Kerner Commission
![President Lyndon Baines Johnson is sitting with three committee members at a table in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Behind them, nine more committee members are standing, two of them only partially visible.](./assets/President_Lyndon_Baines_Johnson_with_some_members_of_the_National_Advisory_Commission_on_Civil_Disorders_Kerner_Commission The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, commonly known as the Kerner Commission, was an 11-member panel appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson via Executive Order 11365 on July 27, 1967, to investigate the causes, events, and prevention of the extensive urban riots that erupted across more than 150 American cities that summer, resulting in over 100 deaths, thousands of injuries, and widespread property damage.[1][2] Chaired by Illinois Governor Otto Kerner Jr. and including figures such as Senators Edward Brooke and Abraham Ribicoff, New York Mayor John Lindsay, and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, the commission conducted extensive hearings, surveys, and analyses over seven months.[1][3] Its 426-page report, released on February 29, 1968, concluded that the nation was "moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal," primarily due to persistent white racism, institutional discrimination in housing, employment, education, and policing, and the resulting buildup of black frustration and alienation rather than inherent criminality or cultural pathologies among rioters.[4][5] The document rejected explanations attributing the violence to communist agitators or a criminal underclass, instead emphasizing systemic failures of white society to integrate African Americans, and recommended expansive federal programs for job creation, urban renewal, welfare reform, and community policing to avert further escalation.[4][6] Though it became a bestseller with over two million copies sold and shaped national conversations on racial inequality, the report provoked controversy for its indictment of mainstream institutions—including media and Johnson's own Great Society initiatives—and for downplaying empirical evidence of riot participation by employed individuals engaging in opportunistic looting and arson, which suggested breakdowns in social norms and law enforcement as proximate causes over distant structural ones.[7][8] Johnson publicly distanced himself from its findings, viewing them as a rebuke to his administration, and few of its costly recommendations were implemented amid fiscal constraints and the 1968 election.[9] In retrospect, the report's apocalyptic prognosis proved overstated, as subsequent decades witnessed substantial black socioeconomic gains—including a halving of the poverty rate from 34% in 1968 to around 19% by the 2010s, rising median household incomes, expanded college enrollment, and declining segregation—driven largely by civil rights legislation, economic expansion, and reduced overt discrimination rather than the welfare expansions it advocated, which some analyses link to unintended family structure disruptions.[10][8] Critics, drawing on later data, argue the commission's causal emphasis on external racism neglected internal community factors like educational underperformance and crime rates, contributing to a narrative that prioritized victimhood over agency and influenced policies with mixed long-term efficacy.[8][11]Historical Context
The 1960s Urban Riots
The urban riots of the 1960s in the United States primarily affected major cities with large African American populations, erupting in predominantly black neighborhoods and involving widespread arson, looting, and confrontations with police. These disturbances, often triggered by incidents of perceived police misconduct, escalated into multi-day disorders characterized by opportunistic violence rather than coordinated protest. Between 1965 and 1968, over 300 such incidents occurred, with the peak in the "Long Hot Summer" of 1967 seeing riots in approximately 127 cities, resulting in dozens of deaths, thousands of injuries, and hundreds of millions in property damage nationwide.[12] The Watts riot in Los Angeles, California, from August 11 to 17, 1965, marked a significant escalation, ignited by the arrest of Marquette Frye for drunk driving and subsequent clashes between police and onlookers. Over six days, the violence spread across a 50-square-mile area, involving an estimated 35,000 participants in acts including the burning of over 1,000 vehicles and structures; it resulted in 34 deaths (33 black and 1 white, mostly from gunfire), 1,032 injuries, 3,438 arrests, and more than $40 million in property damage.[13] In 1967, the unrest intensified with the Newark riot from July 12 to 17, sparked by the arrest and alleged beating of black cab driver John Smith by white police officers, leading to five days of chaos that included sniper fire, looting of over 200 stores, and arson of hundreds of buildings. The disorder claimed 26 lives (21 black and 5 white), injured over 700 people, prompted 1,500 arrests, and caused at least $10 million in damages, requiring deployment of 4,000 National Guard troops.[14] The Detroit riot, from July 23 to 28, 1967—the deadliest of the era—began with a police raid on an unlicensed after-hours bar celebrating returning black veterans' return, quickly devolving into widespread pillaging, firebombing (over 1,600 fires set), and armed clashes across 12 square miles. It produced 43 deaths (33 black and 10 white), 1,189 injuries, more than 7,200 arrests, and destruction of over 2,000 buildings with estimated damages exceeding $132 million, necessitating federal troops and marking the costliest urban upheaval up to that point.[15][16]Preceding Social and Economic Conditions
