Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Direct tax

A direct tax is a levy imposed by a government directly on the income, profits, wealth, or property of individuals or organizations, which the taxpayer pays without shifting the burden to another party. Unlike indirect taxes such as value-added or sales taxes, which are collected from intermediaries and embedded in the price of goods or services, direct taxes target the earner or owner explicitly. Common examples include personal income taxes, corporate income taxes, estate taxes, and property taxes, which form a significant portion of revenue in modern economies. Historically, direct taxes faced constitutional constraints in federations like the , where early interpretations required apportionment among states for taxes on persons or to prevent regional inequities, leading to debates resolved by the Sixteenth in 1913 authorizing unapportioned taxes. This shift enabled expansive use of progressive direct taxation for funding public goods and redistribution, though origins trace to ancient systems like wealth-based levies. Direct taxes influence economic behavior by altering marginal incentives: higher rates on labor reduce work effort and hours supplied, while taxes on discourage and , often correlating with slower long-term in empirical analyses across countries. Studies indicate that reliance on direct taxes, particularly at elevated rates, can impede GDP expansion compared to lighter burdens or alternatives like taxes, though they enable targeted . Controversies persist over their progressivity, which aims to equalize burdens but may exacerbate inefficiencies if rates exceed revenue-maximizing levels, as observed in labor supply distortions.

Definition and Fundamentals

Conceptual Definition

A direct tax is a imposed by a entity on the , , or person of a , where both the legal incidence—who is statutorily required to remit payment—and the economic incidence—who ultimately bears the reduced or —coincide on the same individual or entity, precluding substantial shifting to third parties via mechanisms or contractual adjustments. This definition prioritizes the causal reality of burden distribution over formal legal designation, as economic theory demonstrates that taxes labeled "direct" can exhibit partial shifting under certain elasticities of , while some "indirect" levies may bind inescapably to the initial payer. Verifiability of incidence thus hinges on empirical of behavioral responses, such as rigidity or asset inelasticity, rather than administrative convenience alone. John Stuart Mill, in his Principles of Political Economy (1848), articulated direct taxes as those "paid by the person on whom it is legally imposed," emphasizing their transparency and resistance to evasion compared to indirect forms embedded in transactions. Adam Smith, in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), similarly contrasted taxes on rents, profits, or capitation with those on consumables, arguing that the former fall directly on the contributor without intermediary absorption, aligning incidence with the taxed party's capacity to bear it. These classifications underscore a first-principles approach: direct taxes enforce accountability by linking payment to verifiable personal attributes like headcount or ownership, minimizing opportunities for diffusion through market channels. Archetypal direct taxes include poll or head taxes, which exact a uniform sum per liable individual irrespective of economic activity, ensuring non-shiftable incidence on the assessee. Such instruments, historically employed for their simplicity in assessment, have become uncommon in contemporary fiscal systems due to challenges in equitable enforcement amid heterogeneous populations.

Distinction from Indirect Taxes

Direct taxes are levied directly on individuals or entities based on their , , or , with the legal incidence fixed on the who bears the burden without the to shift it to others. In contrast, indirect taxes, such as value-added taxes () or sales taxes, are imposed on transactions involving , allowing the initial payer—typically a —to pass the forward through higher prices to consumers or other parties in the . This pass-through mechanism in indirect taxes creates economic distortions where the actual burden depends on market dynamics rather than statutory assignment, avoiding the direct visibility of who pays but embedding compliance within routine commerce. The incidence of indirect taxes hinges on the relative price elasticities of : when is less than supply, consumers absorb a larger share of the through elevated prices, whereas inelastic supply shifts more burden to producers. , by design, preclude such shifting, as the liability adheres to the assessed taxpayer—such as through brackets—ensuring the payer's incentives remain unaltered by intermediary repricing but exposing them to personal behavioral adjustments like reduced labor supply. This fixed liability fosters causal clarity in direct taxation, where policy intent directly maps to payer obligations, unlike the diffused outcomes in indirect systems influenced by elasticities that can obscure accountability. Administratively, direct taxes necessitate individualized , return filing, and mechanisms like withholding or audits to verify and , which demand higher administrative but enable tailored progressivity. Indirect taxes, integrated into point-of-sale or supply-chain collections, streamline by leveraging records, reducing the need for declarations and yielding lower evasion rates since evasion requires coordinated underreporting across intermediaries. However, direct taxes face elevated evasion risks in environments with weak institutional trust, as taxpayers may underreport earnings more readily than businesses concealing embedded taxes, amplifying costs for governments reliant on . Direct taxes permit observable progressivity, where higher earners face escalating rates traceable to explicit legislative brackets, aligning with ability-to-pay principles. Indirect taxes exhibit regressive tendencies, as uniform rates on disproportionately burden lower- households who allocate a greater share of to taxable , rendering their distributional effects less amenable to calibration without exemptions that complicate . This in systems highlights -driven , while indirect regressivity underscores reliance on patterns over individualized assessments.

Historical Evolution

Origins in Ancient and Pre-Modern Societies

In , direct taxation emerged as early as the third millennium BCE, primarily in the form of land taxes assessed on agricultural yields following the annual s. Pharaohs levied these taxes , typically as a portion of harvests—often around one-fifth to one-third depending on fertility and levels—to sustain the state's administrative apparatus, including labor for monumental projects and military campaigns. This system centralized revenue extraction, enabling pharaonic authority to maintain armies without immediate reliance on currency debasement, though it imposed coercive burdens on peasant households vulnerable to variability. The introduced tributum, a direct levy on property and later , to finance military expeditions, with assessments based on declared wealth and applied mainly to citizens during wartime. Under (r. 27 BCE–14 CE), the tributum capitis was formalized as a on provincial subjects, fixed at rates like one per adult male, generating stable funds for legions and imperial while sparing citizens to curb domestic unrest. Plebeian resistance to these levies, evident in early secessions (e.g., 494 BCE) over enslavement tied to and tax obligations, highlighted their coercive nature and prompted patrician concessions like , underscoring how direct taxes fueled expansion but risked social upheaval when unequally distributed. In pre-modern societies, direct taxes adapted to imperial and feudal structures. Medieval Europe's feudal system relied on land levies such as —commutations of obligations into cash payments from vassals' estates—to equip armies for and dynastic wars, often assessed ad hoc at rates like two shillings per knight's fee. The Islamic caliphates, from the , imposed as a on non-Muslim dhimmis (protected subjects), scaled by (e.g., 48, 24, or 12 dirhams annually for wealthy, middle, or poor adult males), to fund conquests and administration while incentivizing conversion to avoid payment. In , property assessments under dynasties like the (206 BCE–220 ) formed the core of taxes, with cadastral surveys determining yields and levies (typically 1/15th of harvest) to support centralized bureaucracies and border defenses, contrasting decentralized tolls in less unified realms. These mechanisms provided rulers with non-inflationary revenue for military needs, bypassing seigniorage's risks of currency dilution, though frequent revolts—such as Roman provincial uprisings or Chinese peasant rebellions—revealed enforcement's reliance on force.

Emergence in the Modern Era

The transition to systematic direct taxes in the modern era coincided with the demands of industrialization and expanding state functions, as governments sought revenue sources more stable and verifiable than mercantilist reliance on customs duties and excises, which fluctuated with trade and were vulnerable to smuggling. In Britain, the window tax of 1696—levied at two shillings on houses with up to ten windows and higher rates thereafter—served as an early proxy for wealth assessment, generating revenue for William III's wars without broad income enumeration, but its unpopularity and evasion led to reforms and eventual repeal in 1851 amid complaints of arbitrary enforcement and health impacts from bricked-up windows. Similarly, under the U.S. Articles of Confederation (1781–1789), the national government's inability to impose direct taxes on individuals—limited to state requisitions that often went unpaid—resulted in chronic revenue shortfalls, with federal interest obligations alone reaching $1.6 million by the mid-1780s and contributing to fiscal collapse that underscored the need for centralized taxing authority. French revolutionaries in the 1790s pursued direct contributions as a cornerstone of fiscal reform, abolishing regressive indirect taxes like the and introducing three categories—land (contribution foncière), (contribution mobilière), and windows/doors (contribution des portes et fenêtres)—to distribute burdens equitably based on ability to pay, though implementation faltered due to incomplete cadastral surveys and resistance from rural areas. These efforts reflected rising administrative capacity enabled by Enlightenment-era , allowing tentative shifts from feudal levies to enumerated assessments tied to productive assets. In , the 1891 income tax reform marked a pivotal experiment, broadening the base to include wages, capital, and incomes in a progressive structure that supplemented earlier class taxes, facilitating state financing for military and infrastructural expansion amid rapid industrialization without resorting to inflationary debasement. Empirically, the adoption of such direct levies paralleled state growth, as verifiable and assessments provided elastic revenue streams—rising with economic output—contrasting the inelasticity of indirect taxes; for instance, Prussian direct tax yields supported fiscal stability during the 1890s industrialization surge, avoiding the currency manipulations common in pre- regimes. This causal mechanism incentivized administrative investment in censuses and registries, enabling governments to fund canals, railways, and armies essential to economies while minimizing reliance on volatile revenues.

