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Interchange fee

An interchange fee is a per-transaction charge paid by a merchant's acquiring bank to a cardholder's issuing bank for facilitating credit or debit card payments, typically comprising 1.5 to 3 percent of the transaction value plus a fixed component.^[1]^[2] These fees, set by card networks such as Visa and Mastercard, cover issuer costs for fraud detection, rewards programs, and account management while forming the largest portion—often around 80 percent—of the total merchant discount rate passed to retailers.^[3]^[4] In economic terms, interchange fees balance incentives between merchants and cardholders, with theory suggesting optimal levels promote network efficiency but empirical debates persist over whether network-set rates exceed competitive necessities, potentially inflating merchant expenses without proportional consumer benefits.^[5]^[6] Controversies center on allegations of supracompetitive pricing akin to cartel behavior, prompting regulations like the U.S. Durbin Amendment's debit card caps at 21 cents plus 0.05 percent per transaction, which generated $31.59 billion in debit and prepaid interchange revenue in 2021 amid claims that fee reductions could stifle payment innovation and security investments.^[7]^[8]^[9]^[10]

Fundamentals

Definition and transaction flow

An interchange fee is a per-transaction payment made by an acquiring bank, which processes payments on behalf of merchants, to a card-issuing bank that provides the payment card to the consumer. This fee, typically ranging from 1.5% to 3% of the transaction value plus a fixed component, reimburses the issuer for costs associated with card issuance, fraud prevention, customer service, and rewards programs.^[11]^[1] In a typical card transaction flow, the consumer presents a credit or debit card to the merchant for payment. The merchant's point-of-sale terminal captures the card details and forwards an authorization request to its acquiring bank. The acquirer routes the request through the card network—such as Visa or Mastercard—to the issuer for approval, which verifies funds availability and approves or declines the transaction, sending the response back through the same path.^[1]^[8] Upon approval, the transaction settles later that day or in batches. The acquirer credits the merchant's account net of processing fees, while the network facilitates settlement between acquirer and issuer: the acquirer transfers funds to the issuer, including the interchange fee, which constitutes the majority of the merchant's total discount rate paid to the acquirer. Network assessment fees are deducted separately by the card scheme. This structure ensures issuers are compensated upstream in the payment chain.^[11]^[12]

Components of total merchant costs

The total costs incurred by merchants for processing credit or debit card transactions, often aggregated as the merchant discount rate (MDR), primarily consist of three core components: interchange fees, network assessment fees, and acquirer or processor markups. These fees collectively form the deduction from the transaction amount before funds are credited to the merchant's account, typically ranging from 1.5% to 3.5% of the transaction value plus fixed per-transaction charges.^[13]^[14] In fiscal year 2023, interchange fees accounted for nearly 90% of the processing fees paid by select federal entities accepting card payments.^[15] Interchange fees represent the largest portion, comprising 70% to 90% of the total MDR, and are paid by the merchant's acquiring bank to the card-issuing bank to cover costs such as credit risk, fraud prevention, and rewards programs. These rates are set by card networks like Visa and Mastercard based on factors including card type, transaction method, and merchant category, and are non-negotiable for the merchant.^[1]^[15] For example, Visa consumer credit card interchange might be around 1.8% plus a fixed fee, while premium rewards cards can exceed 2.5%.^[16] Network assessment fees, levied by card brands such as Visa or Mastercard, are smaller charges—typically 0.10% to 0.15% of the transaction volume—used to fund network operations, branding, and infrastructure. These are calculated on gross transaction volume and passed directly to the merchant via the acquirer, remaining relatively consistent across transaction types.^[17]^[18] Acquirer or processor markups constitute the remaining variable portion, added by the merchant's payment processor or acquiring bank for services including transaction authorization, settlement, and customer support. This markup, often 0.2% to 0.5% plus fixed fees, is negotiable and can vary by merchant volume, pricing model (e.g., interchange-plus vs. blended), and processor efficiency.^[19]^[20] The formula for MDR is thus: MDR = interchange fees + assessment fees + markup, enabling merchants to analyze and optimize costs through transparent "interchange-plus" pricing models.^[19]^[21]

Economic Role

Two-sided market theory

In payment card networks, two-sided market theory posits that platforms facilitate interactions between distinct end-user groups—cardholders and merchants—characterized by indirect network externalities, where the value to one side increases with the participation of the other.^[22] Cardholders benefit from wider merchant acceptance, while merchants gain from a larger pool of paying customers, creating a feedback loop that expands overall platform usage.^[23] This structure differs from traditional one-sided markets, as pricing must account for cross-side externalities rather than marginal costs alone; unadjusted marginal pricing would underprovide participation on the elastic side, leading to suboptimal network size.^[24] The interchange fee serves as a key mechanism to balance these sides, functioning as a transfer from the merchant's bank (acquirer) to the cardholder's bank (issuer), effectively subsidizing issuers to lower costs for cardholders—who typically exhibit higher price elasticity due to alternatives like cash or competing payment methods.^[25] In equilibrium, the fee is set above the acquirer's marginal cost but below the issuer's, reflecting higher issuing costs (e.g., fraud prevention, rewards programs) and the need to internalize merchants' benefits from increased card transactions.^[26] Theoretical models, such as those developed by Rochet and Tirole, demonstrate that positive interchange fees maximize joint surplus when cardholder demand elasticity exceeds merchants' and issuing costs surpass acquiring costs, preventing merchant resistance while inducing card adoption.^[22]^[23] Empirical applications of the theory in card markets confirm that interchange fees enable zero or negative effective prices for cardholders (via rewards), funded by merchant payments, which in turn boost transaction volumes and merchant revenues net of fees.^[24] However, deviations from theoretical optima—such as regulatory caps—can distort side-balancing by reducing issuer incentives, contracting cardholder participation, and ultimately harming total welfare, as evidenced in debit card regulations where fee reductions led to diminished network effects without proportional merchant relief.^[27] This underscores the theory's emphasis on platform governance rules, like the "honor all cards" mandate, to sustain interoperability and prevent fragmentation.^[28]

Incentives for issuers and consumer benefits

Interchange fees serve as a key revenue mechanism for card issuers, compensating them for the costs of issuing payment cards, authorizing transactions, and managing associated risks such as fraud and credit losses.^[29] This income stream incentivizes issuers to invest in secure infrastructure, expand card issuance, and compete on service quality, as higher fees correlate with greater participation in network growth and innovation in payment systems.^[30] ^[31] Without such fees, issuers would face reduced margins, potentially leading to higher direct consumer fees or diminished incentives to promote card usage over alternatives like cash.^[32] A primary consumer benefit arises from issuers redirecting interchange revenue toward rewards programs, including cashback, travel points, and discounts, which effectively subsidize cardholders' spending. Federal Reserve analysis from 2025 indicates that banks allocate an average of 86% of interchange income—equating to 1.57% of purchase volume after netting against 1.82% average interchange revenue—to fund these rewards, thereby lowering the net cost of transactions for users.^[33] This rebate structure not only attracts new accounts but also empirically drives higher card adoption rates, with studies showing interchange levels strongly linked to growth in credit card originations beyond other revenue sources.^[34] Beyond rewards, interchange fees enable issuers to absorb fraud-related expenses and provide ancillary services like purchase protection and dispute resolution, enhancing consumer security and convenience compared to cash or check payments.^[35] In two-sided payment markets, these fees balance platform dynamics by shifting value from merchants to consumers, promoting efficient transaction volumes; empirical reviews of fee caps, such as those post-Durbin Amendment in 2011, reveal reduced rewards and issuer innovation without corresponding price relief for non-card users, underscoring the fees' role in sustaining consumer-oriented incentives.^[32] ^[36]