In the years leading up to the mid-1960s urban riots, African American communities in northern and western cities faced stark economic disparities compared to white Americans. Unemployment rates for blacks were consistently double those for whites, standing at 10.9% for blacks versus 5.0% for whites in 1963, with black workers earning on average half as much as their white counterparts. Poverty afflicted over half of black Americans in 1963 (51%), compared to 15% of whites, and by 1967, approximately 33.9% of black families lived below the poverty line versus 11% of all U.S. families. These gaps persisted despite post-World War II economic growth, exacerbated by deindustrialization in urban areas and limited access to skilled jobs, which concentrated black labor in low-wage sectors.[17][18][19] Social conditions were marked by deteriorating family structures, as highlighted in the 1965 Moynihan Report, which documented a rising proportion of black families headed by single females—reaching 25% of black households by the mid-1960s—due to high rates of divorce, separation, desertion, and out-of-wedlock births. This "tangle of pathology," centered on family weakness, contributed to intergenerational poverty and welfare dependency, with the report arguing that urban ghetto family disintegration predated and perpetuated economic woes rather than stemming solely from them. Concurrently, violent crime rates in U.S. cities surged, increasing 126% between 1960 and 1970, fostering environments of insecurity in black neighborhoods amid these familial strains.[20][21][22] The Great Migration of over 6 million African Americans from the rural South to northern cities between 1910 and 1970 intensified urban overcrowding and segregation, as migrants encountered housing discrimination through practices like redlining, where federal policies and private lenders systematically denied loans to black areas, confining residents to deteriorating ghettos. By the 1960s, this resulted in hyper-segregated urban enclaves with substandard housing, limited mobility, and heightened exposure to slum conditions, despite legal challenges to discrimination. These factors compounded economic isolation, as black families were largely excluded from federally subsidized homeownership programs that benefited whites, perpetuating wealth gaps and residential instability.[23][24][25]Formation and Operations
Establishment and Mandate
The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, known as the Kerner Commission after its chairman Illinois Governor Otto Kerner Jr., was established by President Lyndon B. Johnson through Executive Order 11365 signed on July 29, 1967.[1] This action followed a series of urban disturbances during the summer of 1967, including major riots in Newark, New Jersey, from July 12 to 17 and in Detroit, Michigan, from July 23 to August 1, which resulted in over 100 deaths, thousands of injuries, and widespread property damage.[26] Johnson emphasized the need to confront the violence disrupting civil peace, stating that no society could tolerate such massive unrest, and directed the commission to conduct an urgent yet thorough inquiry unbound by preconceptions.[26] The commission's mandate, as outlined in the executive order, required it to investigate the origins and causes of the recent major civil disorders in American cities, including the role of organizations inciting violence.[1] It was tasked with developing programs and procedures to avert future disorders or improve their containment, such as enhanced communication, training, and coordination among authorities.[1] Additionally, the commission was to appraise the roles and capabilities of local, state, and federal agencies in managing disorders and address other related issues as directed by the President.[1] Johnson framed the core questions for the commission as: What happened? Why did it happen? And what can be done to prevent it from happening again?[26] The order specified an interim report by March 1, 1968, and a final report within one year, after which the commission would terminate.[1]Membership and Advisory Panels
