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Wirecard

Wirecard AG was a German financial technology company founded in 1999 near Munich, initially providing payment processing services for online transactions, including high-risk sectors such as gambling and adult entertainment.^[1]^[2] It specialized in electronic payment solutions, risk management, and issuing prepaid cards, expanding into banking and lending through aggressive acquisitions and partnerships.^[3] Headquartered in Aschheim, the firm grew rapidly under CEO Markus Braun, achieving a market capitalization exceeding €24 billion at its peak and earning inclusion in Germany's DAX 30 index in September 2018.^[1]^[4] The company's ascent was marred by persistent allegations of accounting irregularities, particularly concerning its Asian operations, which were later exposed as largely fictitious.^[5] In June 2020, Wirecard filed for insolvency after auditors could not verify €1.9 billion in reported cash balances, primarily held in purported escrow accounts in the Philippines that did not exist, revealing one of Europe's largest corporate frauds.^[6]^[7]^[8] The scandal prompted criminal charges against Braun and other executives for fraud, market manipulation, and falsifying accounts, alongside criticism of auditing firm EY for failing to detect the discrepancies over a decade and of BaFin regulators for inadequate oversight.^[9]^[8] Trials began in 2022, highlighting systemic failures in corporate governance and financial reporting in Germany, and leading to index reforms and enhanced auditing requirements.^[8]^[10]

Origins and Early Development

Founding and Initial Business Model

Wirecard was founded in January 1999 in a suburb of Munich, Germany, initially operating as Wire Card, a provider of electronic payment processing services amid the late stages of the dot-com boom.^[11]^[12] The company's early operations focused on facilitating credit card transactions for online vendors, leveraging technology to handle the technical aspects of payment authorization, settlement, and risk assessment in an era when e-commerce infrastructure was nascent.^[8]^[4] The initial business model emphasized serving high-risk sectors underserved by conventional banks, including online gambling and adult entertainment websites, which required specialized processing for transactions often rejected by mainstream providers due to fraud and regulatory concerns. This niche positioning allowed Wirecard to capitalize on the rapid growth of internet-based commerce, processing payments through partnerships with card networks and acquiring banks while managing associated risks like chargebacks.^[12]^[4] By 2000, the dot-com market crash strained the young firm, leading to financial distress and a recapitalization effort that preserved its core payment gateway operations.^[1] Jan Marsalek joined the company around this time, contributing expertise in mobile and wireless payment systems, which complemented the foundational credit card focus but did not alter the primary model until later leadership changes.^[11]^[4]

Merger with InfoGenie and Public Listing

In December 2004, Wirecard Technologies GmbH, a private payment processing firm, entered into a reverse merger with InfoGenie Europe AG, a publicly traded but struggling German company focused on call center operations and information services listed on the Neuer Markt segment of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.^[13]^[4] The transaction, dated December 14, 2004, involved InfoGenie issuing new shares in exchange for Wirecard's assets, effectively allowing the private entity to assume control and utilize InfoGenie's listing shell without a traditional initial public offering.^[14] This structure was common for faster access to public markets, particularly for tech firms seeking capital amid InfoGenie's declining operations, which largely ceased post-merger.^[4] Markus Braun, who had acquired significant influence in InfoGenie earlier in 2004, played a key role in orchestrating the deal, positioning Wirecard's payment processing business at the forefront of the combined entity.^[15] On March 14, 2005, the merger was formalized with the entry of the name change from InfoGenie Europe AG to Wirecard AG in the commercial register, marking the official transition.^[16] Following this, Wirecard AG's shares began trading on the Prime Standard segment of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange in 2005, providing immediate liquidity and visibility to investors.^[8] The public listing via reverse merger enabled Wirecard to raise capital efficiently, bypassing the regulatory scrutiny of a full IPO, and set the stage for its expansion into electronic payments and banking services.^[17] At the time, the company's market capitalization was modest, reflecting its early-stage fintech focus, but the structure drew limited contemporaneous criticism despite InfoGenie's prior delisting attempts from the Neuer Markt being blocked by courts in 2002.^[8] This event transformed Wirecard from a non-listed processor into a market-listed entity, with Braun assuming CEO duties to drive subsequent growth.^[13]

Business Operations and Expansion

Core Products and Services

Wirecard AG specialized in electronic payment processing, providing acquiring services that enabled merchants to accept credit and debit card payments, as well as alternative methods like mobile and Chinese payment systems, through its proprietary platforms.^[18]^[19] These services included transaction settlement across multiple currencies and geographies, fraud detection via real-time monitoring, and risk management tools to assess and mitigate financial exposures for clients.^[4]^[20] A key component involved card issuing through its subsidiary Wirecard Bank AG, which held a German banking license and facilitated the issuance of physical prepaid cards, virtual cards, and debit products for corporate and consumer use, often integrated with loyalty programs and e-wallets.^[21] The bank also supported deposit management and basic banking functionalities, allowing Wirecard to offer end-to-end payment value chain solutions, from acceptance to issuance and compliance. The company's platforms extended to e-commerce and mobile payment gateways, such as the Wirecard Payment Page, which handled customizable checkouts, installment options, and cross-border transactions for over 250,000 merchants globally by 2020.^[22]^[23] Additional offerings encompassed software for digital retail transformation, including point-of-sale integrations and analytics for transaction optimization.^[19] These services were marketed as scalable, technology-driven solutions, leveraging APIs for seamless merchant integration.^[4]

