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Islamic Consultative Assembly

The Islamic Consultative Assembly (Persian: Majles-e Shurā-ye Eslāmi), also known as the Majlis, is the unicameral national legislature of the Islamic Republic of Iran.^[1] It comprises 290 representatives elected by direct popular vote from 207 multi-member electoral districts for four-year terms.^[1]^[2] Under Articles 62–90 of the Iranian Constitution, the Assembly exercises legislative authority, including the power to enact laws, approve the national budget, summon government officials for questioning, and impeach ministers, though all legislation must conform to Islamic jurisprudence and constitutional principles as vetted by the Guardian Council.^[3]^[4] While ostensibly representing popular sovereignty in Iran's hybrid theocratic-republican system, the Assembly's effectiveness is constrained by the unelected Guardian Council, which disqualifies candidates deemed insufficiently loyal to the regime's Islamist ideology, often resulting in dominance by conservative factions aligned with the Supreme Leader.^[5] Recent elections, such as those in 2024, have seen historically low voter turnout—around 41%—reflecting widespread disillusionment amid economic hardships and restricted political pluralism.^[6] The body traces its origins to the 1906 Persian Constitution establishing Iran's first Majlis, but the post-1979 revolutionary framework subordinated it to clerical oversight, transforming it into a consultative rather than sovereign parliament.^[7] Notable for its role in vetting executive appointments and occasionally challenging government policies—such as through budget scrutiny or ministerial impeachments—the Assembly has nonetheless ratified key hardline measures, including nuclear deal scrutiny and sanctions responses, underscoring its alignment with the Islamic Republic's foreign policy priorities over domestic reform demands.^[8] Controversies include allegations of corruption, factional infighting, and complicity in suppressing dissent, as evidenced by parliamentary support for security forces during nationwide protests.^[4]

History

Origins in the Persian Constitutional Revolution

The Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911 arose from widespread discontent with the Qajar dynasty's autocratic rule, exacerbated by economic hardships, arbitrary taxation, and concessions granted to foreign powers for loans and trade privileges. Protests began in December 1905 when merchants and guild members sought refuge in the British legation and royal mosque in Tehran, demanding a house of justice to address grievances against corrupt officials. This bast movement expanded, involving intellectuals, bazaar traders, and segments of the Shia clergy who viewed the shah's absolutism as incompatible with Islamic principles of consultation and justice. By mid-1906, mass demonstrations forced Mozaffar ad-Din Shah to concede, issuing a royal decree on August 5, 1906, promising an elective assembly to represent the people and limit monarchical power.^[9] Elections for the first Majlis, or National Consultative Assembly, proceeded under a September 9, 1906, electoral law that apportioned seats by class and region, favoring urban elites and landowners while excluding many rural and nomadic groups. The assembly convened on October 7, 1906, in Tehran, marking Iran's initial experiment with representative governance amid ongoing revolutionary fervor. Its primary task became drafting a constitution to codify separation of powers, elective representation, and royal accountability, drawing partial inspiration from Belgian and French models but rooted in demands for fiscal transparency and reduced foreign influence. The Fundamental Laws were ratified by the Majlis and signed by the ailing shah on December 30, 1906, just before his death, establishing the Majlis as the lower house with authority over budgets and legislation, though upper house provisions for clerics remained unrealized initially.^[10]^[11] Early sessions emphasized oversight of state finances, scrutinizing the shah's debts and foreign concessions like the 1872 Reuter loan and tobacco monopoly, which had drained national resources without commensurate benefits. The Majlis sought to nationalize revenues from customs and oil prospects, reflecting causal tensions between modernization imperatives and traditional authority structures vulnerable to external predation. Implementation proved inconsistent, as the assembly's powers clashed with entrenched court interests, foreshadowing conflicts under successor Mohammad Ali Shah, yet the 1906 Majlis laid foundational precedents for legislative checks on executive absolutism.^[9]^[11]

Operations Under the Pahlavi Dynasty

Under Reza Shah Pahlavi, who ascended as Shah on December 12, 1925, following a Majlis declaration deposing the Qajar dynasty, the assembly functioned largely as a mechanism to endorse the monarch's authoritarian modernization agenda rather than as an independent legislative body.^[12] The Majlis approved key reforms, including the 1931 legislation redefining Shari'a courts' jurisdiction to prioritize secular Western-inspired codes, facilitating Reza Shah's secularization drives such as compulsory unveiling of women in 1936 and the expansion of a centralized military.^[13] Infrastructure projects, like the Trans-Iranian Railway completed in 1938, were similarly rubber-stamped, with the assembly's role confined to formal ratification amid manipulated elections and the 1928 ban on political parties, which eliminated opposition and ensured loyalist dominance.^[14] This subordination reflected Reza Shah's consolidation of power, where the Majlis served regime stability over genuine representation, as bureaucratic extensions of the Pahlavi court operated beyond parliamentary oversight.^[15] Following Reza Shah's forced abdication on September 16, 1941, amid Allied occupation during World War II, the Majlis briefly revived with greater pluralism under his son, Mohammad Reza Shah, who assumed the throne on September 28, 1941; however, post-1953 coup dynamics reimposed monarchical control, with the assembly approving initiatives like the 1963 White Revolution land reforms and women's suffrage while sidelined from substantive debate.^[16] Elections grew increasingly engineered, culminating in the March 2, 1975, establishment of the Rastakhiz Party as Iran's sole legal entity, absorbing all prior factions and requiring compulsory membership for citizens, which formalized single-party rule and Majlis composition under regime-vetted candidates.^[17] This eroded public legitimacy, as evidenced by opposition boycotts and perceptions of the assembly as a facade, prioritizing elite patronage over electoral integrity.^[18] The Majlis's diminished independence stemmed causally from intertwined factors of surging oil revenues and the SAVAK security apparatus, established in 1957 to suppress dissent. Oil income, which quadrupled after the 1973 OPEC embargo to over $20 billion annually by 1977, enabled direct executive funding of lavish projects and military spending—bypassing legislative budget scrutiny and reducing incentives for parliamentary negotiation or taxation reforms.^[19] Concurrently, SAVAK's pervasive surveillance and arrests of over 3,000 political opponents yearly by the mid-1970s ensured Majlis deputies' compliance, as infiltration and coercion deterred independent voices, subordinating the body to regime preservation amid widening socioeconomic disparities from uneven oil distribution.^[20] This dynamic prioritized monarchical centralization, rendering the assembly a nominal institution despite its constitutional facade.^[21]

Reestablishment Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution

Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the National Consultative Assembly (Majlis) established under the Pahlavi monarchy was dissolved as part of the transitional government's restructuring toward an Islamic republic.^[22] Elections for the newly designated Islamic Consultative Assembly were held on March 14 and May 9, 1980, under the oversight of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the revolution's leader and de facto supreme authority, with voter turnout reaching 52.14% among 20.8 million eligible voters.^[23]^[24] The assembly initially comprised 270 members, representing a unicameral legislature tasked with lawmaking subject to Islamic jurisprudence.^[22] The 1979 Constitution, approved by referendum on December 2-3, 1979, and later amended in 1989, enshrined the Islamic Consultative Assembly as the primary legislative body, empowered to enact laws on all matters within the framework of Islamic principles and constitutional limits (Article 62).^[25] However, this republican structure was subordinated to the doctrine of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the Islamic jurist), with the assembly's output requiring approval from the Guardian Council—half clerical appointees—to ensure conformity with Sharia and the constitution (Articles 91-99).^[25] The first post-revolution session convened in late May 1980, shortly before the Iran-Iraq War erupted on September 22, 1980, prompting the assembly to prioritize emergency war powers, including mobilization decrees and budget reallocations for defense.^[23] This reconfiguration contrasted the constitution's emphasis on elected representation with entrenched theocratic mechanisms, as the Guardian Council's veto authority over legislation—intended to safeguard Islamic orthodoxy—quickly manifested in the 1980s through rejections of bills deemed insufficiently aligned with religious rulings, foreshadowing ongoing tensions between popular sovereignty and clerical dominance.^[25] By the early 1980s, such clerical oversight bodies, including preliminary reviews by bodies like the Revolutionary Council, had already nullified several Majlis initiatives, establishing a pattern where legislative proposals required multiple revisions to pass muster.^[22] The assembly's seat count was later expanded to 290 members effective from the 2000 elections, reflecting adjustments to population and representation needs.

