Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Fifth-generation fighter

A is a that integrates low-observable technologies with advanced , including of multi-spectral data from onboard and offboard sources, to provide pilots with a comprehensive picture for superior in high-threat environments. These aircraft emphasize survivability through reduced detectability across radar, infrared, and visual spectra, alongside capabilities such as —sustained supersonic flight without afterburners in designs like the F-22 Raptor—and network-enabled operations for coordinated strikes. The pioneered operational fifth-generation fighters with the , focused on air dominance through unmatched , maneuverability, and integrated sensors that enable first-detection and first-engagement advantages, and the multirole , which fuses 360-degree sensor data for joint all-domain operations across air, sea, and land forces. China's Chengdu , operational since 2017, prioritizes long-range penetration of air defenses with advanced and internal weapons bays, while Russia's Sukhoi incorporates , intended , and for multirole combat, though production remains limited with around 20-25 aircraft active as of 2025. Defining achievements include the F-22's role in maintaining U.S. air superiority and the F-35's with allied forces, but controversies arise from exorbitant development costs—exemplified by the F-35 program's overruns—and debates over the full maturity of and engine technologies in non-U.S. designs like the Su-57 and early J-20 variants.

Definition and Classification

Technological Criteria

Fifth-generation fighters are defined by their incorporation of low-observability stealth as a core design principle, achieved through airframe shaping that deflects radar waves, radar-absorbent materials, and specialized coatings to minimize radar cross-section (RCS) across multiple aspects, particularly against X-band fire-control radars prevalent in air-to-air threats. This results in RCS reductions typically to 0.001 m² or less in the frontal aspect, representing orders-of-magnitude improvements over fourth-generation aircraft, enabling detection ranges shortened to fractions of those for non-stealthy platforms under realistic signal-to-noise conditions. Such stealth is not mere add-on but integral, requiring trade-offs in aerodynamics and maintenance to prioritize broadband electromagnetic signature management, including infrared and acoustic reductions. Advanced avionics form another benchmark, centered on that integrates data from (AESA) radars, infrared search-and-track (IRST) systems, (EW) sensors, and electro-optical targeting pods into a unified picture presented to the pilot via helmet-mounted displays. This fusion enables 360-degree , automated threat prioritization, and beyond-visual-range targeting by correlating low-probability-of-intercept emissions with passive detections, reducing in high-threat environments. Performance criteria emphasize capability, defined as sustained supersonic flight (Mach 1.2 or higher) without use, which conserves fuel and minimizes signatures compared to afterburner-dependent dashes. High thrust-to-weight ratios exceeding 1.0, enabled by advanced engines with high-bypass efficiencies, support rapid accelerations and maneuverability, while internal weapons bays maintain by concealing ordnance and conformal fuel tanks, preventing external drag-inducing stores. Network-centric integration requires secure, high-bandwidth data links for sharing of fused data in a "combat cloud," allowing with unmanned systems, satellites, and command nodes to enable distributed and swarming tactics in electronically contested . These features prioritize causal advantages in first-detection and first-kill scenarios, where information dominance translates to kinetic outcomes without relying on vulnerable voice communications.

Debates on True Fifth-Generation Status

The absence of a formal, treaty-bound definition for fighter generations has fueled ongoing debates, with the adhering to stringent criteria emphasizing all-aspect , capability, , and internal weapons carriage for like the F-22 and F-35, while and Chinese classifications often de-emphasize comprehensive low observability in favor of and suites. This divergence reflects differing priorities: Western standards prioritize penetration of dense air defenses via reduced cross-section () across multiple aspects, whereas non-Western claims frequently rely on assertions without independent validation, leading analysts to question the empirical equivalence of contested entrants. Russia's , touted as fifth-generation since its 2010 prototype rollout, draws criticism for visible engine fan blades lacking serpentine inlets and an estimated frontal of 0.1–0.5 m²—orders of magnitude larger than the F-22's 0.0001 m²—exposing it to early detection by modern radars. Independent modeling and expert assessments attribute these shortfalls to design compromises favoring over signature management, rendering promotional claims of parity with U.S. peers unverifiable without open testing data. China's , operational since 2017, achieves frontal but faces 2024–2025 analyses questioning all-aspect performance due to canard-induced scattering and exposed engine nozzles, with side-profile potentially elevated by structural edges and less advanced radar-absorbent materials. The FC-31/J-35 variant, entering limited production by mid-2025, exhibits similar developmental gaps in verified low-observability, including reliance on external conformal fuel tanks in early configurations that undermine internal carriage claims. South Korea's , despite advanced , is consensus-classified as 4.5-generation due to mandatory external hardpoints for full loadouts and semi-stealth shaping that preserves from non-frontal angles, with even optimistic upgrades projected for Block III failing to meet full fifth-generation thresholds. These disputes highlight hurdles, as evaluations hinge on manufacturer-provided data from non-transparent programs versus sparse metrics; true demands prioritization of outcomes like RCS measurements in controlled tests, sortie survivability rates, and resilience over unverified videos or state announcements.

Core Characteristics

Stealth and Low Observability

Low observability in fifth-generation fighters centers on minimizing radar cross-section (RCS), a measure of how much radar energy an aircraft reflects back to the emitter, typically quantified in square meters. Effective RCS reduction relies on deflecting electromagnetic waves via geometric design rather than absorption alone, as scattering theory dictates that planar surfaces aligned parallel to the radar beam redirect energy away from the source. Aircraft employ faceted or curved-but-aligned edges to achieve broadband RCS minimization, avoiding right angles or protrusions that cause specular reflections; internal weapons bays and fuel tanks further eliminate drag-inducing external stores that would amplify returns. Radar-absorbent materials (), often carbon-based composites, coat surfaces to dissipate incident waves as heat, targeting multiple frequencies but adding weight and maintenance demands. These principles impose trade-offs, as stealth-optimized shapes constrain : high-maneuverability curves may increase at off-angles, while designs for must mask faces without excessive boundary layer bleed, potentially limiting sustained supersonic efficiency or suppression. Low-frequency radars (VHF/UHF) exploit longer wavelengths that interact less with small-scale features, degrading shaping benefits, compounded by persistent plume signatures detectable by advanced sensors. The F-22 achieves a frontal RCS of approximately 0.0001 m²—comparable to a —validated in operational tests and exercises where it evaded legacy radars at ranges exceeding detection thresholds for non- peers. In contrast, claims, touted by state sources as parity-level, remain unverified by analysis, with assessments noting reliance on unproven simulations over empirical data. Advancements in the include research into metamaterial-based coatings that adaptively tune absorption to specific threats, potentially countering frequency-agile radars through phase-changing composites tested in laboratory prototypes.

Sensor Fusion and Avionics

in fifth-generation fighters amalgamates inputs from multiple sensors—such as AESA radars, electro-optical systems, and arrays—into a singular, low-latency model, granting pilots superior and decision primacy over legacy platforms. This integration correlates tracks across spectra, automating and cueing to alleviate pilot workload amid high-threat densities. For instance, the F-35 employs advanced algorithms to fuse , , and passive sensor data, yielding a helmet-displayed view that correlates threats without manual cross-referencing. Key enablers include distributed aperture systems for omnidirectional coverage; the F-35's AN/AAQ-37 uses six sensors to deliver spherical search-and-track, missile warning, and to the pilot's in , independent of aircraft attitude. Complementing this, AI-driven processing prioritizes threats by fusing multi-spectral signatures— returns, plumes, and electronic emissions—into actionable cues, as demonstrated in ’s cognitive warning receivers that employ for dynamic identification and ranking. Such capabilities extend to software-defined architectures, permitting modular upgrades via over-the-air patches, which have been tested in tactical aircraft to inject new functions mid-mission without hardware swaps. By compressing the OODA loop through automated fusion, these systems accelerate threat response cycles beyond fourth-generation limits, though their performance hinges on resilient datalinks prone to disruption via jamming or cyber interference, underscoring a causal dependency on electromagnetic spectrum dominance. Off-board "combat cloud" processing further distributes computational load, enabling scalable fusion across networked assets. As of October 2025, sensor fusion advancements facilitate manned-unmanned teaming, wherein fifth-generation aircraft ingest drone-derived data streams for extended sensor apertures and distributed lethality, as pursued in U.S. and Chinese programs integrating loyal wingmen.

Propulsion and Aerodynamic Performance

Fifth-generation fighters incorporate advanced engines optimized for , the sustained supersonic flight without , which enhances range and reduces infrared detectability compared to afterburner-dependent acceleration. The F119-PW-100 engines powering the F-22 Raptor exemplify this, delivering approximately 35,000 lbf (156 kN) of per engine in while enabling 1.5 and a top dash speed exceeding 2. These engines employ variable geometry in compressor and fan stages to balance high with thermodynamic efficiency, minimizing fuel consumption during extended operations. Thrust vectoring nozzles further augment post-stall maneuverability in designs prioritizing close-range combat recovery, as seen in the Sukhoi Su-57's AL-41F1 engines, which provide three-dimensional vectoring for enhanced agility at high angles of attack. The Izdeliye 30 upgrade, under testing as of late 2024, introduces a flat two-dimensional nozzle retaining vectoring while aiming to improve stealth through reduced radar reflectivity, with dry thrust increased to 11,000 kgf (108 kN) and afterburner to 18,000 kgf (176 kN) per engine. In contrast, Chinese Chengdu J-20 variants initially relied on WS-10C engines with thrust around 132-140 kN, but integration of the WS-15 Emei, certified for production by 2023, boosts afterburner thrust to approximately 180 kN per engine—surpassing the F119's 156 kN in raw output—though empirical data on long-term reliability remains limited due to China's historical challenges in high-bypass turbofan maturation. Aerodynamic designs emphasize relaxed static , where the center of gravity is positioned aft to reduce inherent stability, compensated by digital systems for precise control during high-alpha (angle-of-attack) regimes exceeding 30 degrees. This enables sustained 9G maneuvers and efficient loiter times through optimized lift-to-drag ratios, with or tailless configurations in aircraft like the J-20 and F-22 promoting for without excessive drag penalties. Fuel efficiency derives from integrated airframe-engine optimization, allowing combat radii over 1,000 km in modes, though trade-offs persist: the J-20's WS-15, while thrust-competitive, exhibits higher specific fuel consumption than mature Western equivalents based on independent analyses of operational prototypes. Emerging developments, such as the U.S. Next Generation Adaptive Propulsion program, introduce variable-cycle engines like GE's XA102 and Pratt & Whitney's XA103, which passed detailed design reviews in early and enable seamless transitions between high-thrust and high-efficiency modes for NGAD precursors. These adaptive designs, building on F119 heritage, promise 10-20% improvements in range and thermal management, influencing retrofits for existing fifth-generation fleets to sustain performance in contested environments.

Internal Weapons and Network Integration

Fifth-generation fighters incorporate internal weapons bays to maintain low-observable signatures during transit to targets, enabling the carriage of air-to-air missiles and precision-guided munitions without external pylons that increase radar cross-section. The Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor features two side bays for short-range missiles like the AIM-9 Sidewinder and a ventral bay accommodating up to six AIM-120 AMRAAM medium-range missiles in air-to-air configuration, or two 1,000-pound GBU-32 JDAMs alongside missiles for ground attack. The Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II employs two internal bays supporting up to four AIM-120 AMRAAMs or two GBU-31 JDAMs per bay in standard loadouts, with upgrades like the Sidekick adapter enabling six AIM-120s internally for enhanced beyond-visual-range engagement capacity. The Sukhoi Su-57 includes two tandem main bays, each roughly 4.4 meters long, capable of holding up to four air-to-air missiles such as the K-77M, plus smaller side bays for a total internal payload emphasizing volume over the more compact U.S. designs, though Russian claims of superiority in capacity warrant scrutiny given limited verification and observed constraints. China's features a ventral bay for long-range missiles and side bays for short-range types like the , with estimates of up to six air-to-air missiles internally, prioritizing stealth-preserving carriage amid opaque disclosures from state-affiliated sources that may inflate capabilities. Network integration in these aircraft facilitates data sharing for coordinated strikes, with the F-35 leveraging the (MADL)—a directional, high-bandwidth X-band —for stealthy transmission of tracks and targeting cues among formations, surpassing the omnidirectional Link-16's vulnerabilities. This enables real-time delegation of engagements, including cueing weapons from off-board s on allied assets or unmanned s, though F-22 integration remains hampered by its receive-only Link-16 mode and intra-fifth-generation bridging via intermediaries like the U-2. In contested environments, electronic countermeasures () impose bandwidth constraints, as Link-16's 1 Mbit/s rate proves susceptible to , potentially isolating platforms, while MADL's narrow beam offers resilience but limits connectivity to line-of-sight formations. Empirical U.S. tests demonstrate that F-35 off-board extends effective engagement ranges by fusing distributed data, with networked cueing allowing pilots to fire AIM-120s at targets beyond individual horizons, though quantitative gains vary by scenario and remain classified beyond acknowledgments of improved awareness. Export variants restrict full network capabilities, as the withholds F-35 and proprietary algorithms from allies, ensuring control over updates and interoperability to mitigate risks, a policy echoing restrictions on sensitive in sales to partners like and . Comparable opacity surrounds and systems, where Su-57 and J-20 integrations with drones or networks are marketed for but lack transparent validation, reflecting strategic withholding of core technologies.