International Growth and Partnerships

Wirecard's international expansion strategy emphasized acquisitions of local payment processors and strategic alliances to rapidly scale operations in emerging markets, often bypassing the need for direct licensing by leveraging partner networks. Beginning around 2010, the company established bases in Dublin and Dubai alongside its German headquarters, funding growth through capital raises exceeding €500 million to target Asia, the Middle East, and North America.^[24] This approach enabled Wirecard to process transactions in regions without its own acquiring capabilities, relying on third-party partners for compliance and local execution.^[25] Key acquisitions included Citi Prepaid Services in March 2017, which facilitated entry into the US prepaid card market and formed Wirecard North America; the deal, initially announced in June 2016, expanded its offerings in electronic payments and risk management.^[26] In Asia, Wirecard acquired entities such as AllScore Payment Services in Beijing, enabling a foothold in China with investments in digital payment licenses announced in November 2019.^[27] Operations extended to India via the Hermes unit and Brazil through Moip, supporting claims of diversified revenue streams in high-volume markets like e-commerce and remittances.^[25] Partnerships bolstered this growth, with a prominent example being the April 2019 agreement with SoftBank Vision Fund for up to €900 million in convertible bonds and collaboration to penetrate Japan and South Korea, where SoftBank was to provide technological and market access support.^[28] ^[29] Wirecard publicized hundreds of such alliances, including with SAP and Zurich Insurance, positioning itself as a global platform; however, many proved superficial or promotional, lacking substantive integration or volume contribution.^[30] Subsequent probes exposed that much of the touted Asian partnerships, including escrow arrangements in the Philippines, were fabricated to inflate reported revenues, undermining the veracity of the expansion narrative.^[8]

Financial Trajectory and Market Position

Revenue Reporting and Valuation Surge

Wirecard's reported revenues expanded rapidly during the mid-2010s, reflecting aggressive growth in payment processing volumes and international acquisitions. Consolidated revenue stood at €601 million in fiscal year 2014.^[31] This figure rose to €799.6 million in 2015, a 33% increase, supported by higher transaction volumes processed through its platform, which reached €45.2 billion that year.^[32]^[33] The upward trajectory accelerated thereafter, with annual revenues climbing to €1.02 billion in 2016 (a 28% year-over-year gain), €1.53 billion in 2017 (50% growth), €2.06 billion in 2018 (35% increase), and €2.54 billion in 2019.^[34]^[32]^[35] Much of this expansion was attributed to surging business in emerging markets, particularly Asia, where Wirecard claimed partnerships with local entities drove transaction volumes exceeding €100 billion by 2018.^[36] In the first quarter of 2019, quarterly revenue jumped 35% to €567 million, prompting the company to raise its full-year profit forecast amid optimism over digital payment trends.^[37] This revenue reporting underpinned a dramatic valuation surge, as investors viewed Wirecard as a high-growth fintech leader. The company's market capitalization ballooned from under €5 billion in mid-2015 to a peak of approximately €24 billion by early 2020, briefly exceeding that of Deutsche Bank and positioning Wirecard among Germany's top-valued firms.^[4]^[38] Between 2004 and 2018, reported revenues had grown roughly 50-fold, enhancing its appeal to institutional investors and contributing to stock price multiples that reflected expectations of continued double-digit expansion.^[39] The inclusion of such metrics in earnings releases and analyst coverage reinforced perceptions of operational scalability, despite limited transparency into third-party Asian escrow accounts central to the growth narrative.^[40]

Inclusion in DAX Index and Investor Appeal

Wirecard AG was announced for inclusion in the DAX index on September 5, 2018, by Deutsche Börse, with the change effective September 24, 2018, replacing Commerzbank AG and elevating the company from the MDAX to Germany's premier blue-chip benchmark comprising the 30 largest listed firms by market capitalization and liquidity.^[41]^[42] This milestone validated Wirecard's reported trajectory as a high-growth fintech, with its shares having surged to overtake Deutsche Bank's valuation in August 2018, reaching a market capitalization exceeding €21 billion.^[43] Leading up to the inclusion, Wirecard's stock delivered strong returns, climbing 151.7% in 2017 and advancing another 35.6% through 2018, amid a broader rally that saw shares rise nearly fivefold over preceding years from lower bases.^[44]^[45] By September 2018, the company's market capitalization stood at approximately €24 billion, positioning it as one of Europe's most valued payment processors and fueling perceptions of it as a disruptor in the sector.^[2]^[46] Investor appeal stemmed from Wirecard's portrayal as a frontrunner in digital payments amid the global pivot to cashless economies, with reported expansions into emerging markets via acquisitions and partnerships that promised scalable revenue from transaction processing and risk management services.^[2] The firm's narrative of technological innovation in secure online and mobile payments, coupled with consistent positive audit opinions from EY through 2019, attracted institutional funds seeking exposure to fintech growth stocks comparable to global peers like Adyen.^[2] This combination enabled Wirecard to raise capital readily at premium valuations, reinforcing a feedback loop of stock appreciation and market confidence prior to emerging scrutiny.^[47]

Emergence of Doubts and Investigations

Early Allegations of Irregularities

In June 2008, the German shareholder protection association SdK accused Wirecard of falsifying its 2007 accounting figures, prompting a special audit by EY that ultimately cleared the company of major irregularities.^[1] Shortly thereafter, German authorities prosecuted two individuals for failing to disclose Wirecard stock positions, highlighting early governance concerns but not directly validating fraud claims.^[12] More substantive doubts emerged in April 2015 when Financial Times journalist Dan McCrum launched the "House of Wirecard" investigative series on FT Alphaville, alleging a potential €250 million hole in the company's balance sheet tied to dubious third-party acquiring (TPA) operations, particularly in Dubai where client volumes appeared inflated through fictitious merchants.^[48] Wirecard responded aggressively, issuing legal threats via law firm Schillings and hiring consultancy FTI Consulting to defend its practices, while dismissing the reports as short-seller driven misinformation.^[12] Concurrently, U.S.-based research firm J Capital published a report questioning the scale of Wirecard's Asian business, estimating operations far smaller than reported and flagging inconsistencies in revenue from high-risk partnerships.^[12] By 2016, anonymous short-seller group Zatarra escalated claims of money laundering linked to Wirecard's international payment processing, prompting Germany's financial regulator BaFin to investigate the accusers for suspected market manipulation rather than probing Wirecard's books directly.^[12] These early allegations, often centered on opaque overseas subsidiaries handling high-risk transactions for gambling and adult entertainment, were repeatedly rebutted by Wirecard's management as competitive sabotage, with the company leveraging aggressive PR and legal tactics to maintain investor confidence amid persistent but unproven doubts.^[49] Internal red flags, such as system crashes traced to executive desks, were reportedly suppressed, foreshadowing deeper issues without triggering regulatory intervention at the time.^[50]