The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders comprised 11 members appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson, chaired by Illinois Governor Otto Kerner and with New York City Mayor John V. Lindsay serving as vice chairman.[27] The membership included bipartisan representation from Congress, with Democratic Senator Fred R. Harris of Oklahoma and Republican Senator Edward W. Brooke of Massachusetts; House members James C. Corman (Democrat, California) and William M. McCulloch (Republican, Ohio); labor leader I. W. Abel, president of the United Steelworkers of America; business executive Charles B. Thornton, chairman and CEO of Litton Industries; civil rights advocate Roy Wilkins, executive director of the NAACP; Katherine G. Peden, former Kentucky Commissioner of Commerce; Herbert Jenkins, Atlanta chief of police; and attorney Louis B. Heilbron of San Francisco.[27] This composition reflected a mix of political, business, labor, civil rights, and law enforcement perspectives.[28]| Role | Name | Position/Affiliation |
|---|---|---|
| Chairman | Otto Kerner | Governor of Illinois |
| Vice Chairman | John V. Lindsay | Mayor of New York City |
| Member | Fred R. Harris | U.S. Senator, Oklahoma |
| Member | Edward W. Brooke | U.S. Senator, Massachusetts |
| Member | James C. Corman | U.S. Representative, California |
| Member | William M. McCulloch | U.S. Representative, Ohio |
| Member | I. W. Abel | President, United Steelworkers of America |
| Member | Charles B. Thornton | Chairman and CEO, Litton Industries |
| Member | Roy Wilkins | Executive Director, NAACP |
| Member | Katherine G. Peden | Former Commissioner of Commerce, Kentucky |
| Member | Herbert Jenkins | Chief of Police, Atlanta |
| Member | Louis B. Heilbron | Attorney, San Francisco |
Investigative Methods and Data Collection
The Commission employed a multifaceted investigative approach, including deployment of field teams, closed hearings, extensive surveys and interviews, and analysis of existing records from government agencies. Field teams, typically consisting of six members, were sent to 23 cities affected by disorders, conducting intensive studies in 10 of them—such as Detroit, Newark, and Watts—and reconnaissance surveys in 20 cities to document riot patterns, participant profiles, grievances, and underlying conditions.[27][29] These teams interviewed over 1,200 eyewitnesses using structured questionnaires, compiled chronologies of events, and assessed tension factors like police-community relations and socioeconomic indicators.[27] Commissioners themselves visited eight cities to supplement these efforts with direct observations.[27] Hearings formed a core component, with 20 days of closed sessions held from August to November 1967, featuring testimony from over 130 witnesses that generated a 3,900-page transcript and 1,500 pages of depositions from 90 individuals.[27][28] Witnesses included federal and local officials, military experts, university scholars, business leaders, civil rights activists like Martin Luther King Jr., law enforcement figures such as J. Edgar Hoover, ghetto residents, and black militants, providing insights into urban violence triggers, government responses, and community dynamics.[27][30] Data collection encompassed large-scale surveys and empirical analyses. Attitude surveys targeted Negro and white residents in 15 cities, community leaders, and probability samples in Detroit and Newark to distinguish riot participants, counter-rioters, and non-involved bystanders; additional polls covered 30 police departments' capabilities and insurance perceptions among 1,500 homeowners and 1,500 businessmen in six cities.[27] The Commission analyzed arrest records from 22 cities, encompassing characteristics of approximately 13,000 individuals charged in connection with the disorders, alongside socioeconomic data from the U.S. Census Bureau, Department of Labor statistics, police and fire logs, National Guard after-action reports, and FBI documents.[27] Specialized studies examined media coverage (e.g., 955 television sequences and 3,779 newspaper articles), housing conditions from 1960 Census data, employment programs, and federal funding impacts, drawing on prior reports like the McCone Commission on Watts.[27] This quantitative foundation informed profiles of rioters, such as 61% under age 24 and 20% unemployed in Detroit samples.[27]Core Findings and Analysis
Attributed Causes of the Riots
The Kerner Commission attributed the 1967 urban riots primarily to "white racism," which it described as "essentially responsible for the explosive mixture which has been accumulating in our cities since the end of World War II."[27] This racism manifested in pervasive discrimination and segregation across key societal domains, fostering a deepening divide that threatened to produce "two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal."[31] The Commission emphasized that such systemic barriers, rather than isolated incidents, created long-term grievances among Negro communities, with civil disorders erupting when accumulated tensions met precipitating events like police actions.[32] Police practices ranked as the most frequently cited grievance, symbolizing "white power, white racism, and white repression" to many in affected neighborhoods.