Historical Development

Origins in Cold War Concepts (1970s–1990s)

The conceptual foundations for fifth-generation fighters emerged from the US-Soviet technological arms race during the Cold War, where each side sought decisive advantages in air superiority amid escalating threats from high-performance interceptors and projected future aircraft. The Soviet Union's MiG-25 Foxbat, operational since 1970 and capable of Mach 3 speeds at high altitudes, generated alarm in US intelligence assessments, initially perceived as a versatile superiority fighter until a 1976 pilot defection revealed its limitations as a specialized interceptor; this spurred accelerated US responses, including the F-15 Eagle program, while laying groundwork for beyond-fourth-generation requirements emphasizing survivability against advanced radar and missile systems. Mid-1970s US research pivoted toward radar evasion as a core survivability enabler, driven by DARPA's recognition that conventional fighters would face unacceptable attrition against dense Soviet air defenses. The Have Blue demonstrator program, initiated in 1975 under Lockheed's Skunk Works, produced two faceted prototypes that validated low-observable principles through subscale testing and culminated in manned flights starting December 1, 1977, at Groom Lake, achieving radar cross-sections reduced by orders of magnitude via angular shaping and radar-absorbent materials. This proof-of-concept directly informed subsequent stealth applications, proving that practical low observability could be integrated without prohibitive aerodynamic penalties. Building on Have Blue's success, the US Air Force advanced into production with the F-117 Nighthawk, whose first flight occurred on June 18, 1981, marking the debut of an operational aircraft prioritizing invisibility over speed or maneuverability, with its faceted design deflecting radar waves and internal bays concealing weapons. Parallel efforts coalesced in the (ATF) program, authorized in 1981 to counter anticipated Soviet fourth-generation-plus threats like enhanced MiG-29 variants, incorporating , , and from inception. Technological maturation in the enabled these concepts' feasibility, as (CFD) tools allowed precise simulation of complex airflow over stealth-optimized shapes, reducing reliance on costly wind-tunnel iterations, while advanced composites facilitated lightweight structures with integrated radar-absorbent properties essential for maintaining performance amid low-observable constraints. The ATF competition intensified with prototype fly-offs in 1990–1991, pitting Lockheed's YF-22—emphasizing agility and thrust-vectoring—against Northrop's YF-23, which prioritized passive ; the YF-22 was selected on , 1991, for its balanced demonstration of air dominance attributes. Soviet efforts mirrored threat perceptions but diverged in emphasis, focusing on kinematic performance in aircraft like the MiG-29 (first flight 1977), which influenced requirements for beyond-visual-range engagement and maneuverability, yet lagged in systematic integration due to computational and material gaps, with exploratory low-observable concepts shelved amid economic pressures by the late 1980s.

United States Initiatives (1990s–2010s)

The United States initiated fifth-generation fighter development through the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) program, which sought to replace the F-15 Eagle with a superior air dominance platform emphasizing stealth, supercruise, and advanced avionics. In 1991, the U.S. Air Force selected the Lockheed YF-22 and Northrop YF-23 prototypes for evaluation after issuing a request for proposals in 1986. Lockheed's design was chosen in 1996 for engineering and manufacturing development (EMD), with the first production F-22 Raptor flying in 1997 and achieving initial operational capability (IOC) on December 15, 2005. By 2011, 195 F-22s had been produced, a number capped due to escalating unit costs exceeding $150 million each amid post-Cold War budget constraints. Congress imposed an export ban on the F-22 in to safeguard proprietary and technologies from potential adversaries, a decision reinforced by concerns over technology risks. This measure preserved U.S. qualitative edges but limited allied . The program's engineering triumphs included integrated low-observable design and thrust-vectoring engines enabling , though delays arose from scaling complex radar-absorbent materials and integration, reflecting first-principles challenges in achieving all-aspect without compromising performance. Parallel to F-22 maturation, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program originated in to develop a multirole successor for legacy aircraft across services, selecting and for concept demonstration that year. Lockheed's X-35 prevailed in 2001, leading to variants: F-35A (conventional takeoff), F-35B (short takeoff/vertical landing), and F-35C (carrier-based). The F-35A reached IOC in August 2016, but development spanned the 2000s with persistent software integration hurdles for and mission data processing. Post-9/11 strategic shifts emphasized multirole versatility for asymmetric threats alongside peer competition, pivoting resources toward the F-35's affordable over F-22 expansion. Empirical data from exercises underscored U.S. platforms' superiority, with F-22s achieving kill ratios exceeding 100:1 in simulated beyond-visual-range engagements due to stealth-enabled first-look, first-kill advantages. F-35s similarly demonstrated dominance, posting 20:1 ratios by fusing offboard data for , though scaling software concurrency for real-time processing caused multiyear delays. These initiatives established benchmarks in causal determinants of air superiority—low observability and information dominance—despite integration frictions from exponentially growing computational demands.

Russian Su-57 Program (2000s–Present)

The Russian Su-57, developed under the PAK FA (Prospective Airborne Complex of Frontline Aviation) program, originated from a 1999 initiative to create a fifth-generation fighter to replace aging Su-27 derivatives. Sukhoi won the competition against Mikoyan, with prototype development accelerating in the early 2000s. The first prototype achieved its maiden flight on January 29, 2010, from the Komsomolsk-on-Amur aircraft plant. Initial serial production Su-57s incorporated the AL-41F1 engine with three-dimensional for , derived from Su-35 technology. However, features have faced scrutiny due to the aircraft's configuration, which increases cross-section by presenting additional edges not fully aligned for low observability, and exposed exhaust nozzles that emit significant signatures. Independent analyses indicate these design choices prioritize agility over comprehensive and thermal , limiting the Su-57's low-observability compared to peers without such protrusions. Development encountered persistent challenges, including post-2014 Western sanctions restricting access to advanced materials and components, which exacerbated delays in achieving full production capabilities. The program shifted to the more advanced Izdeliye 30 (AL-51F1) engine for improved thrust, supercruise, and reduced signatures, with ground tests completing by 2020 and flight integration occurring in prototypes by late 2024; serial integration began in early 2025. Despite Russian announcements of accelerated output, only approximately 40-44 aircraft, including prototypes, were in service by mid-2025, far below initial targets of dozens annually. Export efforts highlighted performance uncertainties, with withdrawing from a joint FGFA venture in 2018 after prototypes revealed and shortfalls during evaluations. emerged as a potential customer, with leaked documents in October 2025 indicating an order for up to 12 Su-57E variants, though deliveries remain unconfirmed amid questions over operational maturity. In the Ukraine conflict, Su-57 deployments have been restrained, primarily involving launches from airspace to minimize risks, with expanded formation tactics reported in 2025 but no deep penetrations. A June 2024 strike damaged a parked Su-57 at Akhtubinsk airbase, 600 km from the front, underscoring vulnerabilities in basing and maintenance rather than airframe resilience, as the jet was not in active flight. This incident, combined with sparse combat data, has reinforced skepticism about the platform's readiness for high-threat environments.

Chinese J-20 and FC-31 Developments (2000s–Present)

The Chengdu J-20, known as the "Mighty Dragon," emerged from development efforts initiated in the late 1990s by the Chengdu Aerospace Corporation, with its prototype achieving first flight on January 11, 2011. Serial production commenced around 2015, enabling rapid scaling through China's industrial capacity, which by late 2025 had yielded over 300 aircraft across multiple production lines operating at rates up to 200 units annually. Initially reliant on Russian AL-31 engines, the J-20 transitioned to the indigenous WS-15 turbofan, demonstrating maturity through dual-engine test flights in 2023, which addressed prior limitations in thrust and supercruise capability. China's advancement in fifth-generation fighters has been accelerated by allegations of technology acquisition through , including the breach of F-35 data and the 2014 conviction of Chinese national Su Bin for conspiring to steal F-22 and F-35 designs, potentially informing aspects of the J-20's configuration such as layout and integration. While official Chinese sources assert advanced stealth features, independent verification remains constrained by restricted access, with analyses questioning the radar cross-section due to design elements like canards and engine nozzle visibility. Parallel to the J-20, the FC-31 (later redesignated J-35) prototype first flew in October 2012 as a lighter, export-focused stealth fighter, evolving into the carrier-capable J-35 variant with maiden flight in 2021 and public debut at the 2024 Airshow. A land-based J-35A variant emerged in 2023, tailored for requirements with adjusted avionics and airframe, entering low-rate production by mid-2025. Similar claims link the FC-31's development to pilfered F-35 blueprints, evident in shared multirole emphases and internal bays, though China's emphasis on quantity over refined quality persists, with stealth performance unconfirmed by neutral testing. These programs underscore China's strategy of leveraging state-directed industrial mobilization for quantitative parity, yet persistent gaps in areas like engine reliability and systems integration—partly rooted in reverse-engineered foundations—highlight challenges in achieving qualitative equivalence to Western counterparts.

Emerging Programs in Other Nations (2010s–2025)

Turkey's KAAN program, initiated in the early 2010s as the TF-X project by Turkish Aerospace Industries, accelerated following Turkey's 2019 expulsion from the F-35 program due to its acquisition of Russian S-400 systems. The first prototype achieved maiden flight on February 21, 2024, with a second prototype entering production by September 2025 and slated for flight in 2026. Turkish officials target initial operational capability in the late 2020s, with first deliveries to the Turkish Air Force by the end of 2028, though integration of an indigenous engine is projected for 2032, highlighting ongoing reliance on foreign powerplants amid supply chain vulnerabilities. India's (AMCA) program, conceptualized in the 2010s by the , emphasizes stealth design for internal weapons carriage and , but has encountered persistent engine development challenges. Historical efforts with the indigenous GTRE engine failed to meet requirements, leading to a 2025 agreement for co-development of a 120 kN engine with France's for the AMCA Mk-2 variant. Prototype development received $1.8 billion approval in , yet the program faces delays from technological gaps and funding constraints typical of non-superpower initiatives. Japan's F-X effort transitioned from fifth-generation demonstrators like the 2016 X-2 to sixth-generation focus via the (GCAP) with the and , with formal development set to begin in 2025 and a demonstrator flight targeted for 2027. This shift reflects budgetary pressures and alliance dependencies, as Japan grapples with doubts over meeting a 2035 rollout amid smaller-scale R&D compared to major powers. South Korea's KF-21 Boramae, with first flight on July 19, 2022, incorporates partial features such as reduced cross-section materials but lacks full internal weapons bays in early blocks, classifying it as a 4.5-generation initially. Upgrades for Block III, including internalized bays and enhanced coatings, aim to elevate it toward fifth-generation capabilities, with deliveries commencing in 2026; however, progress hinges on international partnerships for engines and , exposing vulnerabilities to export controls and funding volatility. Sweden's , through contracts with the , conducts conceptual studies for future fighter systems from 2025 to 2027, exploring manned-unmanned integrations as successors to the Gripen series. Valued at approximately $276 million, these efforts underscore resource-limited nations' emphasis on modular, collaborative approaches to bridge and sensor gaps without full indigenous fifth-generation production. Across these programs, common obstacles include dependence on foreign suppliers for critical components like engines and , exacerbated by geopolitical tensions and limited domestic industrial bases, resulting in protracted timelines and cost overruns relative to counterparts.

