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Competition and Markets Authority

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is an independent non-ministerial government department in the United Kingdom responsible for enforcing competition law, investigating mergers and markets, and protecting consumers from anti-competitive practices and unfair trading.^[1] Established under the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, it merged the functions of the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission, operating in shadow form from 1 October 2013 and fully from 1 April 2014.^[2] The CMA promotes competitive markets by probing cartels, abuse of dominance, and mergers that could substantially lessen competition, while also conducting market studies to address systemic issues such as in energy and grocery sectors.^[3] It has imposed significant fines for violations, totaling around £47 million in one year for competition and consumer cases, and secured commitments from firms to restore competition.^[4] In regulatory appeals and advice on subsidies and internal markets, the CMA ensures government policies align with competition principles.^[3] Notable achievements include completing multiple in-depth merger investigations annually and advancing consumer protections, such as against fake reviews under recent legislation.^[5] However, the CMA has faced criticisms for its merger review processes, perceived as lengthy and overly interventionist, particularly in digital and global deals, leading to calls for reform and the 2025 resignation of its chair amid pro-business pressures.^[6]^[7] These tensions highlight debates over balancing consumer protection with economic dynamism in an era of rapid technological change.^[8]

Establishment and Historical Development

Predecessor Bodies and Formation

The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and the Competition Commission (CC) served as the principal predecessor bodies to the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). Established under the Fair Trading Act 1973 and operational from 1 April 1974, the OFT was tasked with promoting competition, protecting consumers, and conducting preliminary assessments of mergers, cartels, and other anticompetitive practices. The CC, created by the Competition Act 1998 and effective from 1 April 1999, replaced the Monopolies and Mergers Commission and focused on detailed, quasi-judicial reviews of complex mergers and market investigations where competition concerns were identified. These bodies operated in parallel, with the OFT handling frontline enforcement and referrals to the CC for deeper analysis, but this division led to criticisms of inefficiency, duplication, and delays in resolving cases.^[9] The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 addressed these issues by abolishing the OFT and CC and establishing the CMA as their successor, with the Act receiving Royal Assent on 25 April 2013. The CMA launched in shadow form on 1 October 2013 to prepare for transition, becoming fully operational on 1 April 2014 as a non-ministerial department independent of direct government oversight.^[10] This merger transferred approximately 800 staff and the combined budgets of the predecessors to the CMA, aiming to unify expertise, reduce procedural fragmentation, and expedite competition decisions without compromising independence.^[9]

Evolution Post-Establishment

Following its operational launch on 1 October 2014, the CMA prioritized integrating the functions of its predecessors, the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission, into a unified structure to enhance efficiency in merger control and enforcement. By the 2015-16 financial year, this consolidation enabled the CMA to reduce average Phase 1 merger review durations to 34 working days, with 74% of non-complex cases completed within the statutory 35-day limit. Annual reports documented progress in clearing inherited caseloads, including the closure of legacy cartel investigations and a reduction in overall investigation timelines from 35 months to 25 months by 2016-17, alongside launching 10 new civil enforcement cases—exceeding the target of four.^[11]^[12] The CMA introduced procedural efficiencies, such as fast-track merger assessments for straightforward cases and expanded use of undertakings in lieu of reference, accepting nine such remedies in 2015-16 compared to three the prior year. Enforcement intensified, with Competition Act penalties totaling £46 million in 2015-16 and rising to nearly £100 million in 2016-17, contributing to cumulative fines exceeding £100 million by 2018 across cartel and abuse cases. These measures reflected adaptations to persistent market distortions, yielding over £3 billion in estimated consumer benefits by 2016-17.^[11]^[12] In response to lingering effects of the 2008 financial crisis, the CMA conducted sector-specific market investigations into retail energy supply and personal current accounts in banking, launched in 2014 and concluding with final reports in 2016. The energy probe identified £1.4 billion in annual consumer detriment from weak customer engagement and complex tariffs, leading to remedies implemented within six months. Similarly, the banking investigation addressed post-crisis concentration and switching barriers, projecting £1 billion in savings over five years through enhanced competition. These inquiries underscored the CMA's role in remedying structural failures without relying on prior regulatory interventions deemed insufficient.^[13]^[14]^[12]

Post-Brexit Expansion

Following the end of the Brexit transition period on 31 December 2020, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) assumed full independent jurisdiction over merger control in the United Kingdom, diverging from prior EU oversight where qualifying mergers were routinely notified to the European Commission.^[15] This shift enabled the CMA to conduct standalone assessments of global transactions with potential UK impacts, previously often deferred to EU review, resulting in increased scrutiny of deals involving substantial lessening of competition in UK markets.^[16] The CMA's expanded remit now encompasses a broader volume of multi-jurisdictional mergers, with enhanced procedural tools such as voluntary pre-notification discussions to streamline reviews while prioritizing domestic economic interests over EU-wide considerations.^[17] In parallel, the National Security and Investment Act 2021, which entered into force on 4 January 2022, introduced a dedicated UK regime for screening investments posing national security risks, complementing the CMA's competition-focused merger reviews through coordinated information-sharing protocols. A Memorandum of Understanding between the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (now the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology) and the CMA, formalized in June 2022, facilitates joint assessments of sensitive mergers by allowing the CMA to provide competition expertise to government security evaluations and vice versa, without merging the regimes.^[18] This integration ensures that national security scrutiny operates alongside, but independently of, CMA competition analysis, enabling holistic evaluation of transactions in critical sectors like infrastructure and advanced technology.^[19] The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, receiving Royal Assent on 24 May 2024, further bolstered the CMA's proactive regulatory authority in digital markets by establishing a dedicated unit to designate firms with Strategic Market Status (SMS) based on criteria such as market entrenchment and subscriber numbers exceeding specified thresholds. Firms granted SMS face enforceable conduct requirements, pro-competition interventions, and final offer mechanisms to curb dominance, empowering the CMA to intervene ex ante in fast-evolving tech sectors rather than relying solely on retrospective enforcement.^[20] This framework, operationalized through CMA guidance on SMS criteria effective from early 2025, marks a post-Brexit divergence from EU digital rules by tailoring interventions to UK-specific priorities like consumer protection and innovation.^[21]

