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Catch points

Catch points are specialized railway safety devices consisting of a pair of sprung trailing points, for example in the UK installed on steep gradients exceeding 1 in 260, designed to derail runaway trains or vehicles traveling without authorization to prevent collisions with other trains or infrastructure.^[1] These points function by guiding derailed vehicles into a safe area, such as a sand drag, gravel mound, or off the main track, thereby isolating potential hazards and protecting mainline operations.^[2] Terminology and specific requirements vary by region; for instance, similar devices are known as derails in the United States. Often used interchangeably with trap points, catch points specifically address downhill runaways on inclines, whereas trap points are positioned at siding or loop exits to block unauthorized movements onto main lines.^[3] Historically, catch points were essential on railways before the widespread adoption of automatic brakes, as they provided a mechanical means to stop unbraked vehicles that might detach and roll backward.^[3] In modern applications, they remain in use at high-risk locations like steep sections near depots or platforms, sometimes integrated with intermediate train stops and speed controls to mitigate overrun risks beyond buffer stops or short overlaps.^[4] Design standards for catch points emphasize reliable derailment at line speeds, with overlaps calculated using engineering curves to ensure effective stopping distances, and they are often unworked or train-operated rather than signal-controlled.^[4] Although less common today due to advanced braking systems and signaling, catch points continue to serve as a critical passive safety measure in global rail networks, particularly in regions with challenging topography.^[3]

Introduction

Definition and Purpose

Catch points and trap points are specialized railway safety devices designed to derail or divert unauthorized or runaway rail vehicles from potentially hazardous routes onto safer paths, such as embankments, sand drags, or safety sidings.^[3] These mechanisms consist of switch blades that force derailing when vehicles encounter them in the reverse or unintended direction, thereby preventing them from continuing on the main line. The primary purpose of catch points is to halt runaway vehicles descending steep gradients, where the risk of uncontrolled backward movement is high, thus avoiding collisions with following trains on the same line.^[3] In contrast, trap points serve to protect mainline routes by derailing vehicles emerging from sidings, loops, or branch lines without authorization, ensuring they do not foul the primary track and endanger through traffic.^[2] This distinction arises from their placement: catch points are typically installed on down gradients to address split-train risks, while trap points are positioned at junctions to isolate secondary tracks. In operation, both devices rely on a fixed or sprung configuration of the switch blades, which vehicles passing in the correct direction can traverse without issue, but which actively guide errant movements toward derailment.^[3] Developed in response to 19th-century railway disasters involving runaways, these points remain essential for enhancing overall track safety in modern networks.^[3]

Historical Development

Catch points emerged in the mid-19th century as a critical safety measure in British railway engineering, during an era when most wagons and carriages lacked effective brakes, making runaway vehicles a common hazard on inclines. These devices, consisting of partial switches designed to derail errant rolling stock before it could rejoin the main line, were initially manual and positioned at the foot of gradients to prevent collisions from split trains or uncontrolled movements. The 1868 Abergele rail disaster, where unbraked oil wagons rolled from a siding and collided with an express train, killing 33 people, underscored the dangers and highlighted the absence of such protective points at the site, contributing to calls for their mandatory installation across the network.^[5] By the late 19th century, catch points had evolved from simple manual designs to spring-loaded mechanisms, where the switch blades were held in the derailing position by springs, allowing authorized downhill movements to pass while automatically resetting to derail unauthorized runaways. This innovation improved reliability and reduced the need for manual intervention, aligning with broader advancements in track engineering. Their use peaked during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, particularly on double-track lines and in sidings, as railways expanded rapidly and safety concerns intensified. Regulatory milestones, such as the Board of Trade's 1885 requirements mandating trap points (a variant of catch points) at siding exits connecting to running lines—unless protected by signals—formalized their placement, influencing practices on British-influenced railways in colonies and dominions like India, Australia, and Canada.^[3]^[6] The widespread adoption of continuous braking systems, beginning with the Westinghouse air brake in 1869 and becoming standard by the early 20th century, marked the gradual decline of catch points from the mid-20th century onward. These automatic brakes, which applied pressure across the entire train upon failure or command, significantly reduced the risk of runaways, rendering many catch points obsolete except in specific high-risk locations like isolated sidings. While still present in heritage railways and certain freight yards, their role diminished as modern interlocking, signaling, and braking technologies provided more comprehensive protection.^[3]^[5]

