Cyril Ramaphosa
Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa (born 17 November 1952) is a South African politician, businessman, and former trade union leader who has served as President of South Africa since February 2018 and as leader of the African National Congress (ANC) since December 2017.[1][2][3] Born in Johannesburg to Venda parents and raised in Soweto after his family relocated there in 1962, Ramaphosa studied law at the University of the North, where he became involved in student politics and was detained under security laws for his activism.[1][4] He rose to prominence as a trade unionist, serving as general secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers from 1982 to 1991 and helping establish the Congress of South African Trade Unions in 1985, during which time he led major strikes that advanced workers' rights amid apartheid repression.[1][3] Appointed ANC secretary-general in 1991, Ramaphosa chaired the party's negotiating team at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa and later led the Constitutional Assembly, overseeing the adoption of South Africa's post-apartheid constitution in 1996, a process credited with enabling a peaceful transition from minority rule.[1][5] Disillusioned with internal ANC dynamics, he exited politics in 1996 to build Shanduka Group, amassing wealth through stakes in mining, energy, and fast-food franchises, before re-entering public life in 2012 as ANC deputy leader and becoming deputy president under Jacob Zuma in 2014.[4][6] As president, Ramaphosa pledged to combat corruption and revive the economy but has presided over sluggish growth averaging 0.6 percent annually, unemployment surpassing 33 percent—particularly acute among youth at over 60 percent—and chronic power outages, while facing scrutiny over undeclared cash hidden at his Phala Phala farm in 2020, though cleared by investigators.[7][8][9] Following the ANC's loss of its parliamentary majority in the 2024 elections, Ramaphosa formed a government of national unity, retaining the presidency amid debates over policy reforms and fiscal constraints.[10]Early Life and Education
Childhood and Family Background
Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa was born on 17 November 1952 in Johannesburg to Samuel Ramaphosa, a policeman in the South African Police who later retired, and Erdmuth Ramaphosa.[1][11][12] His parents originated from Eastern Venda in rural northern South Africa and had migrated to urban Johannesburg for employment opportunities under the apartheid system's spatial restrictions on black South Africans.[13] Ramaphosa was the second of three children in the family.[11] The family initially lived in Western Native Township, a designated area for black residents on the outskirts of Johannesburg, before authorities relocated them to Soweto in 1962 as part of apartheid-era urban planning that segregated and controlled black populations in townships.[1][12] This move exposed the young Ramaphosa to the daily realities of racial segregation, including limited access to resources and enforced separation from white areas, though his parents attempted to insulate him from the regime's more direct brutalities by emphasizing education and stability.[14] Samuel's role in policing, which involved upholding apartheid laws, placed the family in a complex position within black communities, where such employment provided modest economic security amid widespread poverty but was often viewed with suspicion due to its association with state enforcement.[15] Ramaphosa's Venda heritage linked the family to traditional rural networks in Limpopo Province, influencing later decisions such as sending him at around age 16 to board at Mphaphuli High School in Sibasa, near his father's ancestral area, to complete secondary education away from urban disruptions.[16][17] These early experiences in a migrant labor household underscored the economic pressures driving black families to urban centers while maintaining rural ties, shaping Ramaphosa's formative years amid systemic disenfranchisement.[13]Academic and Early Influences
Ramaphosa completed his secondary education at Mphaphuli High School in Sibasa, Limpopo, matriculating in 1971.[18] In 1972, he enrolled at the University of the North (now the University of Limpopo) in Turfloop to pursue a BProc degree in law, marking the beginning of his formal academic engagement with legal studies amid the intensifying anti-apartheid struggle.[1] [11] At university, Ramaphosa's academic pursuits were quickly intertwined with political activism, as he joined the South African Students' Organisation (SASO), a key proponent of the black consciousness movement led by figures like Steve Biko, which emphasized psychological liberation and self-reliance among black South Africans.[1] He also served as chairman of the Student Christian Movement, exposing him to liberation theology that fused Christian ethics with anti-apartheid resistance, influencing his view of faith as a tool for social justice.