Key Developments in the 19th and 20th Centuries

In , was first introduced in 1799 by as a temporary wartime measure to finance the , imposing a levy on incomes above £60 at rates up to 10 percent; it was abolished in 1816 amid public opposition following the war's end. Reintroduced in 1842 by to address fiscal deficits from reduced tariffs, the tax was set at a flat rate of 7 pence in the pound (about 3 percent) on incomes over £150 and became a permanent fixture, marking the shift toward direct taxation as a core revenue source in modern states. This permanence reflected causal pressures from industrial growth and declining indirect revenues, enabling sustained government spending without proportional reliance on regressive excises. In the United States, the Supreme Court's 1895 decision in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. invalidated the Income Tax Act of 1894, ruling that taxes on income from property constituted direct taxes requiring apportionment among states by population under Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, thus blocking unapportioned federal income levies. This prompted the ratification of the 16th Amendment on February 3, 1913, which explicitly authorized Congress to impose taxes on incomes "from whatever source derived" without apportionment, fundamentally enabling the expansion of federal direct taxation and shifting fiscal capacity toward progressive structures amid demands for funding infrastructure and social programs. World War I catalyzed widespread income tax expansions for war financing; in the U.S., the War Revenue Act of 1917 raised top individual rates from 15 percent to 67 percent and corporate rates to 50 percent, while broadening the base to include more middle-income earners, increasing federal tax revenue from $809 million in 1917 to $3.6 billion by 1918. European nations followed suit, with Britain doubling rates to 30 percent by 1918 and introducing excess profits taxes, as total war demands outstripped indirect revenues and borrowing limits, embedding direct taxes deeper into peacetime systems during the interwar period through retained high rates and administrative refinements. World War II further entrenched direct taxes globally via massive base-broadening; the U.S. Revenue Act of 1942 lowered exemptions to $624 annually, imposed a 5 percent "Victory Tax" on all wages, and introduced payroll withholding, transforming from a "class tax" on the wealthy (covering 5 percent of pre-war) to a "mass tax" affecting 75 percent of workers and raising federal revenues from under 5 percent of GDP before 1941 to over 20 percent by 1945. Similar escalations occurred elsewhere, with direct es funding Allied and Axis efforts through rate hikes and new levies, as causal imperatives of total mobilization prioritized administrative efficiency over evasion risks inherent in indirect alternatives. Post-1945, direct tax revenues in developed nations rose markedly as shares of GDP—from around 5 percent in early 20th-century and the U.S. to over 20 percent by the —driven by expansions and needs, with taxes supplanting tariffs and excises as primary sources. The (OECD), established in 1961, promoted model bilateral tax treaties to mitigate on direct flows, fostering harmonization that stabilized cross-border investment while accommodating rising domestic direct tax burdens amid globalization's early pressures.

Forms and Implementation

Primary Examples

Personal income taxes are levied directly on individuals' earnings, including wages, salaries, business income, and other sources, with liability determined by after deductions and exemptions. These taxes often employ withholding at source, where employers deduct estimated tax amounts from paychecks and remit them to the taxing authority, a formalized in the United States through the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943 to facilitate quarterly collections aligned with current-year liabilities. Corporate income taxes are imposed on the net profits of business entities, calculated as minus allowable expenses, , and other deductions, with rates applied to the resulting . This is paid directly by the to the and cannot be shifted to consumers or other parties. Property taxes constitute ad valorem assessments on the ownership of , vehicles, or other tangible assets, based on their appraised , typically administered at local levels. Millage rates determine the , expressed as a per thousand dollars of assessed value—for instance, a 20-mill equates to $20 tax per $1,000 of value. Capital gains taxes target profits from disposing of capital assets like securities or , computed as the difference between sale proceeds and the asset's adjusted basis, often distinguished by holding periods for short-term (ordinary income rates) versus long-term gains. Estate and taxes apply to wealth transfers at death: taxes on the gross value of the decedent's holdings before distribution, and taxes on amounts received by heirs, both borne directly by the or beneficiaries rather than shifted elsewhere. Wealth taxes levy annual charges on an individual's net worth, encompassing global assets such as real estate, financial holdings, and business interests minus debts, with thresholds triggering liability—for example, France's Impôt de Solidarité sur la Fortune (ISF) applied progressive rates up to 1.5% on fortunes exceeding €1.3 million until its repeal in 2017.

Variations by Jurisdiction

In federal systems such as the United States, direct taxation on income features a layered structure where federal authorities impose a national income tax alongside state-level levies that vary significantly by jurisdiction, with rates ranging from 0% in states like Texas and Florida to over 10% in California and New York as of 2023. This dual system results in combined effective top marginal rates often exceeding 50% when including local surcharges, influenced by deductions and credits that narrow the taxable base. In contrast, unitary systems like India's centralize personal income taxation under the Income Tax Act of 1961, which consolidates levy, collection, and administration at the national level without subnational income taxes, applying progressive slabs up to 30% plus surcharges for high earners, though states handle other direct taxes such as property assessments. Within the , direct taxes remain a matter of national sovereignty, precluding uniform rates or bases, but member states must align with EU fundamental freedoms as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which in 2023 rulings emphasized compliance in cross-border scenarios, such as annulling selective aid decisions in intra-group financing cases while upholding anti-avoidance measures. This leads to diverse implementations, with top marginal tax rates averaging around 42.8% across European countries in 2025, modulated by exemptions that reduce effective burdens— for instance, broad deductions for family allowances in states versus narrower bases in . In non- contexts like , direct taxation emphasizes corporate income and individual income taxes with progressive rates up to 45%, but property-related levies remain limited to pilots in cities like (0.4-0.6% on assessed values) and deed taxes (3-5%), avoiding nationwide recurrent property taxes due to land ownership structures, thereby concentrating revenue elsewhere and minimizing broad-base direct levies on immovable assets. Cross-jurisdictional differences in base breadth arise from exemptions and thresholds, which causally lower effective rates below statutory levels; data indicate top marginal tax rates averaged 42.5% in 2022, with exemptions for gains or specific incomes widening disparities, such as deferred taxation in the versus immediate inclusion in , impacting behavioral incentives like investment relocation. These structural variations underscore how federal layering amplifies complexity and potential , while centralized or sovereignty-preserved models prioritize uniformity but risk evasion through jurisdictional arbitrage, as evidenced by CJEU interventions curbing discriminatory practices without imposing harmonized rates.

Economic Implications

Effects on Incentives and Behavior

High marginal tax rates on reduce the after-tax reward for additional work effort, leading individuals to supply less labor or exert lower intensity in productive activities. Empirical estimates of the labor supply elasticity with respect to net-of-tax wages typically range from -0.1 to -0.5 across demographics, with stronger responses among secondary earners and high- individuals who can more easily adjust hours, defer , or engage in . For instance, life-cycle models calibrated to U.S. data show that cuts in marginal rates increase long-run through heightened labor productivity and entrepreneurial activity. In the United States, top marginal rates of 70% prevailing from 1964 to 1981 prompted behavioral shifts, including recharacterization of income as capital gains or sheltered forms to exploit lower effective rates, rather than sharp declines in reported labor supply among top earners. These dynamics align with principles, where rates exceeding revenue-maximizing levels erode incentives to generate , as evidenced by behavioral responses to historical U.S. tax reforms showing diminished high-end earnings generation under elevated brackets. Such distortions extend to high earners' location decisions, with elevated rates correlating to increased intentions or relocation to lower-tax jurisdictions, though pre-1980s U.S. mobility constraints muted overt brain drain. Direct taxation of , compounded by —corporate profits taxed at the firm level and again as dividends or realized gains—lowers net returns, deterring savings and . Theoretical models demonstrate that such levies distort intertemporal allocation, reducing stock accumulation as households substitute toward current . Empirical analyses confirm that higher taxes correlate with subdued levels, as firms and individuals shift toward less taxed assets or defer realizations. Compliance requirements for direct taxes, involving meticulous record-keeping, audits, and filings, impose fixed costs that disproportionately burden small entities. Studies indicate that these costs consume a larger share of for small businesses—up to 67% higher relative to larger firms—due to limited resources for and legal expertise, thereby discouraging new ventures and advantaging incumbents with in compliance. In the U.S., aggregate business compliance expenditures exceed $126 billion annually, with smaller firms facing elevated per-employee burdens that can exceed 5% of gross receipts.