Design and Components

Catch Points

Catch points are railway safety devices designed to derail descending runaway vehicles on steep gradients, thereby halting them before they can endanger main line traffic. Unlike other derailing mechanisms, they are oriented facing up the gradient to intercept vehicles rolling downhill without authorization. This configuration ensures that authorized uphill trains can pass through without interference, while any uncontrolled descent triggers derailment.^[1]^[7] The core design typically employs a single switch blade or a full turnout mechanism to force wheels off the running rails, guiding vehicles into a safety area. These points are commonly spring-loaded, allowing the switch to remain in the derailing position by default and automatically reset after an authorized train passes over them in the trailing direction. A manual lever operates against the spring for intentional movements, ensuring the points can be temporarily held open when needed. This spring-loaded feature enhances reliability on gradients exceeding 1 in 260, where runaway risks are highest.^[1]^[7]^[8] Key components include precisely aligned switch rails that move to create the derailing path, guard rails to prevent wheels from regaining the main line, and connections to downstream stopping mechanisms such as sand drags for energy absorption. These differ from trap points, which are positioned to protect main lines from vehicles erroneously exiting sidings, rather than catching downhill runaways.^[7]^[9]

Trap Points

Trap points, also known as trapping points, are specialized facing points installed at the exits of sidings, loops, or branch lines to prevent unauthorized or runaway vehicles from fouling the main running lines. They function by derailing or diverting such vehicles away from the primary route, ensuring the safety of through traffic. As part of the broader family of catch points, trap points are particularly designed for locations where movements originate from secondary tracks onto the main line.^[3] In British railway practice, trap points are required at siding exits where necessary under safety regulations to minimize risks from runaway vehicles, with designs incorporating interlocking mechanisms that synchronize their operation with adjacent main line points to avoid conflicts. These points typically consist of switch rails (or tongues) that can be locked in position, often with electrical insulation to prevent interference with track circuits, ensuring that vehicles cannot proceed onto the main line unless the points are correctly set. The interlocking prevents the main line from being fouled by ensuring trap points remain in the derailing position until a safe movement is authorized.^[9]^[3] Various types of trap points exist, each tailored to specific structural and operational needs for safeguarding main lines. Single tongue trap points feature a single movable switch rail that leads away from the main line into a short section of track or directly to derailment, providing basic protection by derailing the leading wheelset of an unauthorized vehicle; this design is simple and commonly used where space is limited and full derailment is acceptable. Double tongue trap points employ two switch rails forming a partial turnout, which can include a crossing to guide both wheels of the leading axle off the rails more effectively, allowing the vehicle to be stopped while remaining partially on the track; they are preferred in locations where trains may approach as part of a running movement, such as in goods loops. Trap points with a crossing integrate a common crossing element, often in configurations like slip switches, to handle diverging routes across multiple tracks while ensuring derailment occurs before the conflict point. Trap roads with stops extend the derailing section into a short dedicated track leading to buffer stops, sand drags, or gravel mounds for controlled halting without full derailment, applied in areas requiring gentler stopping for heavier consists. Wide-to-gauge trap points widen the track gauge beyond standard dimensions, causing wheel flanges to drop off the rails and derailing the vehicle vertically; this type is used where lateral space is constrained, though it is less favored due to potential infrastructure damage.^[3] Historically, trap points have been standardized in British railways since the era of unbraked vehicles in the 19th century, primarily for protecting main lines from branch lines and sidings to prevent collisions amid expanding networks. Their design evolved with early 20th-century incidents, such as the 1946 Coton Hill derailment, which underscored the need for robust protection at siding exits and influenced subsequent standardization for branch line safety.^[3]