[11] These involvements shaped his early worldview, prioritizing organized resistance against apartheid's systemic oppression over uninterrupted scholarly focus, though they led to his detention without trial for several months in 1974 following a pro-Frelimo rally supporting Mozambique's independence.[4] [11] Disruptions from activism and detentions prevented completion of his degree at the University of the North, prompting him to pursue extramural studies through the University of South Africa (Unisa), from which he graduated with a BProc in 1981.[19] This period solidified influences from black consciousness ideology and student organizing, directing him toward labor union leadership as a practical extension of legal training and political mobilization, rather than conventional legal practice.[1]Anti-Apartheid Activism
Labor Union Leadership
In 1982, Cyril Ramaphosa founded the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) at the request of the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA), serving as its inaugural general secretary alongside figures such as James Motlatsi and Elijah Barayi.[1] The union was formally launched on 4 December 1982 in Klerksdorp (now Matlosana), aiming to organize black mineworkers against exploitative conditions under apartheid-era labor practices.[20] Under Ramaphosa's leadership, the NUM expanded rapidly, securing collective bargaining recognition from the Chamber of Mines in 1983 and growing to represent over 300,000 workers by the late 1980s, making it South Africa's largest trade union at the time.[21] Ramaphosa directed several high-stakes strikes that challenged mining industry employers and the apartheid state. In 1984, he led the NUM in a major strike beginning on 9 August, involving tens of thousands of gold and coal miners demanding wage increases and better conditions; the action, one of the largest in South African history, lasted several weeks and resulted in significant concessions despite violent repression that killed dozens of workers.[22] A follow-up strike in 1985 further pressured employers, leading to the suspension of the action on 3 September after partial gains on pay and recognition.[23] In 1987, amid a wage dispute, Ramaphosa orchestrated a three-week national strike across gold, coal, platinum, and other sectors, involving over 300,000 miners and culminating in a 13% wage settlement after intense negotiations with the Chamber of Mines.[4] His tenure emphasized strategic organizing and non-racial unionism, though Ramaphosa's style was characterized as consultative and pastoral rather than overtly charismatic, prioritizing member input and sustained pressure on employers over short-term militancy.[24] Ramaphosa also played a key role in forming the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in 1985, serving on its inaugural executive and integrating the NUM into a broader federation that coordinated anti-apartheid labor actions.[1] By 1991, the NUM under his guidance had transformed from a nascent entity into a powerhouse that influenced national politics, though Ramaphosa stepped down as secretary to assume the ANC secretary-general position.[6]Key Strikes and Organizational Growth
Ramaphosa served as the inaugural general secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), founded on 5 August 1982 in Johannesburg, initially representing around 6,000 mineworkers amid apartheid-era restrictions on black labor organization.[25] Under his leadership, the NUM rapidly expanded by focusing on shop-floor organizing, winning formal bargaining recognition from the Chamber of Mines in 1983 after initial recruitment drives and localized actions demonstrated worker support.[4] This recognition marked a pivotal shift, enabling the union to negotiate industry-wide agreements and grow membership to over 200,000 by mid-decade through aggressive recruitment in gold, coal, and platinum sectors.[26] A key early strike occurred in 1984, involving coordinated actions at major mines like Vaal Reefs, where demands for better wages and conditions led to over 14,000 dismissals, including 13,000 at Vaal Reefs South alone, testing the union's resilience but ultimately reinforcing its organizational structure via re-recruitment and solidarity campaigns.[26] The NUM's growth accelerated as these efforts exposed systemic exploitation, drawing in migrant workers from hostels and rural areas, with membership surpassing 300,000 by 1987.[22] The most significant action was the 1987 strike, launched on 9 August after failed wage talks with the Chamber of Mines, mobilizing over 330,000 miners—primarily on Anglo American operations—for 21 days in South Africa's largest and longest mining stoppage to date.[22][27] Despite no immediate wage gains and mass dismissals exceeding 50,000, the strike catalyzed broader anti-apartheid mobilization, enhanced NUM's bargaining leverage in subsequent years, and solidified its role as a vanguard for black worker rights, contributing to sustained membership growth and influence in the labor federation COSATU formed in 1985.[4][28]Constitutional Role and ANC Ascendancy