Major Legislative Milestones and Crises Since 1979

Following the 1979 Revolution, the Islamic Consultative Assembly prioritized legislation consolidating revolutionary economic policies, including the nationalization of banks and insurance companies in June 1979, which merged 36 private banks into nine state-controlled entities to align the financial sector with Islamic principles and state oversight.^[26] In 1981 and 1984, the Assembly passed bills attempting to nationalize foreign trade, though both were vetoed by the Guardian Council, reflecting tensions between economic centralization efforts and clerical oversight amid wartime constraints during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).^[27] These measures, enacted under severe external pressures including U.S. sanctions and Iraqi invasions, emphasized resource mobilization for defense, with the Assembly approving annual budgets that funneled oil revenues toward military expenditures, sustaining Iran's war effort but exacerbating inflation and shortages without fostering structural reforms.^[28] The 2009 Green Movement protests, triggered by disputed presidential election results on June 12, tested the Assembly's responsiveness, as mass demonstrations challenged regime legitimacy and demanded electoral transparency. While a minority of deputies voiced sympathy for protesters' grievances, the Assembly as a body aligned with hardline factions, endorsing the Supreme Leader's validation of the results and supporting security crackdowns rather than initiating oversight legislation or investigations into fraud allegations, thereby prioritizing institutional stability over accountability.^[29] This alignment, amid over 100 show trials and arrests of opposition figures, underscored the Assembly's limited autonomy in crises perceived as existential threats to the theocratic order.^[30] In the nuclear domain, the Assembly played a contentious oversight role in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), forming a special committee on June 21, 2015, to scrutinize the accord after its interim framework announcement, delaying votes for at least 80 days to incorporate domestic implementation conditions.^[31] Ultimately approving the deal in October 2015 with appended legislation mandating government adherence to parliamentary stipulations on sanctions relief and centrifuge limits, the Assembly's debates revealed factional divides, with conservatives criticizing concessions while reformers highlighted economic relief potential; however, post-U.S. withdrawal in 2018, subsequent sessions focused on retaliatory nuclear advancements rather than renegotiation, illustrating how external sanctions constrained legislative efficacy.^[32]^[33] A major security crisis struck on June 7, 2017, when Islamic State-affiliated gunmen and suicide bombers assaulted the Parliament building and Ayatollah Khomeini's mausoleum simultaneously, killing 17 inside the Assembly premises and wounding over 40, in the deadliest attack on state institutions since 1979.^[34]^[35] The breach, involving assailants scaling walls and exchanging fire with guards for hours, exposed vulnerabilities in perimeter security and intelligence coordination, prompting temporary session suspensions and heightened IRGC oversight, yet no comprehensive legislative reforms on institutional protections ensued, as responses emphasized retaliatory rhetoric over systemic audits.^[36] Cyber vulnerabilities emerged as recurring crises in the 2020s, with dissident hacktivists from the "Uprising till Overthrow" group claiming a February 13, 2024, breach of the Parliament's Khaneh Mellat News Agency, leaking internal data to undermine regime narratives.^[37] Such incidents, amid broader Iranian cyber defenses strained by state-sponsored offensive operations elsewhere, highlighted dependencies on outdated infrastructure and potential insider threats, though Assembly responses involved sporadic connectivity restrictions rather than proactive modernization laws.^[38] The 2022 Mahsa Amini protests, erupting after her death in custody on September 16, further strained the Assembly, which on September 21 advanced the "Hijab and Chastity Bill" imposing harsher penalties—including up to 10-year prison terms—for violations of mandatory veiling, effectively doubling down on enforcement amid widespread unrest against morality police practices. This legislative push, signed into partial effect by President Raisi in August 2022 but accelerated during demonstrations, reflected alignment with conservative factions enforcing cultural mandates, contributing to over 500 protest-related deaths per human rights monitors, while sidelining reform proposals for police accountability or hijab law revisions, thus reinforcing regime resilience through coercive measures over conciliatory ones.^[39]^[40]

Constitutional Framework and Powers

Legislative Authority and Lawmaking Process

The Islamic Consultative Assembly possesses the authority to enact laws on all subjects, encompassing economic policies, taxation, budgets, civil codes, and other domestic affairs, as established in Article 71 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.^[41] This legislative power is exercised through a structured process designed to facilitate deliberation among elected representatives while aligning outputs with national priorities. Bills addressing these areas originate from the executive branch, a minimum of fifteen assembly members, or one of the specialized commissions, and must pertain to matters within the assembly's purview.^[42] Upon introduction, proposed legislation is assigned to the relevant commission—such as those on economic affairs, security, or cultural matters—for detailed scrutiny, including hearings, expert consultations, and proposed amendments.^[43] The commission's report then advances the bill to the plenary session, where it undergoes general debate, further modifications via motions, and final voting. Ordinary laws require approval by a simple majority of members present, ensuring that fiscal measures like annual budget approvals (submitted by the government under Article 52) and tax impositions proceed efficiently once debated.^[41] ^[42] The assembly's role extends to ratifying international treaties and agreements under Article 77, which follow a similar procedural path but integrate executive proposals on foreign policy instruments.^[41] In practice, this framework has supported the passage of comprehensive national strategies, including the Five-Year Development Plans; for example, the Fifth Plan was reviewed and approved by the assembly in early 2011 after commission deliberations, setting targets for economic growth, infrastructure, and social welfare through 2015.^[44] Similarly, the Seventh Plan, emphasizing transformation in key sectors, received assembly endorsement in 2023 as a blueprint for the subsequent five years.^[45] When legislative disagreements arise, particularly on bills stalled in review, the Expediency Discernment Council convenes to arbitrate and propose resolutions, providing a mechanism analogous to bicameral reconciliation to expedite enactment.^[46] This process underscores the assembly's central function in translating policy debates into binding statutes, with over 200 bills typically introduced per session across commissions, though final passage depends on plenary consensus.^[43]

Oversight Functions Including Impeachment and Budget Approval

The Islamic Consultative Assembly holds authority to oversee the executive branch through mechanisms such as interpellation, where at least 10 deputies can summon ministers or the president to respond to questions regarding their duties, with responses required within 10 days as stipulated in Articles 88 and 89 of the Iranian Constitution.^[47] Failure to satisfy the assembly during interpellation can escalate to a vote of no confidence, potentially leading to dismissal. This process has been invoked variably, with success rates fluctuating based on parliamentary factional majorities; for instance, conservative-dominated assemblies have frequently used it against reformist executives, resulting in targeted accountability rather than systemic reform.^[8] Budget approval constitutes a core oversight function, as the assembly reviews, amends, and ratifies the annual national budget submitted by the president, enabling scrutiny of executive fiscal priorities and expenditures.^[48] In practice, this involves detailed examination by specialized commissions, such as the Plan and Budget Committee, which can reject or modify allocations, as seen in the assembly's approval of the 1404 solar year budget outlines on October 29, 2024, amid debates over revenue projections and subsidy distributions.^[49] Such reviews enforce fiscal discipline but often reflect intra-elite bargaining, with empirical data showing frequent amendments that prioritize short-term political gains over long-term economic efficiency.^[50] Impeachment powers extend to cabinet ministers and, under Article 89, the president for constitutional violations, requiring a one-third initiation threshold and a two-thirds majority for removal after a formal warning.^[51] Ministers face routine vulnerability, as demonstrated by the 2018 impeachment of Economy Minister Masoud Karbasian under President Hassan Rouhani, ousted amid economic pressures from sanctions, and more recently, the March 2, 2025, dismissal of Finance Minister Abdolnasser Hemmati with 182 of 273 votes due to currency devaluation and inflation exceeding 40 percent.^[52]^[53] These actions highlight the assembly's capacity for executive checks, though outcomes are causally tied to parliamentary composition—conservative majorities have impeached over a dozen ministers since 2016, often rendering oversight factionally selective and constrained by overarching institutional vetoes, yielding more performative than transformative accountability.^[54]^[8]