Organizational Structure and Governance

Leadership and Decision-Making

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is governed by a Board chaired by an individual appointed by the Secretary of State for Business and Trade through open competition for a non-renewable term of up to eight years, with Doug Gurr serving as interim Chair since 21 January 2025.^[22] The Chief Executive, Sarah Cardell, leads the executive team in managing operational functions, including initial case assessments, while the Board provides strategic oversight and ensures alignment with the CMA's statutory duty to promote competition for the benefit of consumers.^[23] Panel members, also appointed by the Secretary of State, form independent inquiry groups for in-depth investigations, selected to avoid conflicts and maintain impartiality in decision-making.^[24] Decision-making within the CMA emphasizes structural independence from government influence through a bifurcated process, particularly in merger control and market studies: Phase 1 screening is handled by the executive to filter cases based on preliminary evidence, while qualifying matters proceed to Phase 2, where autonomous inquiry groups—composed of panel members uninvolved in earlier stages—conduct detailed analysis and issue final remedies or clearances grounded in empirical data rather than external directives.^[22] This separation reduces risks of internal bias and reinforces the CMA's operational autonomy, as affirmed in its commitment to evidence-led rulings.^[22] Accountability is maintained via annual reports laid before Parliament, which detail performance metrics such as investigation timelines, enforcement success rates, and adherence to procedural fairness, without compromising case-specific independence.^[25] These reports underscore the CMA's focus on verifiable outcomes over political priorities, with the 2024-2025 edition highlighting progress in streamlining processes while upholding rigorous, data-driven standards.^[23]

Internal Units and Operations

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) organizes its operations through specialized directorates that facilitate distinct investigative and analytical functions, minimizing redundancy while supporting coordinated enforcement. The Mergers Directorate evaluates merger notifications and conducts assessments under statutory timelines. The Competition Enforcement Directorate investigates antitrust infringements, including cartels and abuse of dominance. The Consumer Protection and Markets directorate handles consumer detriment and market studies. The Markets and Mergers Intelligence unit screens incoming intelligence for potential cases, prioritizing high-impact issues. The Digital Markets Unit, established in shadow form in April 2021 to prepare for enhanced digital regulation, focuses on strategic market status designations and conduct requirements in tech sectors.^[26]^[27] Staffing has expanded to support these units, reaching approximately 1,080 employees by the end of the 2023/24 fiscal year, with an average full-time equivalent of 1,008.5. This growth enables parallel processing across directorates. Funding derives primarily from HM Treasury grant-in-aid via Parliamentary Supply, augmented by merger filing fees and penalties recovered under the Competition Act 1998, which totaled £7.85 million in fines for that period. Total managed expenditure stood at £147.2 million in 2023/24.^[5] Workflows emphasize procedural efficiency, with Phase 1 merger reviews limited to 40 working days for initial filtering, during which the Mergers Directorate assesses substantial lessening of competition risks. Cases warranting deeper scrutiny proceed to Phase 2, with a statutory deadline of 24 weeks from reference, subject to extensions for complexity or information gaps. These timelines, enforced across units, promote swift yet rigorous decision-making without encroaching on other directorates' remits.^[28]

Legal Powers and Responsibilities

Merger Control

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) exercises statutory authority over mergers under the Enterprise Act 2002, as amended, enabling it to investigate transactions that may result in a substantial lessening of competition (SLC) within the United Kingdom. The regime operates on a voluntary notification basis, meaning parties are not legally required to inform the CMA of a merger prior to completion, though notifications are strongly encouraged to mitigate risks of post-completion intervention, including orders to unwind deals.^[29] Jurisdiction arises if the merger qualifies as "relevant" under specified thresholds: either the target firm's annual UK turnover exceeds £100 million, or the merged entity would supply or acquire at least 25% of goods or services of a particular description in the UK (or a substantial part thereof).^[29] These thresholds, updated effective 1 January 2025 via the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, also incorporate a new "hybrid" criterion capturing mergers where one party has UK turnover over £800 million alongside a 25% share condition, broadening scrutiny of high-value deals with potential competitive overlaps. The review process commences with an initial Phase 1 assessment, lasting up to 40 working days, during which the CMA screens for prima facie SLC risks through economic analysis, market tests, and stakeholder consultations.^[30] If no substantial concerns emerge, the merger is cleared unconditionally; otherwise, it may proceed to Phase 2, an in-depth investigation spanning up to 105 working days (extendable in complex cases), involving detailed econometric modeling, customer surveys, and third-party evidence to quantify competitive effects.^[30] Throughout, the CMA emphasizes timely engagement, often issuing questionnaires or information notices, and maintains a "call-in" power to review non-notified mergers within four months of completion (or public awareness) if thresholds are met.^[29] Substantively, the CMA applies an SLC test focused on the merger's likely impact on competition, assessing reductions in rivalry across horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate dimensions through a forward-looking, evidence-based evaluation of market dynamics. This competition effects framework examines how diminished rivalry might lead to higher prices, lower quality, reduced innovation, or other consumer harms, incorporating dynamic factors like entry barriers, buyer power, and failing firm defenses where applicable. Countervailing efficiencies—such as cost savings, innovation gains, or supply chain improvements—are weighed if they are verifiable, merger-specific, and demonstrably passed through to consumers, potentially offsetting identified harms without undermining rivalry. Where an SLC is provisionally found, the CMA prioritizes effective remedies to restore competition, favoring structural solutions like divestitures of assets or businesses to preserve pre-merger market conditions, while behavioral undertakings (e.g., access commitments or non-compete restrictions) are used sparingly for residual issues due to enforcement challenges. Remedies must be proportionate, timely, and monitored via compliance reporting, with the CMA consulting parties and third parties before finalizing orders; in practice, such interventions occur in a minority of Phase 2 cases, reflecting rigorous screening to clear benign mergers efficiently.

Market Investigations

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) possesses statutory powers under the Enterprise Act 2002 to conduct market studies and, where warranted, full market investigations into sectors exhibiting suspected structural features that prevent, restrict, or distort competition.^[31]^[32] These tools target systemic market failures, such as entrenched dominance or coordination among incumbents, rather than isolated firm behaviors, allowing the CMA to address issues like high barriers to entry or weak incentives for innovation that impair dynamic competition over time.^[33] Market studies, typically completed within 12 months, can originate from the CMA's initiative, super-complaints by designated consumer bodies, or referrals by sector regulators, and serve as a preliminary assessment to identify potential adverse effects on competition (AEC).^[34]^[35] If a market study uncovers features likely contributing to an AEC, the CMA may refer the matter for a phase 2 investigation, extending up to 18 months (extendable by six months for complexity), involving detailed economic analysis, stakeholder consultations, and evidence gathering on market dynamics.^[32] In these probes, the CMA evaluates not only static competition metrics like pricing and market shares but also dynamic elements, including barriers to new entrants—such as regulatory hurdles or data asymmetries—and impacts on innovation, where incumbents' control over key assets may stifle R&D investment or product variety.^[36]^[37] Adverse findings occur in a minority of referred cases, prompting remedies only when proportionate to restoring competitive vigor without undue regulatory burden.^[35] Remedies imposed following an AEC determination under section 161 of the Enterprise Act 2002 prioritize effectiveness and minimal intervention, ranging from behavioral requirements (e.g., mandatory information disclosure or contract changes) to structural measures like asset divestitures or ownership separations to facilitate entry and rivalry.^[38] In the 2014–2016 energy market investigation into Great Britain's retail and wholesale gas and electricity supply, the CMA identified features like complex tariffs and vertical integration as distorting competition, leading to remedies including a cap on default standard variable tariffs, enhanced switching processes, and requirements for suppliers to simplify offerings, which aimed to reduce inertia-driven loyalty and promote contestability.^[13]^[39] Similarly, in pharmaceuticals-related probes, such as those addressing pay-for-delay agreements that extend monopolies and deter generic entry, the CMA has pursued conduct remedies to eliminate barriers to innovation, though full market investigations have more commonly yielded targeted interventions like licensing obligations to boost supply chain competition.^[40] These actions underscore the regime's emphasis on causal links between market features and consumer harm, with ongoing monitoring to ensure remedy compliance and adaptability to evolving conditions.^[41]