Negotiations for Democracy
In July 1991, Cyril Ramaphosa was elected secretary-general of the African National Congress (ANC), positioning him as the head of the party's negotiation team amid the unbanning of political organizations and the release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990.[1] This role thrust him into the forefront of talks with the National Party government led by F.W. de Klerk, culminating in the launch of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) on December 20, 1991, at the World Trade Centre in Kempton Park.[29] As ANC chief negotiator, Ramaphosa engaged in bilateral discussions with government counterpart Roelf Meyer, defense minister and later constitutional affairs minister, fostering a personal rapport that facilitated progress on thorny issues like power-sharing and constitutional principles despite deep mistrust from decades of conflict.[30] CODESA I established 19 working groups to draft an interim constitution, but entrenched positions—particularly the ANC's demand for majority rule versus the government's insistence on federalism and minority protections—stalled agreement.[31] CODESA II, reconvened in May 1992, collapsed following the Boipatong massacre on June 17, 1992, where 45 people were killed in an attack blamed on Inkatha Freedom Party supporters allegedly aided by police, prompting the ANC to withdraw and erect the "tent city" protest outside the negotiations venue.[31] Ramaphosa and Meyer then revived a confidential bilateral channel in August 1992, conducting over 40 off-the-record meetings that de-escalated violence and rebuilt momentum, including agreements on an independent electoral commission and a transitional executive council.[32] This groundwork enabled the Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP), initiated on March 5, 1993, involving 26 parties and excluding only minor groups like the Pan Africanist Congress initially.[33] Ramaphosa's pragmatic approach emphasized verifiable commitments over ideological purity, helping navigate impasses such as the Inkatha Freedom Party's walkout in April 1993 after the adoption of an election date of April 27, 1994.[13] By November 1993, intensified sessions—marked by a critical "sunset clause" deal on minority rights and a November 16 meeting among Mandela, de Klerk, Ramaphosa, and Meyer—yielded the interim constitution, signed into law on December 18, 1993, which enshrined universal suffrage, a government of national unity for five years, and protections against retroactive land expropriation.[34] Ramaphosa's insistence on binding agreements averted broader civil war, as evidenced by the decline in political violence from over 3,000 deaths in 1992 to under 1,000 by mid-1993, though critics from both sides accused him of concessions that diluted radical reforms.[31] These negotiations directly enabled the ANC's victory in the April 1994 elections, with Ramaphosa subsequently chairing the Constitutional Assembly tasked with finalizing the permanent constitution by 1996.[1]Elevation Within ANC Hierarchy
At the African National Congress's 48th National Conference, held in Durban from 2 to 6 July 1991—the first such gathering inside South Africa following the organization's unbanning in February 1990—Cyril Ramaphosa was elected secretary-general, a pivotal administrative and strategic role within the party's hierarchy.[1][3] This election positioned him as the chief negotiator for the ANC in talks with the apartheid government, overseeing the development of the party's policy framework amid the transition to democracy.[1][4] Ramaphosa's selection reflected his growing influence, derived from his prior leadership in the National Union of Mineworkers and his alignment with pragmatic elements favoring negotiated settlement over protracted conflict.[35] As secretary-general, Ramaphosa chaired the ANC's National Negotiations Commission, which coordinated the party's participation in multi-party forums like the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) starting in December 1991 and the subsequent bilateral talks that culminated in the 1993 interim constitution.[1][36] His tenure also involved managing internal party dynamics, including the integration of exiled leadership with domestic activists, and he was simultaneously elected to the ANC's National Executive Committee (NEC), enhancing his access to decision-making at the highest levels.[1] This dual role solidified Ramaphosa's status as a rising figure, often viewed by observers as Nelson Mandela's preferred successor due to his organizational acumen and avoidance of factional extremism.[37] Ramaphosa retained the secretary-general position through the ANC's 49th National Conference in December 1994, where the party affirmed its dominance post-election victory, but his elevation began to wane as Thabo Mbeki consolidated support for the deputy presidency.[38] By April 1996, amid frustrations with bureaucratic constraints and opportunities in the private sector, he announced his intent to resign from active political roles, marking the end of his initial ascent within the ANC structure.[39]Business Career
