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Problem of evil

The refers to the philosophical dilemma of reconciling the existence of evil and suffering in the world with the traditional attributes of as omnipotent (all-powerful), omniscient (all-knowing), and omnibenevolent (all-good). This issue challenges the coherence of theistic belief by arguing that the presence of evil implies either that lacks one or more of these qualities or does not exist at all. The problem is often traced back to the philosopher (341–270 BCE), who formulated it as a : "Is willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?" This was later popularized by the philosopher in his work (1779), where it is presented through the character to question the design argument for 's existence. Philosophers distinguish between two primary versions of the problem: the logical problem of evil and the evidential problem of evil. The logical version, as articulated by in his 1955 essay "Evil and Omnipotence," posits a strict incompatibility, claiming that the mere existence of any evil logically contradicts the existence of a with the three attributes, rendering incoherent. In contrast, the evidential version, defended by thinkers like William Rowe in his 1979 article "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of ," argues that the sheer amount and intensity of apparently gratuitous suffering (such as or natural disasters) provides strong probabilistic evidence against the existence of such a , even if it does not definitively disprove it. Evil is typically categorized into , arising from human and actions like or , and , stemming from non-human causes such as earthquakes, diseases, or animal suffering. Responses to the problem fall into two main categories: theodicies, which attempt to justify God's permission of evil by showing that it serves a greater good (e.g., the free will defense by , arguing that moral good requires the possibility of ), and defenses, which merely demonstrate that the existence of evil is logically compatible with God's attributes without fully explaining why evil occurs (e.g., skeptical theism, which holds that human cognitive limitations prevent us from understanding God's reasons). Influential theodicies include the soul-making theodicy of , inspired by , which views suffering as essential for character development and spiritual growth toward perfection. These debates continue to shape , influencing discussions on , , and human morality.

Definitions and Key Concepts

Concept of Evil

In philosophical and theological discussions, particularly those addressing the problem of evil, the concept of evil is typically understood as a profound form of harm, wrongdoing, or deviation from the good that causes significant suffering or moral disorder. This broad notion encompasses states of affairs that are undesirable or antithetical to well-being, often challenging notions of a benevolent order in the universe. Evil is distinguished from mere wrongdoing or misfortune by its depth and intentionality in certain cases, serving as a central element in inquiries into human nature, divine justice, and cosmic purpose. A fundamental distinction exists between and . Moral evil refers to harms resulting from the deliberate actions or choices of free moral agents, such as human cruelty, , or ; for instance, exemplifies moral evil through systematic acts of hatred and dehumanization perpetrated by individuals and regimes. In contrast, natural evil involves suffering arising from non-moral causes inherent to the natural world, independent of human agency, such as s, diseases, or predatory behavior in ecosystems; an devastating a populated area illustrates natural evil by inflicting widespread destruction without culpable intent. This categorization, rooted in , highlights how moral evil implicates while natural evil raises questions about the design of the physical world. Historically, concepts of evil trace back to and biblical traditions. In Plato's ethics, evil is portrayed as stemming from ignorance, where individuals err due to a lack of knowledge about the true good, as articulated in dialogues like the and , positing that no one willingly chooses what they believe to be harmful. Biblical narratives, particularly the fall account in chapters 2–3, introduce evil through humanity's disobedience, framing it as a rupture in the divine-human relationship. In modern philosophy, definitions of evil often build on these foundations, viewing it as either a positive force of profound immorality or, in the Augustinian tradition, a privation or absence of good—lacking substantial reality but manifesting as corruption of what ought to be virtuous or ordered. Thinkers like Hannah Arendt have explored evil's banality in moral contexts, emphasizing how ordinary failures of thought enable atrocities, while theological analyses maintain the moral-natural divide to probe existential suffering. These perspectives underscore evil's role in highlighting tensions between human agency and the apparent indifference of nature.

