Amman Message
The Amman Message is a declaration issued by King Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein of Jordan on 9 November 2004 (27 Ramadan 1425 AH), aimed at clarifying the true nature of Islam and promoting unity among Muslims by rejecting extremism and affirming the legitimacy of diverse Islamic jurisprudential traditions.[1][2] The initiative responded to the misuse of Islamic teachings to justify violence, particularly in the wake of terrorist acts attributed to radical interpretations, by emphasizing moderation, tolerance, and the prohibition of takfir—the act of declaring other Muslims as apostates.[3][4] Central to the Amman Message are its three core points, unanimously endorsed by over 500 leading Muslim scholars from various schools of thought: first, the recognition of all eight major Islamic legal schools (madhabs)—the four Sunni, four Shia, and Ibadhi—as valid interpretations of Islam; second, the forbiddance of takfir among Muslims adhering to these schools; and third, the stipulation that issuance of religious rulings and resolution of disputes be confined to qualified scholars within these traditions.[5][6] This consensus marked the first unified scholarly agreement on core Islamic identity in over a millennium, fostering a framework for intra-Muslim dialogue and countering sectarian divisions.[2][7] The Message's impact extended through international conferences, such as the 2004 gathering in Amman that produced supporting fatwas, and subsequent endorsements by political leaders and institutions across the Muslim world, influencing efforts to combat radicalism and promote interfaith understanding.[8] While praised for bridging Sunni-Shia divides and providing a bulwark against jihadist ideologies, it has faced criticism from hardline groups rejecting its inclusive approach as diluting strict doctrinal purity, though empirical endorsements underscore its broad acceptance among mainstream scholars.[4][9]Origins and Historical Context
Pre-2004 Islamist Extremism
The proliferation of Islamist extremism in the late 20th century stemmed from ideologies emphasizing takfir—the excommunication of Muslims deemed insufficiently pious—and offensive jihad against perceived apostate regimes and non-believers. Egyptian thinker Sayyid Qutb, executed in 1966, advanced this framework in his influential Milestones, portraying modern Muslim governments as jahiliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance) and obligating believers to overthrow them through violence, an idea that radicalized elements within the Muslim Brotherhood and inspired subsequent jihadist doctrines.[10][11] Qutb's emphasis on purifying Islam via confrontation rejected gradualist reform, fostering a causal chain where ideological purity justified intra-Muslim conflict, diverging from classical Sunni scholarship that restricted takfir to rare, evidentially rigorous cases. Pivotal events amplified these ideas into organized militancy. The November 1979 seizure of Mecca's Grand Mosque by approximately 400 armed followers of Juhayman al-Otaybi, who proclaimed the Saudi rulers apostates and awaited a messianic figure, exposed vulnerabilities in Wahhabi-influenced states; the two-week siege ended with Saudi forces retaking the site after an estimated 250–600 deaths, including militants, soldiers, and pilgrims.[12] Concurrently, the Soviet Union's December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan mobilized tens of thousands of foreign fighters, including Arabs funded by Saudi donors and Pakistani networks, into mujahedeen ranks; Osama bin Laden, arriving in 1980, leveraged these alliances to found Al-Qaeda in 1988 as a base for transnational jihad post-Soviet withdrawal in 1989.[13][14] Al-Qaeda's campaign intensified pre-2004 violence, with the August 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania killing 224 people, mostly Africans, via truck bombs targeting civilian areas.[15] The October 2000 USS Cole attack in Yemen slew 17 U.S. sailors, while the September 11, 2001, hijackings struck New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania, causing 2,977 fatalities and reshaping global security.[16] Regional manifestations included the Algerian Civil War (1991–2002), where the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) invoked takfir to rationalize massacres of villagers and intellectuals, contributing to 150,000–200,000 total deaths amid factional strife.[17] Attacks like the October 2002 Bali nightclub bombings (202 deaths, including Muslims) and May 2003 Casablanca explosions (45 deaths) normalized suicide tactics against soft targets, contravening historic Islamic edicts against harming non-combatants.[18] This pattern of indiscriminate killing, often rationalized by fringe fatwas, eroded communal cohesion and highlighted interpretive deviations from consensus-based fiqh.Jordan's Motivations and King Abdullah II's Role