Constraints from the Guardian Council and Supreme Leader

All legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly is subject to mandatory review by the Guardian Council, which verifies compliance with Islamic tenets—assessed by its six cleric members—and constitutional provisions, as required under Article 94 of the Constitution.^[55] The Council has ten days to approve bills or return them to the Assembly with objections; unaddressed returns prevent enactment. This process has historically constrained legislative output, with approval rates varying across Majlis terms: 87% for the first Majlis (1980–1984), 75.9% for the sixth (2000–2004), and 81% for the ninth (2012–2015), meaning 13–24% of bills faced rejection or mandated revisions.^[56] Earlier periods saw higher rejection proportions of 27–40%, often involving bills on foreign trade, banking, property rights, press freedoms, and women's issues.^[55] The Council's composition reinforces these limits, comprising twelve members: six faqih (Islamic jurists) directly appointed by the Supreme Leader and six mojtahed (legal scholars) selected by the Assembly from candidates nominated by the head of the judiciary, who is appointed by the Leader.^[55] This structure ensures theocratic dominance, as the Leader controls a majority and influences the judiciary's nominees, embedding oversight that prioritizes guardianship over parliamentary majorities. In cases of impasse, where the Assembly insists on its version by a two-thirds majority, disputed bills are referred to the Expediency Discernment Council, established in 1988 by Ayatollah Khomeini and formalized in the 1989 constitutional revisions.^[57] Appointed entirely by the Supreme Leader—who also serves as its effective head—this body advises on policy and can approve vetoed legislation if deemed expedient for the Islamic system, overriding the Guardian Council's objections.^[57] It has mediated numerous disputes, enabling passage of otherwise blocked measures while aligning outcomes with the Leader's directives under Article 110 of the Constitution, which vests him with defining general policies of the regime.^[55] These mechanisms collectively diminish the Assembly's sovereignty, subordinating elected representatives' outputs to clerical and leadership vetting; for instance, the Guardian Council's candidate disqualifications—exceeding thousands in the 2024 parliamentary elections, where eligibility was curtailed for ideological alignment—preemptively constrain the body's composition and capacity for independent lawmaking.^[58] Empirical patterns of returns and overrides underscore a systemic prioritization of theocratic conformity over electoral mandates, rendering the Assembly's legislative authority conditional and revocable.^[56]

Electoral System

Candidate Eligibility and Guardian Council Vetting

Candidates for the Islamic Consultative Assembly must be Iranian citizens at least 30 years of age, possess basic literacy, and demonstrate belief in Islam or one of Iran's recognized religious minorities, as stipulated in the Elections Act of the Islamic Consultative Assembly.^[59] Additional formal requirements include no disqualifying criminal convictions and sufficient educational qualifications, though these are secondary to assessments of political reliability.^[59] The Guardian Council, comprising six clerics appointed by the Supreme Leader and six jurists nominated by the head of the judiciary and approved by the Assembly, conducts mandatory pre-election vetting of all candidates under Article 99 of the Constitution, which entrusts it with supervising parliamentary elections.^[60] Vetting emphasizes candidates' loyalty to the Islamic Republic's principles, including practical commitment to Islamic governance and the doctrine of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist), often drawing on intelligence dossiers to assess ideological alignment rather than solely legal criteria.^[59] This process, opaque and non-appealable in practice, functions as a ideological filter, disqualifying those deemed insufficiently committed to the regime's theocratic framework, thereby limiting electoral competition to factions within the established power structure.^[59] ^[61] Disqualification rates underscore the exclusionary nature of vetting; in the 2024 elections, approximately 37,000 candidates registered, but only 15,200—about 41%—received approval, with reformist and moderate figures disproportionately rejected, including many incumbent parliamentarians.^[61] Similar patterns occurred in prior cycles, such as 2016, where roughly 30% of applicants were approved amid widespread rejection of reformists.^[59] These outcomes have reinforced conservative dominance in the Assembly, as the vetting mechanism systematically excludes voices challenging core regime tenets, contrasting sharply with principles of open suffrage by prioritizing systemic preservation over diverse representation.^[62] ^[63]

Electoral Constituencies and Representation

The Islamic Consultative Assembly consists of 290 seats, with 285 allocated through general constituencies and 5 reserved for recognized religious minorities as stipulated in Article 64 of the Constitution.^[64] These general seats are distributed across approximately 207 constituencies, predominantly single-member districts in rural and less populous areas, while larger urban centers employ multi-member districts to reflect higher population densities.^[65] The reserved minority seats include two for Armenian Christians, one for Assyrian and Chaldean Christians combined, one for Jews, and one for Zoroastrians, elected separately from dedicated minority constituencies rather than competing in the general pool.^[66] Seat apportionment follows population-based criteria derived from national censuses conducted every decade, aiming for proportional representation while incorporating minimum guarantees for each of Iran's 31 provinces to ensure geographic coverage.^[67] For instance, Tehran Province, home to over 13 million residents, holds the largest allocation of 30 seats in a single multi-member constituency, reflecting its demographic weight.^[68] This system has undergone adjustments post-census; following the 2016 census, minor reallocations occurred to align with updated population figures, though sparsely populated provinces like Ilam or South Khorasan retain at least one seat despite representing under 1% of the national population each.^[69] Critics, including Iranian political geographers, have highlighted potential imbalances in this districting, arguing that provincial minimums result in overrepresentation for rural and remote areas relative to urban centers, exacerbating urban-rural representational disparities.^[70] Such structures can amplify conservative voices from less densely populated regions, as multi-member urban districts dilute influence through larger voter pools.^[71] No provisions exist for extraterritorial representation of the Iranian diaspora, estimated at over 4 million abroad, leaving expatriates without direct input into the Assembly.^[59] Allegations of gerrymandering, such as irregular boundary adjustments favoring incumbent-aligned factions, have surfaced in academic analyses of districting pathologies, though empirical verification remains limited by opaque redistricting processes controlled by the Interior Ministry.^[70]

Election Procedures, Turnout, and Recent Results

Elections to the Islamic Consultative Assembly occur every four years, with members serving four-year terms. The 290 seats are allocated across 217 constituencies, including 18 single-member districts and multi-member districts for larger provinces, using a parallel voting system where voters select as many candidates as seats available.^[72] To secure a seat in the first round, a candidate must obtain at least 20% of the votes cast in the constituency; constituencies where no candidate meets this threshold hold runoff elections between the top contenders.^[5] Voting is conducted via secret ballot at polling stations, typically on a Friday, with provisions for expatriates and military personnel.^[73] The most recent election for the 12th Majlis took place on March 1, 2024, with runoffs on May 10, 2024. Voter turnout reached approximately 41%, including spoiled ballots, marking the lowest participation rate since the 1979 Islamic Revolution and reflecting a broader trend of declining engagement from previous highs above 60% in earlier cycles.^[62] ^[74] Conservative and principlist factions dominated the results, securing around 233 seats in the 290-member body, bolstered by the Guardian Council's disqualification of over 7,000 potential candidates, which limited competition and contributed to perceptions of electoral futility among the public.^[75] ^[76] Following the election, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf was re-elected as Speaker on May 28, 2024, receiving 198 votes out of 287 cast.^[77] The progressive drop in turnout—from 64% in 2000 to 41% in 2024—signals deepening public disillusionment, as the pre-election vetting process by the Guardian Council ensures only regime-aligned candidates advance, rendering the ballot a choice among vetted options rather than a mechanism for substantive policy shifts or opposition representation.^[62] ^[63] This dynamic, where disqualifications exceed approvals by wide margins, underscores the elections' role in legitimizing the theocratic structure while highlighting causal links between restricted pluralism and voter apathy.^[76]