Comparison to Indirect Taxes

Direct taxes differ from indirect taxes primarily in the certainty of economic incidence, as the burden of direct levies—such as or taxes—falls inescapably on the designated , who cannot legally shift it without evasion. In contrast, indirect taxes like (VAT) or sales taxes impose a statutory on intermediaries, but the economic burden is often forwarded to final consumers through higher prices, rendering the incidence more elastic and dependent on market elasticities. This shifting mechanism contributes to the regressive nature of many indirect taxes, as lower-income households devote a greater proportion of their to of taxed , resulting in a higher effective relative to income compared to higher earners. From first principles, both tax types generate deadweight losses by altering incentives and relative prices, prompting behavioral substitutions that reduce overall ; the magnitude depends on the taxed margin's elasticity, with direct taxes potentially distorting labor supply or savings more broadly, while indirect taxes target specific bundles, often yielding narrower but still significant costs. Direct taxes promote greater fiscal , as taxpayers directly observe deductions from wages or assets, fostering political and restraint on rate increases, whereas indirect taxes embed costs in product prices, obscuring the true and potentially enabling less scrutinized expansions. However, direct taxes invite sophisticated evasion tactics, such as concealing in accounts, where an estimated 27% of global offshore financial wealth remained untaxed as of , equating to about 3.2% of world GDP. Indirect taxes, conversely, face evasion in informal cash-based economies through underreporting of transactions, though their broader base across all can mitigate some losses if compliance is high. Empirical fiscal compositions illustrate these dynamics, as seen in the , where VAT reliance—accounting for 15.7% of total government tax revenues and 7.2% of GDP in 2023—complements direct taxes by broadening the revenue base without solely depending on visible levies, though this mix can amplify regressive pressures if not offset by exemptions or rebates. Such reliance shifts some burden to , reducing immediate pressure on direct tax progressivity requirements while highlighting indirect taxes' role in stabilizing revenues amid evasion challenges in direct systems.

Empirical Evidence on Growth Impacts

Meta-analyses of empirical studies on OECD countries demonstrate that higher direct tax burdens, particularly from income taxes, correlate with reduced GDP growth rates, primarily through diminished investment and capital formation. A 2020 meta-analysis synthesizing multiple econometric models found that a 10 percent increase in the overall tax burden is associated with an approximate 0.2 percentage point decline in annual GDP growth, with direct taxes exerting stronger negative effects than indirect ones due to their distortionary impact on labor and savings decisions. This aligns with panel data analyses showing corporate income taxes significantly hampering growth by lowering after-tax returns on investment, as evidenced in cross-country regressions where a one percentage point rise in the corporate tax rate reduces long-term GDP growth by 0.2 to 0.5 percentage points. Comparative evidence highlights direct taxes' adverse macroeconomic effects relative to indirect taxes. In a panel study of 51 countries from 1992 to 2016, direct taxes exhibited a statistically significant negative relationship with , while indirect taxes showed an insignificant but positive association, suggesting indirect levies impose fewer distortions on productive activities. Similarly, structural analyses in developed economies confirm that shifts toward higher direct tax shares in —such as and corporate income taxes—correlate with slower growth trajectories compared to reliance on consumption-based indirect taxes, which appear growth-neutral or mildly supportive in models. Case-specific empirics reinforce these patterns, including the "tax curse" hypothesis for direct taxation. A 2024 study on using time-series data from 1980 to 2022 found direct taxes negatively impact GDP growth, validating the curse effect wherein excessive direct levies stifle expansion without commensurate fiscal benefits, unlike indirect taxes which showed neutral or positive influences. In the United States, historical data from periods of high marginal rates (exceeding 70 percent prior to 1981) link elevated direct taxation to suppressed aggregate hours worked and , with post-reform reductions in rates associated with subsequent growth accelerations in macroeconomic models controlling for confounding factors. These findings, drawn from peer-reviewed econometric work, underscore causal channels where direct taxes reduce growth by altering incentives at the margin, though estimates vary by institutional context and enforcement quality.

Progressivity and Equity Debates

Theoretical Foundations of Progressivity

The ability-to-pay principle underpins progressive direct taxation, asserting that tax burdens should correspond to an individual's financial capacity, with higher earners facing steeper rates to reflect greater resources for bearing costs without undue hardship. This rationale draws from vertical equity, where unequal treatment aligns with unequal circumstances, contrasting horizontal equity's demand that equals pay equally. articulated early foundations in his 1848 , proposing taxes proportioned to as a measure of ability while endorsing graduated scales specifically for luxury expenditures to minimize distortions on necessities, though he emphasized proportionality for core revenues to preserve incentives. A key theoretical justification invokes declining marginal utility of income, positing that each additional dollar yields less satisfaction to the wealthy than to the poor, thus justifying rates to equate across income levels under an equal- variant of ability-to-pay. Early modern adoption appeared in the U.S. , which imposed rates starting at 1% on incomes over $3,000 for singles (about $92,000 in 2023 dollars) and rising to 7% on portions exceeding $500,000, affecting under 1% of households amid exemptions. Proponents claimed such structures would fund public goods while curbing through redistribution, assuming minimal interference with productive behavior. From first principles, however, progressivity's equity claims falter by presuming static utility functions decoupled from causal incentives; higher marginal rates demonstrably alter effort, investment, and risk-taking, as supply-side analysis reveals reduced labor supply and when taxes exceed revenue-maximizing thresholds. Empirical assessments confirm behavioral offsets undermine goals, with progressive hikes prompting evasion, relocation, or diminished work hours that erode tax bases and limit net transfers to the low-income, often yielding smaller compression than static models predict. These dynamics expose tensions with equity, as observed abilities diverge post-tax due to endogenous responses rather than inherent differences, challenging the principle's verifiability absent controlled incentives.

Progressive Versus Flat Tax Structures

Progressive tax structures impose higher marginal rates on higher income levels, with the United States maintaining a top federal rate of 37% on taxable income exceeding $626,350 for single filers in 2025. This design seeks to achieve vertical equity by aligning tax burdens more closely with ability to pay, as higher earners retain a larger share of after-tax income despite elevated rates. Proponents argue it redistributes resources to mitigate income inequality, though empirical assessments of long-term equity outcomes remain debated due to behavioral responses like reduced labor supply at high marginal rates. In contrast, flat tax systems apply a uniform rate to all above exemptions, as in Estonia's 22% or Russia's 13% rate introduced in 2001. These structures prioritize horizontal equity, treating equal incomes identically, and indicates they enhance compliance and economic incentives by minimizing distortions from rate gradients. For instance, Russia's reform correlated with a nearly 20% rise in revenues as a share of GDP within the first year, attributed to reduced evasion rather than solely growth, as pre-reform GDP expansion was already robust at 10.6% annually. Similarly, flat systems have shown lower administrative complexity, with studies linking them to improved labor participation and savings rates compared to alternatives. Critics of progressive systems highlight their propensity for evasion and avoidance at peak brackets, where higher marginal rates incentivize sheltering income, as evidenced by theoretical models and micro-data showing greater elasticity of taxable income to rate changes in graduated structures. Flat taxes mitigate this by simplifying enforcement, though initial regressivity concerns are often addressed via basic exemptions or credits, preserving progressivity in effective incidence while stabilizing revenues. Empirical cross-country analyses suggest flatter structures correlate with stronger growth responses to tax cuts, as progressivity amplifies deadweight losses on investment and work effort. Hybrid approaches, such as Friedman's negative income tax proposal, combine flat-rate taxation above a threshold with subsidies for low earners, aiming to replace fragmented with a streamlined safety net that preserves work incentives. This framework empirically favors revenue stability over purely progressive designs, as uniform rates reduce base erosion; Russia's post-reform experience, where personal income tax collections rose 26% inflation-adjusted in the implementation year, underscores how flat elements can broaden the tax base without rate hikes. Overall, while progressive taxes claim fairness through redistribution, data on compliance and growth tilt toward flat systems' efficiency in sustaining fiscal capacity amid behavioral adaptations.

Criticisms of Progressive Direct Taxation

High progressive direct tax rates distort economic incentives by reducing the after-tax returns to effort, risk-taking, and investment, thereby discouraging and . Empirical analyses indicate that elevated marginal rates diminish entrepreneurial entry and activity, as individuals shift toward lower-risk or avoidance strategies rather than starting ventures. For instance, on U.S. data demonstrates that higher marginal rates correlate with reduced and business formation among high earners, with long-term effects on wealth accumulation and innovation output. In the post-World War II era, when U.S. top marginal rates exceeded 90% from 1944 to 1963, effective rates were moderated by deductions and loopholes, but statutory highs still fostered widespread and arguably constrained broader economic dynamism, contributing to slower intergenerational compared to subsequent lower-rate periods. Progressive systems often fail to sustainably reduce income inequality due to significant behavioral responses, including capital flight and income shifting, which offset measured Gini coefficient improvements. In France, the 2012-2014 75% supertax on incomes above €1 million under President Hollande prompted an exodus of over 10,000 high-net-worth individuals, primarily to lower-tax jurisdictions like Belgium, resulting in net revenue losses exceeding the tax's yield through foregone income and other taxes. Similarly, Sweden's high progressive rates and wealth taxes elicit strong elasticities in reporting and relocation behaviors, with studies estimating that such policies reduce reported wealth by 20-30% via avoidance, limiting true redistributive impact despite post-tax Gini figures around 0.27. These responses highlight how progressivity amplifies evasion and emigration, dwarfing static equality gains and perpetuating underlying disparities. From a perspective, steep progressivity facilitates divisive rhetoric framing taxation as , while overlooking evidence that rate reductions enhance growth without proportional inequality spikes. The 1981-1986 , lowering the top marginal rate from 70% to 28%, correlated with accelerated GDP growth averaging 3.5% annually in the mid-1980s expansion, alongside revenue increases from broadened bases and behavioral boosts, consistent with dynamics where high rates suppress taxable activity. Critics of progressivity, drawing on such empirics, argue it prioritizes symbolic redistribution over verifiable prosperity gains, as flat or lower-rate regimes in comparable economies demonstrate superior incentives for and without inducing fiscal collapse.