Installation and Operation

Locations and Placement

Catch points are primarily installed on steep gradients within railway networks to prevent uncontrolled downhill runaways of vehicles, particularly in locations where gradients exceed 1 in 260. These devices, often configured as sprung trailing points, are strategically placed to derail any unauthorized backward movement while permitting normal forward traffic to pass without obstruction. In contrast, trap points are deployed at the exits of sidings, passing loops, or branch lines to safeguard main line access by diverting potential overrunning vehicles away from running lines, typically leading into a safety area such as a sand drag or buffer stop.^[1]^[2]^[3] Placement criteria for both types emphasize ensuring clearance for authorized train movements, with considerations for track geometry, operational speeds, and the mass and type of vehicles involved. For instance, catch points must be positioned to account for unidirectional traffic flows on inclines, allowing self-restoration after passage of scheduled trains, while trap points are oriented to protect converging routes without interfering with legitimate departures. In the UK, Network Rail standards require such installations to integrate with overall track alignment, ensuring that derailed vehicles are contained without fouling adjacent lines. International practices, such as those in Australia under ARTC guidelines, similarly prioritize geometric compatibility to minimize derailment risks.^[3]^[1] Under the Railway Safety (Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 1997, infrastructure controllers are required to use derailing devices, such as trap points, to prevent collisions from runaway vehicles where reasonably practicable. This requirement extends to ensuring appropriate spacing, such as positioning catch points where the distance to protective signals is less than the length of the longest train that could be stopped there, necessitating interlocking mechanisms like Browne's locks for enhanced safety. These provisions underscore a commitment to risk-based placement, with infrastructure controllers responsible for maintaining suitable equipment.^[9]^[10]

Safety Features

Catch points incorporate several auxiliary safety systems to enhance their reliability and ensure timely detection of potential overruns, thereby protecting main line traffic from unauthorized or runaway movements. These features work in conjunction with the points' inherent derailing mechanism to maintain operational integrity in high-risk locations such as steep gradients. While most catch points are unworked and passive, auxiliary systems like interlocking may apply where they are integrated with operated trap points or signaling for enhanced protection. Interlocking systems provide mechanical or electrical linkages between points and signaling infrastructure, verifying that the points are correctly positioned before permitting train movements. In UK railway practices, interlocking ensures flank protection by preventing conflicting routes, particularly for trap points integrated with catch points, where the points must be synchronized with adjacent main line switches to avoid collisions. For instance, electrical interlocking circuits confirm point detection before releasing signals, adhering to fail-safe principles that default to a safe state during failures. This integration is essential for operated points, though many catch points remain unworked and rely on passive alignment.^[3]^[11] Track circuit interrupters are specialized devices fitted at catch points to monitor and respond to overruns by interrupting the electrical continuity of adjacent track circuits. When a vehicle derails into the run-off area, the interrupter activates, maintaining an "occupied" signal status that holds protecting signals at danger and alerts signallers to the incident. In UK systems, these interrupters are insulated to prevent interference from electrification and are typically mounted on the stock rail, wired in series for redundancy; they are mandatory at locations like catch points on track-circuited lines to comply with safety integrity levels. This feature ensures that even after derailment, the signaling system remains protective against following trains.^[11]^[7] Maintenance protocols emphasize rigorous inspections to preserve the functionality of catch points, focusing on components prone to degradation such as springs, alignments, and rail wear. In the UK, standards require competent personnel to conduct visual and functional examinations of unworked points like catch points at defined intervals, typically including checks for spring tension, switch blade clearance, and overall geometry to detect early signs of misalignment or fatigue. Defects are classified by severity—immediate action for critical issues affecting safety—and documented in reports submitted within specified timelines, with twice-yearly detailed inspections for high-usage tracks. These protocols, aligned with Network Rail and RSSB guidelines, ensure long-term reliability without compromising the points' passive operation.^[12]^[13]^[7]