Internal Organization

Leadership Structure Including Speaker and Deputies

The speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly is elected annually by a majority vote of its members via secret ballot, typically at the inaugural session of a new term and in subsequent annual meetings. This process ensures alignment with the prevailing factional balance within the 290-seat body. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a conservative principlist with a background in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, has occupied the speakership since May 28, 2020, securing re-election on June 11, 2025, for his sixth consecutive one-year term amid the 12th Majlis.^[43]^[78] The speaker holds authority over the assembly's executive operations, including organizational, financial, and administrative matters, while presiding over plenary sessions and determining the order of business to shape the legislative agenda. This role extends to representing the Majlis in diplomatic engagements and official correspondence, amplifying the speaker's influence in foreign policy signaling. Ghalibaf's tenure has coincided with principlist majorities, enabling consistent prioritization of hardline economic and security policies.^[43]^[79] Two deputy speakers are selected through a parallel secret ballot process immediately following the speaker's election, providing continuity by assuming presiding duties during absences and supporting session management. As of June 2025, Ali Nikzad holds the first deputy position, and Hamidreza Haji-Babaei the second, both aligned with conservative factions.^[78]^[80] Leadership positions function less as neutral arbiters and more as coordinators among dominant principlist blocs, whose electoral vetting by the Guardian Council reinforces ideological conformity to Supreme Leader directives. This dynamic has sustained Ghalibaf's stability through the 12th Majlis, elected March 1, 2024, where conservative cohesion limits internal challenges.^[81]^[82]

Specialized Commissions and Political Factions

The Islamic Consultative Assembly conducts much of its legislative scrutiny through specialized commissions, standing committees dedicated to particular policy areas, with their number ranging from a minimum of 19 to a maximum of 23 under the Majlis rules of procedure.^[43] These bodies, reformed after each parliamentary election, examine government bills, hold expert consultations, and draft reports that guide full assembly deliberations, thereby exerting significant influence over legislative outcomes in domains such as security, economy, and social policy. In the 12th Majlis, commission memberships and leadership were finalized on June 30, 2024, following the May 27 opening session and credential verifications completed by May 30.^[83] Key examples include the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, chaired by Ebrahim Azizi, which reviews defense strategies and diplomatic initiatives; the Economic Commission, led by Seyyed Shams al-Din Hosseini, tasked with analyzing fiscal reforms and trade measures; and the Education, Research and Technology Commission, headed by Alireza Monadi Sefidan, focused on academic and innovation policies.^[83] These commissions foster specialized policy development but often result in silos that prioritize regime stability, as their compositions reflect the vetting process favoring alignment with Supreme Leader priorities, evidenced by consistent endorsement of hardline positions on issues like nuclear negotiations and subsidy reallocations in recent reports. Informal political factions, unbound by formal parties due to post-1987 prohibitions, shape internal debates and coalition-building despite Guardian Council exclusions of ideological outliers. Principlists, emphasizing orthodox Islamic governance and fealty to the Supreme Leader, dominate the 12th Majlis with over 200 seats, enabling control of commission agendas and blocking divergent amendments.^[84] Reformists, advocating cautious systemic adjustments, hold a minority around 40 seats, their influence curtailed by the 2024 elections' 41% first-round turnout, which empirically favored loyalist candidates amid widespread disillusionment.^[85] This hardline preponderance causally reinforces factional outputs mirroring the Leader's veto-enforced red lines, as seen in commissions' rejection of liberalization proposals in economic and cultural spheres since June 2024.^[83]

Legislative Procedures and Voting Mechanisms

The Islamic Consultative Assembly holds ordinary sessions that commence after parliamentary elections and continue annually, aligned with the Persian calendar year beginning around March 21, with legal validity established upon the attendance of two-thirds of its 290 members, equivalent to at least 194 deputies. ^[25] This quorum requirement also applies to decision-making, unless the Assembly's internal code of procedure specifies otherwise for particular actions. ^[25] Extraordinary sessions may be convened outside the ordinary schedule by the Speaker of the Assembly, the President of Iran, or a petition signed by one-quarter of the members (74 deputies), often to address urgent legislative matters such as budget approvals or responses to national crises. ^[86] Deliberations on bills occur primarily in open sessions, where proceedings are broadcast via radio and published in official reports and the government gazette to ensure public access, though closed sessions can be approved by a three-fourths majority of members present in cases deemed necessary for national security or sensitivity. ^[25] Debate protocols allow deputies to discuss proposed legislation, with government-initiated bills requiring prior endorsement by the Council of Ministers and member-initiated bills needing sponsorship from at least 15 deputies before referral to relevant commissions for review. ^[25] Amendments to bills may be proposed by individual members during floor debates, subject to the presiding officer's management to maintain order and relevance, though contentious issues have occasionally led to extended discussions delaying passage, as observed in debates over economic reforms amid sanctions pressures in the 2010s. Voting mechanisms in the Assembly rely on recorded votes among members present, typically requiring a simple majority for the approval of ordinary legislation, while higher thresholds—such as two-thirds—apply to specific decisions like constitutional amendments or overrides of Guardian Council vetoes. ^[7] Votes are conducted through roll-call or nominal methods during sessions, without widespread adoption of electronic systems for internal parliamentary balloting as of 2024, distinguishing them from electronic voting machines trialed in some public elections since 2021. ^[87] Session efficiency varies, with ordinary terms spanning approximately nine months of active deliberation, punctuated by recesses, but extraordinary convocations have compressed timelines during events like the 2022-2023 protests, where key bills faced accelerated scrutiny under heightened security.

Composition

Current Membership as of 2025

The 12th Islamic Consultative Assembly, elected on March 1, 2024 (first round) and May 10, 2024 (runoffs for 45 seats), totals 290 members serving four-year terms from constituencies apportioned by population, with Tehran province holding the largest bloc of 30 seats. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a principlist and former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander, was re-elected Speaker on May 28, 2024, with 198 votes from 287 participating members, consolidating conservative leadership amid challenges from ultraconservative rivals.^[81]^[88] Principlists (conservatives aligned with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's principles) dominate with approximately 75% of seats (around 218), bolstered by independents tacitly supporting their agenda, while reformists hold negligible representation due to widespread disqualifications by the Guardian Council, which vetted and approved only candidates deemed loyal to the Islamic Republic's theocratic framework.^[89]^[75] This vetting process, disqualifying thousands of applicants (over 12,000 registered, with reformist-leaning figures disproportionately rejected), enforces ideological conformity, resulting in a body empirically homogeneous in outlook—favoring hard-line policies on foreign relations, domestic security, and economic self-reliance—rather than reflecting broader societal pluralism.^[62] Female representation remains minimal at about 6% (roughly 17 members), consistent with patterns in prior terms where cultural and vetting barriers limit women's candidacy and election in a male-dominated political structure.^[90] Five seats are constitutionally reserved for recognized religious minorities: one Zoroastrian (Behshid Barkhordar, elected 2024), one Jew, one Assyrian/Chaldean Christian, and two Armenian Christians, elected separately from their communities without competing against Muslim candidates.^[91]^[66] These allocations, while providing token inclusion, do not mitigate the overall principlist uniformity, as minority MPs historically align with regime priorities to retain influence.

Historical Trends in Membership and Party Dominance

The first post-revolutionary Majlis, elected on March 14, 1980, featured strong clerical dominance, with clerics occupying approximately 61% of seats in the 270-member assembly, alongside majorities held by the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) and its allies, who controlled 170 to 180 seats.^[92]^[22] This composition reflected the consolidation of revolutionary forces prioritizing Islamic governance and opposition to monarchist remnants, with turnout exceeding 70% amid post-revolution mobilization.^[23] Conservative factions, including clerical networks, retained control through the 1980s and early 1990s, as seen in the 1984 and 1988 assemblies, where IRP successors and traditionalists blocked liberalizing measures amid the Iran-Iraq War and internal purges.^[92] Reformist gains emerged in the mid-1990s under President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's pragmatic conservatism, culminating in the 1996 elections where reformists secured a slim majority with 71% turnout, challenging hardline vetoes on social and economic policies.^[92] The 2000 elections marked a reformist peak, with the 2nd of Khordad Front allies winning a landslide, capturing over 170 of 290 seats in the initial round and solidifying control after runoffs, driven by public demand for President Mohammad Khatami's liberalization agenda.^[93]^[94] Guardian Council disqualifications reversed these gains; prior to the 2004 vote, thousands of reformist incumbents were barred, enabling conservatives to claim majorities and stall reforms, a pattern repeated in 2008 amid low 51% turnout and further vetting that sidelined moderates.^[95]^[92] Post-2009 Green Movement protests, which exposed reformists' limited leverage against supreme leadership authority, accelerated principalist (hardline conservative) entrenchment, with factions like the Combatant Clergy Association dominating subsequent assemblies through sustained candidate exclusions and alignment with security apparatuses.^[96] Long-term, clerical representation declined from 61% in 1980 to under 10% by the 2010s, yielding to lay principalists, while reformist seats eroded below 20% post-2016, correlating with economic sanctions, inflation spikes, and unrest cycles (e.g., 2017-2019 protests) that undermined reformist credibility as regime enablers incapable of structural change.^[92] This shift underscores causal regime mechanisms—vetting, suppression, and ideological loyalty tests—prioritizing hardliner consolidation over electoral pluralism, amid declining turnout from 70%+ in the 1990s to below 50% by the 2010s, signaling voter disillusionment with factional constraints.^[5]