Major Investments and Wealth Building
Following his departure from frontline politics in the mid-1990s, Ramaphosa entered the business sector, establishing Shanduka Group in 2001 as a black-owned investment holding company focused on black economic empowerment (BEE) opportunities. Shanduka rapidly diversified into sectors including mining, energy, real estate, banking, insurance, and telecommunications, with Ramaphosa serving as executive chairman. The group's portfolio included stakes in coal mining ventures with Glencore Xstrata and significant holdings in platinum producer Lonmin Plc, where Shanduka acquired a 9% stake in 2010 using R2.5 billion in loan financing from Lonmin itself to fulfill BEE requirements. These investments positioned Shanduka as a key player in resource extraction, leveraging post-apartheid equity mandates to secure preferential access.[40][41][42] A notable expansion came in March 2011, when Shanduka secured a 20-year master franchise agreement to operate all 145 McDonald's restaurants in South Africa, including ownership of associated properties; the deal's financial terms were not publicly disclosed, but it marked Ramaphosa's entry into consumer retail franchising amid growing fast-food demand. Shanduka sold this franchise in September 2016 to a Middle Eastern investor group, capitalizing on the chain's established market presence. Concurrently, Shanduka's mining interests, particularly in Lonmin, generated returns through dividends and interest payments that offset acquisition debts, though Lonmin later faced financial strain partly attributed to such arrangements. In November 2014, ahead of his vice presidency, Ramaphosa divested Shanduka's mining assets—including Lonmin and coal operations—to avoid conflicts of interest, reportedly netting between $200 million and $300 million personally from the transactions.[43][44][45] Shanduka's growth and subsequent mergers—culminating in its integration into Phembani Group in June 2015—formed the core of Ramaphosa's wealth accumulation, with the firm described as his primary value creator through strategic BEE-compliant deals that often involved equity swaps and government-linked tenders. By 2018, his net worth was estimated at approximately R6.4 billion (about $450 million), derived largely from these divestments and residual holdings in diversified assets. Critics, including business analysts, have questioned the sustainability of such BEE-driven gains, arguing they relied on political proximity rather than operational innovation, as evidenced by Shanduka's dependence on resource sector subsidies and loans. Ramaphosa maintained stakes in non-mining areas like energy and property post-divestment, sustaining income streams into his political return.[46][47][40]Black Economic Empowerment Involvement
Ramaphosa established the Shanduka Group in 2001 as a black-owned investment company that capitalized on South Africa's emerging Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) framework, which incentivized companies to transfer equity stakes to black-owned entities to meet empowerment criteria.[48][49] Shanduka focused on sectors such as resources, energy, and financial services, acquiring minority stakes in established firms through BEE transactions that often involved discounted shares or financing arrangements tied to political connections.[50] In 2005, Shanduka partnered with Glencore as its BEE counterpart for a coal export project, securing empowerment-compliant ownership in the venture, and later collaborated again on investments in the Optimum coal mine.[50] By 2010, Shanduka had taken a 50% stake in Incwala Resources, the designated BEE partner of UK-based mining firm Lonmin, which held a 26.5% interest in Lonmin's South African operations, amplifying Ramaphosa's influence in platinum mining ahead of the 2012 Marikana massacre.[13] These deals, facilitated by BEE codes requiring black ownership thresholds, contributed significantly to Ramaphosa's personal fortune, estimated to exceed R6 billion by the mid-2010s through Shanduka's exits and dividends. Critics contend that Ramaphosa's BEE engagements exemplify how the policy disproportionately enriched a narrow cadre of politically connected individuals rather than fostering widespread economic inclusion, with Shanduka's gains reliant on state-linked tenders and empowerment discounts that bypassed broader black entrepreneurship.[51][52] Ramaphosa has defended BEE as essential for redressing apartheid-era disparities, dismissing claims of elite capture by emphasizing its role in creating black industrialists like himself.[53] Shanduka was wound down by 2014 amid Ramaphosa's return to politics, with assets sold to entities including Chinese investors, yielding further returns estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars.Conflicts of Interest and Criticisms
