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Communalism

Communalism is a political ideology asserting that individuals' primary social, economic, and political interests derive from membership in a religious, ethnic, or cultural community, rendering such communal ties the dominant basis for loyalty and organization over national, class, or individual affiliations.^[1] This view treats communities as cohesive units with inherent shared stakes, often politicizing identity to mobilize support, allocate resources, or contest power.^[2] Emerging notably in colonial settings like British India, where policies codified religious differences into separate electorates and legal systems, communalism fostered divisions that escalated into partition and recurrent violence, such as riots over sacred sites and demands for autonomy.^[1] In pluralistic societies, including post-colonial states like India and Nigeria, communalism manifests as the assertiveness of groups defined by shared cultural identities, demographic structures, and socioeconomic hierarchies, positioning them as rivals or "candidates for nationhood" in electoral and institutional arenas.^[2] It challenges secular nation-building by prioritizing group-specific claims, such as uniform civil codes or resource shares, often resulting in conflicts that empirical studies link to intensified mobilization rather than dissolution under modernization.^[2] Scholarly analyses, frequently shaped by institutional biases favoring universalist frameworks, tend to frame communalism as retrograde or divisive, yet causal patterns indicate it persists as a rational response to perceived threats in diverse polities, influencing parties and policies from the Hindu Mahasabha to contemporary ethnic federations.^[1] Distinct from collectivist economics or medieval urban alliances, modern communalism's defining controversies revolve around its role in eroding shared civic spaces, as seen in rising incidents of identity-based clashes documented in administrative records from the colonial era through independence.^[1] Proponents may defend it as safeguarding minority or majority equities against assimilation, while critics highlight its zero-sum dynamics, though evidence from plural societies underscores its adaptability amid globalization rather than inevitable decline.^[2]

Definitions and Meanings

Etymology and Core Concepts

The term "communalism" derives from the English adjective "communal," which traces back to the Latin communis meaning "shared" or "common," entering English via Old French comunal in the 14th century to denote pertaining to a commune or community.^[3] By the 1870s, "communalism" emerged in English, modeled on French communalisme (first attested 1871), initially referring to a theory of government by autonomous communes or federations of local communities, distinct from centralized communism or individualism.^[4]^[5] This early usage emphasized decentralized self-governance rooted in communal ownership and mutual aid, as articulated in 19th-century European political thought amid reactions to state absolutism and industrial alienation.^[4] In broader political and social discourse, the term evolved by the late 19th and early 20th centuries to describe an ideology prioritizing the interests, identity, and solidarity of a particular religious, ethnic, or cultural community over those of a larger nation-state or universal humanity.^[6] At its core, communalism posits that members of such a community share not only cultural or spiritual bonds but also converging secular interests—political, economic, and social—that demand collective defense against perceived threats from out-groups, often framing inter-community relations as inherently competitive or zero-sum.^[7] This manifests as heightened in-group loyalty, where individual or national affiliations are subordinated to communal ones, driven by evolutionary and sociological tendencies toward tribalism for resource protection and social cohesion, as observed in human group formation patterns across history.^[6] Communalism differs from sectarianism, which is narrower and typically confined to intra-religious divisions, and from nationalism, which elevates a civic or ethnic nation as the primary unit rather than sub-national communities.^[7] It contrasts sharply with individualism, which privileges personal autonomy over group obligations, and cosmopolitanism, which advocates transcending parochial identities for global or humanistic unity.^[8] While proponents may view it as a bulwark against homogenization or external domination, critics argue it fosters exclusionary politics and conflict by essentializing group differences, a dynamic evident in empirical studies of identity-based mobilization where communal appeals correlate with reduced cross-group cooperation.^[6]^[9]

Political Communalism in South Asia

Political communalism in South Asia constitutes an ideology that conceptualizes religious communities—chiefly Hindus and Muslims—as indivisible, homogeneous blocs inherently predisposed to mutual antagonism, wherein the political, economic, and cultural interests of one group are perceived as existentially threatened by the other. This framework elevates confessional identity above all other social divisions, positing that loyalty to one's religious collective demands vigilant defense against perceived encroachments, often culminating in claims for segregated electorates, autonomous territories, or preferential legal accommodations. In India and Pakistan, it underpins a zero-sum competition for state resources and influence, where communal leaders exploit these fissures to consolidate power by framing interfaith interactions as irreconcilable clashes rather than shared civic endeavors.^[10]^[11]^[12] Its empirical foundations transcend colonial-era manipulations, deriving instead from profound theological disparities, such as Islam's scriptural mandates for dominance over non-Muslims (including concepts of dar al-Islam versus dar al-harb) clashing with Hinduism's accommodative pluralism rooted in dharma's emphasis on contextual coexistence, alongside demographic pressures like the Muslim population's historically higher growth rates—reaching approximately 14.2% of India's total by the 2011 census, amid projections of further shifts—that amplify majority-minority insecurities. These elements engender a realist assessment of incompatible worldviews: Muslim communalism often invokes fears of Hindu numerical supremacy eroding Islamic distinctiveness, while Hindu variants highlight risks of demographic swamping and cultural erasure, as articulated in pre-partition analyses positing an "inherent antagonism" between the faiths that sustained separation despite shared geography. Academic narratives minimizing these roots in favor of elite instrumentalism overlook pre-colonial precedents of conquest-driven tensions, though such interpretations prevail in institutionally biased scholarship.^[13]^[14]^[15] Unlike apolitical religious devotion, political communalism weaponizes faith for hegemony, evident in Muslim demands for sharia-derived personal laws insulating community autonomy from uniform civil codes, or Hindu assertions of historical precedence to reclaim sites overlaid by mosques, thereby subordinating national cohesion to sectarian entitlements and perpetuating cycles of exclusionary mobilization. This politicization thrives on portraying rivals as existential foes, fostering voter bases through narratives of victimhood and retribution rather than rational policy discourse.^[16]^[17]

Philosophical and Economic Variants

Philosophical communalism posits a worldview centered on the primacy of community bonds over individualistic liberalism, advocating for social structures where individual rights derive from collective responsibilities rather than abstract universal principles. This variant draws from thinkers who critique atomistic individualism, arguing that human flourishing emerges from embedded communal relations that foster mutual aid and shared ethical norms. Unlike liberal philosophies emphasizing personal autonomy, philosophical communalism views the self as inherently relational, shaped by communal practices and traditions that prioritize group cohesion for moral and social stability.^[18] Economic communalism proposes a socio-economic framework that rejects market mechanisms and private property in favor of direct community stewardship over resources, land, and production enterprises. In this system, money and competitive exchange are abolished, with allocation determined through localized assemblies ensuring equitable distribution based on need and contribution. Akin to guild socialism but confined to small-scale, autonomous units, it envisions federated communities managing economic life without hierarchical state or corporate intermediaries, aiming to eliminate exploitation while promoting ecological sustainability and participatory decision-making.^[19]^[20] This economic model intersects with anarchist traditions, particularly through frameworks like Murray Bookchin's communalism, which advocates confederated municipal assemblies as alternatives to centralized hierarchies, emphasizing bottom-up democracy and resource commons to counter both capitalism's commodification and statism's coercion. Proponents argue such decentralization aligns incentives with local ecological limits, fostering innovation through collective deliberation rather than profit-driven rivalry. However, critiques highlight its neglect of individual incentives for risk-taking and technological advancement, as communal decision-making often diffuses responsibility and under-rewards specialized expertise, leading to stagnation observed in historical intentional communities. Scalability poses further challenges, with coordination across diverse localities prone to free-rider problems and inefficient resource pooling in complex societies exceeding Dunbar's number of viable social bonds, approximately 150 individuals. Empirical analyses of cooperative communes reveal high dissolution rates due to these incentive misalignments, underscoring causal tensions between equality mandates and dynamic economic adaptation.^[21]^[22]

