can politicize command if promotions prioritize loyalty over competence.[21]Army Light Infantry Battalions
The land force component of the Timor-Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL) is structured around two light infantry battalions, designated the 1st and 2nd Battalions, optimized for defensive operations in the country's mountainous and coastal terrain. Each battalion is authorized to maintain approximately 600 personnel, enabling rapid mobilization for territorial defense, internal security, and disaster response in a low-intensity threat environment.[35] These units emphasize mobility and adaptability, relying on light infantry tactics suited to Timor-Leste's archipelago geography rather than heavy mechanized warfare.[36] Following the 2006 crisis, which stemmed from ethnic and regional divisions within the F-FDTL and resulted in the dismissal of nearly 600 personnel, reconstruction efforts shifted toward fostering loyalty and discipline in the battalions to prevent recurrence of internal fractures.[37] Recruitment and promotion post-crisis prioritized cohesion under civilian oversight, integrating veterans from the independence struggle while diluting prior factional influences based on regional origins. Training regimens focus on border security patrols, particularly along the shared frontier with Indonesia, through joint task forces aimed at combating smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal crossings.[2] Elements of the Falintil Special Unit are incorporated into battalion operations to bolster counter-insurgency expertise, drawing on historical guerrilla warfare experience for scenarios involving potential non-state threats. This structure supports cost-effective defense of sovereign territory, where light forces provide sufficient deterrence against conventional incursions given Timor-Leste's limited strategic adversaries and geographic isolation.[35]Naval Force Component
The Naval Force Component of the Timor-Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL) was established in December 2001 through the transfer of two Albatroz-class patrol boats from Portugal, marking the initial step toward building maritime capabilities for a nation heavily reliant on sea resources.[38] This small fleet, primarily consisting of two Jaco-class patrol boats commissioned in June 2010 and built in China, operates from the Hera Naval Base near Dili to conduct coastal patrols and enforce exclusive economic zone (EEZ) regulations.[39] [40] The vessels support fisheries protection against illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) activities, a critical role intensified after the 2018 Australia-Timor-Leste maritime boundary treaty resolved disputes over Timor Sea resources and shifted emphasis to sustainable EEZ management.[41] [42] The naval component's operations focus on sovereignty defense, fishery resource safeguarding, and search-and-rescue missions within territorial waters, reflecting Timor-Leste's strategic prioritization of maritime security driven by potential revenues from fisheries and offshore hydrocarbons.[40] Initial independent patrols commenced following the Jaco-class acquisition, enabling monitoring of territorial waters amid ongoing regional challenges like IUU fishing by foreign vessels.[43] However, the fleet lacks blue-water projection, confined to coastal duties due to vessel limitations and absence of advanced combatants. Australia has pledged two Guardian-class patrol boats, with delivery delayed as of 2024 due to Timor-Leste's unreadiness, potentially expanding capacity once received.[44] [45] Persistent maintenance challenges, rooted in budget shortfalls and inadequate infrastructure such as the lack of local dry-docking facilities, have resulted in high vessel downtime rates, undermining operational readiness.[46] For example, in 2020, political stalemates halted maintenance on the Jaco-class boats, and by 2022, over $2 million was allocated specifically for repairs on the Chinese-origin vessels acquired over a decade prior.[47] [48] These issues, empirically evidenced by repeated funding drives for basic upkeep, constrain the force's ability to reliably patrol the EEZ, despite the causal imperative from resource-dependent economics to secure maritime domains.[46] While foreign partnerships, including Australian training, aid capacity building, domestic fiscal constraints limit sustained blue-water aspirations.[49]Air Component