Antitrust Enforcement

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) enforces the Chapter I prohibition of the Competition Act 1998, which outlaws agreements between undertakings that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the United Kingdom, including cartels engaging in price-fixing, bid-rigging, or market-sharing.^[42] This provision parallels the European Union's Article 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) but operates independently under UK law.^[43] Following Brexit on 31 January 2020 and the end of the transition period on 31 December 2020, the CMA exercises full autonomy in antitrust enforcement, unbound by EU decisions or precedents, enabling tailored application to UK-specific markets.^[44] Under the Chapter II prohibition, the CMA targets abuses of a dominant position by one or more undertakings, such as predatory pricing, refusal to supply, or discriminatory practices that exploit market power to the detriment of competition or consumers.^[45] Violations may affect trade within the UK, with the CMA assessing dominance based on market shares typically exceeding 50 percent, though lower thresholds apply in concentrated markets.^[46] For "hardcore" cartel conduct like bid-rigging or price-fixing, the CMA imposes criminal sanctions pursuant to the Enterprise Act 2002, exposing individuals to up to five years' imprisonment and/or unlimited fines upon conviction.^[47] Civil enforcement complements this with fines on undertakings up to 10 percent of their worldwide turnover, designed to deter anti-competitive behavior through financial severity.^[48] In a 2023 case involving bid-rigging for demolition and asbestos removal contracts, the CMA fined ten construction firms nearly £60 million for colluding to allocate bids and suppress competition.^[49] The CMA's leniency programme incentivizes detection of concealed cartels by granting full immunity from fines and criminal prosecution to the first qualifying applicant that discloses evidence of infringement and cooperates fully, with subsequent applicants eligible for penalty reductions up to 50 percent.^[50] This mechanism has proven effective in uncovering otherwise undetectable agreements, as evidenced by ongoing consultations to refine guidance post-legislative updates.^[51] Overall, these tools emphasize deterrence, with penalties structured to exceed illicit gains and promote self-reporting amid the challenges of proving secretive conduct.^[52]

Consumer Protection

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) enforces consumer protection laws primarily through civil measures targeting unfair commercial practices that harm consumer interests, such as misleading information or aggressive selling tactics. Under the Consumer Rights Act 2015, the CMA possesses investigatory powers outlined in Schedule 5, enabling it to gather evidence on potential breaches of consumer law, including requirements for traders to provide accurate information about goods, services, and digital content.^[53] These powers were significantly expanded by the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, which took effect on 6 April 2025, granting the CMA direct enforcement authority without relying solely on court proceedings or local authorities.^[54] This regime addresses practices detrimental to consumers, such as fake online reviews and subscription traps, where businesses obscure cancellation processes or auto-renew terms to retain customers unfairly.^[55] In practice, the CMA has prioritized digital market harms, issuing guidance and taking early action under the new rules. For instance, in July 2025, it enforced commitments from online platforms to remove fake reviews after finding over half of surveyed businesses non-compliant with prior voluntary guidance, prohibiting paid or incentivized false endorsements that mislead average consumers.^[56] Similarly, the authority targets subscription traps by scrutinizing unclear terms and hidden fees, aligning with prohibitions on unfair practices under the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, as updated by the 2024 Act to ban drip pricing—where mandatory fees are revealed only late in the purchasing process.^[57] These interventions aim to deter scams and exploitative tactics prevalent in e-commerce and recurring billing models, with the CMA conducting compliance sweeps and accepting undertakings to resolve issues swiftly.^[58] Enforcement mechanisms include issuing enforcement notices requiring businesses to cease harmful practices, with non-compliance attracting fines up to 10% of a firm's global annual turnover or £300,000, whichever is higher.^[59] The CMA collaborates with local Trading Standards services through the Consumer Protection Partnership for coordinated investigations and with the Financial Conduct Authority via a 2019 Memorandum of Understanding to address overlapping issues in financial services, such as misleading investment promotions.^[60]^[53] Additionally, the CMA handles super-complaints from designated consumer bodies under the Enterprise Act 2002, launching market-wide inquiries if practices appear to harm broad consumer groups, as seen in past responses to issues like loyalty pricing penalties.^[61] To support prevention, it runs educational campaigns and publishes guidance for businesses on compliant practices, emphasizing transparency to foster informed consumer choices without unduly burdening legitimate operations.^[62]

Notable Investigations and Decisions

Early Merger and Cartel Cases

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), upon its formation on 1 October 2014, inherited a portfolio of merger oversight responsibilities from predecessor bodies, including monitoring compliance with divestiture remedies imposed by the Competition Commission in the 2009 Lloyds TSB/HBOS merger, which required the sale of approximately 600 branches to restore competition in personal current accounts.^[63] This case, though predating the CMA, set an early precedent for structural remedies in banking, with the CMA ensuring ongoing adherence to branch disposals and Verity House sales as part of its initial enforcement consistency efforts post-2014.^[64] In its first full year of operation through March 2015, the CMA conducted 84 Phase 1 merger inquiries and three Phase 2 investigations, establishing procedural precedents for evidence-based assessments that prioritized substantial lessening of competition only on robust grounds.^[65] One early Phase 2 case involved Pure Gym/LA Fitness, which was abandoned by the parties following referral, underscoring the CMA's willingness to probe vertical and conglomerate effects without automatic clearance.^[66] Overall, from 2014 to 2019, the CMA cleared around 90% of Phase 1 mergers unconditionally, reflecting high evidentiary thresholds that avoided over-intervention while referring select cases—typically fewer than 5%—to Phase 2 for deeper scrutiny, thereby balancing pro-competitive outcomes with regulatory restraint.^[67] On the cartel front, the CMA aggressively pursued anti-competitive agreements, imposing fines exceeding £50 million by 2017 across sectors including pharmaceuticals and construction-related activities. In February 2016, the CMA fined pharmaceutical firms including Actavis UK, Mylan, and others a total of £44.99 million for unlawful agreements to delay or limit generic competition in modified-release morphine sulphate capsules, marking one of its earliest major Chapter I enforcement actions and establishing precedents for prosecuting pay-for-delay and market-sharing pacts through leniency applications and dawn raids. These cases emphasized forensic evidence from internal documents, contributing to consistent deterrence by demonstrating the CMA's commitment to fining up to 10% of global turnover while offering reductions for cooperation.^[40] Early cartel probes in construction, building on inherited Office of Fair Trading investigations, involved bid-rigging and cover pricing, with fines imposed on suppliers for collusive tendering that inflated costs for public projects; by 2017, cumulative penalties in these areas reinforced evidentiary standards requiring proof of intent and effect, fostering internal CMA guidelines for swift settlements to enhance enforcement efficiency without compromising rigor.

