Evil
Evil, in its philosophically narrow sense, designates the most egregious forms of moral despicability, encompassing actions, characters, or events that intentionally inflict profound, inexcusable harm, such as genocide, sadistic torture, or systematic dehumanization.[1] This contrasts with broader usages that apply to any wrongdoing or suffering, including minor flaws or natural misfortunes.[1] Central distinctions include moral evil, which arises from the deliberate choices or negligence of human agents, as in murder or deceit, and natural evil, which stems from impersonal forces like earthquakes or disease, independent of moral agency.[1] Historically, conceptions of evil have evolved from ancient dualistic views positing evil as an independent force opposed to good, to privation theories seeing it as absence of goodness, and modern secular accounts like Immanuel Kant's "radical evil," which describes an innate human propensity to prioritize self-interest over universal moral law, rendering evil a choosable inversion of ethical priorities present in all individuals.[1][2] Hannah Arendt further analyzed it through the "banality of evil," observed in bureaucratic thoughtlessness enabling atrocities, as in the Holocaust, where perpetrators acted without demonic intent but through mundane failure to think critically about consequences.[1] Empirically, psychological inquiries reveal evil's roots in ordinary human capacities amplified by situational pressures, as demonstrated by Stanley Milgram's obedience experiments, where participants administered seemingly lethal shocks under authority, highlighting how deference to power can override personal ethics and produce harmful outcomes.[1] The concept's enduring significance lies in its role within the problem of evil, which challenges explanations of pervasive suffering in a rationally ordered world, demanding causal accounts grounded in human agency and environmental factors rather than unsubstantiated supernatural attributions.[1] Debates persist over evil's objectivity, with some ethical relativists questioning absolute standards amid cultural variations, though first-principles reasoning emphasizes its measurability through observable patterns of unnecessary harm and violation of reciprocal rational interests.[1]Etymology and Definitions
Linguistic Origins
The English word evil derives from Old English yfel (also spelled evel in Kentish dialects), attested before 1150 and meaning "bad, vicious, ill, or wicked."[3][4] This term stems from Proto-Germanic *ubilaz, which carried connotations of harm, moral wrongness, or exceeding acceptable bounds, as evidenced by cognates such as Old High German ubil ("evil" or "bad"), Old Saxon ubil, Old Frisian ubil, and Old Norse illr ("bad" or "ill").[5][3] The Proto-Germanic root *ubilaz has been linked to a Proto-Indo-European (PIE) origin, with two primary hypotheses: one proposing *wap- ("bad" or "evil," implying inherent moral defect), and another deriving it from *upélos (literally "going over or beyond acceptable limits," from *upó and *h₃ewp- meaning "over" or "exceeding," suggesting excess as a source of harm).[5][6] The exact PIE reconstruction remains uncertain, as few terms for "evil" (in the sense of moral badness) reliably trace back to PIE, possibly due to evolving cultural conceptions of wrongdoing across Indo-European branches.[6] In Germanic languages, evil and related forms historically encompassed both physical ill (e.g., illness or misfortune) and moral culpability, reflecting a semantic broadening from tangible harm to abstract vice, distinct from unrelated terms like Latin malus ("bad") or Greek kakós ("evil").[7] This evolution underscores how linguistic encodings of "evil" often prioritized experiential causality—such as transgression or imbalance—over abstract universals, with no direct etymological ties to words like devil (from Greek diaballō, "to slander" or "throw across").[5][8]Attempts at Universal Definition
Philosophers have long sought a universal definition of evil, yet consensus remains elusive due to its multifaceted nature encompassing intentional harm, suffering, and deviation from moral order. Early Christian thinkers like Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE) proposed the privatio boni theory, positing evil not as a positive substance or entity created by God, but as the privation or absence of good in otherwise good created beings.[9] This view, rooted in Neoplatonism, explains moral evil as the corruption of free will turning away from divine goodness and natural evil as defects in the material order, thereby preserving God's omnipotence and benevolence without attributing evil's origin to divine creation.