Historical Origins

Pre-Colonial and Early Influences

In pre-Islamic India, Hindu society was structured around the varna system and thousands of jatis—endogamous occupational and kinship-based communities—that emphasized group solidarity, ritual purity, and mutual obligations, functioning as decentralized social units with proto-communal characteristics. These structures, rooted in ancient texts like the Manusmriti (circa 200 BCE–200 CE), promoted internal cohesion within castes while allowing regional autonomy among kingdoms, contrasting with the more centralized imperial models that later invaders imposed. This fragmentation, while enabling resilience against external threats, also entrenched identity-based loyalties that could manifest as communal friction when challenged by monotheistic ideologies seeking uniformity.^[23] The advent of Islamic rule began with the Umayyad conquest of Sindh in 711 CE under Muhammad bin Qasim, but intensified through Turkic invasions from the 10th century, driven by the expansionist doctrine of jihad and the ummah's imperative to extend dar al-Islam over infidel lands. Mahmud of Ghazni's seventeenth raid in 1026 CE targeted the Somnath temple in Gujarat, where his forces destroyed the shrine, shattered its lingam idol, and reportedly massacred 50,000 defenders, symbolizing not mere plunder but religious iconoclasm to assert Islamic supremacy. Such acts, chronicled in Persian sources like Utbi's Tarikh-i-Yamini, engendered deep-seated Hindu grievances over desecration of sacred sites, with over 80 major temples razed across northern India by 13th-century Ghurid and Delhi Sultanate forces, per archaeological and inscriptional evidence.^[24] Policies under the Delhi Sultanate (1206–1526 CE) and early Mughals further exacerbated divides through the jizya tax, a capitation levy on non-Muslims symbolizing dhimmi subordination and exemption from military service, collected coercively from Hindus while Muslims were often spared. Rulers like Firuz Shah Tughlaq (r. 1351–1388 CE) enforced it harshly, combining it with temple destructions and sporadic forced conversions, as recorded in his memoirs Futuhat-i-Firuz Shahi, where he boasted of converting 1,800 Ashrafi captives. Mughal emperor Aurangzeb reinstated jizya in 1679 CE, applying it variably by wealth but broadly to Hindus, sparking revolts in regions like Gujarat and Maharashtra; fatwas from his era fixed rates at 12–48 dirhams annually for able-bodied non-Muslims, underscoring discriminatory fiscal burdens that fueled perceptions of existential threat.^[25] Historians like Muhammad Ferishta (d. 1623 CE) in his Tarikh-i-Ferishta documented conquest-era demographic shifts, attributing them to massacres, enslavement, and migrations that reduced Hindu populations in conquered territories like Punjab and Sindh, with estimates of tens of millions affected over centuries—though likely inflated, these align with patterns of settlement by Turkic-Afghan elites and Sufi missionaries. This interplay of Islamic expansionism against Hindu societal pluralism sowed seeds of communal antagonism, as jizya and iconoclasm reinforced Hindu narratives of alien oppression, while ummah solidarity among Muslims prioritized religious over ethnic ties, predating colonial manipulations.

Colonial Era Developments (1857–1947)

Following the Indian Revolt of 1857, British authorities imposed direct Crown rule via the Government of India Act 1858, which ended East India Company control and led to reprisals disproportionately targeting Muslim communities perceived as revolt instigators, including property confiscations and administrative exclusions that heightened mutual suspicions between Hindus and Muslims.^[26] These measures, coupled with the decennial census from 1871 onward that rigidly categorized populations by religion, transformed fluid social identities into politicized communal ones, amplifying pre-existing tensions rooted in historical conquests and differing legal traditions.^[27] The Indian Councils Act of 1909, known as the Morley-Minto Reforms, introduced separate electorates for Muslims, reserving seats in legislative councils for candidates elected solely by Muslim voters, a provision advocated by the Muslim League to safeguard minority interests but which entrenched religious divisions in representative politics.^[28] This system, applying to about 62,000 Muslim voters out of India's 300 million population, excluded cross-communal voting and incentivized parties to appeal to sectarian loyalties, marking the first formal institutionalization of communal representation under British policy.^[29] Critics, including nationalist leaders, argued it fragmented unified Indian opposition to colonial rule by pitting communities against each other.^[30] A brief period of Hindu-Muslim cooperation emerged during the Khilafat Movement (1919–1924), when Muslim leaders allied with the Indian National Congress against British dismantling of the Ottoman Caliphate post-World War I, culminating in joint non-cooperation campaigns that mobilized over 30,000 arrests by 1921.^[31] However, the alliance fractured after the movement's collapse in 1922–1923 amid violent communal clashes, such as the Malabar Rebellion where Mappila Muslims killed over 2,000 Hindus and the Kohat riots displacing thousands, exposing irreconcilable demands over issues like cow protection and mosque constructions on disputed sites.^[32] Escalating separatist sentiments within Muslim politics led to the Lahore Resolution of March 23, 1940, adopted by the All-India Muslim League under Muhammad Ali Jinnah, which demanded autonomous states for Muslim-majority regions in northwestern and eastern India, framing Hindu-majority rule as existential threat to Islamic identity and practices.^[33] This resolution, passed by delegates representing 25 million Muslims, shifted from minority safeguards to territorial partition, exploiting British wartime concessions like the 1940 August Offer that promised postwar constitutional advances but failed to bridge communal rifts.^[34] Tensions peaked with Direct Action Day on August 16, 1946, declared by Jinnah to press for Pakistan amid stalled cabinet mission talks, triggering the Calcutta Killings where rioters—initially Muslim League supporters—attacked Hindu neighborhoods, resulting in 5,000 to 10,000 deaths over four days, with estimates indicating the majority of fatalities among Hindus due to targeted mob violence involving arson, stabbings, and looting across 2,000 affected areas.^[35] ^[36] British authorities, deploying only 2,000 troops late, contained the riots by August 20 but at the cost of underscoring how colonial divide-and-rule tactics—such as favoring Muslim electorates—had magnified underlying religious antagonisms into demands for sovereign separation.^[37]