Divine Attributes

The classical divine attributes that underpin the theological framework of the are , , and . denotes 's unlimited power to actualize any logically possible state of affairs, excluding contradictions such as creating a square circle. refers to 's exhaustive knowledge of all truths, including past, present, and future events, as well as all necessary and contingent propositions. characterizes as perfectly good, whose will is directed solely toward moral perfection and the promotion of value without any malevolence. , signifying 's immaterial and transcendent presence throughout all space and time, is another classical attribute but is not central to the . These attributes emerged prominently in medieval , influenced by Anselm of Canterbury's in , which defines as "that than which nothing greater can be conceived," necessarily possessing maximal perfection, including the omni qualities as essential to divine greatness. Thomas Aquinas further synthesized and refined them in his , portraying as simple and immutable, where attributes like and are not distinct accidents but identical with 's essence, derived from scriptural and philosophical reasoning to affirm 's over creation. Philosophical debates have nuanced these attributes, particularly regarding . On , thinkers like Aquinas and modern philosophers argue it excludes logical impossibilities, as such acts would not demonstrate power but undermine rationality; for instance, God cannot make 2+2=5, since this violates inherent to divine nature. In the case of , —developed by —posits "middle knowledge," God's prevolitional awareness of counterfactuals of creaturely (e.g., what agents would do in any possible circumstance), reconciling exhaustive foreknowledge with libertarian human without implying . Alternative views, such as , challenge exhaustive divine foreknowledge, suggesting God knows all that is knowable but not future actions, to better address issues of evil and human . Collectively, these attributes form the basis for the by implying that a who is omnipotent could eliminate , omniscient would foresee and prevent it, and omnibenevolent would desire its absence, rendering the existence of apparently incompatible with divine .

Theodicy and Defenses

The term "," coined by the philosopher in his 1710 work Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal, refers to a systematic justification or vindication of 's and goodness in the face of apparent in the world. Leibniz argued that , being omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, created the best , where exists not as a direct creation of but as a necessary consequence for achieving greater and . This approach seeks to reconcile divine attributes with by demonstrating that no better world could exist without compromising or . In contrast, a "defense" does not aim for full justification but merely shows that the and evil is logically possible, thereby shifting the burden of proof away from the theist. Philosopher , in his 1974 book God, Freedom, and Evil, developed such a defense, positing that God could not create free creatures who always choose good without logical contradiction, as true freedom entails the possibility of choosing evil. This defense addresses the logical problem of evil by outlining a possible scenario—such as widespread transworld depravity, where free beings inevitably choose wrongly in any world—without claiming it fully explains why God permits specific instances of suffering. Historically, early Christian thinkers like (354–430 CE) and of Lyons (c. 130–202 CE) offered foundational theodicies differing on the origins of evil. Augustine, in works such as Confessions and , attributed evil's emergence to the misuse of by angels and humans, who turned away from toward lesser goods, introducing moral disorder into an originally creation. Irenaeus, in Against Heresies, viewed evil as arising in a world intentionally designed for human maturation, where free creatures develop virtue through challenges rather than starting in a state of unfallen . These perspectives laid the groundwork for later theodicies, emphasizing and developmental purposes as key to understanding evil's role. Broadly, theodicies fall into types such as the Augustinian, which conceives as a privation or absence of good—lacking substantial and thus not created by —and the Irenaean, focused on "soul-making," where serves as a means for moral and spiritual growth toward divine likeness. In the Augustinian type, corrupts but does not exist positively, preserving 's sole role as creator of good. The Irenaean type, conversely, posits a two-stage : an immature world of potential followed by eschatological fulfillment, with as educational for agents. These frameworks provide general strategies for reconciling with divine benevolence without delving into exhaustive explanations. Critiques of theodicy often highlight its potential to diminish the raw reality of by subordinating it to abstract greater goods, thereby risking an inadequate acknowledgment of suffering's horror. Ethically, attempts to justify extreme evils—such as those of —raise profound concerns, as post-Holocaust thinkers like argued that such justifications profane victims by implying their agony serves a divine purpose, fostering skepticism toward any that prioritizes God's vindication over human solidarity. This has led to "anti-theodicy" positions, which reject explanatory efforts in favor of protesting evil's injustice.