United States Constitutional History

The U.S. Constitution, in Article I, Section 9, Clause 4, originally prohibited from levying capitation or other direct taxes without apportioning them among the states according to the decennial census. This provision reflected the Framers' intent to constrain federal power over property and individuals, reserving direct taxation—typically understood as taxes on land, slaves, or head taxes—to state sovereignty unless apportioned by population to avoid favoring populous states. Prior to the Sixteenth Amendment, such taxes were rare, with relying primarily on indirect excises, duties, and tariffs for revenue. Early Supreme Court interpretation in Hylton v. United States (1796) classified a federal tax on carriages for personal use as an excise rather than a direct tax, exempting it from apportionment since it targeted luxury consumption rather than ownership of real property or persons. The unanimous decision, authored by Justices Paterson, Cushing, and Iredell, emphasized that direct taxes were limited to those incapable of sensible apportionment without injustice, such as land or poll taxes, thereby upholding Congress's broader taxing authority under Article I, Section 8. The prompted temporary income taxes in 1861 and 1862, upheld as indirect in Springer v. United States (1881), but the 1894 Income Tax Act met resistance. In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (1895), a 5-4 majority ruled that taxes on income derived from (rents) and (dividends, interest) constituted direct taxes on the underlying property, requiring and rendering the unapportioned levy unconstitutional. This decision invalidated the flat 2% tax on incomes over $4,000, prompting political backlash and advocacy for reform. Ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment on February 3, 1913, by 36 states explicitly empowered Congress "to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." This bypassed Pollock's constraints, enabling the Revenue Act of 1913's graduated income tax starting at 1% on incomes over $3,000 (with surtaxes up to 6% on higher brackets). The amendment's adoption expanded federal fiscal capacity, building on the Bureau of Internal Revenue—established July 1, 1862, to collect Civil War levies—which evolved into the modern Internal Revenue Service administering permanent direct taxation. In Moore v. United States (2024), the Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, upheld the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act's one-time repatriation tax on undistributed foreign corporate earnings attributed to U.S. shareholders, as the income had been realized at the corporate level. The ruling reaffirmed longstanding precedent requiring realization—actual receipt or control of gains—for income taxation under the Sixteenth Amendment, rejecting broader claims that unrealized appreciation could be taxed as income and preserving constitutional limits on direct levies absent realization. This decision underscored originalist boundaries, declining to expand "income" beyond realized accretions to wealth.

Developments in Other Countries

In , , effective from 1 1962, establishes the comprehensive legal framework for levying and administering direct taxes on income from salaries, business, capital gains, and other sources for individuals, Hindu undivided families, firms, and companies. This act delineates chargeability, exemptions, deductions, and assessment procedures, with progressive slabs historically applied to promote equity while enabling revenue mobilization. In the 2023 Union Budget, amendments to the new default tax regime revised slabs for assessment year 2024-25, setting a nil rate up to ₹3 , 5% on ₹3-7 , 10% on ₹7-10 , 15% on ₹10-12 , and higher rates thereafter, alongside a ₹50,000 and increased rebate limits to ₹7 effectively tax-free, simplifying compliance and reducing effective rates for many taxpayers. Within the , the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has imposed constraints on direct tax harmonization through enforcement of fundamental freedoms, rejecting measures that discriminate or restrict cross-border activities unless justified by overriding and proportionate anti-abuse rules. In its 8 June 2023 ruling in Case C-322/21, the CJEU examined national anti-abuse provisions denying tax deductions for intra-group financing arrangements, affirming that such rules must align with the Parent-Subsidiary Directive's general anti-abuse clause, which targets wholly artificial setups lacking economic substance, while preserving member states' autonomy in direct taxation absent explicit EU competence. These decisions underscore the CJEU's role in curbing abusive reliance on EU law without mandating uniform tax bases or rates. China's 1994 Tax-Sharing Reform, implemented on 1 January 1994, fundamentally reallocated direct tax revenues by classifying and as shared or central taxes, enhancing Beijing's fiscal capacity from 22% of total revenue in 1993 to 55.7% in 1994 through unified administration and collection. This reform centralized control over direct taxes previously fragmented under local governments, introducing a provisional rate of 33% and laying groundwork for subsequent expansions in taxation, though direct taxes remained secondary to until later decades. Australia incorporated capital gains into its direct tax system via the Income Tax Assessment Act amendments effective 20 September 1985, subjecting realized gains on assets acquired post that date to personal income tax rates, with provisions for indexation of costs to mitigate inflation effects and exemptions for principal residences. The reform addressed revenue erosion from taxpayers converting ordinary income into untaxed capital appreciation, broadening the tax base without a separate capital gains levy, and included roll-over relief for certain involuntary disposals.

Global Policy Shifts Post-2020

Following the , governments worldwide implemented expansive fiscal stimulus measures, elevating public -to-GDP ratios and contributing to subsequent pressures, which in turn prompted policy efforts to bolster direct tax revenues without immediate spending cuts. Empirical analyses indicate that these fiscal deficits, rather than solely monetary factors, were primary drivers of the post-2020 surge in major economies like the , as increased household incomes and business liquidity from tax reductions and transfers fueled amid supply constraints. This environment linked rising —projected to reach 140% of U.S. GDP by late 2024—to direct tax expansions, as nominal revenue gains from helped offset real fiscal strains but highlighted the need for structural adjustments to sustain funding for ongoing expenditures. A pivotal global shift materialized through the /G20 Inclusive Framework on (BEPS) 2.0, where over 140 jurisdictions agreed in October to Pillars 1 and 2, aiming to reallocate taxing rights on multinational enterprises (MNEs) and impose a 15% effective minimum rate on entities with annual s exceeding €750 million. Pillar 2's Global Anti-Base Erosion () rules, released as model legislation in December , target profit-shifting practices, projecting an annual global increase of approximately $150 billion from higher effective direct rates on corporates, particularly in low- digital and intangible sectors. These measures represented a coordinated departure from pre-pandemic , prioritizing stability amid pressures, though implementation has varied, with administrative guidance continuing through 2024 to address transitional qualified status for compliant regimes. Concurrent with these international accords, unindexed brackets in many jurisdictions amplified buoyancy via bracket creep during the 2021-2023 episode, where nominal wage growth pushed taxpayers into higher marginal rates without corresponding gains, effectively raising effective direct burdens. In non-indexed systems prevalent in parts of and certain U.S. states, this fiscal drag generated additional revenues—high initially improving fiscal positions before expenditures adjusted—serving as a passive to counteract accumulation without overt rate hikes. However, such dynamics have sparked sovereignty tensions, exemplified by U.S. nationalist resistance to the framework, where congressional Republicans and the administration in disavowed prior commitments, arguing the global minimum undermines domestic policy autonomy and competitiveness by enabling foreign top-up taxes on U.S. MNEs.

Specific Changes in 2023-2025

In the United States, the announced inflation adjustments for tax year 2025, increasing the to $15,000 for single filers and married individuals filing separately, $30,000 for married couples filing jointly, and $22,500 for heads of household, reflecting approximately a 2.7% rise from 2024 levels tied to the chained . exemptions also rose to $88,100 for single filers and $137,300 for joint filers, with the phaseout threshold adjusted to $609,350 for singles and $1,218,700 for joint returns, aiming to prevent bracket creep amid persistent . These adjustments maintain the structure of the 2017 (TCJA), many individual provisions of which are set to expire after December 31, 2025, prompting debates in over extensions; proponents argue for permanence to sustain economic incentives, while critics highlight the projected $4.5 trillion revenue loss over a if fully extended without offsets. Federal individual collections reached $2.4 trillion in 2024, comprising 49% of total and marking an increase from prior years despite economic slowdown signals in GDP growth, raising questions about long-term sustainability as collections rely on high-income earners amid debates over TCJA sunsets potentially reversing rates to pre-2018 levels. Globally, the OECD's Tax Policy Reforms 2025 report documented changes in 86 jurisdictions adopting or announcing direct tax measures in 2024, with a focus on implementing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Pillar Two rules establishing a 15% global minimum corporate tax, leading to rate hikes or base-broadening in countries like those in the Inclusive Framework to curb profit shifting and boost revenues. In the European Union, no sweeping direct tax initiatives materialized for 2025, though member states advanced harmonization via directives like DAC8 for enhanced reporting and Pillar Two transposition, with preliminary 2026 revenue projections emphasizing labor tax expansions amid falling overall tax-to-GDP ratios in 2023; empirical data showed direct tax collections rising in line with BEPS enforcement but vulnerable to multinational relocation risks.