Digital and Tech Sector Interventions

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has intensified scrutiny of mergers in the digital and technology sectors, focusing on potential harms to innovation and competition in software design and gaming markets. In November 2023, the CMA provisionally determined that Adobe's proposed $20 billion acquisition of Figma would reduce competition in the UK digital design tools market, where the combined entity would control over 80% of browser-based design software used by designers, potentially stifling innovation by eliminating Figma as an independent rival to Adobe's offerings.^[68] The parties terminated the deal in December 2023 after failing to resolve the CMA's concerns through remedies, marking a rare outright block of a high-profile tech merger and highlighting the regulator's emphasis on preserving dynamic competition in nascent digital markets.^[69] In contrast, the CMA cleared Microsoft's $69 billion acquisition of Activision Blizzard in October 2023, but only after Microsoft agreed to divest Activision's non-EEA cloud streaming rights to Ubisoft for 15 years, ensuring continued access for rival cloud gaming services and preventing Microsoft from leveraging the deal to dominate the emerging cloud gaming segment.^[70]^[71] Under the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, the CMA's Digital Markets Unit (DMU) has pursued ex-ante interventions against entrenched dominance in mobile ecosystems. In January 2025, the DMU launched strategic market status (SMS) investigations into Apple's iOS and Google's Android platforms, app stores, and browsers, examining practices such as self-preferencing of proprietary apps, restrictions on alternative app distribution, and barriers to interoperability that entrench market power and limit consumer choice.^[72] By July 2025, the CMA proposed designating both firms with SMS in mobile operating systems and app distribution, citing evidence that UK users rarely switch platforms due to ecosystem lock-in, with Apple and Google controlling over 90% of the market.^[73] On October 22, 2025, the CMA confirmed these designations, enabling enforceable codes of conduct to address abuses like excessive commissions on app stores (up to 30% for Apple and Google) and prohibitions on sideloading, aimed at fostering fairer competition without awaiting post-merger harms.^[74] These interventions underscore tensions between safeguarding consumer welfare through proactive regulation and supporting rapid innovation in tech markets, where the CMA's precautionary merger assessments—requiring robust evidence of no substantial lessening of competition—have been critiqued by some economists and industry observers for potentially deterring foreign investment and hindering UK scale-ups by signaling a high bar for deal approvals in dynamic sectors.^[75] The approach prioritizes empirical analysis of potential foreclosure risks over speculative efficiencies, but critics argue it may overlook the pro-competitive benefits of integration in fast-evolving technologies like cloud-based design and gaming, possibly contributing to the UK's lag in attracting Big Tech headquarters compared to more permissive jurisdictions.^[76]

Recent High-Profile Actions

In 2024, the CMA launched a market investigation into the veterinary services sector following concerns over consolidation through mergers and acquisitions, which had reduced competition and contributed to veterinary prices rising by more than 60% since 2016.^[77] The probe, initiated in May 2024 after reviewing multiple mergers involving groups like Independent Vetcare, identified limited choice for pet owners, particularly in corporate-dominated areas, and proposed remedies including mandatory divestitures of practices to independent buyers, prohibitions on non-compete clauses for vets, and enhanced merger scrutiny to prevent further concentration.^[78] Provisional findings released on 15 October 2025 recommended structural changes to veterinary business models, with a consultation open until 12 November 2025 and final decisions expected by March 2026.^[79] Post-COVID, the CMA addressed competition in transatlantic air routes through its ongoing review of the Atlantic Joint Business Agreement involving airlines such as British Airways, American Airlines, and others. In March 2025, the CMA proposed accepting commitments from five airlines to allocate specific Heathrow slots—known as remedy slots—to competitors, enabling expansion on UK-US passenger routes and mitigating fare increases from reduced rivalry.^[80] These measures, building on prior slot remedies, were intended to operate through the 2025 IATA winter season, with the CMA monitoring compliance to ensure competitors like Virgin Atlantic and Delta could utilize them effectively.^[81] The CMA has intensified enforcement against resale price maintenance (RPM) in online retail, issuing warnings and pursuing cases amid high complaint volumes, though specific high-profile fines in fashion remain limited to advisory actions rather than penalties post-2020. In related consumer protection efforts, the authority has scrutinized pricing practices in e-commerce, aligning with broader post-pandemic scrutiny of digital marketplaces to prevent artificial price floors that harm competition.^[82] For the Amazon-iRobot merger, announced in 2022, the CMA cleared the deal in Phase 1 on 16 June 2023 after finding no substantial lessening of competition in robotics, despite international scrutiny; the transaction was ultimately withdrawn in January 2024 due to EU opposition, not CMA intervention.^[83]

Economic Impact and Effectiveness

Achievements in Promoting Competition

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has achieved measurable consumer benefits through its competition-promoting interventions, as quantified in official impact assessments. Over the three years to 2023/24, CMA actions delivered an estimated £8.2 billion in total consumer benefits, averaging £2.7 billion annually, with remedies addressing anti-competitive practices in mergers, cartels, and markets.^[84] These outcomes reflect a high return on public investment, yielding £23 in consumer savings for every £1 of taxpayer expenditure during the period.^[84] Similarly, the 2021/22 annual report estimated at least £2 billion in annual consumer savings from enforcement activities, including over £6 billion in cumulative direct financial benefits from 2019/20 to 2021/22.^[85] In merger control, the CMA's remedies have prevented substantial lessening of competition, unlocking efficiencies and choice. In 2023/24, it reviewed 54 Phase 1 merger cases—clearing 27 with remedies and 18 unconditionally—and 9 Phase 2 cases, including 2 cleared with remedies to mitigate harms.^[84] Since inception, such interventions have contributed to broader consumer welfare gains by blocking or restructuring deals that would otherwise concentrate market power.^[85] Antitrust enforcement, particularly via the leniency program, has dismantled cartels and deterred price-fixing, with self-reporting enabling swift investigations and fines exceeding £400 million in sectors like pharmaceuticals in 2021/22 alone.^[85] The program incentivizes disclosures from participants, facilitating evidence-led prosecutions that restore competitive pricing.^[50] Market investigations have targeted structural issues, implementing remedies to boost efficiency in investigated sectors. Recent launches into veterinary services, infant formula, and housebuilding aim to enhance choice and transparency, building on prior cases where interventions improved market dynamics.^[84] Annual State of UK Competition Reports, published since 2020, underpin these efforts with data-driven insights into competitive trends, guiding remedies to counter weakening pressures.^[86]