Historical Development

Early origins (1950s-1970s)

The earliest modern credit cards, such as the Diners Club card introduced in 1950, operated as closed-loop systems managed by a single entity, where merchants paid a direct discount fee—typically 5 to 7 percent of transaction value—to the card issuer without involving separate issuing and acquiring banks, thus precluding interchange fees.^[37] American Express followed in 1958 with a similar charge card model, billing cardholders monthly and charging merchants a flat fee for processing, again without interbank transfers.^[37] These proprietary systems relied on manual authorization and lacked the multi-bank infrastructure that would later necessitate interchange mechanisms.^[38] Interchange fees emerged in the mid-1960s alongside the expansion of bank-issued revolving credit cards and interbank licensing agreements, which created the need for settlement between issuing banks (providing credit to cardholders) and acquiring banks (handling merchant transactions). Bank of America launched BankAmericard in 1958 as a proprietary product in California but began licensing it to out-of-state banks in 1966 to broaden acceptance and issuance, marking the onset of cross-bank transaction processing and the introduction of interchange reimbursements to compensate issuers for credit risk, fraud prevention, and account management costs.^[39] ^[40] Concurrently, in 1966, a consortium of banks formed Master Charge (later Mastercard) as a collaborative network, incorporating interchange from inception to facilitate nationwide merchant acceptance and issuer participation.^[41] These fees, initially modest and manually calculated via paper drafts or telegraphic transfers due to limited automation, averaged under 2 percent of transaction value and served primarily to cover issuers' disproportionate costs in the nascent four-party payment model.^[38] By the early 1970s, the proliferation of licensed programs led to formalized networks, such as the 1970 formation of National BankAmericard Inc. (precursor to Visa), which standardized interchange rates to streamline interbank settlements amid growing transaction volumes—reaching millions annually—and rudimentary electronic verification systems.^[37] This period solidified interchange as a core incentive for banks to issue cards, subsidizing consumer rewards and credit availability while shifting some processing burdens from merchants to issuers, though fees remained unregulated and varied by network agreements.^[41] Empirical data from the era indicate interchange comprised the bulk of merchant discount rates, with total fees hovering around 3-5 percent, reflecting high manual handling costs before widespread computerization.^[38]

Expansion and standardization (1980s-2000s)

During the 1980s, the validity of interchange fees faced antitrust scrutiny in the NaBanco v. Visa case, initiated in 1979, where the plaintiff alleged price fixing by Visa's uniform fee structure. Courts ruled in Visa's favor by 1984, affirming interchange fees as a reasonable mechanism for issuers to recover processing and credit costs from acquirers, thereby legitimizing network-set fees and enabling broader adoption.^[31] This legal clarity supported the expansion of credit card networks, coinciding with the mid-1980s emergence of debit cards, which applied similar fee models to PIN-based transactions across emerging regional networks.^[31] Visa and Mastercard standardized interchange fees through centralized network rules, including honor-all-cards mandates that required merchants to accept all affiliated cards at uniform terms, published biannually with variations by merchant category and transaction type.^[11] Initially simple, fee schedules grew in complexity to reflect differentiated incentives; for instance, Visa expanded from four categories in 1991 to 60 by 2009, while Mastercard increased from four to 243, accommodating new programs like rewards cards introduced in the early 1980s and premium variants in the 2000s.^[11] These structures typically ranged from 1.5% to 2% of transaction value for credit cards, with signature debit at around 1.2% and PIN debit at $0.35–$0.50 by the 2000s.^[31] The period saw rapid expansion in card usage, driven by network growth and consumer incentives funded by rising fees; debit transactions tripled from 2000 to 2006, surpassing credit volumes, while overall card payments exceeded 50% of U.S. retail by 2005.^[31] Average rates increased, with Visa's standard retail credit fee rising 23% from 1.25% in 1995 to 1.54% in 2009, and Mastercard's from 1.30% in 1991 to 1.58%; premium card fees grew about 24% since their 2005 introduction.^[11] Total U.S. interchange fees escalated from $20 billion in 2002 to $35–45 billion by 2007, reflecting heightened transaction volumes and fee adjustments amid merchant challenges, such as the 2003 Wal-Mart settlement addressing network exclusivity rules.^[11]^[31]

Pricing and Determination

Factors setting interchange rates

Payment card networks such as Visa and Mastercard establish interchange rates through unilateral schedules that acquirers must apply when reimbursing issuers for transactions, with rates varying to account for differential costs, risks, and incentives across the two-sided market.^[42]^[43] These schedules are periodically updated—Visa, for instance, revised its U.S. rates effective October 19, 2024—to reflect evolving processing costs, fraud patterns, and regulatory environments while aiming to sustain network growth.^[42] Operational factors prominently shape rate tiers. Card type is primary: debit cards typically incur lower fees (e.g., 0.3-0.5% plus fixed per-transaction amounts under U.S. regulations like the Durbin Amendment) compared to credit cards (averaging 1.5-2.2%), with premium rewards cards commanding higher reimbursements to offset issuer-funded benefits such as cashback or miles.^[31]^[2] Transaction characteristics further differentiate: card-not-present (e.g., online) payments face elevated rates due to heightened fraud exposure, often 0.5-1% above card-present equivalents, while secure authentication methods like EMV chip or PIN reduce risk premia relative to magnetic-stripe swipes.^[1] Merchant category codes (MCCs) adjust for industry-specific hazards, with high-risk sectors like travel or gaming assessed up to 3% or more to cover potential chargebacks and defaults.^[44] Transaction volume thresholds and cross-border elements also influence, though domestic swipes under $15 may qualify for reduced tiers to encourage small-purchase acceptance.^[45] Economically, these rates derive from two-sided market dynamics where networks set fees to internalize platform externalities, maximizing joint issuer-acquirer profits rather than strictly mirroring marginal costs (estimated at 0.2-0.5% per transaction for authorization and fraud prevention).^[46] Theory posits that optimal levels hinge on demand elasticities—merchants' lower sensitivity to fees relative to cardholders' enables subsidies to the consumer side, funding rewards that boost usage and volume (e.g., U.S. interchange revenue exceeded $50 billion annually by 2023).^[31]^[46] Empirical models confirm deviations from cost-plus pricing: competition among networks often elevates fees to extract merchant surplus for consumer inducements, diverging from social optima where non-users bear indirect costs via higher retail prices.^[6] Networks justify this as promoting efficiency, with rates calibrated to cover issuer investments in security and rewards amid fragmented issuer competition.^[25]