Media Scrutiny and Short Seller Reports

Investigative journalism targeting Wirecard intensified in April 2015 when Financial Times reporter Dan McCrum launched the "House of Wirecard" series on FT Alphaville, highlighting discrepancies in the company's Asian operations, including unverifiable client relationships and inflated revenue claims from third-party acquirers.^[49] The series drew on leaked documents, whistleblower tips, and on-the-ground checks in Dubai and the Philippines, revealing patterns of round-tripping transactions and fictitious partnerships that suggested systematic accounting manipulation.^[12] Wirecard dismissed these reports as baseless attacks coordinated by short sellers, threatening legal action against the FT and commissioning counter-investigations that portrayed critics as market manipulators.^[12] By January 2019, scrutiny escalated with FT articles alleging money laundering and fraud at Wirecard's Singapore office, prompting a sharp share price drop and prompting Germany's BaFin regulator to impose a two-month ban on short selling Wirecard stock on February 18, 2019, citing threats to market confidence.^[51] BaFin's action, extended temporarily, shielded Wirecard from further downward pressure but drew criticism for prioritizing company stability over investor protection, as later analyses showed it delayed reckoning with underlying issues.^[52] Concurrently, German outlet Handelsblatt published reports questioning Wirecard's escrow balances and audit reliability, amplifying doubts about the firm's €2 billion in claimed Asian cash holdings.^[53] Short seller reports paralleled media efforts, with J Capital Research issuing a November 2015 analysis recommending a short position, asserting Wirecard's Asian profits stemmed from non-existent operations and fabricated merchant acquiring.^[47] In 2016, under the pseudonym Zatarra Research & Investigations, Viceroy Research (led by Fraser Perring) released a report detailing alleged criminal activities, including fake contracts and trustee manipulations in the Philippines, which Wirecard refuted as speculative and funded by competitors.^[54] These disclosures, often sourced from forensic accounting and local verifications, faced aggressive pushback, including Munich prosecutors' 2019 probes into short sellers for alleged manipulation—later dropped—yet proved prescient as independent probes confirmed the critiques' validity post-collapse.^[55] Despite institutional resistance, such reports underscored short sellers' role in unmasking fraud where auditors and regulators faltered.^[52]

The Fraud Revelation and Collapse

EY Audit Failures and Missing Funds

Ernst & Young (EY) acted as Wirecard AG's external auditor from 2009 through 2018, issuing unqualified opinions on the company's consolidated financial statements each year despite mounting evidence of irregularities in its Asian subsidiaries.^[2]^[17] These opinions certified that Wirecard's reported revenues and assets, including purported escrow balances exceeding €1 billion annually by the late 2010s, were fairly presented in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards.^[2] EY's audits overlooked systemic issues such as inflated third-party acquiring volumes and unverified cash positions, relying excessively on management representations and forged confirmations from entities in the Philippines and Dubai.^[56] A whistleblower alerted EY to potential fraud as early as 2016, citing fake contracts and revenue round-tripping, but the firm did not escalate these concerns or adjust its audit approach accordingly.^[57] Five different EY partners signed off on the unqualified opinions between 2009 and 2018, with rotations failing to introduce sufficient scrutiny amid repeated red flags from short-seller reports and media investigations.^[17] The critical breakdown occurred during the 2019 audit, when EY could not obtain independent confirmation for €1.9 billion in cash balances—about 25% of Wirecard's reported balance sheet—that were claimed to be held in trustee accounts at two Philippine banks, including BDO Unibank.^[58] On June 18, 2020, Wirecard delayed its 2019 annual report and Q1 2020 results, attributing the holdup to the banks' alleged refusal to provide verification, a claim EY deemed insufficient after multiple attempts to corroborate the assets.^[58] By June 25, 2020, Wirecard admitted the funds "likely do not exist," revealing them as fabricated to conceal losses from fictitious transactions and embezzlement schemes involving executives and complicit local partners.^[58] This disclosure triggered the withdrawal of financial statements from 2015 onward, a market capitalization plunge of over €11 billion, and insolvency proceedings with €3.5 billion in liabilities.^[58] Post-collapse probes, including by KPMG and German authorities, confirmed EY's procedural lapses, such as inadequate testing of internal controls over high-risk escrow arrangements and failure to challenge management's explanations for discrepancies.^[56] In April 2023, Germany's Audit Oversight Body (APAS) imposed a two-year ban on EY auditing public-interest entities for new mandates, citing "repeated grave violations" of professional duties in the 2016–2018 audits, alongside a €500,000 fine on the firm and penalties up to €300,000 on individual auditors.^[59]^[60] EY maintained the fraud's sophistication evaded detection but acknowledged shortcomings in skepticism and evidence gathering.^[59] The episode underscored vulnerabilities in auditing complex fintech structures, where reliance on opaque third parties masked balance sheet manipulations totaling billions in overstated profits over a decade.^[56]

Executive Arrests and Insolvency Filing

On June 19, 2020, Wirecard's CEO Markus Braun resigned following the company's disclosure that auditors from EY could not verify the existence of €1.9 billion in cash balances reported in its Asian operations, prompting a suspension of trading in its shares.^[51] By June 22, 2020, Wirecard stated that these funds likely did not exist, escalating the crisis and leading to the dismissal of COO Jan Marsalek, who subsequently fled Germany and remains at large.^[61] Markus Braun turned himself in to Munich prosecutors on June 23, 2020, and was arrested on charges of aggravated fraud, false accounting, and market manipulation related to the fabricated balances, which prosecutors alleged were used to inflate Wirecard's financial position.^[61] ^[62] Braun denied the accusations, claiming the missing funds were held in legitimate trust accounts, but investigations revealed evidence of systematic falsification spanning years.^[51] Two days later, on June 25, 2020, Wirecard filed for insolvency at the Munich District Court after failing to secure emergency funding, with liabilities exceeding €3.5 billion against verified assets of approximately €900 million.^[51] ^[63] The filing marked one of Germany's largest corporate collapses, triggering creditor claims processes and the appointment of Michael Jaffe as insolvency administrator to manage asset liquidation and investigations into preferential payments.^[51] Subsequent arrests included former executives such as Stephan von Erffa in July 2020 on related fraud charges, underscoring the breadth of alleged internal complicity in the scheme.^[64] BaFin, Germany's financial regulator, faced criticism for prior leniency toward Wirecard despite whistleblower reports, though it cooperated in the criminal probes post-collapse.^[8]