Secular and Atheistic Responses

Evil as Illusion or Absence

In secular philosophical traditions, the illusion thesis posits that evil lacks objective reality and arises from a misperception of the world. Drawing from Eastern influences, , as articulated in classical texts, views evil as part of , the illusory power that veils the non-dual reality of , creating apparent dualities like through (avidya). This perspective dissolves the by asserting that suffering and moral wrongs are not ultimate truths but projections of the conditioned mind, vanishing upon that reveals the underlying unity and goodness of existence. Western variants of the appear in Mary Baker Eddy's , where evil is deemed an "error" or false belief contrary to the divine Mind's perfection. Eddy argues in Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures that evil has no actual existence, as it contradicts the spiritual reality of God as all-good; instead, it is a mental overcome through understanding Truth. This approach maintains that apparent evils, such as or , are unreal projections of material sense, resolvable by aligning thought with spiritual principle. The privation theory, in its secular neo-Platonic formulation, treats evil not as an illusion but as the absence or lack of good, without positive ontological status. Plotinus, in his Enneads, identifies matter as the root of evil—a formless substrate that represents privation of form, order, and intelligibility emanating from the One, leading to imperfections in souls and bodies. Unlike theistic adaptations centered on divine goodness (e.g., Augustine's version), Plotinus' account is cosmological, explaining evil as an inevitable byproduct of the material realm's distance from the intelligible Good, without invoking a creator's intent. Proponents of these views argue that if is either illusory or a mere privation, it poses no genuine to a fundamentally good or rational world, as there is no substantive entity requiring explanation or justification. For instance, the illusion thesis suggests that recognizing evil's unreality eliminates the evidential weight of , while privation theory preserves the positivity of all that exists by reducing evil to deficiency. Critiques, however, contend that these accounts fail to address the experiential reality of ; , for example, manifests as a positive rather than a mere absence, undermining the theory's for intense, gratuitous evils. Modern naturalistic variants extend the by framing as a subjective perceptual byproduct of , where moral judgments of "evil" evolved to promote social cooperation and survival rather than reflecting objective metaphysical truths. In , perceptions of harm or wrongdoing are adaptive responses shaped by , rendering a constructed category without independent reality beyond biological utility. This view aligns with broader secular , suggesting that the dissolves under scientific scrutiny, as it confuses evolved emotional responses with cosmic absolutes.

Necessity of Evil for Greater Goods

Atheistic perspectives on the necessity of evil emphasize that suffering and harm are inherent features of a naturalistic , arising from fundamental biological and physical processes rather than divine intent. In , operates through mechanisms that require pain and death to drive adaptation and survival, making suffering an unavoidable byproduct of life on . Philosopher Paul Draper argues that under , the distribution of pleasure and pain in the world is explained by their utility for biological fitness: pain motivates avoidance of threats, while predation and cull populations to favor advantageous traits. This process generates immense animal suffering—such as the prolonged agony of prey animals or the starvation of the unfit—which is gratuitous from a theistic viewpoint but predictively neutral or even expected under a hypothesis of indifferent natural laws. Draper's evidential posits that such natural evils are more probable given naturalism than , as a benevolent would prioritize minimizing suffering without relying on it for cosmic purposes. Philosophical arguments extend this naturalistic necessity to broader trade-offs in any conceivable world governed by consistent laws. Even concepts like , when secularized, imply inherent risks: human agency emerges from complex neural and environmental interactions that allow for both benevolent and harmful choices, without a safeguard against misuse. , in critiquing theistic defenses, inverts the burden by noting that claims of evil's necessity for greater goods (such as requiring danger) fail to demonstrate logical incompatibility between and a world free of such dependencies; in a godless framework, these trade-offs are simply the structure of reality, not a divine compromise. No world devoid of physics or could sustain complexity without entailing disasters like earthquakes or extinctions, as immutable laws of nature preclude a without sacrificing itself. This secular view undermines optimistic by portraying not as a puzzle for divine but as an emergent property of an amoral . Critiques of theistic design highlight the inadequacy of positing in a world allegedly created by an omnipotent being. If evils like are unavoidable trade-offs, as atheists contend, then the actual world—with its inefficiencies—falls short of what an optimal could achieve, contradicting claims of a "best ." For instance, the argument from no best world asserts that if metaphysical constraints prevent perfection (e.g., free will's risks or evolutionary costs), no singular optimal exists, rendering theistic assertions of divine selection incoherent; a truly benevolent would either eliminate such necessities or opt for non-existence over a suboptimal . Representative examples illustrate these systemic necessities. Cancer exemplifies how multicellular life, evolved for cooperative survival, inadvertently enables rogue cellular evolution: the same genetic flexibility allowing tissue repair and adaptation permits that lead to uncontrolled , affecting even non-reproductive organisms and causing profound . Similarly, pandemics arise as zoonotic spillovers from ecological and evolutionary dynamics, where viruses adapt across species boundaries in dense, interconnected biospheres—a natural outcome of and , not moral failing. Historical events like the or demonstrate how such systemic processes amplify harm without teleological purpose, reinforcing atheistic arguments that the world's design prioritizes persistence over welfare. These cases parallel theistic notions like soul-making but frame evil as an indifferent necessity, not a pathway to .