[10] Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) refined this framework in the Summa Theologica, defining evil as the privation of a due good in a subject capable of it, distinguishing it from mere negativity by requiring a relational lack—such as sight's absence in the blind—thus applying to both human acts and natural phenomena like disease.[11] This metaphysical approach influenced Western theology but faced critiques for inadequately accounting for evil's apparent intentionality or experiential intensity, as it reduces evil to deficiency rather than active force. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), departing from ontological definitions, introduced "radical evil" in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason (1793), describing it as an innate human propensity to prioritize self-love over the moral law, rendering all individuals susceptible to corruption despite formal freedom. Kant viewed this not as deterministic but as a universal predisposition freely adopted at the species level, enabling moral evil through inverted maxims while allowing redemption via rational autonomy; however, it applies primarily to moral agency, sidelining natural evils like earthquakes.[12] Contemporary efforts often adopt a narrower, action-oriented focus. Philosopher Luke Russell, in Being Evil: A Philosophical Perspective (2020), defines an evil action as one that is gravely wrong, causes extreme harm or suffering, and involves full culpability by a fully aware agent, emphasizing degree over essence to distinguish evil from ordinary wrongdoing.[13] This consequentialist-leaning account, informed by case studies of atrocities, prioritizes empirical harm metrics but invites debate over thresholds for "extreme" and potential cultural variances in culpability assessment. Other modern analyses, such as those examining genocide, propose practical definitions integrating philosophical history with historical evidence, framing evil as sovereign-enabled mass destruction defying human dignity, though these remain context-specific rather than fully universal.[14] Despite such attempts, definitional pluralism persists, reflecting evil's resistance to reduction amid diverse ethical frameworks.Philosophical Conceptions
Ancient and Classical Views
In ancient Greek philosophy, early thinkers like Empedocles conceptualized evil in terms of cosmic forces, positing strife (neikos) as an opposing principle to love (philia), where strife disrupts harmony and generates discord in the universe.[7] This dualistic framework influenced later views but lacked a systematic ethical treatment. Plato regarded evil primarily as a privation or absence of good, rooted in ignorance and disorder of the soul rather than a substantive entity. In dialogues such as the Republic and Theaetetus, he argued that no one commits evil knowingly, as the soul errs due to misperception of reality, mistaking shadows for forms and pursuing apparent goods that lead to harm.[15] [16] Evil manifests as relative lacks, such as disease or moral failing, which are deficiencies in due order rather than independent causes.[17] Plato's Timaeus further attributes natural evils to necessity and the disorderly motions of pre-cosmic matter, tamed but not eradicated by the demiurge's imposition of rational structure.[18] Aristotle rejected a positive principle or origin for evil, asserting in the Metaphysics that evil lacks substantial reality, serving merely as a corruption or privation of potential good in perishable things.[19] Eternal entities, being unchanging, cannot admit evil, as corruption requires potency for change.[20] In ethical terms, as outlined in the Nicomachean Ethics, moral evil emerges from habitual choices deviating from the golden mean—excess or deficiency in virtues like courage or temperance—driven by irrational appetites rather than deliberate opposition to good.[21] Aristotle emphasized that vice results from defective upbringing or unchecked desires, not an inherent cosmic force.[22] Hellenistic schools, including Stoicism, viewed evil as confined to moral faults arising from assent to false impressions, incompatible with rational nature. Stoics like Chrysippus held that only virtue is good and vice evil; externals like pain or loss are adiaphora (indifferents), misjudged as evils due to ignorance of providential order.[23] Evil thus stems from the soul's failure to align with logos, the rational principle governing the cosmos, rendering it a product of human error rather than external necessity.[24] Epicureans, conversely, equated evil with bodily and mental pains but maintained these are avoidable through prudent calculation and simple pleasures, dismissing supernatural or metaphysical origins. Roman adaptations, such as Cicero's synthesis in De Natura Deorum, echoed these ideas, attributing apparent evils to incomplete human understanding of divine rationality.[25]Medieval and Enlightenment Developments