The Air Component of the F-FDTL, designated as the Componente Aérea Ligeira (CAL), maintains a limited aviation capability centered on utility roles such as troop transport, medical evacuation, reconnaissance, patrol, and humanitarian assistance during natural disasters like floods and earthquakes.[50] Lacking fixed-wing combat aircraft or attack helicopters, the component prioritizes internal security and rapid response within Timor-Leste's terrain, reflecting severe budgetary limitations that preclude advanced procurement or sustained operations.[51] Its assets support interoperability with allies but depend heavily on foreign donations and training for functionality, as domestic maintenance expertise remains nascent.[52] Current inventory includes light fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters suited for short-range missions. In June 2023, the United States donated a Cessna Stationair Turbo 206 to enhance maritime surveillance, disaster response, and territorial protection, marking a key addition to the component's surveillance and light transport roles.[53] [54] Small numbers of utility helicopters provide medevac and logistics support, though specific models and quantities are not publicly detailed in recent assessments, underscoring operational opacity and resource constraints.[55] No evidence supports acquisition of combat aviation, aligning with the F-FDTL's defensive posture and fiscal realities that favor ground and naval priorities.[56] Operations primarily utilize Baucau Airfield, Timor-Leste's longest runway, which underwent joint U.S.-F-FDTL rehabilitation starting in January 2022 to bolster maritime domain awareness and emergency response infrastructure.[57] The U.S. completed airfield lighting and runway upgrades by December 2023, enabling safer night operations and expanded utility.[58] U.S. Air Force mobile training teams from the 36th Tactical Advisory Squadron have conducted recurrent sessions on airfield management, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and maintenance since at least 2023, coinciding with asset handovers to build local proficiency.[59] While enabling swift domestic deployments—such as relief in remote areas—the component faces challenges including high maintenance demands, pilot shortages, and reliance on partners like the U.S. and Australia for heavy-lift alternatives during major contingencies.[52] Quarterly U.S. Air National Guard engagements in 2025 have focused on sustaining these basics amid broader interoperability exercises like CARAT, though no independent combat projection exists.[60] [31] This setup underscores causal trade-offs: modest assets yield targeted responsiveness but expose vulnerabilities to equipment downtime or allied withdrawal, prioritizing cost-effective disaster aid over expansive defense ambitions.[61]Special Forces and Logistics Support
The FALINTIL Special Unit serves as the elite special operations component of the Timor-Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL), inheriting the guerrilla warfare legacy of the original FALINTIL resistance fighters from the Indonesian occupation era.[62] Established to address modern security challenges, the unit specializes in high-risk missions including urban warfare, reconnaissance, hostage rescues, and rapid response to subversive activities.[62] Its mandate extends to countering terrorist threats and protecting national sovereignty through asymmetric capabilities suited to Timor-Leste's rugged terrain and limited resources.[62] Training for the Special Unit emphasizes rigorous physical and tactical preparation, incorporating combat simulations, advanced weaponry handling, and interoperability for joint operations with allied forces.[62] Personnel are equipped with specialized gear, including armored vehicles and secure communications systems, to enhance operational effectiveness in counter-terrorism scenarios.[62] Following the 2006 crisis, which exposed vulnerabilities in internal security, the unit's focus shifted toward specialized counter-terrorism training to mitigate risks from non-state actors, though its small scale—aligned with plans for a company-sized formation—constrains broader scalability.[62] Logistics support within the F-FDTL is managed by the Service Support Unit (UAS), which ensures sustainment for forward-deployed elements in remote and austere environments across Timor-Leste's mountainous and coastal districts.[63] This unit handles distribution of essential supplies such as fuel, ammunition, food, and water, alongside vehicle transportation and equipment maintenance to maintain operational readiness.[63] Structured into specialized companies for replenishment, maintenance, transport, and sanitary services, the UAS facilitates rear-echelon functions critical for prolonged missions, with training in logistics management and technical support to adapt to the nation's infrastructure limitations.[63]Personnel and Training
Recruitment, Demographics, and Retention
The Timor-Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL) maintains a total active personnel strength of approximately 2,000 as of 2024, focused primarily on light infantry capabilities with limited reserves.[2] Recruitment occurs through periodic drives rather than continuous annual intake, with the government authorizing selections of around 600 candidates in both 2021 and 2022 to bolster ranks.[64][65] These processes involve applications via district and sub-district administrations, emphasizing merit-based selection following the 2006 crisis, though initial formation integrated former Falintil guerrillas to consolidate national defense loyalty.[64] Demographically, the force consists predominantly of young males, reflecting Timor-Leste's youth-heavy population and high unemployment rates among that cohort, which the military helps mitigate as an employment avenue. Efforts to diversify include targeted female recruitment; for instance, a 2011 drive filled 92 positions out of 600 with women, representing about 15% of that intake. Post-2006 reforms addressed regional imbalances by prioritizing broader geographic representation in recruit selections, reducing eastern-western divides that fueled prior internal divisions.