Jordan faced mounting threats from Islamist extremism in the early 2000s, including plots by Jordanian-born Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, who targeted the Hashemite monarchy and sought to destabilize the kingdom through takfirist ideology that declared fellow Muslims apostates to justify violence.[19] The kingdom's strategic position as a moderate Arab state allied with the West, combined with its custodianship of Islamic holy sites, amplified the urgency to counter radical narratives that misrepresented Islam as inherently violent, especially amid global events like the 9/11 attacks and the Iraq insurgency that fueled sectarian divisions.[2] These motivations centered on preserving national stability, reclaiming authentic Islamic jurisprudence from extremists, and fostering intra-Muslim unity to delegitimize terrorism, as Jordan's government viewed unchecked Salafi-jihadism as an existential risk to its pluralistic society and regional influence.[7] King Abdullah II, ascending the throne in 1999 as a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad through the Hashemite line, positioned himself as a guardian of moderate Islam, leveraging Jordan's religious authority to initiate the Amman Message on November 9, 2004 (27 Ramadan 1425 AH).[7] He personally drafted the core statement, which posed three fundamental questions to 24 leading Muslim scholars: the definition of a Muslim, recognition of the eight main schools of Islamic jurisprudence, and the conditions for issuing fatwas or declaring takfir.[2] Under his patronage, this evolved into a broader effort, culminating in the July 2005 International Islamic Conference in Amman attended by 200 scholars from 50 countries, where consensus was reached on rejecting extremism and affirming tolerance.[7] Abdullah II's hands-on role extended to securing endorsements from over 500 scholars and institutions by July 2006, including unanimous approval at the Organization of the Islamic Conference summit in December 2005, framing the Message as a theological bulwark against sedition and fanaticism.[7] His vision emphasized Islam's essence as mercy and moderation, denouncing distortions that permitted terrorism while promoting dialogue with non-Muslims, as evidenced in his subsequent international advocacy, such as UN resolutions on interfaith harmony.[2] This initiative reflected his strategic realism in addressing causal drivers of extremism—ideological fragmentation and illegitimate religious rulings—without compromising Jordan's Sunni orthodox framework.[20]Core Principles and Content
The Three Fundamental Points
The three fundamental points of the Amman Message, derived from fatwas issued by leading Islamic scholars in response to consultations initiated by King Abdullah II of Jordan on 9 November 2004, establish criteria for recognizing legitimate Islamic jurisprudence and prohibiting unauthorized excommunication (takfir). These points were unanimously agreed upon by over 200 scholars from more than 50 countries at an international conference in Amman in July 2005.[2][5] The first point affirms that adherents to the eight primary schools of Islamic jurisprudence—four Sunni (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali), two Shi'a (Ja'fari and Zaydi), Ibadi, and Zahiri—are Muslims, rendering it impermissible to declare them apostates. Their blood, honor, and property are declared inviolable. This extends to followers of the Ash'ari creed, practitioners of authentic Sufism (Tasawwuf), proponents of genuine Salafi thought, and any Muslim group affirming God, His Messenger, the pillars of faith, the five pillars of Islam, and self-evident religious tenets without denial thereof.[2][21] The second point emphasizes unity over division, stating that commonalities among these schools outweigh differences, with consensus on core Islamic principles including monotheism, the Qur'an as divine revelation, Muhammad as the final prophet for all humanity, the five pillars (shahada, salat, zakat, sawm, hajj), and beliefs in angels, scriptures, messengers, the Day of Judgment, and divine decree. Divergences pertain only to subsidiary issues (furu'), viewed as a mercy rather than grounds for schism, echoing historical scholarly views that variance among jurists constitutes a beneficial diversity.[2][5] The third point mandates adherence to established jurisprudential methodologies for issuing fatwas, requiring issuers to possess qualifications defined by their respective schools and prohibiting unqualified absolute ijtihad, invention of new schools, or fatwas deviating from Shari'a certainties. This framework aims to prevent misuse of religious authority by unqualified individuals or groups promoting extremism.[2][21]Definitions of Islam, Jihad, and Apostasy