Network rules and variations by card type

Payment card networks such as Visa and Mastercard set interchange fees via their operating rules, which differentiate rates by card product type to reflect variations in issuer costs, risk, and benefits provided to cardholders.^[42]^[43] These rules require acquirers to identify the card type during transaction authorization—via product indicators—and reimburse issuers accordingly, with qualification often depending on factors like transaction data submission and merchant category compliance.^[47]^[43] Credit cards generally attract higher interchange fees than debit cards, as networks allocate elevated rates to premium or rewards products to subsidize consumer perks like cashback or travel benefits. For Visa U.S. domestic transactions effective October 19, 2024, standard consumer credit retail rates stand at 1.43% plus $0.10, while super premium tiers (e.g., Visa Infinite) can reach 2.30% plus $0.10 under performance thresholds.^[42] Mastercard employs similar tiering by program (e.g., World or Core), with credit rates varying based on card level and requiring enhanced data for optimal qualification.^[43] Debit cards command lower fees, segmented into regulated (capped for large issuers under U.S. Regulation II) and unregulated/exempt categories. Visa regulated debit retail rates are limited to 0.05% plus $0.21 plus a $0.01 fraud adjustment, compared to 0.80% plus $0.15 for exempt debit; Mastercard regulated debit follows a comparable 0.05% plus $0.22 structure.^[42]^[48]^[49] Network rules distinguish signature (credit-like) from PIN debit, often applying higher unregulated rates to the former due to fraud exposure.^[43] Prepaid cards align closely with debit structures but may incur slightly higher rates or category-specific caps, such as Visa's 1.15% plus $0.15 for retail or a $0.35 flat cap at supermarkets for exempt prepaid.^[42] Commercial cards, including corporate and purchasing variants, feature the highest fees to cover business-specific risks like larger ticket sizes and detailed reporting (e.g., Level II/III data). Visa corporate travel and entertainment rates reach 2.50% plus $0.10, while purchasing cards start at 1.65% plus $0.10; Mastercard applies analogous elevations for business products.^[42]^[43] These variations incentivize issuers to issue higher-fee cards with rewards, as networks' rules ensure consistent reimbursement tied to product type, though acquirers must adhere to non-discrimination and timely settlement mandates.^[47]^[43]

Debates and Empirical Evidence

Merchant burdens and pass-through to prices

![GAO report on interchange fees][float-right] Interchange fees constitute the largest component of merchants' card acceptance costs, often accounting for 70-90% of the total merchant discount rate paid to acquirers. In the United States, these fees averaged approximately 2% of transaction value for credit cards as of recent estimates, with variations by card brand, type (e.g., rewards vs. standard), and merchant category code.^[6] Small and low-margin merchants, such as those in grocery or restaurant sectors, face disproportionate burdens, as fees can erode slim profit margins—sometimes exceeding 2-3% of sales volume in high-volume, low-ticket transactions.^[6] A 2025 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) analysis of payment card costs for federal entities, which function similarly to private merchants, underscored that escalating interchange fees have driven up overall processing expenses without commensurate negotiation leverage for cost reductions.^[50] Empirical evidence on pass-through to consumer prices reveals partial but incomplete transmission of these costs. Merchants typically adjust prices upward to recoup a share of interchange expenses, yet studies consistently find pass-through rates below 100%, influenced by market competition, demand elasticity, and menu costs of repricing. For example, following the 2011 Durbin Amendment's debit interchange caps, which reduced average fees from 44 cents to 21 cents per transaction, consumer price reductions were modest and uneven, with pass-through estimated at 20-80% across retail categories, per analyses of supermarket and gasoline pricing data.^[51] Similarly, European and Australian post-regulation studies post-2015 fee caps showed long-term retail price declines of 0.5-1.5% attributable to lower interchange, but these effects diminished over time and varied by sector, suggesting merchants retain some savings rather than fully passing them on.^[52] In two-sided payment markets, cost incidence analysis indicates merchants bear a net burden, as cardholder rewards—funded largely by interchange—often exceed direct consumer fees but fall short of full merchant pass-through. A Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City study quantified U.S. merchant cost pass-through as roughly twice the value of rewards, implying regressive effects where lower-income consumers, less likely to hold rewards cards, subsidize higher-income users via higher prices without equivalent benefits.^[53] Theoretical models predict higher pass-through in competitive retail environments, yet real-world frictions like asymmetric information and network effects limit full offset, with merchants absorbing 20-50% of costs on average according to meta-reviews of regulation impacts.^[36] This incomplete pass-through challenges claims of seamless consumer harm from uncapped fees, as retained merchant margins may fund service improvements or competitive pricing elsewhere.^[6]

Antitrust claims and network coordination

The principal antitrust claims against interchange fees in the United States stem from the multidistrict litigation In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation, initiated in 2005 by a class of merchants against Visa, Mastercard, and numerous issuing banks. Plaintiffs contended that the defendants violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring to fix interchange fees at supracompetitive levels through coordinated network rules and practices, such as uniform fee schedules and prohibitions on merchants steering customers to lower-cost cards or negotiating individualized rates.^[54]^[55] These rules, including "honor all cards" policies, allegedly insulated issuers from competitive pressures, enabling horizontal collusion among banks—competitors who participate in the networks—to inflate fees that merchants ultimately bear as part of total processing costs.^[56]^[57] Network coordination lies at the core of these allegations, as Visa and Mastercard operate as associations of financial institutions where issuers collectively influence interchange reimbursement levels via association governance and default pricing schedules. Critics assert this structure facilitates tacit agreement on fees, circumventing direct negotiation and fostering price rigidity; for instance, networks set baseline interchange rates (often 1.5-3% of transaction value for credit cards) that acquirers must reimburse issuers, with limited deviation allowed, effectively standardizing costs across competitors and reducing incentives for issuers to compete downward on rewards or services funded by these fees.^[57]^[6] Defendants countered that such coordination is vertical—a platform balancing issuer incentives with merchant acceptance—and essential to prevent free-riding, where high-reward cards benefit from network-wide infrastructure without contributing proportionally; courts have partially upheld this defense, dismissing certain per se conspiracy claims in favor of rule-of-reason analysis, though injunction claims advanced to trial.^[58]^[59] The case yielded a $5.54 billion damages settlement in 2019 for merchants accepting Visa or Mastercard from 2004 to 2019, approved by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, but injunctive relief claims persist, with trials delayed to 2026 amid appeals over class certification and settlement scope.^[60]^[54]^[61] Separate enforcement actions, such as the U.S. Department of Justice's 2024 lawsuit against Visa for debit market monopolization, highlight related coordination issues, alleging exclusionary tactics that entrench high network fees (including interchange components) by blocking rival debit rails, though this focuses more on routing than fee-fixing per se.^[62]^[63] Economic analyses of these claims emphasize that while coordination stabilizes two-sided platforms, empirical pass-through of fees to consumer benefits remains debated, with no conclusive judicial finding of systemic collusion to date.^[6]^[64]