Measured Outcomes and Data

The Competition and Markets Authority's (CMA) 2024 Impact Assessment estimates that its interventions generated aggregate direct financial benefits of £9,079.6 million over the financial years 2022/23 to 2024/25, averaging £3,026.5 million annually in avoided consumer harm, enhanced competition, and related gains across enforcement activities.^[87] These benefits are apportioned as follows: £1,024.1 million annually from merger control (preventing anti-competitive consolidations), £1,717.8 million from market studies and investigations (addressing structural market failures), £119.6 million from competition law enforcement (dismantling cartels and abuses), and £165.0 million from consumer protection actions (redress and deterrence).^[87] The assessment employs methodologies such as counterfactual harm projections and post-intervention savings, drawing on economic modeling to quantify impacts like reduced overcharges and improved market efficiency. The CMA's merger review processes demonstrate high clearance rates, with 1,037 mergers considered in 2024, but only 38 (3.6%) subject to formal Phase 1 investigation, and fewer than 1% ultimately blocked or abandoned due to competition concerns.^[67] Across 2020–2024, approximately 16% of investigated mergers (Phase 1 and Phase 2 combined) resulted in prohibitions or abandonments, reflecting selective scrutiny of potentially harmful deals while approving the vast majority without intervention.^[75] Appeals against CMA merger decisions have historically succeeded in fewer than 10% of cases on substantive grounds, as courts apply a deferential standard requiring clear errors in reasoning or evidence, underscoring the robustness of the authority's analytical frameworks despite occasional procedural remands.^[88] Post-intervention metrics in specific sectors illustrate productivity and consumer behavior uplifts; for instance, the CMA's 2014–2016 energy market investigation, which identified weak customer engagement as an adverse effect on competition, prompted remedies including simplified tariffs and price protections, contributing to an estimated pre-intervention annual detriment of £1–2 billion from low switching rates (around 10% annually).^[89] Subsequent data show temporary increases in switching to over 15% in 2017–2018, alongside broader market dynamism, though rates have since moderated to 5–7% amid external factors like price volatility; these changes align with the assessment's £1.7 billion annual benefits from market interventions, incorporating enhanced supplier competition and reduced inertia-driven harms.^[87] Overall, the CMA's operations yield a benefit-cost ratio of 24.5:1, with annual costs averaging £123.6 million against the quantified benefits, based on ex-post evaluations and peer-reviewed economic techniques that prioritize causal attribution over correlative trends.^[87] This ratio reflects efficiencies in resource allocation, though it relies on assumptions about persistence of remedies and multiplier effects on innovation and entry.

Criticisms of Regulatory Burden

Critics of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) contend that its merger review processes impose substantial delays, with pre-notification assessments averaging over 65 working days and Phase 2 investigations extending up to 24 weeks or longer, often resulting in total timelines of 6 to 12 months for complex cases.^[90]^[91] These protracted reviews have led to high abandonment rates, with approximately 70% of deals referred to in-depth Phase 2 scrutiny either abandoned or blocked between 2021 and 2023, primarily due to mounting costs, opportunity losses, and shifting market dynamics that render transactions unfeasible.^[92]^[93] In fast-paced sectors such as technology, where competitive advantages erode quickly, such delays are particularly burdensome, as they can kill deals before completion and deter future M&A activity essential for scaling operations and innovation.^[94] The CMA's stringent evidentiary standards and preference for structural remedies over behavioral ones exacerbate compliance burdens, requiring firms to divert significant resources to data submissions, economic modeling, and remedy negotiations, even in transactions posing minimal competitive harm.^[95] Business analysts argue this overly cautious framework elevates regulatory costs—encompassing legal fees, internal staffing, and foregone synergies—that frequently outweigh the prophylactic benefits of intervention in low-risk mergers, potentially hampering efficiency gains and long-term productivity.^[96] Empirical analyses of regulatory impacts on M&A decisions indicate that elevated compliance expenses systematically reduce deal volumes and values, supporting claims that the CMA's approach may inadvertently stifle economic dynamism without proportionate antitrust safeguards.^[96] Post-Brexit, the CMA's broadened jurisdiction over global mergers has intensified these criticisms, with its rigorous scrutiny perceived by industry observers as fostering a protectionist environment that deters foreign direct investment (FDI) by signaling unpredictable and onerous hurdles for inbound deals.^[97] Business reports highlight how this stance, including frequent call-ins of international transactions, contrasts with more streamlined regimes elsewhere, contributing to perceptions of the UK as a less attractive merger venue and potentially reducing FDI inflows critical for post-pandemic recovery.^[98] In acknowledgment of these burdens, the UK government issued a 2025 strategic steer directing the CMA to expedite reviews and prioritize growth alongside competition, aiming to mitigate the chilling effect on investment while preserving enforcement integrity.^[99]

Controversies and Debates

Allegations of Overreach and Interventionism

Critics of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) have alleged jurisdictional overreach in its scrutiny of global mergers with limited direct UK nexus, exemplified by its investigation into Nvidia's proposed acquisition of Arm Holdings, announced in September 2020 and abandoned on February 8, 2022, following CMA concerns over potential foreclosure of competition in chip design and cloud services.^[100] US lawmakers and business groups contended that the CMA's phase 2 probe extended beyond proportionate UK impacts, imposing undue barriers on a transaction primarily affecting international markets and lacking substantial UK turnover thresholds, thereby exemplifying "foreign regulatory overreach" that harms cross-border investment without sufficient due process safeguards.^[101] Such interventions, opponents argue, amplify uncertainty for multinational firms, as the CMA's voluntary notification regime still yields binding outcomes that can derail deals despite minimal local effects.^[102] The establishment of the Digital Markets Unit (DMU) within the CMA, empowered under the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 to impose ex-ante codes of conduct on designated firms with "strategic market status," has drawn criticism for preempting market-driven corrections in favor of anticipatory rulemaking absent proven harms.^[103] Pro-market analysts assert this shift mirrors interventionist models like the EU's Digital Markets Act, risking stifled innovation by mandating preemptive behavioral adjustments—such as data-sharing requirements—based on speculative dominance rather than empirical evidence of anticompetitive conduct, potentially distorting incentives in dynamic digital sectors.^[104] Detractors highlight the DMU's broad discretion in designating activities and enforcing remedies, warning it undermines causal analysis of actual market failures in favor of regulatory presumption.^[105] Business representatives have reported heightened uncertainty from the CMA's interventionist stance, with 2024 marking a record year for merger interventions—over 50% of phase 1 cases involving remedies or referrals, exceeding the 10-year average—as firms navigate evolving guidelines and protracted reviews that deter deal-making.^[106] Legal and consulting firms note that frequent policy adjustments, including stricter vertical merger assessments, exacerbate perceptions of unpredictability, prompting claims that the CMA's approach has rendered the UK "closed for business" by prioritizing theoretical harms over evidenced consumer benefits.^[107] Parliamentary inquiries have echoed these concerns, identifying regulatory ambiguity as a key deterrent to foreign direct investment, though the CMA maintains its actions target substantial lessening of competition based on rigorous analysis.^[108]