Post-Collapse Proceedings

Criminal Trials and Outcomes

Former Wirecard CEO Markus Braun and former chief accounting officer Oliver Bellenhaus faced trial in Munich starting December 8, 2022, on charges including aggravated commercial fraud, breach of trust, and market manipulation related to the fabrication of €1.9 billion in fictitious Asian escrow accounts.^[65]^[66] Braun, who has denied wrongdoing, has remained in pretrial detention since his arrest on June 23, 2020, with the trial extended by the Munich Regional Court to December 2025 due to its complexity involving over 100 witnesses.^[67]^[68] In February 2025, prosecutors dropped certain charges against Braun, including those for falsifying 2015 annual results and 26 counts of market manipulation, narrowing the case but maintaining core fraud allegations that could yield up to 15 years imprisonment if convicted.^[69] The trial has highlighted alleged orchestration of a multiyear scheme to inflate Wirecard's balance sheet, with prosecutors claiming Braun led a "gang" that falsified financial statements to sustain the company's valuation.^[70] Bellenhaus, who turned state's witness, received a reduced sentence prospect in exchange for testimony detailing internal manipulations, though his final penalty awaits the main verdict.^[71] No convictions have been issued in the German proceedings as of October 2025, amid criticisms of prolonged proceedings in Germany's post-WWII largest fraud case.^[72] Internationally, Singapore courts delivered the scandal's first criminal convictions. In June 2023, Wirecard's former international finance manager James Wardhana received 21 months' imprisonment, and regional head of payments Chai Ai Lim got 13 months, both pleading guilty to conspiring to misappropriate over S$2 million in client funds via falsified transactions.^[73]^[74] In September 2025, former Wirecard subsidiary executives Paul O'Sullivan and Avinash Rajaratnam were convicted on charges of falsifying accounts; O'Sullivan on five counts and Rajaratnam on 13, tied to fraudulent invoices and transfers exceeding S$10 million, with sentencing pending.^[75]^[76] Fugitive former COO Jan Marsalek, accused of coordinating the Asian fake accounts and espionage activities, remains at large as of 2025, subject to an international arrest warrant; Austrian authorities charged him in absentia with fraud in 2021.^[72] Separately, Israeli operative Aviram Azari pleaded guilty in U.S. federal court in 2022 to wire fraud and identity theft for hacking critics on Wirecard's behalf, receiving a sentence of time served plus restitution.^[47] These outcomes underscore the scandal's global scope, though core German prosecutions against top leadership persist without resolution.

Civil Liabilities and Regulatory Reforms

In September 2024, the Munich Regional Court ruled that former Wirecard CEO Markus Braun and two other executives—chief operating officer Jan Marsalek and accounting head Stephan von Erffa—must pay a total of €140 million in damages plus interest to the company's insolvency administrator, holding them liable for breaches of managerial duties that contributed to the €1.9 billion fraud.^[77]^[78] The judgment, stemming from claims that the executives failed to ensure accurate financial reporting and internal controls, represents one of the largest civil penalties against corporate leaders in the scandal, though appeals are anticipated given the defendants' prior criminal convictions.^[77] Investors pursued civil claims against auditor EY, alleging negligence in certifying Wirecard's financial statements from 2014 to 2018, with demands exceeding €700 million in compensation for losses tied to the inflated valuations.^[79] In February 2025, the Bavarian Higher Regional Court rejected a test case under the pre-2024 Capital Markets Model Case Act, ruling that EY's audit opinions did not constitute direct "capital market information" attributable to the auditor rather than the company, forcing investors toward individual suits and marking a setback for collective recovery efforts.^[80] Separate U.S. class actions by shareholders were voluntarily dismissed in October 2025, limiting potential recoveries there.^[81] Claims against regulator BaFin for supervisory failures were dismissed by a German administrative court in January 2022, which held that BaFin's mandate prioritizes systemic stability over individual investor protection, shielding it from liability despite criticisms of its delayed response to early fraud signals.^[82]^[83] Some shareholders escalated related disputes to Germany's Federal Court of Justice in October 2025, seeking clarification on loss quantification amid ongoing insolvency proceedings.^[84] The Wirecard collapse prompted the Finanzmarktintegritätsstärkungsgesetz (FISG), enacted in June 2021 and effective from July 1, 2021, which bolstered BaFin's enforcement tools by granting exclusive authority over ad hoc financial audits and spot checks starting January 2022, alongside powers for direct account access, executive summons, and hiring forensic experts to detect irregularities preemptively.^[85]^[86] The law mandates listed companies to maintain robust internal control systems and risk management, reintroduces oversight of material outsourcing arrangements, and enables BaFin interventions in third-party banking services, including fines for non-compliance.^[85]^[87] BaFin underwent structural reorganization, including a strengthened presidential role in budgeting and management, creation of specialized Focus Units and a rapid-response Task Force in August 2021, and a ban on staff trading in financial instruments (with limited exceptions) to address conflicts exposed by Wirecard-related trades.^[85] Further, FISG introduced mystery shopping for consumer protection compliance from 2022 and discontinued prior fragmented enforcement models, consolidating BaFin's financial reporting supervision to prevent recurrence of unchecked accounting fraud.^[85]^[88] These measures, informed by ESMA's 2020 peer review of German reporting practices, aimed to enhance early detection without expanding BaFin's headcount disproportionately.^[89]