Operational Deployments and Testing

In-Service Aircraft and Fleet Sizes (as of 2025)

The operates the world's largest inventory of fifth-generation fighters, with 185 F-22 in the inventory as of September 2025, of which approximately 143 are designated as combat-coded aircraft available for operational missions, while the remainder support training and testing roles. The F-35 Lightning II program has delivered over 1,245 aircraft globally by October 2025, including more than 1,000 to U.S. services across the , , and Corps, with the U.S. F-35A variant achieving a mission capable rate of about 51.5 percent in 2024, limited by sustainment challenges such as parts and demands. The F-35 is fielded by over a dozen partner nations, enhancing collective inventories; for instance, the operates around 40 F-35B variants, while has integrated more than 45 F-35A aircraft into its Air Self-Defense Force by late 2025. China's maintains at least 300 stealth fighters as of September 2025, distributed across multiple brigades, with production continuing at a rate supporting fleet expansion amid limited transparency on exact operational readiness metrics. The , a carrier-capable variant, has entered initial service with the Navy and Air Force in small numbers since September 2025, though specific fleet figures remain undisclosed and below 50 units. Russia's Felon inventory stands below 30 operational aircraft as of late 2025, hampered by production delays, engine supply constraints from Western sanctions, and prioritization of other needs during ongoing conflicts, resulting in low sortie generation rates compared to legacy fleets. No other nations field comparable fifth-generation fighters in significant quantities, with programs like Turkey's and South Korea's KAI KF-21 remaining in testing phases without full operational deployment.
AircraftPrimary OperatorEstimated In-Service Fleet (2025)Key Readiness Notes
F-22 RaptorUnited States185 total (143 combat-coded)High maintenance demands; focused on air superiority roles.
F-35 Lightning IIUnited States & allies1,245+ global~51% mission capable for USAF; widespread export integration.
J-20 Mighty DragonChina300+Rapid buildup; operational details opaque.
Su-57 FelonRussia<30Limited production; constrained availability.
J-35China<50Emerging carrier-based; initial low-rate production.

Combat Usage and Simulated Engagements

Fifth-generation fighters have engaged in limited combat operations, confined to permissive environments lacking peer adversaries or sophisticated anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) defenses. The first entered combat on May 22, 2018, when Israeli struck Iranian targets in Syria, marking the stealth fighter's debut in airstrikes without reported air-to-air engagements. U.S. Marine Corps followed on September 27, 2018, executing a strike in Afghanistan against Taliban positions by dropping two 500-pound bombs from a weapons cache. The UK's Royal Air Force deployed six in June 2019 for 12 sorties over Iraq and Syria, focusing on reconnaissance and precision strikes amid operations against ISIS remnants. These missions validated sensor fusion and internal weapons carriage in low-threat scenarios but provided no data on survivability against integrated air defenses or equal stealth opponents. The has supported operations in Syria since 2017 for intelligence, surveillance, and air superiority but recorded no confirmed aerial victories. China's J-20 has conducted routine patrols over the Taiwan Strait since April 2022, with state media reporting undetected transits through the Tsushima Strait in July 2025 as evidence of stealth efficacy against regional radars. No combat losses or engagements have been verified, limiting insights to peacetime posturing. Russia's saw initial use in Ukraine in October 2022 for a claimed air-to-air shootdown of a Ukrainian via long-range missile from standoff range. By August 2025, deployments expanded to formation strikes with R-77M missiles for cover and Kh-69 for targets, yet operations remain cautious, primarily launching from Russian airspace to evade Ukrainian systems, highlighting risk aversion despite the ongoing conflict. Simulated engagements in exercises underscore potential advantages but reveal gaps in peer-level validation. In Red Flag drills, F-22s achieved a 241:2 kill ratio against mixed aggressors in 2007, with later iterations citing over 100:1 dominance through supercruise and sensor advantages. F-35s recorded 15:1 ratios by 2025, emphasizing data-linked tactics over individual kinematics. The U.S. Air Force's X-62A VISTA conducted AI-piloted dogfights against manned F-16s in April 2024, autonomously executing offensive maneuvers in visual-range scenarios without safety pilot input. Interoperability tests, such as NATO's Trident Atlantic 2025, saw a French Rafale score a simulated kill on an F-35, questioning stealth assumptions in electronic warfare-heavy environments. Absent real-world peer confrontations or validated penetrations of systems like S-400 or HQ-9, these simulations offer tactical correlations but lack causal proof of operational superiority in denial regimes.

Comparative Evaluation

Technical Specifications Across Models

The F-22 Raptor attains a maximum speed of Mach 2.25 at altitude, with supercruise capability at Mach 1.76 without afterburner, enabling sustained supersonic flight for reduced infrared signature and faster intercepts. Its combat radius exceeds 590 nautical miles on internal fuel for air-to-air missions, supported by two Pratt & Whitney F119-PW-100 engines each providing 35,000 lbf thrust with afterburner. Internal payload capacity includes up to six AIM-120 missiles or equivalent ordnance, prioritizing stealth over volume. Radar cross-section (RCS) remains classified but is estimated at approximately 0.0001 m² frontal aspect from open-source analyses of its all-aspect shaping and radar-absorbent materials. The F-35 Lightning II family caps at Mach 1.6 with full internal load across variants, reflecting a design trade-off for multirole efficiency over raw speed. Combat radius varies: over 590 nm for the F-35A conventional takeoff model, approximately 450 nm for the F-35B short takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) variant enabling operations from amphibious ships, and around 600 nm for the F-35C carrier-based version. The F-35B's unique STOVL feature relies on a lift fan and swiveling nozzle for vertical operations, though it reduces internal fuel and payload compared to the F-35A. Internal bays accommodate two AIM-120 missiles and two 2,000-lb bombs or similar, with RCS estimates around 0.001 m² frontal, higher than the F-22 due to multirole compromises but still low-observable across broad aspects. As of 2025, ongoing Block 4 upgrades enhance engine thrust via the F135-PW-100's improved cooling and power extraction for directed energy weapons. Russia's Su-57 incorporates 3D thrust-vectoring nozzles on its AL-41F1 engines (upgrading to Izdeliye 30 by 2025 for 31,000 lbf thrust each), yielding superior supermaneuverability at high angles of attack despite a maximum speed of Mach 2. The Izdeliye 30 engine boosts supercruise to Mach 1.3-1.6 and extends combat radius to approximately 1,000 km on internal fuel, with internal bays for four missiles emphasizing beyond-visual-range engagements. RCS is reduced via composites (25% of structure) and shaping but estimated at 0.1-1 m² frontal—higher than U.S. peers due to exposed engine faces and rivets—prioritizing cost over all-aspect stealth. China's J-20 achieves Mach 2+ with WS-10C engines, transitioning to WS-15 variants by 2025 for improved thrust-to-weight ratio (over 10:1) and supercruise above Mach 1.2, addressing earlier reliability issues. Combat radius approximates 1,100 km internal, with bays for four PL-15 missiles optimized for long-range intercepts. RCS benefits from diverterless supersonic inlets and composites but remains estimated at 0.01-0.1 m² frontal, with canards and ventral fins potentially increasing side/rear signatures; avionics details are classified, limiting verification.
ModelMax SpeedCombat Radius (internal fuel)RCS (frontal est., m²)Internal Payload ExampleKey Differentiator
F-22~590 nm~0.00016× AIM-120 AMRAAMAll-aspect supercruise stealth
F-35A>590 nm~0.0012× AIM-120 + 2× 2,000 lb bombs multirole
F-35B~450 nm~0.001Reduced vs. A variant for expeditionary ops
Su-57~540 nm~0.1-1 missilesThrust-vectoring
J-20~593 nm~0.01-0.1 missilesLong-range BVR focus

Production Rates, Costs, and Sustainment

The achieves the highest production rates among fifth-generation fighters, with projecting deliveries of 170 to 190 aircraft in 2025, driven by full-rate production across international partners and U.S. services. The program's flyaway cost for the F-35A variant averages $82.5 million across recent lots (15-17), reflecting economies from sustained high-volume , though engine price surges have pushed some configurations toward $100 million or more. China's Chengdu J-20 maintains estimated annual production of around 120 units as of 2025, enabling rapid fleet expansion to potentially over 500 aircraft by 2026, though these figures derive from satellite analysis and open-source intelligence rather than official disclosures, which may understate or overstate capabilities amid state opacity. Unit costs are assessed at approximately $110 million by defense analysts, exceeding the F-35A due to indigenous engine development challenges and limited serial production efficiencies, positioning the J-20 as a high-premium investment in stealth quantity. Russia's experiences severely constrained output, with production effectively stalled below 20 units annually even in optimistic pre-2022 plans, hampered by Western sanctions, conflict resource diversion, and engine supply issues; as of mid-2025, the active fleet remains under two dozen aircraft despite a contracted unit price around $50 million, highlighting how lower costs fail to translate to scalable numbers without industrial resilience. Sustainment burdens amplify these disparities, with the F-35 program's lifetime costs projected to exceed $2 trillion through 2070 or beyond, over 70% attributable to operations and for 2,400+ U.S. aircraft, driven by complex coatings, , and global logistics—figures audited by the that underscore causal trade-offs between technological edge and fiscal scalability. Supply chain fragilities further compound risks, as fighters like the F-35 require over 400 kg of rare earth elements per for radar-absorbent materials and , with controlling 80-90% of global refining capacity, creating leverage points for export restrictions that could disrupt Western production absent diversified sourcing. These enforce a core realism: fifth-generation premiums—often 2-3 times those of advanced fourth-generation peers—limit deployable quantities in high-attrition scenarios, favoring massed fleets for volume over exquisite few for denial, as evidenced by historical air campaigns where numerical superiority has repeatedly overridden qualitative margins.
AircraftEstimated Flyaway Cost (USD, 2025)Annual Production Rate (2025 est.)
F-35A$82.5 million170-190
J-20$110 million~120
Su-57~$50 million<20 (stalled)

Strategic Implications

Shifts in Air Superiority Doctrine

The introduction of fifth-generation fighters has fundamentally altered air superiority doctrine by enabling stealth-enabled penetration of integrated air defense systems (IADS), thereby facilitating (SEAD) and destruction of enemy air defenses (DEAD) missions that deny adversaries the ability to launch first strikes. reduces radar cross-sections to levels that compress enemy detection timelines, allowing these aircraft to operate within weapon engagement zones without immediate counter-detection, shifting engagements from visual-range dogfights to beyond-visual-range (BVR) kills where networked data links provide decisive advantages. This causal progression—low enabling survivable ingress, followed by precision strikes on and command nodes—creates a permissive for follow-on operations, inverting traditional attrition-based superiority models that relied on numerical mass or standoff munitions. In U.S. doctrine, fifth-generation platforms like the F-22 and F-35 serve as force multipliers in contested environments, particularly emphasizing distributed operations across the Pacific theater to counter peer adversaries' numerical advantages in legacy aircraft. The U.S. Air Force's Air Superiority 2030 Flight Plan outlines how these fighters integrate sensor data to orchestrate joint counterair missions, prioritizing BVR dominance and IADS degradation over close-in maneuvers, which aligns with the pivot toward agile combat employment to mitigate base vulnerabilities. This approach leverages fifth-generation fusion of electro-optical, infrared, and electronic warfare sensors to achieve "decision superiority," where pilots act as quarterbacks for networked kills rather than sole effectors, enhancing overall campaign tempo against high-threat densities. Adversaries have adapted by emphasizing anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies, layering long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) like Russia's S-400 with fighter patrols to contest penetration, yet empirical evidence from the conflict reveals inherent limitations in achieving persistent air superiority despite such investments. forces, reliant on ground-based defenses for denial rather than offensive air dominance, have conducted fewer than 20,000 sorties since —far below expectations for superiority—due to persistent mobile SAM threats and terrain masking, underscoring how A2/AD can delay but not decisively deny stealthy ingress without complementary air assets. These observations highlight doctrinal vulnerabilities: over-reliance on static defenses exposes gaps to SEAD , as seen in the loss of over 100 fixed-wing aircraft to ground fire, compelling a hybrid denial posture that fifth-generation stealth exploits through selective, low-density strikes. Looking to the 2030s, doctrine anticipates hybrid , where fifth-generation fighters command swarms of (CCAs) for scalable suppression, extending BVR paradigms to attritable drone-hypersonic integrations that overwhelm IADS through volume and deception. U.S. programs like envision manned platforms retaining human judgment for dynamic threat adaptation while offloading high-risk SEAD to unmanned effectors, fostering resilient air superiority amid proliferating low-cost sensors and missiles. This prioritizes system-of-systems over singular platform lethality, ensuring first-strike denial evolves into persistent domain control against adaptive foes.