Moral Rationalism and Evil God Challenge

Moral rationalism approaches the problem of evil by asserting that moral facts are grounded in reason, providing intuitive grounds to reject the notion of an omnibenevolent deity in light of observable suffering. Under this view, the existence of profound evils—such as gratuitous human and animal pain—rationally entails that no perfectly good being could permit them without justification, thereby disproving divine goodness. Philosopher Michael Tooley exemplifies this critique in his evidential argument from evil, where he contends that instances of intense, apparently pointless suffering constitute strong probabilistic evidence against theism, particularly if one accepts hedonistic intuitions that pain is intrinsically bad and pleasure intrinsically good. Tooley argues that such evils are prima facie unjustifiable, shifting the evidential balance toward atheism unless theists can demonstrate unknown greater goods that outweigh them. The , articulated by in his paper, extends rationalist critiques by highlighting a structural in theistic hypotheses. Law formulates the challenge as follows: the evidential problem of undermines belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent to the same degree that a parallel "problem of good"—the abundance of pleasure, beauty, and moral acts—would undermine belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnimalicious . Since the world exhibits both significant evil and significant good, the observable data provide equally compelling grounds for either an all-good or all-evil deity, rendering the traditional good God hypothesis no more rationally defensible than its malevolent counterpart. This arises because theistic defenses against evil, such as or soul-making, could hypothetically mirror defenses against good (e.g., good arising from a malevolent to maximize overall), but theists rarely entertain the latter. The implications of the profoundly shift the dialectical burden onto theists, compelling them to explain why evidence favors benevolence over malevolence without relying on asymmetries. For instance, proponents of the challenge argue that assuming divine goodness is more parsimonious, as malevolence would require convoluted explanations for pervasive goods (e.g., hidden evils disguised as benefits), whereas goodness aligns more straightforwardly with moral intuitions about a benevolent . Critics within rationalist frameworks, however, note potential asymmetries, such as the observation that goodness appears more fundamental to rational agency than , making an evil God hypothesis less coherent with human . Nonetheless, the challenge underscores that without resolving this evidential parity, theistic belief remains rationally precarious. This rationalist perspective finds historical antecedents in Gnostic traditions, where the —a flawed or ignorant —is posited to account for the inherent in the material world. In Gnostic cosmology, the (often identified with the , ) is an imperfect being who fashions a defective physical realm, trapping divine sparks in suffering bodies, thus resolving the by attributing creation to a lesser, erroneous power rather than a supreme good . This dualistic framework parallels the by symmetrically inverting traditional , portraying the observable world's imperfections as evidence of a malevolent or incompetent rather than a benevolent one. Scholarly analyses emphasize how such views emerged as critiques of orthodox , using the to explain without impugning ultimate divinity.

Rejection of Theodicy

The rejection of represents a philosophical stance that refuses to justify or explain a theistic framework, viewing such efforts as morally inadequate or conceptually misguided. Proponents argue that attempting to rationalize undermines the gravity of human pain and risks diminishing the urgency of compassionate response. This position, often termed "antitheodicy" or "atheodicy," prioritizes acknowledgment of evil's reality over speculative defenses of divine goodness. A prominent Wittgensteinian approach to this rejection is articulated by D.Z. , who contends that the should not be framed as a theoretical puzzle requiring explanation but as a practical call to and ethical action. In his view, theodicies distort religious language by treating as a moral agent subject to human-like justifications, whereas demands lament and rather than intellectual resolution. Phillips emphasizes that responding to involves recognizing its senselessness, not subordinating it to a divine plan, thereby preserving the integrity of faith without rationalization. The has intensified this critique, placing traditional "on trial" by rendering justifications for mass suffering ethically untenable in the face of industrialized . Post-Auschwitz , particularly within Jewish thought, argues that any attempt to vindicate God's permission of such horrors equates to in denying victims' experiences, leading many to abandon explanatory frameworks altogether. This perspective links briefly to existential , where personal encounters with evoke against cosmic order rather than . Critics of further highlight its potential for victim-blaming, as exemplified in Fyodor Dostoevsky's , where Ivan Karamazov's rebellion rejects the notion that innocent children's serves a higher purpose. Ivan's famous —that he would return his "ticket" to a built on such —underscores how theodicies can imply that victims' pain is necessary or deserved, thereby shifting away from addressing . This literary critique has influenced philosophical discourse, portraying justification as a form of moral evasion. As an alternative to rational , posits faith as a non-rational commitment that accepts evil without demanding explanation, relying on divine mystery over logical reconciliation. maintain that belief in God transcends evidential challenges like the , avoiding the pitfalls of intellectual justification while affirming trust amid uncertainty. This approach, historically associated with thinkers like , offers a way to sustain without engaging in defensive . From a secular standpoint, dismisses as irrelevant since it presupposes a whose actions require defense; is simply a natural outcome of an indifferent universe governed by causal laws, not divine intent. extends this by rejecting supernatural justifications in favor of human-centered efforts to mitigate through , , and , emphasizing alleviation over explanation. In this view, the focus shifts to empirical solutions for , rendering theological rationalizations obsolete. A seminal historical articulation of this rejection appears in Terrence W. Tilley's 1991 book The Evils of , which systematically critiques as a that generates secondary harms by marginalizing sufferers, distorting religious texts, and fostering passivity toward real-world evils. Tilley argues that theodicy's pursuit of intellectual harmony often supplants genuine moral engagement, advocating instead for a that confronts evil directly without exculpating . His work has shaped contemporary debates, highlighting theodicy's unintended consequences in both academic and pastoral contexts.