The Amman Message delineates the boundaries of Islam by specifying that a Muslim is one who adheres to one of the eight recognized schools of Islamic jurisprudence—namely, the four Sunni schools (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali), the two main Shi'a schools (Ja'fari and Zaydi), the Ibadi school, and the Zahiri school—along with the Ash'ari creed, genuine Sufism, or authentic Salafi thought.[5] This definition encompasses those who affirm belief in Allah as the one God, the Qur'an as His revealed word, Muhammad as His final prophet and messenger, the six pillars of faith (iman), and the five pillars of Islam (shahada, salat, zakat, sawm, hajj), provided they do not explicitly deny self-evident tenets of the religion.[5] It emphasizes that disagreements among these schools pertain only to subsidiary matters (furu'), not core principles (usul), viewing such diversity as a divine mercy rather than a source of division.[5] Regarding apostasy, the Message explicitly prohibits declarations of takfir (excommunication as an apostate) against any Muslim fitting the above criteria, rendering their blood, honor, and property inviolable under Islamic law.[5] It asserts that only God determines apostasy in the ultimate sense, and no individual or group may issue such judgments against adherents of the recognized schools, as this would undermine Muslim unity and invite chaos.[5] This stance counters extremist interpretations that liberally apply takfir to justify violence, insisting that even those who err in interpretation remain within the fold unless they renounce foundational beliefs outright.[2] On jihad, the Amman Message and its associated scholarly endorsements define it not as indiscriminate "holy war" but as striving (juhd) in the path of God, encompassing both non-violent efforts (greater jihad, such as self-purification and social reform) and, when necessary, defensive military action (lesser jihad) governed by strict ethical rules derived from the Qur'an, Sunnah, and consensus of the schools.[22] Legitimate jihad prohibits targeting non-combatants, including civilians, women, children, clergy, and the elderly; mandates proportionality and cessation upon enemy surrender; and forbids treachery, mutilation, or environmental destruction.[22] It is framed as resistance to oppression or defense of the faith and community, explicitly rejecting offensive aggression, terrorism, or suicide bombings as un-Islamic innovations that violate these regulations.[22] These principles, drawn from classical juristic texts across the schools, aim to reclaim jihad from extremist distortions while upholding its regulated role in Islamic ethics of war.[22]Broader Implications for Muslim Unity
The Amman Message advanced Muslim unity by securing endorsements from over 500 scholars representing Sunni, Shia, Ibadi, and other traditions, establishing a historic consensus on the legitimacy of eight major jurisprudential schools (four Sunni, three Ja'fari Shia, one Zaydi Shia, and Ibadi).[7] This framework, articulated in the 2004 declaration and reinforced at the July 2005 Amman conference attended by 200 scholars from 50 countries, defined a Muslim as one who adheres to these schools or traditional creeds like Ash'arism, Maturidism, or Atharism, while condemning unqualified takfir (declarations of apostasy) as impermissible.[2] The initiative's three points—defining legitimate Islamic authority, prohibiting fatwas of apostasy without scholarly consensus, and restricting fatwa issuance to qualified experts—aimed to resolve intra-ummah infighting by prioritizing ijma' (consensus) over divisive interpretations.[7] Endorsements from figures like Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani (Shia) and Yusuf al-Qaradawi (Sunni) symbolized cross-sectarian solidarity, with the Organization of the Islamic Conference adopting the Message at its December 2005 Mecca summit, thereby institutionalizing it across 57 member states.[7] Proponents, including the Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre, argue it provides a "basis for unity and a solution to infighting," influencing subsequent efforts like the 2006 Marrakesh Declaration on minority rights and countering extremist narratives that fuel sectarianism.[2] By recognizing Sufism and moderate Salafi thought alongside madhhabs, it broadened orthodoxy, theoretically safeguarding diverse practices within the ummah against puritanical exclusions.[7] Despite these scholarly achievements, the Message's broader impact on tangible unity remains contested, as sectarian conflicts persisted post-2004, including the Iraq insurgency (2006–2008 peak violence) and Syria's civil war from 2011, where takfir rhetoric proliferated among groups like ISIS that explicitly rejected Amman-inspired consensus.[23] While elite fatwas and OIC resolutions promoted dialogue, empirical evidence of reduced division is sparse, with ongoing Sunni-Shia tensions in Yemen and Bahrain underscoring political exploitations overriding theological appeals.[24] Critics, including some Salafi voices, contend the initiative's top-down, state-sponsored nature diluted doctrinal rigor, prioritizing geopolitical stability over authentic reform, thus achieving symbolic rather than substantive cohesion.[25]Development Process
Issuance and Initial Scholarly Consultations