Consumer welfare effects of fees and caps

Interchange fees enable card-issuing banks to fund consumer rewards programs, such as cashback, points, and travel perks, as well as interest-free credit periods and free checking accounts, effectively subsidizing payment convenience for users who spend more than average.^[65] These benefits disproportionately aid higher-spending households, but empirical analyses indicate that uncapped fees correlate with broader consumer access to no-fee services, with U.S. data showing that pre-regulation interchange revenue supported approximately $13 billion in annual rewards value distributed to cardholders.^[6] From a first-principles perspective, fees align incentives by compensating issuers for fraud prevention, authorization costs, and credit risk, fostering network growth that lowers per-transaction expenses over time through scale.^[66] Regulatory caps on interchange fees, intended to curb merchant costs and potentially lower retail prices, have instead often shifted burdens to consumers via reduced issuer revenues. In the U.S., the 2011 Durbin Amendment capped debit interchange at 21 cents plus 0.05% of transaction value (or 12 cents ad valorem for exempt small issuers), reducing merchant fees by over $7 billion annually but prompting banks to increase consumer-facing charges.^[51] Post-Durbin, free checking accounts declined from 75% to under 40% of offerings by 2018, with monthly maintenance fees rising by an average of $4-7 per account and ATM fees surging, netting a consumer cost increase estimated at $5-10 billion yearly, as merchants passed through less than 20% of savings in price reductions.^[67]^[68] Event studies of bank stock reactions confirm that these shifts eroded consumer welfare, particularly for lower-income debit users who lost subsidized services without equivalent retail price gains.^[69] In the European Union, the 2015 Interchange Fee Regulation limited consumer debit fees to 0.2% and credit to 0.3% of transaction value, slashing average rates by 35% (over €2 billion annually) and yielding modest merchant cost reductions.^[70] However, pass-through to retail prices has been limited, with econometric estimates showing only a 0.17% long-run price drop per 1% fee reduction, while issuers responded by curtailing rewards—credit card perks fell by up to 20% in affected markets—and introducing or hiking annual fees, offsetting much of the potential consumer benefit.^[52]^[71] Reviews indicate that while large retailers retained most savings, smaller merchants and consumers faced higher scheme fees or reduced card acceptance incentives, with no significant uptick in overall payment efficiency or welfare gains.^[72] Australia's 2003 reforms capped credit interchange at 0.5% and later adjusted debit benchmarks, initially boosting card adoption but leading to reward program cuts—cashback rates dropped 50% within years—and a shift to direct consumer fees, including higher annual charges averaging AUD 50-100 more per card.^[73] Empirical tracking by the Reserve Bank of Australia reveals that while merchant surcharging rose (enabling partial pass-through), net consumer costs increased for reward-reliant users, with low-income households bearing disproportionate hits from fee hikes on basic accounts, underscoring how caps redistribute rather than enhance welfare.^[74] Cross-jurisdictional evidence consistently shows that caps favor large merchants—who capture 80-90% of savings without proportional price cuts—over consumers, who experience welfare losses from disrupted issuer subsidies exceeding any diffused retail benefits.^[75]^[27]

Regulation and Litigation

United States

In the United States, interchange fees for debit cards issued by large financial institutions are regulated under the Durbin Amendment, enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010, which directed the Federal Reserve to establish standards ensuring fees are reasonable and proportional to the issuer's incremental costs.^[76] The regulation, implemented in October 2011 via Regulation II, capped debit interchange fees at 21 cents plus 0.05% of the transaction value, with an additional one-cent fraud-prevention adjustment allowed under certain conditions, applying to issuers with over $10 billion in assets.^[77] This cap reduced annual interchange revenue for affected banks by approximately $8.2 billion, representing over 30% of prior levels, prompting issuers to offset losses through higher consumer deposit fees and reduced free checking accounts.^[27] Credit card interchange fees remain unregulated by statute, with rates determined by networks like Visa and Mastercard, averaging around 2% of transaction value as of 2024.^[42]

Durbin Amendment and debit caps (2011 onward)

The Durbin Amendment also mandated routing choices for debit transactions, allowing merchants to select networks to promote competition, though adoption has been limited due to network restrictions and issuer preferences for branded PIN debit.^[78] Empirical analyses indicate mixed effects on consumer welfare: while merchant costs declined, banks' pass-through of savings to consumers was incomplete, with studies estimating net consumer costs rising due to fee hikes, though some event studies suggest overall benefits from lower retail prices.^[79] In November 2023, the Federal Reserve proposed adjustments to the cap for fraud-related costs amid rising debit fraud, but these were not finalized before a significant legal development.^[77] On August 6, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota vacated the interchange fee cap under Regulation II, ruling it exceeded the Federal Reserve's statutory authority, thereby removing the price controls for covered debit issuers pending appeal or further rulemaking.^[80]

Ongoing antitrust settlements (2005-2024)

Antitrust litigation against Visa and Mastercard originated in 2005 with class-action suits by merchants alleging horizontal price-fixing and monopolistic practices in setting credit and debit interchange fees, claiming networks and issuers colluded to suppress competition and inflate rates above competitive levels.^[81] A 2013 settlement approved by the court provided $7.25 billion in reimbursements to merchants for fees paid from 2004 onward, marking the largest antitrust settlement in U.S. history at the time, without admitting liability.^[82] Subsequent suits for post-2012 fees culminated in a March 2024 proposed $30 billion agreement, including temporary credit interchange fee caps until 2030 and rule changes to enhance merchant negotiating power, but this was rejected by a federal judge in June 2024 for failing to provide adequate relief relative to claimed damages exceeding $100 billion.^[83] Separate settlements for 2004-2019 claims totaling $5.5 billion were finalized, with claim deadlines extended to August 2024, while trials for remaining cases involving major retailers were postponed to 2026.^[61] These actions have not imposed permanent fee caps on credit interchange, as courts have upheld networks' defenses of fee-setting as unilateral business judgments rather than per se antitrust violations.^[84]

Durbin Amendment and debit caps (2011 onward)

The Durbin Amendment, Section 1075 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act signed into law on July 21, 2010, directed the Federal Reserve Board to establish standards ensuring debit card interchange fees charged by covered issuers—those with consolidated assets exceeding $10 billion—were reasonable and proportional to the incremental costs incurred for processing the transaction.^[85] Exemptions applied to smaller issuers below the $10 billion threshold and specific card types, such as those used for government-administered benefit programs.^[8] The Federal Reserve implemented the amendment through Regulation II, finalized on June 29, 2011, with the interchange fee cap taking effect for covered issuers on October 1, 2011.^[86] The cap formula set maximum fees at 21 cents plus 0.05 percent of the transaction value, with an additional 1 cent adjustment allowable for fraud-prevention and compliance costs, subject to periodic review based on issuer-reported data.^[77] Regulation II also mandated that covered issuers enable debit transactions to route through at least two unaffiliated payment networks, including at least one PIN network, to enhance merchant choice and competition.^[8] Post-implementation studies documented a sharp decline in average debit interchange fees, from approximately 44 cents pre-regulation to about 23 cents, equating to over 30 percent revenue reduction—or roughly $8.2 billion annually—for regulated issuers.^[27] Large banks offset these losses by raising consumer-facing fees, including monthly account maintenance charges, out-of-network ATM fees, and overdraft fees, while curtailing free checking accounts; the proportion of fee-free checking accounts dropped from over 75 percent in 2010 to under 40 percent by 2013.^[78] ^[67] Empirical analyses revealed limited merchant pass-through of cost savings to consumers, with price reductions averaging less than 1 percent overall and concentrated in competitive retail sectors where debit usage was high; small merchants experienced negligible benefits due to constrained bargaining power with networks.^[87] ^[68] Event-study research indicated net negative effects on consumer welfare, as increased banking costs outweighed any potential retail price benefits, disproportionately burdening lower-income households reliant on debit.^[51] In October 2023, the Federal Reserve proposed revising the cap downward to 14.4 cents plus 0.04 percent of transaction value, citing updated cost data from large issuers, though this faced opposition over projected further revenue erosion of about $4 billion annually for banks.^[77] ^[88] Legal challenges persisted, culminating in an August 2025 U.S. District Court ruling in North Dakota vacating the fee cap components of Regulation II for impermissibly incorporating non-incremental costs such as fixed authorization expenses and certain network fees, exceeding statutory limits; the vacatur was stayed pending appeal to avoid market disruption.^[80] ^[89] A conflicting September 2025 decision from a Kentucky District Court upheld Regulation II as lawful and reasonable.^[90]