Geopolitical Proliferation and Export Controls

The maintains stringent export controls on its fifth-generation fighters to preserve technological superiority, prohibiting all foreign sales of the F-22 Raptor under the Obey Amendment enacted in 1998 and codified into law, citing risks of reverse-engineering and espionage by adversaries. In contrast, the F-35 Lightning II has been exported to over 19 allied nations, with more than 900 aircraft delivered globally by early 2025, subject to (ITAR) that restrict sensitive technologies and require end-use monitoring to prevent proliferation. These measures, enforced by the U.S. Department of State, limit transfers to vetted partners while blocking adversaries, thereby sustaining a qualitative edge amid growing numerical challenges from competitors. China actively promotes proliferation of its fifth-generation designs for geopolitical leverage, offering the FC-31 (export variant of the J-35) to , with deliveries set to commence in 2025 as the first international sale of a , potentially including up to 40 units equipped with long-range missiles. This aligns with 's rapid J-20 fleet expansion to at least 300 aircraft by September 2025, outpacing U.S. F-22 numbers and incentivizing technology acquisition through cyber means or supply chain vulnerabilities to close performance gaps. Russia's Su-57 ambitions have faltered, with a joint fifth-generation program with (FGFA) canceled in 2018 over and engine deficiencies, and subsequent offers rebuffed amid sanctions and 's preference for indigenous development. U.S.-led sanctions intensified in 2024–2025 have curtailed s by targeting evasion networks and dual-use technologies, though incomplete enforcement allows partial circumvention via third parties, hindering Su-57 production and sales. Such controls mitigate escalation risks from unchecked , as widespread diffusion of capabilities could erode deterrence thresholds, yet allied F-35 integrations reinforce collective superiority against authoritarian expansions. dynamics thus heighten incentives for theft and races, underscoring the causal link between export restraint and sustained operational advantages in contested regions.

Criticisms and Empirical Challenges

Overstated Capabilities and Verification Issues

The J-20's purported air superiority features, including frontal stealth comparable to or exceeding the F-22 Raptor, remain unverified through or testing as of 2025, with its zero operational engagements leaving capabilities theoretical rather than empirically demonstrated. assertions of undetected flights near in July 2025 lack third-party confirmation, fueling skepticism about cross-section claims amid visible elements like canards that elevate detection risks from certain angles. Persistent engine vulnerabilities, including reliability shortfalls documented in non-state analyses, further undermine performance hype, as the WS-10C powerplants exhibit stalls and insufficient compared to mature Western alternatives. Russia's faces analogous scrutiny, with promoted N036 Byelka capabilities promising superior detection ranges belied by exposed engine nozzles that amplify signatures and visibility by factors of 6 to 10 relative to U.S. peers. Official claims of reduced cross-section through shaping and materials contrast with observable plume visibility during flight tests, indicating incomplete suppression and heightened vulnerability in beyond-visual-range engagements. Limited —fewer than 20 operational units by mid-2025—and reliance on interim AL-41F1 engines without full stealth-optimized successors exacerbate verification gaps, as state-sponsored demonstrations prioritize over rigorous data release. Across these platforms, maturity lags assertions, with 2025 evaluations highlighting uncertain software integration in Chinese designs that fails to match the F-35's decade-plus of networked data processing and real-time threat correlation. Classified testing protocols, often termed "" evaluations, conceal failure metrics and subsystem interdependencies, impeding peer-reviewed analysis and favoring simulations over empirical proxies. Independent modeling, such as those assessing one-on-one scenarios, consistently assigns the F-22 kinematic and low-observability edges over J-20 and Su-57 configurations, though aggregate force sizes could alter dynamics absent verified individual superiority. State media from adversarial producers systematically inflate capabilities to project parity, as evidenced by discrepancies between promotional footage and leaked on developmental stalls, whereas assessments prioritize observable metrics like signatures and detection events over unaudited claims. This opacity underscores a broader empirical shortfall: fifth-generation attributes like all-aspect demand adversarial encounters for causal validation, simulations notwithstanding, revealing hype where data voids persist.

Economic Burdens and Opportunity Costs

The F-35 Lightning II program illustrates the fiscal pressures of fifth-generation fighter development, with total lifetime costs projected at $2.1 trillion over its 94-year span from 1994, encompassing procurement, operations, and sustainment. Procurement expenses have risen by $13.4 billion since 2019 estimates, while sustainment costs have climbed 44% to $1.58 trillion since 2018, driven by persistent technical delays and supply chain dependencies. These overruns, documented in audits, divert substantial portions of defense budgets from other priorities, such as ground forces modernization or munitions stockpiles, without commensurate reductions in unit flyaway prices, which hover around $80-110 million. China's program mitigates some unit costs—estimated at $110 million each—through state-owned enterprises like AVIC, which receive government subsidies and prioritize national over profit margins, enabling fleet expansion despite engine import dependencies. In , the faces acute constraints from Western sanctions restricting microchip access and entrenched inflating , leading to production suspensions and output limited to fewer than 20 serial units by 2025, with per-aircraft costs ballooning due to inefficient domestic substitutions. Such inefficiencies underscore how institutional factors exacerbate economic burdens, yielding low fleet sizes relative to invested capital. These expenditures entail significant opportunity costs, as funds allocated to limited numbers of high-end manned fighters—often fewer than planned due to overruns—forego scalable alternatives like drone swarms, where clusters of $500 to $50,000 unmanned systems can saturate defenses at a fraction of a single jet's price, potentially achieving superior attrition ratios in peer conflicts. Analysts argue reallocating even a portion of fifth-generation budgets, such as $75 billion from deferred F-35 buys, could procure thousands of under $30 million each, enhancing force multiplicity over singular platform reliance. In 2025, compounds these strains by diminishing real-term outlays amid global spending surges to $2.718 trillion in 2024, with and budgets facing 5-7% erosion in for labor and materials. F-35 exports to allies, including shared production in nations like the and , partially defray costs by distributing development burdens and generating revenues, though this relies on sustained partner commitments amid their own fiscal pressures. Russia's allocations, projected to shrink nominally to $156 billion in 2026, further highlight sanctions' compounding effect on low-yield programs like the Su-57. Prioritizing verifiable economic returns, such as cost-per-mission-hour metrics over or rationales, reveals the tension between legacy manned platforms and emerging unmanned paradigms.