The Amman Message was issued on 9 November 2004 (corresponding to the eve of the 27th of Ramadan 1425 AH) by King Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein of Jordan in Amman.[7] The initial statement sought to clarify the nature of true Islam amid rising extremism, denouncing deviant ideologies while affirming orthodox interpretations across Islamic traditions.[2] It was drafted under the king's patronage in consultation with Jordanian religious scholars, emphasizing empirical adherence to foundational Islamic sources over politicized or sectarian distortions.[7] To establish scholarly legitimacy, King Abdullah II immediately dispatched three targeted questions to 24 leading religious authorities representing diverse Sunni, Shi'a, and other jurisprudential schools: (1) Who is considered a Muslim? (2) Under what conditions, if any, is it permissible to declare a professing Muslim an apostate (takfir)? (3) Who qualifies to issue binding fatwas in Islam?[7] These queries aimed to derive consensus on core definitional and authoritative matters, prioritizing textual evidence from Quran and Sunnah over unqualified opinions.[2] Key respondents included the Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar University (Muhammad Sayyid Tantawy), Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, whose fatwas validated the eight principal madhhabs of jurisprudence—four Sunni (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanbali), four Shi'a (Ja'fari, Zaydi, Isma'ili, Ibadi)—along with orthodox theological frameworks like Ash'arism/Maturidism and Salafi thought, while restricting takfir to rare, evidentially rigorous cases and limiting fatwa issuance to qualified mujtahids within these schools.[7][2] These endorsements provided the doctrinal foundation for subsequent elaborations, underscoring that unqualified individuals or groups lack authority to define Islam or excommunicate others.[7] The responses highlighted a shared commitment to intra-Muslim boundaries grounded in historical scholarly consensus rather than modern ideological impositions.[2]2005 International Islamic Conference
The International Islamic Conference, formally titled "True Islam and Its Role in Modern Society," took place in Amman, Jordan, from July 4 to 6, 2005 (27–29 Jumada II 1426 AH). Hosted under the patronage of King Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein, it assembled approximately 200 leading Muslim scholars, muftis, and religious authorities from over 50 countries, representing diverse jurisprudential traditions including Sunni, Shia, and Ibadi schools.[2] [26] The gathering sought to lend religious legitimacy to the Amman Message—initially issued in November 2004—by achieving scholarly consensus on core Islamic tenets, countering deviant interpretations that fueled extremism and sectarian division.[2] Participants included prominent figures such as Egypt's Grand Mufti Ali Gomaa, Qatar-based scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi, and Iran's Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Ali al-Taskhiri, alongside representatives from institutions like Al-Azhar University and various national fatwa councils.[8] The conference's proceedings emphasized empirical fidelity to established Islamic sources—the Quran, Sunnah, and consensus (ijma')—while rejecting unqualified innovations in fiqh or creed that deviated from recognized methodologies. Discussions highlighted the Amman Message's role in promoting intra-Muslim dialogue and resilience against external politicization of religion.[26] The primary outcome was a unanimous declaration affirming three key points derived from the Amman Message: first, the religious validity of adherents to the eight major schools of jurisprudence (madhahib)—Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali (Sunni); Ja'fari and Zaydi (Shia); Ibadi; and Zahiri—along with creedal traditions such as Ash'arism, Maturidism, Atharism, Sufism, and authentic Salafism, defining them unequivocally as Muslims and prohibiting takfir (declarations of apostasy) against them absent strict, consensus-based criteria.[2] [26] Second, it underscored shared fundamentals of faith, including belief in Allah, the Quran, Prophet Muhammad, the five pillars, and the six articles of faith, viewing jurisprudential differences as divinely ordained mercy rather than grounds for division. Third, it mandated that fatwas be issued solely by qualified scholars adhering to these madhahib's methodologies, barring self-appointed individuals from pronouncing takfir or innovating deviant rulings that undermine communal harmony.[2] [26] The statement explicitly endorsed the Amman Message for fostering moderation (wasatiyyah), fairness, and brotherhood among Muslims, urging rejection of discord, foreign interference, and unqualified extremism. Signed by all attendees, it marked the first pan-Islamic scholarly consensus on these issues in modern times, laying groundwork for subsequent endorsements by over 500 scholars worldwide by mid-2006.[2] [26] This declaration prioritized causal clarity in Islamic self-definition, grounding unity in verifiable textual and historical precedents over subjective or politicized claims.[2]Subsequent Fatwas and Endorsements