During his tenure as a non-executive director of Lonmin Plc from 2010 to 2014, Cyril Ramaphosa faced significant criticism for his role in the events leading to the Marikana massacre on August 16, 2012, where South African police killed 34 striking miners and injured 78 others at Lonmin's platinum mine in Marikana, North West province.[6] On August 15, 2012, the day before the shooting, Ramaphosa emailed Lonmin management and government ministers, describing the ongoing wildcat strike as a "dastardly criminal" act and urging "concomitant action" to address it, which critics interpreted as pressuring authorities for a forceful response against the protesters.[54] Labor unions and analysts accused him of betraying his roots as a former trade union leader by prioritizing corporate interests over workers' rights, with the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) later rejecting his 2017 apology as inadequate, arguing that his influence as a Lonmin director and senior ANC figure exacerbated tensions without improving miners' conditions.[55] The Farlam Commission of Inquiry into the massacre criticized Lonmin for failing to engage workers on grievances, though it did not directly hold Ramaphosa accountable for the police action; nonetheless, the incident damaged his reputation among labor activists who viewed it as emblematic of his shift from union advocacy to elite business alignment.[56] Ramaphosa's business interests through Shanduka Group, which he founded in 2000, drew accusations of conflicts of interest, particularly in Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) transactions that leveraged his ANC connections for equity stakes in major firms. Shanduka secured BEE deals in sectors like energy, mining, and telecommunications, amassing Ramaphosa an estimated fortune exceeding R6 billion by 2012, yet critics contended these were not built through entrepreneurial innovation but via politically facilitated "handouts" under BEE policies designed to redistribute ownership post-apartheid.[57] A notable controversy arose in 2012 when Shanduka acquired a minority stake in MTN Nigeria amid Ramaphosa's chairmanship of MTN Group, prompting Corruption Watch to highlight the potential for undue influence in regulatory or investment decisions favoring his personal holdings.[58] While Shanduka denied impropriety and no formal sanctions resulted, such overlaps fueled broader critiques of BEE as a system enabling cronyism, where politically connected individuals like Ramaphosa gained disproportionate benefits—evidenced by his stakes in entities like Standard Bank and Alexander Forbes—without equivalent risks or contributions borne by non-connected black entrepreneurs.[59] Further scrutiny targeted alleged tender irregularities involving Shanduka subsidiaries, such as claims in 2012 of collusion in Free State province school construction contracts, though the Presidency later stated in 2021 that Shanduka received no such tenders.[60] Ramaphosa's defenders, including business analysts, argued these criticisms overlooked the structural barriers to black wealth creation in a historically white-dominated economy, but detractors, including opposition figures, portrayed his trajectory as hypocritical for a former anti-apartheid activist who amassed wealth while South Africa's inequality persisted, with Gini coefficients remaining above 0.63 in the 2010s.[52] These business-era controversies underscored tensions between Ramaphosa's professed commitment to ethical capitalism and perceptions of elite capture, influencing public and intra-ANC debates on his suitability for higher political office.[61]Political Re-entry and Deputy Roles
ANC Deputy Presidency
Cyril Ramaphosa was elected as Deputy President of the African National Congress (ANC) at the party's 53rd National Conference in Mangaung, Free State, held from December 16 to 20, 2012.[62] He secured 3,018 votes from approximately 4,500 delegates, defeating challengers including Tokyo Sexwale with 470 votes and Kgalema Motlanthe, the incumbent deputy who had shifted focus to contesting the ANC presidency against Jacob Zuma.[63][64] Ramaphosa's victory, backed by Zuma's allies despite his business background and earlier sidelining by the party, positioned him as the presumptive successor to Zuma, who was re-elected ANC President with 2,775 votes.[65] In his role as ANC Deputy President from December 2012 to December 2017, Ramaphosa served on the National Executive Committee (NEC), the party's highest decision-making body between conferences, and contributed to policy formulation and internal governance.[3] He chaired subcommittees on economic transformation and supported ANC branches in implementing resolutions from Mangaung, including calls for organizational renewal amid declining electoral support.[1] Ramaphosa advocated for strengthening party discipline and addressing factionalism, often mediating disputes within provincial structures strained by patronage networks.[13] Tensions emerged between Ramaphosa and Zuma over allegations of corruption and state capture involving Zuma's associates, such as the Gupta family and executives at state-owned enterprises.