Stopping Mechanisms

Sand Drags

Sand drags serve as a friction-based stopping mechanism following derailment by catch points, where a section of track is embedded in a deep bed of loose sand or gravel to decelerate runaway or derailed vehicles gradually. The wheels and flanges of the rolling stock plow into the sand, generating high frictional resistance that dissipates the vehicle's kinetic energy over a controlled distance, preventing abrupt collisions or further uncontrolled movement. The length and depth of the sand bed are specifically designed based on factors such as the expected speed of the derailed vehicles, the weight and type of rail traffic, and the gradient of the approach, ensuring effective stopping without excessive damage to the infrastructure or stock.^[14]^[7] In construction, sand drags typically consist of rails laid within a contained pit or trench filled with sand to a depth that covers the top of the rail heads, often retained by wooden or concrete boarding to maintain the profile and prevent erosion. This setup allows the track to guide the vehicles into the drag before the friction takes effect, and maintenance involves periodic replenishment of the sand and inspection of the containment structure to ensure consistent performance. Historically, sand drags have been employed since at least the early 20th century, initially on falling gradients to intercept backward-running wagons or uncontrolled trains, evolving into standard features at siding exits and incline protections.^[15]^[7] The primary advantages of sand drags include their ability to provide a softer, more gradual halt compared to rigid buffer stops, thereby minimizing impact forces and potential structural damage to both the vehicles and the railway infrastructure. They are versatile for use in both catch point and trap point configurations, offering a passive, low-maintenance safety solution in space-constrained areas like depots or urban rail systems. For instance, in the Montreal Metro's Beaugrand garage test track, a sandpile drag is integrated with rubber-tyred track sections to safely stop test vehicles, demonstrating adaptation to specialized rapid transit environments.^[16]

Safety Sidings

Safety sidings consist of extended track arrangements, often parallel or diverging from the main line, that guide runaway or derailed railway vehicles into a contained area leading to a dead end or buffer stop, allowing for safe deceleration and containment without impacting the primary route.^[17] These structures are engineered for higher-speed incidents where vehicles may exceed the capacity of basic stopping mechanisms, incorporating calculated lengths based on factors such as train speed, gradient, and braking efficiency to ensure complete halting within the siding boundaries.^[18] Design standards typically require a minimum length, such as 50 meters, adjustable according to site-specific simulations that account for emergency braking distances up to several hundred meters at speeds around 90 km/h.^[18] In applications, safety sidings are commonly integrated into passing loops and freight yards to manage potential runaways from adjacent sidings or storage areas, providing a buffer zone that isolates errant vehicles from main line traffic and reduces collision risks.^[2] They overlap with catch points to form a layered defense, where the points initially derail or divert vehicles into the siding for controlled stopping.^[2] Such installations are prevalent in regions with varied topography, ensuring operational continuity by minimizing disruptions from uncontrolled movements. Variations in safety sidings include the incorporation of buffer stops at dead ends to absorb impact energy, with types such as friction sliding buffers suitable for speeds up to 25 km/h or heavy stopping structures for similar limits, often combined with diverging track alignments to steer vehicles away from hazards.^[17] In the United Kingdom, they serve as essential components alongside trap points for main line protection, while in Australia, standards emphasize risk-assessed designs with arrestor elements for comprehensive runaway containment in industrial settings.^[2]^[17]

Effectiveness and Limitations

Performance Evaluation

Catch points are rarely tested through intentional activation with live rolling stock, as such tests would cause significant damage to both the vehicles and infrastructure; instead, performance evaluations primarily rely on computer simulations and detailed post-incident analyses to assess their reliability in derailing runaway trains.^[19] These methods allow for modeling of various scenarios without real-world disruption, focusing on factors like train mass, gradient, and point geometry to predict derailment outcomes.^[20] Key performance metrics for catch points include derailment success rates and the potential for residual infrastructure damage following activation. In practice, these devices achieve high success in diverting trains from main lines, but their ability to fully contain vehicles depends on the stopping distance after derailment. For instance, in the 2016 Paddington incident, trap points (a variant of catch points) successfully derailed a two-car diesel multiple unit traveling at 25 mph (40 km/h), preventing it from entering active running lines, yet the train's momentum carried it 46 meters beyond the points, where it struck and damaged an overhead line equipment mast at 8 mph (13 km/h).^[19] This case illustrates a typical limitation, where derailment occurs effectively but does not always halt the train immediately, potentially leading to secondary impacts on adjacent assets. Quantitative data is limited due to the infrequency of events. Several factors influence catch point performance, including environmental conditions, vehicle speed, and maintenance quality. Adverse weather, such as snow or ice, can reduce rail-wheel adhesion, impairing the points' ability to guide wheels off the rail and increasing the risk of partial or failed derailment. Higher vehicle speeds amplify momentum post-derailment, extending overrun distances and damage potential, as evidenced by the Paddington event where the 25 mph approach exceeded the designed containment zone.^[19] Inadequate maintenance, such as worn components or improper alignment, further compromises effectiveness. Railway standards require regular inspections and adjustments for all points, including catch points, to ensure operational integrity under varying loads and conditions.