[27] The report documented widespread perceptions of brutality, excessive force, and a "double standard" of justice, where Negro suspects faced harsher treatment than whites; in 12 of 24 surveyed disorders, police incidents served as the immediate trigger.[32] In cities like Detroit and Newark, rumors of police shootings or abusive arrests rapidly escalated tensions, exacerbated by inadequate complaint mechanisms and delayed responses.[27] Economic disparities were identified as another core factor, with Negro unemployment rates roughly double those of whites (8.2% versus 3.4% in 1967) and nonwhite poverty affecting 40.6% of the population in 1966.[27] The Commission linked these conditions to segregation limiting access to skilled jobs and education, trapping residents in underemployment and low-wage unskilled labor—Negroes earned about 70% of white incomes—while merchants in ghettos exploited consumers through higher prices.[32] In specific locales, such as Tampa, over 55% of Negro men held unskilled positions, with more than half of families earning under $3,000 annually.[27] Additional grievances included substandard housing (e.g., 25% of Detroit's 12th Street area deemed unfit), inferior municipal services like infrequent garbage collection in Atlanta, and exclusion from political decision-making, which bred a sense of powerlessness.[27] Frustrated expectations from civil rights gains, combined with summer heat, youth concentrations on streets, and unchecked rumors (present in over 65% of disorders), further primed volatile conditions.[27] The report also critiqued media for inadequate coverage of underlying racial issues, often prioritizing sensationalism over analysis.[27] Overall, these intertwined factors, rooted in historical discrimination, were seen as eroding hope and propelling disorders in over 150 instances across 1967.[31]Key Empirical Observations from Investigations
The investigations of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders documented 164 civil disorders occurring in 128 cities during the first nine months of 1967, with over 150 cities affected overall that year. These were categorized by severity: eight major disorders (characterized by extensive fires, looting, sniping, and duration exceeding two days, often requiring National Guard or federal intervention); 33 serious disorders (involving isolated looting and fires lasting one to two days); and 123 minor disorders (limited in scope and duration, handled by local police). Major incidents were concentrated in northern and midwestern cities with significant black populations, such as Detroit, Newark, and Cincinnati, primarily erupting in ghetto areas.[27] Casualties were disproportionately concentrated in the largest events, with 83 deaths and 1,897 injuries reported across 75 disorders in 67 cities, over half of both occurring in Newark and Detroit alone. In Detroit, 43 individuals were killed (33 black, 10 white) and 324 injured, while Newark recorded 23 to 26 deaths (mostly black civilians) and 725 injuries. Approximately 10% of deaths and 36% of injuries involved public employees, primarily law enforcement and firefighters, with the majority of civilian casualties among black residents. Property damage estimates varied widely due to initial overreporting, totaling between $66.7 million and $664.9 million nationally, though insured losses were under $75 million; Detroit's damage ranged from $22 million to $50 million (initially estimated at $200–500 million), and Newark's from $10.2 million to $25 million, much of it from inventory losses in commercial areas.[27] Arrest figures reached 16,389 across surveyed disorders, with 83% of arrestees being black and 15% white; nearly 53% were aged 15–24, and 81% were 15–35 years old. In Detroit, 7,200–7,231 arrests included 52.5% in the 15–24 age group and 80.8% in the 15–35 range, with 63% male. Participant profiles from surveys and arrest data indicated typical involvement by young black males who were high school dropouts, underemployed or unemployed (over 20% unemployed), and long-term residents of the affected cities; for instance, about 11% of Detroit's riot-area residents and 45% of Newark's black males aged 15–35 self-identified as participants. Triggers were empirically linked to police actions in 12 of 24 analyzed disorders (e.g., arrests or rumored brutality), with rumors exacerbating tensions in over 65% of cases, often amid accumulated grievances like unemployment rates for black youth (26.5% for ages 16–19 versus 3.8% nationally).[27]| Category | National Totals (1967 Disorders) | Key Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Disorders | 164 in 128 cities | 8 major, 33 serious, 123 minor; peaked in July |
| Deaths | 83 | >80% in Newark/Detroit; majority black civilians |
| Injuries | 1,897 | >50% in Newark/Detroit; includes law enforcement |
| Arrests | 16,389 | 83% black, 53% aged 15–24; logistical strains noted |
| Property Damage | $66.7M–$664.9M (estimates) | Insured < $75M; focused on commercial/inventory losses in ghettos |