Manifestations in India

Muslim Communalism and Separatism

Muslim communalism in India emphasized the primacy of Islamic identity and solidarity over shared national citizenship, fostering demands for political separation from Hindu-majority regions. This ideology, articulated by leaders like Muhammad Ali Jinnah, posited that Muslims constituted a distinct nation incompatible with Hindu-majority rule, driven by differences in religion, culture, and law.^[38] The All-India Muslim League, founded in 1906, increasingly mobilized on this basis, rejecting composite nationalism in favor of safeguarding Muslim interests through separate electorates and territorial autonomy.^[39] The Two-Nation Theory formalized this separatist outlook during the Lahore session of the Muslim League on March 23, 1940, where Jinnah declared Hindus and Muslims as two separate nations with irreconcilable ideologies, traditions, and ways of life, necessitating autonomous Muslim homelands in Muslim-majority areas of northwest and eastern India.^[39] This resolution, often termed the Pakistan Resolution, rejected integration into a unified Indian state, arguing that numerical minority status under Hindu dominance would erode Muslim political and cultural sovereignty.^[40] Escalation occurred through the Muslim League's call for Direct Action Day on August 16, 1946, intended to press for Pakistan via mass protests but sparking widespread riots, including the Noakhali massacres in October 1946, where Muslim mobs targeted Hindu communities in Bengal's Noakhali district, resulting in thousands of deaths, forced conversions, and abductions amid organized communal fervor. These events, preceded by the Calcutta Killings, demonstrated the League's willingness to employ violence to assert territorial claims, with local Muslim leaders inciting attacks on Hindu properties and populations.^[41] The theory culminated in the 1947 Partition of British India into India and Pakistan on August 14-15, 1947, displacing 14 million people and causing an estimated 1-2 million deaths from intercommunal violence, disease, and starvation as populations migrated along religious lines.^[42] Post-Partition, separatist impulses persisted, with Pakistan claiming Muslim-majority princely states like Jammu and Kashmir, leading to tribal incursions in October 1947 to seize territory despite the Hindu ruler's accession to India.^[43] Underlying these demands was an Islamist worldview rooted in classical Islamic jurisprudence dividing the world into dar al-Islam (territories governed by Islamic law) and dar al-harb (lands of war under non-Islamic rule), where Muslim residence in the latter required either migration to Islamic domains or efforts to expand dar al-Islam through conquest or separation.^[44] In the Indian context, this theology framed Hindu-majority areas as inherently adversarial, justifying irredentist claims beyond initial partitions rather than accommodation as a protected minority, as evidenced by ongoing Pakistan-sponsored insurgencies in Kashmir seeking its integration into an expanded Islamic polity.^[45] Empirical patterns of violence and territorial assertion thus reflect not transient fears but doctrinal imperatives prioritizing pan-Islamic unity over pluralistic coexistence.^[38]

Hindu Communalism and Nationalism

Hindu communalism emerged in the early 20th century as a response to perceived threats to Hindu cultural and demographic integrity amid rising Muslim separatism and communal tensions during British rule. Vinayak Damodar Savarkar articulated the concept of Hindutva in his 1923 pamphlet Essentials of Hindutva, defining a Hindu as one who views India (Bharatvarsha) not only as the fatherland (pitribhumi) but also as the holy land (punyabhumi), emphasizing shared ancestry, culture, and historical continuity as the basis of national identity rather than mere territorial residence.^[46] ^[47] This framework positioned Hindus as the core of Indian civilization, countering narratives of religious pluralism that Savarkar saw as diluting Hindu claims to the land. In 1925, Keshav Baliram Hedgewar founded the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) in Nagpur as a volunteer organization aimed at fostering Hindu unity and discipline through daily shakhas (branches), motivated by observations of Hindu disorganization in the face of events like the 1921 Moplah Rebellion, where thousands of Hindus were killed or converted by force.^[48] The 1947 Partition intensified Hindu communal consolidation, with an estimated 14-18 million people displaced in mutual migrations, including approximately 4.7-5 million Hindus and Sikhs fleeing violence in Pakistan to India, alongside ongoing influxes from East Pakistan due to targeted attacks on minorities.^[49] ^[50] These migrations, coupled with reports of Hindu persecution in the new Islamic states—such as forced conversions and property seizures—fueled a defensive nationalism, expanding RSS membership and affiliates like the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (predecessor to the BJP) to advocate for protections against demographic shifts and cultural erosion. Organizations emphasized self-reliance (swadeshi) and military-like training to counter what adherents viewed as existential vulnerabilities, including lower Hindu fertility rates and proselytization pressures. Hindu nationalist groups have cited contributions to national efforts, such as RSS volunteers aiding relief for over 10 million refugees from East Pakistan during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, where Pakistani forces targeted Hindu minorities amid a broader genocide that killed up to 3 million, disproportionately affecting Hindus.^[51] Critics within Hindu circles have faulted pre-1990s leadership for perceived passivity toward historical grievances, like the destruction of thousands of temples during medieval invasions, prompting movements to reclaim sites such as Ayodhya's Ram Janmabhoomi. This culminated in the December 6, 1992, demolition of the Babri Masjid by thousands of kar sevaks (volunteers), built in 1528 on a site Hindus believe marks Lord Rama's birthplace, symbolizing a shift from acquiescence to assertive reclamation amid legal disputes and archaeological evidence of prior temple structures.^[52] Empirical analyses of Hindu-Muslim riots indicate that Hindu-initiated violence often follows precipitating incidents against Hindu processions, symbols, or pilgrims, rather than unprovoked aggression. For instance, the 2002 Gujarat riots, which resulted in over 1,000 deaths (mostly Muslim), were triggered by the Godhra train burning on February 27, 2002, where a Muslim mob set fire to Coach S-6 of the Sabarmati Express, killing 59 Hindu kar sevaks returning from Ayodhya, as concluded by the Nanavati-Mehta Commission based on forensic evidence of external arson and witness testimonies.^[53] ^[54] Datasets spanning 1950-1995, such as those tracking over 1,000 incidents, reveal patterns where riots escalate from disputes over religious processions or cattle slaughter, with Hindu responses frequently reactive to initial provocations, underscoring causal links tied to immediate threats rather than premeditated expansionism.^[55]

Major Events and Riots

The Calcutta Killings of August 16–19, 1946, marked one of the earliest large-scale outbreaks of communal violence preceding India's partition, initiated by the All-India Muslim League's call for Direct Action Day to demand Pakistan through strikes and protests.^[35] The riots began with attacks by Muslim mobs on Hindu neighborhoods in Calcutta, escalating into mutual reprisals that resulted in an estimated 4,000 to 10,000 deaths, with initial violence disproportionately targeting Hindus before Hindu counter-mobilization. This event, triggered by political mobilization for separatism rather than spontaneous grievance, set a pattern of migration-forced violence, leading to similar riots in Noakhali and Bihar.^[35] The Partition of India in 1947 triggered the deadliest communal massacres in modern South Asian history, with mutual killings across Punjab and Bengal claiming between 200,000 and 2 million lives amid forced migrations of 14–18 million people.^[56] In western Punjab (future Pakistan), Hindu and Sikh minorities faced systematic expulsions and massacres by Muslim majorities, resulting in higher proportional deaths among the 5–6 million fleeing Hindus and Sikhs compared to the 6–7 million Muslims migrating eastward; estimates indicate over 80% of non-Muslim deaths occurred in Pakistan territories due to organized attacks during evacuations.^[57] Violence was reciprocal but asymmetrical, with Muslim-initiated population transfers exacerbating Hindu-Sikh vulnerabilities in areas like Rawalpindi and Lahore, while retaliatory killings dominated East Punjab.^[56] Post-independence, the 1984 anti-Sikh riots following Indira Gandhi's assassination on October 31 exemplified state-enabled communal targeting, with Congress Party affiliates organizing pogroms in Delhi and other cities that killed at least 2,146 Sikhs in Delhi alone, per official counts, and up to 8,000 nationwide.^[58] Investigations, including by India's Central Bureau of Investigation, implicated senior Congress leaders in inciting and distributing voter lists to mobs for targeted attacks on Sikh properties and persons.^[59] The 1992–1993 riots after the Babri Masjid demolition on December 6, 1992, by Hindu kar sevaks resulted in approximately 2,000 deaths nationwide, predominantly Muslims, during widespread unrest in Mumbai and other areas.^[60] In Mumbai, initial Muslim protests escalated into arson and clashes, followed by Hindu retaliatory violence, with the Srikrishna Commission later documenting police bias favoring Hindus but confirming mutual initiation in some incidents.^[61] The 2002 Gujarat violence, sparked by the Godhra train burning on February 27 that killed 59 Hindu pilgrims in a fire attributed to a Muslim mob per the Nanavati-Mehta Commission, led to retaliatory riots claiming over 1,000 lives, mostly Muslims. Official data recorded 790 Muslim deaths versus 254 Hindus, with the initial attack on the train—where passengers were allegedly lured and set ablaze—serving as the catalyst, challenging narratives of unprovoked Hindu aggression.^[62] The 2020 Delhi riots from February 23–26, amid Muslim-led protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act, resulted in 53 deaths (36 Muslims, 15 Hindus, 2 unidentified) and over 200 injuries, with violence erupting from clashes between protesters blocking roads and Hindu counter-demonstrators.^[63] Delhi courts identified figures like Sharjeel Imam as key conspirators in inciting mobs through speeches advocating separation of northeastern India, linking the unrest to organized Islamist agitation rather than isolated Hindu provocation.^[64] Government data from the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) on riots under IPC Section 153A (promoting enmity between groups) shows persistent patterns, with over 2,900 religious violence cases from 2017–2021, often initiated by disputes over processions or places of worship where minority aggressors in majority areas feature disproportionately in FIRs, countering claims of systemic Hindu initiation.^[65]