Political Influences and Independence Questions

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) operates as a non-ministerial government department, designed to insulate its decision-making from direct political interference, with the government appointing its board and panel members but lacking authority to direct specific investigations or outcomes.^[109] This structure aims to ensure operational independence, as affirmed in official statements emphasizing the CMA's role in impartial enforcement free from ministerial override.^[110] However, government-issued strategic steers, such as the May 2025 draft directing the CMA to prioritize pro-growth interventions and UK-focused harms, illustrate indirect influence that critics argue could compromise this autonomy by aligning regulatory priorities with prevailing administration agendas.^[111]^[112] Appointments to CMA leadership have drawn scrutiny for potentially reflecting political priorities, with calls for greater diversity in expertise to mitigate entrenched bureaucratic perspectives. In January 2025, the UK government replaced the CMA chair amid accusations from Prime Minister Keir Starmer of an "anti-growth" stance, appointing a former Amazon executive to inject practical business acumen into oversight.^[113] Earlier, a House of Lords committee in February 2024 condemned delays in senior appointments as "unacceptable," highlighting risks of politicized vacancies undermining timely, expert-led regulation.^[114] Such processes, while formally merit-based, have fueled debates over whether they sufficiently counter institutional inertia or instead serve to recalibrate the CMA toward short-term economic imperatives under varying governments. CMA interventions in areas like net-zero transitions and sustainability collaborations have prompted questions about impartiality, as its proactive stance—evident in the 2023-2024 annual plan's emphasis on accelerating environmental goals and guidance permitting non-anti-competitive green agreements—may align too closely with policy directives.^[115]^[116] This focus, while framed as evidence-based, risks subordinating pure competition analysis to broader societal objectives, particularly when government pressures intensify, as seen in February 2025 calls for the CMA to adopt a "less risk-averse" approach to mergers supporting growth.^[117] In contrast to the European Commission's Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP), which faces accusations of politicization through protectionist interventions, the CMA's domestic orientation post-Brexit enhances its insulation from supranational politics but exposes it more acutely to UK governmental shifts.^[118]^[119] Despite protestations of steadfast independence, these dynamics underscore ongoing tensions between the CMA's statutory autonomy and the realities of executive influence.^[120]

Business and Innovation Impacts

The Competition and Markets Authority's (CMA) merger interventions, particularly blocks since 2019 where it has prohibited 59% of investigated deals compared to 30% previously, have correlated with reduced acquisition opportunities for UK startups, a primary exit route essential for recycling venture capital into new ventures.^[121]^[122] In 2019, eight UK startups were acquired by major technology firms such as Microsoft, Google, and Amazon, underscoring M&A's role in the ecosystem; analogous U.S. enforcement trends from 2021 to 2024 show sharp declines in startup acquisitions, leading to lower exit multiples, increased shutdowns, and constrained VC returns that deter future funding.^[123] Surveys indicate that 50% of venture capitalists would reduce investments if such exits face heightened restrictions, creating a chilling effect on entrepreneurship in dynamic sectors like technology.^[123] While CMA actions aim to prevent monopolistic entrenchment that could stifle entry, evidence suggests potential harms to research and development (R&D) through diminished incentives for high-risk innovation, as large-firm acquisitions often integrate and scale startup technologies.^[121] For instance, delays in deals like Amazon's investment in Anthropic, despite lacking UK-specific competition concerns, impose disproportionate compliance burdens on resource-limited innovators, potentially diverting scale-ups overseas where regulatory environments better accommodate consolidation for global competitiveness.^[124] On the positive side, CMA efforts to address barriers such as data access and interoperability have supported horizontal enablers for R&D, enabling smaller entrants to compete and innovate in markets like open banking.^[37] However, the regulatory burden from expanded scrutiny, including broader document requests, risks outweighing these benefits by prioritizing static competition metrics over dynamic efficiencies where incumbents drive substantial R&D, as seen in 92% of U.S. public company innovation stemming from venture-backed paths.^[121] Economic analyses advocate for proportionality tests in CMA assessments, incorporating growth-oriented metrics such as £10 billion valuation thresholds or innovation leadership indicators, to mitigate trade-offs between preventing harms and enabling scale-up consolidation necessary for sustained R&D investment.^[37]^[121] Such adjustments would better align interventions with causal drivers of entrepreneurship, recognizing that over-reliance on ex-ante blocks may erode the UK's position in fast-evolving fields like artificial intelligence without empirical validation of purported "killer acquisition" risks.^[121]

Recent Developments and Future Outlook

Digital Markets Unit and Reforms

The Digital Markets Unit (DMU) was established within the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) in shadow form in April 2021 to oversee the development and enforcement of a new pro-competition regime for digital markets.^[125] The unit focuses on addressing market power dynamics in fast-evolving digital sectors, particularly those dominated by tech platforms with substantial and entrenched influence over UK users and businesses.^[20] The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, which received Royal Assent on 24 May 2024, granted the DMU statutory powers to designate firms as having Strategic Market Status (SMS) if they meet criteria for substantial, entrenched market power in digital activities linked to the UK, such as search services, social media, or cloud computing. SMS-designated firms face enforceable conduct requirements to promote fair dealing, open choices, and trust, with the DMU empowered to impose remedies like data access mandates or interoperability obligations.^[20] Non-compliance can result in fines up to 10% of a firm's global annual turnover, or 5% daily for ongoing breaches, alongside potential business separation orders in extreme cases.^[126] The regime's core aim is ex-ante regulation to preempt anti-competitive conduct, mirroring aspects of the European Union's Digital Markets Act but tailored to UK-specific market conditions.^[127] Key reforms under the 2024 Act and subsequent CMA guidance updates target merger control in digital contexts, enhancing DMU oversight of transactions involving SMS firms through mandatory reporting and heightened scrutiny of vertical or conglomerate effects.^[128] Revised CMA merger guidelines, updated in January 2025 following consultations initiated in 2023, introduce streamlined procedures including shortened Phase 1 timelines from 40 to 35 working days for certain cases and explicit consideration of merger efficiencies where verifiable evidence demonstrates consumer benefits outweighing harms.^[29] These changes aim to reduce procedural delays while maintaining rigorous assessment of dynamic digital market foreclosure risks, with new turnover-based and share-of-supply thresholds expanding voluntary notification scope from 1 January 2025.^[129] For SMS mergers, the DMU gains priority intervention rights, enabling faster pro-competition interventions to preserve contestability.^[130]