Modern Alternatives

In North America, particularly in the United States and Canada, derailers serve as a primary alternative to traditional catch points, functioning as portable or fixed barriers to intentionally derail unauthorized or runaway rolling stock and prevent fouling of mainline tracks. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) regulates fixed derailers under 49 CFR Part 218, Subpart F, requiring them, when used for protection, to be placed at least 150 feet from the end of protected equipment to ensure safety during shunting operations, while portable derailers must be clearly visible and properly placed to avoid accidents.^[21]^[22] These devices, often simpler in design than sprung catch points, are bolted directly to the rail and raised or lowered manually or mechanically, providing a cost-effective means of protection without the need for complex point mechanisms. Advanced braking systems and electronic monitoring technologies have further diminished the reliance on physical catch points globally by minimizing runaway risks through proactive intervention. Modern freight and passenger trains equipped with electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes enable faster, more uniform brake applications across an entire consist, reducing stopping distances by up to 40% compared to traditional air brake systems and effectively eliminating the need for derailment devices on most gradients. Integrated systems like Positive Train Control (PTC) in the US enforce automatic braking if a train exceeds speed limits or approaches a stop signal, providing an electronic safeguard that supersedes mechanical alternatives in fitted stock operations.^[3]^[23] Catch points remain prevalent in regions with challenging topography and legacy infrastructure, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and India, where they are installed on steep inclines exceeding 1:260 to protect against runaways in non-electrified or unfitted sections. In the UK, Network Rail mandates their use at the foot of descending gradients for lines with non-braked wagons, ensuring compliance with Railway Group Standards. Australian networks, including those managed by Transport for NSW, employ catch points at buffer stops and siding entrances to control approach speeds, as outlined in state rail safety protocols. Similarly, Indian Railways integrates catch sidings into signaling layouts on ghat sections, with interlocking requirements specified in the General Rules for signaling to prevent unauthorized movements. However, North American railways largely forgo catch points in favor of derailers and PTC, reflecting a preference for non-destructive electronic safeguards that enhance operational efficiency without physical derailing.^[1]^[4] Post-2021 developments in AI-enhanced detection have accelerated the shift toward integrated safety systems, with machine learning algorithms enabling real-time monitoring of track conditions and train dynamics to preempt runaway scenarios. For instance, AI-powered imaging portals, such as those deployed by Norfolk Southern in collaboration with Georgia Tech, scan passing trains at track speed to detect anomalies like wheel defects that could lead to brake failures, identifying critical issues before they escalate. These systems complement traditional methods by providing predictive alerts, reducing false positives in detection compared to manual inspections. Catch points retain niche relevance in heritage railways and areas handling unfitted stock, where modern electronics may not be feasible, but regulatory frameworks are increasingly favoring unified systems like the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS). ERTMS Level 2, with its continuous speed supervision via radio-based communication, enforces braking to prevent overspeed on inclines, allowing for the phased removal of physical points in upgraded corridors across Europe and adopting regions. In the UK and Australia, ongoing ERTMS rollouts prioritize such integrated signaling to boost capacity while maintaining safety for legacy operations.^[24]^[25]