Governance Failures and Systemic Lessons

Auditor and Internal Control Breakdowns

Ernst & Young (EY) served as Wirecard's external auditor from 2009 to 2019, issuing unqualified opinions on the company's financial statements despite persistent red flags in its Asian operations, where much of the fraudulent activity occurred.^[90] EY's audits failed to adequately verify significant cash balances claimed in third-party escrow accounts, particularly in the Philippines and Singapore, relying instead on forged bank confirmations and management representations without direct contact with the institutions involved.^[91] For instance, in verifying over €1 billion at OCBC Bank in Singapore, EY accepted falsified documents rather than obtaining independent confirmations, contravening auditing standards that require substantive testing in high-risk areas.^[91] This oversight persisted even after internal probes like Project Ring in 2016-2017 uncovered evidence of balance sheet manipulation, which Wirecard executives halted mid-investigation, yet EY proceeded to approve the 2017 accounts without resolution.^[91] The breakdowns escalated in 2020, when EY conducted a special audit of Wirecard's third-party acquirer (TPA) business following KPMG's April report questioning revenue authenticity from Asian partners.^[90] Despite testing sample transactions—such as a €9.95 porn site subscription and $23.08 FIFA coin purchase in December 2018—EY overlooked that these were fabricated using prepaid cards controlled by Wirecard insiders, failing to perform deeper fraud risk assessments.^[91] On June 18, 2020, EY disclosed its inability to confirm the existence of €1.9 billion in purported cash reserves, admitting the balances were likely fictitious due to an "elaborate and sophisticated fraud" involving multiple parties, prompting its resignation and Wirecard's insolvency filing a week later.^[92] Subsequent investigations by Germany's Auditor Oversight Body deemed EY's work grossly negligent, citing failures to identify fraud risks and adhere to professional standards, resulting in a two-year ban from auditing public interest entities in Germany starting in 2023.^[93]^[59] Wirecard's internal controls exhibited systemic weaknesses that enabled the fraud, including inadequate segregation of duties and overreliance on unverified TPA revenues, which accounted for a disproportionate share of reported profits but lacked substantive documentation or bank corroboration.^[94] A McKinsey review commissioned by Wirecard highlighted a deficient internal control framework, with poor IT security, risk management processes, and governance structures that allowed executives to engage in round-tripping—funneling funds through subsidiaries and fake clients to inflate sales—without detection.^[95] German law under § 317 HGB mandated only a basic early warning system rather than robust internal audits, leaving the supervisory board with limited independent access to information and no required audit committee, facilitating management override of controls.^[90] These lapses extended to subsidiaries in Dubai and Asia, where fictitious escrow accounts were created without on-site verification or reconciliation, exacerbating the opacity that external auditors like EY failed to penetrate.^[94] The interplay of these breakdowns underscored a reliance on management assertions over empirical evidence, with internal mechanisms unable to flag the €1.9 billion discrepancy until external pressure mounted.^[90] Philippine banks, for example, denied any relationship with Wirecard's claimed trustees, revealing fabricated partnerships that internal due diligence should have scrutinized.^[90] Post-collapse analyses, including KPMG's special investigation, confirmed that uncooperative subsidiaries and absent revenue proofs from 2016-2018 stemmed from foundational control failures, not mere isolated errors.^[96]

Regulatory Lapses and Market Corrections

The German financial regulator BaFin exhibited significant lapses in overseeing Wirecard AG, despite repeated public allegations of irregularities dating back to 2015, including reports from the Financial Times questioning the existence of third-party client cash balances in Asia.^[97] BaFin prioritized defending Wirecard's reputation over rigorous investigation, authorizing probes into short sellers and journalists for alleged market manipulation rather than scrutinizing the company's accounting practices, which delayed substantive regulatory action until after the fraud's exposure.^[98] These failures stemmed from structural weaknesses in BaFin's supervisory framework, including insufficient resources for on-site inspections and over-reliance on self-reported data from supervised entities, contributing to the undetected inflation of Wirecard's balance sheet by approximately €1.9 billion in fictitious assets.^[99] In the market domain, Wirecard's share price, which had peaked at over €190 in September 2018 amid rapid growth narratives, underwent a precipitous correction as doubts intensified. On June 18, 2020, following the postponement of annual results and admission of unverifiable balances, shares plummeted more than 60% in a single trading session, erasing substantial market capitalization.^[100] Trading was suspended multiple times by the Frankfurt Stock Exchange amid volatility, and by June 25, 2020—after Wirecard disclosed the €1.9 billion shortfall and filed for insolvency—shares opened below €3, reflecting a near-98% decline from levels a week prior and a total evaporation of over €20 billion in shareholder value since early 2020.^[101] This collapse triggered broader market repercussions, including heightened scrutiny of fintech valuations and a temporary dip in investor confidence in German equities, though no systemic contagion ensued due to Wirecard's isolated position. Post-collapse, these lapses prompted targeted regulatory corrections in Germany, culminating in the Finanzmarktintegritätsstärkungsgesetz (FISG) enacted on July 28, 2021, which expanded BaFin's enforcement powers, mandated enhanced auditor independence, and introduced stricter penalties for false financial reporting to prevent recurrence.^[102] BaFin underwent internal restructuring, including bans on staff trading in supervised companies and increased on-site verification requirements, while a 2020 government overhaul aimed to bolster the agency's independence and resources amid criticism of its prior deference to industry stakeholders.^[85]^[103] Courts later affirmed BaFin's non-liability for investor losses, attributing primary responsibility to company executives and auditors, though the scandal underscored the need for proactive, evidence-based supervision over reactive measures. These reforms have since led to more aggressive BaFin interventions in other cases, signaling a shift toward prioritizing financial stability over entity protection.^[105]