Ongoing antitrust settlements (2005-2024)

In 2005, a class action lawsuit was filed by merchants against Visa, Mastercard, and issuing banks, alleging a conspiracy to fix interchange fees at supracompetitive levels in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, stemming from coordinated pricing practices that began in the late 1990s and persisted into the 2000s.^[60] The case, consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, claimed that these networks' rules and fee structures suppressed merchant competition and innovation, such as surcharging or steering customers to lower-cost payment options.^[54] After years of litigation, including a rejected $7.2 billion preliminary settlement in 2013 due to objections over inadequate relief and collusion concerns, the parties reached a revised damages agreement in 2019 for $5.5 billion to compensate merchants for overcharges on transactions from January 1, 2004, to January 25, 2019.^[54] This settlement, approved by Judge Margo K. Brodie on December 13, 2019, provided pro rata distributions based on merchant sales volume but excluded injunctive relief claims, leaving allegations of ongoing anticompetitive conduct unresolved for future proceedings.^[60] Claim deadlines for this payout were extended into 2024, with final distributions ongoing as of August 2024.^[91] The injunctive relief phase continued, focusing on structural reforms to fee-setting mechanisms. In March 2024, Visa and Mastercard proposed a $30 billion settlement, including caps on credit card interchange fees at current average levels until 2030, reductions of 4 basis points on most U.S. credit transactions starting in 2025, and rule changes to allow greater merchant flexibility in payment routing—aimed at resolving claims dating back to 2005 without admitting liability.^[84] ^[92] However, on June 25, 2024, U.S. District Judge Denise Cote rejected the deal, citing inadequate notice to class members and insufficient evidence that the caps would meaningfully lower fees or deter future coordination, particularly given the networks' market power exceeding 80% of U.S. card volume.^[83] ^[93] As of late 2024, trials for remaining claims by national retailers, including allegations of continued horizontal agreements on fee benchmarks, were postponed from 2025 to 2026, prolonging the litigation amid separate DOJ scrutiny of Visa's debit practices and merchant challenges to post-Durbin fee hikes.^[61] ^[94] These developments highlight persistent tensions over whether network coordination, rather than unilateral pricing, drives fee levels, with empirical analyses in court filings questioning the pro-competitive justifications offered by defendants.^[95]

European Union

The European Union enacted the Interchange Fee Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2015/751) on 29 April 2015 to limit excessive interchange fees in card payments, foster competition, and establish a unified market for card-based transactions across member states.^[96] The regulation targets fees paid by acquirers to issuers in four-party schemes (such as Visa and Mastercard) and applies caps based on the merchant indifference test, which estimates the maximum fee level allowing merchants to remain neutral between card and cash payments.^[96] It entered into force on 18 May 2015, with most provisions applying from 9 December 2015, including the fee caps, while certain network rules followed in June 2016.^[97] Commercial card transactions were initially exempt from caps, though subject to transparency requirements, reflecting the regulation's focus on consumer debit and credit cards where fees were deemed highest relative to costs.^[98]

Interchange Fee Regulation (2015) and caps

Under the regulation, interchange fees for consumer debit card transactions are capped at 0.2% of the transaction value or €0.05 per transaction (whichever is lower), while consumer credit card fees are limited to 0.3% of the value.^[98] ^[99] These limits apply to transactions within the European Economic Area (EEA), excluding three-party schemes like American Express unless they operate as four-party networks.^[100] The caps aimed to reduce merchants' costs, which prior to regulation averaged 0.9-2% for credit cards in some countries, by preventing issuers from capturing rents unrelated to processing costs.^[96] Enforcement is handled by national authorities, with the European Commission monitoring compliance and addressing exemptions for small issuers (under 500,000 transactions annually).^[101] No major amendments altered the core caps by 2025, though the regulation requires periodic review of exemptions and impacts.^[96]

Post-implementation reviews (up to 2025)

The European Commission conducted a study in 2020 on the regulation's application, finding that caps had lowered average interchange fees significantly (from around 0.5-0.6% pre-2015 to below cap levels) and increased card acceptance, though some merchants reported shifts to higher scheme or acquirer fees.^[101] ^[71] This review informed potential revisions but led to no immediate legislative changes, with the Commission emphasizing ongoing monitoring of pass-through to merchants and consumer effects.^[71] By 2025, the European Court of Auditors' special report on digital payments evaluated the IFR as part of broader PSD2 implementation, noting it prevented anti-competitive fee structures but highlighted persistent issues in cross-border payments and non-capped segments like commercial cards.^[102] Industry assessments on the regulation's 10-year anniversary in June 2025 indicated cumulative increases in inter-scheme fees (up to 33.9% from 2018-2022, averaging 7.6% annually beyond inflation), prompting calls from merchant groups for extended caps or transparency on wholesale pricing.^[103] ^[104] No new caps were imposed by October 2025, but the reviews underscored the need for adaptation to rising digital payment volumes and evolving network costs.^[102]

Interchange Fee Regulation (2015) and caps

Regulation (EU) 2015/751, known as the Interchange Fee Regulation (IFR), was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council on 29 April 2015 to establish uniform caps on interchange fees for card-based payment transactions within the European Economic Area (EEA), aiming to reduce merchant costs and foster a more competitive single market for payments.^[96] The regulation entered into force on 8 June 2015, but the fee caps took effect on 9 December 2015, with additional business rules applying from 9 June 2016.^[96] Under the IFR, interchange fees for consumer debit card transactions are capped at 0.2% of the transaction value, or alternatively at a flat rate of €0.05 for domestic debit transactions within a member state.^[96] For consumer credit card transactions, the cap is set at 0.3% of the transaction value.^[96] These limits apply to transactions initiated with cards issued by EEA-based issuers and acquired by EEA-based acquirers, excluding one-legged transactions where either party is outside the EEA.^[96] The caps target fees previously averaging 0.5-1% for debit and up to 1.5-2% for credit cards from international schemes, which the European Commission argued imposed disproportionate costs on merchants without corresponding efficiency gains or full pass-through benefits to consumers.^[105] Exemptions include commercial cards, used primarily for business expenses, due to their lower transaction volumes, higher fraud risks, and distinct economic role, allowing uncapped fees often several times higher than consumer caps.^[105] Other exclusions cover cash withdrawals, certain three-party schemes like American Express for consumer cards, and limited-network or limited-use payment instruments.^[96] Beyond caps, the IFR introduced business rules to enhance competition, such as prohibiting payment card schemes from enforcing territorial protection clauses that restrict cross-border use, mandating functional separation between scheme management and processing services, permitting co-badging of cards with multiple schemes, and eliminating the "honour all cards" rule for non-equivalent card categories to allow merchants greater steering flexibility.^[96] These measures sought to align fee levels with the "merchant indifference test," an economic benchmark positing that fees should not exceed costs incurred by card-issuing banks in providing services, thereby promoting efficiency without subsidizing card rewards or usage from merchant-funded revenues.^[96]