Philosophical and Global Contexts

Communitarian Philosophy

Communitarianism posits that individual identities and moral reasoning are fundamentally constituted by social relations and communal practices, rather than autonomous choice abstracted from context. This view challenges liberal individualism by arguing that persons are "encumbered" selves, embedded within traditions, languages, and shared narratives that provide the framework for ethical deliberation. Key proponents, including Alasdair MacIntyre, contend that moral formation arises from participation in particular communities and historical practices, where virtues are cultivated through ongoing traditions rather than universal principles derived from hypothetical contracts.^[18]^[66] Amitai Etzioni developed "responsive communitarianism" as a practical framework emphasizing the balance between individual rights and social responsibilities, advocating for communal norms to guide personal conduct and policy. Etzioni's approach, outlined in works like The Spirit of Community (1993), stresses that unchecked individualism erodes social cohesion, as evidenced by declining civic engagement and family structures, necessitating a revival of shared obligations to sustain liberty. This contrasts sharply with John Rawls's theory of justice, which communitarians critique for relying on the "veil of ignorance" to construct an unencumbered self, detached from the constitutive attachments that actually shape moral agency and communal goods. Michael Sandel, in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982), exemplifies this by arguing that Rawlsian neutrality ignores how community membership informs the very ends individuals pursue, leading to an impoverished account of justice that privileges procedure over substantive bonds.^[67]^[68]^[69] In application, communitarian philosophy critiques forms of multiculturalism that prioritize group differences without fostering assimilation into overriding civic virtues, potentially exacerbating fragmentation by overlooking the need for shared moral horizons. Thinkers like Etzioni highlight that while diversity enriches societies, tolerance has limits when sub-communal loyalties undermine core responsibilities, as seen in empirical patterns of parallel societies resisting integration. This embedded perspective underscores causal links between communal health and individual flourishing, positing that atomistic liberalism contributes to social pathologies like anomie by severing people from formative traditions.^[70]^[71]

Bookchin's Libertarian Communalism

Murray Bookchin formulated libertarian communalism, also termed libertarian municipalism, as a framework for decentralized, direct democracy through networked municipal assemblies. First articulated in 1980, it envisions popular assemblies in neighborhoods and towns exercising sovereignty over local affairs, confederating upward to manage larger scales without hierarchical state structures.^[72] This approach rejects centralized authority, proposing that economic resources be municipally owned and allocated via participatory decision-making, distinct from both capitalist markets and state-planned economies.^[73] Developed primarily during the 1980s and 1990s amid Bookchin's broader social ecology project, the theory draws inspiration from the direct democratic practices of the ancient Athenian polis, where citizen assemblies deliberated policy without intermediaries.^[74] Bookchin critiqued Marxism's historical centralism empirically, citing the Soviet Union's bureaucratic degeneration after 1917—where Lenin's vanguard party consolidated power, leading to authoritarianism rather than worker emancipation—as evidence of statism's inherent failures.^[75] Similarly, he rejected capitalism for fostering ecological degradation and social alienation, arguing that both systems prioritize abstraction over grounded, face-to-face communal life.^[76] Critics contend that libertarian communalism underestimates scalability challenges, as assembly participation declines with population size; historical experiments, such as the Spanish Civil War collectives of 1936–1939, saw initial egalitarian structures devolve into informal hierarchies and factionalism amid external pressures and internal coordination needs.^[77] Bookchin's model also overlooks persistent human tendencies toward dominance, evidenced in post-revolutionary settings where decentralized groups reemerged oligarchic patterns despite anti-authoritarian ideals.^[75] While Bookchin countered that confederal coordination could mitigate these via rational discourse, detractors view it as overly optimistic, ignoring causal realities of power asymmetries in unscripted human interactions.^[73]

African and Other Regional Forms

In sub-Saharan Africa, communalism manifests through ethnic and tribal identities that prioritize group loyalties over national cohesion, often exacerbating resource competition and violence despite rhetorical emphasis on interdependent philosophies like ubuntu. Ubuntu, a Nguni Bantu term roughly translated as "humanity towards others," is frequently idealized as a collectivist ethic fostering communal harmony and mutual interdependence, rooted in pre-colonial practices of shared decision-making and reciprocity.^[78] However, empirical evidence reveals persistent inter-communal clashes, such as the 1994 Rwandan genocide, where Hutu militias systematically killed an estimated 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu in 100 days, driven by ethnic mobilization rather than unified communal bonds.^[79] This event underscores how invocations of ubuntu-like reconciliation, including post-genocide Gacaca community courts that processed over 1.2 million cases by 2012, have coexisted with underlying tribal fissures, as ethnic identities were politicized for power rather than transcended.^[80] Critiques note that ubuntu's collectivist framing often romanticizes interdependence while downplaying causal drivers of individualism in resource scarcity, where group affiliations serve elite interests amid weak institutions.^[81] Similar dynamics appear in other regions, such as Lebanon's confessionalism, a sectarian power-sharing system formalized in the 1943 National Pact and modified by the 1989 Taif Agreement, which allocates parliamentary seats, cabinet posts, and key offices proportionally among Maronite Christians, Sunni and Shia Muslims, and Druze based on religious demographics.^[82] This mirrors Indian communalism's identity-based divisions by entrenching group vetoes and patronage, leading to governance paralysis; for instance, Lebanon's sectarian elite failed to elect a president for over two years from 2022 to 2024 amid economic collapse, with GDP shrinking 38% from 2019 to 2022 due to corruption and debt crises exceeding 150% of GDP.^[83] Power-sharing breakdowns, evident in the 1975–1990 civil war that killed over 150,000, highlight how formalized communal allocations incentivize zero-sum competition over cross-sectarian cooperation, paralleling failures in managing pluralism without addressing underlying economic individualism.^[84] Cross-regional data illustrates the superior outcomes of hybrid governance—blending market incentives with limited identity accommodations—over rigid communalism. Botswana, with its multi-ethnic Tswana-dominant society, achieved average annual GDP per capita growth of 7.22% from 1966 to 2006 through secure property rights, fiscal discipline, and resource revenue management via the Pula Fund, reaching $8,279 per capita by 2018 despite diamond dependence.^[85] In contrast, Zimbabwe's post-2000 land reforms, framed in ethnic redistribution rhetoric under ZANU-PF's Shona favoritism, triggered hyperinflation peaking at 89.7 sextillion percent monthly in 2008 and GDP per capita stagnation at $1,352 by 2018, as communal claims eroded institutional trust and investment.^[86] These disparities affirm that empirical individualism in incentives outperforms pure communal interdependence claims, as hybrid systems mitigate conflict by prioritizing rule-based allocation over group entitlements.^[87]