References

  1. [1]
    Defining the 5th Generation Fighter Jet - Joint Base Langley-Eustis
    Mar 14, 2017 · These aircraft also feature integrated avionics, which autonomously fuse and prioritize the aircraft's multi-spectral sensors and off board data ...
  2. [2]
    F-22 Raptor > Air Force > Fact Sheet Display - AF.mil
    The F-22 Raptor is combination of stealth, supercruise, maneuverability, and integrated avionics, coupled with improved supportability.Missing: key | Show results with:key
  3. [3]
    5th Gen Capabilities - F-35 Lightning II
    The F-35 combines stealth, advanced sensors, information fusion and network connectivity – all within a supersonic, long-range, highly maneuverable fighter.
  4. [4]
    J-20 fighter can easily penetrate air-defense networks, designer says
    Sep 22, 2025 · China's J-20 fifth-generation fighter jet has outstanding stealth capability and can easily penetrate enemy air-defense networks, a senior ...
  5. [5]
    Su-57 (Felon) Russian Stealth Fighter - OE Data Integration Network
    May 21, 2024 · The fighter is designed to have supercruise, supermaneuverability, stealth, and advanced avionics to overcome the prior generation fighter ...Missing: features | Show results with:features
  6. [6]
    Only 5 true fifth-generation fighter jets are in service today. Here's ...
    Oct 11, 2025 · Operational numbers are limited, with roughly 20–25 aircraft active. The Su-57 provides the Russian Aerospace Forces with a multirole ...
  7. [7]
    F-35 Lightning II: Background and Issues for Congress
    Dec 11, 2024 · Fifth-generation technologies include stealth coatings and shaping, an internal weapons bay, composite materials, advanced radar and sensors, ...
  8. [8]
    The Case for Fifth-Generation and NGAD Airpower
    Low observability, commonly known as stealth, and sensor fusion are not bolt-on capabilities and cannot be retrofitted or modified: They must be designed into ...<|separator|>
  9. [9]
    Advanced Fighters - SP's Aviation
    Synergy of stealth, super-cruise and information fusion for complete situational awareness are the attributes of fifth generation fighter aircraft.Missing: criteria | Show results with:criteria
  10. [10]
    Technical comparison of fifth-generation fighter jets
    Jun 12, 2025 · The fifth-generation concept is based on several cumulative criteria: integrated stealth, sensor fusion, advanced data links, multi-role ...Missing: defining | Show results with:defining
  11. [11]
    [PDF] 5th Generation Fighter Jets and Their Role in 21st Century Military ...
    Sep 27, 2025 · Abstract – Fifth-generation fighter jets are revolutionary aircraft that represent the cutting edge of modern aviation technology.
  12. [12]
    596: FUTURE TRENDS OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT - 55 NDA Alumni
    Feb 11, 2025 · 5th Generation AC typically includes stealth, low-probability-of-intercept radar (LPIR), agile airframes with supercruise performance, advanced ...
  13. [13]
    5th Generation Fighters; Beyond Lockheed Martin
    Jun 18, 2020 · Lockheed originally defined the 5th Generation as enjoying all-aspect radar stealth, supermaneouvrability (the capability of fighter aircraft to ...Missing: criteria | Show results with:criteria
  14. [14]
    Why Fifth Generation Jet Fighters Are the Future of Aerial Combat
    Aug 11, 2025 · At the heart of Fifth Generation fighters lie a constellation of technological advancements: stealth characteristics, sensor fusion, supercruise ...
  15. [15]
    Avionics enter the 5th generation | Military Aerospace
    Dec 31, 2007 · Some of the enabling technologies to achieve a truly net-centric, interoperable battle space include low probability of detection/low ...<|separator|>
  16. [16]
    How do Russia, China, and the US compare in terms of their ... - Quora
    Dec 23, 2023 · Only the US has actual 5th generation fighters. The Russian and Chinese jets are generation 4, maybe 4.5. They don't have the same level of ...
  17. [17]
    World's Top Military Powers All Facing Issues With Fifth-Gen Fighters
    Dec 23, 2023 · The world's top military powers each have fifth-gen jets, but Russia, China, and the US are all facing problems with their fighters.
  18. [18]
    Russia's Su-57 Felon Stealth Fighter: 5 Reasons It Keeps Failing
    Aug 29, 2025 · A deep dive into the Su-57's fatal flaws. From compromised stealth to a production nightmare, Russia's top fighter is a strategic failure.
  19. [19]
    SU-57 Vs F-35: Best Bet for India - Defence Research and Studies
    Jul 24, 2025 · Whereas Su-57 with a stealth radar cross-section (RCS) estimated at 0.1–0.5 m², significantly larger than the F-35's. Its design includes ...
  20. [20]
    What is the radar cross section of the Su-57, and how does it stack ...
    Feb 19, 2022 · The SU-57's cross section hasn't been made public as far as I know, but it's not good. The thing is covered in rivets and screws and it has no S-ducts.Missing: debates | Show results with:debates
  21. [21]
    Su-57 Radar scattering simulation - Aircraft 101 - WordPress.com
    Sep 26, 2022 · The aim of our simulation is to evaluate the mean and median radar cross section as well as the radar scattering pattern of the Su-57 at 4 frequencies.Missing: debates | Show results with:debates<|separator|>
  22. [22]
  23. [23]
    The stealthiest fighter jets in the world in 2025 - AeroTime
    May 1, 2025 · The J-20 is a long-range hunter, with a huge range and large internal fuel stores. It's designed to break into enemy airspace and push back US ...
  24. [24]
    China's Fifth-Gen Stealth Jet Takes Aim at the F-35's Global ...
    Oct 15, 2025 · China's new twin-engine J-35 stealth fighter is poised to rival America's F-35 Lightning II, marking the most consequential global contest in ...
  25. [25]
    China's 'New J-35' Fighter Has 1 Simple 'Stealth' Mission
    Aug 2, 2025 · Key Points and Summary – China's second fifth-generation stealth fighter, the J-35, has reportedly entered active duty, giving Beijing another ...
  26. [26]
    South Korea's KAI KF-21 Boromae Fighter Is Having a Moment
    Aug 12, 2025 · -Developed to replace aging U.S.-made aircraft, the KF-21 is a 4.5-generation fighter that incorporates “semi-stealth” features and bears a ...
  27. [27]
    KAI CEO Heaps Praises On KF-21 Boramae - EurAsian Times
    Aug 3, 2024 · The CEO of Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) has categorized the KF-21 Boramae as a “4.9th generation” fighter jet, aligning it more closely with the advanced ...
  28. [28]
    Stealth Technology - Everything Everywhere Daily
    One of the principles laid out by Ufimtsev was the importance of the shape of an aircraft. The goal is to reduce the radar cross-section of an aircraft. As ...
  29. [29]
    [PDF] Stealth Aircraft Design (“Low Observability”) - Understanding Airplanes
    The intensity of an airplane's radar reflectivity is quantified as the airplane's Radar Cross Section, or RCS. Stealth is all about reducing the RCS. •.
  30. [30]
    Stealth Aircraft - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics
    Special radar absorbant materials are used in stealth aircraft. The shape and contours of the aircraft greatly influence effective radar cross section.
  31. [31]
    This Is the Material That Keeps American Fighter Jets Stealthy
    Aug 16, 2025 · Radar-absorbent materials (RAM) play a key role in determining the effectiveness of an aircraft's stealth performance.
  32. [32]
    Stealth Vs. Speed: A Look At Trade-Offs In Modern Fighter Jet Design
    May 13, 2024 · The F-22 Raptor, for example, maintained stealth superiority for two decades while boasting supercruise and super-maneuverability capabilities.
  33. [33]
    How radars detect stealth aircraft today
    Jun 16, 2025 · In this article, we analyze the principles that enable radar to detect stealth aircraft, focusing on technical weaknesses, radar innovations (UHF/VHF, ...
  34. [34]
    What is the RCS value of the F-22 and B2? Do lower numbers mean ...
    Apr 18, 2023 · Take the RCS (Radar Cross Section) of the F-22: it is 0.0001m² with a signature of -40dBm² which makes it the size of a marble or insect.Is it true that the F-22 has 0.0001 m^2 RCS? I used to read ... - QuoraWhat is the RCS of an F-22 Raptor? - QuoraMore results from www.quora.com
  35. [35]
    STEALTH - RCS comparisons - Materials - Techniques | DefenceHub
    Dec 29, 2023 · For comparison, the 5G F-22 has an RCS of 0.0001m2, about the size of a bumble bee. The U2 and SR-71 spy planes have an RCS of 0.01m2, about the ...
  36. [36]
    The F-22 Raptor: extreme stealth, radar signature reduced to that of ...
    Aug 11, 2025 · These tests confirm that the F-22's design reduces its signature to a level equivalent to that of a small object, ensuring optimal stealth ...<|separator|>
  37. [37]
    China Claims Its J-20 Stealth Fighter Flew Near Japan Undetected
    Jul 30, 2025 · Without independent verification, experts remain skeptical, raising questions about the aircraft's true stealth capabilities versus its ...
  38. [38]
    Stealth Coating Materials Trends and Forecasts - Data Insights Market
    Rating 4.8 (1,980) Apr 29, 2025 · These technologies could enable the development of more sophisticated and adaptable stealth coatings, capable of providing protection against a ...Missing: 2020s | Show results with:2020s
  39. [39]
    Modernizing 5th Gen Fighter Pilot Training - Air University
    Feb 9, 2023 · Sensor fusion is an important advancement for fifth-generation fighters. It is a technology that combines the information gathered from ...<|separator|>
  40. [40]
    Das Distributed Aperture System - jsf.mil
    The F-35 DAS provides spherical situational awareness. The DAS surrounds the aircraft with a protective sphere of situational awareness. It warns the pilot of ...
  41. [41]
    RTX's Raytheon demonstrates first-ever AI/ML-powered Radar ...
    Feb 24, 2025 · This integration allows CADS to employ cognitive methods to sense, identify and prioritize threats. With the CADS capability, the enhanced RWR ...
  42. [42]
    F-16 receives in-flight software update during recent flight test - AF.mil
    Jul 31, 2021 · “We believe this is the first time a fighter aircraft has received a software update and gained new capability all while in flight,” added Lt.
  43. [43]
    The F-35's New OODA Loop | Proceedings - U.S. Naval Institute
    Unique sensor-fusion algorithms integrate these sensors with advanced weapons and tactics to create an OODA loop that no fourth-generation fighter can match.
  44. [44]
    [PDF] Fifth Generation Air Warfare
    These paths are potentially vulnerable to disruption from physical attacks, electronic jamming and cyber attacks and so require suitable hardening. Complicating ...
  45. [45]
    Manned-Unmanned Teaming and the Rise of Integrated Sense-and ...
    Through persistent surveillance, networked sensors, and autonomous capabilities, MUMT enables operators to see first, decide first, and strike ...
  46. [46]
    F119 Engine - Pratt & Whitney
    Supercruise, the ability to operate supersonically without afterburning, gives the F-22 exceptional combat performance without compromising mission range.
  47. [47]
    How The F-22 Raptor Achieves Its Remarkable Mach 2 Top Speed
    Nov 12, 2024 · The Pratt & Whitney F119-PW-100 engines allow the F-22 Raptor to reach Mach 2 with their high thrust-to-weight ratio and supercruise capability.
  48. [48]
    F-22 can supercruise, vanish from radar and outmanoeuvre rivals ...
    Aug 25, 2025 · The F-22 can fly at Mach 1.5 in supercruise, allowing it to intercept targets faster while remaining stealthier than its competitors. Extreme ...
  49. [49]
    Russian Su-57 Spotted With Flat 2D Thrust Vectoring Nozzle
    Dec 11, 2024 · The new Izdeliye 30 engines increase the Su-57's thrust to 11,000 kg without afterburner and 18,000 kg in afterburner, according to reports, ...
  50. [50]
  51. [51]
    China's J-20 fighter seems to have a new homegrown engine, after ...
    Jul 18, 2023 · The thrust-to-weight ratio of the WS-15 Emei engine is supposedly greater than 10, which puts it near the performance of the F-22A's F119 engine ...
  52. [52]
    5 Fast Facts On China's Military Aircraft Engines - Simple Flying
    Dec 31, 2024 · The latest WS15 is more powerful than F119 F22 engine being a crystal blade for longer life. It has low maintenance and set to replace WS10C.
  53. [53]
    [PDF] Investigation of High-Alpha Lateral-Directional Control Power ...
    The NASA and U.S. Navy have initiated a joint program to develop flight-validated lateral-directional control power design guidelines for high-performance.
  54. [54]
    Leading-Edge Vortex Controller (LEVCON) Influence on the ... - MDPI
    Nov 15, 2023 · These types of wings exhibit a high angle of attack at maximum lift, a shallow lift curve slope, and reduced longitudinal stability as the angle ...
  55. [55]
    Is China's WS-15 Turbofan Engine Good or Not? | Stirlingkit
    Feb 21, 2023 · In terms of thrust, the thrust of the ws15 engine can reach 16 tons, while the thrust of the United States is only 15.5 tons, so it is better ...
  56. [56]
    Pratt & Whitney and General Electric Complete Detailed Design ...
    Feb 22, 2025 · 19, 2025, General Electric Aerospace announced the successful completion of the Detailed Design Review (DDR) for its XA102 adaptive cycle engine ...