Following the July 2005 International Islamic Conference in Amman, which saw 200 scholars from over 50 countries endorse the Amman Message's three points, additional fatwas and endorsements emerged from subsequent scholarly assemblies and individual pronouncements, expanding support to over 500 signatories across 84 countries by mid-2006.[6][2] These built on the core affirmations of the eight major Islamic jurisprudential schools, the criteria for recognizing a Muslim, and the qualifications for issuing fatwas, with participants reiterating prohibitions on unqualified takfir (declaring Muslims apostates).[27] In September 2005, the Forum of Muslim Ulama and Thinkers in Mecca produced 42 endorsements, emphasizing unity against extremism while upholding the Message's delineation of legitimate madhabs.[6] This was followed in November 2005 by the Islamic Schools of Jurisprudence Conference at Aal al-Bayt University in Jordan, yielding 33 signatures from scholars who affirmed the Message's role in curbing sectarian fatwas.[6] The same month, the 9th Session of the Council of Ministers of Religious Endowments in Kuwait added seven institutional endorsements, focusing on standardized fatwa issuance.[6] Further momentum came in December 2005 at the 3rd Extraordinary Session of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Mecca, where 54 leaders and scholars ratified the principles, linking them to broader ummah cohesion.[6][2] By April 2006, the Conference on Moderate Islamic Thought and Culture in Amman secured 55 additional signatures, with participants issuing statements against deviant interpretations of jihad.[6] A pivotal endorsement occurred in June 2006 during the 17th session of the International Islamic Fiqh Academy (affiliated with the OIC) in Amman, where 68 jurists unanimously approved the three points, declaring the eight schools as valid representations of Islamic orthodoxy and restricting fatwa authority to qualified mujtahids.[28][6][24] This session's resolution explicitly called for adherence to scholarly consensus (ijma') in jurisprudence to prevent unqualified rulings.[24] The wave concluded in July 2006 with the Muslims of Europe Conference in Istanbul, attracting 157 endorsements from diaspora scholars who adapted the Message to contemporary European contexts while upholding its anti-takfir stance.[6] Individual fatwas from prominent figures, such as those by Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Abdullah bin Bayyah, reinforced these collective affirmations, with Qaradawi publicly supporting the prohibition on lay fatwas in media outlets.[2] These post-2005 developments, documented in the Amman Message's grand list, represented a concerted scholarly effort to institutionalize the initiative's boundaries on doctrinal disputes.[6]Reception and Endorsements
Support from Mainstream Muslim Authorities
The Amman Message received endorsements from over 500 leading Muslim scholars worldwide, spanning 84 countries and representing mainstream authorities across the eight major schools of Islamic jurisprudence (Sunni, Shia, and Ibadi).[6] These endorsements affirmed the message's three core points: the validity of followers of these schools as Muslims, the prohibition of declaring fellow Muslims as apostates (takfir), and the restriction of religious authority to qualified scholars within these traditions.[27] A pivotal event was the International Islamic Conference held in Amman on July 27-29, 2005, where approximately 200 scholars convened and unanimously signed a fatwa supporting the message, emphasizing its role in clarifying authentic Islam and rejecting extremism.[8] Key signatories included Grand Muftis and heads of major institutions, demonstrating institutional backing from established Sunni and Shia leadership. Prominent endorsers from Sunni authorities included:- Prof. Dr. Ali Jumu’a, Grand Mufti of Egypt (2003-2013), who participated in the 2005 conference.[8]
- Sheikh Dr. Ahmad Badr Hassoun, Grand Mufti of Syria since 2005.[6]
- Sheikh Said Al-Hijjawi, Grand Mufti of Jordan.[6]
- Prof. Dr. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, President of the International Union of Muslim Scholars and Director of the Sunna and Sira Council, Qatar.[8]
- Prof. Dr. Ali Bardakoglu, Head of Turkey's Directorate of Religious Affairs (2003-2010).[6]
| Authority | Position | Country/School |
|---|---|---|
| Ali Jumu’a | Grand Mufti | Egypt/Sunni |
| Ahmad Badr Hassoun | Grand Mufti | Syria/Sunni |
| Yusuf Al-Qaradawi | President, International Union of Muslim Scholars | Qatar/Sunni |
| Abdullah bin Bayyah | Vice President, International Union of Muslim Scholars | Mauritania/Sunni |
| Ali al-Sistani | Grand Ayatollah | Iraq/Shia |
| Ahmad Al-Khalili | Grand Mufti | Oman/Ibadi |