Criticisms and Defenses

Charges of Divisiveness and Violence

Critics of communalism argue that it inherently promotes divisiveness by elevating religious loyalties above civic or national ones, fostering an environment of mutual suspicion and periodic outbreaks of violence that undermine social cohesion and economic development. In the Indian context, this perspective portrays communalism as a legacy of colonial divide-and-rule policies, perpetuating cycles of riots and displacement that divert resources from modernization efforts and exacerbate poverty in affected regions.^[88]^[89] Left-leaning intellectuals and policymakers, such as Jawaharlal Nehru, have framed communalism as a "scourge" that fragments the nation, advocating secularism as the primary antidote to prevent religious identities from politicization and to ensure equal treatment under the state. Nehru's approach emphasized opposition to all forms of communalism—Hindu, Muslim, or otherwise—viewing it as antithetical to scientific temper and democratic progress, with policies like uniform civil codes intended to dilute group-based assertions.^[90]^[91] This view, echoed in mainstream academic and media narratives, attributes violence primarily to irrational religious bigotry rather than underlying governance failures or electoral incentives, though such sources often exhibit institutional biases favoring secularist interpretations over data-driven assessments of political agency.^[92] Empirical patterns challenge the narrative of communalism as the sole driver, with records indicating that a substantial portion of post-1947 communal incidents, including major riots from 1950 to 1995, transpired under Congress-led administrations at the center or state levels, suggesting opportunism by ruling parties in mobilizing religious sentiments for political gain rather than inherent religious inevitability.^[93]^[94] Secularist critiques that blame religion outright overlook how enforced suppression of differences can lead to more catastrophic eruptions, as evidenced by the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, where decades of communist-era denial of ethnic and religious distinctions under Tito resulted in genocidal conflicts once central authority weakened.^[95]^[96] Realist analyses posit that unaddressed communal tensions, when artificially muted, accumulate pressures that manifest more destructively than managed expressions of difference.^[97]

Empirical Realities of Religious Differences

Religious doctrines rooted in incompatible ethical frameworks amplify human tendencies toward group-based loyalties, as evolutionary psychology demonstrates that tribalism—manifested in preferential treatment of in-groups and suspicion of out-groups—arose from survival pressures in ancestral small-scale societies where intergroup competition was recurrent.^[98] In the context of Hinduism and Islam, this dynamic is intensified by doctrinal divergences: Hinduism's principle of ahimsa, which mandates non-violence toward all sentient beings as a foundational ethic derived from texts like the Upanishads and Mahabharata, clashes with Islam's endorsement of taqiyya, a permissibility for concealing faith or intentions under duress to preserve the believer, as codified in Shi'i jurisprudence and supported by Quranic verses such as 16:106.^[99] These differences foster asymmetries in trust and reciprocity, where one tradition prioritizes unyielding non-harm and the other allows strategic dissimulation, rendering naive assumptions of seamless coexistence empirically untenable without enforced boundaries that acknowledge such causal incompatibilities. The 1947 Partition of India empirically validated the need for demographic separation to mitigate intergroup frictions, as the Muslim population share in what became independent India fell from approximately 24% in British India (per the 1941 census) to 9.8% by 1951, stabilizing religious compositions thereafter and averting the perpetual minority-majority disequilibria that fueled pre-Partition demands for autonomy.^[100]^[101] Pre-Partition concessions by the Indian National Congress, such as accepting separate electorates for Muslims via the 1916 Lucknow Pact and supporting the 1919-1924 Khilafat Movement despite its pan-Islamic separatist undertones, empirically encouraged escalating claims by the Muslim League rather than fostering unity, culminating in the two-nation theory's realization.^[102] This pattern of yielding to minority vetoes without reciprocal integration underscores how disregarding doctrinal and tribal realities perpetuates instability, as evidenced by the League's shift from negotiated safeguards to outright partition advocacy post-concessions. Historical precedents in Islamic polities further illustrate the risks of unassertive majorities: under caliphates like the Umayyad and Abbasid, non-Muslims classified as dhimmis received nominal protection in exchange for jizya tribute and adherence to restrictive covenants, such as the Pact of Umar, which barred public religious displays, mandated distinctive attire, and imposed social subordination to affirm Islamic supremacy.^[103] Such institutionalized hierarchies, where minorities subsidized and deferred to the ruling creed, demonstrate that without proactive self-assertion by host communities, doctrinal expansions historically subordinate others rather than assimilate equitably. Communal recognition thus serves as a causal safeguard, enabling majorities to maintain sovereignty and avert reversion to dhimmi-like equilibria through pragmatic boundary-setting informed by these empirically recurrent patterns.

Responses from Secularism and Nationalism

Secularism in India, as enshrined in the Constitution, aimed to mitigate communalism by promoting state neutrality toward religions and equal treatment of citizens irrespective of faith. However, critics argue that its implementation has faltered, particularly through the non-enactment of Article 44, which directs the state to secure a uniform civil code (UCC) across the territory but remains unfulfilled at the national level despite decades of deliberation.^[104]^[105] This gap has perpetuated religion-specific personal laws, notably allowing Muslim personal law derived from Sharia principles to govern matters like marriage, divorce, and inheritance for over 170 million adherents, fostering parallel legal norms that diverge from codified Hindu, Christian, and Parsi laws reformed post-independence.^[106] The persistence of entities like Darul Qaza (Sharia tribunals) exemplifies these flaws, as they issue non-binding fatwas and judgments on civil disputes that communities often treat as authoritative, despite Supreme Court rulings affirming their lack of legal recognition and enforceability under Indian law.^[107]^[108] In cases such as Vishwa Lochan Madan v. Union of India (2014) and subsequent 2025 affirmations, the Court clarified that "Sharia Courts," "Darul Qaza," or "Qazi Courts" hold no statutory validity, yet their operation under the umbrella of personal law autonomy has been empirically linked to inconsistent rights application, particularly disadvantaging Muslim women in triple talaq and polygamy disputes.^[109] This selective accommodation, termed "pseudo-secularism" by proponents of stricter equality, prioritizes minority appeasement over uniform standards, enabling communal silos rather than dissolving them through shared legal frameworks.^[110] In contrast, nationalist responses, exemplified by the Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP) ascent to power in 2014, have emphasized cultural and national unity to counter separatist tendencies inherent in communalism. Empirical data from the Global Terrorism Index indicates a marked decline in terrorism-related deaths in India following this shift, dropping from 193 fatalities in 2014 to approximately 60 by 2022, amid intensified counter-insurgency in regions like Jammu and Kashmir.^[111] This correlates with policy measures asserting national sovereignty, such as the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019, which integrated disputed territories and reduced cross-border infiltrations fueling communal strife.^[112] Nationalism's efficacy is further evidenced by a broader downturn in large-scale communal riots; National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) statistics show riot cases falling from peaks of over 1,000 annually pre-2014 to under 800 by 2022, attributable to proactive state interventions prioritizing majority integration without minority exemptions.^[113] Debates persist on whether this reflects genuine equality or majoritarian tilt, yet data suggest nationalism has empirically curbed violence more effectively than secularism's deferential approach, which sustained divisions via unequal legal pluralism. True secularism, per constitutional intent, demands parity—such as UCC implementation—over favoritism, but nationalism has delivered de facto cohesion by enforcing shared civic obligations.^[114]