Infrastructure and Operations

The Majlis Building and Facilities

The Islamic Consultative Assembly convenes in the Baharestan complex at Baharestan Square in central Tehran, which has functioned as the parliament's primary seat since 1906.^[97]^[43] Originally developed as a Qajar-era palace and garden in the late 19th century, the site was repurposed for legislative use following the Constitutional Revolution, symbolizing Iran's early experiments in representative governance.^[98] The architecture of the original Baharestan building reflects Qajar influences, incorporating traditional Persian elements such as courtyards and domes alongside European-inspired features like neoclassical facades, a result of architectural exchanges during the period.^[99] A major fire in 1994 severely damaged the structure, prompting the construction of a modern replacement within the complex, inaugurated on March 13, 2001, to house ongoing sessions.^[99]^[100] Facilities encompass a central assembly hall capable of seating the body's 290 members, adjacent office spaces for deputies, dedicated rooms for parliamentary commissions, and administrative areas supporting legislative activities.^[43] The newer extensions cover about 25,500 square meters, including structures for member offices and commission meetings.^[101] Following the 1979 Revolution, the complex saw functional adaptations to prioritize institutional continuity, preserving its role as the physical embodiment of legislative authority amid political transformations.^[98]

Notable Security Incidents and Cyber Attacks

On June 7, 2017, five ISIS-affiliated gunmen launched a coordinated assault on the Islamic Consultative Assembly building in Tehran, using automatic weapons and attempting to detonate suicide vests, resulting in the deaths of one parliament guard and several attackers during a prolonged siege that lasted several hours.^[102] The attack, claimed by ISIS via its Amaq news agency, disrupted ongoing parliamentary sessions, forcing lawmakers to shelter in place or evacuate while security forces neutralized the assailants, with Iranian officials reporting four terrorists killed and one suicide bomber detonating prematurely.^[103]^[104] This incident, the most significant breach of the Majlis premises since the 1979 revolution, highlighted vulnerabilities in physical security amid ISIS's sectarian targeting of Shiite institutions, with Iranian authorities subsequently convening security reviews to enhance perimeter defenses and access controls.^[105] In the cyber domain, the Majlis has faced intrusions exposing internal data, notably a February 2024 breach of parliamentary servers by unidentified hackers that leaked confidential documents related to election processes and regime strategies, prompting a temporary suspension of operations to mitigate further damage.^[106]^[107] This incident, attributed to opposition-aligned actors, revealed sensitive administrative details and underscored systemic weaknesses in digital infrastructure, leading to heightened cybersecurity protocols but also internal distrust, as evidenced by the regime's closure of affected systems.^[108] Such leaks have empirically delayed legislative deliberations, with sessions postponed amid investigations into compromised networks, exploiting the assembly's reliance on isolated, state-controlled IT environments vulnerable to external actors seeking to undermine governance legitimacy.^[109] These events reflect how adversaries, including Sunni extremist groups and dissident hackers, capitalize on the Majlis's centralized yet under-resourced security posture to amplify regime fractures without direct confrontation.

Controversies and Criticisms

Democratic Legitimacy and Veto Power Abuses

The Guardian Council's constitutional mandate to vet candidates for compatibility with Islamic principles and loyalty to the regime has systematically excluded reformists and moderates, undermining the Islamic Consultative Assembly's democratic legitimacy. In the 2021 presidential election, out of 592 registered candidates, the Council approved only seven, disqualifying prominent reformists and pragmatists to ensure hardline dominance. Similarly, ahead of the 2024 parliamentary elections, the Council rejected over 20 percent of incumbent lawmakers and a substantial number of aspirants, including conservatives like former speaker Ali Larijani, narrowing the field to regime-aligned figures and perpetuating one-party rule by osulgarayan (principled or hardline conservatives). This vetting, with six of the Council's twelve members directly appointed by the Supreme Leader, prioritizes theocratic conformity over electoral pluralism, as evidenced by the consistent barring of opposition voices that could challenge entrenched power structures.^[110]^[58]^[58] Such exclusions have manifested in historically low voter turnout, serving as an empirical indicator of perceived illegitimacy among the populace. The 2024 parliamentary elections recorded a mere 41 percent participation rate, including spoiled ballots—the lowest in the Islamic Republic's history—compared to higher engagement in pre-vetting universal suffrage systems elsewhere, where competition fosters genuine choice without clerical oversight. This boycott reflects causal links between restricted candidacy and public disaffection, as Iranians increasingly view elections as ritualistic affirmations of the status quo rather than mechanisms for representation, with turnout dipping amid post-2022 protests signaling broader rejection of the system's facade.^[62]^[62]^[111] The Council's veto authority extends beyond candidates to legislation, frequently overriding Majlis majorities in ways that expose the theocratic eclipse of popular will. Bills advancing economic reforms or social moderation have been struck down or forced into revisions for non-compliance with rigid interpretations of Sharia, as in repeated rejections of measures challenging state monopolies or clerical privileges, thereby nullifying assembly outputs despite electoral mandates. Claims of an "Islamic democracy" falter under this structure, where unelected guardians—half selected by the Leader—can annul laws and candidacies, subordinating empirical voter preferences to doctrinal fiat and rendering the assembly a subordinate body rather than a sovereign legislature. This dynamic, rooted in the 1979 Constitution's dual oversight, prioritizes regime preservation over representative governance, as corroborated by analyses of the system's exclusionary mechanics.^[112]^[112]^[113]

Allegations of Corruption, Inefficiency, and Regime Alignment

The Islamic Consultative Assembly has faced persistent allegations of corruption, with multiple scandals implicating members in embezzlement and financial misconduct. In November 2011, Iranian authorities arrested suspects in a $2.8 billion fraud case, described as the largest embezzlement scandal in the country's history, involving at least ten members of parliament who were linked to the scheme through connections to the primary suspect.^[114] Further probes in the 2010s revealed systemic graft, including a 2018 parliamentary debate where ministers and MPs exchanged accusations of bribery, blackmail, and embezzlement in public funds.^[115] In 2023, a lawmaker who disclosed a major financial corruption case within the Assembly reported being barred from speaking in sessions, highlighting efforts to suppress internal whistleblowing.^[116] These incidents underscore a pattern where parliamentary oversight fails to prevent or prosecute elite-level corruption effectively. Critics have pointed to the Assembly's inefficiency, particularly in legislative delays that exacerbate economic challenges. During periods of acute crisis, such as the 2010s sanctions-induced downturn, the body struggled with protracted debates and stalled bills on critical reforms, contributing to policy paralysis amid rising inflation and unemployment.^[117] For instance, subsidy restructuring efforts, vital for fiscal stability, faced repeated obstructions, reflecting a reluctance to enact measures that could alienate key constituencies despite public hardship.^[118] This inefficiency is compounded by the Assembly's alignment with the Supreme Leader's directives, often prioritizing regime loyalty over constituent needs; the body has functioned more as a rubber-stamp for velayat-e faqih authority than an independent check, as evidenced by its limited success in challenging executive or clerical vetoes on reform proposals.^[119] Disparities in compensation further fuel perceptions of self-interest. Leaked documents from 2024 revealed average monthly salaries for MPs exceeding 200 million Iranian tomans (approximately $4,000 at black-market rates), including allowances, while the national poverty line hovered around 10 million tomans per month for many households amid hyperinflation.^[120] Proposals for salary hikes, such as rumored 70% increases in 2017, provoked public outrage, contrasting sharply with stagnant wages for ordinary citizens.^[121] While the Assembly has occasionally pursued anti-corruption measures, such as a 2018 motion to establish a dedicated organization for oversight, these efforts appear selectively enforced, targeting political rivals rather than systemic issues, as corruption scandals continue to proliferate among regime insiders.^[122] In June 2025, a senior MP publicly criticized elite privileges following a cleric family scandal, yet such rebukes rarely lead to structural accountability.^[123] This selective approach reinforces views that the institution serves regime preservation over genuine reform.