Theistic Responses

Free Will Defense

The free will defense posits that a world with genuine moral good requires the possibility of , as true for rational creatures entails the ability to choose wrongly, thereby rendering the coexistence of and evil logically consistent. This approach counters the logical by arguing that an omnipotent cannot create free beings who invariably choose good without undermining their . Alvin Plantinga's formulation, widely regarded as the most rigorous, employs to demonstrate that no logical contradiction arises from 's existence alongside evil. The defense has deep historical antecedents in . , addressing the origin of evil in On the Free Choice of the Will, asserted that is a divine gift enabling , but its misuse—exemplified by and Adam's prideful choice—introduces evil without implicating , who creates only good. , in The Consolation of Philosophy, further reconciled divine foreknowledge with human freedom by explaining that 's timeless views all events simultaneously without necessitating them, allowing free choices to occur contingently despite . These early ideas emphasize freedom's value while attributing evil to creaturely agency, laying groundwork for later developments. Plantinga's core argument hinges on possible worlds semantics and the notion of transworld depravity. He defines a creature as significantly free if it can perform actions of moral good or , and transworld depravity occurs when every essence might instantiate suffers from the property that, in any world where it freely performs a good action, it also freely performs at least one action. Plantinga maintains it is possible that all creaturely essences are transworld depraved, implying no feasible world exists where free creatures universally choose good; thus, cannot actualize moral goodness from free will without permitting , resolving the alleged logical inconsistency. This structure shifts the burden, showing the atheist must prove no such obtains rather than assuming a . Despite its influence, the defense faces significant critiques. It effectively targets moral evil but leaves natural evil—such as earthquakes, diseases, or animal suffering—unaddressed, as these arise independently of human free choices and challenge God's benevolence toward non-moral creation. Moreover, Plantinga presupposes libertarian incompatibilism, where free will excludes causal determinism; he concedes that compatibilist accounts, which reconcile freedom with determinism, undermine the defense, as an omnipotent God could then actualize determined yet "free" good choices without evil.

Greater Good and Soul-Making Theodicies

The greater good theodicy posits that instances of evil are permitted by because they lead to goods that outweigh them, such as moral virtues that could not exist without the contrast or challenge of evil. For example, qualities like courage and compassion require the existence of danger and suffering to be meaningfully exercised and developed. This approach traces back to early Christian thought, notably in Augustine of Hippo's concept of (fortunate fault), which views the original sin of humanity as ultimately beneficial because it occasioned the incarnation of Christ and the greater redemption it brought. Augustine argued in works like that , though evil, results in a higher order of good through , transforming a potential world of innocence into one of profound salvation. Building on this tradition, the Irenaean soul-making , developed by , reframes the purpose of evil as essential for human spiritual maturation in a world designed as a "vale of soul-making." Drawing from the second-century bishop , who saw humanity as created immature and destined for growth rather than in a state of original perfection, Hick argued in Evil and the God of Love (1966) that evil and suffering provide the necessary conditions for free moral agents to evolve from self-centered beings (bios) toward selfless, Godlike character (zoe). This process occurs at an "epistemic distance" from God, where humans must respond to challenges through and effort, fostering virtues impossible in a paradise without or opposition. Unlike Augustinian views emphasizing restoration after a fall, Hick's emphasizes progressive development, with the world's evils serving as a developmental environment for eternal fulfillment. Skeptical theism complements these theodicies by addressing epistemic limitations in evaluating whether evils truly lead to greater goods, asserting that human cognitive capacities are too finite to discern God's full reasons for permitting . Philosopher Stephen Wykstra introduced the "noseeum inference" to critique evidential arguments from evil, such as William Rowe's claim that apparently gratuitous suffering (e.g., a fawn dying in a forest fire) provides strong evidence against God's existence. Wykstra argued in "The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from " (1984) that just because we do not see justifying goods for an evil (no-see-um), it does not follow that none exist, akin to a child's inability to perceive reasons for a parent's actions; thus, such inferences overreach human analogy to divine wisdom. This position undermines Rowe's evidential case by suggesting that our failure to identify greater goods does not probabilistically disconfirm . Critics of greater good and soul-making theodicies contend that they fail to adequately quantify or demonstrate that the purported superior goods genuinely outweigh the evils involved, particularly in cases of extreme or seemingly pointless suffering. For instance, Rowe's evidential argument highlights instances of intense pain that appear gratuitous, challenging whether virtues like compassion could require such disproportionate horror rather than milder challenges. Hick's framework is faulted for assuming universal soul-making progress, yet it struggles to explain why some individuals endure suffering that hinders rather than promotes growth, or why non-human animal pain fits this moral development model. Skeptical theism faces objections that widespread skepticism about divine reasons could erode moral knowledge, as it implies we might not recognize obvious goods or evils in everyday judgments.