2024 State of UK Competition Report

The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) published its third State of UK Competition Report on 24 October 2024, assessing competition dynamics across the UK economy over the preceding 25 years. The report concludes that competition has experienced a modest weakening, evidenced by average cost markups rising by approximately 10% since 1997 in Great Britain, though this trend is less severe than in the United States. Business dynamism has also declined, with firm entry and exit rates, as well as job reallocation rates, falling since 2004; the employment share of young firms dropped from around 40% to 20% over the period. Market concentration, measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), has remained stable since the Great Financial Crisis, averaging about 1,100 in 2022—similar to 1997 levels and aligned with European peers.^[86]^[131] Sectoral analysis highlights varying intensities of competitive pressure, with services—particularly administrative and professional services—showing the steepest increases in markups, driven by older, larger firms entrenching market power. Concentration has risen in areas like arts and entertainment, while manufacturing's share of the economy has declined amid overall service sector growth. The report links these trends to productivity challenges, noting reduced dynamism contributes to slower growth, though aggregate labour productivity in the UK exceeds European averages but exhibits higher volatility; firm-level data show a positive correlation between markups and productivity, but no strong industry-level ties to investment or innovation. The CMA attributes partial mitigation of these issues to its enforcement actions, such as merger scrutiny, which have helped stabilize concentration post-financial crisis.^[86]^[131] In response, the CMA recommends strengthening merger control and enforcement to prevent undue market power accumulation, alongside measures to reduce barriers for smaller firms, including better access to inputs, knowledge diffusion, and addressing ownership networks that limit competition. The report does not advocate broad deregulation but emphasizes evidence-based interventions to foster dynamism, such as early scrutiny of technology-driven markets. Looking ahead within the report's scope, priorities include examining AI foundation models—via the CMA's ongoing review—and enhancing supply chain resilience to support productivity, with the newly established Microeconomics Unit tasked with informing the government's growth mission through targeted analysis.^[86]^[131]

Ongoing Challenges in Global Context

Post-Brexit, the CMA has faced coordination challenges with the European Commission and the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) on cross-border mergers, leading to procedural divergences that increase uncertainty for multinational firms. While agreements like the UK-EU Competition Cooperation Agreement of 2025 aim to rebuild ties through information exchange, differences in timelines, substantive assessments, and remedy preferences have persisted, as seen in parallel reviews where the CMA cleared deals prohibited by the EU, such as in certain tech and pharma sectors.^[132]^[133] An OECD analysis highlights how such divergences, exacerbated by the UK's independent post-Brexit regime, complicate global merger reviews involving multiple jurisdictions, potentially deterring investment without aligned outcomes.^[134] In the context of US-China economic rivalry, the CMA grapples with foreign state subsidies—particularly from China—that distort UK open markets by enabling below-cost exports and unfair advantages in sectors like renewables and manufacturing. These subsidies, often non-transparent and exceeding WTO disciplines, undermine competitive neutrality, as evidenced by EU complaints and UK parliamentary evidence noting their role in lowering export prices and eroding domestic industries.^[135] The CMA's enforcement tools, focused on domestic antitrust, have limited direct recourse against such foreign distortions, prompting calls for enhanced screening akin to the EU's Foreign Subsidies Regulation, though UK policy emphasizes WTO compliance over unilateral retaliation to avoid escalation.^[136] To address these global pressures and support UK growth amid rivalries, the CMA is evolving toward a lighter-touch regime post-2025, prioritizing pro-investment interventions over stringent blocks. The government's 2025 Strategic Steer directs the CMA to focus on evidence-based harms to UK consumers and streamline processes, as outlined in its Annual Plan for 2025-2026, which targets growth-enhancing competition while reducing regulatory burdens that could hinder innovation against subsidized foreign competitors.^[137]^[138] This shift aligns with broader efforts to position the UK as an agile player in WTO-aligned markets, balancing openness with resilience against geopolitical distortions.^[139]