Notable Incidents

Historical Events

The Abergele rail disaster of August 20, 1868, marked a turning point in the development of catch points as a safety measure on UK railways. A passenger train collided with several runaway wagons loaded with flammable paraffin oil that had been inadequately secured on a steep gradient near Abergele, North Wales; the wagons ignited upon impact, engulfing the leading coaches in fire and killing 33 people while injuring dozens more. The incident exposed the vulnerabilities of shunting operations and loose-coupled wagons without effective brakes on inclines, prompting the widespread introduction of catch points on gradients exceeding 1 in 100 to deliberately derail any descending runaways before they could reach main lines or stations.^[26] In the early 20th century, numerous accidents involving unfitted freight trains—those without continuous vacuum or air brakes—highlighted ongoing risks of runaways on undulating terrain, driving refinements to catch point technology. The Quintinshill rail disaster on May 22, 1915, involved a signaling error leading to a troop train colliding with a stationary local passenger train near Gretna, Scotland, resulting in a multi-train collision that killed 226 people, many of them troops en route to war.^[27] Before the full implementation of continuous braking across freight services in the mid-20th century, catch points significantly curbed gradient-related collisions by providing a reliable, low-maintenance means to isolate potential runaways, thereby preventing many from escalating into major wrecks during an era when manual braking dominated.

Recent Cases

On 4 January 2010, freight train 4N47, traveling from Inverness to Perth on the Highland Main Line, derailed at Carrbridge station after overrunning signal AC336 at danger and passing through trap points (points 116) set to direct it onto a short run-out section. The incident occurred during snowy conditions, where ice and snow ingress reduced the effectiveness of the train's brake blocks and rigging, leading to insufficient deceleration on the steep gradient approaching the station. The front portion of the train, including the locomotive and six wagons, derailed onto an embankment, coming to rest after impacting trees; the driver and technician sustained minor injuries. The Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) report identified key causal factors, including the driver's application of modified braking rules for winter conditions without adequate assessment of snow-related risks, and recommended enhancements to operational rules, risk assessments for trap points, and brake testing procedures to prevent similar overruns.^[28] In March 2022, a freight locomotive derailed at catch points on the edge of Eastleigh depot, Southampton, after becoming a runaway. The catch points functioned as designed, derailing the locomotive and preventing it from entering main lines, though it caused delays to passenger and freight services. No injuries were reported.^[29] In a separate event on 16 June 2016, a two-car diesel multiple unit operated by Great Western Railway derailed immediately outside London Paddington station after the driver passed signal SN6006, mistakenly believing it cleared entry to platform 1, and traversed open trap points at approximately 25 mph. The trap points successfully diverted the train from the main lines but could not prevent it from striking an overhead line equipment mast 46 meters away, as the distance was insufficient for full stoppage at that speed despite late braking efforts. No passengers were aboard, and there were no injuries, but the impact caused significant damage to the mast and associated infrastructure, blocking lines 1 and 2 and leading to the complete closure of all Paddington approaches until 19 June, with widespread service disruptions across the network. RAIB's safety digest emphasized underlying issues such as gaps in the driver's route knowledge, unclear signaller communications, and the need for better risk assessments of trap point placements near critical infrastructure to mitigate partial derailment consequences.^[19] On 9 March 2020, a single loaded cement wagon (VTG10601) ran away uncontrolled from a siding within the Hanson UK cement works near Clitheroe, Lancashire, after an ineffective handbrake application failed to secure it on a falling gradient. The wagon traveled approximately 0.75 miles (1.2 km), crossing two public level crossings—where two cars were forced to brake abruptly—and reached Horrocksford Junction, where it derailed on trap points designed to prevent unauthorized access to the main line. It stopped clear of the running lines with no injuries reported, though the wagon sustained minor damage and the track suffered severe distortion requiring repairs. The RAIB investigation, published in December 2020, highlighted maintenance gaps, including a missed periodic examination of the wagon's handbrake that could have detected its deficiencies, and inadequate risk assessments for stabling procedures at industrial sites; subsequent analysis in 2021 by the Office of Rail and Road noted ongoing concerns about implementation of recommendations for improved wagon securing protocols and oversight by site operators.^[30]^[31]

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