[66] Ramaphosa later testified before the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into State Capture in August 2021 that he raised concerns internally about graft during cabinet meetings and NEC discussions but prioritized ANC unity to avoid public splits, opting for private persuasion over confrontation.[67] The commission's 2022 report criticized Ramaphosa for limited action, noting he could have leveraged his deputy authority more aggressively against implicated officials, though it acknowledged systemic resistance from Zuma loyalists.[68] These frictions intensified by 2016, as Ramaphosa distanced himself from Zuma's defense of controversial policies like the Nkandla homestead upgrades, ruled unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 2016.[6] Ramaphosa's deputy tenure facilitated his grooming for higher leadership, with him defending the ANC's legacy in public addresses while critiquing inefficiencies in state institutions.[69] By late 2017, amid Zuma's mounting scandals, Ramaphosa's reformist stance garnered broader NEC support, culminating in his election as ANC President at the 54th National Conference on December 18, 2017, where he narrowly defeated Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma with 2,440 votes to 2,261.[70] This transition marked the end of his deputy role and Zuma's effective sidelining within the party.South African Deputy Presidency
Ramaphosa was appointed Deputy President of South Africa on 25 May 2014, following Jacob Zuma's re-election as President after the African National Congress (ANC) secured 62.15% of the vote in the 7 May general elections.[1] In this role, he assisted the President in executing governmental functions, chaired cabinet meetings in Zuma's absence, and acted as acting President during Zuma's international travel or unavailability, including periods in 2015 and 2017.[6] His appointment positioned him as a counterbalance to Zuma's administration, which was increasingly embroiled in corruption allegations, though Ramaphosa initially lent legitimacy to the government amid public scandals.[6] As Deputy President, Ramaphosa chaired the National Planning Commission from 3 June 2014, overseeing efforts to advance the National Development Plan aimed at reducing poverty and inequality through economic reforms, though implementation lagged due to policy gridlock and resistance from Zuma-aligned ministers.[71] He coordinated economic cluster portfolios, advocating for private sector involvement in infrastructure and youth employment programs, such as expanding the Youth Employment Service to place over 100,000 young people in jobs by 2017.[35] Ramaphosa also led initiatives on HIV/AIDS response as vice-chair of the South African National AIDS Council, contributing to a decline in new infections from 480,000 in 2012 to approximately 220,000 by 2017 through expanded antiretroviral treatment access.[35] The tenure occurred amid South Africa's deepening state capture crisis, involving alleged influence by the Gupta family over cabinet appointments and procurement, with Ramaphosa's reformist stance clashing with Zuma's faction; he publicly criticized corruption in 2016 speeches but lacked authority to enact purges until later.[72] Economic indicators reflected stagnation, with GDP growth averaging 1.1% annually from 2014 to 2017, unemployment rising to 27.5% by 2018, and state-owned enterprises like Eskom accumulating R400 billion in debt under mismanagement tolerated in the cabinet.[73] Critics, including opposition parties, accused Ramaphosa of complicity by remaining in a cabinet that approved controversial deals, such as the R30 billion Optimum coal contract linked to Gupta entities in 2015.[74] Ramaphosa's election as ANC President on 18 December 2017 at the party's 54th conference intensified internal divisions, paving the way for Zuma's resignation on 14 February 2018; Ramaphosa was then elected President by the National Assembly the following day, ending his deputy tenure.[3] During this period, leaked emails in September 2017 revealed a personal affair, prompting privacy concerns but no formal political repercussions.[75] His deputy role thus served as a bridge for ANC renewal efforts, though constrained by Zuma's dominance until the leadership shift.[76]ANC Leadership
Contested Election and Zuma Succession