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Feb 19, 2024 · In 2016, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) estimated this costs customers £1-2bn a year. Those who switched to fixed deals saved, and ...
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The CMA's “revised” approach to UK merger control and impact on ...
Mar 24, 2025 · On 12 March 2025 the UK's Competition & Markets Authority (CMA) announced the next stage in its evolving approach to merger investigations, ...
[91]
UK Merger Control in 2024/25: Key Takeaways - WilmerHale
Jun 12, 2025 · Out of the 41 Phase 1 investigations, the CMA unconditionally approved 21 deals, five were cleared subject to remedies and one was abandoned.
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Nearly 70% of all M&A deals subject to CMA in-depth probes ...
Nov 29, 2023 · As a result of this, Linklaters reports that the last three years have seen “70% of deals in the UK abandoned or killed.” The news today, ...
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CMA kills off 70% of deals - Estates Gazette
Since the start of least year, according to law firm Linklaters, the CMA has killed off 12 of the 17 deals it has subjected to in-depth anti-trust examination.
[94]
UK Competition Authority Launches Consultation on Merger ...
despite raising concerns — may generate efficiencies that benefit consumers, the CMA is reviewing how its ...
[95]
[PDF] Who's afraid of the UK Competition & Markets Authority
More recently, the EC has prohibited Booking.com's acquisition of Etraveli, deploying a controversial “ecosystem” theory of harm, rejecting the parties' ...
[96]
How do regulatory costs affect mergers and acquisitions decisions ...
This paper introduces a firm-specific measure of regulatory costs and explores its role in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) decisions.
[97]
Q4 2025 Update – UK Merger Control and National Security ...
Oct 16, 2025 · The UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) continues to attach considerable weight to the strategic steer that it received from the ...
[98]
UK's competition regulator has killed more deals than the EU's ...
May 4, 2024 · The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has blocked more tie ups than the European Commission every year bar one in the past five years.
[99]
CMA told to make growth and international investment top priority
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[100]
NVIDIA / Arm merger inquiry - GOV.UK
The CMA investigated NVIDIA's acquisition of Arm, but the merger was abandoned and the inquiry was cancelled on 8 February 2022.
[101]
Rep. Duncan Leads Letter Expressing Concern over Foreign ...
Mar 8, 2023 · ... CMA's interventions are harming US interests. What is particularly worrying about the CMA is its almost total lack of due process. For ...
[102]
Strategic steer and CMA policy proposals: UK government consults ...
Feb 14, 2025 · It has faced intense criticism for what some parties consider to have been jurisdictional overreach in certain cases, aggravated by the CMA not ...
[103]
Comments to the UK Parliament Regarding the Digital Markets ...
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Conflicting Missions: The Risks of the Digital Markets Unit to ...
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[105]
The UK's New Digital Markets Regime: Unfettered Discretion and ...
Oct 7, 2024 · The regime will be run by the Digital Markets Unit (“DMU”), a new directorate that sits within the CMA, which has been preparing in “shadow ...
[106]
UK Competition and Markets Authority Merger Outcome Statistics ...
Apr 24, 2025 · Of the six mergers referred for an in-depth investigation, two resulted in conditional clearances with remedies, one was blocked, one was ...Missing: appeal | Show results with:appeal
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CMA's Growth Agenda: UK Competition Authority May Loosen ...
Dec 6, 2024 · The CMA has in the past been called overly interventionist in merger control compared to other authorities, leading to claims that “the UK is ...
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[PDF] Growing pains: clarity and culture change required - Parliament UK
Jun 13, 2025 · “We know that regulatory uncertainty is a central factor raised by overseas investors as to why they are not investing (or investing more) ...
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Amid Expected Political Change in the UK, the CMA Will Likely ...
Jul 2, 2024 · As an NMD, the CMA is very independent of Parliament's political influence. While the government appoints members to the CMA's board and panel, ...
[110]
The CMA at 10: Why an independent, impartial competition and ...
Apr 18, 2024 · This is the core of the fair, open and effective competition the CMA was established to protect, to foster, and of the consumer protections it ...
[111]
UK government emphasises CMA's independence while steering it ...
May 15, 2025 · It directs the CMA to prioritise pro-growth and pro-investment interventions, to focus on harms that impact UK-based consumers and businesses, ...
[112]
draft strategic steer to the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)
May 15, 2025 · The government is committed to protecting the role of the CMA as the UK's independent competition authority and this is made clear in the ...
[113]
UK replaces CMA chair with ex-Amazon boss after anti-growth ...
Jan 22, 2025 · Doug Gurr, a former country manager for Amazon UK, has been selected by the government as interim chair of the Competition and Markets Authority.
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House of Lords slams UK government for delaying CMA board ...
Feb 8, 2024 · The delay in appointing senior officials to the UK's Competition and Markets Authority is “unacceptable,” a House of Lords committee has ...Missing: process | Show results with:process<|separator|>
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CMA Annual Plan 2023 to 2024 - GOV.UK
Mar 23, 2023 · The CMA will continue to take action to accelerate the transition to a net zero economy and promote environmental sustainability. We have ...
[116]
CMA clarifies stance on climate collaborative sustainability ... - IIGCC
Apr 25, 2024 · The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has published informal guidance on the application of the UK Competition Act 1998 to environmental sustainability ...Missing: impartiality | Show results with:impartiality
[117]
UK government pushes antitrust regulator to be 'less risk averse'
Feb 13, 2025 · Since taking power last year, the Labour government has stepped up pressure on regulators, demanding they play their part in tearing down ...
[118]
Competition with politicisation is not competition, it's harmful ...
Sep 6, 2023 · The European Union should reaffirm the principle that undue interference in competition enforcement is protectionism that has negative effects.
[119]
Trends, developments and divergence from EU law? The CMA's first ...
Feb 24, 2022 · This blog explores how the CMA has tackled its increased workload in the first year post-Brexit, under the shadow of the global pandemic.Missing: independence | Show results with:independence<|separator|>
[120]
CMA boss defends independence in face of pressure to green-light ...
Feb 27, 2024 · Competition and Markets Authority chief executive Sarah Cardell said the watchdog would remain independent in the face of political pressure ...<|separator|>
[121]
[PDF] Merger Policy, Competition and Innovation Leadership - ECIPE
ex-ante powers of the CMA and a growing regulatory burden that may replace competitive market forces: “The concern about the Digital Markets Unit's powers ...
[122]
https://tenentrepreneurs.org/s/Better-Together.pdf
[123]
New tech takeover laws threaten British startups
UK startups and competition would be damaged if the government cracks down on mergers and acquisitions involving big tech companies, a new report argues.
[124]
Will the UK CMA's changes to its merger rules deliver?
Aug 6, 2025 · The CMA's retooled approach to global merger investigations that prioritises mergers with a UK-specific impact, and deprioritises ...Missing: precautionary criticisms
[125]
Digital Markets Unit and the Digital Markets Competition Regime
Apr 7, 2021 · The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers (DMCC) Act, which came into effect in 2025, granted the CMA with powers to enforce the DMCR. The ...
[126]
CMA sets out initial plans as new digital markets competition regime ...
Jan 7, 2025 · As part of these preparations the CMA established its Digital Markets Unit (DMU), which has been operating in shadow form since 2021 and in ...
[127]
[PDF] A new pro-competition regime for digital markets - GOV.UK
The Digital Markets Unit was set up in a non-statutory form within the CMA in April 2021 to support the rapid establishment of the statutory regime. 25. The non ...
[128]
Mergers guidance on jurisdiction and procedure - GOV.UK
This guidance provides advice and general information to companies and their advisers on the procedures used by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)Missing: streamlined 2014-2019
[129]
CMA2: changes to CMA mergers guidance (2024) - GOV.UK
Nov 20, 2023 · The CMA is consulting on updates to guidance on jurisdiction and procedure (CMA2) in relation to merger control.
[130]
Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024: Impact of the ...
May 12, 2025 · Its three-pronged approach enhances the regulation of digital markets, reinvents the competition law and merger control regime and strengthens ...
[131]
[PDF] The State of UK Competition Report 2024 - GOV.UK
Oct 24, 2024 · Our previous report on labour market power (CMA, 2024) finds evidence of labour market power across many UK firms. Therefore, we opt for ...<|separator|>
[132]
UK–EU Competition Cooperation Agreement - Steptoe
Jul 2, 2025 · These include dawn raids, formal requests for information (RFIs), the power to impose significant fines, and the ability to block transactions ...
[133]
The end of an era? A transatlantic merger control retrospective
Mar 17, 2025 · Post-Brexit divergence between the EU and UK authorities has been much discussed. With the benefit of hindsight, we look back over the ...
[134]
[PDF] Challenges and sources of divergence in cross-border merger ...
Some competition authorities such as the ACCC (Australia), the EC (European Union), and the CMA were concerned that the transaction could lead to a significant ...
[135]
Evidence on Trade with China - UK Parliament Committees
Subsidies benefiting products that will be exported overseas have the effect of making the export price lower than it would be in the absence of subsidies.
[136]
Foreign Subsidies Regulation: subsidies under scrutiny
Jan 31, 2024 · The FSR rules enable the European Commission to tackle foreign subsidies that cause distortions and undermine the level playing field for companies.
[137]
CMA's Annual Plan to drive growth by promoting competition ...
Mar 27, 2025 · The plan sets out the CMA's firm commitment to use its competition and consumer protection powers to drive positive outcomes for UK consumers and businesses ...
[138]
Levelling the playing field: CMA's Powers Narrowed in Pro-Growth ...
May 21, 2025 · The UK Government has published the final version of its Strategic Steer1 to the CMA, which aims to create a “level playing field” through ...
[139]
New approach to ensure regulators and regulation support growth ...
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