In medieval scholastic philosophy, the dominant conception of evil built upon Augustinian foundations, positing it as a privation of good rather than a substantive entity with independent existence. Thomas Aquinas, in his Summa Theologica (composed between 1265 and 1274), systematically argued that evil arises not from any positive cause but from a defect in the cause of good, specifically the failure of a being to attain its proper form or end.[26] For Aquinas, all beings naturally tend toward good as their perfection, and evil constitutes the absence of this due perfection in substances that ought to possess it, such as when a rational agent's will deviates from the divine order toward disordered ends.[27] This privation theory preserved monotheistic commitments to God's absolute goodness by denying evil ontological status, while accounting for its causal effects through secondary agents like free will or natural limitations. Scholastic debates further refined this view, emphasizing moral evil's origin in the will's voluntary deflection from the supreme good. Thinkers like Duns Scotus (c. 1266–1308) and William of Ockham (c. 1287–1347) introduced nuances on divine will and nominalism, suggesting that evil's classification as such depends on God's free decree rather than inherent essences, though they upheld privation as non-being.[28] Natural evils, such as disease or disaster, were explained as instrumental to greater goods or as consequences of a fallen creation, aligning with empirical observations of order amid apparent disorder in nature. These developments integrated Aristotelian causality with theology, framing evil as parasitic on good without implying dualism or divine authorship. The Enlightenment shifted toward rationalistic theodicies, prioritizing logical coherence and empirical adequacy over purely theological axioms. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, in his Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal (1710), classified evils into metaphysical (inherent creaturely imperfection), physical (suffering from natural laws), and moral (human sin), arguing that God, in creating from infinite possibilities, selected this world as the optimal balance where free will necessitates some evil to yield higher goods like virtue through adversity.[29] This optimism faced sharp critique from empiricists like David Hume and satirists like Voltaire, who, in Candide (1759), lampooned it by highlighting gratuitous suffering, such as the 1755 Lisbon earthquake that killed between 10,000 and 50,000 people without discernible moral compensation, questioning providential necessity.[30] Enlightenment conceptions increasingly naturalized evil, attributing moral variants to human passions, ignorance, or societal corruption rather than demonic agency, as seen in Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws (1748), which linked tyrannical evils to institutional imbalances remediable by rational reform. This secular pivot, while retaining deistic nods to divine permission, emphasized empirical causation and human agency, diminishing supernatural explanations and foreshadowing psychological and social scientific approaches to vice and harm.Modern and Contemporary Philosophy
Immanuel Kant, in his 1793 work Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone, posited radical evil as an innate human propensity to prioritize self-love and empirical incentives over the moral law, rendering the moral disposition corrupt at its root while preserving freedom to choose good.[2] This view frames evil not as external temptation but as a deliberate inversion of maxims, universal across humanity yet reversible through rational effort.[1] Friedrich Nietzsche, in Beyond Good and Evil (1886), critiqued traditional Judeo-Christian morality as a "slave morality" that inverts noble values of strength and vitality into "evil," while recasting weakness as "good."[31] He distinguished "good and bad"—affirming life-enhancing qualities—from "good and evil," which he saw as ressentiment-driven constructs suppressing human potential, urging a revaluation beyond binary moral absolutes. In the 20th century, Hannah Arendt's 1963 analysis of Adolf Eichmann's trial introduced the "banality of evil," describing how ordinary bureaucrats enable atrocities through thoughtlessness and careerism rather than sadistic intent or ideological fanaticism.[32] Arendt observed Eichmann's inability to think from others' perspectives, leading to complicity in genocide via unreflective obedience, challenging demonic stereotypes of evildoers.