Role in Human Rights Issues and Suppression of Dissent

The Islamic Consultative Assembly has enacted legislation reinforcing strict Islamic morality codes, including provisions in the penal code that criminalize behaviors deemed contrary to Sharia, such as apostasy, blasphemy, and public moral offenses, which enable severe punishments including flogging and execution.^[124] These laws, upheld and amended through parliamentary processes, contribute to a legal framework where dissent—often labeled as "enmity against God" or moharebeh—is prosecutable by death, with the Majlis rarely proposing reforms to limit such applications despite international scrutiny.^[125] Supporters within the Assembly argue these codes are indispensable for preserving Iran's Islamic identity and social order, framing them as direct implementations of constitutional mandates to align legislation with Islamic jurisprudence.^[126] In response to the 2022 protests triggered by Mahsa Amini's death in custody, the Majlis accelerated passage of the Chastity and Hijab Law in September 2024, which imposes fines, vehicle confiscations, business closures, and up to 15-year prison terms for hijab non-compliance or related activism, escalating enforcement mechanisms beyond prior regulations.^[127]^[128] The law's 74 articles expand surveillance and penalties, including for promoting "unveiling," and was defended by parliamentary conservatives as a security imperative to counter perceived cultural threats, echoing Supreme Leader Khamenei's portrayal of hijab observance as foundational to regime stability.^[129] Critics, including human rights organizations, contend this entrenches gender-based repression, violating rights to bodily autonomy and expression, with enforcement disproportionately targeting women and fueling cycles of protest and crackdown.^[130] The Assembly's ratification of penal provisions has facilitated Iran's high execution rates, with Amnesty International documenting over 1,000 executions in 2025 alone—predominantly for drug offenses, dissent-related charges, and moral crimes—marking the highest annual toll in decades and comprising 64% of global known executions in 2024.^[131]^[132] Post-2022 uprising, executions surged as a tool to deter opposition, with laws passed or sustained by the Majlis enabling rapid judicial processes that UN experts describe as weaponized against protesters, often bypassing fair trial standards.^[133] The Human Rights Council has repeatedly condemned these practices in resolutions, urging Iran to restrict capital punishment to intentional homicide and halt its use for suppressing dissent, though Majlis members seldom oppose Leader-endorsed security bills that broaden such powers.^[134] Iranian defenders counter that executions uphold divine justice and deter societal corruption, rejecting Western human rights frameworks as incompatible with Islamic sovereignty.^[135] This legislative alignment has causally reinforced institutional impunity, as evidenced by minimal internal pushback against bills expanding dissent-suppression tools, such as those targeting independent media and assembly.^[136]

Influence and Impact

Domestic Policy Achievements and Failures

The Islamic Consultative Assembly has enacted legislation aimed at economic rationalization, most notably the Targeted Subsidies Law approved in January 2010, which phased out broad subsidies on energy, bread, and other essentials, redirecting savings toward cash transfers to households and productive investments.^[137] This reform, implemented from December 2010, sought to curb fiscal waste—estimated at 20-25% of GDP prior to reform—and promote energy efficiency amid Iran's heavy reliance on subsidized fossil fuels.^[138] Initial outcomes included a shift in resource allocation, with partial gains in industrial productivity and reduced smuggling of cheap fuels, though these were undermined by subsequent inflationary pressures and external shocks.^[139] In infrastructure and development, the Majlis has periodically approved multi-year plans, such as elements of the Sixth Five-Year Development Plan (2016-2021), allocating funds for transport and urban projects, contributing to expansions in road networks and housing under programs like the Mehr Housing Plan, which delivered over 2 million units by 2018 despite quality criticisms.^[140] Wartime efforts during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) saw parliamentary backing for mobilization laws that facilitated domestic production ramps in defense and basic goods, sustaining supply lines through ideological incentives rather than market mechanisms.^[141] These measures reflect instances of legislative alignment with regime priorities, yielding short-term resilience but limited long-term scalability due to veto constraints and non-market distortions. Failures predominate in macroeconomic stability, with the Majlis's budgetary oversight failing to arrest chronic hyperinflation, which averaged over 30% annually from 2018-2025 and peaked at 45.3% in September 2025, eroding purchasing power and exacerbating inequality despite repeated fiscal laws.^[142] Youth unemployment, hovering at 22.8% in 2024 per World Bank data, reflects inadequate legislative responses to structural mismatches, including rigid labor laws and overemphasis on ideological sectors over private enterprise, leaving graduates underemployed amid a demographic bulge.^[143] Subsidy reform's cash handouts, while politically expedient, fueled demand-pull inflation without corresponding supply-side reforms, compounding post-2018 sanctions gridlock and revealing the Majlis's constrained autonomy under theocratic oversight, where ideological vetoes prioritize conformity over empirical efficacy.^[139] Overall, these outcomes underscore inconsistent results, with legislative initiatives often yielding partial efficiencies overshadowed by systemic inefficiencies and policy reversals.

Foreign Policy Involvement and Limitations

The Islamic Consultative Assembly possesses constitutional authority to ratify international treaties, protocols, contracts, and agreements, provided they receive subsequent approval from the Guardian Council to ensure compatibility with Islamic principles and the constitution.^[144] This role extends to reviewing and debating foreign policy matters through committees, such as those on national security and foreign affairs, where lawmakers conduct hearings on issues like nuclear negotiations and regional relations.^[145] For instance, on October 13, 2015, the Majlis approved a bill enabling implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with 161 votes in favor, 59 against, and 13 abstentions, following months of review after the deal's signing in July 2015.^[146] More recently, on May 21, 2025, the assembly ratified a strategic partnership treaty with Russia, emphasizing deepened military and economic ties amid ongoing Western sanctions.^[147] Despite these powers, the assembly's influence on foreign policy remains peripheral and subordinate to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who directs overall strategy through the Supreme National Security Council and holds veto authority over major decisions, including nuclear policy and proxy engagements.^[148]^[149] The Guardian Council's veto power further constrains parliamentary initiatives, frequently rejecting or amending bills perceived as overly conciliatory toward adversaries, as seen in historical overrides of legislation challenging isolationist doctrines. Dominant hardline factions within the Majlis, often aligned with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' worldview, prioritize confrontational measures—such as the 2017 anti-U.S. bill countering sanctions and the June 2025 legislation imposing harsher penalties for collaboration with "hostile" foreign entities—over diplomatic outreach, thereby reinforcing cycles of international isolation and sanctions.^[150]^[151] This alignment sustains regime support for regional proxies like Hezbollah and the Houthis, whose activities provoke retaliatory measures from the U.S. and allies, though direct Majlis funding or command of such groups falls under executive and Leader oversight.^[145] In practice, reformist-leaning parliaments have occasionally advanced limited diplomatic efforts, as during the JCPOA era under President Hassan Rouhani, but these face reversal amid factional shifts; post-2018 U.S. withdrawal, hardliner-dominated sessions scrutinized compliance and curtailed IAEA access, exemplifying how internal veto dynamics and Leader prioritization limit sustained engagement.^[146] Empirical patterns show the assembly's outputs rarely diverge from the Leader's hawkish baseline, contributing to persistent economic pressures from sanctions imposed since 1979, with over 1,500 U.S. designations by 2024 targeting proxy-linked entities and nuclear proliferation.^[152] Such constraints underscore the Majlis as a ratifier rather than initiator, with its debates serving more to legitimize executive actions than to independently shape global positioning.