Societal Impacts and Policy Responses

Communal riots impose direct economic costs through property damage and business halts, alongside indirect effects like reduced investment and consumption. Analysis of Indian household surveys indicates that neighborhoods experiencing riots see nonfood consumption drop by 14% and total consumption by 7%, with effects lingering up to a decade due to heightened insecurity and disrupted markets. ^[115] In the 2002 Gujarat riots, violence deterred foreign direct investment and domestic capital inflows, slowing regional growth amid widespread arson and relocation of industries. ^[116] Persistent communal divisions exacerbate economic inefficiencies by fostering segregated markets and mistrust, limiting inter-community trade and labor mobility. Pre-partition Hindu-Muslim economic disparities, rooted in differential adoption of modern institutions like joint-stock companies, contributed to overall subcontinental underperformance relative to unified potentials, as fragmented networks hindered capital accumulation and innovation. ^[117] Post-1947 partition amplified these issues, with displaced populations and bifurcated supply chains causing immediate GDP contractions estimated in the billions, though long-term divergence owes more to policy than communalism alone. ^[118] Socially, communalism drives demographic shifts via higher fertility in minority groups, straining public infrastructure. National Family Health Survey data from 2015–2016, reflecting trends into the 2011 census period, show Muslim total fertility rates at 2.6 children per woman versus 2.1 for Hindus, yielding a 14.2% Muslim population share in 2011 up from 9.8% in 1951 and accelerating resource demands in education and housing for growing cohorts. ^[119] ^[120] This differential growth fosters enclave formation, eroding broader social cohesion and amplifying competition for jobs in urban areas with high communal density. Conversely, intra-communal bonds provide resilience in crises, enhancing coordinated aid. The 2001 Gujarat earthquake, magnitude 7.7 on January 26, prompted Hindu networks—including RSS, VHP, Ramakrishna Mission, and BAPS—to deliver rapid relief, distributing food, medical supplies, and shelter to over 100,000 affected, leveraging organizational structures for efficient response where state efforts lagged. ^[121] ^[122] Such solidarity underscores communalism's dual role in bolstering group-level social capital amid external shocks.

Legal and Governmental Measures

Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), enacted to curb communalism, prohibits promoting or attempting to promote enmity, hatred, or ill-will between groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste, or community, punishable by imprisonment up to three years or a fine or both.^[123] Complementary provisions under IPC Section 295A address deliberate acts intended to outrage religious feelings, with similar penalties, while the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, targets organizations fostering communal discord. Enforcement of these laws has faced criticism for selectivity, with data from the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) showing a rise in cases registered under Section 153A in states like Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu between 2018 and 2020, yet allegations persist of inconsistent application, particularly leniency toward inflammatory rhetoric from Islamist groups compared to Hindu nationalists, as noted in analyses of hate speech prosecutions.^[124] Such disparities are attributed by observers to institutional biases in law enforcement and judiciary, where mainstream media and academic sources often downplay violations by minority communities despite empirical patterns in riot instigation.^[125] Reservation policies, enshrined in Articles 15, 16, and 46 of the Constitution, allocate quotas in education, employment, and politics for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes to address historical inequities, but empirical critiques highlight their role in entrenching caste-based identities and exacerbating communal tensions. For instance, extensions of quotas beyond initial 10-year limits have institutionalized divisions, fostering competition over resources along caste lines and politicizing identities, as evidenced by ongoing demands for sub-categorization that fragment groups further without resolving underlying disparities.^[126] In Jammu and Kashmir, the abrogation of Article 370 on August 5, 2019, via the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, revoked the region's special autonomy, enabling uniform application of Indian laws, including reservations, and integrating it as union territories to diminish separatist communalism rooted in religious exclusivity.^[127] This measure, proponents argue, counters the prior status's facilitation of insular policies that amplified Hindu-Muslim divides, though implementation involved temporary security clampdowns.^[128] Empirical data indicate improved effectiveness of governmental measures post-2014, with NCRB statistics recording a 40% decline in overall riot cases from 66,042 in 2014 to 39,260 in 2023, alongside a 12% drop in communal killings between 2006-2013 and 2014-2021 periods.^[129]^[130] Officials attribute this to enhanced deterrence through proactive policing, digitization of surveillance, and stricter enforcement rather than reliance on interfaith dialogue, which prior administrations emphasized amid rising incidents under the United Progressive Alliance (59,971 riots in 2004 rising to 66,042 by 2014).^[131] These shifts reflect a causal emphasis on credible threat of punishment over appeasement, yielding measurable reductions despite persistent challenges in uniform implementation across states.^[132]

Contemporary Developments (Post-2000)

The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), passed by India's Parliament on December 11, 2019, and assented to by the President the following day, expedited naturalization for non-Muslim refugees—Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis, and Christians—from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan who entered India before December 31, 2014, due to religious persecution in their countries of origin.^[133] Home Minister Amit Shah articulated the legislation's intent as safeguarding minorities facing systemic discrimination in these Muslim-majority states, where adherents of Islam, comprising the ruling majorities, encounter no equivalent existential threats warranting such refuge.^[134] When linked to the National Register of Citizens (NRC), a process to verify legal residency nationwide—building on Assam's 2019 exercise that excluded 1.9 million individuals, predominantly Bengali Muslims suspected of illegal entry from Bangladesh—the CAA elicited protests from December 2019 through early 2020, with critics in mainstream outlets decrying it as exclusionary despite its empirical focus on documented illegal infiltration rather than citizen Muslims.^[135] These demonstrations intensified communal frictions, culminating in the Delhi riots of February 23–26, 2020, where anti-CAA blockades and inflammatory rhetoric provoked counter-mobilizations, yielding 53 fatalities—38 Muslims and 15 Hindus per contemporaneous tallies—and over 500 injuries alongside widespread arson targeting Hindu properties.^[136] Subsequent probes, including Delhi Police chargesheets, documented coordinated incendiary acts by protest organizers, framing the unrest as a violent backlash to sustained disruptions rather than spontaneous Hindu aggression, amid a pattern where 97% of FIRs implicated Islamist networks.^[137] Advancing Hindutva assertions, the Ram Temple's pran pratishtha ceremony in Ayodhya on January 22, 2024, presided over by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, fulfilled a Supreme Court-mandated resolution to the site's contested status—replacing the 1992-demolished Babri Masjid with a structure honoring the Hindu belief in Lord Ram's birthplace—while averting mass violence through heightened security and legal finality.^[138] Nationwide processions marking the event registered minimal incidents, contrasting historical grievances and underscoring institutional mechanisms for addressing communal claims without reverting to pogroms.^[139] Internationally, the Taliban's seizure of Kabul on August 15, 2021, after two decades of attempted nation-building, imposed fundamentalist Sharia governance—banning women's education beyond primary levels, enforcing burqas, and executing public floggings—exposing the causal fragility of integrating ideologically rigid Islamism into pluralistic frameworks, as coercive dominance supplanted prior secular accommodations.^[140] This reversion, with over 1.2 million girls denied secondary schooling by 2023 and minority Hazara communities facing targeted killings, empirically bolsters realism favoring societal separation or rigorous assimilation over integrationist optimism, where irreconcilable doctrinal priors precipitate subjugation of non-conformists.^[141]