At the African National Congress's 54th National Conference, held from December 16 to 20, 2017, at the Nasrec Expo Centre in Johannesburg, delegates elected a new party president amid intense factional rivalry.[77] Cyril Ramaphosa, then deputy president of South Africa and the ANC, competed against Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, a former African Union Commission chairperson and ex-wife of incumbent ANC president Jacob Zuma, who was widely seen as her backer.[78] The contest reflected deep divisions within the ANC between Ramaphosa's reform-oriented faction, emphasizing anti-corruption measures, and Zuma's supporters, who favored continuity amid allegations of state capture under Zuma's tenure.[79] On December 18, 2017, Ramaphosa was declared the winner in a closely fought ballot involving approximately 5,000 delegates.[80] [81] His victory, by a narrow margin, secured him the ANC presidency and positioned him as the party's candidate for South Africa's presidency, given the ANC's tradition of the party leader assuming the national role.[77] Zuma's allies contested the outcome, alleging irregularities in branch nominations and delegate accreditation processes that favored Ramaphosa, though no formal challenges overturned the results, and the ANC's electoral committee upheld the vote.[82] Ramaphosa's election intensified pressure on Zuma to resign as both ANC president and South African head of state to avoid a leadership split.[83] On February 13, 2018, the ANC's National Executive Committee formally recalled Zuma, citing the need for unity following the conference outcome.[84] Zuma resigned the presidency on February 14, 2018, after initial resistance, stating he disagreed with the decision but complied to prevent further discord.[85] Parliament elected Ramaphosa as president on February 15, 2018, with 396 votes in favor out of 539 cast, marking the formal transfer of power from Zuma's administration.[86] This succession averted a potential constitutional crisis but highlighted ongoing ANC internal tensions, as Zuma loyalists continued to challenge Ramaphosa's authority in subsequent party structures.[87]Internal Renewal Initiatives
Upon assuming the ANC presidency in December 2017 following the 54th National Conference, Cyril Ramaphosa prioritized internal renewal to address corruption, factionalism, and organizational decline exacerbated during Jacob Zuma's tenure. The renewal agenda, formalized through the conference resolutions, emphasized rebuilding the party's ethical foundation, enhancing cadre quality, and restoring public trust, with Ramaphosa framing it as essential for advancing the National Democratic Revolution.[88] [89] A cornerstone initiative was the "step-aside" rule, adopted at the 2017 conference and requiring ANC members charged with corruption or serious crimes to voluntarily withdraw from leadership positions within 30 days or face suspension by the National Executive Committee. This measure, retained without amendment at the 2022 policy conference, aimed to bolster organizational integrity by sidelining accused individuals during legal proceedings, targeting the pervasive graft exposed by the Zondo Commission. However, critics, including Ramaphosa's rivals within the party, contended that its application was selective, primarily targeting Zuma-aligned figures like Ace Magashule while sparing others, thereby serving factional interests rather than uniform accountability.[90] [91] [92] Complementing this, the ANC Integrity Commission was strengthened under Ramaphosa to vet candidates for public office, investigate ethical breaches, and enforce disciplinary actions, including against members failing to cooperate on state capture inquiries. In March 2024, the commission cleared Ramaphosa and Gwede Mantashe for candidacy after reviewing adverse findings, deeming nine top leaders eligible based on its assessments. Amendments in October 2024 sought to reinforce the commission's independence as the guardian of ANC values, mandating disciplinary proceedings for non-compliant members.[93] [94] Renewal efforts extended to cadre development and organizational revitalization, including the 2018 OR Tambo Policy on leadership to improve deployment practices and political education programs aimed at fostering ethical, competent members. Ramaphosa's administration introduced accountability frameworks requiring leaders to report performance regularly and focused on reconstructing branch structures into "vibrant and activist" units through grassroots engagement. By 2025, these included intensified branch visits and a municipal revival plan to align local governance with renewal goals, though empirical outcomes remained contested amid the party's 2024 electoral decline to 40% support, suggesting incomplete implementation.[95] [96] [97]2024 Electoral Setbacks and Coalition Politics
In the general elections held on 29 May 2024, the African National Congress (ANC), under Cyril Ramaphosa's leadership, received 40.18% of the national vote, securing 159 seats in the 400-member National Assembly—a sharp decline from 57.50% and 230 seats in 2019.[98] [99] This marked the first time since the end of apartheid that the ANC failed to win an outright majority, reflecting widespread voter dissatisfaction driven by persistent economic stagnation, with unemployment exceeding 32% and GDP growth averaging under 1% annually in recent years, alongside chronic infrastructure failures such as frequent power outages (load shedding) that disrupted businesses and households.[99] [100] Corruption scandals, including state capture under prior ANC administrations and unaddressed cadre deployment practices, further eroded public trust, as evidenced by the party's loss of support in key provinces like Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal, where it fell below 40%.