Afterlife and Eschatological Solutions

Eschatological solutions to the posit that the ultimate resolution of lies in the , where divine justice compensates for temporal injustices and restores harmony. In , this framework encompasses concepts of as eternal bliss for the righteous, as punishment for the wicked, and as the eventual salvation of all souls. is depicted as a realm of perfect communion with , free from pain and evil, serving as recompense for earthly trials endured faithfully. , conversely, represents separation from , often as a consequence of unrepented , though its nature varies between eternal torment and remedial purification. These eschatological vistas address evil by framing it as transient within an eternal divine plan, where posthumous rewards or corrections balance the scales of moral order. Universalism, the belief that all will ultimately be reconciled to , offers a particularly optimistic resolution, eliminating permanent . Early Church Father of Alexandria (c. 185–254 ) articulated this in his doctrine of apokatastasis, or universal restoration, arguing that 's infinite goodness would eventually purge all souls of through purifying fires, leading to the salvation of , demons, and even himself. viewed as a deviation from the good that , in his mercy, would fully rectify post-mortem, thus resolving the apparent injustice of without eternal between . This perspective influenced later thinkers but was condemned at the Fifth in 553 , yet it persists in modern universalist interpretations as a that underscores divine and benevolence. A key argument in eschatological theodicy is the compensation for , exemplified in the , where Job's restoration—receiving double his former possessions, family, and longevity after enduring immense loss—illustrates divine vindication beyond earthly retribution. Philosopher (1922–2012) extended this through his "replica theory" of , proposing that God creates exact physical duplicates of believers in the , ensuring continuity of identity without violating natural laws. In works like Death and Eternal Life (1976), Hick argued this mechanism allows infinite goods—eternal joy and growth—to outweigh finite earthly evils, rendering purposeful as preparation for eschatological fulfillment. Such compensation posits that no is gratuitous when viewed sub specie aeternitatis, as infinite divine rewards eclipse temporal pain. Philosophical issues arise concerning the comparative value of finite versus goods in these solutions. Proponents contend that an eternal amplifies the significance of earthly choices, making finite sufferings meaningful through their role in achieving everlasting , where the intensity of joy proportionally exceeds past woes. Critics, however, argue that eschatological compensation fails to explain why an omnipotent permits to occur at all, merely postponing rather than preventing it, and question whether goods truly justify finite horrors like or . Atheistic critiques highlight that no amount of future bliss adequately vindicates a deity's allowance of such evils, potentially rendering the morally insufficient. Non-Christian parallels appear in , where karma and provide an eschatological balance to evil by linking suffering to past actions across multiple lives. The doctrine of karma holds that moral deeds determine future rebirths, with evil experiences serving as retribution or learning opportunities until liberation () is attained, thus explaining apparent injustices without impugning divine goodness. Scholarly analyses note, however, that while karma addresses distribution of suffering, it does not fully resolve , as it presupposes an impersonal cosmic law rather than explaining the origin of evil itself. This cyclical samsara ultimately leads to union with the divine, mirroring in compensating temporal evil through eternal resolution.