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— 'Reading the Rwandan Genocide', International Studies Review vol. 3, no. 3 (2001). Waldorf, Lars, 'Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice ...
[82]
Full article: Rethinking Inter-Communal Violence in Africa
As the language of 'ethnic violence' faded from discussions of conflict in Africa by the mid 2000s, 'inter-communal violence' has gradually taken its place.
[83]
The Failure of Political Sectarianism in Lebanon
Sep 4, 2024 · It will then look at the failed attempts at reconciliation between the warring factions in the 1980s and address the Taif Agreement of 1989 that ...Missing: parallels Indian communalism
[84]
Two Distinct Demonstrations of Confessionalism's Failure as a ...
This paper argues that Lebanon and Iraq are two specific examples of confessionalism, demonstrating its failure to manage ethnic and religious pluralism.Missing: parallels Indian communalism
[85]
(PDF) Lebanon and Iraq: Two Distinct Demonstrations of ...
Aug 10, 2025 · Lebanon and Iraq: Two Distinct Demonstrations of Confessionalism's Failure as a Means to Manage Ethnic and Religious Pluralism. November 2021 ...Missing: parallels Indian
[86]
Why Botswana Is Better Off Than Zimbabwe - FEE.org
Mar 30, 2018 · Economic openness served Botswana well. Between 1966 and 2006, its average annual compound growth rate of GDP per capita was 7.22 percent—higher ...
[87]
Botswana and Zimbabwe: A Tale of Two Countries | Cato Institute
May 14, 2008 · In fact, Khama seems to have had a healthy regard for the British parliamentary system and common law. Economic openness served Botswana well.
[88]
[PDF] A study and comparison of Zimbabwe and Botswana
Strong property rights, preventing state interference, are crucial for economic growth in developing African states, as seen in Botswana's prosperity.
[89]
Socio-Political Dynamism of Communal Violence in India - jstor
Communal violence (especially between Hindus and Muslims, and. Hindus and Christians) has shocked India, particularly in the last two.
[90]
Communalism in India, Meaning, Causes, Effects, UPSC Notes
Oct 15, 2025 · Communalism in India reflects religious tensions, notably between Hindus and Muslims. Historical communal conflicts strain national unity, challenging social ...
[91]
[PDF] Nehru and Communalism - E-Magazine....::...
He regarded communalism as a scourge dividing the nation and preventing the country's unity. In a foreward to the book 'Dharma Nirapeksh Raj' written by ...
[92]
Nehru and his Views on Secularism - Indian National Congress
From his dissection of communalism, Nehru discovered that secularism was the sole response to the communal forces. Scientific life-style was its pragmatic base.
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Q. Write short notes on: Nehru and secularism (64th BPSC/2018)
Secularism for him meant a complete opposition to communalism of all kinds. For him, Secularism is not only a socio- political theory but a mental approach of ...
[94]
[PDF] Religious Riots and Electoral Politics in India - EconStor
In India, there is evidence of religion-related incidents of violence as early as 1714 with a number of riots being reported in the eighteenth and nineteenth ...
[95]
[PDF] Chapter 4 Hindu-Muslim - Riots, 1950–1995: The National Picture
This chapter deals with the overall statistics on Hindu-Muslim riots, the so-called large-n of communal violence.1 Based primarily, though.
[96]
In the Balkans, Barriers Made Neighbors Bad - HFG
Feb 26, 2025 · For many people living in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, the possibility of interethnic violence was inconceivable.
[97]
[PDF] Religion, Conflict and Prospects for Peace in Bosnia, Croatia and ...
In Yugoslavia, differences in religion and culture have led to. Page 5. violent conflicts over policy, territory and populations, conflicts which are ...
[98]
[PDF] The Role of Ethnicity in Ethnic Conflicts: The Case of Yugoslavia
fascination with rituals of violence and terror' (Pavkovic,1997,p:37) that linked ... violent conflict in the history of the Balkans. Features of common ...
[99]
[PDF] Tribalism Is Human Nature
Therefore, selective pressures have sculpted human minds to be tribal, and group loyalty and concomitant cognitive biases likely exist in all groups. Modern ...<|separator|>
[100]
Taqiyyah | Islamic Doctrine & Practices - Britannica
Oct 9, 2025 · Taqiyyah, in Islam, the practice of concealing one's belief and foregoing ordinary religious duties when under threat of death or injury.
[101]
Partition: Why was British India divided 75 years ago? - BBC
Aug 14, 2022 · The population was about 25% Muslim, with the rest mostly Hindu but also Sikh, Buddhist and other religions. Getty Images Indian independence ...
[102]
Population growth and religious composition in India
Sep 21, 2021 · India's religious composition largely stable since Partition Between 1951 and 2011, Muslims grew by 4.4 percentage points to 14.2% of the ...
[103]
Congress 'appeasement' policy among reasons behind Partition
May 11, 2022 · "The Lucknow Pact of 1916, Khilafat Movement of 1919 and the Gandhi-Jinnah talks were examples of Congress' 'tushtikaran' (appeasement). It ...Missing: pre- | Show results with:pre-
[104]
The Pact of Umar Regulating the Status of Non-Muslims Under ...
The pact contains a list of rights and restrictions on dhimmis. By abiding by them, non-Muslims are granted the security of their persons, their families, and ...
[105]
What is Uniform Civil Code in India | Article 44 - BYJU'S
Article 44 says, “The State shall endeavor to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.” Context: Uniform Civil Code in ...
[106]
The Implementation of a Uniform Civil Code - India Foundation
Jan 5, 2023 · Thus, Article 44 of the Constitution says that: “the state shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the ...
[107]
Sharia Courts and Muslim Personal Law in India: Intersecting Legal ...
Jan 1, 2024 · Dar ul qaza judgments are nonbinding from the perspective of the state and they cannot be directly appealed. However, as their authority rests ...
[108]
Islamic Court Judgments Not Legally Valid Or Enforceable - NDTV
Apr 28, 2025 · Islamic courts like "Qazi's Court", "Kaziyat's Court (Darul Qaza)" or "Sharia Court' have no recognition in law, the Supreme Court has reiterated.
[109]
'Sharia courts have no legal status, their rulings not binding on ...
May 5, 2025 · “The 'Sharia Court', 'Court of Qazi', 'Darul-Qaza' or 'Kajiyat', have no legal recognition and their observations are not legally binding.
[110]
Sharia courts have no legal standing: Top court slams Kazi ruling in ...
Apr 29, 2025 · Sharia courts have no legal standing: Top court slams Kazi ruling in divorce case · The Supreme Court criticised the Allahabad High Court and a ...
[111]
An Insight Into The Pseudo-Secularism In India | Legal Service India
Instead, it implies that the state should be devoid of religion. The relationship between the state, society, and religion in India is not well defined in ...
[112]
Global Terrorism Index | Countries most impacted by terrorism
Outside Afghanistan, terrorism deaths rose 4% in the rest of the world. • Islamic State (IS) and its affiliates remained the world's deadliest terrorist group ...