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Payment Page Solutions - Wirecard
Wirecard Payment Page v2 (WPP v2) is an online checkout solution which combines a highly customizable user interface with payment processing for various payment ...Missing: issuing | Show results with:issuing
[23]
The Wirecard Fiasco: Digital Payments Gone Wrong
Oct 14, 2020 · The company had 5,000 employees and claimed to process payments for 250,000 merchants worldwide in addition to its card-issuing and technology ...
[24]
Wirecard: Another Fintech Fraud - Seven Pillars Institute
Nov 19, 2020 · Founded in 1999 in Munich (Germany), primarily as a provider of financial services to the gambling and pornography industries at the close of ...Missing: initial | Show results with:initial
[25]
The Wirecard documents, explained - FT Alphaville - Financial Times
Oct 14, 2019 · Kurniawan is now a suspect in a probe by Singapore police into potential accounting fraud and money laundering at several Wirecard subsidiaries ...
[26]
Wirecard completes Citi Prepaid acquisition - FinTech Futures
Wirecard AG has finalised its acquisition of Citi Prepaid Services. First announced in June 2016, the deal expands Germany-based Wirecard's prepaid payment ...
[27]
Wirecard Expands Its Global Financial Platform Services With ...
Nov 5, 2019 · This step underlines Wirecard's strategy to expand its global technology platform by way of cross-border licenses. In the current industry-wide ...
[28]
Wirecard lands $1 billion investment from Japan's Softbank - Reuters
Apr 24, 2019 · The two companies also unveiled a strategic partnership in which Softbank will help Wirecard expand in Japan and South Korea, and provide ...
[29]
Wirecard To Get EUR 900 Mln Investment From SoftBank - RTTNews
Apr 24, 2019 · The planned issuance of convertible bonds is subject to the approval of Wirecard's Annual Shareholders meeting to be held on June 18. The ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[30]
https://www.wsj.com/articles/wirecard-boasted-of-hundreds-of-partnerships-some-were-less-than-meets-the-eye-11594820867
[31]
[PDF] BEING AGILE – CREATING VALUE - Financial Times
Apr 8, 2015 · Transaction volumes processed through the Wirecard platform grew ... Consolidated revenue grew 24.8 percent year on year to reach EUR 601 million.
[32]
Wirecard AG (WRCDF) Revenue - Stock Analysis
Wirecard AG had revenue of 741.60M EUR in the quarter ending September 30, 2019, with 36.02% growth. This brings the company's revenue in the last twelve months ...Missing: figures | Show results with:figures
[33]
[PDF] Annual Report 2015 | Wirecard
In the 2015 fiscal year, the transaction volume processed through the Wirecard platform grew by almost 32 percent to EUR 45.2 billion.
[34]
[PDF] Annual Report 2016 | Wirecard
The report shows that consolidated revenue thus in- creased to EUR 1.02 billion. Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation. (EBITDA) ...
[35]
Wirecard AG (WRCDF) Income Statement - Yahoo Finance
Wirecard AG (WRCDF) ; Total Revenue. 2,537,400 ; Cost of Revenue. 1,316,400 ; Gross Profit. 1,220,900 ; Operating Expense. 619,000 ; Operating Income. 601,900.
[36]
[PDF] Annual Report 2018 | Wirecard
The transaction volume in Eu- rope increased by around 21 per cent in comparison to the previous year to EUR 62.5 billion, while a further EUR. 62.4 billion was ...
[37]
Germany's Wirecard lifts profit forecast on rising payment volumes
May 8, 2019 · In the first quarter of 2019, Wirecard reported a 35 per cent increase in revenue to €567m and a 50 per cent increase in net profit to €106m.
[38]
Wirecard (WDI.F) - Market capitalization - Companies Market Cap
On July 25, 2024 Wirecard had a market cap of $32.36 Million USD. The market capitalization, commonly called market cap, is the total market value of a ...Missing: AG | Show results with:AG
[39]
Wirecard's future in doubt after missing cash sparks investor flight
Jun 18, 2020 · ... Wirecard at just €4 a share, the company was a moneymaking machine. Between 2004 and 2018, Wirecard's revenue grew 50-fold and its operating ...
[40]
Wirecard News: CEO Arrest Is a Bad Look For Europe - Bloomberg
What Wirecard Says About Europe's Tech Scene ... Wirecard ... But after a remarkable turnaround, it eventually grew to report 2.1 billion euros in revenue for 2018.<|control11|><|separator|>
[41]
Wirecard AG to be included in DAX - Deutsche Börse Cash Market
Sep 5, 2018 · The shares of Wirecard AG will be included in the DAX index, and will replace the shares of Commerzbank AG, which will move to MDAX. This ...
[42]
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/wirecard-to-replace-commerzbank-in-dax-2018-09-06
[43]
Unknown firm overtakes Deutsche Bank – DW – 08/15/2018
Aug 15, 2018 · Wirecard shares, part of the Tec-Dax index, were worth more than €21 billion ($24 billion), beating Deutsche Bank's €20 billion market valuation ...
[44]
Wirecard (WDI.F) - Stock price history - Companies Market Cap
Annual Stock Price Performance ; 2019, -24.11% ; 2018, 35.60% ; 2017, 151.70% ; 2016, -12.12%.
[45]
Why Germany's Wirecard Is No Stranger to Controversy
Feb 18, 2019 · In September 2018, Wirecard replaced Commerzbank AG in Germany's 30-company DAX stock ... Wirecard's share price rose nearly five-fold ...
[46]
Wirecard Chapter Ends With Stock Set to Delist From Exchanges
Nov 12, 2021 · Wirecard had a market capitalization of more than 24 billion euros ($27 billion) at its peak in 2018, eclipsing the value of Germany's biggest ...
[47]
How the Wirecard scandal happened: Case study - Transparently.AI
(In 2022, Aviram Azari, an Israeli private detective, pleaded guilty to computer intrusion, wire fraud and identity theft charges relating to work done on ...
[48]
https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2015/04/27/2127427/the-house-of-wirecard/
[49]
How the Financial Times Exposed a Billion-Dollar Fraud
Jun 29, 2022 · McCrum's House of Wirecard series revealed what is believed to be one of the largest corporate frauds in history, and led to the collapse of the ...
[50]
How the Biggest Fraud in German History Unravelled
Feb 27, 2023 · The tech company Wirecard was embraced by the German élite. But a reporter discovered that behind the façade of innovation were lies and links to Russian ...
[51]
Timeline: The rise and fall of Wirecard, a German tech champion
Mar 16, 2021 · 1999: Wirecard is founded in Munich. 2002: Markus Braun, previously a KPMG consultant, takes over as chief executive. [reut.rs/2WZDgER]. 2005: ...Missing: early | Show results with:early