  57. [57]
    Air Force moves forward with next-gen engine work, raises GE, Pratt ...
    Jan 28, 2025 · The US Air Force is moving ahead with development of a next-gen fighter engine following awards to manufacturers GE Aerospace and RTX subsidiary Pratt & ...
  58. [58]
    NGAD engines pass key design reviews, prototype work underway
    Feb 20, 2025 · The two proposed adaptive engines that might one day power the Next Generation Air Dominance fighter have passed an important design review.
  59. [59]
    F-22 Weapons - GlobalSecurity.org
    Jan 22, 2016 · For its air-to-ground role, the F-22 can internally carry two 1,000 pound-class Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), two AIM-120C, and two AIM ...<|separator|>
  60. [60]
    F-35 Lightning II Archives | Air & Space Forces Magazine
    Armament: F-35A: one 25 mm GAU-22/A cannon; standard internal loadout: two AIM-120 AMRAAMs and two GBU-31 JDAMs. Accommodation: Pilot on Martin Baker MK16 ...
  61. [61]
    F-35 Closer To Carrying Six AIM-120 Missiles Internally
    Mar 24, 2023 · Known as Sidekick, the upgrade will give F-35As and Cs the ability to go from four to six AIM-120 missiles in their internal bays.
  62. [62]
  63. [63]
    Sukhoi Su-57 Felon Fighter Jet, Russia - Airforce Technology
    Jan 20, 2023 · The fighter has two large internal weapons compartments, each capable of carrying up to four K-77M air-to-air missiles. Engine and ...Missing: capacity | Show results with:capacity
  64. [64]
    First Clear Image of a Chinese J-20 Stealth Fighter Launching a PL ...
    Nov 28, 2024 · The side internal weapons bays are designed to house the PL-10 short-range air-to-air missile. Additionally, the J-20's bay mechanics and ...
  65. [65]
    The J-20 'Mighty Dragon' Was Designed for 1 Purpose in Mind
    Aug 21, 2025 · It has three internal weapons bays, the largest of which can carry up to six air-to-air missiles. Additionally, the F-22 has four external ...
  66. [66]
    Northrop Grumman-Developed Multifunction Advanced Data Link ...
    Apr 23, 2013 · MADL is a high-data-rate, directional communications link. It allows coordinated tactics and engagement to bring significant operational advantages to fifth- ...
  67. [67]
  68. [68]
    The F-22 and the F-35 Are Struggling to Talk to Each Other ... And to ...
    While Raptors can receive over the Link 16 network—the standard across US and NATO aircraft—it can't transmit over the system. Instead, it uses the F-22-only ...
  69. [69]
    Lockheed Martin Skunk Works®' Project Hydra Demonstrates 5th ...
    May 3, 2021 · Lockheed Martin Skunk Works, the Missile Defense Agency and the US Air Force successfully linked a U-2, five F-35s and an F-22 in air and provided real-time 5 ...
  70. [70]
    Friend-Or-Foe Identification in Intense Electronic Warfare
    Jul 30, 2025 · ... Link 16, which shares tactical data between units. In intense GE, jamming Link 16, with its limited bandwidth of 1 Mbit/s, can isolate an ...
  71. [71]
    F-35 testers wrap up Weapons Delivery Accuracy tests
    Dec 20, 2017 · The F-35 WDA tests ensure the fighter can deliver lethal air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons, including missiles and bombs, proving its ...Missing: fusion extension empirical
  72. [72]
  73. [73]
    Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II procurement - Wikipedia
    This decision was reversed in 2021, due to declining F-35 local production cost. The United States has refused to share the F-35 software source code with its ...Participation and orders · Level 3 partners · Exports · Potential exports
  74. [74]
    You Don't Need A Kill Switch To Hobble Exported F-35s
    Mar 11, 2025 · The U.S. doesn't have to rely on a kill switch to rapidly degrade and soon end a foreign country's ability to use its F-35s.
  75. [75]
    Russia's MiG-25 Foxbat Was a Mach 3 'Lead Sled'
    Jul 18, 2025 · The MiG-25's design history dates back to the 1960s, when Soviet war planners recognized the urgent need for a high-speed, high-altitude ...Missing: origins ATF
  76. [76]
    Stealth turns 40: Looking back at the first flight of Have Blue
    Dec 16, 2017 · The story of Have Blue begins with a DARPA effort called Project Harvey—named for the invisible six-foot-three-and-a-half-inch rabbit from the ...
  77. [77]
    History of Stealth: From Out of the Shadows
    The next step after the XST pole tests was “Have Blue,” Lockheed's manned technology demonstrator that entered flight testing in April 1977.
  78. [78]
    Lockheed F-117A Nighthawk Stealth Fighter | HowStuffWorks
    The first Lockheed F-117A Nighthawk Stealth Fighter prototype flew on June 18, 1981, piloted by Harold Farley, Jr., but the existence of the aircraft was not ...
  79. [79]
    F-117 Nighthawk | Lockheed Martin
    ... Have Blue, the stealth demonstrator that led to the F-117 Nighthawk. DARPA awarded Skunk Works with the contract for the Nighthawk less than a year after Have ...
  80. [80]
    [PDF] A History from the XF-108 to the Advanced Tactical Fighter - DTIC
    program to build a single-mission air superiority aircraft as a response to the failed attempt to make the F-111 perform several missions. ChaPter Two: The Air ...
  81. [81]
    [PDF] Computational Fluid Dynamics and Airplane Design
    Feb 22, 2008 · Without the Enabling Technology investment in CFD and Aero dynamic design technology during the 1980's, the 777: would have 10% higher TAROC ...
  82. [82]
    23 April 1991 - Air Force Historical Foundation
    Apr 23, 1991 · 1991: SECAF Donald B. Rice announced the winner of the Advanced Tactical Fighter competition. He selected the Lockheed/Boeing/General Dynamics F-22 with the ...
  83. [83]
    Flashback: Northrop YF-23 Black Widow II
    Feb 1, 2022 · On April 23, 1991, Secretary of the Air Force, Donald Rice announced that the Lockheed F-22 and Pratt & Whitney F119 won the competition for the ...Missing: flyoff | Show results with:flyoff
  84. [84]
    MiG-25 Foxbat: Origins, History and Technical Data Analysis
    Jun 29, 2025 · A Response to a Mach 3 Threat: The Genesis of the Foxbat. The MiG-25 was born from a specific and urgent fear that gripped Soviet military ...Missing: program | Show results with:program
  85. [85]
    F-22 Raptor History - GlobalSecurity.org
    The F-22A Raptor achieved Initial Operational Capability [IOC] on 15 December 2005. Reaching the IOC milestone culminated a collaborative effort between ...
  86. [86]
    F-22 Raptor History | Lockheed Martin
    Oct 1, 2020 · After nearly 44000 wind tunnel test hours, 13000 material sample tests, six years of development, and a trio of program rephasings mandated ...
  87. [87]
    Air Force F-22 Fighter Program - EveryCRSReport.com
    The F-22 program began in 1999, procuring 195 aircraft through 2009. It's considered the most capable fighter, but had oxygen issues and production was ...
  88. [88]
    High Operating Costs, Low Production Run, Export ban
    F-22 Raptor export ban​​ The total cost of development and testing, added to the procurement cost of 195 aircraft, put the program at around $108 billion, making ...
  89. [89]
    [PDF] F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter "JSF" Program - DTIC
    Oct 25, 2007 · In November. 1996, the Defense Department selected two major aerospace companies, Boeing and. Lockheed Martin, to demonstrate competing designs ...
  90. [90]
    [PDF] F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program - UNT Digital Library
    Apr 29, 2014 · Based on the current F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) schedule, the F-35A will reach the. IOC milestone between August 2016 (Objective) and ...
  91. [91]
    F-22 Raptors make mark at Red Flag - Air Combat Command
    Feb 14, 2007 · The F-22A Raptor is flying in its first Red Flag exercise that started here Feb. 3, showcasing its stealth, super cruise and other advantages absent in legacy ...Missing: RCS | Show results with:RCS
  92. [92]
    "Red Flag confirmed F-35 dominance with a 20:1 kill ratio" U.S. Air ...
    Feb 28, 2017 · The F-35 achieved an impressive 20:1 kill ratio at Nellis Air Force Base's Red Flag 17-1. Every aviation enthusiast knows about Red Flag.Missing: performance empirical
  93. [93]
    The F-35 Fighter's 2 Big Problems That Won't Go Away
    Aug 25, 2025 · Late-arriving hardware delayed software testing. During flight tests in 2023, pilots frequently had to reset their F-35s' systems in flight.Missing: bugs | Show results with:bugs
  94. [94]
    Sukhoi Su-57 | Felon, Top Speed, Weapons Loadout, & Combat ...
    Sep 19, 2025 · The PAK FA initiative led to the development of the Sukhoi Su-57 after two Soviet proposals failed. ... In 1999 Russia launched a combat aircraft ...Missing: timeline | Show results with:timeline
  95. [95]
    Sukhoi Su-57 – A significant boost to Russian air combat capabilities
    Feb 26, 2021 · The Su-57 is an outcome of the Russian Air Force's PAK FA fifth-generation fighter jet programme. ... A timeline of the Su-57 development. India ...
  96. [96]
    To the Anniversary of the First Flight of the Su-57 Fighter - RuAviation
    Jan 30, 2025 · Two possible dates were set: January 28 or 29, depending on weather conditions at the Dzyomgi airfield and the aircraft's readiness. On January ...
  97. [97]
    USAF Avionics Technician explains why Russia chose to evolve the ...
    According to its manufacturer, serial production of the aircraft began in 2022. Why didn't Russia develop a clean sheet stealth aircraft design instead of the ...Missing: timeline | Show results with:timeline
  98. [98]
    Unlike F-35, Su-57's shape and airframe interfere with stealth
    Mar 16, 2024 · Another design challenge with the Su-57 is the presence of canards – small wings positioned ahead of the primary wings. These additional ...
  99. [99]
    The Su-57 has stealth features but it's not as stealthy as the F-22 ...
    May 14, 2025 · The engine vents/exhaust are not exactly stealth on the Su 57 - experts say they are bigger nosier and warmer ( heat dissipation not as good ...How does the Russian Sukhoi Su-57 fighter jet compare to other fifth ...Does the SU-57 have canards in front of its engine intakes? - QuoraMore results from www.quora.com
  100. [100]
    Russia's Su-57: The Worst Stealth Fighter in the Air? - 19FortyFive
    Dec 4, 2021 · Russia's Su-57 is widely seen as the least stealthy of the 5th generation entrants, but there's more to a fighter jet than radar cross-sections.
  101. [101]
    PAK FA / T-50 / Project 701 - GlobalSecurity.org
    The 2019 contract signed at the Army Forum called for 76 Su-57 aircraft to be delivered by the end of 2027, but this target appeared increasingly unattainable ...Missing: timeline | Show results with:timeline
  102. [102]
    Russia's Su-57 to Feature 'Fifth-Gen' Engine in 2024
    Feb 7, 2024 · Russia will induct Su-57 fighter jets featuring a new engine from 2024. The second-stage Izdelie-30, or AL-51F1, engine is production-ready following its tests.
  103. [103]
    Russia's 5th-Generation Su-57 Now Equipped with Second-Stage ...
    Jan 9, 2025 · The second stage AL-51F1 engine (Izdeliye 30 or Product 30) is the final component that makes the Russian-made Su-57 fully compliant with the country's fifth- ...
  104. [104]
    How Many Su-57 Fighter Jets Does Russia Have? - SlashGear
    May 31, 2025 · In April 2025, the number increased by two, indicating that Russia's total force of Su-57s at that time was 44. The Sukhoi Su-57 'Felon'. An ...
  105. [105]
    I Study Stealth Fighters for a Living. Russia's Su-57 Felon Is No ...
    Jul 30, 2025 · As of mid-2025, only a small fleet of Su-57s is believed to be in active service with the Russian Aerospace Forces. This slow production rate ...
  106. [106]
    Remember PAK-FA? India and Russia Planned to Build the Su-57 ...
    Apr 20, 2024 · In 2018, India withdrew from a joint venture with Russia to develop a fifth-generation fighter aircraft, known at the time as the PAK-FA.<|separator|>
  107. [107]
    Algeria's Su-57E fighter jet deal reportedly confirmed in Rostec leak
    Oct 7, 2025 · Leaked Rostec documents suggest Algeria has ordered 12 Su-57E and 14 Su-34 aircraft, as Moscow builds alternative payment and logistics ...
  108. [108]
    Algeria Is Buying More Russian Su-57 Fighter Jets, Leaked ...
    Oct 10, 2025 · There have been reports for more than a year that Algeria would be the first export country to adopt the Su-57, but few details actually emerged ...
  109. [109]
    Too Little, Too Late? Russia's Su-57 Felon Officially Joins War in ...
    Aug 17, 2025 · The Felon fails that test. The Su-57 is designed with two large internal weapons bays to keep its radar signature low, as well as smaller ...Missing: capacity | Show results with:capacity
  110. [110]
    Damaged Su-57 Emphasises the Vulnerability of Russian Airbases ...
    Jun 10, 2024 · Ukraine's apparent success in damaging a Su-57 is a substantial blow to Russia's long-troubled stealth fighter fleet.
  111. [111]
    Russia Expands Su-57 Combat Ops. in Ukraine with 'Whole ...
    Aug 5, 2025 · Prior operations by the Su-57 against Ukrainain targets have included air defence suppression, air to air combat, and operations in heavily ...
  112. [112]
  113. [113]
  114. [114]
    One J-20 stealth aircraft is now produced in China every eight days ...