[66] Retention has improved since the 2006 crisis, which saw significant desertions amid ethnic and factional splits, prompting purges and restructuring to foster professionalism over patronage. Pre-reform nepotism allegations, often tied to Falintil veteran networks, contributed to cohesion issues, though subsequent merit shifts have enhanced stability. Reserves remain underdeveloped, with limited formal mobilization structures, underscoring reliance on active personnel for operational needs. Veteran integration persists as a policy focus, including provisions for retired Falintil members to undertake non-operational roles post-retirement.[67][68]Training Programs and Capacity Building
The Comandante Nicolau Lobato Training Center (CICNL) in Metinaro serves as the primary domestic facility for F-FDTL training, focusing on combat tactics, movement strategies, attack and defense, and battle scenario simulations to transition personnel from guerrilla warfare backgrounds to professional military standards.[69][70] Australia's Defence Cooperation Program has been instrumental in developing Metinaro's infrastructure and delivering specialized instruction in infantry skills, English language proficiency, engineering, logistics, and maritime security since the post-independence era.[29][71] Portugal contributes through ongoing mentorship and courses attended by F-FDTL personnel in Portugal, emphasizing shared historical ties and operational professionalization, while the United States provides Non-Commissioned Officer Academy training domestically.[4][72] These foreign-assisted programs aim to build leadership and discipline, with empirical evidence of reduced internal risks post-2006 crisis through post-2010 recruitment drives that restored force strength and fostered stability without major mutinies or confrontations.[73] Human rights training, aligned with UN principles, is integrated via partnerships with the Provedor de Direitos Humanos e Justiça (PDHJ) and UN entities, covering constitutional rights, proportional force, and ill-treatment prevention; examples include a five-day session for F-FDTL at Metinaro in July 2025 and another for the terrestrial component in Baucau in June 2025.[74][75] Such initiatives, while enhancing compliance and reducing excessive force reports, have drawn implicit critique for potentially prioritizing normative standards over warfighting proficiency tailored to local asymmetric threats like border incursions.[76] In 2025, capacity building extended to soft skills, with 19 F-FDTL members completing a 10-day public speaking course in September to improve communication for leadership roles.[77] Overall, these efforts have empirically strengthened discipline metrics, as evidenced by sustained force cohesion and no recurrence of 2006-scale divisions, though reliance on donor curricula risks misalignment with Timor-Leste's unique security environment.[35][29]Rank Insignia and Hierarchy
The rank structure of the FALINTIL-Força de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) is organized into three principal categories: commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers (sergeants), and enlisted personnel (corporals and privates), as codified in Decree-Law No. 18/2006, which regulates promotions based on fitness, service time, and merit.[78] This system emphasizes hierarchical progression from entry-level access ranks—second lieutenant for officers, sergeant for NCOs, and private for enlisted—through modalities including seniority, merit, and exceptional distinction, with minimum service requirements such as eight years for staff sergeant.[78] Promotions are overseen by the Chief of the Joint Military Staff and the F-FDTL Council of Promotions, ensuring alignment with operational needs in a compact force.[78] Officer ranks, reflecting Portuguese linguistic and structural influences from the colonial era, ascend from second lieutenant to brigadier-general, with provisions for higher general officer grades introduced via Decree-Law No. 32/2009 to accommodate leadership roles like the Chief of the Defence Force. The hierarchy prioritizes combat experience from Falintil guerrilla veterans over formal academic credentials, as evidenced by 2024 amendments waiving university degree requirements for officer entry to retain seasoned personnel.[79] NCO ranks provide mid-level command, while enlisted grades focus on specialist roles, with the corporal specialist grade slated for phase-out to streamline the base level.[78]| Category | Ranks |
|---|---|
| Officers | Second Lieutenant, First Lieutenant, Captain, Major, Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel, Brigadier-General (with higher generals per Decree-Law 32/2009)[78] |
| Non-Commissioned Officers (Sergeants) | Sergeant, Staff Sergeant, Sergeant First Class, Master Sergeant, Sergeant Major[78] |
| Enlisted (Corporals/Privates) | Private, Corporal[78] |