[101] [102] The Democratic Alliance (DA) emerged as the official opposition with 21.81% of the vote and 87 seats, while Jacob Zuma's uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) party captured 14.58% primarily in KwaZulu-Natal, and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) obtained 9.52%.[103] Ramaphosa, facing internal ANC pressure to resign amid the setback, rejected demands from Zuma-aligned factions and instead pursued coalition talks, announcing on 14 June 2024 the formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU) with the DA, Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and smaller parties like the Patriotic Alliance, excluding the leftist MK and EFF to prioritize centrist economic reforms.[104] [105] Parliament re-elected Ramaphosa as president that day with 283 votes out of 444, enabling the coalition's support.[104] The GNU cabinet, unveiled by Ramaphosa on 30 June 2024 and sworn in on 3 July, allocated key portfolios to coalition partners, including DA leader John Steenhuisen as Minister of Agriculture and DA members in Home Affairs, Public Works, and Environment, signaling a shift toward market-oriented policies amid ideological tensions over issues like land expropriation without compensation.[106] [107] Voter turnout dropped to 58.64%, the lowest in a post-apartheid national election, underscoring apathy linked to unfulfilled ANC promises on service delivery and inequality, where over 55% of the population remains below the poverty line.[101] [99] Early coalition governance has shown stability but fragility, with disputes over budget allocations and policy priorities testing Ramaphosa's brokering role.[108]Presidential Tenure
Economic Management and Stagnation
Cyril Ramaphosa assumed the presidency on February 15, 2018, inheriting an economy undermined by years of state capture, corruption, and infrastructure decay under his predecessor Jacob Zuma. His administration prioritized structural reforms to unlock growth, including efforts to dismantle monopolies, improve energy supply, and attract investment through initiatives like the Presidential Investment Conference. Despite these pledges, real GDP growth averaged under 2% annually from 2018 to 2023, with a post-COVID rebound to 4.96% in 2021 followed by deceleration to 1.91% in 2022 and subdued rates thereafter, constrained by persistent supply-side bottlenecks.[109][110] Per capita GDP declined from $6,680 in 2017 to $6,190 in 2023, reflecting growth lagging population expansion and exacerbating poverty.[111] A core driver of stagnation was the escalating energy crisis at Eskom, South Africa's state-owned utility, where load shedding—rolling blackouts—intensified from 2018 onward due to aging infrastructure, mismanagement, and insufficient maintenance. These outages, peaking at over 300 days in 2023, disrupted manufacturing and mining, reduced industrial output by up to 20% in affected sectors, and contributed an estimated 2.3% drag on annual GDP growth through lost productivity and higher operational costs for businesses adopting backups.[112][113] Ramaphosa's government responded with emergency procurement of private renewables and debt relief for Eskom, but union resistance and regulatory hurdles delayed transmission expansions, prolonging the crisis.[114] Unemployment compounded the malaise, rising from around 27% in 2018 to 33.2% by Q2 2025, with expanded measures including discouraged workers pushing effective joblessness above 40%; youth rates hit 62.2%, fueling social unrest and skills mismatches in a rigid labor market protected by collective bargaining laws.[8][115][116] Policies like broad-based black economic empowerment (BEE), while aimed at redress, were criticized for entrenching cronyism and deterring investment through compliance burdens, contributing to deindustrialization and low business confidence.[117] To counter these issues, Ramaphosa launched Operation Vulindlela in October 2020, a joint initiative with the Treasury targeting seven priorities including electricity generation, port efficiency, and digital infrastructure, with Phase II in May 2025 extending to local government and water reforms.[118][119] Progress included visa system streamlining and initial load shedding reductions by mid-2025, but implementation lagged due to bureaucratic inertia and fiscal constraints, with annualized growth stuck at 0.6% into 2025.[120][117] Foreign direct investment remained tepid, with inflows of 11.7 billion rand ($661 million) in Q1 2025, hampered by policy uncertainty over land expropriation and mining regulations, despite Ramaphosa's $100 billion FDI target.[121][122]| Key Economic Indicators Under Ramaphosa (2018–2025) | Value/Trend |
|---|---|
| Average Annual GDP Growth | <2% (2018–2023)[109] |
| Per Capita GDP Change (2017–2023) | -7.3% ($6,680 to $6,190)[111] |
| Unemployment Rate (Q2 2025) | 33.2% (youth: 62.2%)[8] |
| FDI Inflows (Q1 2025) | 11.7 billion rand[121] |
| Load Shedding GDP Impact (Est.) | -2.3% annual growth[113] |