    Aug 5, 2025 · One J-20 stealth aircraft is now produced in China every eight days. In 2025, the annual output reached 200 jets with 5 production lines.
  115. [115]
  116. [116]
    J-31 - An F-35 with Chinese Characteristics? - GlobalSecurity.org
    China was suspected of being behind a reported 2009 cyber intrusion that resulted in the theft of a very large amount of design and electronics data on the F-35 ...Missing: allegations | Show results with:allegations
  117. [117]
    The man who stole America's stealth fighter secrets for China
    Feb 16, 2024 · A 51-year-old Chinese national named Su Bin pled guilty to charges associated with what the American Justice Department described as a “years-long conspiracy.”
  118. [118]
    PLA's J-20 fighters use stolen US tech: report - Asia Times
    Oct 21, 2019 · In 2007, Lockheed Martin reportedly found Chinese hackers stealing technical documents related to the F-35 program, a serious online security ...
  119. [119]
  120. [120]
    China's J-35 Naval Stealth Fighter Seen Like Never Before
    Jun 20, 2025 · The second known flying J-35 prototype, serial 3503, was subsequently spotted in July of 2022 with a low-visibility gray tactical paint scheme.
  121. [121]
    Shenyang J-35 - Wikipedia
    The introduction of the J-35 makes it the second Chinese fifth-generation fighter (after the Chengdu J-20) and China the only country other than the United ...
  122. [122]
    The man who STOLE the F-22 and F-35 for China - YouTube
    Feb 23, 2024 · ... J-20 and forthcoming Shenyang FC-31, both incorporate stolen design ... espionage-for-the-chinese-government/ https://www.cbc.ca/news ...Missing: reverse engineering
  123. [123]
    China's J-20 Stealth Fighter Simply Summed Up In Just 1 Word
    Oct 12, 2025 · Evidence of cyber theft and borrowed ideas helped China build the J-20 fast—but scale, not looks, made Beijing a stealth-fighter power.
  124. [124]
    China Aims to "Mass Produce" Its J-20 5th-Gen Stealth Fighter
    Oct 9, 2024 · Having new, domestically-produced engines make the Chinese J-20 5th-generation stealth fighter measurably improve the aircraft's performance and mission scope.Missing: training | Show results with:training
  125. [125]
    Second Prototype of Turkey's Kaan Fighter is Now In Production
    Sep 27, 2025 · The new Kaan prototype has been spotted during assembly a year after the maiden flight of the first example, and is set to fly in 2026.Missing: target | Show results with:target
  126. [126]
    Vendor vows to hasten Turkey's fifth-generation 'Kaan' fighter plane
    May 5, 2025 · The company says it now aims to deliver the first aircraft to the Turkish Air Force by the end of 2028.Missing: IOC target
  127. [127]
    Turkey targets 2032 for indigenous engine integration in KAAN ...
    Jul 31, 2025 · Ankara has signed a deal to export 48 of these aircraft to Indonesia, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced on June 11, 2025.Missing: IOC target
  128. [128]
    India's Fifth-Generation Fighter Ambitions - The Heritage Foundation
    Apr 29, 2025 · China's Chengdu J-20 Mighty Dragon, a fifth-generation stealth fighter, is now operational in the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).
  129. [129]
    India to develop with France engine for desi stealth fighter
    Aug 23, 2025 · India to develop with France engine for desi stealth fighter ... "DRDO has cleared the proposal by Safran, which already makes a variety of ...
  130. [130]
    Global Combat Air Programme - Wikipedia
    Under the current timeline, formal development is expected to begin in 2025, with a demonstrator aircraft to fly in 2027, and production aircraft to begin ...
  131. [131]
    Japan frets over fighter rollout target and weighs stopgap ... - Reuters
    May 30, 2025 · Japan has growing doubts that its next-generation fighter project with Britain and Italy will meet a 2035 rollout target, ...Missing: fifth | Show results with:fifth
  132. [132]
    South Korea's KF-21 Fighter To Get Stealthier With Internal ...
    Aug 6, 2025 · Adding internal weapons bays to the KF-21 will make it better able to penetrate air defenses while dropping heavy bunker-busting weapons.
  133. [133]
    Can Korea turn the KF-21 into its first homegrown stealth fighter?
    Aug 16, 2025 · The KF-21EX, the Block III variant of the fighter, is poised to upgrade the KF-21 into a fully stealth fighter by internalizing its weapons bay, ...
  134. [134]
  135. [135]
    Saab receives order from FMV for continued future fighter concept ...
    The contract period is 2025-2027. Saab. The order includes conceptual studies of manned and unmanned solutions in a system of systems perspective, and ...
  136. [136]
    Sweden Extends Saab Contract for Future Fighter Jet Concept ...
    Oct 15, 2025 · Sweden Extends Saab Contract for Future Fighter Jet Concept Research ... The contract covers 2025 to 2027, ahead of a government decision ...
  137. [137]
    Was Erdogan unaware Turkey's bid to build a world-class fighter jet ...
    Oct 1, 2025 · The fifth-generation F-35 aircraft is the world's most advanced fighter jet. Ankara was kicked out of the development programme for the plane ...
  138. [138]
    AMCA: India Wants Its Own Stealth Fighter (Forget the F-35 or Su-57)
    Engine development remains a bottleneck, as India has yet to produce a fully indigenous engine suitable for fifth-generation fighters.Missing: issues | Show results with:issues
  139. [139]
    Lockheed Eyes Upgrades For Oldest F-22 Raptors - The War Zone
    Sep 22, 2025 · The Air Force currently has 185 F-22s, but only 143 are combat-coded, with the rest being dedicated to training and test and evaluation ...
  140. [140]
    Lockheed Martin and Belgium Celebrate Arrival of First..
    Oct 14, 2025 · More than 1,245 F-35s are currently operational around the globe, and the fleet has surpassed 1 million flight hours. The combat-proven F-35 ...
  141. [141]
    Air Force Mission Capability Rates Reach Lowest Levels in Years
    Feb 18, 2025 · The mission capable rate for the F-35A held steady, inching up a half percentage point to 51.5 percent., possibly benefitting from increased ...
  142. [142]
    Largest Air Force in the World by F-35 Fleet in 2025 - Aviation A2Z
    Sep 25, 2025 · Norway has completed delivery of its 52 F-35As, making it one of the first European nations to field a full Lightning II fleet. Operating ...
  143. [143]
    China's 300th J-20 Spotted at Changchun Air Show - The Aviationist
    Sep 17, 2025 · The PLA Air Force is steadily fielding the J-20, with at least 50 new jets delivered since June 2024, reaching a fleet of at least 300 J-20s ...
  144. [144]
    China Now Fields Five Different Stealth Fighter Types
    Sep 7, 2025 · The People's Liberation Army Air Force is currently procuring four types of fighter aircraft in parallel, namely the J-20 and the new J-35 fifth ...
  145. [145]
    Israel Says F-35s See First-Ever Combat With IDF Over Syria - NPR
    May 22, 2018 · Israel's air force commander says recent airstrikes against Iranian targets in Syria were carried out by the F-35 stealth fighter.Missing: Iraq | Show results with:Iraq
  146. [146]
    Marines' F-35B Joint Strike Fighter Conducts First-Ever Combat ...
    Sep 27, 2018 · The Marine Corps' F-35B Joint Strike Fighter has conducted its first-ever combat strike, completing a mission in Afghanistan today in support of Operation ...
  147. [147]
    The United Kingdom Becomes The Third Country To Send F-35s ...
    Jun 25, 2019 · The detachment of six Joint Strike Fighters in Cyprus has since flown a combined total of 12 sorties over both Syria and Iraq. The jets have ...
  148. [148]
    5 Times The F-35 5th-Generation Fighter Has Been Used In Combat
    Nov 11, 2024 · It was a complex operation that had to travel some 1,200 miles across enemy airspace over Syria and Iraq. Israel also targeted Syrian radar ...
  149. [149]
    J-20 fighter jet starts routine training patrols in East, South China Seas
    Apr 13, 2022 · The J-20, China's most powerful, domestically developed stealth fighter jet, has started to patrol the East China Sea and the South China Sea in routine ...Missing: usage | Show results with:usage
  150. [150]
    China's J-20 stealth aircraft flew through the Tsushima Strait. Did ...
    Jul 29, 2025 · The Chinese air force's most advanced J-20 stealth fighter has flown through the strategic Tsushima Strait near Japan, an apparent first not ...Missing: usage | Show results with:usage
  151. [151]
    Su-57 performance in Ukraine : r/FighterJets - Reddit
    Oct 9, 2023 · Su-57s have reportedly been used by Russia in Ukraine. In October 2022, Russia claimed to have shot down a Ukrainian Su-27 using a Su-57. ...If the su-57 is stealth why rus dont use it to destroy all key ukr ...Why are the Russians reluctant to bring out their brand new SU-57 ...More results from www.reddit.com
  152. [152]
    Russia expands use of Su-57 fighter in Ukraine - Defence Blog
    Aug 5, 2025 · The reports suggest a shift in both the intensity and sophistication of Su-57 employment. Russian forces are reportedly refining armament ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  153. [153]
    The Raptor in the Real World | Air & Space Forces Magazine
    Feb 1, 2007 · The F-22's team blitzed the opposition with a favorable 241-to-two kill ratio. What's more, the two lost aircraft were F-15Cs, not F-22s.
  154. [154]
    ACE Program Achieves World First for AI in Aerospace - DARPA
    Apr 17, 2024 · DARPA's Air Combat Evolution (ACE) program has achieved the first-ever in-air tests of AI algorithms autonomously flying an F-16 against a human-piloted F-16.
  155. [155]
    Scores Simulated "Kill" on U.S. F-35 in Trident Atlantic 2025
    Aug 22, 2025 · French Rafale scores a simulated kill on U.S. F-35 in NATO's Trident Atlantic 25 exercise in Finland, sparking global debate on stealth vs ...
  156. [156]
    Fifth Generation Air Combat - Joint Air Power Competence Centre
    A fifth generation aircraft is capable of operating effectively in highly contested combat environments, defined by the presence of the most capable current ...Missing: criteria debates
  157. [157]
    Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor - The Aviationist
    Nov 7, 2024 · Maximum speed: Mach 2.25 (1,500 mph, or 2,414 km/h) · Supercruise: Mach 1.76 (1,162 mph, or 1,870 km/h) · Range: 1,600 nmi (3,000 km) or more with ...Missing: RCS | Show results with:RCS
  158. [158]
    Lockheed Martin / Boeing F-22 Raptor Specifications - MILAVIA
    Jan 1, 2015 · ... Max Take-Off Weight 83,500 lb (38,000 kg) Performance: max level speed at altitude estimated Mach 2.25 (1,500 mph, 2,410 km/h); Combat radius ...
  159. [159]
    Radar Cross Section (RCS) - GlobalSecurity.org
    The RCS of a B-26 bomber exceeds 35 dBm2 (3100m2 ) from certain angles. In contrast, the RCS of the B-2 stealth bomber is widely reported to be about -40dBm2 .Missing: fifth Jane's Defence DoD
  160. [160]
    Aircraft Facts - 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
    Max Gross Weight, 60,000 lb class (27,216 kg) ; Maximum Speed, Mach 1.6 (approximately 1,200 mph) ; Combat Radius (Internal Fuel), >450 nautical miles (833 km).Missing: RCS | Show results with:RCS
  161. [161]
    F-35 Lightning II | Lockheed Martin
    » F135-PW-100. » 40,000 lb Max. » 25,000 lb Mil. » Vertical N/A. Combat Radius (Internal Fuel). » > 590 nm / 1,093 km (USAF Profile). Max G-Rating. » 9.0..Missing: variants STOVL RCS payload
  162. [162]
    Everything You Need to Know about the F-35B
    Dec 9, 2024 · Speed with Payload: It can reach speeds of Mach 1.6 while carrying a full internal payload, demonstrating impressive performance in combat and ...Missing: RCS | Show results with:RCS
  163. [163]
    Su-57 Felon - Army Recognition
    Aug 30, 2025 · These engines allow the Su-57 to achieve a maximum speed of Mach 2 (approximately 2,135 km/h) at high altitude and Mach 1.1 (1,350 km/h) at sea ...
  164. [164]
    Russia Won't Give Up on Su-57 Felon Stealth Fighter - 19FortyFive
    Jun 1, 2025 · Each engine produces over 86 kN of dry thrust, increasing to over 142 kN with afterburner engaged. This engine marks a significant improvement ...
  165. [165]
    How Fast Is Russia's Su-57 Felon Stealth Fighter?
    Jul 28, 2025 · It can also supercruise at around Mach 1.3. The aircraft has a service ceiling of 20,116 meters and a combat range of over 3,500 kilometers.
  166. [166]
    LIMA 2025 - Rosoboronexport provides new details on the Sukhoi ...
    May 31, 2025 · The Su-57 has reduced radar signature, thanks to the use of composite materials, which represent around 25% of the structure, a radar-absorbing ...<|separator|>
  167. [167]
    J-20 Chengdu Mighty Dragon - Army Recognition
    Aug 8, 2024 · Engine, 2x Shenyang WS-10B. Speed, 2,400 km/h (Mach 2). Altitude ? Range, 6,000 km. Fuel ? Specifications. Back to top. Country Manufacturer<|separator|>
  168. [168]
    China's "Mighty Dragon" Jet Fighter Is Getting An Upgrade
    Jan 8, 2025 · By 2019, considerable numbers of J-20s became operational. Initially, the fifth-generation platform flew with Russian AL-31 engines. The PRC ...
  169. [169]
    Chengdu J-20 Mighty Dragon Stealth Fighter - The Defense Watch