Post-implementation reviews (up to 2025)

The European Commission's 2020 report on the application of Regulation (EU) 2015/751 evaluated the regulation's initial impacts, finding that interchange fees had declined substantially, generating annual savings of approximately €2.68 billion for acquirers in 2017, with credit card fees experiencing the most pronounced reductions.^[105] Merchants benefited from €1.2 billion in yearly cost reductions, facilitated by greater transparency through unblended fee structures adopted by 60% of merchants, particularly benefiting larger retailers.^[105] Issuers faced revenue losses of €2.95 billion annually but offset these through higher transaction volumes, without evidence of widespread increases in consumer card fees.^[105] Consumer benefits were estimated at €864 million to €1.93 billion per year, based on a 66-72% pass-through of merchant savings to lower prices or improved services, though full pass-through varied by sector and required ongoing monitoring.^[105] The report noted improved market integration, with cross-border card transactions rising from 6.7% to 8.7% of total volume between 2014 and 2017, alongside stabilization of domestic schemes, though acquiring market concentration increased, warranting antitrust vigilance.^[105] Overall, the regulation met core objectives of fee reduction and barrier removal, but the Commission recommended enhanced data reporting for future assessments.^[105] A supporting study commissioned by the Commission, covering 2015-2017, corroborated these figures, quantifying a €2.7 billion annual drop in interchange fees, with merchant savings of €1.2 billion and consumer benefits around €900 million after pass-through, while noting erosion from higher acquirer margins and scheme fees without substitution into unregulated areas during the period.^[106] By 2025, merchant associations reported unintended shifts, including a 33.9% rise in international card scheme fees from 2018 to 2022 (averaging 7.6% annually beyond inflation) and growth in uncapped commercial card volumes, which diluted some consumer debit/credit savings.^[107] The European Court of Auditors' January 2025 special report on EU digital payments attributed part of the post-2015 surge in card acceptance and transaction growth to the interchange caps, though it highlighted incomplete evaluations of long-term price intervention effects and called for better oversight of exemptions like commercial cards.^[102] A July 2024 Commission-commissioned study on card market developments affirmed the caps' role in curbing consumer card fees but identified rising cross-border and online transaction costs outside the caps, with no major regulatory adjustments enacted by late 2025.^[108] Visa and Mastercard voluntarily extended consumer card caps through November 2029 in July 2024, maintaining 0.2% for debit and 0.3% for credit on offline transactions amid ongoing scrutiny of online fees.^[109]

Australia and New Zealand

Reserve Bank reforms and caps (2003-2025)

The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) initiated comprehensive reforms to the card payments system in the early 2000s to address high interchange fees, which were seen as inflating merchant costs and potentially harming competition. In January 2003, the RBA implemented the first measures, including a standard on merchant pricing that prohibited "no surcharge" rules by card schemes, allowing merchants to pass on costs via surcharges.^[110] Concurrently, the RBA capped domestic credit card interchange fees, reducing average levels by approximately half to around 0.95% of transaction value by October 2003, while permitting surcharging and focusing on cost-based benchmarks rather than mandating issuer fees.^[111]^[112] For debit cards, reforms followed in November 2006, introducing caps and weighted-average benchmarks to align fees closer to processing costs and promote least-cost routing, addressing scheme rules that favored higher-fee premium debit products.^[113]^[114] In New Zealand, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) monitored payment systems but deferred direct interchange fee regulation to the Commerce Commission under the Retail Payment System Act 2022, which empowered oversight of Mastercard and Visa networks to enhance efficiency.^[115] Historically, New Zealand relied on low-cost EFTPOS systems with minimal or zero interchange fees, contrasting with scheme debit and credit cards that incurred higher charges up to 0.80% or more.^[116] Unlike Australia's proactive caps, New Zealand's approach emphasized voluntary industry adjustments until statutory intervention, with the RBNZ influencing through financial stability reports highlighting fee distortions.^[116]

Recent adjustments and impacts

As of 2025, the RBA's ongoing review proposes further tightening domestic credit interchange caps to 0.3% from prior levels around 0.5-0.8%, alongside new caps on foreign-issued card fees and prepaid benchmarks, aiming to reflect merchant acquisition costs while preserving network incentives.^[117]^[118] In New Zealand, the Commerce Commission finalized interchange fee standards in July 2025, capping in-person credit transactions at 0.30% (a reduction from 0.80%) effective December 1, 2025, with foreign card caps from May 2026, projected to save merchants $100 million annually by aligning fees with debit benchmarks plus a modest premium.^[119]^[120]^[121] These adjustments build on Australia's post-2003 experience, where caps reduced average fees by over 40% initially, boosted surcharging adoption (reaching 20-30% of merchants by mid-2000s), and increased debit usage, though critics note persistent scheme dominance and limited pass-through to consumer prices due to issuer rewards programs.^[117]^[122] In New Zealand, the 2025 caps are expected to enhance merchant competition and efficiency without immediate surcharge bans (proposed separately for 2026), potentially mirroring Australia's shift toward cost-based pricing amid rising transaction volumes.^[123] Empirical data from Australia's reforms indicate sustained fee reductions but mixed welfare effects, with merchant costs falling yet consumer benefits offset by reward dilution and network investments.^[124]^[111]

Reserve Bank reforms and caps (2003-2025)

In 2003, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) initiated reforms to address inefficiencies in the card payments system, including high interchange fees that distorted competition between credit and debit networks. The first measure, effective January 2003, was the Standard on Merchant Pricing, which prohibited "no surcharge" rules by card schemes and issuers, enabling merchants to surcharge based on payment method costs.^[110] Concurrently, the RBA issued an Interchange Fee Standard establishing cost-based benchmarks to reduce fees, with lower rates taking effect on November 1, 2003, roughly halving average credit card interchange from prior levels and prompting acquirers to pass savings to merchants via reduced service fees.^[124]^[110] Subsequent reforms targeted debit cards. In July 2006, scheme debit interchange (Visa and Mastercard) fell from approximately 44 cents to 12 cents per transaction, while eftpos fees were reduced to 4-5 cents, promoting least-cost routing.^[110] By January 2010, eftpos interchange was capped at 12 cents to align with scheme debit, and in July 2013, eftpos adopted multilateral pricing with a maximum of 5 cents per transaction.^[110] For credit cards, a weighted-average cap of 0.50% of transaction value—with an individual rate ceiling of 0.80%—was imposed on Mastercard and Visa from November 2006, formalized in Standard No. 1 of 2016.^[125] Debit and prepaid caps, set in Standard No. 2 of 2016, limit weighted averages to 8 cents per transaction (or 0.20% for percentage-based fees), with individual ceilings at 10 cents or 0.20%.^[125] These benchmarks have remained in place through 2025, though the RBA's ongoing reviews highlight persistent issues, such as credit card fees exceeding efficient levels due to scheme pricing practices. In July 2025, the RBA proposed further reductions in domestic interchange caps, alongside a ban on surcharging effective July 2026, to lower merchant costs by an estimated $2.4 billion annually while preserving incentives for efficient payment use.^[117]^[126] In New Zealand, the Reserve Bank (RBNZ) provides oversight of the payments system but delegates detailed regulation to the Commerce Commission under the Retail Payment System Act 2022, with RBNZ consultation on network designations. Interchange fees on Visa and Mastercard networks were first capped via an Initial Pricing Standard effective November 13, 2022, targeting credit and debit transactions to promote efficiency.^[115] On July 17, 2025, the Commission finalized reductions saving approximately $100 million annually, effective December 1, 2025, including credit card in-person fees lowered to 0.30% (a 0.10% premium over debit rates, down from 0.80%) to align with international benchmarks and reduce merchant costs without undermining issuer incentives.^[119] Domestic EFTPOS transactions, dominant in low-value payments, incur no interchange fees, supporting cost-based competition.^[116] These measures complement broader efforts, including proposed surcharging bans by May 2026, amid RBNZ monitoring of system stability.^[123]