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Qalibaf re-elected as Irans parliament speaker - Press TV
May 28, 2024 · Iran's parliament has re-elected Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf as its speaker for a one-year period. He was reinstated with 197 votes out of 287.Missing: Ghalibaf | Show results with:Ghalibaf
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Ghalibaf Re-Elected as Iran Parliament Speaker
Jun 11, 2025 · Iran Parliament, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, has re-elected Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf as Speaker, for the sixth consecutive year.
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Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf: Speaker of Iran's Parliament | UANI
From 1994-97, he was the head of the Khatam al-Anbia Construction Headquarters during the post-war reconstruction marked by the Guard Corps' expanded footprint ...
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Iran parliament speaker reelected for additional year
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has been elected as the speaker of the 12th parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran, securing his position for a one-year term.
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Understanding The Re-installation of Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf ...
May 28, 2024 · Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf was re-assigned as Speaker. According to the regime's parliamentary formalities, Ghalibaf secured 198 votes.
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Iran's Political System: The Case of Parliamentary Elections – ERI
The Majlis appears to have roles that are similar to the functions of an ordinary Parliament. Parliamentarians draft legislation, ratify international treaties ...<|separator|>
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Iranian parliament finalizes makeup of specialized commissions
Jun 30, 2024 · On May 30, the process of verifying the credentials of the representatives of the 12th Majlis was completed, paving the way for the election of ...Missing: formed date
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Islamic Consultative Assembly Facts for Kids
Oct 17, 2025 · The Islamic Consultative Assembly has the power to create laws for Iran. However, these laws must follow the country's main religion (Islam) and ...
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Iran's 2024 elections - Commons Library
Mar 26, 2024 · Iranians went to the polls in March. How might the election results affect Iranian politics and political stability? Tehran, city in Iran.Missing: districts apportionment
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Iran's Majlis; Rules and powers - Mehr News Agency
Feb 24, 2024 · The functions of the legislature are exercised through Iran's parliament (better known as Majlis), consisting of 290 elected representatives of the people.
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Voting Machines Operating Flawlessly: Iran ICT Minister
May 10, 2024 · TEHRAN (Tasnim) – The electronic voting machines used in the ongoing run-off parliamentary election across Iran are in operation faultlessly ...
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Ghalibaf Re-Elected as Speaker in Newly Inaugurated Iranian ...
May 29, 2024 · Iranian MPs re-elected Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf as the parliament (Majlis) speaker a day after the inauguration of the new convocation of the parliament.
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Conservatives dominate Iran's parliament, assembly elections
Mar 2, 2024 · Preliminary indications put voter turnout at around 40 percent, the lowest levels since the country's 1979 revolution.
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Iran (Islamic Republic of) - Country Fact Sheet | UN Women Data Hub
However, work still needs to be done in Iran (Islamic Republic of) to achieve gender equality. As of February 2024, only 5.6% of seats in parliament were held ...<|separator|>
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MPs representing the religious minorities in Iran's Parliament
Mar 6, 2024 · According to Article 64 of the Constitution, each religious minority sect is allowed to elect one person to the parliament. Ara Shaverdian, who ...
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Jan 30, 2020 · Since the 1979 revolution, Iran's politics have changed dramatically from a one-party system heavily dominated by clerics to a multi-party ...Missing: shifts | Show results with:shifts
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parliamentary elections Majlis Shoraye Eslami, 2000
IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF): Results of parliamentary elections held in Majlis Shoraye Eslami, 2000.
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MERIA: Iran's 2000 Elections - Columbia International Affairs Online
The February 2000 Iranian parliamentary elections marked a major turning point in the battle between reformist and conservative elements in the Islamic ...
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[PDF] Iran's 2008 Majlis Elections: - The Game of Elite Competition
Given the extent of disqualification of reformist candidates, the issue in these elections was always how well the reformists and the more pragmatic.
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Factbox: The outcome of Iran's 2020 parliamentary elections
Feb 26, 2020 · The Islamic Republic of Iran held its eleventh parliamentary elections on February 21. IranSource previously ran a factbox that showed why ...
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BAHĀRESTĀN (2) - Encyclopaedia Iranica
BAHĀRESTĀN, the name of a garden, public square, and complex of buildings in central Tehran, the main part of which presently forms the headquarters of an ...Missing: Majlis architecture expansions
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History Camera - Baharestan
In 1871 the main plan of Baharestan building was drawn and the Iranian architects ... Except the event of cannonading the Majlis, this building had been ...Missing: complex expansions
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(PDF) From Negarestan to Baharestan A Masterpiece of Iranian ...
The change in the use of the Baharestan building from a house (internal) to a residence (ceremonies) and a council (the house of the nation) over a short ...
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KUNA : IRAN''S NEW MAJLIS BUILDING INAUGURATED - 13/03/2001
Mar 13, 2001 · Iran's new parliament building was inaugurated in a special ceremony Tuesday in the presence of senior officials.Missing: capacity | Show results with:capacity
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New Building of Islamic Consultative Assembly – Tehran
New Building of Islamic Consultative Assembly with an area of 25,500 m2 together with adjacent buildings include representative office, commission building and ...Missing: capacity | Show results with:capacity
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Iranian military blames Saudis after 12 killed in Tehran terrorist attack
Jun 7, 2017 · Isis claimed responsibility for the attacks, publishing a brief video that purported to show the assailants inside the parliament. Reza ...
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Gunmen attack Iran's parliament, Khomeini shrine | ISIL/ISIS News
Jun 7, 2017 · News|ISIL/ISIS. Gunmen attack Iran's parliament, Khomeini shrine. At least 13 dead in attacks on parliament and Mausoleum of Ayatollah ...
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Terrorist operation in Majlis ends, 4 terrorists killed - IRNA English
Jun 7, 2017 · Parliament operation ended by security forces who killed three of the terrorists, one of them had detonated himself before. Meanwhile, according ...
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Security sessions held to study Majlis terror attack - Tehran Times
Jun 15, 2017 · TEHRAN – Security sessions are being held to review last week's terror attack on Majlis administrative building and adopt security ...
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Iranian Parliament Suspended Amid Controversial Document Leak
Feb 28, 2024 · In a startling turn of events, the Iranian regime has temporarily shut down the Majlis (parliament) following the leak of confidential ...<|separator|>
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Parliamentary Server's Breach Was Final Nail to Iran Sham ...
Feb 28, 2024 · Since 1989, following Khomeini's death, the Iranian regime has orchestrated eight presidential elections and eight parliamentary elections.
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Hacktivist Group Breaches Iranian Judiciary Servers | Iran International
Feb 20, 2024 · This week, documents were leaked following the hack of the Iranian parliament's media arm, revealing a wide range of Tehran's strategies to ...
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Iran's regime can't even trust its own parliament |
Feb 26, 2024 · All members of the Majlis (parliament) are people who for more than four decades have actively participated in the regime's crimes, theft, ...Missing: incidents | Show results with:incidents
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Iran's Guardian Council disqualifies most presidential hopefuls
May 25, 2021 · Seven candidates have been allowed to run in Iran's presidential elections on June 18, and none of them is a prominent reformist or pragmatist.
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Iran election seen as legitimacy test for rulers as dissent grows
Feb 29, 2024 · Iran holds a parliamentary election on Friday seen as a test of the clerical establishment's popularity at a time of growing dissent over an ...
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Iran's electoral facade | Chatham House – International Affairs Think ...
Mar 4, 2024 · Iran's parliamentary and Assembly of Experts election held on 1 March should not be seen as a democratic exercise where people express their will at the ballot ...Missing: urban rural imbalance gerrymandering
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The 2024 Election Cycle Starts in Iran | The Washington Institute
Aug 18, 2023 · Upcoming votes pose a dilemma for the Supreme Leader: should he aggressively disqualify candidates and further alienate the public, ...
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Ten Iranian MPs involved in recent embezzlement case
Nov 18, 2011 · Recently, Iran has arrested 35 suspects regarding a $2.8 billion fraud scandal, which is described as Iran's biggest case of embezzlement ever.