References

  1. [1]
    Direct Tax: Definition, History, and Examples - Investopedia
    A direct tax is a tax paid directly by an individual or organization to the entity that levied the tax, such as the U.S. government.What Is a Direct Tax? · History · Examples
  2. [2]
    What Is Taxed and Why - Lesson 4: Direct and Indirect Taxes - IRS
    A direct tax is one that the taxpayer pays directly to the government. These taxes cannot be shifted to any other person or group.
  3. [3]
    Direct vs. indirect tax: the differences - Thomson Reuters
    Feb 6, 2024 · Direct tax is a tax levied on companies, as well as individuals, that cannot be passed on to another taxpayer.
  4. [4]
    Direct Tax | TaxEDU Glossary - Tax Foundation
    A direct tax is levied on individuals and organizations and is not expected to be passed on to another payer (unlike indirect taxes such as sales and excise ...
  5. [5]
  6. [6]
    Interpretation: Direct and Indirect Taxes | Constitution Center
    A direct tax applies to land or directly to humans “without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance.” Hylton v. United States (1796); see also ...
  7. [7]
    Historical Highlights of the IRS | Internal Revenue Service
    Sep 13, 2025 · 1895 - Supreme Court ruled the new income tax unconstitutional on the grounds that it was a direct tax and not apportioned among the states on ...
  8. [8]
    History of Taxes: A Brief Overview - Tax Foundation
    Augustus switched to a direct system of taxation, and one of the taxes administered outside Italy was a graduated tax based on wealth that some scholars have ...
  9. [9]
    Effects of Income Tax Changes on Economic Growth | Brookings
    This paper examines how changes to the individual income tax affect long-term economic growth. The structure and financing of a tax change are critical to ...
  10. [10]
    Impact of Direct Taxation on Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence ...
    According to several types of research, large amounts of direct taxes may harm economic growth by discouraging labour, savings, and investment. This is because ...
  11. [11]
    Which taxes are best and worst for growth? - Economics Observatory
    May 20, 2024 · Tax affects economic growth by reducing consumer spending and lowering incentives to invest. But different fiscal policies have variable overall ...
  12. [12]
    How do taxes affect the economy in the long run? | Tax Policy Center
    High marginal tax rates can discourage work, saving, investment, and innovation, while specific tax preferences can affect the allocation of economic resources.
  13. [13]
    Effects of Taxes on Labor Income | NBER
    Higher tax rates on labor income and consumption expenditures lead to less work time in the legal market sector, more time working in the household sector.
  14. [14]
    Tax Incidence | TaxEDU Glossary - Tax Foundation
    Tax incidence measures who bears the legal or economic burden of a tax. Legal incidence is who pays, while economic incidence is who bears the cost.
  15. [15]
    Tax Incidence: Definition and How It Works - Investopedia
    Tax incidence is an economic term used to describe who legally pays the tax and who bears the burden for it on an economic incidence.
  16. [16]
    Legal vs Economic Incidence: Estimating Who Pays Taxes
    Legal incidence is who writes the check, while economic incidence is who ultimately bears the cost of a tax, which can be consumers, owners, or employees.
  17. [17]
    Principles of Political Economy with some of their Applications to ...
    Feb 5, 2018 · Taxes are either direct or indirect. A direct tax is one which ... "John Stuart Mill: Traditional and Revisionist Interpretations". The ...
  18. [18]
    Book V, Chapter 2 | Adam Smith Works
    Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it. A tax upon the rent of ...Missing: classification | Show results with:classification
  19. [19]
    Head Tax | TaxEDU Glossary
    A head tax, also known as a poll tax or capitation, is a flat or uniform tax levied equally on every taxpayer. Learn more with TaxEDU.
  20. [20]
    Direct Taxes - Definition, Different Types, and Advantages
    Direct taxes are one type of taxes an individual pays that are paid straight or directly to the government, such as income tax, poll tax, land tax, and.
  21. [21]
    ArtI.S9.C4.1 Overview of Direct Taxes - Constitution Annotated
    Under the rule of apportionment, Congress sets the total amount to be raised by a direct tax, then divides that amount among the states according to each state ...
  22. [22]
    A Guide to Understanding Indirect and Direct Taxes - IBFD
    Dec 3, 2024 · Direct taxes are demanded from the intended payer, while indirect taxes are demanded from one person to indemnify another. Direct taxes are on ...
  23. [23]
    Indirect Tax: Definition, Meaning, and Common Examples
    An indirect tax is a form of taxation where the tax is collected by an intermediary, such as a manufacturer or retailer, and then passed onto the consumer.Missing: distinction | Show results with:distinction
  24. [24]
    Elasticity and tax revenue (article) - Khan Academy
    The tax incidence depends on the relative price elasticity of supply and demand. When supply is more elastic than demand, buyers bear most of the tax burden.
  25. [25]
    Tax incidence - Economics Help
    Dec 22, 2018 · The tax incidence depends upon the relative elasticity of demand and supply. The consumer burden of a tax increase reflects the amount by which ...
  26. [26]
    Identifying Important Kinds of Taxes: Direct and Indirect Taxes
    Sep 17, 2025 · Direct taxes target income, wealth, or property, and are typically paid directly to national or regional tax authorities. On the other hand, ...
  27. [27]
    Direct Tax vs Indirect Tax: Where the Difference Lies | Fonoa | Blog
    May 5, 2023 · ... tax compliance, reducing tax evasion, and enhancing their overall economy. ... Fonoa offers the following product suite to automate indirect tax ...Missing: administrative enforcement
  28. [28]
    The inequality impact of consumption taxes: An international ...
    Consumption taxes are often considered as the most regressive component of the tax system. However, there are only few estimates, and even fewer ...
  29. [29]
    Regressive Taxation | Research Starters - EBSCO
    The most common regressive tax is a consumption tax. Consumption taxes are usually indirect taxes, levied on goods and services, of which the most common ...
  30. [30]
    4/2/2002, Taxes in the Ancient World - Almanac, Vol. 48, No. 28
    Apr 2, 2002 · Ancient households had to pay taxes in kind, and they paid different taxes throughout the year. Poll taxes required each man to deliver a cow or sheep to the ...
  31. [31]
    Ancient Egypt's Hidden Legacy of Tax Mastery - Boston University
    Nov 8, 2023 · This transparency in grain production allowed the pharaoh to make villages collectively responsible for paying taxes and providing labor for ...
  32. [32]
    Roman Taxes - Taxation in the Roman Empire - UNRV.com
    It was introduced by Augustus, but the rate was reduced to 0.5% by his successor, Tiberius. Tributum Capitis. A poll tax imposed on the inhabitants of the Roman ...Missing: head | Show results with:head
  33. [33]
    Jizyah | Definition & Facts - Britannica
    Oct 6, 2025 · Jizyah, historically, a tax (the term is often incorrectly translated as a “head tax” or “poll tax”) paid by non-Muslim populations to their Muslim rulers.
  34. [34]
    liangshuifa 兩稅法, the Twice-Taxation System - Chinaknowledge
    Jan 22, 2016 · Liangshuifa 兩稅法, the twice-taxation system, was introduced in the late eighth century by the Tang dynasty 唐 (618-907) and remained valid ...
  35. [35]
    Taxes the 18th century way - UK Parliament
    This was first levied by Parliament in 1696 in support of William III's war with France. House owners paid two shillings on properties with up to ten windows, ...
  36. [36]
    How Failed Tax Policy Led to the Constitutional Convention
    Sep 16, 2016 · The Articles failed to grant the new national government any general taxing power—hardly surprising given the role of taxes in the still-raging ...
  37. [37]
    Intro.5.2 Weaknesses in the Articles of Confederation
    Congress under the Articles lacked authority to levy taxes. She could only request the states to contribute their fair share to the common treasury, but the ...
  38. [38]
    The Revolutionary Quest for Fiscal Stability, 1789–1799 (Chapter 2)
    The Revolutionaries of the 1790s sought to design a more equitable tax system, based on direct taxes; most indirect taxes were abolished.
  39. [39]
    The Prussian Income Tax - jstor
    The Prussian income tax existed since 1851, supplementing the class tax of 1820, which was based on social standing, not income.
  40. [40]
    Elites and the adoption of the Prussian Income Taxes of the 1890s
    May 20, 2020 · We show that the adoption of a highly sophisticated income tax in 1891 shifted the tax burden from land to industry and diluted the political influence of the ...Missing: introduction | Show results with:introduction
  41. [41]
    Fiscal Innovation in Nondemocratic Regimes: Income Taxes in ...