[52]
Wirecard's scandal shows the benefits of short-sellers - The Economist
Jun 24, 2020 · Wirecard has admitted it has a €1.9bn hole in its accounts. Its founder and boss, Markus Braun, once lauded as a visionary, quit on June 19th and was arrested ...Missing: report | Show results with:report
[53]
Wirecard's house tumbles - Fraud Magazine Article
Mar 1, 2021 · Dan McCrum, an investigative reporter for the Financial Times, spent six years questioning the finances of Wirecard, Germany's moneymaking payments processor.Missing: early | Show results with:early<|control11|><|separator|>
[54]
Zatarra Research & Investigations - Wirecard Reports
Jul 3, 2020 · The infamous Zatarra Research & Investigations report on Wirecard from 2016, by Viceroy's Fraser Perring. Four years later, this report remains entirely ...
[55]
German prosecutors drop probe into FT over Wirecard - Reuters
Sep 3, 2020 · The prosecutors launched an investigation into a Financial Times journalist in February 2019, prompting the newspaper to reject any allegations ...Missing: scrutiny Viceroy Bonitas
[56]
[PDF] What are the wider supervisory implications of the Wirecard case?
Oct 1, 2020 · While multiple causes underpin accounting scandals such as. Wirecard, they often point at deficiencies in the audit profession.
[57]
Accounting's Big Lie — and How to Fix It
Oct 6, 2022 · ... unqualified audits until 2018,” the Financial Times reported. 106. A whistleblower warned EY of fraud at Wirecard four years before the ...
[58]
'Total disaster': Phantom billions plunge Wirecard into chaos - Reuters
Jun 22, 2020 · Wirecard said on Monday that 1.9 billion euros ($2.1 billion) it ... mistakes. "It is a scandal that something like this could happen ...
[59]
EY banned from auditing public interest companies in Germany over ...
Apr 3, 2023 · Germany's Wirecard filed for insolvency in 2020 following the discovery of a $2 billion accounting fraud that regulators, the company's ...
[60]
EY's Wirecard audits marred by 'repeated grave' violations of duties ...
Apr 20, 2024 · EY, which had been Wirecard's auditor for close to a decade, had issued unqualified audit opinions. The summary of the review, published on ...
[61]
Former Wirecard CEO Arrested Amid Widening Criminal Probes
Jun 23, 2020 · Markus Braun, who resigned last week, turned himself in Monday evening in Munich as part of a probe into the company's accounting practices, ...
[62]
Wirecard's Ex-C.E.O., Markus Braun, Is Arrested in Germany
Jun 23, 2020 · June 23, 2020. The former chief executive of Wirecard, a German electronic payment platform, has been arrested in Munich, prosecutors said ...
[63]
Wirecard files for insolvency after ex-CEO arrested in $2 billion ...
Jun 25, 2020 · Wirecard has filed for insolvency, just days after a $2 billion accounting scandal at the company burst into the open, crashing its stock and leading to the ...Missing: Handelsblatt Viceroy Bonitas<|separator|>
[64]
Wirecard Ex-C.E.O. Arrested on New Charges of Defrauding Banks
Dec 7, 2020 · Markus Braun, the former chief executive, and two other former Wirecard executives were arrested early Wednesday after prosecutors “ ...
[65]
How Wirecard Went from Fintech Star to Criminal Court
Dec 8, 2022 · The scandal led to the resignation and jailing of the company's former Chief Executive Officer Markus Braun.Missing: outcomes | Show results with:outcomes
[66]
Wirecard bosses' fraud trial begins after scandal that rocked Germany
Dec 7, 2022 · ... charges including fraud and market manipulation that could result in a jail term of up to 15 years for each of them if convicted. In his ...
[67]
Wirecard boss Braun to remain in pre-trial detention after four years
Sep 4, 2024 · Braun has been in custody since July 2020 as investigations proceed. He is accused of commercial and organized fraud and breach of trust, among ...Missing: outcomes | Show results with:outcomes
[68]
German court extends Wirecard trial to end 2025 - no judgement date
Dec 14, 2024 · A Munich court has extended the Wirecard trial for Germany's largest fraud case since 1945 for a further year up to the end of 2025, a court ...Missing: 2023 | Show results with:2023
[69]
Prosecutors drop some charges against former Wirecard chief
Feb 12, 2025 · Among the dropped charges are allegations of falsifying Wirecard's 2015 annual results, 26 counts of market manipulation and certain cases of ...Missing: outcomes | Show results with:outcomes
[70]
[PDF] what to expect from the Wirecard trial - jura.uni-frankfurt.de
Dec 2, 2022 · On Thursday, prosecutors will read out 89 pages of charges, alleging that Braun was the head of a gang that orchestrated a complex, multiyear ...Missing: outcomes | Show results with:outcomes
[71]
Wirecard trial enters its third year | Börsen-Zeitung
Jan 17, 2025 · A conviction of the accused would close the criminal chapter for Braun, but the entire Wirecard affair is far from over. The fugitive former ...
[72]
Insight: The ex-convict's tale: Germany's role in Wirecard scandal ...
Apr 22, 2021 · Insight: The ex-convict's tale: Germany's role in Wirecard scandal under microscope. By John O'Donnell and Tom Sims. April 22, 202110:18 PM ...
[73]
Wirecard Fraud Scandal: First Criminal Convictions Handed Down ...
Jun 20, 2023 · A verdict on Braun, who has been in custody since 2020 and denies wrongdoing, is not expected until at least 2024, according to Reuters. What We ...Missing: outcomes | Show results with:outcomes<|separator|>
[74]
Singapore hands down first Wirecard criminal convictions
Jun 20, 2023 · Both pleaded guilty after being charged in 2022 alongside two other people in connection with the case. The rulings mark the first convictions ...<|separator|>
[75]
Executives found guilty of fraud in Singapore Wirecard case
Sep 21, 2025 · O'Sullivan was found guilty of five charges and Rajaratnam 13, each relating to specific fraudulent transactions and carrying possible sentences ...
[76]
2 men convicted of falsifying accounts linked to collapsed payments ...
Sep 23, 2025 · Wirecard filed for insolvency in Germany in June 2020. Singaporean R. Shanmugaratnam was convicted on Sept 22 of 13 counts of falsification of ...
[77]
Wirecard ex-CEO Braun, two others ordered to pay 140 mln euros in ...
Sep 5, 2024 · ... trial in Munich accused of fraud and falsifying financial statements. Braun denies all wrongdoing. In August, German prosecutors charged ...Missing: 2023 | Show results with:2023
[78]
Germany: Wirecard board members liable for EUR 140 million