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Minister, MPs Trade Charges of Corruption, Blackmail During ...
Aug 9, 2018 · Debates at the Iranian parliament (Majles) on Wednesday August 8 shed light on a web of alleged corruption, blackmailing, embezzlement, bribery and mishandling ...Missing: 2010s | Show results with:2010s
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Lawmaker Who Disclosed Corruption Case Is 'Silenced' At Parliament
May 29, 2023 · An Iranian lawmaker who has disclosed a major case of financial corruption at the parliament says he has been barred from speaking during ...
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Iran's biggest financial scam weakens Ahmadinejad - Reuters
Oct 6, 2011 · The $2.6 billion scam has taken on political dimensions as some hardline politicians have linked the main suspect in the fraud to a so-called " ...Missing: Majlis | Show results with:Majlis
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[PDF] Energy subsidies have been a core policy in many parts of the world ...
The Iran model of reforming the system of energy subsidies is a bold attempt at pursuing the twin objectives of enhancing economic efficiency and social justice ...
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Power Dynamics Under the Iranian Constitution
Jan 21, 2023 · The upshot is that although nominal legislative power may lie with the Consultative Assembly, this power is severely constrained by the Guardian ...Missing: structure | Show results with:structure
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Leaked Documents Expose Iranian MPs' Lucrative Salaries Amidst ...
Feb 16, 2024 · According to this table, the average salaries received by representatives in the month of Khordad exceeded 200 million tomans. The highest ...
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Iranians furious over rumors of 70% increase in MP salaries
Dec 21, 2017 · In reaction to the ballyhoo, parliament Speaker Ali Larijani said Dec. 19, “They say that the salary of parliament members has increased by 70%.
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Iranian MPs Draft Motion to Set Up Anti-Corruption Organization
Aug 11, 2018 · Once the Anti-Corruption Organization is established, he said, all Iranian bodies, including banks and municipalities, will have to submit their ...
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Senior MP bashes elite privilege in Iran after cleric family scandal
Jun 11, 2025 · A senior Iranian lawmaker has issued a rare and sharply worded rebuke of the country's entrenched corruption and perceived cronyism.
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Codifying Repression: An Assessment of Iran's New Penal Code
Aug 28, 2012 · This report says that many problematic provisions of the current penal code remain unaddressed in the proposed amendments.
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2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iran
To “safeguard” Islamic ordinances and to ensure legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament) is compatible with Islam, a Guardian ...
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The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran
The President must obtain, for the Council of Ministers, after being formed and before all other business, a vote of confidence from the Assembly. During his ...
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Iran: New Hijab Law Adds Restrictions and Punishments
Oct 14, 2024 · These legal articles also drastically increase penalties for activism against compulsory hijab (article 36), including long-term imprisonment.<|control11|><|separator|>
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Iran's Parliament Passes Strict 'Chastity and Hijab' Law - IranWire
Dec 2, 2024 · The Islamic Republic's Parliament has officially passed the "Chastity and Hijab" law, a 74-article piece of legislation that imposes sev ...
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The Islamic Republic of Iran's Chastity and Hijab Law and the ...
Dec 14, 2024 · A key element includes the compulsory hijab for women and gender segregation in public. This social order distinctly diverges from Western norms.<|separator|>
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Iran Wages War Against Women with Draconian New Hijab Law
Dec 13, 2024 · “Iran's hijab law is not only an extreme violation of women's rights, it will also create the conditions for grave violence against women,” ...Missing: Majlis | Show results with:Majlis
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Iran: Over 1,000 people executed as authorities step up horrifying ...
Sep 26, 2025 · Iranian authorities have executed over 1000 people thus far in 2025, the highest number of yearly executions in Iran that the organization ...
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Death sentences and executions in 2024 - Amnesty International
Apr 8, 2025 · This report covers the judicial use of the death penalty for the period January to December 2024. Amnesty International's monitoring shows an increase by 32% ...
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UN experts appalled by unprecedented execution spree in Iran with ...
Sep 29, 2025 · International law restricts capital punishment to only the 'most serious crimes'— interpreted as intentional murder. “Drug offences do not meet ...
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Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic ...
In its resolution S35/1, on the deteriorating situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Human Rights Council on 24 November 2022 ...
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The Islamic Republic is mobilizing all its forces against unveiled ...
Apr 20, 2023 · In its latest statement on March 30, the Interior Ministry declared hijab as an unquestionable Sharia necessity and one of the fundamental and ...
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Iranian Parliament Passes Repressive Law Targeting Dissent,
Jul 3, 2025 · The primary objective of these laws is to create an atmosphere of fear, preventing protests, the growth of independent media networks, and the ...Missing: Consultative Assembly morality<|separator|>
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[PDF] Iran–The Chronicles of the Subsidy Reform
Iran increased energy and agricultural prices up to 20 times on December 18, 2010, reducing implicit energy subsidies. This paper reviews the reform's planning ...Missing: outcomes | Show results with:outcomes
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The Politics of Subsidy Reform in Iran - MERIP
Of the revenue gained from the lessening of subsidy levels, the state would keep 20 percent, ostensibly compensating for increased costs in the public sector.
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Iran's Subsidy Reform from Promise to Disappointment
Iran's subsidy reform failed due to high cash transfers causing inflation and international sanctions causing oil export decline and economic crisis.Missing: outcomes | Show results with:outcomes
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Iran: Subsidy Reform amid Regional Turmoil - Brookings Institution
Mar 3, 2011 · On December 19, 2010, the government ended the decades-long subsidy program for bread and energy products like gasoline, and replaced it with ...Missing: outcomes | Show results with:outcomes
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The Organization for the Mobilization of the Oppressed - IranWire
Apr 9, 2019 · As a subunit of the IRGC, the Basij began its operations in recruitment, training and transporting fighters to the front during the 1980-88 Iran ...
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Iran Inflation Rate - Trading Economics
Inflation Rate in Iran increased to 45.30 percent in September from 42.40 percent in August of 2025. Inflation Rate in Iran averaged 16.58 percent from 1957 ...Missing: Majlis | Show results with:Majlis
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Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24 ...
Share of youth not in education, employment or training, male (% of male ... Iran, Islamic Rep. 2024. 22.8. Iraq. 2024. 32.1. Ireland. 2024. 11.1. Isle of Man.
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The Ratification and Status of the International Treaties in the Legal ...
Under the Constitution of Iran all international treaties should all be ratified by the Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament) and the Guardian Council; ...Missing: policy | Show results with:policy
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How Can Majles Influence Iran's Foreign Policy? - دیپلماسی ایرانی
Jun 30, 2020 · Iran's parliament, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, enjoys a wide range of powers in both internal and foreign affairs enshrined in the ...
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The P5+1 and Iran Nuclear Deal Alert, October 15
Oct 15, 2015 · Two days later, on Oct. 13, the Majlis voted in favor of the detailed bill approving the nuclear deal. The bill passed with 161 votes in favor, ...
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Iranian Parliament ratifies strategic partnership treaty with Russia
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Iran's supreme leader sets its hardline foreign policies - The Guardian
May 21, 2024 · Foreign policy in Iran – including on the key nuclear issue – is set by the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, and the supreme national security council.Missing: limitations | Show results with:limitations
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Can Iran's New President Change the Regime's Confrontational ...
Jul 9, 2024 · Iran's system empowers the supreme leader, and this is especially true in foreign policy. The president's official powers are largely confined ...
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Iranian Foreign Ministry, Parliament agree on anti-U.S. bill
Jul 29, 2017 · TEHRAN – On Saturday, Iran's parliament (Majlis) and Foreign Ministry agreed unanimously on a draft bill to counter “the U.S. support for ...
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Iranian parliament passes bill imposing harsher penalties for ...
Jun 23, 2025 · Iran's parliament unanimously approved legislation on June 23 imposing stricter penalties for collaboration with hostile foreign governments and forces.Missing: statistics | Show results with:statistics
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Iran's Multifaceted Foreign Policy
... veto power over all decisions made by the Majlis. Another body, the Expediency Council, arbitrates between the Majlis and the Guardian Council, and consults ...Missing: bills | Show results with:bills