    The aircraft can reach speeds over Mach 2 and has a combat radius exceeding 1,100 km. ... 20 continues to evolve with new radar, engine, and electronic warfare ...
  170. [170]
    How Good a Fighter Plane Is China's J-20 Mighty Dragon?
    Sep 22, 2025 · And with internal weapons bays, the J-20 can carry long-range weapons without compromising stealth performance. Of course, the J-20 is not ...
  171. [171]
    Lockheed Looks to Deliver Up to 190 F-35s in 2025
    Jan 29, 2025 · Lockheed Martin expects to deliver 170-190 F-35s in 2025 and took almost $2 billion in charges on secret projects in 2024's fourth quarter.
  172. [172]
    Economic Impact - F-35 Lightning II
    How much does the F-35 cost? A. For Production Lots 15 through 17, the average flyaway cost of an F-35A was $82.5 million; $109 million for an F-35B, and $102. ...
  173. [173]
    F-35 Unit Price Passes $100m as Engine Costs Surge - TURDEF
    Aug 29, 2025 · ... F-35A's flyaway cost back beyond $100 million. Each F135 engine now costs an average of $20 million, up from Lot 17's $14–15 million. The ...
  174. [174]
  175. [175]
    Mighty Dragon - China's expanding fleet of next gen J-20s - Janes
    Oct 9, 2024 · However, greater production of the J-20 is also possibly limited by cost. The unit price of the J-20 is approximately USD110 million.
  176. [176]
    russia Halts Production of Su-57 Stealth Fighters - Defense Express
    Oct 10, 2024 · In 2019, the Kremlin signed a contract for 76 production jets, reportedly at a cost of around $50 million per unit. The russian firm delivered ...
  177. [177]
    F-35 program's lifetime price tag tops $2 trillion, Pentagon wants jets ...
    Apr 15, 2024 · Combined with an estimated procurement cost of $422 billion, the program's total expected cost is now over $2 trillion, an eye-popping figure ...
  178. [178]
    China has found Trump's pain point - rare earths - BBC
    Oct 17, 2025 · For example, a single F-35 fighter jet is estimated to need more than 400kg (881.8lb) of rare earths for its stealth coatings, motors, radars ...
  179. [179]
    Top 10 most expensive fighter jets in 2024 - AeroTime
    Feb 21, 2025 · Janes puts the unit price of a J-20 at approximately $110 million. While the early J-20s used Russian AL-31 engines, they limited the jets' ...
  180. [180]
    Fifth generation fighters crucial to air superiority - AF.mil
    Mar 2, 2012 · Fifth-generation fighters, such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and the F-22 Raptor, are critical to maintaining air superiority and global precision attack ...
  181. [181]
    The Future of Stealth Military Doctrine - NDU Press
    Sep 26, 2025 · By reducing the RCS, the detection range of a stealth platform by adversary sensors increases. For example, an F-35, equipped with an LPI radar ...
  182. [182]
    [PDF] The Mitchell Forum
    Jun 10, 2025 · 4 Unlike air supremacy, which assumes unchallenged dominance, air superiority reflects a dynamic, time-bound control tailored to contested ...
  183. [183]
    [PDF] US Air Superiority in a Conflict with China - DTIC
    Mar 29, 2021 · Per JP 3-01, air superiority is achieved through “the counterair mission [which] integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and ...
  184. [184]
    Airpower Has a Mass of Its Own: Predicting an Air Order-of-Battle for ...
    Apr 21, 2025 · Two core missions shape the fight for air dominance: air superiority and global strike. ... Reports indicate that production of the J-20—China's ...<|separator|>
  185. [185]
    In Denial About Denial: Why Ukraine's Air Success Should Worry the ...
    Jun 15, 2022 · Despite having one of the largest and most technologically sophisticated air forces in the world, Russia has failed to establish air superiority ...
  186. [186]
    The Significance of Air Superiority: The Ukraine-Russia War
    Jul 2, 2024 · The first is the failure of the Russian Air Force to establish air superiority and overwhelm Ukrainian forces to achieve a decisive victory at ...
  187. [187]
    Allied Air Command Lessons from Ukraine
    This article offers a comprehensive assessment of the conflict, focusing on Russia's and Ukraine's failure to achieve air superiority.Introduction · Air Superiority Remains Job #1 · The Quality 'vs' Quantity Balance
  188. [188]
    Air Superiority Will Always Require Pilots, Air Force Officials Say
    Mar 4, 2025 · Service officials served up a reminder that while achieving air superiority will require both crewed and uncrewed systems, pilots aren't going anywhere.Missing: hybrid 2030s
  189. [189]
    The Future of Air Dominance: 6th-Generation Fighter Capabilities ...
    Sep 20, 2025 · Instead, future dominance could hinge on distributed operations, where swarms of low-cost, AI-driven drones—like the Air Force's **XQ-58A ...
  190. [190]
    [PDF] The Future of Air Superiority: Command of the Air in High Intensity ...
    Sep 5, 2025 · While theorists such as Douhet, Ritter,21 and Warden have emphasized the necessity of achieving air superiority, what seems self-evident to ...
  191. [191]
    Why The US Is Banned From Exporting F-22 Raptor Fighter Jets
    Sep 16, 2025 · The F-22's export ban goes even further than a general agreement not to share the technology. Its ban is explicitly written into law. The ...
  192. [192]
    Why The F-22 Is Banned From Being Sold To Other Countries
    Jul 12, 2025 · Export of the F-22 was banned before it entered service, putting more pressure on the program's early cancellation.
  193. [193]
    F-35 in Action - F-35 Lightning II
    The F-35 is the choice for America and 19 allied nations, strengthening global security and deterring threats around the world.
  194. [194]
    These Are The Countries That Purchase US Fighter Jets
    Aug 10, 2025 · Export volumes underline this American dominance. As of early 2025, over 900 F-35s are in service with 19 partner nations, and more than 1,700 ...
  195. [195]
    International Traffic in Arms Regulations: U.S. Munitions List ...
    Aug 27, 2025 · The Department of State (the Department) amends the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to remove from the U.S. Munitions List ...
  196. [196]
    Pakistan says China offered 40 J-35 stealth aircraft, among others
    Jun 10, 2025 · This turned out to be a redesigned FC-31, a private venture by Shenyang Aircraft Corporation to develop a modern fighter jet for export ...
  197. [197]
    Pakistan plans to purchase Chinese FC-31 fighter jets - Militarnyi
    China will soon start supplying the Pakistani Air Force with its promising 5th-generation FC-31 “Gyrfalcon” fighter jets, also known as the J-35.
  198. [198]
    Sukhoi Su-57 - Wikipedia
    The high degree of static instability (or relaxed stability) in both pitch and yaw, advanced KSU-50 flight control system, and canted thrust vectoring nozzles ...
  199. [199]
    India takes a relook at Russian Su-57, but not for its stealth. Here's why
    Sep 23, 2025 · India in 2018 withdrew from FGFA programme with Russia due to concerns over Su-57's stealth and super cruise capabilities. Indian will evaluate ...
  200. [200]
    Russia Sanctions and Export Controls
    Since Russia invaded Ukraine, the scope and severity of U.S. sanctions and export controls imposed on Russia have expanded significantly.
  201. [201]
    Russia Sanctions and Export Controls: U.S. Agencies Should ...
    Sep 8, 2025 · U.S. agencies assess that export controls have hindered but not completely prevented Russia's efforts to obtain U.S. military technologies.Missing: arms | Show results with:arms
  202. [202]
    Russian Arms Sales and Sanctions Monthly Snapshot - RAND
    The Russian Arms Sales and Sanctions Monthly Snapshot captures a selection of the most salient open source material on Russian arms sales and information ...
  203. [203]
    Powering Proliferation: The Global Engine Market and China's ...
    Mar 21, 2023 · This paper examines major non-US players in the engine market, with a particular focus on both allies and potential adversaries.
  204. [204]
    China's J-20 Is Good But It Remains Untested - The National Interest
    Nov 3, 2021 · That may give the J-20 the added boost it needs, and the aircraft will likely become more capable as time goes on. Another factor however is the ...
  205. [205]
    China Is Trying to Fix the Engine Problem Plaguing Its Fighter Jets
    Jun 6, 2021 · The J-20, like all Chinese aircraft, has been hobbled by a lack of efficient and durable, high-performance jet engines. That problem has plagued China's ...
  206. [206]
    Overhyped Chinese Stealth Fighter Falls Short of Real Combat Power
    Jul 5, 2025 · The J20 continues to face criticism for its overhyped stealth features questionable engine performance and lack of real combat testing.
  207. [207]
    The Su-57 is marketed as stealth fighter but radars have between 6 ...
    The Su-57 is marketed as stealth fighter but radars have between 6 to 10 times greater detection range against the Felon compared to F-22 & F-35.
  208. [208]
    U.S. analyst: Kremlin doesn't trust the Su-57's capabilities
    Aug 22, 2024 · He highlighted that the plane's engine nozzles are not concealed within the fuselage, which boosts the aircraft's radar visibility.
  209. [209]
    Analysis: What's Wrong with the Russian Su-57? A Lot - Kyiv Post
    May 19, 2024 · The engine nozzles themselves were also made of radio-absorbing materials, using ceramics, which further reduces radar visibility. When ...
  210. [210]
  211. [211]
    F-22 Raptor vs. China's J-20 and Russia's Su-57: Which Fighter ...
    Apr 11, 2025 · Simulations often show the F-22 having a significant advantage in a one-on-one dogfight due to its superior agility and thrust vectoring ...Missing: RAND | Show results with:RAND
  212. [212]
    How would the F-22 and F-35 do against the J-20 in air-to-air combat?
    Oct 1, 2021 · The f-22 gets the edge here in all aspect stealth and maneuverability though but not by much. Probably both sides would suffer at least one loss ...How likely is it that the f22 raptor can dominate like in ... - RedditRed Flag Exercise 25 ( F16 / F22 / F15 / F35 / Typhoon ) - RedditMore results from www.reddit.com
  213. [213]
    F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: More Actions Needed to Explain Cost ...
    May 30, 2023 · The F-35 program's total procurement costs have increased by $13.4 billion since the last cost estimate in 2019. This is, in part, due to DOD ...
  214. [214]
    The F-35 Will Now Exceed $2 Trillion As the Military Plans to Fly It ...
    May 16, 2024 · Projected costs for sustaining the F-35s have continued to rise from $1.1 trillion in 2018 to $1.58 trillion 5 years later (a 44% increase).
  215. [215]
    F-35 Program Plagued by Cost, Delivery Overruns, GAO Says
    Sep 3, 2025 · With the goal of improving on-time product delivery, the Pentagon's F-35 program has worked to establish pay incentives to the contractors and ...
  216. [216]
    Why China's J-20 Fighter Jet Is More Expensive Than America's F-35
    Sep 21, 2025 · According to AeroTime, the Chengdu J-20 has an estimated cost of $110 million. ... This large order book means that the development cost of the ...
  217. [217]
    Why are Chinese fighter jets so much cheaper than Western ...
    May 13, 2025 · J-20, US$110 million. With stealth capabilities and advanced avionics, China's lower-cost fighter jets may reshape the defence aviation industry ...
  218. [218]
    Russia stopped Su-57 production after USA shuts down smuggling ...
    Oct 11, 2024 · Russia's new Su-57 jet exposed as a fraud by IAF–Russia cancelled the production of the Su-57 fighter jet ... Su-57s and likely increased the per- ...
  219. [219]
    Sanctions, Corruption and Microchips: Inside the Su‑57's Struggle ...
    What happened instead is that the Sukhoi Su‑57 is now a cautionary tale of how sanctions, supply‑chain vulnerability, and corruption in procurement can sabotage ...
  220. [220]
    The $500 drone vs. $82 million fighter jet: warfare economics have ...
    Sep 9, 2025 · A new report from Dedrone by Axon reveals the stark economic reality facing military forces worldwide: a $500 DIY drone can now destroy an $82.5 ...
  221. [221]
    Drone Swarms: The Good, The Bad, and The Terrifying Future
    Sep 19, 2023 · “When you consider that a drone swarm consisting of many thousands of off-the-shelf drones would cost less than, say, one F-35 fighter or a ...
  222. [222]
    The Pentagon Should Scale Back F-35 Purchases—and Buy ...
    Sep 30, 2025 · The opportunity cost of this move, of course, is 500 fifth-generation aircraft. But what could $75 billion buy instead?
  223. [223]
    Fighter Jets Vs. Elon Musk: What U.S. Military Drones Mean For ...
    Mar 28, 2025 · CCAs currently cost less than $30 million each, while fighter jets range up to $350 million or more.
  224. [224]
    Unprecedented rise in global military expenditure as European and ...
    Apr 28, 2025 · (Stockholm, 28 April 2025) World military expenditure reached $2718 billion in 2024, an increase of 9.4 per cent in real terms from 2023 and ...Missing: inflation | Show results with:inflation
  225. [225]
    Russia's Military Budget Shrinks as War Costs Hit Kremlin's ...
    Sep 30, 2025 · State spending on national defense is projected to go down next year to around $156 billion from more than $163 billion, under the current ...Missing: impact | Show results with:impact