Recent adjustments and impacts

In July 2025, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) proposed lowering caps on domestic interchange fees for credit and debit card transactions from the existing weighted-average benchmarks of 0.50% for debit and 0.80% for credit, alongside introducing new caps on fees for foreign-issued cards, as part of its ongoing review of retail payments regulation.^[117] These adjustments aim to address persistent high merchant costs, with the RBA estimating annual savings of approximately A$1.2 billion for businesses, disproportionately benefiting small merchants who pay rates closer to current caps.^[127] Implementation is targeted for July 1, 2026, pending consultation feedback, though critics including card networks argue that further reductions could hinder issuer revenues and innovation, potentially raising barriers for smaller fintech entrants.^[128] In New Zealand, the Commerce Commission finalized interchange fee regulations on July 17, 2025, under the Retail Payment System Act 2022, imposing new caps on Mastercard and Visa networks effective December 1, 2025, for domestic cards and May 1, 2026, for foreign-issued cards.^[119] Key reductions include lowering in-person credit card fees from 0.80% to 0.30% (a 0.10% premium over debit rates) and online fees from 1.20% to 0.50%, building on prior reforms and expected to save merchants an additional NZ$100 million annually in interchange costs.^[115] These changes promote efficiency in the retail payment system by curbing scheme-set fees that exceed cost-based benchmarks observed in comparable jurisdictions like Australia, though the Commission notes potential pass-through effects to consumers via adjusted issuer rewards or account fees remain uncertain.^[119] Early impacts in both countries align with historical patterns from 2003-2017 reforms, where fee caps reduced merchant service fees without significantly eroding card usage or security investments, though New Zealand's 2025 measures are projected to further compress issuer margins amid rising digital payment volumes.^[117] In Australia, the proposals coincide with broader surcharging bans, potentially amplifying merchant relief but requiring enhanced fee transparency to prevent acquirer opportunism.^[127] New Zealand's implementation has prompted network adjustments to comply, with no immediate evidence of widespread transaction shifts to uncapped alternatives like international cards pre-foreign cap activation.^[129]