Jan 3, 2025 · The Munich Regional Court ordered former Wirecard board members to pay a total of EUR 140 million in damages plus interest (Judgment of ...
[79]
Germany: Investors seek compensation over Wirecard fiasco - DW
Dec 23, 2023 · Institutional and private investors are claiming compensation of more than €700 million ($772 million) from Ernst and Young. The costs for the ...
[80]
Auditor liability in the Wirecard case: EY avoids test case | HEUKING
Mar 17, 2025 · The BayObLG ruled that claims for damages against EY for issuing unqualified audit opinions in the years 2014 to 2018 do not fall within the ...Missing: 2009 | Show results with:2009
[81]
Wirecard Investors Plan to Abandon Recovery Bid in Fraud Suit
Oct 16, 2025 · Wirecard AG investors intend to voluntarily dismiss their proposed class action over an alleged €1.9 billion fraud, they told a federal court.Missing: liabilities | Show results with:liabilities
[82]
Wirecard investors' case against German regulator BaFin dismissed ...
Jan 19, 2022 · The lawsuits were dismissed, with the court arguing that under German law, BaFin explicitly works for the wider public interest rather than that ...
[83]
Wirecard Investors Can't Hold Bafin Responsible, Court Rules
Jan 19, 2022 · The tribunal on Wednesday threw out four suits by shareholders who claimed they lost between 3,000 euros ($3,404) and 60,000 euros after the ...Missing: outcome | Show results with:outcome
[84]
Burned Wirecard Shareholders Head to Top German Court for Payout
Oct 16, 2025 · Wirecard AG shareholders have turned to Germany's top civil court for clarity on their losses, in a case that could curb what the defunct ...
[85]
04.08.2021 After Wirecard: more powers for BaFin
Aug 4, 2021 · Germany's financial supervisor more powers and sets out stricter rules for the personal securities transactions conducted by its staff members.
[86]
The new Financial Market Integrity Strengthening Act (FISG)
The FISG, which came into force on 1 July 2021, for the first time legally requires adequate and effective internal control systems and risk management ...
[87]
New Requirements for Corporate Governance and Audit of German ...
Jun 7, 2021 · The Act establishes new requirements for the corporate governance and the audit of listed companies as well as other public-interest entities.Missing: details | Show results with:details
[88]
[PDF] ESMA42-2004696504-7690 Follow-up Report to Wirecard Peer ...
Jul 18, 2024 · The FISG discontinued, as of 1 January 2022 the two-tier process which comprised (i). FREP that had been designated under the Transparency ...
[89]
ESMA to assess German financial reporting system following ...
Jul 15, 2020 · The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) is to launch an assessment of the supervisory response in the financial reporting area by BaFin.
[90]
[PDF] What are the wider supervisory implications of the Wirecard case
8 That is why a short sale ban as instituted for Wirecard stock between February and April 2019, has likely harmed investors, who subsequently bought stocks at ...
[91]
EY and Wirecard: anatomy of a flawed audit - Financial Times
Oct 25, 2021 · First-hand testimony paints a picture of missed opportunities to uncover the fraud and a failure to understand a company EY audited for a decade.
[92]
Wirecard scrambles to find missing $2.1 billion as loan crunch looms
Jun 18, 2020 · EY was unable to confirm the existence of 1.9 billion euros ... fraudulent transactions to the detriment of Wirecard AG have occurred.Missing: inability | Show results with:inability
[93]
German watchdog finds EY's Wirecard audits grossly negligent
Apr 16, 2024 · A review on behalf of the German parliament concluded in 2021 that EY had failed to spot signs of fraud risk, did not follow professional ...<|separator|>
[94]
[PDF] An Investigation Into the Causes and Impact of the Incredible Fraud ...
1999 Wirecard founded near Munich, Germany as a payment processor for online gambling and porn operations. 2002 Marcus Braun appointed CEO and reinvigorated ...
[95]
The Falling House of Wirecard - American Accounting Association
May 1, 2025 · One of the key failures of EY was their failure to verify Wirecard's ... audit, and any identified control deficiencies. In assessing ...
[96]
[PDF] Report - Wirecard
Apr 27, 2020 · organic growth was not an option. Wirecard AG had decided to look for a strategic partner in order to use existing local connections and ...
[97]
What the Wirecard scandal reveals about the state of German ...
Nov 19, 2020 · The Wirecard scandal has evolved into the largest case of accounting fraud ... regulators failed to beef up BaFin's powers to meet the challenges
[98]
[PDF] What are the wider supervisory implications of the Wirecard case?
Oct 14, 2020 · The rationale for investor protection can instead be found in the presence of asymmetries of information between investors, who provide the ...
[99]
[PDF] The Wirecard scandal and the role of BaFin
... allegations against Wirecard concerning irregularities in. Wirecard's acquisition of Indian company Hermes. The allegations are immediately denied by Wirecard ...
[100]
Wirecard shares plummet as payments firm postpones annual report
Jun 18, 2020 · Wirecard shares plunged more than 60% on Thursday as the German payments giant postponed its annual results once again.
[101]
Why Wirecard's share price was nearly wiped out | IG International
Jun 26, 2020 · German payments company Wirecard AG's share price nosedived nearly 90% after its board revealed on Thursday 25 June 2020 that it would be filing ...
[102]
Wirecard Accounting Scandal Prompts Germany to Act on Financial ...
Jul 28, 2021 · The scandal has led German regulators to adopt a new law, the Act on Strengthening the Financial Market Integrity.
[103]
Germany to overhaul regulator after Wirecard scandal - DW
Jul 6, 2020 · Germany plans to restructure its financial services regulator BaFin after the watchdog's reputation took a hit in the Wirecard scandal.
[104]
Wirecard: Court finds BaFin not liable for damage suffered by investors
Feb 17, 2023 · The plaintiff sued BaFin for alleged failure to adequately supervise Wirecard AG and abuse of office. ... Modern Slavery StatementSRA Regulation ...
[105]
German watchdog says Wirecard mistakes have made it ... - BaFin
Jun 26, 2025 · 2025 „German watchdog says Wirecard mistakes have made it more willing to 'step on toes'“. Interview des BaFin-Präsidenten Mark Branson mit ...Missing: failures | Show results with:failures