    Fiscal Innovation in Nondemocratic Regimes: Income Taxes in Prussia 1891-3 ... Prussian Income Taxes of the 1890s," in Explorations in Economic History.Missing: introduction | Show results with:introduction
  42. [42]
    [PDF] The Triumph and Denouement of the British Fiscal State: Taxation ...
    Agricultural incomes went up by between 1 per cent and 2 per cent a year from 1790 to 1815, while total direct taxes deflated by an index of agricultural ...
  43. [43]
    Key dates - UK Parliament
    1799 - Income Tax introduced. By Prime Minister William Pitt. 1816 - Income Tax abolished. A year after the end of the Napoleonic War, by popular demand. 1842 ...
  44. [44]
    IPTM1300 - Development of policyholder taxation: historical - GOV.UK
    Mar 19, 2016 · Income tax was abolished in 1816, following thedefeat of Napoleon, but reintroduced by Sir Robert Peel in 1842, as he inherited both agrowing ...
  45. [45]
    Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company - Oyez
    The Court held that the Act violated the Constitution since it imposed taxes on personal income derived from real estate investments and personal property.
  46. [46]
    Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. | 157 U.S. 429 (1895)
    In a decision later nullified by the Sixteenth Amendment, the Court held that income taxes are direct taxes and thus must be divided among states according to ...
  47. [47]
    Historical Background on Sixteenth Amendment | U.S. Constitution ...
    Pollock came to the Court twice. In Pollock I, the Court invalidated the tax at issue insofar as it was a tax upon income derived from real property, but the ...
  48. [48]
    War Revenue Act passed in U.S. | October 3, 1917 - History.com
    While only five percent of the U.S. population was required to pay taxes, U.S. tax revenue increased from $809 million in 1917 to a whopping $3.6 billion the ...
  49. [49]
    U.S. Economy in World War I – EH.net - Economic History Association
    The tax rate for an income of $10,000 with four exemptions (about $140,000 in 2003 dollars) went from 1.2 percent in 1916 to 7.8 percent. For incomes of ...Missing: expansions | Show results with:expansions
  50. [50]
    How World War II Reshaped US Taxation - Tax Foundation
    Sep 3, 2024 · World War II changed how much tax revenue we collect. Before 1941, the US federal government rarely collected more than 5 percent of GDP in tax revenue.
  51. [51]
    How World War II Still Determines Your Tax Bill - Time Magazine
    Apr 14, 2016 · To pay for the war, Congress passed a new Revenue Act that nearly doubled the number of Americans who would have to pay income taxes.
  52. [52]
    Taxation - Our World in Data
    As pointed out above, early-industrialized countries increased tax revenues after the First World War specifically by increasing direct forms of taxation.Missing: industrialization | Show results with:industrialization
  53. [53]
    Tax revenue | OECD
    The Global Revenue Statistics Database is a major step forward in providing comparable and reliable tax revenue data for a large number of economies from all ...Missing: historical rise 19th 20th
  54. [54]
    [PDF] EvoLuTIoN OF FEDERAL INCOME TAx WITHHOLDING - Cato Institute
    Focusing on the legalization of mandatory federal income tax withholding throughtheCurrent Tax Payment Act of 1943, this article examines forces that have ...
  55. [55]
    Corporate Income Tax Definition | TaxEDU Glossary - Tax Foundation
    A corporate income tax (CIT) is levied by federal and state governments on business profits. Many companies are not subject to the CIT because they are taxed ...
  56. [56]
    Tax on corporate income - OECD
    Tax on corporate income are taxes levied on the net income or profits and capital gains of enterprises.
  57. [57]
    Property Tax Millage Rates | Department of Revenue - Georgia.gov
    A tax rate of one mill represents a tax liability of one dollar per $1,000 of assessed value. The average county and municipal millage rate is 30 mills. The ...
  58. [58]
    How do state and local estate and inheritance taxes work?
    An estate tax is levied on the estate of the deceased while an inheritance tax is levied on the heirs of the deceased. Only 17 states and the District of ...
  59. [59]
    Estate tax | Internal Revenue Service
    Oct 29, 2024 · The Estate Tax is a tax on your right to transfer property at your death. It consists of an accounting of everything you own or have certain interests in at ...Frequently Asked Questions on · Estate tax for nonresidents not...
  60. [60]
    The High Cost of Wealth Taxes - Tax Foundation
    Jun 26, 2024 · [3] France was the last country to repeal its wealth tax in 2018, replacing it with a real estate wealth tax. Among OECD countries, there are ...
  61. [61]
    Income Tax Act 1961: Chapters, Objectives, Features, Provisions
    Oct 17, 2025 · The Income Tax Act 1961 governs the levy, collection, and administration of direct taxes in India. It applies to all persons earning income in ...Scope of Income Tax Act 1961 · Chapters of the Income Tax...
  62. [62]
  63. [63]
    Euro Tax Flash from EU Tax Centre - KPMG International
    The CJEU annuls Commission decision on Luxembourg tax rulings related to intra-group financing structures.
  64. [64]
  65. [65]
    Top Personal Income Tax Rates in Europe, 2025 - Tax Foundation
    Feb 11, 2025 · Among European OECD countries, the average statutory top personal income tax rate lies at 42.8 percent in 2025. Denmark (55.9 percent), France ...Missing: 2020s | Show results with:2020s
  66. [66]
    China, People's Republic of - Corporate - Other taxes
    Jul 2, 2025 · A deed tax, generally at rates from 3% to 5%, may be levied on the purchase, sale, gift, or exchange of ownership of land-use rights or real ...Missing: direct | Show results with:direct
  67. [67]
    Property Tax in China for 2025 [Expert Guide] - MSA Advisory
    Jun 7, 2024 · Tax Rates: The tax rate in Shanghai is generally set at 0.6% for properties valued above a certain threshold and 0.4% for properties that fall ...The Current State of Property... · Regional Variations in... · Shanghai · ChongqingMissing: direct | Show results with:direct
  68. [68]
    [PDF] Tax Database Update 2023 - OECD
    The top statutory personal income tax (PIT) rate is the combined central ... In 2022, the OECD average top PIT rate was 42.5%, 1.8 percentage points.Missing: 2020s | Show results with:2020s
  69. [69]
    Taxation - EUR-Lex - European Union
    With regard to direct taxation, the EU has however established some harmonised standards for company and personal taxation, and member countries have taken ...
  70. [70]
    Income tax and labour supply: Let's acknowledge what we don't know
    Aug 23, 2012 · The consensus is that increasing tax rates usually reduces work effort. Considering the effect of a rise in a proportional tax, Meghir and ...
  71. [71]
    Adjustment Costs, Firm Responses, and Micro vs. Macro Labor ...
    This study shows that tax effects on labor supply are shaped by adjustment costs and hours constraints, and that macro elasticities may be larger than micro ...
  72. [72]
    Marginal tax rates and income in the long run - ScienceDirect.com
    We estimate a life-cycle model of savings, labor productivity and entrepreneurs to measure the long-run response of income to marginal tax rate cuts in the US.
  73. [73]
    [PDF] Evidence on the High-Income Laffer Curve from Six Decades of Tax ...
    The Laffer curve suggests cutting tax rates can raise revenue by stimulating work, but evidence suggests little impact on labor supply.
  74. [74]
    The Real Lesson of 70 Percent Tax Rates on Entrepreneurial Income
    Jan 29, 2019 · The high individual tax rates from 1950 through 1980 largely drove entrepreneurial business income out of the individual income tax system and into the ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  75. [75]
    Evidence on the High-Income Laffer Curve from Six Decades of Tax ...
    An influential group of “supply-side” economists argued that high marginal tax rates were severely reducing the incentives of people to work.Missing: empirical pre-
  76. [76]
    Does a 70% Top Marginal Tax Rate Make Sense? | Mercatus Center
    Feb 12, 2019 · Taxing them too much risks wealthy people cutting back on productivity or moving elsewhere. This is why some economists estimate top marginal ...
  77. [77]
    Higher tax rates can lead to brain drain | Fraser Institute
    Mar 18, 2016 · Yet, with recent personal income tax rate hikes, governments across the country are doing the exact opposite, encouraging a “brain drain” among ...
  78. [78]
    [PDF] Taxes on Capital and Savings
    Total wealth reflects both capital stock accumulated through savings and pure price effects. Example 1: house can increase in value because it is improved ...
  79. [79]
    [PDF] Why Some Double Taxation Might Make Sense
    U.S. double taxation of dividend income affects share values and distorts savings and investment decisions. ... on Capital Asset Prices: Theory and Empirical ...
  80. [80]
    [PDF] The Economic Effects of Capital Gains Taxation
    It is argued that the saving rate is unlikely to increase as a consequence of a capital gains tax redu ction since empirical studies have found only a weak ...
  81. [81]
    [PDF] Effective Federal Income Tax Rates Faced By Small Businesses in ...