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U.S. Merchants Enter into Landmark Settlement with Visa ...
Mar 27, 2024 · The settlement stems from a 2005 lawsuit which alleged that merchants paid excessive fees to accept Visa and Mastercard credit cards, and that ...<|separator|>
[82]
Court Approves $7.25 Billion Settlement in MasterCard/Visa Class ...
On December 13, 2013, the court granted final approval of a class action settlement valued at $7.25 billion, the largest antitrust settlement in US history.
[83]
Visa, Mastercard $30 billion swipe fee settlement rejected by US judge
Jun 25, 2024 · A U.S. judge on Tuesday rejected a $30 billion antitrust settlement in which Visa and Mastercard agreed to limit fees they charge merchants ...
[84]
Visa, MasterCard settle antitrust suit over swipe fees with merchants
Mar 27, 2024 · According to the settlement announced Tuesday, Visa and Mastercard will cap the credit interchange fees until 2030, and the companies must ...
[85]
Regulation of Debit Interchange Fees - Congress.gov
May 16, 2017 · Merchants may be able to pass more of the interchange fee costs to customers on products with fewer substitutes, which may face less ...
[86]
[PDF] Proposed Revisions to Regulation II's Interchange Fee Cap
Oct 25, 2023 · The Board implemented these and other provisions of the Durbin Amendment in 2011 and 2012 when the Board adopted Regulation II (Debit Card ...
[87]
[PDF] Did the Durbin Amendment Reduce Merchant Costs? Evidence from ...
New survey results found that the Durbin regulation has had limited and unequal impact on reducing merchants' costs of accepting debit cards, and it has ...
[88]
Impact of Proposed Revision to Debit Card Interchange Fee Cap on ...
Nov 14, 2023 · The Federal Reserve's proposed revision to debit card interchange fee caps in the U.S. will have a negative 28% (c.$4 billion) impact on ...Missing: details | Show results with:details
[89]
Federal Court Vacates Federal Reserve's Interchange Fee Rule
Aug 14, 2025 · On August 6, the U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota vacated the Federal Reserve's 2011 Regulation II interchange fee cap rule,
[90]
District court rules Reg II is lawful and reasonable
Sep 18, 2025 · A Kentucky U.S. District Court ruled this week the Federal Reserve's debit interchange Regulation II is lawful and reasonable.
[91]
Deadline Extended for Merchants to Claim Payouts from Visa ...
May 16, 2024 · Merchants can claim their share of a $5.5 billion settlement with Visa and Mastercard until August 30, 2024. Learn how to file a claim and ...
[92]
Proposed Visa/Mastercard Interchange Fee Settlement
Jun 11, 2024 · The 2024 Settlement also reduces average interchange on most domestic (ie,US card and merchant) credit card transactions by 4-7 basis points.<|control11|><|separator|>
[93]
Federal judge rejects $30 billion settlement between Visa ... - CNN
Jun 25, 2024 · A federal judge overseeing a $30 billion preliminary swipe-fees settlement between Mastercard, Visa and retailers formally rejected the deal Tuesday.<|separator|>
[94]
Visa faces fresh antitrust challenge over US debit interchange fees
Aug 21, 2025 · The October 2024 lawsuit filed by merchants paints Visa as a monopolist, controlling over 60% of US debit transactions and extracting more than ...
[95]
Merchant Plaintiffs Reach Settlement in Payment Card Interchange ...
Apr 17, 2024 · The proposed settlement would reduce current interchange fee rates paid by merchants, impose a five-year interchange fee rate cap, and require changes to ...
[96]
L_2015123EN.01000101.xml - EUR-Lex - European Union
The caps in this Regulation are based on the so-called 'Merchant Indifference Test' developed in economic literature, which identifies the fee level a merchant ...
[97]
[PDF] Position Paper on the EU Interchange Fee Regulation (Regulation ...
Jun 24, 2020 · 1.1. Capping interchange fees on consumer debit and credit cards has generally led to price reductions for merchants when they accept card ...<|separator|>
[98]
Antitrust: Regulation on Interchange Fees - European Union
Jun 8, 2016 · Therefore, the Regulation caps interchange fees for consumer debit cards to 0.2 % and consumer credit cards to 0.3 % of the value of the ...
[99]
Assessing the impact of the MIF Regulation interchange fee caps
As of 9 December 2015, interchange fees in the EU were capped at 0.3% for credit cards and the lesser amount of 0.2% or €0.05 per transaction for debit cards.
[100]
The IFR - Payment Systems Regulator
Where the caps apply, they currently limit interchange fees to 0.2% of the value of a transaction for consumer debit cards (including prepaid cards), and 0.3% ...
[101]
European Commission Publishes Study on the Application of the ...
Mar 18, 2020 · the interchange fees on consumer cards have substantially decreased by 35% (over EUR 2bn). This has led to lower costs for retailers and is in ...
[102]
Special report 01/2025: Digital payments in the EU
Jan 9, 2025 · Interchange Fee Regulation (IFR): The regulation, adopted in 2015, aims to create a single market for card payments and to prevent competition ...
[103]
Ten years after the Interchange Fee Regulation, we need new action ...
Jun 12, 2025 · Data shows a cumulative increase in ICS' fees of 33.9% between 2018 and 2022 (7.6% per year average), on top of inflation, without a ...
[104]
The Interchange Fee Regulation turns 10 - Ecommerce Europe
Jun 10, 2025 · The IFR was introduced in 2015, to harmonise and reduce interchange fees across the EU by capping them at 0.2% for debit cards and 0.3% for consumer cards.Missing: post- reviews
[105]
[PDF] Report on the application of Regulation (EU) 2015/751 on ...
Jun 29, 2020 · The IFR introduced caps for hitherto high interchange fees for consumer debit and credit cards, therefore setting harmonized ceilings for ...
[106]
[PDF] Interchange Fee Regulation on the application of the
Commercial cards are exempted from the interchange fee cap and carry interchange fees that are several times larger than the capped fees for debit and ...
[107]
[PDF] Brussels, 12 June 2025 Ten years after the Interchange Fee ...
Jun 12, 2025 · Data shows a cumulative increase in ICS' fees of 33.9% between 2018 and 2022 (7.6% per year average), on top of inflation,.
[108]
(PDF) Study on new developments in card-based payment markets ...
Jul 6, 2024 · This study provides an assessment of new developments in card-based payment markets, with a focus on the Interchange Fee Regulation's (IFR) impact on the ...
[109]
Visa and Mastercard extend EU interchange fee cap past 2024
Jul 8, 2024 · Visa and Mastercard will retain the cap until November 2029. Fees for offline transactions using a consumer card will stay at 0.2% for debit cards and 0.3% for ...Missing: evaluation | Show results with:evaluation
[110]
The Bank's Card System Reforms | Review of Card Payments ...
The first reform measure to take effect, the Standard on merchant pricing, came into force in January 2003. It removed the restrictions imposed by the ...
[111]
[PDF] The Economic Effects of Australia's Regulation of Interchange Fee ...
Sep 15, 2005 · Intervention: Reduced interchange fee by half for associations and permitted surcharging; did not regulate prices of semi-open proprietary ...
[112]
[PDF] Testing Interchange Fee Models Using The Australian Experience
The new interchange fees went into effect October 31, 2003. For a more detailed chronology, see Reserve Bank of Australia, Payments System Board Annual Report ...
[113]
[PDF] Review of the Impact of Australian Payments Reforms
Mar 3, 2011 · Debit card interchange fee reforms were implemented in November 2006. The RBA was principally concerned with two issues. Firstly that scheme ...
[114]
[PDF] Payment Card Regulation in Australia
• Following joint work with competition regulator, the RBA set caps on credit card interchange fees in 2003 and on debit cards in 2006. • Focus was to bring ...
[115]
Retail payment system | Commerce Commission
Interchange fee regulation. 'Interchange fees' are a significant component of the fees businesses pay to accept payments on the Mastercard and Visa networks.
[116]
Bank fees and financial system efficiency
May 4, 2022 · EFTPOS transactions are free in New Zealand, while payments using scheme cards involve interchange fees, which are charged per transaction and ...
[117]
Interchange Fees | Merchant Card Payment Costs and Surcharging
The debit interchange cap of 6 cents is above the average costs of 5 cents for issuers to issue cards and process transactions. The issuer costs measured in the ...Missing: welfare | Show results with:welfare
[118]
Changes Ahead for Australia's Payments Sector: The RBA Proposes ...
Aug 7, 2025 · The RBA has notably proposed to reduce the domestic credit interchange cap to 0.3% of transaction value and prepaid interchange weighted-average ...Missing: impacts | Show results with:impacts
[119]
[PDF] Retail payment system - Interchange Fee Regulation for Mastercard ...
Jul 17, 2025 · regulation.141. Review of pass-through following implementation. 4.3. We intend to conduct a review of pass-through post implementation and ...<|separator|>
[120]
Commerce Commission announces final decision on interchange ...
Jul 18, 2025 · The Commerce Commission will introduce a new pricing standard reducing interchange fees by $100m, with new caps effective Dec 1, 2025 (domestic ...
[121]
New Zealand Payment System update: Interchange fee regulation ...
Jul 21, 2025 · In-person: Reduced from 0.80% to 0.30%. This reflects a 0.10% premium over the debit rate, aligning with international benchmarks and accounting ...
[122]
The Regulation of Interchange Fees: Australian Fine-Tuning Gone ...
We have available at least one real world example, namely the interchange fee restrictions that the Reserve Bank of Australia (“RBA”) imposed on the credit card ...Missing: caps | Show results with:caps
[123]
[PDF] Ban on merchant surcharges for accepting payments - MBIE
Sep 17, 2025 · Our analysis is informed by submissions to recent Commission consultations on related issues including interchange fee regulation and external ...
[124]
[PDF] Payments System Reform: The Australian Experience
Following discussions with the RBA, the banks took a pro- posal to the competition authority to abolish interchange fees.
[125]
Backgrounder on Interchange and Scheme Fees | Explainer | RBA
cap credit card interchange fees to a weighted average of 0.50 per cent of transaction value, with a ceiling on individual interchange rates of 0.80 per cent.Missing: history | Show results with:history
[126]
Payments System Board Update: August 2025 Meeting
Aug 28, 2025 · At its meeting today, the Payments System Board discussed a number of issues, including the regulatory response to the CHESS batch failure ...
[127]
Review of Merchant Card Payment Costs and Surcharging
Jul 15, 2025 · The proposed reductions to interchange caps would benefit small businesses the most, as they tend to pay fees closer to the existing caps.Missing: adjustments | Show results with:adjustments
[128]
[PDF] Response to the Review of Merchant Card Payment Costs and ...
Sep 9, 2025 · The Commerce Commission in New Zealand published its decision in July 2025 to lower credit interchange fees, with a reduction for in-person ...
[129]
Notification of the Mastercard and Visa Interchange Fee Network ...
Jul 17, 2025 · The network standard comes into effect on 1 December 2025, however the interchange fee caps applying to foreign-issued card transactions take effect on 1 May ...