[33] Contemporary philosophers, building on these foundations, often define evil as profound immorality involving gratuitous harm or radical disregard for victims' humanity, rejecting relativism. For instance, Susan Neiman in Evil in Modern Thought (2002) traces secular understandings from the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 onward, arguing evil's incomprehensibility demands both intelligibility and moral resistance, as seen in responses from Voltaire to Adorno.[34] Analytic ethicists like Claudia Card emphasize foreseeable intolerable harms that perpetrators could avert but pursue for unworthy ends, distinguishing evil from mere wrongdoing by degree of culpability and suffering inflicted.[1] These views prioritize causal agency and empirical accountability over theological or cultural excuses, acknowledging human capacity for both profound virtue and calculated destruction.Religious Perspectives
Abrahamic Traditions
In Abrahamic traditions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—evil constitutes rebellion against the singular, omnipotent God's sovereign will, arising from the free choices of finite creatures rather than an autonomous dualistic principle rivaling divine goodness.[35] These faiths reject Gnostic or Manichaean dualism, positing evil as a privation or corruption of created order, permitted to enable moral agency and ultimate vindication of divine justice.[36] Theodicy frameworks emphasize free will defenses: evil's existence tests faith, fosters virtue through opposition, and underscores redemption, with Satanic figures as tempters subordinate to God's permissive decree.[37] Judaism conceptualizes evil through the yetzer hara (evil inclination), an inherent drive toward selfish desires and survival instincts that, unchecked, leads to sin but is essential for human vitality and procreation; mastery of it via Torah observance elevates the individual toward holiness.[38] The yetzer tov (good inclination) counters it post-bar mitzvah, framing moral struggle as internal rather than external demonic force.[39] Satan (ha-Satan) appears in texts like Job as a heavenly accuser testing righteousness under divine authorization, not an originator of evil independent of God.[40] Natural and moral evils trace to Adam's primordial sin disrupting cosmic harmony, yet theodicy prioritizes mystery and divine incomprehensibility over resolution, as in Job's confrontation with unmerited suffering dated to circa 600–400 BCE.[41] Rabbinic sources, such as the Talmud (compiled 200–500 CE), attribute evil's persistence to incomplete creation awaiting human tikkun olam (repair of the world).[42] Christian doctrine locates evil's genesis in Lucifer's primordial rebellion—prideful aspiration to divine status (Isaiah 14:12–15, circa 700 BCE)—culminating in the serpent's deception of Adam and Eve (Genesis 3, circa 1400–500 BCE), introducing original sin that corrupts human nature and subjects creation to futility.[36] Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE) defined evil as privatio boni, a metaphysical lack of due good rather than substance, preserving God's non-creation of defect.[43] The Devil, as chief adversary, tempts toward idolatry and autonomy from God, exemplified in Christ's wilderness temptation (Matthew 4:1–11, circa 70–100 CE), yet wields only permitted influence to refine believers.[44] Moral evil manifests in willful sin against God's law (1 John 3:4), while natural evil stems from the Fall's cosmic entailments; both yield to eschatological eradication through Christ's atonement and second coming, restoring paradise sans temptation.[45] Free will remains pivotal, as coerced obedience negates love, with evil's allowance demonstrating God's glory in overcoming it.[46] Islamic theology traces evil to Iblis, a jinn elevated for piety but defiant in refusing prostration to Adam (Quran 7:11–18, revealed circa 610–632 CE), driven by arrogance (takabbur) and banished to whisper temptations (waswas) without compelling power.[47] Humans, granted free will (ikhtiyar), bear responsibility for succumbing to base desires (nafs ammara), with evil as deviation from fitrah (innate monotheism) and Sharia.[48] The Quran counters evil's asymmetry by enjoining repulsion with superior good (41:34), transforming enmity, while trials (ibtila')—including suffering—discern believers from hypocrites (29:2–3).[49] Hadith collections, like Sahih Bukhari (compiled 846 CE), reinforce Satan's role in inciting forbidden acts but affirm Allah's predestination subordinates all to His wisdom, rendering evil a test resolved at Qiyamah (Judgment Day) via paradise or hellfire.[50] Unlike Christian original sin, humanity enters pure but prone to error, with prophets modeling resistance.[48]