Process and Privation Theories

The privation theory of evil, with roots in Neoplatonism, posits that evil is not a positive entity or substance but rather the absence or lack of a due good in something that ought to possess it. This view traces back to Plotinus, who in his Enneads (I.8) identifies evil as a privation arising from matter's formless deficiency, where the soul's turn toward sensible matter leads to moral failings, but evil itself lacks substantial reality as it stems from a negation of the Good emanating from the One. Plotinus's framework influenced later Christian thinkers by framing evil as a metaphysical lack rather than an independent force, allowing for a world created wholly good by God without implying divine authorship of evil. Thomas Aquinas provided the most systematic exposition of the privation theory in Christian theology, building on Aristotelian and Neoplatonic foundations to argue that evil consists in the privation of a good that a being is naturally ordered to have. In the Summa Theologica (I, q. 48, a. 1), Aquinas defines evil as "the privation of good," emphasizing that it is not a thing in itself but a corruption or defect in a subject, such as blindness, which is the absence of sight in an eye that should see, rather than a positive entity added to the eye. He clarifies that this privation is not mere non-being but a lack relative to a being's form and end— for instance, a stone lacks sight without evil, but a human or animal deprived of it suffers evil because sight is due to their nature (I, q. 48, a. 3). Thus, all evils, whether moral (sin as privation of due act) or natural (disease as privation of health), presuppose some good as their subject, preserving God's goodness as the source of all being while attributing evil to the failure of creatures to actualize their potential. In contrast, process theodicy, emerging in 20th-century philosophy, addresses evil through a dynamic metaphysics that reimagines divine power as limited and relational, drawing from Alfred North Whitehead's . Whitehead's (1929) describes reality as a creative advance of interdependent events, where functions as the primordial lure toward novel possibilities rather than an omnipotent controller, influencing the world through persuasive rather than coercive power. David Ray Griffin further develops this into a in God, Power, and Evil (1976), arguing that evil arises from the inherent in an evolving universe, where actual entities (including creatures) exercise in concrescence, sometimes resulting in destructive decisions that can only lure away from but not override without negating freedom. In this model, God's is redefined as maximal power within the metaphysical constraints of creativity and temporality, so natural disasters or moral wrongs stem from the world's inherent indeterminacy and creaturely agency, not divine will. Critics of the privation theory contend that it insufficiently accounts for the apparent positive reality of evil experiences, such as intense suffering, which feel like substantial forces rather than mere absences, potentially diminishing the problem's urgency by reducing evils to linguistic or metaphysical negations. Similarly, process faces objections for undermining classical theism's doctrine of divine , as portraying as unable to prevent evil challenges traditional attributes of and , leading some to argue it constructs a weaker incompatible with biblical portrayals of as all-powerful. Despite these critiques, both theories offer metaphysical alternatives to evidential explanations of evil by shifting focus to and divine nature.

Other Specialized Theodicies

The cruciform theodicy, prominent in Protestant theology, posits that 's identification with human through the crucifixion of Christ provides a framework for understanding not merely as permitted but as shared in divine vulnerability. , in his seminal work The Crucified God, argues that the cross reveals as voluntarily entering into godforsakenness, thereby transforming from meaningless to participatory in the divine drama of , where 's power is expressed through weakness rather than . This approach emphasizes that Christ's encompasses the full spectrum of human evils—economic, political, and personal—offering that reorients the toward eschatological hope rather than justification of divine permission. Building on similar participatory themes, the exemplarist theodicy, developed by Marilyn McCord Adams, addresses horrendous evils by envisioning —particularly through Christ's —as an infinite exemplar whose goodness absorbs and defeats finite evils, akin to a dark spot vanishing in an boundless canvas of . In Evils and the Goodness of , Adams contends that divine intimacy with sufferers, achieved postmortem through , overpowers evils that threaten to define a person's life, prioritizing aesthetic and relational wholeness over instrumental greater goods. This theodicy rejects reductive explanations, insisting that 's ethical perfection involves direct participation in horrors to ensure no created person is lost to evil's engulfing power. Theistic responses to the , particularly from Catholic perspectives, counter the symmetry between gods by invoking classical metaphysics, where goodness is identified with and as mere privation, rendering an "evil god" metaphysically incoherent. Thomistic thinkers like Peter S. Dillard argue that since is pure act and subsistent being, creation's default goodness stems from participation in divine esse, while lacks positive reality and cannot constitute a being. This allows theists to affirm observable goods as evidence of a benevolent source, while evils require no equivalent "good god" , as non-being cannot originate maximal reality. Critiques of animal suffering in evolutionary contexts have prompted specialized theodicies that view such pain as integral to fostering and , with eschatological ensuring ultimate . Bethany Sollereder's God, Evolution, and Animal Suffering proposes a without a primordial fall, where creates through natural processes that necessarily include predation and pain to generate diverse life forms capable of rich relationships. Complementing this, eschatological frameworks draw on :19–23 to argue that animals, as part of groaning , will share in cosmic renewal, with their suffering redeemed through transformed existence in the new heaven and earth, preserving divine goodness amid evolutionary history.