    More specifically, compliance with tax regulations imposes costs that are 67 percent higher in small firms than in larger firms. Another aspect of this ...
  82. [82]
    [PDF] Recent Research on Small Business Compliance Burden - IRS
    Many activities and costs commonly associated with tax compliance are necessary not only to comply with the federal income tax system, but also for other ...
  83. [83]
    Tax Complexity Costs the US Economy over $536 Billion Annually
    Aug 27, 2025 · The compliance cost of business (corporate) income tax returns is over $126.2 billion. Their quarterly tax filings cost $47.3 billion to ...Missing: studies | Show results with:studies
  84. [84]
    Theme 3: Fairness in Taxes - Lesson 2: Regressive Taxes - IRS
    Explain to students that sales taxes are considered regressive because they take a larger percentage of income from low-income taxpayers than from high-income ...
  85. [85]
    Regressive Tax | TaxEDU Glossary - Tax Foundation
    A regressive tax is one that creates a larger burden on lower-income taxpayers than on middle- or higher-income taxpayers.
  86. [86]
    Understanding Regressive Taxes: Definition & Common Types
    A regressive tax imposes a uniform rate regardless of income, leading to higher financial strain on low-income individuals compared to those with higher ...What Is a Regressive Tax? · How It Works · Types · Regressive vs. Other Taxes
  87. [87]
    [PDF] Lecture 3: Tax Incidence and Efficiency Costs of Taxation
    Key point: Taxes can be shifted: taxes affect directly prices, which affect quantities because of behavioral responses, which affect indirectly the price of ...Missing: indirect | Show results with:indirect
  88. [88]
    Deadweight Loss of Taxation: Definition, How It Works, and Example
    Deadweight loss of taxation is a measurement of the economic loss that can be caused by a tax due to its damaging effects on supply and demand.
  89. [89]
    [PDF] GLOBAL TAX EVASION
    Oct 22, 2023 · In this scenario 27% of offshore financial wealth is untaxed in 2022, representing 3.2% of world GDP. Source: for global offshore financial ...
  90. [90]
    Value added tax (VAT) in the EU - Consilium
    In 2023, VAT represented 7.2% of the EU's GDP, and made up 15.7% of total government tax revenue. 15.7%. of total tax revenues was generated by VAT in 2023 ...
  91. [91]
    Tax revenue statistics - Statistics Explained - Eurostat
    In 2023, tax revenue made up nearly 88% of total general government revenue in the European Union. In 2023 in the EU, taxes on production and imports accounted ...
  92. [92]
    Taxes and Economic Growth in OECD Countries: A Meta-analysis
    This study performs a meta-analysis of the effect of taxes on economic growth in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries.
  93. [93]
    [PDF] Impact on Economic Growth and Total Tax Revenue - Sciedu
    Mar 17, 2020 · This study investigates the effects and consequences of both direct and indirect taxes on economic growth and total tax revenue in a panel of 51 ...
  94. [94]
    [PDF] The effect of direct and indirect taxes on economic growth ... - EconStor
    Abstract. This paper examines how the economic growth in advanced countries is affected by various types of tax revenue. Ten developed countries were chosen ...
  95. [95]
    Is taxation a curse or a blessing? The case of Turkiye - Nature
    Oct 27, 2024 · The results of the analysis reveal that direct taxes have a negative impact on economic growth and thus the tax curse hypothesis is valid, ...
  96. [96]
    Tax Increases Reduce GDP | NBER
    Tax changes have very large effects: an exogenous tax increase of 1 percent of GDP lowers real GDP by roughly 2 to 3 percent.
  97. [97]
    [PDF] “The Ability to Pay” in Tax Law: Clarifying the Concept's Egalitarian ...
    A vast amount of tax literature appeals to the premise that a system of taxation should assign tax burdens according to taxpayers' “ability to pay.”.
  98. [98]
    Principles of Political Economy with some of their Applications to ...
    Feb 5, 2018 · John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) originally wrote the Principles of Political Economy, with some of their Applications to Social Philosophy very quickly.
  99. [99]
    [PDF] On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax Policy
    Aug 27, 2010 · A progressive or graduated rate reflects the differences in marginal utility of dollars of income to persons with different amounts of income.” ...
  100. [100]
    History of Federal Income Tax Rates: 1913 - 2025
    In 1913, the top rate was 7%, rose to 77% in 1918, peaked at 94% in 1944, and is currently 40.8% (37% + 3.8%).
  101. [101]
    16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Federal Income Tax (1913)
    Sep 13, 2022 · Yet in 1913, due to generous exemptions and deductions, less than 1 percent of the population paid income taxes at the rate of only 1 percent ...
  102. [102]
    Supply Side Economics - NYU Stern
    Supply-side economics argues that lower tax rates improve private sector incentives, leading to higher employment, productivity, and output.
  103. [103]
    [PDF] Do Progressive Taxes Reduce Income Inequality?
    Although we expect the productivity response from more progressive taxes to reduce actual inequality, the evasion response may increase actual disposable ...
  104. [104]
    2025 Tax Brackets and Federal Income Tax Rates | Tax Foundation
    Oct 22, 2024 · The top marginal income tax rate of 37 percent will hit taxpayers with taxable income above $626,350 for single filers and above $751,600 ...2023 Tax Brackets · 2026 Tax Brackets if the TCJA... · 2024 Tax Brackets
  105. [105]
    Federal income tax rates and brackets | Internal Revenue Service
    Jul 8, 2025 · Tax rates and tables. See the 2024 tax tables (for money you earned in 2024). Find the 2025 tax rates (for money you earn in 2025) ...
  106. [106]
    [PDF] The Case for a Progressive Tax - MIT Economics
    An increase in the marginal tax rate only at a single income level in the upper tail increases the deadweight burden (decreases revenue because of reduced earn ...
  107. [107]
    Estonia - Individual - Taxes on personal income
    May 29, 2025 · Personal income tax rates​​ Estonia has a proportional (i.e. flat) tax rate of 22%, which applies to all items of income derived by a resident ...
  108. [108]
    [PDF] The Russian Flat Tax Reform - International Monetary Fund (IMF)
    As a percentage of GDP, PIT revenues increased by nearly one-fifth. Such a strong revenue performance following a marked reduction of marginal tax rates quickly.
  109. [109]
    [PDF] Demythologizing the Russian Flat Tax - Brookings Institution
    1In the six quarters leading up to January 1, 2001, when the ''flat tax'' reform came into effect, Russia's GDP grew at an average annual rate of 10.6 percent.
  110. [110]
    Flat-rate tax systems and their effect on labor markets
    Two main benefits are usually associated with flat tax systems: increased incentives and compliance [5]: First, flat taxes enhance incentives to work, save, ...
  111. [111]
    [PDF] Myth and Reality of Flat Tax Reform: Micro Estimates of Tax Evasion ...
    Using micro-level data, we examine the effects of Russia's 2001 flat rate income tax reform on consumption, income, and tax evasion. We use the gap between ...
  112. [112]
    [PDF] Does the Progressivity of Taxes Matter for Economic Growth?
    Our analysis indicates that changes in the progressivity of tax rates can have important growth effects even in situations where changes in flat rate taxes do ...<|separator|>
  113. [113]
    The Impact of Individual Income Tax Changes on Economic Growth
    Jun 14, 2022 · The study found that an exogenous tax increase of 1 percent of GDP resulted in an estimated 3 percent decline in GDP after three years (12 ...
  114. [114]
    Negative Income Tax - Econlib
    The idea of a negative income tax (NIT) is commonly thought to have originated with economist Milton Friedman, who advocated it in his 1962 book, ...
  115. [115]
    Flat Taxes Are Big in the Former USSR. Have They Worked?
    Nov 8, 2011 · Adjusted for inflation, revenue from Russia's personal income tax increased by 26 percent [PDF] in the year after a flat tax was implemented, ...
  116. [116]
    [PDF] The “Flat Tax(es)”: Principles and Evidence
    Sep 1, 2006 · It stresses that the flat taxes that have been adopted differ fundamentally, and that empirical evidence on their effects is very limited. This.
  117. [117]
    How to set top tax rates without deterring innovation | Stanford ...
    Oct 25, 2022 · “There is extensive empirical evidence that innovation responds to tax incentives,” Jones says. If income taxation distorts innovation by ...
  118. [118]
  119. [119]
    Why We Can't Go Back to Sky-high, 1950s Tax Rates
    Apr 18, 2012 · From 1950 to 1963, income tax revenue averaged 7.5 percent of GDP; that's less than in the Reagan years when rates were being slashed.<|separator|>
  120. [120]
    The myth that America prospered after WWII despite extremely high ...
    Apr 4, 2023 · The myth that the US experienced strong economic growth when the top marginal tax rate was high is false.
  121. [121]
  122. [122]
    France forced to drop 75% supertax after meagre returns