[113]
[PDF] 2024 Global Terrorism Index - Institute for Economics & Peace
Feb 17, 2024 · This attack killed 1,200 people, and was the largest single terrorist attack since 9/11, and one of the largest terrorist attacks in history.
[114]
Ten Years of the Modi Regime: Blatant Pursuit of Corporate Hindutva
Dec 30, 2024 · ... communal violence in India. The Delhi riots were among them. NCRB records show that the first three years of the Modi regime, 2014 to 2016 ...
[115]
Religious riots and electoral politics in India - ScienceDirect.com
But the effect of small-scale localised ethnic violence, like ethnic riots, on electoral outcomes has not been studied so far. We analyse this issue in the ...
[116]
[PDF] The economic consequences of civil violence in India
As described in table 2, the most common forms of civil violence are riots: one in every five households reported at least one riot in their neighborhood, then ...
[117]
Riots cost India $646 bn - The Arunachal Times
Aug 7, 2023 · Long-term violence leads to deterrence in investment and destruction of property. After the Gujarat riots 2002, the investments flowing into the ...
[118]
[PDF] Economic Modernization in Late British India: Hindu-Muslim ...
It raises the possibility that the very historical mechanisms responsible for the underperformance of the Middle East relative to western Europe, and of Middle.
[119]
Indian and Pakistani economies since partition – DW – 08/14/2017
Aug 14, 2017 · When India and Pakistan became independent 70 years ago, they were at the same level of development, with both equally poor and wretched.
[120]
The Religious Composition of India | Pew Research Center
Sep 21, 2021 · Muslims still have the highest fertility rate among India's major religious groups, followed by Hindus at 2.1. Jains have the lowest fertility ...
[121]
Pew study: Little change in India's religious make-up in 70 years - BBC
Sep 21, 2021 · Muslims still have the highest fertility rate (2.6 children per woman in 2015) among the major religious groups, followed by Hindus (2.1). Jains ...
[122]
To Rebuild Kutch - Hinduism Today
The major Hindu organizations the RSS/VHP, RK Mission and BAPS provided material relief, psychological support and religious succor all together. Now, eight ...Missing: response | Show results with:response
[123]
[PDF] Gujarat Earthquake Rehabilitation and Relief Work Report
In response to the devastation, BAPS took action to help thousands of people recover. The result was the largest relief operation undertaken ...
[124]
Understanding IPC Section 153A Promoting Enmity Between ...
This article explores IPC Section 153A, which addresses the promotion of enmity between different groups based on religion, race, place of birth, residence, ...
[125]
Why section 153A of Indian Penal Code is under scrutiny – ipi.media
Jun 16, 2022 · According to the NCRB report, from 2018 to 2020, the number of cases registered under section 153A rose drastically in Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh ...Missing: enforcement uneven
[126]
[PDF] with a special focus on Section 153A and Section 295A of IPC
153A. —Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote feelings of enmity ...Missing: uneven | Show results with:uneven
[127]
[PDF] A Legal Analysis of India's Reservation Policies and Their ... - IJFMR
Mar 3, 2025 · Almost everyone opposes the reservation policy because they believe it creates social divisions based on caste and weakens meritocracy and ...
[128]
Understanding the Abrogation of Article 370: Origin and Impact
The abrogation removes the special status granted to Jammu and Kashmir by the Constitution. This means that the Indian Parliament's power to make laws for the ...Missing: communalism | Show results with:communalism
[129]
Article 370: What happened with Kashmir and why it matters - BBC
Aug 5, 2019 · All Indian laws will be automatically applicable to Kashmiris, and people from outside the state will be able to buy property there. The ...Missing: communalism | Show results with:communalism
[130]
India's Violent Crime Cases Fall 29% In A Decade, Riots Down 40%
Oct 3, 2025 · Riots have fallen 40 per cent, from 66,042 cases in 2014 to 39,260 in 2023. Murders have declined 18 per cent, from 33,981 to 27,721, during the ...Missing: communal 2010-2023
[131]
Have communal killings gone up or down? NCRB data show 12 ...
Aug 10, 2023 · Incidentally, the year 2020 was marked by nationwide protests, including in Delhi where riots broke out in its Northeast suburbs, against the ...Missing: 2010-2023 | Show results with:2010-2023
[132]
Major violent crimes declined significantly under Narendra Modi ...
Oct 3, 2025 · Incidents of riots also increased under the UPA government, rising from 59,971 in ... After 2014, riot cases reduced drastically and by 2023, they ...Missing: communal 2010-2023
[133]
Violent crimes in India show decline over past decade: data
Oct 6, 2025 · The sharpest fall was seen in riots, which reduced by about 40 per cent. Officials credit the decline to digitisation and modernisation of ...Missing: communal 2010-2023
[134]
CAA: India's new citizenship law explained - BBC
Mar 11, 2024 · The CAB amended the 64-year-old Indian Citizenship law, which currently prohibits illegal migrants from becoming Indian citizens. It defined ...
[135]
Why Parsis, Christians CAA Eligible But Not Muslims? Amit Shah ...
Mar 14, 2024 · Muslims are not eligible to apply for Indian citizenship under the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) because it is for a Muslim population ...
[136]
India excludes nearly 2 million people from Assam citizen list
Aug 31, 2019 · The government said it carried out the mammoth exercise to detect and deport undocumented immigrants from neighbouring Bangladesh, but critics ...
[137]
2020 Delhi riots: three years later, the scars remain - The Hindu
Feb 23, 2023 · ... victims and 15 Hindus) and left hundreds injured. ... 2020 Delhi riots: three years later, the scars remain. The violence ...
[138]
List of those killed in Delhi communal riots - ThePrint
List of those killed in Delhi communal riots. ThePrint has accessed details ... riots …. Reply. Abhilashh February 29, 2020 At 11:13 am. Riot is a riot.It ...<|separator|>
[139]
Ayodhya Ram Mandir: India PM Modi inaugurates Hindu temple on ...
Jan 22, 2024 · Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has inaugurated a grand temple to Hindu god Ram in the flashpoint city of Ayodhya.Missing: Hindutva | Show results with:Hindutva
[140]
Battle of narratives over Ram temple inauguration
Jan 31, 2024 · Its acceptability received a boost with almost no violence on religious processions celebrating the occasion across the country. For days, ...
[141]
The Taliban in Afghanistan - Council on Foreign Relations
The Taliban are a predominantly Pashtun, Islamic fundamentalist group that returned to power in Afghanistan in 2021 after waging a twenty-year insurgency.Missing: separation | Show results with:separation
[142]
[PDF] AFGHANISTAN 2022 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT - State Department
Mar 18, 2023 · #TwoTakesTaliban (I'm out now). #Afghanistan #journalism.” Also in July, UNAMA reported the Taliban had engaged in 22 arbitrary detentions and ...