Existential Dimensions

The existential problem of centers on the profound personal and emotional turmoil that individuals experience when grappling with the apparent meaninglessness of , shifting the focus from abstract philosophical debates to the raw, lived reality of doubt and despair. This dimension highlights how disrupts one's sense of purpose and authenticity, compelling a confrontation with rather than seeking definitive proofs or justifications. Unlike the logical problem of , which posits an inherent between an omnipotent, benevolent and the of , or the evidential problem, which argues that observed renders God's improbable, the existential approach emphasizes subjective and the maintenance of hopeful commitment amid unrelenting pain. Key existential thinkers have illuminated this anguish through literary and philosophical lenses. , in his exploration of the absurd, described human existence as a futile against an indifferent universe rife with suffering, where the quest for meaning collides irreconcilably with evil's randomness, leading to a of in any transcendent order. , conversely, addressed this through the concept of the "," portraying faith as an passionate, subjective commitment that embraces the paradox of suffering without rational resolution, allowing individuals to affirm existence authentically despite evil's assault on reason. Elie Wiesel's Night exemplifies the in the context of historical atrocity, chronicling his own experiences where the systematic evil of Auschwitz shattered his Jewish faith, prompting anguished questions about divine silence and the possibility of meaning in unimaginable horror. Similarly, Fyodor Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov features Ivan Karamazov's "" narrative, in which the protagonist intellectually and emotionally rejects any cosmic harmony that permits the suffering of innocents, such as tortured children, as an unacceptable price for ultimate good, underscoring a deep-seated moral revulsion against . Psychologically, the existential impact of often manifests as trauma-induced , eroding in the and one's foundations, with survivors of or frequently reporting a fragmented sense of self and purpose. In pastoral theology, responses draw on resources like the biblical lament psalms—such as or Psalm 88—which model honest outcries of abandonment and injustice to , validating emotional protest as a pathway to and communal without demanding intellectual closure. These practices prioritize and relational support, enabling individuals to navigate evil's shadow by integrating into a broader narrative of . This existential refusal to rationalize sometimes aligns with broader rejections of , viewing such efforts as evasive in the face of personal devastation.

Cultural and Artistic Representations

The has profoundly influenced cultural expressions across , , , theater, and modern media, serving as a lens to explore , divine justice, and moral ambiguity. These representations often depict evil not merely as abstract but as visceral experiences that challenge , , and . In literature, John Milton's (1667) grapples with justifying the ways of to amid of angels and humankind, portraying Satan's and the introduction of sin as central to understanding and in a world marred by evil. Fyodor 's (1880) intensifies this through Ivan Karamazov's "," a poignant critique of innocent —particularly of children—that leads to a rejection of a world created by a benevolent , highlighting the existential anguish of undeserved pain. Visual arts have vividly captured the horrors of evil, often blending moral allegory with depictions of human depravity. Hieronymus Bosch's triptych The Garden of Earthly Delights (c. 1495–1505) juxtaposes paradisiacal innocence with chaotic earthly pleasures and infernal torments in its right panel, symbolizing the consequences of succumbing to and the pervasive threat of . Francisco Goya's series (1810–1820) etches the brutal realities of the , exposing unprovoked violence, famine, and atrocities as manifestations of human evil, devoid of heroic glorification and emphasizing war's inherent cruelty. In music and theater, Leonard Bernstein's Mass: A Theatre Piece for Singers, Players, and Dancers (1971) dramatizes a celebrant's crisis of faith during the , incorporating , , and to voice congregational doubts about God's presence amid worldly chaos, culminating in a fragile reconciliation of belief and skepticism. Ancient Greek tragedy, such as Aeschylus's (c. 5th century BCE), parallels biblical narratives like the by portraying the Prometheus's unjust punishment by for aiding humanity, questioning tyrannical divine power and the origins of suffering as a challenge to cosmic order. Modern media continues this tradition, with Terrence Malick's film The Tree of Life (2011) weaving personal grief over a child's death into a cosmic meditation on grace versus nature, invoking Job to confront why innocence succumbs to evil in a seemingly indifferent universe. In non-Western contexts, Buddhist texts address dukkha—often translated as suffering—as the first Noble Truth, attributing it to impermanence, attachment, and ignorance rather than a creator deity's allowance of evil, offering a framework for transcending pain through enlightenment without invoking theistic justification.

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