    Dec 31, 2014 · François Hollande's unpopular tax changes that imposed a 75% rate on earnings above €1m (£780,000) will quietly disappear into the history books ...
  123. [123]
    [PDF] Behavioral Responses to Wealth Taxes: Evidence from Sweden
    This paper provides an empirical assessment of an annual wealth tax. Using Swedish administrative data, I estimate net-of-tax-rate elas-.Missing: Gini | Show results with:Gini
  124. [124]
    [PDF] Income Equality in The Nordic Countries: Myths, Facts, and Lessons
    The Nordic countries have an average Gini coefficient of 0.27, whereas the Gini coefficient is as high as 0.39 in the U.S. and 0.36 in the U.K. In other ...
  125. [125]
    Modeling the Economic Effects of Past Tax Bills - Tax Foundation
    Sep 14, 2016 · The Taxes and Growth model predicts that the 1981 Reagan tax cuts had the largest effect on both the U.S. economy and federal revenue of any of ...
  126. [126]
    Exploring the Laffer Curve: Tax Rates and Revenue Explained
    The Laffer Curve illustrates a relationship between tax rates and tax revenue, proposing that both excessively high and low tax rates can lead to reduced tax ...Missing: pre- | Show results with:pre-
  127. [127]
    Article 1 Section 9 Clause 4 | Constitution Annotated - Congress.gov
    Clause 4 Direct Taxes · No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken.
  128. [128]
    Overview of Direct Taxes | U.S. Constitution Annotated | US Law
    Article I, Section 9, Clause 4: No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or enumeration herein before directed ...
  129. [129]
    ArtI.S9.C4.3 Early Jurisprudence on Direct Taxes
    The Supreme Court first interpreted the Constitution's direct tax language shortly after the Nation's founding in Hylton v. United States.Missing: 1796 | Show results with:1796
  130. [130]
    Hylton v. United States | 3 U.S. 171 (1796)
    The act of Congress of 6 June 1794, laying "a tax on carriages for the conveyance of persons, kept for the use of the owner," is a constitutional law, and is ...
  131. [131]
    Hylton v. United States | Oyez
    A case in which the Court held that the carriage tax was not a direct tax and thus was not subject to apportionment among the states.
  132. [132]
    IRS history timeline | Internal Revenue Service
    Jan 15, 2025 · On July 1, 1862, President Lincoln signed the second revenue measure of the Civil War into law. This law levied internal taxes and established a ...
  133. [133]
    Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company | 158 U.S. 601 (1895)
    Still further, as the matter now stands, it has been decided that a tax upon the income of land is unconstitutional, while the court has made no decision as to ...
  134. [134]
    The Constitution: Amendments 11-27 | National Archives
    AMENDMENT XVI. Passed by Congress July 2, 1909. Ratified February 3, 1913. Note: Article I, section 9, of the Constitution was modified by amendment 16. The ...
  135. [135]
    [PDF] 22-800 Moore v. United States (06/20/2024) - Supreme Court
    Jun 20, 2024 · Nor does this decision attempt to resolve the parties' disagreement over whether realization is a constitutional requirement for an income tax.
  136. [136]
    Moore v. United States - Harvard Law Review
    Nov 10, 2024 · The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a tax that attributed income realized by foreign corporations to the corporations' American shareholders.
  137. [137]
    Tax Laws & Rules > Acts > Income-tax Act, 1961
    Section - 1. Short title, extent and commencement · Section - 2. Definitions. · Section - 3. “Previous year” defined · Section - 4. Charge of income-tax · Section - ...Tax Rules · Companies Act, 2013 · Capital Gains Tax · Indian Partnership Act, 1932Missing: structure | Show results with:structure
  138. [138]
    New Income Tax Slab Interim Budget 2023 – 24 | HDFC Bank
    Budget 2023 made major changes to the income tax slabs under the new tax regime but left income tax slabs and rates unchanged for the old regime.
  139. [139]
    E-News from KPMG's EU Tax Centre - KPMG International
    On June 8, 2023, the CJEU issuedopens in a new tab a decision in case C-322 ... Tax Act was refused by invoking the anti-abuse provision contained therein.
  140. [140]
    China's Tax Reforms of 1994: Breakthrough or Compromise? - jstor
    In late 1993 China announced a comprehensive eco- nomic reform program covering the fiscal and taxation system, central and.
  141. [141]
    China's Fiscal and Tax Reforms: A Critical Move on the Chessboard
    Jul 11, 2014 · The new regime promptly replenished central coffers: in 1994, the central government's revenue more than doubled from the previous year, and ...
  142. [142]
    Chapter 4 - Parliament of Australia
    Capital gains tax (CGT) was introduced in Australia in 1985, principally to stem the loss of revenue from individuals converting income to capital to exploit ...
  143. [143]
    A brief history of Australia's tax system | Treasury.gov.au
    Sep 4, 2006 · The capital gains tax arrangements introduced in 1985 applied to realised gains and losses on assets acquired after 19 September 1985. Certain ...
  144. [144]
    The Fiscal Origin of the COVID-19 Price Surge | St. Louis Fed
    Mar 6, 2025 · In this post, I will argue that inflation was primarily the product of the fiscal deficits incurred in response to the pandemic.
  145. [145]
    [PDF] 24-22 Fiscal Policy and the Pandemic- - Era Surge in US Inflation
    Fiscal policymakers increased federal spending and reduced federal taxes. Those fiscal actions boosted household income, business cash flow, and the resources ...
  146. [146]
    BEPS 2.0: Pillar Two - KPMG International
    The OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS reached agreement on the Pillar Two global minimum tax rules in October 2021, putting out model ...<|separator|>
  147. [147]
    Global Anti-Base Erosion Model Rules (Pillar Two) - OECD
    This Consolidated Commentary incorporates Agreed Administrative Guidance that has been released by the Inclusive Framework since March 2022 up until March 2025.Consolidated Commentary · GloBE Information Return · Global Minimum Tax
  148. [148]
    BEPS 2.0: Pillar One and Pillar Two - KPMG International
    On 20 December 2021, the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework (IF) on (BEPS) released Model Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) rules (Model Rules) under Pillar Two.
  149. [149]
    Inflation and public finances: an overview - Public Sector Economics
    Dec 11, 2023 · High inflation initially boosts tax revenues and improves fiscal positions, but expenditure quickly catches up, offsetting this improvement.Missing: post- | Show results with:post-
  150. [150]
    [PDF] Fiscal drag in theory and in practice: a European perspective
    The phenomenon, commonly referred to as fiscal drag or. “bracket creep”, results in additional government revenue, and it can also alter the distribution of the ...<|separator|>
  151. [151]
    Trump Administration Disavows the OECD Global Tax Deal
    Jan 22, 2025 · An important element of the Global Tax Deal is an agreement to impose a global minimum tax of 15% on corporate profits through very complicated ...
  152. [152]
    Rep. Hern Op-Ed: U.S. Tax Sovereignty Under Threat
    Jun 23, 2025 · Under current OECD rules, traditional tax incentives can easily trigger the OECD minimum tax, allowing other countries to siphon away the U.S. ...
  153. [153]
    New tax laws 2025: Tax brackets and deductions - U.S. Bank
    ... tax rate bracket to the higher 32% rate bracket. The top marginal income rate of 37% will apply to single filers with taxable income of $626,350 and, for ...
  154. [154]
    The 2025 Tax Debate: The Big Picture for Individual Taxes in TCJA
    Apr 9, 2025 · Most of those changes to the individual tax code are scheduled to expire on December 31, 2025. When passed, TCJA's changes to individual taxes ...
  155. [155]
    Debate Ramps Up on Tax Cut Permanency - Thomson Reuters
    Feb 28, 2025 · Permanent extension would reduce tax revenues by $4.5 trillion over the 10-year budget window, which York and Watson say will result in ...
  156. [156]
    What Kinds of Revenue Does the Government Collect?
    May 2, 2025 · In FY2024, the federal government collected revenue from four primary sources: 49% ($2.4 trillion) from individual income taxes. 35% ($1.7 ...
  157. [157]
    Revenues in Fiscal Year 2024: An Infographic
    Mar 20, 2025 · Revenues received by the federal government in 2024 totaled $4.9 trillion, of which almost half was receipts from individual income taxes.
  158. [158]
    Tax Policy Reforms 2025 - OECD
    Sep 11, 2025 · The report covers the tax policy reforms introduced or announced in 2024 in 86 member jurisdictions of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base ...
  159. [159]
    Data on Taxation Trends
    Tax revenues as a share of GDP fell in 2023, but labor tax revenues increased. The share of labor taxes expanded, while consumption tax share decreased.
  160. [160]
    Tax Policy Reforms 2025 - OECD
    Sep 11, 2025 · This chapter provides an overview of the tax reforms adopted by 86 member jurisdictions of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion ...